Rewiring Critical Mineral Supply Chains: The Canada–Japan–France Partnership – Analysis

May 5, 2026 
Observer Research Foundation
By Pratnashree Basu

For much of the past decade, critical mineral diplomacy was framed through a binary lens: either align with China—the dominant player in extraction, refining, and processing—or rally behind US-led friendshoring efforts. That binary is now breaking down. A new triangular alignment between Canada, Japan, and France is beginning to take shape within the G7, driven by a shared recognition that overdependence on both Beijing’s mineral dominance and Washington’s increasingly transactional industrial policy creates strategic vulnerabilities. What is emerging is not an anti-American coalition, nor an anti-China bloc in the conventional sense; rather, it is a middle-power effort to build supply chain resilience through strategic autonomy.

The roots of this alignment lie in the earlier logic of Canada–Japan critical mineral cooperation. Japan needed reliable upstream access to minerals such as lithium, graphite, cobalt, nickel, and rare earths to sustain its automotive, battery, and semiconductor sectors. Canada, meanwhile, possessed abundant reserves but required capital, technology, and long-term buyers to make projects commercially viable. The partnership made strategic sense: Japan could reduce its dependence on Chinese mineral inputs, while Canada could move beyond being merely a raw material exporter and become embedded in higher-value clean technology supply chains.

This logic became visible in concrete projects. Canada’s Nouveau Monde Graphite (NMG) Matawinie Mine in Quebec emerged as one of the most prominent examples of bilateral cooperation. The project secured support from Japanese firms, including Panasonic Energy and Mitsui & Co., alongside Canadian state-backed financing mechanisms. The goal was clear: to create one of North America’s largest integrated graphite facilities to support battery manufacturing while reducing dependence on Chinese graphite refining. Ottawa explicitly positioned the project as part of broader G7 supply chain diversification efforts.

But by 2025–26, however, the strategic conversation had shifted. The challenge was no longer simply dependence on China; it was also the growing uncertainty surrounding US industrial policy. The return of more protectionist trade measures in Washington, combined with efforts to create a preferential, US-led minerals bloc, generated unease among allies. In February 2026, the United States proposed a preferential trade arrangement for critical minerals among select partners. Yet rather than uniformly falling in line, Canada, Japan, and France began exploring parallel mechanisms that would provide greater policy flexibility and strategic room for manoeuvre.

This is where France entered the equation in a significant way. Unlike Canada, France does not possess substantial upstream reserves. However, due to its processing capabilities, industrial financing capacity, and growing drive to build European infrastructure for rare-earth refining, it plays a crucial midstream role. In March 2026, Japan and France signed a new rare-earth cooperation roadmap during French President Emmanuel Macron’s visit to Tokyo. The agreement focused specifically on heavy rare earths such as dysprosium and terbium—materials essential for EV motors, semiconductors, and defence technologies. Crucially, Japan committed to sourcing nearly 20 percent of future demand from France-backed refining projects such as Caremag.

Given its upstream scale, Canada’s contribution to this trilateral alignment is arguably the most significant. Ottawa has made a concerted effort to position itself as the cornerstone of a broader associated minerals ecosystem. Under the G7 Critical Minerals Action Plan launched during Canada’s 2025 G7 presidency in Kananaskis, Ottawa pushed for “standards-based markets,” financing mechanisms, and diversified offtake agreements. By October 2025, Canada had announced 26 investments and partnerships with nine countries, including Japan and France, unlocking billions of dollars in mining and refining investments.

More significantly, Canada began advocating what officials described as a “buyers’ club” model. This marked an important shift in critical mineral diplomacy. Rather than allowing China to dominate pricing or Washington to shape market architecture, Canada proposed coordinated purchasing among trusted partners to guarantee demand for non-Chinese suppliers. Such a mechanism would help address a central challenge in critical minerals markets: Chinese suppliers often undercut prices, rendering alternative mining projects commercially unviable.

Japan strongly backed this approach because it aligns with Tokyo’s long-standing economic security doctrine. Since China’s 2010 rare-earth restrictions on Japan following the Senkaku/Diaoyu crisis, Tokyo has pursued aggressive supply diversification. Its dependence on Chinese rare earths has reportedly fallen from nearly 90 percent to around 60 percent through investments in Australia and Southeast Asia, recycling technologies, and now partnerships with Canada and France. The trilateral framework therefore represents an extension of Japan’s broader de-risking strategy rather than a sudden policy shift.

France’s role is equally strategic. As the 2026 G7 chair, Paris has increasingly framed critical minerals as a question of European strategic sovereignty. French policymakers contend that relying solely on American industrial frameworks risks substituting one dependency for another. This explains why France opposes unilateral measures and places strong emphasis on multilateral collaboration. French officials have repeatedly called for trust-based coordination rather than fragmented national industrial policies.

