NAFTA 2/USMCA

Adios amigos? What Trump 2.0 means for Canada and Mexico

 not in Canada’s interest to throw Mexico under the bus.

THE CONVERSATION
Published: November 18, 2024 

Donald Trump looks over at Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s document as they and Mexico’s president at the time, Enrique Pena Nieto, sign the new United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in November 2018. THE CANADIAN PRESS/AP-Martin Mejia

United States President-elect Donald Trump has vowed to implement an across-the-board tariff of at least 10 per cent on all imports into the country.

While there could be some exemptions for American imports of oil, gas and other natural resources, it’s not yet clear whether Canada will be protected by the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA).

In fact, when the deal comes up for a mandatory review in 2026, Trump has said: “I’m going to have a lot of fun.”

Read more: Facing trade renegotiations, Canada can no longer count on free trade to protect it from U.S. power

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Given that more than 77 per cent of Canada’s exports go to the United States, Canadians have understandably viewed Trump’s declarations with alarm.

And against the likely torrent of American protectionism, Canada has few good options. Responding in kind, for example, will likely lead to a rise in inflation.
Kicking out Mexico?

One idea, recently floated by Ontario Premier Doug Ford, is to abandon CUSMA’s trilateral framework and seek a bilateral Canada-U.S. trade deal. As Ford put it: “We must prioritize the closest economic partnership on Earth by directly negotiating a bilateral U.S.-Canada free trade agreement.”

The premier’s specific complaint is that the Mexican government has failed to prevent the trans-shipment of Chinese goods — especially auto parts and vehicles — through its country in order subvert tariffs imposed by the American and Canadian governments against China.

Ontario Premier Doug Ford at the Ontario legislature in October 2024. THE CANADIAN PRESS/Chris Young

If Mexico won’t act to prevent trans-shipments or impose its own tariffs on Chinese goods, Ford explained, “they shouldn’t have a seat at the table or enjoy access to the largest economy in the world.”

Ford’s comments drew immediate criticism from Mexican trade officials, but Chrystia Freeland, Canada’s deputy prime minister and finance minister, was more sympathetic. Concerns about Mexican handling of Chinese goods “are legitimate concerns for our American partners and neighbours to have. Those are concerns that I share,” she said.

This is not the first time Canadians have expressed wariness about including Mexico in common North American arrangements.
Canada’s position on Mexico

In 1956, when U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower proposed a trilateral summit with Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent and Mexican President Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, Canadian diplomats expressed their opposition to anything that “would appear to equate the relations between the United States and Canada and the United States and Mexico.”

For Ottawa, it was essential to preserve the notion of a special relationship between Canada and the U.S.

Even though the three leaders eventually met in Warm Springs, Ga., the “summit” ultimately consisted of separate U.S.-Canada and U.S.-Mexico bilateral meetings.

Four decades later, Canada pressed to be included in what became the North American Free Trade Agreeement — known as NAFTA — not because of any fellowship with Mexico, but to ensure that its newly won market access to the United States (thanks to the 1988 Free Trade Agreement between the U.S. and Canada) was not undercut by a bilateral Mexico-U.S. deal.
Common front?

As we document in our new book, Canada First, Not Canada Alone, even if Canada’s suspicions of Mexico about trade matters aren’t out of the ordinary, they must be considered against the notion that in dealing with the U.S., there can be strength in numbers

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The author’s book on Canadian foreign policy. (Public Domain)

Throughout the early phase of the CUSMA negotiations during the first Trump presidency, Freeland herself was adamant that Canada not abandon Mexico in favour of a bilateral deal.

Rather, she pointedly emphasized the need to work alongside Mexico to present a common front against the Trump administration’s efforts divide its two North American trading partners.

When faced with an overwhelming aggressor, she argued, it’s best not to stand alone.
U.S. made side deal

This position was backed by other ministers as well as by Ottawa’s trade negotiators even as prominent Canadians — including former prime minister Stephen Harper — called for ditching the Mexicans

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Prime Minister Justin Trudeau meets with Donald Trump, not shown, in London in December 2019. THE CANADIAN PRESS/Sean Kilpatrick

At first, the Canadian approach appeared to succeed. Freeland herself earned a fearsome reputation among American officials, with Trump attacking her as a “nasty woman.”

Later, however, Canadian negotiators thought they saw an opening and offered the Americans a bilateral deal without notifying their Mexican colleagues.

Not only did Washington reject the offer, American officials approached Mexico City and concluded a separate side deal of their own. This time, it was Canada left unaware.
Warning signs

The threat of being cut out of a trade agreement was more imagined than real — the Trump administration could not replace NAFTA with a bilateral arrangement without congressional approval — but Canada still had to move quickly to restore a trilateral solution.

CUSMA subsequently came into effect on July 1, 2020.

The CUSMA negotiations should offer Ford and the entire Canadian negotiating team a warning.

If Canada is prepared to leave Mexico behind, Canadian officials should be prepared for their Mexican counterparts to do the same. And while it seems right now that the U.S. has problems with Mexico and its management of America’s porous southern border than it does with Ottawa, under the mercurial Trump, the situation can can change in an instant.

It’s therefore probably not in Canada’s interest to throw Mexico under the bus.

SEE

Danielle Smith '1,000 per cent' in favour of ousting Mexico from trilateral trade deal with U.S. and Canada

Authors

Asa McKercher
Hudson Chair in Canada-US Relations, St. Francis Xavier University

Adam Chapnick
Professor of Defence Studies, Royal Military College of Canada
Disclosure statement
Adam Chapnick received funding from the Canadian Defence Academy Research Program to support the research that informs this article.

TRUMP SOCK PUPPET

Danielle Smith '1,000 per cent' in favour of ousting Mexico from trilateral trade deal with U.S. and Canada

HOPES TO GET KEYSTONE PIPELINE BUILT

Alberta Premier Danielle Smith speaks at a news conference regarding a new Indigenous energy project with TC Energy in Calgary, Alta., July 30, 2024.

 THE CANADIAN PRESS/Todd Korol

Spencer Van Dyk
CTV News Parliamentary Bureau Writer, Producer
Follow |Contact
Updated Nov. 17, 2024 

Alberta Premier Danielle Smith says she agrees it could be time to cut Mexico out of the trilateral free trade agreement with Canada and the United States.

"Mexico has gone in a different direction, and it's pretty clear that the Americans have indicated that they want to have a fair trade relationship," Smith told CTV's Question Period host Vassy Kapelos, in an interview airing Sunday. "Mexico is not in a position to be able to offer that, especially with the investment that they have from China."

The trilateral deal was first inked in 1994, at the time called NAFTA, before being renegotiated during former president and now-president-elect Donald Trump's first term.

Trump in this last election campaign vowed to reopen the agreement when it comes up for review in 2026.

Ontario Premier Doug Ford, meanwhile, floated the idea earlier this week of ousting Mexico from the trilateral deal in favour of a bilateral one between just Canada and the U.S., a proposal of which Smith said she is "a thousand per cent" in support.

The majority of what Alberta sends to the U.S. is energy exports. According to Smith, Alberta has a $188-billion trade relationship with the United States, compared to the $2.9-billion trade relationship with Mexico.

"It's important, but our absolute number one priority is maintaining those strong trade ties with (the) United States, and if that requires us to do a bilateral agreement, then that's what we should do," she said.

On Tuesday, Ford accused Mexico of being a "back door" for China to get its products, namely vehicles, into North America, "undercutting" Canadian and American workers.

On Saturday, at the end of the APEC summit in Lima, Peru, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau called Mexico a “solid trading partner,” but acknowledged concerns around Chinese investment in its economy that “need to be addressed.”

“I am hopeful that we’re going to be able to work constructively over the coming months and perhaps years to ensure that North America remains an advantageous place for North Americans, for our workers, for our middle class, and creates real growth,” Trudeau said.

Meanwhile, Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland told reporters on Wednesday that she's heard concerns from both the outgoing Biden administration and people connected to the incoming Trump administration that "Mexico is not acting the way that Canada and the U.S. are when it comes to its economic relationship with China."

"I think those are legitimate concerns for our American partners and neighbours to have," Freeland said. "Those are concerns that I share."

Derek Burney, who was former prime minister Brian Mulroney's chief of staff when the original NAFTA was negotiated, said a Canadian push to exclude Mexico from the agreement would be "childish."

