A high-level NATO delegation visits Ukraine for the first time since full-scale invasion

Copyright AP Photo

By Lucy Davalou with AP

Published on 22/03/2026 - EURONEWS

For the first time since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a high-level NATO delegation has paid a visit to discuss the future involvement of Ukrainian military personnel in NATO exercises.

At least one person has been killed during overnight Russian attacks on Ukraine. In parallel, on Sunday, a high-level NATO delegation is in Ukraine for the first time since the 2022 full-scale invasion.

Russia launched 139 drones of different types, including Shaheds, over Ukraine, however, 127 of them were either shot down or jammed, according to Ukraine’s Armed Forces.

In the southern frontline region of Kherson, one person was reported to have been killed and three injured. The regional administration reported on its Telegram channel that over the past day, 34 of its communities have been subjected to drone attacks, air strikes, or artillery shelling. The targets included residential areas, homes, apartment blocks, and social infrastructure.

Related

• ANOTHER DAY, ANOTHER WAR CRIME
• Russia launches 154 drones over Ukraine, killing a couple at home and injuring their children

More Russian attacks were reported in the frontline regions of Sumy and Donetsk, which were subjected to intense shelling and drone attacks, leaving five people injured in Sumy, according to regional administrations. An attack on emergency workers in Sumy responding to a previous Russian strike was also reported, Ukraine’s Emergency Service said.

On the other hand, Robert “Magyar” Brovdi, Commander of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, said on Telegram that Ukraine had destroyed two air defence vehicles in Russia’s Bryansk region, including one missile launcher and one vehicle used to transport and reload its missiles.

NATO delegation discusses their future with Ukraine

Meanwhile, on the diplomatic side, a high-level NATO delegation led by French Admiral Pierre Vandier is in Ukraine for the first time since the 2022 full-scale invasion.

Deputy Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, Pavlo Palisa, wrote in a post on X that they “discussed in detail the involvement of Ukrainian military personnel in future NATO exercises in the role of the conditional adversary,” as well as “the future of JATEC (NATO-Ukraine Joint Analysis, Training and Education Centre),” an initiative supporting coordination and development between Ukraine’s forces and NATO.

For the first time during the full-scale war, Ukraine was visited by NATO military command at this level – a delegation led by Admiral Pierre Vandier, Supreme Allied Commander of NATO's Allied Command Transformation...

Meanwhile, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on Sunday that due to the Trump administration’s easing of sanctions on Russia, Moscow has increased its oil sales, which are funding the war against Ukraine.

On Saturday, a Ukrainian delegation sent by Zelenskyy met with a US delegation in Miami in the hope of restarting peace talks. US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff said on X that the talks were “constructive.” He said the meetings, which included US President Donald Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner, were “part of ongoing mediation efforts, with discussions focused on narrowing and resolving remaining items to move closer to a comprehensive peace agreement.”

As the war in Iran dominates international attention, trilateral talks with Russia, which have yet to produce any breakthrough on key issues, have been on hold.

The sinking of IRIS Dena: A quiet death of the rules-based order

The sinking of IRIS Dena — unarmed, post-exercise, in a neutral state’s waters — exposed a doctrine of impunity, and the quiet death of the rules-based order.

Baqar Hasan 

Published March 10, 2026
DAWN

At 05:08 local time, in international waters 40 nautical miles south of Galle, Sri Lanka, a Mark 48 heavyweight torpedo — one of two fired, with the first missing its mark — struck the IRIS Dena beneath her keel. She was returning from India’s MILAN 2026 multinational naval exercise at Visakhapatnam as an officially invited guest, and was unarmed in accordance with the exercise’s return-voyage protocol.

She had 180 crew members aboard. At least 87 are now confirmed dead, another 32 were rescued and about 60 people were likely unaccounted for, Sri Lankan ​authorities said. The vessel was approximately 1,700 nautical miles from Iran’s nearest coastline and over 1,350 nautical miles from the nearest active theatre of Operation Epic Fury.

The submarine that sank her — identified by CBS News, citing multiple officials, as USS Charlotte, a Los Angeles-class attack submarine — left the area without conducting search and rescue operations. The Sri Lankan Navy recovered survivors and bodies from the water alone.
A quiet death

Pete Hegseth called it a “quiet death.” He was describing a torpedo strike. Without realising it, he was also eulogising something larger — the rules-based international order that the United States and its partners spent 80 years constructing and now appear, with evident satisfaction, to be dismantling.