What makes this trilateral alignment particularly significant is that it reflects the rise of minilateralism within the G7 itself. Traditionally, the G7 functioned through broad consensus led by Washington. Today, smaller coalitions are forming within the grouping to pursue narrower strategic goals. Canada, Japan, and France are effectively creating a sub-group focused on mineral resilience, industrial coordination, and supply chain diversification.

This alignment has broader Indo-Pacific implications. Japan views critical minerals as central to maintaining technological competitiveness vis-à-vis China. Canada increasingly sees mineral diplomacy as a core pillar of its Indo-Pacific strategy. France, with territories and strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific, considers mineral security an integral part of its wider regional role. Their convergence reflects how resource geopolitics is becoming embedded within broader Indo-Pacific strategic competition.

Yet challenges remain. Mining projects face environmental opposition, Indigenous rights concerns, long permitting timelines, and high costs. Processing capacity remains heavily concentrated in China. Even among allies, industrial interests often diverge. The United States remains too large a player to ignore.


Still, the broader trend is unmistakable. The Canada–Japan relationship laid the foundation. France expanded the architecture. Together, the three countries are attempting something far more ambitious: building a critical minerals ecosystem that is neither dependent on Chinese coercion nor vulnerable to American unpredictability. In an era when supply chains are increasingly instruments of geopolitical power, this may prove to be one of the most consequential strategic experiments underway within the G7 today.

About the author: Pratnashree Basu is an Associate Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.

Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation.

Observer Research Foundation

ORF was established on 5 September 1990 as a private, not for profit, ’think tank’ to influence public policy formulation. The Foundation brought together, for the first time, leading Indian economists and policymakers to present An Agenda for Economic Reforms in India. The idea was to help develop a consensus in favour of economic reforms.

Carney says there is 'one negotiator for Canada' after Conservative MPs descend on Washington

Story by Stephanie Taylor

April 30, 2026.


Prime Minister Mark Carney walks with Anita Anand, Minister of Foreign Affairs at Oakville's IUOE Local 793, Thursday April 30, 2026.

OTTAWA — Prime Minister Mark Carney said Thursday that politicians travelling to Washington who are not part of his government often return home not having learned “anything new” about Canada-U.S. trade.

He added that the same can be said when it comes to gleaning information about the state of ongoing discussions and the status of negotiations.


“In the end, there’s one negotiator for Canada, and that is the Government of Canada,” Carney said, speaking at an unrelated announcement in Oakville, Ont.

“Our interlocutors in the United States are generous people. They’re generous with their time, and it’s good of them to meet a host of Canadians coming down. But in the end, they know, and we know that we’re the negotiators.”

Carney’s comments come after Conservative MP Jamil Jivani, along with some of the party’s other MPs, including its foreign affairs critic Michael Chong, went to Washington to participate in a networking event hosted by the American Chamber of Commerce in Canada, which saw them meet with U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer and included other federal and provincial officials.

Citing unnamed sources, The Canadian Press reported Thursday that Greer told those in attendance the “America First” policy ushered in under U.S President Donald Trump was unmovable and that the U.S. was interested in working with Canada on energy issues. National Post has not independently confirmed the contents of what was said.

 Related video: ‘There is one negotiator,’ says Carney on Conservative MP trips to Washington DC (CBC)

“It has not been our experience that people have gone to Washington and have learned anything new, nor has it been that they have learned everything that is either being discussed on the table or where the negotiations are in the end,” Carney said on Thursday.

This trip marks the second Jivani has taken since February, where he went to the White House to meet with Vice-President JD Vance, whom he has been friends with since attending Yale Law School together, along with other Trump officials, saying at the time he wanted to extend a hand to the Carney government to help in navigating the Canada-U.S. relationship.

Opposition Conservative Leader Pierre Poilievre said on Wednesday that dozens of Conservative MPs have travelled to Washington in recent years to fight for “tariff- free trade” and underscored how the party stands ready to fight for Canadian workers.

Ontario MP Shelby Kramp-Neuman, who serves as the party’s critic in Parliament on Canada-U.S. trade, told reporters on Wednesday that she intends to travel to Washington in the coming weeks.

Poilievre, who travelled to the U.S. last month, stopping in Texas, Michigan and New York, has not travelled to Washington himself since becoming party leader back in 2022. He has said he takes the approach of letting the U.S. administration deal with “one prime minister at a time.”

The Conservative leader recently told reporters that his intention was to brief Carney on his trip. During an appearance on The Joe Rogan Experience, aired last month, he told the mega-popular host that he was texting with the prime minister, whom he would not criticize while on foreign soil.