Burney — who later served as the Canadian ambassador to the U.S. — told Kapelos, also in an interview airing Sunday, that Canada should focus on its own relationship with the U.S., instead of concerning itself with Mexico.

"I don't think we need to be provocative," he said. "I think the Mexicans are doing things that are going to give them enough difficulty with the Americans without our help."

"So no, I wouldn't recommend that we take that action," he added.

Burney said the Canadian focus should be on areas of alignment and potential collaboration with the U.S., namely when it comes to energy, liquified natural gas and critical minerals.

"The Mexicans are going to have a boatload of problems to deal with, with the Americans," Burney also said. "They don't need our help, and they won't seek our help, so let them deal with their own problems with the Americans."

Burney in his interview also discussed the need for Canada to spend more on defence, and faster than it currently plans to, if it wants to be taken seriously on other issues when negotiating with the United States.

And Smith in her interview also discussed the federal government's oil and gas sector emissions cap — a policy she's vehemently opposed — and her efforts to work with the people Trump has announced he plans to bring into his administration.

Trump’s record of leaking intelligence and doubts over his new team have allies worried, experts say

Rhian Lubin
Fri, November 1, 2024 

The Independent

Trump’s record of leaking intelligence and doubts over his new team have allies worried, experts say


With days to go until America decides who will become the next president, there are concerns among some US allies over one of the most important aspects of their relationship with the world’s most powerful nation — intelligence sharing.

While a Kamala Harris presidency is expected to fit into a more predictable pattern of intelligence handling, security experts say some US allies have more “anxiety” about the alternative: Donald Trump’s return to the White House.

The Independent spoke to experts in intelligence, national security, and foreign policy from the UK, Australia, and Canada on the implications of a second Trump term. They all agree that the stakes couldn’t be higher – and suggest that the Republican candidate’s track record when it comes to leaking secret information is one of their causes for concern.


“There is trepidation about Mr Trump in the US intelligence community and throughout the Five Eyes network,” Dr Michael Fullilove, executive director of Australia’s Lowy Institute for International Policy in Sydney, tells The Independent, referring to the intelligence-sharing network made up of the US, the UK, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.

“The handling of secrets requires people to follow rules,” Fullilove says. “But Mr Trump doesn’t seem to believe that rules apply to him. He sees himself as existing in a rule-free zone. When you’re talking about the handling of classified intelligence, that’s a problem.”

During Trump’s first administration, the White House “leaked like a sieve,” Dr Daniel Larsen, a lecturer in intelligence and war studies at Scotland’s Glasgow University and previously at Cambridge, tells The Independent.

As a matter of law, a sitting president can declassify the most secret classified information, but US defense experts say even presidents have to transmit declassification orders through the proper channels.
Trump and classified information

In May 2017, months after taking office, Trump shared classified Israeli intelligence, concerning an undercover operation to infiltrate Isis, with the Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov and the Russian ambassador to the US at the time, Sergey Kislyak, during a meeting in the Oval Office. Amid uproar, Trump insisted he had every right to do so, tweeting: “As President I wanted to share with Russia (at an openly scheduled W.H. meeting) which I have the absolute right to do, facts pertaining to terrorism and airline flight safety. Humanitarian reasons, plus I want Russia to greatly step up their fight against ISIS & terrorism.”

In 2019, Trump tweeted a classified satellite image of a failed Iranian rocket launch to his millions of followers. Critics said that by doing so he risked revealing information about US surveillance techniques. Trump responded by telling reporters: “We had a photo and I released it, which I have the absolute right to do.”

Trump is accused of illegally hoarding thousands of classified documents — including papers relating to nuclear weapons and spy satellites – at his Mar-a-Lago resort after his term as president ended. Criminal charges brought by special counsel Jack Smith were sensationally dismissed by a federal judge who was appointed by Trump, but Smith has appealed that decision. Meanwhile, Trump has said he will “fire” Smith for investigating him if he is elected, and has suggested that Smith should be forced to leave the country.

Trump allegedly shared classified information about nuclear submarines to an Australian billionaire at Mar-a-Lago.

In 2019, Trump’s administration was accused of leaking information from the investigation into a terrorist attack on an Ariana Grande concert in Manchester, England, which left 22 people dead. In response, British police briefly stopped sharing information with the US, although the UK intelligence agencies did not.

Trump with Sergey Lavrov, left, and Sergey Kislyak in the Oval Office in May 2017. During the meeting Trump revealed secret information to his Russian guests about an Israeli intelligence operation. He later insisted he was entitled to do so (EPA)

Despite the leaks from Trump’s first term, experts largely agree that intelligence sharing between the allied nations would continue under a second Trump administration, but they acknowledge there would be some level of risk.

Professor Thomas Juneau, a former defense analyst with Canada’s Department of National Defense, explains that his country relies heavily upon the network as it “gets way more than it gives.”

“Is Trump going to kill the Five Eyes on day one? No. That’s way too extreme. But it is conceivable,” says Juneau, an associate professor at the University of Ottawa. “Is it conceivable that in four years, the Five Eyes are weakened and that we don’t necessarily get as much through as we used to? Yes, of course it is.”

Fullilove, of the Lowy Institute, maintains that the Five Eyes “will survive” Trump, and says the assertion that US allies would stop sharing information with the Americans if he were elected is “unrealistic”. But he adds an important caveat: “Trust is critical.”

Kim Darroch, a former British ambassador to the US who resigned in 2019 following the leak of some of his dispatches that were critical of Trump, told The Independent that the relationship between the UK and US intelligence communities “is close, strong and durable” and “will flourish whatever the political climate.”

Christopher Steele, the former head of MI6’s Russia desk who found himself at the center of a worldwide controversy after he authored the so-called Steele dossier, a series of startling allegations suggesting Trump might have been compromised by Moscow, has a much graver assessment. He tells The Independent that concern among British intelligence officials “should be very high” if Trump is re-elected.

“I don’t think we can feel confident that any information that we give America as part of our very close and very important intelligence and security alliance would be safe,” Steele says. “In my 40-year career, I’ve never felt so concerned about the state of the world.”

In 2019, a US Department of Justice report found that the FBI had “raised doubts about the reliability of some of Steele’s reports”. However, Steele maintains to this day that the dossier — an intelligence report collated for a private client — contained “original intelligence [and] was obtained from credible sources.”

In a new book titled Unredacted, Steele warns of “a new world disorder” if Trump takes back the White House next week.

The view on Trump’s home turf was that some of his behavior was “very disturbing” to those in the intelligence world, according to former New York Times correspondent Thom Shanker, who covered the Pentagon, the military and national security for the paper.

In June 2023, prosecutors unsealed an indictment that contained photographs of boxes of classified information stacked in Trump’s Mar-a-Lago bathroom.

“That’s kind of what really shocked people,” Shanker, George Washington University’s Project Director for Media and National Security, tells The Independent.

Boxes of classified documents found at Trump’s Mar-a-Lago resort (US Department of Justice/AFP via Getty Images)

“They were just in the open, where countless numbers of people just walked by and could have reached in and grabbed some or read them. So I think that was very disturbing to a lot of people who work in that world.”

Joe Biden’s home was also raided by the FBI in early 2023 after it emerged that he, too, took classified documents home with him when he was vice-president. Biden complied with the investigation, and no criminal charges were brought. Trump, however, was accused of a cover-up.

“When confronted with it, one cooperated with investigators, one obstructed,” Shanker says. “Taking the classified documents home is less telling than how they responded once they were confronted with it.”

So what do US allies think Trump 2.0 might look like?

Darroch says he is more concerned about a potential second term.

“Back in 2016, Trump had never served in any level of government, so was entirely inexperienced on how to make things happen,” he tells The Independent. “And he brought some mainstream Republican figures into government who turned out not to share his ideas and objectives.”

He continues: “If he wins a second term, it’s clear that he will appoint only supporters to positions around him, and he will have learnt from his first four years how to deliver. So bad ideas are much less likely to get stopped.”

Kim Darroch resigned as UK ambassador to the US in 2019 after dispatches critical of Trump were leaked (Getty)

Juneau says it would be “naive” to assume Trump’s second term would be like the first.

“My fear is that Trump two will be different,” he warns. “And the assumption that many are making here in Canada, but elsewhere too — that we survived Trump one, so we’ll be OK with Trump two — I find that that’s a naive assumption, even if it’s not completely impossible. Trump two will hit the ground running.”