What “quiet death” reveals is not a military assessment but a doctrine: we can do this, anywhere, to anyone, and frame it as dominance rather than law.

Across independent polls conducted after the strikes on Iran, roughly 60 per cent of Americans opposed the campaign. Support was concentrated almost entirely among self-identified MAGA Republicans, whose fragile enthusiasm Donald Trump acknowledged by invoking the “silent majority.”

This operation was not calibrated for America. It was not calibrated for the world. It was calibrated for a base. And when a Secretary of Defence crafts press-conference language as a loyalty signal rather than a legal or strategic communication to the international community, something has gone quietly wrong with the function of government itself.
One doctrine, three expressions

The pattern did not begin with IRIS Dena. On Thursday, February 26 — two days before the bombs fell — Iranian and American negotiators concluded what Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, described as the most intense round of talks yet, and agreed to reconvene in Vienna the following week. Both sides said progress had been made.

The bombs fell on Saturday.

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei — 86 years old, the spiritual authority of 85 million people — was announced dead by nightfall. Omani Foreign Minister Sayyid Badr bin Hamad Albusaid, who had brokered months of diplomatic architecture, said he was dismayed that “active and serious negotiations” had been destroyed. The Member of International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) director-general had stated publicly, and on the record, that the agency had found no proof of an active Iranian nuclear weapons programme — a position consistent with US intelligence assessments.

Iran was negotiating. Then it was bombed.


Hours later, that same Saturday, a missile struck the Shajareh Tayyebeh girls’ elementary school in Minab, in Hormozgan province. Between 165 and 180 people were killed — the majority girls aged seven to twelve, sitting in class on a Saturday morning. Planet Labs satellite imagery, analysed by three independent experts, including Professor Jeffrey Lewis of the Middlebury Institute, showed precision detonation centroids consistent with a US strike, given the geographic location and munition type.

The school had been separated from an adjacent Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) base by a wall built between 2013 and 2016. Al Jazeera’s independent investigation concluded that only two explanations are consistent with the evidence: either the coalition relied on a targeting database more than a decade out of date — constituting grave negligence and reckless disregard for civilian life — or the strike was deliberate, intended to inflict maximum societal shock.

UNESCO condemned it. The UN Secretary-General condemned it. The Pentagon did not respond to requests for comment.

Five days later: IRIS Dena.

Khamenei killed during diplomacy. Schoolgirls killed in their classroom. Sailors killed on an unarmed transit. These are not three separate incidents. They are three expressions of the same doctrine — that when rules become inconvenient, they are set aside, and the press conference follows.

The law that died with the Dena

The San Remo Manual on the laws of naval warfare — the same framework the United States cited for four decades against Iranian conduct in the Persian Gulf — requires neutral state notification, precaution before attack, and verified military necessity. Sri Lanka received no warning. The IRIS Dena reportedly carried no ordnance. No alternative to sinking her was attempted or explained.

When the USS Charlotte fired and departed without conducting search and rescue operations, it added a second violation to the first: the Second Geneva Convention requires parties to a maritime engagement to search for and collect the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked. The Sri Lanka Navy, which bore no responsibility for the engagement, carried out those operations alone. The US did not attempt to argue that the conditions for lawful conduct had been met. It did not need to. Impunity does not require justification. It simply acts, and then describes what it has done as winning.

That is the tell. For 80 years, the rules-based order rested on a claim: that powerful states had accepted constraints on their behaviour and would enforce those same constraints on others. What the past 10 days suggest is that the claim was always conditional. When the most powerful actor in the system decides those constraints no longer apply to itself, there is no enforcement mechanism, no appeal, no remedy. There is only the press conference.
Theatre vs discipline

A nuclear-powered attack submarine hunting a frigate in the Indian Ocean and firing two Cold War-era torpedoes — one missing, one killing — at an unarmed vessel on a transit passage is not military efficiency. It is theatre: a display of capability masquerading as necessity, calibrated for the same domestic audience as Hegseth’s press conference and perfectly aligned with the instincts of an administration that consistently mistakes spectacle for strategy.

The contrast with Iran’s own conduct is instructive, and ought to disturb those who assume the United States holds every strategic advantage. Iran has absorbed the killing of its Supreme Leader, the destruction of its nuclear facilities, and the decimation of its navy. Its military responses have been a disciplined integration of precision and volume that has confounded Western expectations.