Poilievre’s Conservatives have criticized Carney’s government for not yet having secured any kind of trade deal with Trump that would see existing tariffs, such as the 50 per cent levies on steel and aluminum lowered or lessened.

The party’s MPs have also called on the government to be more transparent about its plans to manage the relationship with the U.S., given the upcoming July 1 deadline to begin the scheduled review of the Canada-U.S.-Mexico Agreement.

Carney has characterized Canada’s trade deal with the U.S. as being an envy of its other trading partners, given that goods covered by the trilateral deal continue to be exempt, telling CBC in an interview that aired this week that he did not want to rush into striking a deal with Trump that “disadvantages us.”

National Post

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From Self-Defence To Deterrence: The Quiet End Of Japan’s Postwar Experiment – Analysis

April 29, 2026 
Observer Research Foundation
By Manoj Joshi

Even as the world’s attention is on West Asia, significant developments have been unfolding in the East. On April 21, Japan endorsed scrapping a ban on the export of lethal weapons, the last major hurdle in its move away from its post-war pacifist policy. As part of this shift, the country is now seeking to build up its arms industry and deepen cooperation with its defence partners.

For now, exports will be limited to 17 countries, including India, that have signed defence equipment and technology transfer agreements with Japan. Such exports will require approval from the National Security Council and will be monitored by the government to ensure proper end-use. In principle, Japan will not export lethal weapons to countries at war. Even so, Japan’s shift has generated interest in countries such as Poland and the Philippines.

Facing serious security concerns related to China and North Korea, and influenced in part by uncertainties in US alliance commitments under Trump, Japanese strategic thinking had already begun to shift. The war in Ukraine added further urgency. Now, with the United States fully preoccupied in West Asia, the Japanese assessment is that the US pivot to the Indo-Pacific is unlikely to materialise anytime soon.

Despite isolating itself from the global arms market for decades, Japan has developed significant capabilities through its domestic industry and licensed production. At present, the United States dominates the Japanese market, accounting for 95 percent of its defence imports. Yet well-known companies such as Mitsubishi, Kawasaki, and Fujitsu have meaningful defence divisions, and the country maintains an extensive defence-industrial base. It is capable of manufacturing submarines, fighter jets, and warships.


In terms of technology, Japan is second to none. However, it faces gaps in certain areas of military technology, which it is seeking to address through the new Defense Innovation Science and Technology Institute established in 2025 by its Ministry of Defense. Its Taigei-class submarines, equipped with lithium-ion batteries, are considered among the most advanced conventional submarines in the world. The Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile (HVGP), under development since 2018, was formally deployed for the first time to the Japan Ground Self-Defence Force’s Camp Fuji in Shizuoka Prefecture. A more advanced variant is scheduled for the 2030s. In 2025, Japan conducted the first successful test firing of an electromagnetic railgun at a sea-based target and is likely to become the first country in the world to deploy such systems.

Things on the export front are already moving faster. In its biggest deal ever, Japan formalised an agreement to deliver three frigates to Australia, to be built in Japan by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, with Australia constructing the remaining eight domestically. The initial three-ship contract is valued at approximately A$10 billion (US$6.5-7 billion), part of a total programme estimated at A$15-20 billion for all eleven Mogami-class frigates, with the first vessel due for delivery by December 2029.


Japan’s post-2022 security policy moves reflect a strategic pivot: from a strictly defensive “self-defence” policy to a more assertive, deterrence-oriented posture equipped with stand-off strike capabilities, integrated air and missile defence, multi-domain operations, and deeper alliance cooperation. While still framed under the rubric of self-defence, the underlying shift seeks to adapt Japan to a rapidly deteriorating regional security environment and position it as a more resilient actor in Indo-Pacific stability.

Japan’s pacifist restrictions were rooted in Article 9 of its 1947 Constitution, which renounced war and the maintenance of “war potential.” Over time, however, Japan began to loosen its pacifist stance, beginning in 1954 with the establishment of the Self-Defence Forces (SDF), on the argument that Article 9 permitted “individual self-defense.”

By 1972, this had evolved into a strict “exclusive defence” policy that banned collective self-defence, limited military spending to below 1 percent of GDP, prohibited the export of lethal arms, and barred the possession of “offensive” weapons such as long-range bombers or aircraft carriers. Arms exports were governed by the “three principles” adopted in 1967, which banned exports to communist countries, countries under UN Security Council embargoes, and those involved in or likely to be involved in international conflicts. In 1976, Japan clarified that, as a peace-loving country, it would refrain from promoting arms exports regardless of destination.