Allied security services will be keeping a watchful eye on anyone Trump potentially nominates to head up the CIA and the NSA if he wins a second term.

“The thing that British intelligence would be watching like a hawk would be who he appoints to those positions,” says Larsen, the British intelligence historian. “There would obviously be more anxiety about a Trump administration just because of the much greater uncertainty as to who he might appoint and what those appointees might do.”

British officials, Larsen adds, would consider whether Trump appointees “might do something that would fundamentally change the bureaucratic relationship between these agencies on both sides of the Atlantic. [Whereas] with the Harris administration, you could count on the pretty traditional appointees to these organizations who would leave the relationship in place as it is,” he says.

Trump and Vladimir Putin shake hands at the beginning of a meeting at the Presidential Palace in Helsinki, Finland on 16 July 2018 (AP)

Differences in foreign policy could include Trump’s attitude to Nato, the 32-member Western defense organization, which he has repeatedly criticized. In February, he said the US would not help defend members who failed to spend 2 per cent of their GDP on defense, as per NATO targets. Instead, he said, he would tell the Russians to “do whatever the hell they want”.

John Bolton, who served as Trump’s national security adviser, has said he feared Trump was planning to pull the US out of NATO completely. Some observers suggest he may do that in a second term, or perhaps just make clear that he would not back NATO’s Article 5 commitment to come to the defense of any member that is attacked.

Trump has also repeatedly praised Russian president Vladimir Putin, among other dictators. At a joint news conference in Helsinki in July 2018, Trump surprised onlookers by taking Putin’s word over that of US intelligence agencies on the issue of whether Russia had interfered in the 2016 US election.

Unlike the first administration, Juneau says, Trump would “surround himself with people who will loyally implement his true vision from day one.”

“Jim Mattis, the first secretary of defense, some of [Trump’s] first national security advisers, some of the people at the CIA, like [Mike] Pompeo, they were Republicans. They were conservatives, but they were professionals, and they were actively blocking Trump’s craziest ideas,” says Juneau.

“The fear has got to be, from a Canadian national security perspective, [that] that won’t be the case under Trump two.”

Fullilove agrees that Trump “leant on the so-called adults in the room” when he was first in office. “This time, he has said that he doesn’t want those kinds of people in the room, and many of them will choose not to be in the room with him because they’ve seen what happened to the people who served him in his first term,” he adds. “So you are likely to see more Maga characters in senior positions.”

Trump in the Oval Office during his first term (EPA)

But Fullilove stresses that while “it would be harder” a second time round, Trump would not go completely unchecked. “On the other hand, don’t underestimate the resilience of the American system: the permanent civil service, the military, the Congress, the courts.”

He is also encouraged to hear JD Vance express his support for AUKUS, the trilateral security and defense partnership between Australia, the UK, and the US — but warns that there is still “some nervousness” because of his running mate.

“I asked JD Vance about AUKUS at the Munich Security Conference in February, and he said that he’s a fan,” Fullilove said. “The problem is that Mr Trump has no personal stake in AUKUS, and he has made a habit of ripping up deals that his predecessors signed. So, there is some risk to AUKUS. I wouldn’t overstate it, but there is some nervousness in Canberra.”

When approached for comment, the Trump campaign claimed that the Harris-Biden administration has “put our national security at risk more than any administration in history.”

Karoline Leavitt, the Trump campaign’s national press secretary, said in a statement to The Independent: “When President Trump was in office, NATO was strong, there was no war in Ukraine, and the Middle East was stable. Under Kamala Harris, the entire world is on the brink of a major war as Putin continues his crusade into Ukraine and Iran is funding terrorist attacks against our ally, Israel.”

Leavitt added: “President Trump will restore world peace through American strength and ensure European nations carry their weight by paying their fair share to our mutual defense to lighten the unfair burden on American taxpayers.”

As Americans head to the polls on Nov. 5, the world holds its collective breath as the count to determine the most powerful politician in the world goes down to the wire.

“The world is in the most fragile and dangerous state that it has been for a generation with war in Europe, conflict in the Middle East, and tension with China,” Darroch said. “Against this backdrop, the American people’s decision on who leads them for the next four years is more consequential than ever.”

UK surpasses £4bn in investment on new nuclear subs

PAID FOR BY PENSIONERS WINTER FUEL ALLOWANCE CUT

By Lisa West
- September 26, 2024

In a joint statement released on 26th September 2024, the UK, US, and Australia reaffirmed their deep commitment to the AUKUS trilateral partnership during a high-level meeting at the Old Royal Naval College in London.

The defence ministers of the three nations gathered to review progress on their joint efforts to bolster regional security in the Indo-Pacific, focusing on the development of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines under the SSN-AUKUS programme.

One of the key highlights from the meeting was the UK’s decision to surpass its original commitment by pledging £4 billion towards the SSN-AUKUS project, significantly enhancing its investment to support the detailed design work and the procurement of long-lead items necessary to meet the delivery timeline.

This comes as part of a larger strategy aimed at ensuring a robust and continuous build-up of submarine capabilities for the Royal Navy and its allies over the coming decades.

This financial contribution will also support the UK’s Defence Nuclear Enterprise, where £3 billion has been allocated to enhance submarine industrial infrastructure, ensuring the success of the long-term plan to develop conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines. This investment aligns with the UK’s broader strategy to remain at the forefront of advanced military technology and maintain its leadership role in the Indo-Pacific region.

The US, for its part, has committed USD 17.5 billion to its submarine industrial base, focusing on supplier development, shipbuilder and supplier infrastructure, workforce development, and technology advancements. According to the statement, this substantial investment will “support initiatives related to supplier development, shipbuilder and supplier infrastructure, workforce development, technology advancements, and strategic sourcing,” strengthening the US’s ability to deliver the advanced submarine capabilities required for the SSN-AUKUS programme.

Australia, meanwhile, is making a significant investment of over AUD 30 billion to enhance its own defence industrial base and ensure that it can sustain the high demand for skilled personnel and robust supply chains needed to support the submarines’ long-term operational capabilities. The Australian government has launched several initiatives to build a skilled workforce, including postgraduate scholarships and the “Jobs for Subs” initiative to recruit, train, and retain additional graduates and apprentices to support Submarine Rotational Force-West (SRF-West) in Western Australia.

The joint statement emphasised the strategic importance of these investments, noting that the three nations are committed to maintaining the highest standards of nuclear non-proliferation and fostering collaboration across their industrial bases. The leaders also reaffirmed their commitment to “uphold the global rules-based order where international law is followed, and states can make sovereign choices free from coercion.”

‘Asian NATO’ supporter Ishiba to become Japan’s prime minister

Shigeru Ishiba said Japan needs to play a ‘great role’ in its alliance with the US.

By Taejun Kang for RFA
2024.09.27
Taipei, Taiwan

Former Japanese defense minister Shigeru Ishiba waves as he is elected as new head of the ruling party in the Liberal Democratic Party’s leadership vote and is set to become Japan’s next prime minister in Tokyo, Japan, Sept. 27, 2024. Kyodo/via Reuters

Veteran Japanese lawmaker Shigeru Ishiba, who supports the creation of an “Asia version of NATO”, was set on Friday to become prime minister after winning a closely fought contest to lead the ruling Liberal Democratic Party.

Since the LDP holds a parliamentary majority, the next party leader will  replace Fumio Kishida as prime minister. Kishida  announced his intention to step down in August. 

“We must believe in the people, speak the truth with courage and sincerity, and work together to make Japan a safe and secure country where everyone can live with a smile once again,” Ishiba said in a brief speech to lawmakers after the party vote.

The LDP chose Ishiba as Japan grapples with increasing security threats and risk of war in the region, with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and China’s growing military assertiveness.

The 67-year-old Ishiba, who said changes in the security environment were the reason he announced his candidacy, has been strong on deterrence.

The former defense minister expressed his desire to create an “Asian version of NATO” and bring equality to the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement.

“Ukraine is not a member of NATO. It is not hard to imagine that this prompted President [Vladimir] Putin’s decision,” he said, stressing the need to build a collective security system in Asia, at a news conference on Sept. 10, referring to the Russian leader’s decision to send troops into Ukraine.