Where the United States reached for expensive legacy platforms, Iran deployed a calibrated mix of ballistic missiles and cheap drones that achieved what no formal naval blockade managed in 40 years: the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz.


The Joint Maritime Information Centre now assesses it as a critical-risk environment. Maersk, Hapag-Lloyd, CMA CGM, and MSC have all suspended passage. Traffic is down by more than 80pc. Helima Croft of RBC Capital Markets described it as “about as wrong as things could go at any single point of failure” in global energy markets. Iran closed the world’s most critical energy chokepoint with cheap drones. Its adversary responded with a $1.5 million torpedo fired at an unarmed vessel 1,700 nautical miles from the conflict zone.

The asymmetry is not merely financial. Each Iranian response has been calculated to impose cost without unnecessarily triggering the next threshold — a doctrine of economy and discipline from a state that has studied asymmetric warfare for four decades. When a vastly superior force responds to that kind of disciplined resistance by escalating theatrically rather than strategically, it is not winning. It is revealing that it does not know how to win.

And at the end of that logic sits the USS Gerald R. Ford, repositioned progressively forward in the Eastern Mediterranean and into range of Iran’s longer-reach ballistic arsenal. Whether that forward positioning reflects thinning interceptor stocks or a calculated attempt to bait Iran into providing a casus belli that would rewrite the rules of this conflict entirely, the result is the same: a nuclear-armed superpower manoeuvring its most visible asset into an adversary’s kill envelope. That is not escalation control. That is escalation gambling.

The cost to partners

On Friday morning, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese confirmed what his foreign minister had declined to say two days earlier: three Royal Australian Navy personnel were aboard USS Charlotte when it fired. “We wouldn’t normally confirm such an issue,” Albanese told Sky News, “but given our National Security Committee meetings and the public interest, I can confirm that there were three Australian personnel on board that vessel.” He added, in the same breath, that “no Australian personnel have participated in any offensive action against Iran.”

That distinction collapsed within hours. Professor Don Rothwell of the Australian National University, one of the country’s foremost international law experts, stated plainly that Australians under the command of an American submarine captain would have had very little choice but to be involved. “Literally every person on board a submarine is engaged in active duty,” Rothwell said, “unlike, say, the vast numbers of persons who would be on board an aircraft carrier.”

A submarine has no bystanders. The question of whether Australian personnel participated in offensive action is not one the prime minister can answer with a prepared statement. It is a question of operational reality that the laws of armed conflict, not Canberra’s communications team, will ultimately determine.


Senator Shoebridge, who drew this thread in parliament, put it with characteristic precision: every future US war, under the current AUKUS (a trilateral security partnership between Australia, the UK, and the US) architecture, will have Australia dragged into it “without ever a decision being made by the Australian cabinet.” The Albanese government spent two days stonewalling. When it finally confirmed, it confirmed more than it intended.

India’s position is more exposed, and more silent. On February 25, Prime Minister Narendra Modi stood in the Israeli Knesset — the first Indian leader ever to do so — and declared India’s solidarity with Israel “firmly, with full conviction.” Two days later, Operation Epic Fury began. Eight days later, a vessel India had officially invited to its exercise was sunk in India’s strategic maritime neighbourhood by India’s partner, without any consultation with New Delhi.

India’s senior strategic analyst Brahma Chellaney raised a question that has since become the sharpest edge of New Delhi’s discomfort: under the Communication Compatibility and Security Agreement (Comcasa) and Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), India and the United States share sensitive maritime data.

If USS Charlotte used that shared data to locate IRIS Dena — a vessel that had just departed an Indian port after an Indian-hosted exercise — it would represent, in Professor Brahma Chellaney’s words, “a foundational breach of the defence partnership.” The Indian government denied it categorically, calling the suggestion “preposterous.” But the mere existence of the question — raised not by Iran but by India’s own strategic community — is itself an indictment. “In one torpedo strike,” Chellaney wrote, “American hard power has punctured India’s carefully cultivated soft power.”


The Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region almost certainly tracked IRIS Dena throughout her transit. India knew where she was. India watched. India said nothing. Former Naval Chief Admiral Arun Prakash called the sinking “senseless and inflammatory.” Former Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal said the US had “ignored India’s sensitivities, as the ship was in these waters because of India’s invitation.” Not a serving minister has spoken. That silence is the loudest statement in the Indian Ocean.
Whose quiet death

India’s International Fleet Review (IFR) 2026 drew warships from 74 nations. Every one of their navies must now ask whether participation in an Indian-hosted exercise could expose them to US submarine operations if their flag state happens to be at war with Washington. The answer, established by precedent on March 4, 2026, is: possibly, depending on whether Washington decides you are worth stopping. Chellaney noted it clearly: “The message to participating navies is stark: attending India’s exercises may not guarantee safety once they sail away.”