The long road to change began in 1987, when Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone effectively removed the 1 percent GDP cap, and in 1992, the SDF was permitted to participate in overseas peacekeeping operations.

The key shift, however, began with the prime ministership of Shinzo Abe (2006-7 and 2012-2020). In 2014, his Cabinet passed a resolution permitting collective self-defence, allowing the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) to be used to protect allies such as the United States in a crisis. Thereafter, the government allowed limited arms transfers for humanitarian relief and international cooperation. In 2016, the Philippines leased five used trainer aircraft for maritime patrols over the disputed South China Sea. Later, new air surveillance radars were also sold to Manila.


In 2022, the Cabinet of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida approved new security documents — a National Security Strategy, a National Defense Strategy, and a companion Defense Buildup Program (2023–2027). The new National Security Strategy stated that Japan was “facing the most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War II.” Tokyo stopped short of formally designating Beijing as a “threat,” but described the rise of China as “the greatest strategic challenge that Japan has ever faced.”

In a further policy shift, Japan decided to acquire counter-strike capabilities against adversaries and announced plans to raise defence spending to 2 percent of GDP within five years. In 2023, a new rule was adopted enabling the export of licence-produced weapons manufactured in Japan to the original licence holders.

Policy changes were accompanied by specific capability programmes. The first was the acquisition of US Tomahawk cruise missiles and the decision to upgrade Japan’s own Type 12 missiles, aimed at striking enemy staging areas and missile launch sites. The second was the expansion of its integrated missile defence architecture and sensor networks to counter ballistic and cruise missile attacks. This includes Aegis-equipped ships, land-based interceptors, space-based and persistent ISR capabilities, and investment in early-warning satellites. Third, Japan began investing in unmanned maritime and aerial systems. Fourth, it significantly upgraded its offensive and defensive cyber capabilities to protect critical national infrastructure.

Japan is not pursuing these steps alone. The United States remains Tokyo’s central security partner and is cooperating with Japan on areas such as integrated air and missile defence development, high-power microwave systems, and hypersonic glide-phase interceptors. Beyond the United States, Tokyo is deepening trilateral and multilateral cooperation with partners such as Australia, the United Kingdom, and European states on capability development, intelligence sharing, and joint exercises. In 2022, Japan joined the United Kingdom and Italy in an effort to build a new sixth-generation fighter aircraft by the mid-2030s. Japan is also being considered as a partner in advanced military technology projects with the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia under AUKUS, particularly in the area of autonomous maritime systems.

India and Japan share a “Special Strategic and Global Partnership,” manifested in a range of agreements and institutionalised dialogues. Yet efforts to deepen defence technology cooperation remain below potential — as much a result of Japanese restrictions until recently as of Indian bureaucratic lassitude.

The two countries also have an agreement to jointly develop an advanced underwater surveillance system and other maritime technologies — areas of direct relevance given their shared concerns about Chinese naval expansion in the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific. In February, New Delhi hosted the 11th India-Japan Naval Staff Talks. According to one analyst, the talks “demonstrate that the India-Japan relationship has transitioned from a consultative phase to a phase that is deeply integrated and operational.” The naval talks followed the 18th round of the India-Japan Foreign Ministers’ Strategic Dialogue, which focused on security and defence, investment, and innovation.


Japan’s transformation is neither sudden nor complete. It has been a slow, at times reluctant, evolution of its post-war identity — nudged along by an aggressive, nuclear-armed North Korea, an increasingly assertive China, and an unreliable American patron in a neighbourhood that has steadily grown more dangerous. The April 21 decision represents less a rupture than the removal of the last symbolic fig leaf.

For the Indo-Pacific, a rearmed and strategically assertive Japan is a major asset. It strengthens the web of security partnerships that the United States helped build, but may no longer be relied upon to anchor alone. For India, it opens avenues in defence technology and industrial cooperation that go well beyond what the bilateral relationship has so far achieved. Japan spent seven decades seeking to limit its military profile. That post-war experiment, born of genuine guilt and enforced by American design, is now almost certainly over.

About the author: Manoj Joshi is a Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.

Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation.

PM Carney points to trade irritants with U.S.: ‘Those are violations of our trade deal’

By Rachel Aiello
Updated: April 23, 2026 



OTTAWA -- As top U.S. trade officials revive talk of Canadian trade irritants — such as provincial booze bans — Prime Minister Mark Carney says Canada has its own issues with the Americans, which he wants to see addressed.

“Look, you know what’s an irritant? A 50 per cent tariff on steel, 50 per cent tariff on aluminum, 25 per cent tariff on automobiles, all the tariffs on forest products,” Carney said Thursday, at a housing announcement in Ottawa.Live updates: PM Carney says U.S. trade irritants ‘right there in front of us.’