Shigeru Ishiba celebrates after he was elected as new head of Japan's ruling party at the Liberal Democratic Party’s leadership election Friday, Sept. 27, 2024, in Tokyo, Japan. (Hiro Komae/Pool via Reuters)

While Ishiba does not question the importance of the security alliance with the U.S., he has said Japan needs to play a greater role in the alliance and have a larger say in how American troops are deployed in Japan. 

For instance, he wrote in his 2024 memoir that “Japan is still not a truly independent country” because of the “asymmetry” of its dependence on America for its security.

Ishiba also announced he would consider revising the SOFA, or Status of Forces Agreement, which sets the rules for U.S. military operations in Japan. The agreement was concluded when the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was revised in 1960 and has remained unchanged.

Ishiba said that as LDP president, and thus prime minister, he would seek to establish a base in the U.S. to train Japan’s Self-Defense Forces.

He argued that SOFA should be at the same level as an agreement that would be established upon the creation of such an SDF base in the U.S.

“If we are going to revise SOFA, it has to be something that will strengthen the alliance and improve the regional security environment,” said Ishiba. 

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Ishiba is known as a strong backer of Taiwanese democracy while also calling for deeper engagement with China.

He wrote in his memoir that conflating the Russian invasion of Ukraine and a possible Chinese attack on Taiwan was driven by emotion, not a pragmatic assessment of Chinese threats and the impact on Japan.

The nail-biter party election consisted of two rounds. In the first round, the  368 LDP members in the legislature and 368 rank-and-file members cast  ballots. In a second runoff round between the top two candidates, 415 votes were cast.

Ishiba came second, after economic security minister Sanae Takaichi, in the first round but he beat Takaichi in the runoff by 21 votes.

“I want to protect Japan, protect the people, protect the local regions, and want to be the LDP that follows the rules,” Ishiba said after the first vote.

He will be officially announced as prime minister at a special legislative session on Oct. 1.

Edited by Mike Firn.

Shigeru Ishiba is chosen as Japan's next prime minister after winning leadership vote of ruling LDP party

By North Asia correspondent James Oaten in Tokyo

Former Japanese defence minister Shigeru Ishiba accepts the top job following the party vote. (Kyodo via Reuters)

Japan's next prime minister will be maverick regional politician Shigeru Ishiba after the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) elected him the new leader following the news Prime Minister Fumio Kishida would step down.

Mr Ishiba, a veteran politician and former defence minister, won the top job after a runoff against Sanae Takaichi in an internal ballot after none of the original nine hopefuls won enough support to win the ballot outright.

Had Ms Takaichi won, she would have become Japan's first female prime minister.

The vote was sparked after Mr Kishida announced he would no longer seek the top job at the scheduled party meeting, following months of low approval ratings and a donations scandal that embroiled high-ranking politicians.

Shigeru Ishiba won the leadership vote in a runoff election for the Liberal Democratic Party. (Hiro Komae via Reuters)

Before the final vote among LDP politicians, Mr Ishiba vowed to clean up the party's image.

"We will put an end to the widespread distrust in the LDP," he said.


"Once the election is over, we will put our hearts into protecting Japan, local areas, rules and the people of Japan."

Mr Ishiba, 67, has tried and failed to secure the top job many times.

He is known as a maverick, speaking against the party when he feels necessary, which has made him popular among voters.

"He appears on television media quite a lot to give very frank and honest opinions, including criticism of his own government, and that has made him popular with voters," said Jeff Hall, an expert in politics at Kanda University.

Shigeru Ishiba acknowledged his win after he was elected as new head of Japan's ruling LDP party. (Hiro Komae via Reuters)

He hails from a regional part of Japan suffering population decline and has spoken about the need to help all of Japan, and not just the big cities.

"He has this sort of idealistic focus on helping every part of Japan, and he is also very much a policy expert-kind of politician.

"He loves to talk about defence policy, natural disaster relief policies."

But his criticism of the party, including leaving the LDP before, has hurt him in the past, with some fellow LDP members calling him a traitor.
Ishiba beat out would-be first female PM

Mr Ishiba beat out Ms Takaichi, 63, the economic security minister and a hardline conservative who has praised Margaret Thatcher as a role model.

A protege of former prime minister, the late Shinzo Abe, Ms Takaichi talked about stimulating the economy and maintaining ultra-low interest rates.

But there was concern her conservative views were out of line with the electorate.

"She's extremely conservative on social views, far to the right of most Japanese voters, on things like gender, on same-sex marriage, on the issue of whether or not women should be allowed to have a separate family name when they get married," Mr Hall said.

Sanae Takaichi would have been Japan's first female prime minister. (Hiro Komae via Reuters)

She also advocated visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, which honours Japan's war dead, including convicted war criminals.

Her position would infuriate China and South Korea, a country Japan has tried to build relations with.

"She is also very, very hawkish towards China," Mr Hall said.

One of the initial frontrunners in the race was Shinjiro Koizumi, son of former prime minister Junichiro Koizumi.

At 42, Mr Koizumi would have become Japan's youngest prime minister were he successful, but a series of gaffs led many to conclude he was too inexperienced.


"He thinks he can be the Japanese Trudeau, and he's young, he's handsome," Mr Hall said.

"There are a lot of jokes and memes that depict him as an air-headed person who doesn't really have much substance to him."


Japanese former environment minister Shinjiro Koizumi, the 43-year-old son of former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, speaks at a press conference ahead of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leadership election in Tokyo, Japan, September 6, 2024. REUTERS/Kim Kyung-Hoon (Reuters: Kim Kyung-Hoon)
How the votes were counted

The LDP leadership is elected from a 50-50 split between party members, of which there are just under 1.1 million, and its 368 members of parliament, the Diet.

If no candidate wins enough support from the initial vote, a runoff is held that is only open to the members of parliament.

This means a politician less popular with the public can be elected, as factional heads will get the ultimate say.

"Kishida was a classic example of a leader selected not because of his appeal to voters, but because factions within his party wanted to block another politician from becoming PM," said Mr Hall.


Officials show the result of the first voting to election commission at the leadership election. (Hiro Komae via Reuters)

In this runoff, Ms Takaichi was more popular in the initial vote, achieving 72 votes from Diet members while Mr Ishiba won 46.

But among party members, the vote was much closer, with Ms Takaichi beating her rival by one vote.
Snap election expected

Japan's political system is renowned for its relatively high rotation of prime ministers, yet one where the electorate continues to re-elect the same political party.

The LDP has ruled Japan almost uninterrupted in its post-war years.

It lost majority for only a few months in 1993 and was out of government between 2009 and 2013, losing to the centre-left Democratic Party of Japan.

But those years were marred by internal fighting and the the centre-left party failed to deliver on key policies, prompting voters to return the LDP, viewing them as the more experienced party to run the country.

In recent years, the government has been riddled with scandal. The most explosive were revelations senior members of government failed for years to declare donations.

While Mr Kishida wasn't directly involved in the donations scandal, voters saw him as unable to fix the problem, and his voter approval ratings tanked.


Japan's Prime Minister Fumio Kishida (centre) announced he would no longer seek the top job after months of low approval ratings and a donations scandal. (Hiro Komae via Reuters)

Despite this, the LDP is still expected to win the next general election.

"The LDP, at least, has the experienced people and the know-how to run a government without messing things up, at least in an opinion of many people," Mr Hall said.

"The various scandals of the LDP are, of course, abhorrent, and people are very annoyed by them, but a lot of them are petty corruption scandals and various other scandals that don't cause the country to grind to a halt, or they don't involve breaking major promises to voters."

The main opposition party, the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, has appointed former prime minister Yoshihiko Noda as its leader, to try and unite the opposition forces and appear as a reliable pair of hands.

Mr Ishiba is expected to call a snap election, meaning Japan will be returning to the polls in late October or November.

Shigeru Ishiba: the outsider set to become Japan's next Prime Minister

During the LDP leadership campaign, he called for Japan to lead the creation of an 'Asian NATO', an idea quickly rejected by Washington as too hasty

Reuters Tokyo Published 27.09.24, 

Japan's next prime minister Shigeru Ishiba says he reads three books a day and would rather do that than mingle with the ruling party colleagues who picked him as their new leader on Friday.