This is not a rules-based order. It is a power order: unilateral, unaccountable, and now openly acknowledged as such by the people running it. The Second Geneva Convention, the San Remo Manual, the UN Charter, and the diplomatic conventions that protect negotiations in progress all applied, clearly, to the events of the past 10 days. None of them were observed. None of them were argued against. They were simply set aside — and a press conference was held.

Pete Hegseth called it a “quiet death.”

He was right. He just didn’t say whose.

Header image: A Sri Lanka Navy vessel approaches an Iranian vessel during a rescue operation, a day after the crew of a distressed Iranian military ship, IRIS Dena were assisted in waters south of Sri Lanka, off the coast of Colombo, Sri Lanka March 5, 2026. Sri Lanka Navy/Handout via Reuters/File Photo

The author is a Melbourne-based combat veteran and former Pakistan Army officer with a background in psychology.

Kyiv says it hit 'key' Russian military factory in Bryansk strike, Russia says six dead

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said on Tuesday that a "key" military factory in Russia's western city of Bryansk had been targetted and hit in a missile strike. Russia earlier accused Kyiv of a "terrorist" attack in Bryansk that it said killed six civilians and wounded at least 37 people, without specifying what the target was.

Issued on: 10/03/2026 
By: FRANCE 24

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky called the strike – using cruise missiles – 'a completely justified response' to Russia's attacks. 

© Tetiana Dzhafarova, AFP

Ukraine hit a "key" military factory in a missile strike Tuesday on Russia's western city of Bryansk, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said after Moscow gave a toll of six dead in the attack.

Russia has been raining near-daily drone and missile barrages on Ukraine during its full-scale invasion launched in 2022, prompting Ukraine to strike Moscow's infrastructure, including energy facilities, in retribution.

"Our soldiers struck one of the key Russian military factories in Bryansk. This factory produced electronics and components for Russian missiles. The very ones that are striking our cities," Zelensky said in a daily address.

In a video posted on social media by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine purportedly showing the attack, a building is rocked by multiple explosions, with plumes of black smoke rising from the site.

Zelensky called the strike "a completely justified response to the aggressor".

Russia earlier accused Kyiv of a "terrorist" attack in Bryansk that it said killed six civilians and wounded at least 37 people. It did not say what the target was.

The wounded "were taken to the Bryansk Regional Hospital, where they are receiving the necessary medical care", regional governor Aleksandr Bogomaz said on Telegram.

Ukraine has not commented on the allegation of civilian casualties.

Bryansk, a city of around 400,000 residents, is about 100 kilometres (60 miles) from the Ukraine border.

Ukraine used British Storm Shadow cruise missiles in the attack, the Ukrainian military said.

"Units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces successfully struck the Bryansk microelectronics plant Kremniy El with Storm Shadow air-launched missiles," the General Staff said in a social media post.

"The plant specialises in discrete semiconductor technology and integrated microchips, which are the 'brains' and 'nerve system' of modern weapons, including Iskander missiles," the statement said.

The army said it had inflicted "significant damage to production facilities" at the factory.

In December, Ukraine said it used the Storm Shadows to attack a Russian oil refinery in the Rostov region, a facility it said was directly involved in supplying Moscow's armed forces.
Talks next week?

Ukraine said earlier on Tuesday that Russian strikes killed four people and wounded at least 20 in the embattled Ukrainian town of Sloviansk in the Donetsk region as the Kremlin's forces grind towards the hub.

Moscow claims the Donbas region – a largely industrial area spanning Ukraine's eastern Lugansk and Donetsk regions – is part of Russia despite not having full control over it.

The fate of Donbas, the epicentre of the fighting, remains a key sticking point in the deadlocked talks between Moscow and Kyiv brokered by the United States.

Russia has threatened to take the region by force if Kyiv does not cede at the negotiating table but Ukraine has rejected the demand, arguing that giving up land would only embolden the Kremlin.

Despite the apparent impasse, the United States has proposed another round of Russia-Ukraine talks next week, Zelensky said Tuesday.