“Those are more than irritants,” he said. “Those are violations of our trade deal.” Carney pointing to these specific U.S. trade actions against Canada comes amid ramped-up gripes by U.S. President Donald Trump’s team that several provinces continue to prohibit the sale of American alcohol on liquor store shelves, and questions about whether that may be a barrier to successful trade talks.

These bans on U.S.-made booze are also a contravention of the two countries’ trade agreement, in the eyes of the Americans. But when asked Thursday if he intends to lean on provincial leaders — namely Ontario Premier Doug Ford — to ease off, the prime minister pushed back.

“Surprise, surprise, the premier of Ontario is influential with the LCBO, okay, but he’s the client,” Carney said. “He’s also the duly elected premier of Ontario. He’s got a majority, and he’s taking a view which, you know, by most indications, is supported by the vast majority of the population.”


“What we want to do is make progress as the whole,” he added. “These issues, issues such as decisions on which alcohol to put on the shelves, we can make progress very quickly on that, with progress in other areas.”

Carney continued, saying he is looking to negotiate something that is “mutually agreeable,” and that there “will be adjustments,” but that “when we make progress,” it’ll be up to the provinces with such policies in place to make a call.

During an interview with CNN on Thursday morning, Ford was asked to respond to U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, recently calling the ongoing boycott of U.S. alcohol “insulting and disrespectful to America.”

“I guess what is disrespectful is we never started this tariff war and I don’t believe the American people did. It was Secretary Lutnick followed by President Trump as well that attacked our joint economies,” Ford said Thursday.

Ford has previously said that Ontario will not lift its ban on U.S. alcohol at provincial liquor stores until all new tariffs on Canadian goods are removed.
PM Carney slaps down ‘entry fee’ talk

And, amid reporting from a few major outlets suggesting the Americans are angling for some form of so-called Canadian “entry fee” — or immediate concession — to begin trade talks, Carney says he’s at a loss where that suggestion may be coming from.

“I don’t know where the talk of a ‘entry fee’ is from, certainly not coming from me. It’s not language I’ve ever used, and it’s not language I’ve ever heard from the president of the United States,” Carney said. “It’s a negotiation,” he added. “These things have their own rhythm, and they also have what’s happening above the surface and what’s happening below the surface, and we’ll see in the fullness of time.”

“Our work is… to be prepared on all of the issues to provide our perspective,” Carney said. “We’re also ready to wait. If that’s what has to happen.”

The trilateral trade deal between Canada, the U.S. and Mexico, known as CUSMA, is imminently up for review by July 1. At that point, officials can decide to renew the deal for a 16-year period, or to agree to an annual review process.

On Parliament Hill on Thursday, Conservative Leader Pierre Poilievre noted Carney’s comments dismissing any suggestion of an “entry fee,” and when asked if he thinks Canada should put U.S. wine, beer and liquor back on store shelves, Poilievre said “no.”

Poilievre said that Carney has already “squandered all of our leverage” and he doesn’t think Canada should “squander any more.”

“I don’t think we need to spend three or four days debating whether we should drink bourbon or not. I think we should discuss whether 2.6 million Canadians are going to have their jobs, and the way to get those jobs secured is to get a tariff-free trade deal with the U.S.,” he said.
Americans want concessions

The Americans have long made clear — dating back to last December and reiterated earlier this month — that they will be looking for Canada to make concessions in the CUSMA review process.

U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer, speaking to the U.S. House Ways and Means Committee on Wednesday, repeated a position he’s laid out before, that the U.S. doesn’t “want to rubber-stamp it,” without addressing specific issues.

Beyond booze, another issue the Americans have said they’ll be pushing Canadian officials on, is expanding access to this country’s supply managed dairy market.

Canada allows a limited amount of U.S. dairy to enter tariff-free under CUSMA, but Greer doesn’t think that’s enough.

Canada-U.S. Trade Minister Dominic LeBlanc has already said publicly that dairy supply management concessions are off the table, a position Carney reiterated Thursday.

Greer has also cited Canada’s Online Streaming Act, which he’s said “discriminates against U.S. tech and media firms,” and the Online News Act, as irritants. Both Justin Trudeau-era laws bring streaming and digital news platforms under Canadian cultural and broadcasting rules.

“We’ve been very clear on supply management, on our cultural rights,” Carney said, going on to state Canada will be “defending” those elements.


Rachel AielloOpens in new window

National Correspondent, CTV News

O’Toole says China not a replacement for U.S., disagrees with PM Carney on EV deal

By

Spencer Van Dyk

Opens in new window

Updated: April 26, 2026 

Erin O'Toole, former Conservative Party of Canada leader, is seen in Ottawa,

Former Conservative leader Erin O’Toole is cautioning the prime minister that despite the need to diversify trade, China is not a substitute for the United States.