16Shigeru Ishiba acknowledges after he was elected as new head of Japan's ruling LDP party at the Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) leadership election Friday, Sept. 27, 2024, in Tokyo. (Reuters)

The 67-year-old's successful leadership bid after four failed attempts puts the self-confessed lone wolf at the helm of a Liberal Democratic Party that has ruled Japan for most of the past seven decades.

Ishiba takes over with the party in crisis, having seen its public support ebb away over the past two years with revelations of links to a church branded a cult by critics and a scandal over unrecorded donations.

26Shigeru Ishiba speaks before a runoff election at the Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) leadership election Friday, Sept. 27, 2024, in Tokyo. (Reuters)


A former defence minister who entered parliament in 1986 after a short banking career, Ishiba was sidelined by outgoing prime minister, Fumio Kishida, becoming instead a dissenting voice in the party.


He has rebelled on policies including the increased use of nuclear energy and has criticised his party for not allowing married couples to use separate surnames.


"I consider this my final battle," Ishiba said last month when he launched his campaign at a Shinto shrine in rural Tottori prefecture, where his father was governor and where Ishiba began his political career at the height of Japan's fast growing bubble economy.


"I will bring back a vibrant Japan where people can live with a smile."

36Shigeru Ishiba speaks before a runoff election at the Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) leadership election Friday, Sept. 27, 2024, in Tokyo. (Reuters)


Ishiba, who has also served as agriculture minister, promised to move some ministries and government agencies out of Tokyo to help revive Japan's moribund regions. He has also proposed establishing an agency to oversee the construction of emergency shelters across disaster-prone Japan.


Friction


But his outspoken views, including calls for Fumio and other prime ministers to step down, have earned him enemies in the LDP.


That enmity, which also stems from a four-year defection to an opposition group in 1993, made it difficult for Ishiba to win the 20 nominations he needed from fellow lawmakers to qualify as a candidate in the election on Friday.

46One of candidates Shigeru Ishiba casts his ballot at the Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) leadership election Friday, Sept. 27, 2024, in Tokyo. (Reuters)


After a first round of voting put him through to a run-off with economic security minster Sanae Takaichi, Ishiba acknowledged that his refusal to compromise has caused issues with his colleagues.


"I have undoubtedly hurt many people's feelings, caused unpleasant experiences, and made many suffer. I sincerely apologize for all of my shortcomings," he said in an address to LDP lawmakers who gathered at party headquarters for the election.


His lack of popularity among lawmakers means that Ishiba has had to rely on the support he has nurtured among rank-and-file members over his four decades in politics.


He has stayed in the public eye during his time away from government with media appearances, social media posts and on YouTube, where he muses on topics ranging from Japan's falling birthrate to ramen noodles.


He also pokes fun at himself, including his sometimes-awkward manner and hobbies including plastic models of ships and military aircraft, some of which he displays on the bookshelves that line his parliamentary office in Tokyo.

56Former defence minister Shigeru Ishiba, a candidate for Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) presidential election, speaks during a debate at the Nixon Kisha Club in Tokyo, Japan. September 14, 2024. (Reuters)


U.S. Diplomacy


Seen as an LDP intellectual heavyweight and expert on national security policy, he advocates for a more assertive Japan that can reduce its reliance on longtime ally, the U.S., for its defence.


That position, analysts say, could complicate relations with Washington.


During the LDP leadership campaign, he called for Japan to lead the creation of an "Asian NATO", an idea quickly rejected by Washington as too hasty.


In Okinawa where most of the U.S. troops in Japan are concentrated, he said he would seek greater oversight of the bases they use. He also wants Washington to give Japan a say in how it would use nuclear weapons in Asia.


In an interview with Reuters, Ishiba also criticized the U.S. political backlash to Nippon Steel's bid for U.S. Steel, saying it unfairly cast Japan as a national security risk. Kishida has avoided making comments on the issue ahead of the U.S. presidential election.

66Former Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba, a candidate of Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) presidential election, speaks during a joint press conference at the LDP headquarters in Tokyo, Japan, September 13, 2024. (Reuters)


Policy shifts


Ishiba has, however, softened some policy positions that have put him at odds with party colleagues, most notably saying he would keep some reactors operating in Japan, despite his past opposition to nuclear power and support for renewable energy sources.


A fiscal conservative who has promised to respect the independence of the Bank of Japan to set monetary policy, he has more recently said it is unclear whether conditions were right for a fresh hike in interest rates.


"Politicians don't need to be best friends, as long as their policies and political positions match," Ishiba said in a video posted on YouTube this week

What Japan’s Next Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba Means for the World

Former Japanese Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba delivers a speech before a runoff in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s presidential election to choose the successor to outgoing Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, at the party’s headquarters in Tokyo, Sept. 27, 2024.Kyodo/AP

By Charlie Campbell

TIME
September 27, 2024 


Ishiba Shigeru is set to become Japan’s new Prime Minister after winning the presidency of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in a ballot of party lawmakers and members on Friday afternoon.

A plain-spoken populist and former defense minister who gained the LDP’s leadership on his fifth attempt—what he called his “final battle”—Ishiba, 67, emerged triumphant from a nine-strong field on promises to revitalize rural areas and win back public trust after a slew of scandals led to the stepping down of outgoing Prime Minister Fumio Kishida. Ishiba will assume the nation’s top job on Oct. 1 following a rubber-stamp parliamentary vote.


“Prime Minister Kishida has made a decision to let the LDP be reborn and win back the public's trust,” Ishiba said in his victory speech. “We must all pull together to respond to this.”

Ishiba’s leadership of the East Asian nation of 125 million has implications for global security given Japan’s increasingly prominent role alongside the U.S. checking China’s assertiveness in the Asia-Pacific. Under the outgoing Kishida, who announced he wouldn’t seek reelection last month amid plummeting popularity, Japan has beefed up defense spending and healed historical wounds with South Korea, another key regional U.S. ally.

A Tokyo native, Ishiba has both establishment and rebel credentials. He briefly worked in banking before embarking on his own political career following the death of his father, who was himself a lawmaker and cabinet member. He’s seen as distant from the right-wing faction of the party centered around the late Shinzo Abe, Japan’s longest-serving Prime Minister who was murdered in 2022, having reportedly turned down several cabinet posts under him.

That distance likely proved key in Ishiba’s victory. LDP elders recognized the need for change following public opprobrium regarding the Abe faction’s ties to the controversial Unification Church as well as the misuse of political funds. “Distrust grew in the Kishida administration because he didn’t really deal with the financial scandals of the LDP factions,” says Mieko Nakabayashi, a professor at Tokyo’s Waseda University and a former Japanese lawmaker.

Ishiba’s popularity was bolstered by his outspokenness on the need to properly investigate any malfeasance and for reforms to regain public confidence. Having previously served as agriculture minister and rural revitalization minister, Ishiba’s economic agenda focuses on revitalizing Japan’s outlying regions.

“He has the most credibility as somebody who understands the pain of the people,” says Jeff Kingston, director of Asian studies at Tokyo’s Temple University. “But he’s a blunt-spoken guy who doesn’t suffer fools easily, and many of his colleagues fit that bill. So he can seem arrogant and condescending to his fellow lawmakers.”

As a result, it’s perhaps unsurprising that Ishiba’s support lay more with LDP’s broad membership than fellow lawmakers, many of whom still regard him as a traitor for switching parties for several years in the 1990s. He was also the most populist of the main challengers and known for flip-flopping on various issues depending on public mood, including nuclear energy and whether a woman could serve as Emperor.

“There are many cases when he has changed his stance, so he is sometimes regarded as a weak leader who does not have really strong principles,” says Hosoya Yuichi, a professor of international politics at Keio University in Tokyo. “But at the same time, he is regarded as an experienced, reliable politician.”

Ishiba is one of only two of the leadership candidates who doesn’t speak English—remarkably, four of the nine were Harvard-educated—and is seen as a more conservative choice than his two closest challengers, who would have been either Japan’s youngest or first female leader. (The latter, Economic Security Minister Sanae Takaichi, was ahead on the first-round vote but was defeated by Ishiba in a runoff.)

Yet Ishiba also has a distinct maverick streak. He is one of the few LDP politicians to acknowledge Japanese mistakes in its 1910-45 colonization of Korea, which promises warmer ties with Seoul, though he has also openly called for the establishment of an Asian version of NATO, which may put him on collision course with Beijing.