© France 24
02:01

Zelensky said, in an audio message sent to reporters including AFP, that talks – initially planned for last week in the United Arab Emirates – had been postponed until next week by the United States.

"This was proposed by the American side, but we'll see what happens in the Middle East, to be honest," Zelensky told journalists, adding that the meeting "could be in Switzerland or Turkey".

US special envoy Steve Witkoff said in an interview with CNBC on Tuesday that "there was supposed to be a trilateral this week".

"I think the trilateral will be shifted till sometime next week, and... we're going to remain positive on that," Witkoff added.

(FRANCE 24 with AFP)

 

LeBlanc heading to Washington after Carney says CUSMA 'broken' by U.S. tariffs

By The Canadian Press
 March 05, 2026 

Former ministry of finance special advisor Julian Karaguesian says Dominic LeBlanc may want to ‘scope out the parameters’ of a new trade deal.

OTTAWA — Canada-U.S. Trade Minister Dominic LeBlanc is set to meet President Donald Trump’s trade czar in Washington on Friday, a day after the United States announced it was launching bilateral discussions with Mexico on the review of the continental trade p
act.

LeBlanc’s office said he will be meeting with United States Trade Representative Jamieson Greer to discuss the upcoming mandatory review of the Canada-U.S.-Mexico Agreement on trade, known as CUSMA, as well as other bilateral concerns.

The continental trade pact has shielded Canada from the worst impacts of Trump’s tariffs but the president has repeatedly questioned whether CUSMA should be continued.

The Canada-U.S. relationship has been upended by Trump’s tariffs and threats of annexation. Prime Minister Mark Carney said during a media availability in Australia on Wednesday that CUSMA “effectively has been broken in the short term by U.S. actions.”

Carney said Canada is looking to this year’s trade pact review to “re-establish the trust” individuals, businesses and investors need to guide trade between the nations.


Trade talks between Canada and the United States stalled last October after Trump was angered by an Ontario-sponsored ad quoting former president Ronald Reagan criticizing tariffs.

Despite the freeze-out, LeBlanc and Greer have continued communications by phone.

Canada began domestic CUSMA consultations last year but Ottawa has not formally launched anything with the United States. Greer said last month Canadians have barriers that make it difficult to hold bilateral trade talks.

“They refuse to sell U.S. wine and spirits on their shelves,” Greer told Fox Business. “There are a variety of issues they have not addressed and aren’t addressing and this makes it a big challenge and an obstacle for starting real negotiations with them.”

Some have suggested that the contentious Canada-U.S. relationship could mean the United States and Mexico begin CUSMA negotiations with Canada on the sidelines.

Something similar happened during the original CUSMA negotiations to replace the North American Free Trade Agreement during Trump’s first term.

Robert Lighthizer, Trump’s trade representative at the time, recounted in his book that the United States and Mexico came to an agreement and “Canada was welcome to join if it wanted,” but Washington and Mexico City were “prepared to move forward bilaterally if it did not.”

Ultimately, an agreement was reached that was hailed a success in all three countries.

In a news release Thursday, Greer’s office announced that he and Mexican Secretary of Economy Marcelo Ebrard have instructed their negotiators to begin a “scoping discussion” on the trilateral trade pact.

The release said negotiators are expected to hold their first meeting the week of March 16, and to then meet regularly afterwards as part of the review.

LeBlanc’s meeting in the United States capital could lay the groundwork for Canada to be brought to the CUSMA negotiating table.


CUSMA’s review essentially sets up a three-way choice for the partner countries to make in July. They can renew the deal for another 16 years, withdraw from it or signal both non-renewal and non-withdrawal — which would trigger an annual review that could keep negotiations going for up to a decade.

This report by The Canadian Press was first published March 5, 2026.

The Canadian Press

Mexican companies eager to keep CUSMA treaty, report shows

By Reuters
March 09, 2026 

From left to right: Canada's Prime Minister Mark Carney; Mexico's President Claudia Sheinbaum; U.S. President Donald Trump. (The Canadian Press / The Associated Press)

MEXICO CITY -- Mexican businesses are eager to maintain a trilateral trade agreement with the United States and Canada that is up for review this year, according to a report summarizing Mexico’s public consultation, released on Monday.

The consulted companies called the CUSMA treaty, which replaced the North American Free Trade Agreement in 2020, essential for investment certainty and protecting regional supply chains.