O’Toole has been tapped to join Prime Minister Mark Carney’s 24-member Canada-U.S. Advisory Committee, unveiled this week as a formal review of the countries’ trilateral trade deal with Mexico fast approaches.

More than a year into a protracted trade war with the United States, meanwhile, Carney is once again emphasizing a shift in the relationship with Canada’s closest neighbour, describing Canada’s ties to the U.S. as a “weakness” in a social media video last Sunday.

Through several international trips in the last year, Carney has also moved to deepen ties with other allies, specifically in Europe. And, despite previously fraught relationships, Carney has moved to reset relations with both China and India with the goal of boosting trade.

On a trip to China in January, Carney inked a deal with Chinese President Xi Jinping to allow up to 49,000 Chinese electric vehicles (EVs) into the Canadian market in exchange for a reduction in tariffs on agricultural products. Chinese EVs previously faced 100 per cent tariffs in Canada, in a move by then-prime minister Justin Trudeau in 2024 that was meant to align with the United States.

“I have been publicly critical of that part of the prime minister’s trip,” O’Toole told CTV Question Period host Vassy Kapelos in an interview airing Sunday, when asked about Carney’s decision to allow some Chinese EVs into Canada. “I thought it was good that (Carney) went to China. It’s critical for our agricultural exports and Western Canada, and they needed to see that.”

“But the substitute for a great American partner is not China,” he also said, adding Canada should be aligned with the U.S. when it comes to China as part of a unified North American front.

“We have to be very cautious with China,” he said.

In a speech back in February, Conservative Leader Pierre Poilievre also said China is “no substitute” for the United States.

O’Toole prepared to push back in advisory council discussions

As the July 1 deadline to launch a review of the Canada-U.S. Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) approaches, American officials this week took aim at Canada.

U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer said there is a gap between the Canada and U.S. administrations’ trade philosophies, and threatened enforcement action on the ongoing booze ban in several provinces.

And U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick said Canada treats the U.S. unfairly “at every margin they possibly can.”

In his new capacity on the advisory committee, O’Toole said he’s prepared to push back in the discussions, and that he believes it’s “part of the reason” he was asked to join the group.

He said he’s committed to bringing a conservative voice to the council so it can be a true “best effort Team Canada,” and he’s been assured it “is a substantive, serious exercise.”

“I think I’m going to be disagreeing with some of their policies, and I think that’s what they want,” he said, adding a “diversity of voices and viewpoints” will strengthen Canada’s negotiating team.

Support for Poilievre as Conservative leader

Kapelos also asked O’Toole about Poilievre and recent questions surrounding his leadership.

Despite languishing in the polls on the preferred prime minister question and losing four MPs to the Liberals since last November, Poilievre has insisted he’s staying on at the helm of the party.

Asked if he has O’Toole’s support, the former leader didn’t hesitate: “Yes.”

“He’s got remarkable support within the party, and has set the policy agenda,” O’Toole said.

“I think the stability of a majority (government) will actually, I think, be helpful for Pierre to build up (and) repair,” he added. “The role of the Opposition is to hold the government to account. I want them to hold them to account.”

You can watch former Conservative Leader Erin O’Toole’s full interview on CTV Question Period Sunday at 11 a.m. ET.

Spencer Van Dyk

Opens in new window

Writer & Producer, Ottawa News Bureau, CTV News

Baloch Strike After Talks Stall: Gwadar’s Security Crisis Deepens – OpEd

Gwadar city, Balochistan, Pakistan. Photo Credit: Shayhaq Baloch, Wikipedia Commons

April 22, 2026 
By Ashu Mann


Strategic projects are supposed to be measured in decades. Roads take years to build. Ports take longer to fill. Diplomatic relationships require sustained investment over time. China, better than most, has been willing to play the long game in Balochistan — absorbing setbacks, extending timelines, and repeating that CPEC and Gwadar remain strategic priorities. April 2026 has tested that patience in two distinct and serious ways.

The China-mediated trilateral talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan, held in Urumqi from April 1 to 7, concluded without a ceasefire or any verifiable commitments on the TTP. Both sides exchanged diplomatic language — pledging to “refrain from actions that escalate the situation” and to “explore a comprehensive solution” — but the fundamental disagreement remained intact: Pakistan demanding verifiable Taliban action against TTP militants operating from Afghan soil, the Taliban refusing any arrangement that implies external oversight of its territory.