Regarding U.S. ties, Ishiba has alarmed some by calling for a rebalancing of defense arrangements, with Japan taking more control and responsibility for its own security. He has a reputation as a security hardliner who is fond of building and painting models of aircraft and ships, which reportedly line his office walls, and he has previously voiced support for Japan developing its own nuclear deterrent. However, it’s unlikely he would deviate far from the U.S.-led orthodoxy. U.S. Ambassador Rahm Emanuel congratulated Ishiba in a post on X and said he looks forward to working with him to “cultivate even closer” U.S.-Japan ties.

“We will put our hearts into protecting Japan, local areas, rules, and the people of Japan,” Ishiba said Friday.

Takaichi becomes 1st woman candidate in Japan's PM race

Erica Yokoyama and Alastair Gale | Bloomberg

TAKAICHI: Sanae Takaichi has announced her candidacy for Japan's Prime Minister race. Toru Hanai/Bloomberg

Japan’s ruling party leadership election will have at least one woman in the field after Sanae Takaichi entered the race on Monday.

The protégé of late Prime Minister Shinzō Abe and his aggressive monetary and fiscal policy views pledged to use public money to boost jobs and growth. Takaichi placed third in the 2021 LDP leadership election and is currently trailing Shinjiro Koizumi and Shigeru Ishiba in the latest race.

The leader of the LDP is all but assured of becoming prime minister because of the party’s dominance in parliament. The election will take place on Sept. 27.


Current Prime Minister Fumio Kishida surprised many by saying in August he wouldn’t run in the election, ending his term after nearly three years as premier.


Here’s a look at some of the contenders to replace Kishida.

Sanae Takaichi, 63

A former heavy metal drummer turned hard-line conservative, Takaichi has cited former U.K. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher as an inspiration. Currently minister for economic security, Takaichi is among the leading contenders according to recent public opinion polls. She is a frequent visitor to Yasukuni Shrine, a site regarded by Japan’s neighbors as a symbol of past militarism.

Key policies:Monetary: Support for ultra-loose monetary policy of stance of former premier Abe; doesn’t think price target has been stably met
Fiscal: Believes a strong economy would bring stable growth without raising tax rates; seeks strategic fiscal spending
Energy: Says Japan should target 100% energy self-sufficiency; Would invest in next-generation nuclear reactors in the latter half of 2020s, look to nuclear fusion in the 2030s

Shinjiro Koizumi, 43

The son of a former premier, Shinjiro Koizumi attracted attention in September 2023 for surfing off Fukushima to ease safety concerns following the release of treated wastewater from the wrecked nuclear plant. A former environment minister and proponent of renewable energy, Koizumi made headlines for becoming the first serving cabinet minister to take paternity leave. Koizumi is generally running first or second in polls asking voters who they would like to become prime minister. He formally declared on Sept. 6.

Key policies:Economy: While in principle continuing Kishida’s policies, he said he will also review firing restrictions as part of labor reforms, and completely allow ridesharing
Defense: Defense spending must be swiftly raised to 2% of GDP
Financial: Has said it’s not the time to discuss capital gains tax, given the recent moves from savings to investment
Energy: Restarting new nuclear reactors is an option; need to reduce the amount spent on fossil fuels

Shigeru Ishiba, 67

A former defense minister, Ishiba ranks high in voter surveys of popularity. In his last four tries at the top job, he has struggled to garner enough support from his fellow lawmakers to win the leadership race. In recent weeks, Ishiba has expressed support for the Bank of Japan’s normalization of monetary policy. He announced his candidacy on Aug. 24.

Key policies:Monetary: Has backed the BOJ’s July 31 decision to raise rates and criticized the government’s past long-term extraordinary easing policy
Economic: Looks to reinvigorate domestic demand to spur growth, rather than relying on foreign trade
Foreign: Has been a strong backer of democracy in Taiwan and building partnerships in the region as a way of deterrence against the likes of China

Kono Taro, 61

A former foreign and defense minister with a combative style, Kono lost to Kishida in the last leadership race due to a lack of backing from his parliamentary peers. Kono is in the middle of the pack in recent public opinion polls. Kono has softened his opposition to nuclear power in recent years. He asks that his name be written Japanese style, with his family name first. He declared on Aug. 26.


Key policies:Monetary: Supports BOJ policy normalization if inflation remains in line with expectations. Has also said the weak yen is a problem for Japan.
Fiscal: Says fiscal consolidation is a priority after large stimulus spending during the pandemic
Digital: Called for ending antiquated practices such as use of name stamps as he seeks wider reforms

Toshimitsu Motegi, 68


A party heavyweight who recently said the BOJ should more clearly show its intention to normalize monetary policy, Motegi is currently in the LDP’s No. 2 position. A former foreign minister, he’s also a Harvard graduate and has a tough guy image within the party. He announced his run on Sept. 4.

Key policies:Monetary: Has said BOJ should more clearly show its intention to normalize monetary policy to support the yen, as a weak currency might drive up prices
Fiscal: As party secretary-general, Motegi has been a backer of current fiscal policies and is likely to support the status quo. He has advocated returning some of Japan’s increased tax revenues to the people via direct tax cuts
Foreign: As foreign minister, Motegi showed support for peace in the Taiwan Strait, while also planning for contingencies

Takayuki Kobayashi, 49

Kobayashi is considered part of the younger generation of potential leaders. He is a long shot to take over in 2024, but by running now he is letting LDP members and voters know he has his eyes set on eventually becoming premier. He declared his candidacy on Aug. 19.

Key policies:Monetary: Has spoken about the difficulties of absorbing bonds domestically and the need for seeking overseas investors
Economy: Has said the economy takes precedence over finance, indicating that spending for growth is important
Trade: Expressed need for Japan to strengthen supply chains, including those for critical minerals like lithium and cobalt that are used in energy transition technologies

Yoshimasa Hayashi, 63

Hayashi is from the dovish wing of the ruling party and a trusted lieutenant of Kishida. He ran unsuccessfully in the LDP leadership race in 2012 and is considered by many political analysts to be an outsider in this year’s election. Hayashi studied at Harvard University and spent most of the Kishida administration as foreign minister. He announced his run on Sept. 3.

Key policies:Economy: Supports fiscal spending but says it’s important to keep confidence in Japanese government bonds
Foreign policy: Rejects criticism he’s pro-China and says he’s someone who prioritizes dialogue, including with China
Energy: In favor of restarting nuclear power plants if their safety is confirmed

Katsunobu Kato, 68

The former health minister could emerge as a compromise candidate. The seven-term lawmaker helped guide Japan through the Covid-19 pandemic when the country fared better than most of its Group of Seven peers. Kato has not ruffled a lot of feathers in the ruling party, while playing key roles under the last three premiers. He plans to hold a press conference to formally declare his candidacy on Sept. 10.

Key policies:Monetary policy: In a Bloomberg interview, he said Japan should continue to aim for a world where interest rates and prices keep moving
Economic policy: Aims for sustainable growth through major investment to boost productivity
Fiscal policy: Seeks a balanced approach to managing fiscal health and securing growth

Yoko Kamikawa, 71

Kamikawa is a Harvard graduate who ran her own consulting firm before entering politics. She is known for her efforts to promote women candidates, which is an uphill battle given that only about 12% of LDP lawmakers are female. Kamikawa has yet to declare.


Key Policies:Fiscal: She supported active fiscal spending ahead of the last LDP election in 2021 but has since flagged the need for fiscal discipline
Foreign: Has firmly backed trilateral security cooperation among Japan, South Korea and the U.S. and has pressed to advance human rights globally

Other names listed as possible candidates include lawmaker Seiko Noda, who previously came up short on her bid to become the country’s first female premier, and Ken Saito, the minister of economy, trade and industry.



With assistance from Isabel Reynolds, Yuki Hagiwara and Jon Herskovitz.

Turkey’s Strategic Autonomy in the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean

Daria Isachenko
Erol Kaymak

SWP Comment 2024/C 39,

 06.09.2024, 

7 Pages
doi:10.18449/2024C39

Research Areas Turkey
PDF | 352 KB
EPUB | 1.2 MB
MOBI | 3.1 MB

LONG READ

In the Black Sea, Turkey has been able to engage in resource exploration and joint security arrangements with its neighbours. Ankara’s approach to the Black Sea demonstrates that with the right diplomatic efforts and mutual recognition of inter­ests, regional cooperation is possible even in complex geopolitical environments. The contrast in Ankara’s positioning in the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean highlights the potential for Turkey to participate in cooperative frameworks in the latter case, provided its concerns and interests are adequately addressed.