Mexico’s Economy Ministry released the 88-page report one week before the U.S. and Mexico are slated to hold bilateral discussions to kick off a three-way review of the USMCA.

With some 80% of Mexican exports going to the U.S., the treaty is critical to the Latin American country’s economy.

The pact, signed during U.S. President Donald Trump’s first term, requires Mexico, the U.S. and Canada to hold a joint review this year to extend the agreement.


If extended, the treaty will remain in place for another 16 years. If the countries don’t reach an agreement, it is subject to annual reviews, which many industries consider an effective death knell for the USMCA.

The report stresses that Mexican businesses broadly want to strengthen the pact rather than a wholesale renegotiation.

That, however, may be overly optimistic, given that Trump has publicly questioned the need for the treaty and threatened to pull out of it altogether.

(Reporting by Emily Green; Editing by Stephen Eisenhammer and Andrei Khalip)

Half of Canadian small businesses see U.S. as unreliable partner one year into trade war: CFIB

ByAnam Khan
March 04, 2026 

The Toronto skyline  

THE CANADIAN PRESS/Chris Young

Half of Canadian small businesses no longer view the U.S. as a reliable trading partner one year into the trade war, according to a new study by the Canadian Federation of Independent Business.

The study shows the strain is showing up directly in day-to-day business dealings.

“Small businesses have faced massive uncertainty since the trade battle began last year,” Dan Kelly, president of the CFIB said in a press release.

“Small business owners have been dealing with the whiplash of trying to keep up with sudden changes and threats, including many that don’t happen or are revised within hours. With the Canada-U.S.-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) coming up for review in the months ahead, the stakes are even higher.”

About 75 per cent of small businesses say the tariff fight has strained their relationships with U.S. partners or clients, up from 49 per cent in March 2025. More than two-thirds (68 per cent) of Canadian small business owners also continue to report being negatively affected by U.S. tariffs.

Tariff pain is widespread, relief is limited

CFIB research also found tariffs hit firms unevenly, with 37 per cent of owners saying 2025 was a good year, while 35 per cent said it was a poor one.

“There’s reduced profits, reduced revenues. These are the major things, and all of this has implications on what funds they have available to reinvest in their business, or to pay employees,” said Marvin Cruz, CFIB’s senior director of research and one of the authors of the report.

“The entrepreneurial spirit is a bit dampened.”

Cruz said the pressure is pushing some owners toward tough decisions, including taking on more debt or even thinking about closing.

About 18 per cent of businesses that reported a poor year said they contemplated permanently closing because of tariffs, compared with two per cent among those reporting an average or good year.

Nearly a third, 31 per cent, of businesses that had a poor year said they took on increased debt, compared with 10 per cent for those reporting an average year and five per cent for those reporting a good year. Poor-performing businesses also reported higher levels of reduced hiring and paused investments.

Federal relief failing to support SMEs

While a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision on tariff rates is expected to provide some relief, CFIB said it will not change the situation for most Canadian exports, since many goods are already covered under CUSMA. The group said the ruling should still help the 27 per cent of businesses hurt by tariffs on non-CUSMA compliant goods.

At the same time, CFIB said steel and aluminum tariffs imposed by both countries remain a major challenge, with 44 per cent of small businesses reporting they have been affected.

Limited uptake in federal tariff response initiative

CFIB also pointed to limited uptake of Ottawa’s Regional Tariff Response Initiative (RTRI), stating that less than one per cent of small businesses have applied and 77 per cent are entirely unaware the program exists.

“We keep hearing the same things from small business owners: they’re too small to qualify, they didn’t know about the program, or that the required paperwork isn’t worth the time and resources,” said Corinne Pohlmann, CFIB executive vice-president of advocacy.

CFIB said restrictive eligibility rules are a key barrier. In British Columbia, businesses must employ at least 10 full-time workers to qualify, while in Quebec, eligibility is now closed and applications are limited to manufacturing firms with annual revenues of $2 million or more.

The organization said it has sent a letter to Prime Minister Mark Carney, Finance Minister Champagne, and Canada’s Regional Development Agencies questioning the program’s design and effectiveness.

CFIB is calling on Ottawa to:Provide broad tax relief, including a reduction in the small business tax rate from nine per cent to six per cent.
Create a rebate program for tariff-impacted SMEs and ensure rebates and refunds are not treated as taxable income
Stay focused on maintaining the CUSMA agreement to reduce uncertainty and protect cross-border supply chains.