China described the process as “substantive” and said it would continue, but the talks produced no mechanism for enforcement and no agreement on the core issue. Then, on April 12, BLA fighters using a speedboat attacked a Pakistan Coast Guard patrol boat on a routine patrol near Jiwani, killing all three personnel on board.

The BLA claimed the operation under its newly announced naval wing, the Hammal Maritime Defence Force — a formal declaration that the insurgency has extended its theatre from land and air into the sea. It was the first maritime attack of its kind in the region. Both events strike directly at Gwadar’s viability: one cutting at the diplomatic foundations of the port’s regional purpose, the other introducing a new military threat to the waters surrounding it.

The long game China has been playing requires certain conditions to hold. Regional stability, at least at a functional level, is one. Some degree of Pakistani state capacity to manage the security environment is another. Progress, however slow, in Baloch-Pakistan relations is a third. None of these conditions are being met adequately right now. Pakistani-Afghan relations are at their worst point in years, frozen by the February strikes and the failure of the Urumqi talks to produce any binding thaw. Pakistani security forces are capable but stretched, now confronting a threat that has extended from land through the air — the BLA launched a drone unit earlier this year — and now to sea.

Baloch communities remain alienated from CPEC’s development model, and the group that channels that alienation into violence has just demonstrated a significant expansion of its operational reach. For Beijing, recalibrating timelines is manageable. Recalibrating the fundamental strategic logic is harder. The Urumqi outcome is worth dwelling on, because it exposes something about Chinese regional influence that BRI’s promotional literature tends to obscure. China’s economic leverage over Pakistan is substantial and real. But leverage is not unlimited.

When Islamabad attends talks in Xinjiang, it does so partly because Beijing asks and partly because Pakistan genuinely wants the TTP issue resolved — the two objectives align. That alignment has limits, however: Pakistan cannot accept an arrangement that provides only symbolic progress on TTP, because symbolic progress has not reduced violence in the past. China’s leverage over the Taliban is weaker and more transactional. Beijing is one of the few governments maintaining economic engagement with Kabul, and that provides some influence. But the Taliban’s primary audience is Afghan domestic opinion, and conceding to Pakistani demands under Chinese pressure is politically toxic in Kabul. No amount of Chinese economic inducement can easily change that calculus. The talks stalled because the conditions for a durable agreement do not currently exist, and Chinese mediation — however well-resourced — cannot manufacture conditions it cannot control.

The maritime attack changes the threat calculus in a specific and lasting way. Before April 12, the security challenge around Gwadar was serious but bounded: a land-based insurgency attacking infrastructure and personnel, supplemented more recently by drone strikes, requiring a defined land-and-air security response. That response was expensive and imperfect, but it had a recognisable shape. The BLA’s new naval wing changes that. Maritime insurgency requires maritime counterinsurgency — different equipment, different training, different intelligence architecture.

Pakistan does not have these in place for this environment. Building them takes time and resources that are already strained. In the interval before adequate maritime security capacity exists, the waters around Gwadar are operating in a threat environment without an adequate response. With diplomacy producing process but not outcomes, and the BLA demonstrating that its reach now spans land, air, and sea, Gwadar is under pressure from multiple directions simultaneously. The port’s future depends on conditions that none of the relevant parties are currently in a position to deliver.

Ashu Mann is an Associate Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies. He was awarded the Vice Chief of the Army Staff Commendation card on Army Day 2025. He is pursuing a PhD from Amity University, Noida, in Defence and Strategic Studies. His research focuses include the India-China territorial dispute, great power rivalry, and Chinese foreign policy.

The Overlooked War China Is Desperate to Contain

By RFE/RL staff - Apr 17, 2026

• China hosted trilateral talks to de-escalate violence between Pakistan and Afghanistan, but continued clashes underscore fragile progress.
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• The core dispute over Taliban ties to militant groups remains unresolved and highly contentious.
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• Beijing’s role highlights both its growing regional ambitions and the limits of its diplomatic leverage.
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As US President Donald Trump says the war in Iran could be over "very soon" and Pakistani mediators in Tehran prepare to meet with officials, another nearby conflict has been drawing Beijing's attention.

Since late February, fighting between Afghanistan and Pakistan has intensified, with Islamabad declaring an "open war" with its neighbor. Strikes have killed hundreds and displaced hundreds of thousands, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Afghanistan. The conflict has alarmed the international community and perturbed China, which is a partner to both countries and sensitive to violence along its western borders.

Against that backdrop, Beijing has stepped in to play a diplomatic role, announcing on April 8 that it hosted weeklong talks in Urumqi in western China in hopes of brokering a cease-fire. At stake is not just tempering hostilities but a broader test of China's ability to manage instability on its periphery, where it has deep economic and political ties.