In the Black Sea, Turkey has managed to establish a functioning modus operandi with all the riparian states. Ankara’s strat­egy emphasises regional ownership, multi­lateral cooperation, and a balancing act to prevent domination by any single power. Although Turkey did not join the Western-led sanctions regime against Russia, Ankara’s steps in the Black Sea region, such as its application of the Montreux Convention, its initial mediation efforts between Russia and Ukraine, the Black Sea Grain Deal, as well as the trilateral Black Sea Mine Coun­termeasures Task Force with Romania and Bulgaria, have been welcomed by the West.

In the Eastern Mediterranean, however, the balance between Turkey being a partner or a challenger to its Western allies is rather different. Following Ankara’s controversial drilling activities in 2020, Josep Borrell, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission, stated that “the three old Empires: Russia, China and Turkey … come as threats or Global rivals” for Europe. It is also in the context of the Eastern Mediter­ranean that Turkey’s policy is often described as expansionist and revisionist.

Comparing and contrasting Turkey’s Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean poli­cies, we can observe that one of Ankara’s key problems in the latter case is its sense of exclusion from having a say in regional discussions. The Eastern Mediterranean nexus of conflicts also shows that one of the dominant approaches in Ankara’s foreign policy is to assert its interests “both on the ground and at the table” (hem sahada, hem de masada). A driving logic behind this is that in order to sit at the table, one must be present on the ground. The desire to be at the table stems from Ankara’s sense of entitlement to regional ownership. While Ankara has been able to achieve this in the Black Sea, it is still struggling to negotiate its share in the regional dynamics of the Eastern Mediterranean.

Asserting interests: “Both on the ground and at the table”

Turkey’s foreign policy in recent years has been characterised by striving for strategic autonomy, which has been analysed by experts through various lenses. First, it has been applied in the context of Turkey-West relations and its balancing act, implying Ankara’s aim to diminish Turkey’s depend­ence on the West, especially in the security sphere. Second, Ankara’s quest for strategic autonomy has also been viewed as a defence-oriented maritime strategy to protect nation­al interests and extend the concept of home­land to maritime zones. Yet others have interpreted Ankara’s strategic autonomy based on a neo-Ottoman foreign policy to enhance Turkey’s influence as a regional power.

What is common to these perspectives is the idea of Ankara asserting its agency while aiming to secure its interests and shape regional developments. It does so through a combination of military presence and diplomatic engagement. By projecting military power, forging strategic partnerships, and challenging existing arrange­ments, Turkey seeks to demonstrate its capacity to be a decisive actor in regional affairs. This assertive approach reflects An­kara’s refusal to be excluded from regional decision-making processes. Turkey’s Presi­dent Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s statement, “We are now a country with a fundamental place both on the ground and at the table,” underscores Turkey’s ambition to be a cen­tral player in regional politics and in the international arena.

Turkey’s actions in the Eastern Mediterranean are a clear demonstration of its “on the ground” strategy, including naval exercises, deploying drilling ships in con­tested waters, and signing a maritime boundary agreement with Libya in 2019. Ankara’s aim has been to secure its claims to maritime resources and to counter per­ceived encroachments by Greece and Cyprus, supported by the European Union (EU) and the United States (US). Furthermore, Turkey’s exclusion from regional initiatives, such as the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, exemplifies the challenges it faces in being recognised as a legitimate stakeholder at the table. This fuels Turkey’s assertive approach, based on its perception of being deliberately sidelined. As Erdoğan stated back in 2020, “Turkey, much like a century ago and half a century ago, is facing attempts to be excluded from the re‑establishment of the world order.”

Unlike the Eastern Mediterranean, the Black Sea regional order gives Turkey a key role in shaping it as well as acting as a regional stabiliser. Ankara’s diplomatic efforts focus on maintaining regional sta­bility and preventing external interference, primarily through the strategic implementation of the Montreux Convention. By lev­eraging the Montreux Convention, Turkey has limited the influence of non-riparian states and maintains a balanced power dynamic, preventing any single actor from dominating the region. This has allowed Turkey to play an influential role in the Black Sea’s security architecture, balancing its relationships with both the North Atlan­tic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Russia to maximise its strategic autonomy and regional influence.

Regional ownership in the Black Sea

One of the key elements of Turkey’s Black Sea policy has been the idea of regional ownership. It has been applied in different ways. First, it has meant multilateral insti­tutionalised cooperative frameworks involv­ing all riparian states, such as the Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) as well as maritime missions like the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BlackSeaFor) and the Black Sea Harmony. Second, the notion of regional ownership has increasingly aligned with a Turkish-Russian ‘condominium’, reflecting Turkey’s careful approach to avoid antagonising Russia, alongside Moscow’s reliance on Ankara’s objective to restrict the involvement of non-regional actors.

After February 24, 2022, the idea of regional ownership has been seriously questioned in the West, given the impossibility of a formal multilateral framework that simultaneously engages all riparian states in the Black Sea and given Ankara’s own unease with Russia’s territorial expan­sion. Such a perspective assumes that for regional ownership to function, it must be formal and institutionalised or be exclusively about the Turkey-Russia partnership.

To understand Ankara’s approach in neighbouring regions, it is useful to look at one of the key assumptions behind regional ownership, namely ‘regional responsibility’, which forms the basis of Ankara’s sense of entitlement to shape regional affairs. This is also reflected in the “regional solutions to regional problems” approach that Turkey has promoted elsewhere, from the South Caucasus to Africa.

Broadly conceived, the idea of regional ownership comprises two fundamental elements that guide Ankara’s positioning. First, countries of the region should be in­cluded in regional affairs. Second, countries of the region should have a greater say than non-regional players. Thus, while Ankara has been able to exercise its regional re­spon­sibility in the Black Sea, the denial of regional ownership has been a driving factor behind Turkey’s policies in the case of the Eastern Mediterranean.

Challenges of regional ownership in the Eastern Mediterranean

The Eastern Mediterranean has become a focal point of geopolitical tensions, legal disputes, and economic opportunities, particularly following the discovery of significant natural gas reserves. The region’s complex dynamics are influenced by historical legacies, strategic interests, and the necessity of balancing regional and international relations. The multifaceted challenges of regional ownership in the Eastern Mediterranean have prompted a focus on the actions and foreign policy of Turkey and the contrasting perspectives surrounding these issues.

Many policy perspectives from Western institutions view Turkey’s actions in the Eastern Mediterranean as increasingly asser­tive. Critics argue that Turkey’s maritime claims, military presence, and energy explo­ration activities in disputed waters contrib­ute to regional tensions and undermine inter­na­tional law. These concerns are often framed within the context of Turkey’s strained relations with its NATO allies and the EU.

From this perspective, Turkey’s exclusion from regional cooperation frameworks like the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum is viewed as stemming from its aggressive be­haviour and unwillingness to compromise. Western policy analysts often empha­sise the importance of upholding inter­nation­al law, particularly the United Nations Con­vention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and call for Turkey to align its claims and actions with international norms. They argue that Turkey’s actions violate both the spirit and the letter of UNCLOS, which seeks to provide a fair and equitable framework for maritime boundary delimitation for all parties involved. This perceived disregard for international norms and agreements heightens fears of further instability in a region already fraught with historical rival­ries and territorial disputes.

Policy recommendations from this view­point typically involve a combination of diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, and support for regional cooperation initia­tives that exclude or marginalise Turkey. The goal is to compel Turkey to modify its behaviour and accept a more limited role in the Eastern Mediterranean, in line with the preferences of the EU, the US, and regional allies like Greece, Cyprus, and Israel. By leveraging economic sanctions and diplo­matic isolation, Western policymakers aim to incentivise Turkey to adhere to inter­national legal frameworks and to partici­pate in multilateral negotiations that uphold the rule of law and respect for sovereign boundaries.