Methodology

Final results for the Your Voice- February 2026 survey. The online survey was conducted between February 5-24, n= 1,379. For comparison purposes, a probability sample with the same number of respondents would have a margin of error of at most +/- 2.60 per cent, 19 times out of 20.

Final results for the Your Voice – December survey. The online survey was conducted between December 4-31, 2025, n= 1,663. For comparison purposes, a probability sample with the same number of respondents would have a margin of error of at most +/- 2.40 per cent, 19 times out of 20.


Anam Khan
Journalist, BNNBloomberg.ca

More than 20 U.S. states sue over new global tariffs Trump imposed after his stinging U.S. Supreme Court loss

ByThe Associated Press
March 05, 2026 

Cars drive by a Mercedes-Benz dealership on the Bedford Automile in Bedford, Ohio, Friday, Feb. 20, 2026. (AP Photo/Sue Ogrocki)

WASHINGTON — Some two dozen states challenged U.S. President Donald Trump’s new global tariffs on Thursday, filing a lawsuit over import taxes he imposed after a stinging loss at the Supreme Court.

The Democratic attorneys general and governors in the lawsuit argue that Trump is overstepping his power with planned 15 per cent tariffs on much of the world.

Trump has said the tariffs are essential to reduce America’s longstanding trade deficits. He imposed duties under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 after the Supreme Court struck down tariffs he imposed last year under an emergency powers law.

Section 122, which has never been invoked, allows the president to impose tariffs of up to 15 per cent. They are limited to five months unless extended by Congress.

The lawsuit is led by attorneys general from Oregon, Arizona, California and New York.

“The focus right now should be on paying people back, not doubling down on illegal tariffs,” said Oregon Attorney General Dan Rayfield. The suit comes a day after a judge ruled t hat companies who paid tariffs under Trump’s old framework should get refunds.

The new suit argues that Trump can’t pivot to Section 122 because it was intended to be used only in specific, limited circumstances -- not for sweeping import taxes. It also contends the tariffs will drive up costs for states, businesses and consumers.

Many of those states also successfully sued over Trump’s tariffs imposed under a different law: the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).

A FedEx cargo plane is shown on the tarmac at Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport, Tuesday, April 20, 2021, in Fort Lauderdale, Fla. (AP Photo/Wilfredo Lee, File)

Four days after the Supreme Court struck down his sweeping IEEPA tariffs Feb. 20, Trump invoked Section 122 to slap 10 per cent tariffs on foreign goods. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessant told CNBC on Wednesday that the administration would raise the levies to the 15 per cent limit this week.

The Democratic states and other critics say the president can’t use Section 122 as a replacement for the defunct tariffs to combat the trade deficit.

The Section 122 provision is aimed at what it calls “fundamental international payments problems.” At issue is whether that wording covers trade deficits, the gap between what the U.S. sells other countries and what it buys from them.

Section 122 arose from the financial crises that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s when the U.S. dollar was tied to gold. Other countries were dumping dollars in exchange for gold at a set rate, risking a collapse of the U.S. currency and chaos in financial markets. But the dollar is no longer linked to gold, so critics say Section 122 is obsolete.

Awkwardly for Trump, his own Justice Department argued in a court filing last year that the president needed to invoke the emergency powers act because Section 122 did “not have any obvious application” in fighting trade deficits, which it called “conceptually distinct” from balance-of-payment issues.

Trump slams U.S. Supreme Court's 'very unfortunate ruling' on tariffs

Still, some legal analysts say the Trump administration has a stronger case this time.

“The legal reality is that courts will likely provide President Trump substantially more deference regarding Section 122 than they did to his previous tariffs under IEEPA,” Peter Harrell, visiting scholar at Georgetown University’s Institute of International Economic Law, wrote in a commentary Wednesday.

The specialized Court of International Trade in New York, which will hear the states’ lawsuit, wrote last year in its own decision striking down the emergency-powers tariffs that Trump didn’t need them because Section 122 was available to combat trade deficits.

Trump does have other legal authorities he can use to impose tariffs, and some have already survived court tests. Duties that Trump imposed on Chinese imports during his first term under Section 301 of the same 1974 trade act are still in place.

Also joining the lawsuit are the attorneys general of Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and the governors of Kentucky and Pennsylvania.