While all sides have publicly backed dialogue, deep disagreements over militant groups and cross-border attacks threaten to derail any meaningful de-escalation. Delegations from all three sides were quick to tout the value of the talks. China's Foreign Ministry called them "frank and pragmatic," while the Taliban called them "useful" and said they took place "in a constructive atmosphere."

But even as the talks were underway, Afghanistan accused Pakistan of carrying out shelling across its border, raising questions about whether China can end the conflict and how much diplomatic capital it is willing to attach to the discussions as it also navigates the war in Iran.

"The Taliban and Pakistani diplomats know how to come up with word formulas that make China look good and even limited border easement measures," Michael Semple, an Afghanistan expert at Queen's University Belfast, told RFE/RL. "But agreement on the issue of Taliban support for the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is likely to prove elusive for now."

Pakistan has long alleged that Taliban-run Afghanistan harbors fighters from the TTP, a militant group that carries out cross-border attacks -- allegations the Afghan Taliban denies.

Testing Beijing's Influence

Analysts believe both Pakistan and the Taliban value China as a strategic partner.

For Islamabad, Beijing is a valuable counterweight to its archrival, India, and a needed source of foreign investment. For the Taliban, China represents a massive nearby market that could help its struggling economy while also presenting a partner to help the government gain full international recognition after the militants seized power in 2021.

But while China has leverage on paper, it's unclear how much pressure it is willing to apply.

Beijing has typically taken a back seat in international mediation, confining its efforts to situations likely to yield quick results, such as a 2023 deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia that re-established diplomatic ties between the two Middle Eastern rivals.

Amid the war in Iran, Beijing has also mostly kept its public distance, welcoming foreign delegations and looking to portray itself as an arbiter of international norms. This is in contrast to the United States, such as when Chinese leader Xi Jinping called the US blockade of Iranian ports a "return to the law of the jungle" as he hosted Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the crown prince of Abu Dhabi, on April 14.

Still, some reports, including comments from Trump himself, have suggested China has used its position as Iran's top investor and oil buyer to push toward engaging in cease-fire talks with the United States and potentially moving to wind down the fighting.

Tempering hostilities between Islamabad and Kabul will not be straightforward.

Before the Taliban's return to power in August 2021, officials from Afghanistan's ousted government similarly accused Islamabad of supporting the Taliban on Pakistani soil, which Pakistani officials denied at the time.

There have been few official statements regarding the discussions since they wrapped up in Urumqi. Pakistan has also been playing an active diplomatic role as host to US-Iran cease-fire talks.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning said during a daily briefing after the talks ended that "the three parties agreed to explore a comprehensive solution to the issues in the relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and clarified the core and priority issues that need to be addressed."

Omar Samad, a former Afghan diplomat now based in the United States, says China-backed talks created new momentum, but there is still a large gap between rhetoric and the reality on the ground.

"The talks created a narrow opening, but openings of this kind tend to close quickly when confronted with entrenched mistrust," he told RFE/RL, adding that China and other mediators must sustain a long-term commitment to address structural issues that are "complex but not unsolvable."

From Allies To Adversaries

While the Taliban government was initially expected to maintain Pakistani support after seizing power, ties have frayed between the former allies, mainly over the TTP issue. Tensions peaked in October 2025 during a weeklong official visit by Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi to India.

On October 9, the first day of Muttaqi's visit, Islamabad launched air strikes across several Afghan provinces, including the capital, Kabul. Some reports initially indicated the Kabul attack targeted TTP leader Noor Wali Mehsud, though he later purportedly released a video to prove he was alive. In the wake of the strikes, Taliban forces launched counterattacks along the border, claiming to have killed dozens of Pakistani security personnel. Islamabad rejected those claims.

Defense ministers from both sides traveled then to Doha, the Qatari capital, on October 18 for talks mediated by Turkey, leading to a temporary cease-fire. Separate delegations later met in Istanbul that month for a follow-up meeting. That was followed by additional mediation efforts by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, but Islamabad and Kabul failed to reach a permanent truce.

Following a renewed escalation in February, a major Pakistani strike on March 16 hit the Omid Drug Rehabilitation Center at the former NATO base, Camp Phoenix, in eastern Kabul.

Taliban officials said more than 400 people were killed, while Islamabad maintained it had struck military installations. The UN later reported a death toll of 143. Human Rights Watch condemned the incident as "an unlawful attack and a possible war crime."

"The Taliban for their part seem ideologically committed to the continuation of jihad and thus unable to distance themselves from the TTP," said Semple. "As long as the TTP campaign continues, there is every reason to expect an intensification of the conflict between the Taliban and Pakistan."

By RFE/RL