Ankara’s view of the Eastern Mediterranean order and its search for riparian allies



Map


Source: Sinem Adar et al., Visualizing Turkey’s Foreign Policy Activism (Berlin: Centre for Applied Turkey Studies [CATS], CATS Network, 20 August 2021), Figure 5, https://www.cats-network.eu/topics/visualizing-turkeys-foreign-policy-activism


Turkey’s assertiveness is driven by a combi­nation of factors, including its long-stand­ing maritime disputes with Greece and Cyprus, its desire to secure a share of the region’s energy resources, and its concerns over the formation of alliances that, in An­kara’s view, could isolate or contain Turkey. These strategic concerns are com­pounded by the legacy of historical treaties, such as the Lausanne Treaty, which have left un­resolved tensions and competing claims over maritime boundaries and sovereignty.

In particular, Greece’s militarisation of islands initially demilitarised by the Lausanne Treaty is seen by Turkey as a violation of historical agreements, exacerbating fears of encirclement and strategic vulnerability. Greece has established mili­tary installations on several Aegean islands, including Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Ikaria, and the Dodecanese group (such as Rhodes, Kos, Leros, and Kalymnos), which Turkey con­tends violates the demilitarisation clauses of the Treaties of Lausanne (1923) and Paris (1947). These installations typically consist of army barracks, radar stations, coastal ar­tillery, and defensive fortifications designed for monitoring and defence against poten­tial threats. While Greece justifies this mili­tarisation as necessary for self-defence, cit­ing Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and the proximity of these islands to the Turk­ish coast, Turkey views it as a breach of international agreements and a security threat. The presence of these military facil­ities remains a significant point of diplomatic contention between the two countries.

In this context, Turkey’s signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Libya in November 2019 is particularly sig­nificant. Given Turkey’s lack of partners in the Eastern Mediterranean, it has been Ankara’s strategic move to turn Libya into a “riparian” ally to counter regional isolation and assert its maritime claims. By establish­ing a maritime boundary with Libya, Tur­key aims to challenge efforts by Greece and Cyprus to unilaterally delimit their mari­time zones and to establish a foothold in the region’s energy dynamics. This is not merely about immediate territorial gains, but is also a bid to reshape the regional order in a way that acknowledges Turkey’s strategic importance and historical griev­ances. The MoU serves as both a defensive measure to protect Turkey’s interests and an offensive strategy to project its power and influence in the Eastern Mediterranean.

By forming an alliance with Libya, Tur­key also sought to counterbalance the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, which includes Cyprus, Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority. The MoU strategically positions Turkey as a key player in the region’s energy politics, potentially disrupting plans to transport Eastern Mediterranean gas to European markets via routes that bypass Turkey. Additionally, the MoU underscores Turkey’s broader strategy of using bilateral agreements to assert its claims and also challenges what it perceives as an exclusionary regional order. This move has drawn criticism and increased tensions, but also highlights Turkey’s determination to defend its interests through proactive and sometimes controversial measures, par­ticu­larly against the backdrop of unilateral actions by Greece and Cyprus to delimit their maritime zones without considering Turkish and Turkish Cypriot rights.

Continuities in Turkish foreign policy

Domestically, President Erdoğan’s rapprochement with military and nationalist elements following the 2016 coup attempt has reinforced a confrontational and nation­alistic foreign policy. The “survival of the state” coalition emphasises a strong state capable of defending its sovereignty and interests against perceived external threats. This coalition supports the Blue Homeland doctrine (Mavi Vatan), which advocates for extensive Turkish claims in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Former Chief of Staff of the Turkish Navy Rear Admiral Cihat Yaycı, a key proponent of the Blue Homeland doctrine, argues for an assertive stance to protect Turkey’s mari­time rights. He emphasises the importance of securing Turkey’s access to natural resources and countering Greek claims. Yaycı’s views reflect a broader consensus among Turkish nationalists that Turkey must robustly de­fend its maritime boundaries and resource rights to ensure national security and eco­nomic prosperity. Admiral Cem Gürdeniz, another prominent figure, also supports a strong naval presence to safeguard Turkey’s interests. Both figures have played crucial roles in shaping Turkey’s maritime strategy, advocating for a proactive and sometimes con­frontational approach to maritime disputes.

Turkey’s approach towards the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean is not solely driven by current leadership. It is rooted in long-standing strategic considerations. In the Black Sea, Turkey’s balancing act between its NATO commitments and its desire to maintain stable relations with Russia has been one of the defining features of its regional strategy.



Blue Homeland Doctrine

The Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan) is Turkey’s maritime strategy to expand and secure its sovereign rights in the Eastern Mediterranean, Aegean Sea, and Black Sea. Developed by Turkish naval officers, particularly Admiral Cem Gürdeniz. The doctrine has gained prominence under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s administration as part of Turkey’s broader strategic autonomy and assertive foreign policy.



Context and Evolution

Cold War Legacy: Rooted in Turkey’s Cold War-era naval strategy, which prioritised con­trolling sea routes and safeguarding maritime borders.

Post-2016 Shift: Following the 2016 coup attempt, there was a notable shift towards a more nationalist and assertive foreign policy, with the Blue Homeland doctrine becoming central to Turkey’s maritime strategy.

Geopolitical Dynamics: The discovery of energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean and the evolving security environment in the Black Sea have further propelled the doc­trine’s importance in Turkish policy.



Key Objectives

Maritime Sovereignty: Protect maritime claims and resources.

Strategic Autonomy: Enhance naval capabilities and reduce reliance on Western alliances.

Regional Influence: Establish Turkey as a domi­nant maritime power.



Key Components

Expansion of Claims: Extending Turkey’s mari­time boundaries.

Naval Presence: Deploying forces and conduct­ing exercises.

Strategic Partnerships: Agreements like the 2019 maritime boundary treaty with Libya.



Impact

The doctrine has increased regional tensions, particularly with Greece and Cyprus, and strained relations with NATO and the EU.



For more information see: Serhat Süha Çubukçuoğlu, Turkey’s Naval Activism: Maritime Geopolitics and the Blue Homeland Concept, Pal­grave Studies in Maritime Politics and Secu­rity (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2023).


The Eastern Mediterranean is likely to hold greater strategic significance for Tur­key compared to the Black Sea. It is no coin­cidence that the Blue Homeland doctrine has emerged and been promoted in the offi­cial discourse in the Eastern Mediterranean context. The region’s energy resources, maritime dis­putes, and Turkey’s ambition to establish itself as a regional power make it a lasting top priority for Ankara.

The Blue Homeland doctrine and the “on the ground and at the table” approach are thus extensions of Turkey’s traditional foreign policy objectives, which prioritise the protection of its sovereignty, the asser­tion of its regional influence, and the pur­suit of its economic interests. Future Turk­ish governments are likely to maintain a similar stance in these regions, albeit with potential adjustments based on a changing geopolitical environment.

Outlook and recommendations

Turkey’s actions in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea will have implications for its relationships with the US, the EU, and NATO. By pursuing a balanced and constructive approach, Turkey could lev­er­age its regional influence to enhance its global standing and advance its strategic objectives. However, if Turkey’s security and economic interests remain unaddressed, it may resort to more assertive actions on the ground rather than at the table. An esca­lation of tensions could strain Turkey’s relationships with regional partners and Western allies, potentially leading to diplo­matic and economic consequences. To mitigate these risks, Turkey should balance its assertive posture with diplomatic efforts to find mutually acceptable solutions to regional disputes.

Given the geostrategic interconnectedness between the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean, it is also essential for Ankara’s Western allies to try to engage con­structively with Turkey to address its con­cerns and find common ground. In particular, this may involve revisiting exist­ing agreements and frameworks, such as the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, to ensure that such initiatives are representative, inclusive, and responsive to the needs of all regional stakeholders.

Despite Turkey’s geostrategic location and its potential to diversify energy routes to Europe, political tensions and concerns over Turkey’s assertive foreign policy have hindered closer cooperation with the EU. This has led Turkey to seek alternative alli­ances and secure its energy interests by adopting confrontational policies. These dynamics underscore the interplay between energy security, geopolitical competition, and regional stability, highlighting the need for a more integrated and cooperative ap­proach to energy politics.


Dr Daria Isachenko is Associate at the Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS). 

Dr Erol Kaymak is a Fellow at the Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS).


The Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS) is funded by Stiftung Mercator and the German Federal Foreign Office

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This work is licensed under CC BY 4.0

This Comment reflects the authors’ views.

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ISSN (Print) 1861-1761

ISSN (Online) 2747-5107

DOI: 10.18449/2024C39