Lindsay Whitehurst And Paul Wiseman, The Associated Press

Judge orders refunds after U.S. Supreme Court strikes down Trump’s tariffs

By The Canadian Press
March 05, 2026 

U.S. President Donald Trump speaks during an event to announce new tariffs in the Rose Garden at the White House, April 2, 2025, in Washington. (AP Photo/Mark Schiefelbein, File)

WASHINGTON -- A judge with the U.S. Court of International Trade on Wednesday ordered refunds for companies that paid tariffs that were later struck down by the United States Supreme Court.

In a 6-3 ruling last month, America’s top court concluded it was not legal for U.S. President Donald Trump to use the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, better known as IEEPA, for his sweeping and erratic “Liberation Day” tariffs and fentanyl-related duties on Canada, Mexico and China.

The conservative-led court found that the U.S. Constitution “very clearly” gives Congress power over taxes and tariffs.

The Supreme Court ruling did not say whether there should be refunds, leaving companies that paid the duties to sue the federal government.

In Wednesday’s decision in the New York trade court, Judge Richard Eaton said all importers who paid IEEPA duties are “entitled to the benefit” of the Supreme Court’s decision.


Eaton was ruling specifically on a case brought by Atmus Filtration, a filtration company in Tennessee, but said he will be the only judge to hear cases about refunds.

Eaton ordered the Trump administration to finalize import paperwork without charging companies the IEEPA tariffs. If goods are past that process, U.S. Customs and Border Protection will have to recalculate them without the tariffs, Eaton said.

The Liberty Justice Center, which represented five American small businesses that pushed back on Trump’s tariffs, said the decision made it clear that all importers of record hit by IEEPA duties are entitled to refunds.

“This decision is an important step toward ensuring that businesses can recover the money they were forced to pay under tariffs the Supreme Court has now confirmed were imposed without legal authority,” the centre said in a statement on social media.

A coalition of more than 1,000 small businesses called it a victory and called on the Trump administration to act swiftly. Dan Anthony, executive director of the We Pay the Tariffs coalition, said “now the ball is in the government’s court and small businesses are concerned they will drag this out further.”

“American small businesses have waited long enough,” Anthony said in a news release. “A full, fast, and automatic refund process is what these businesses are owed and anything less is unacceptable.”

The White House has not yet responded to a request for comment. It’s unclear if the Trump administration will appeal the order or take other action to slow down the process.

Trump had warned that the Supreme Court’s decision would have catastrophic consequences for the country. After the top court’s decision came down, he said the question of refunds would get “litigated over for the next two years.”

The government had collected more than US$130 billion from the tariffs by mid-December, according to the Penn Wharton Budget Model.

In a court filing Wednesday ahead of the decision, the Trump administration indicated interest would be included if refunds are ordered.

Brandon Lord, a senior official in U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s trade office, wrote that “in accordance with applicable law, any validated refund of IEEPA duties would include interest.”


Lord indicated refunds could take some time because the department “still requires a review period to ensure no violation of other customs laws and no other duties, taxes or fees are owed.”

Some Canadian companies will be waiting on refunds but Canada had largely been shielded by the IEEPA tariffs due to a carveout under the Canada-U.S.-Mexico Agreement on trade, known as CUSMA.

Trump declared an emergency at the northern border related to the flow of fentanyl last year in order to use IEEPA to hit Canada with 35 per cent tariffs. Those duties didn’t apply to goods compliant under CUSMA.

Trump replaced his IEEPA tariffs last week with a 10 per cent worldwide tariff using Section 122 of the 1974 Trade Act. That duty can only increase to 15 per cent and it will expire after 150 days unless Congress votes to extend it.

That global tariff also does not apply to CUSMA-compliant goods.

Additionally, Canada is being hammered by Trump’s sector-specific tariffs on industries like steel, aluminum, automobiles, lumber and cabinets.

By Kelly Geraldine Malone

This report by The Canadian Press was first published March 4, 2026.

With files from The Associated Press

US, Mexico to hold talks ahead of USMCA trade pact review as Trump tariffs loom

The United States and Mexico said Thursday that their negotiators will hold bilateral talks this month ahead of a joint review of the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement as tariff pressure from US President Donald Trump adds urgency to discussions. The first meeting is set for the week of March 16, with further sessions planned before the pact’s July review.


Issued on: 06/03/2026 -
By: FRANCE 24

The flags of Mexico, Canada and the United States photographed on February 3, 2025. © Paul Sancya, AP

The United States and Mexico said Thursday that negotiators will hold bilateral talks this month ahead of a joint review of the US-Mexico-Canada trade pact, in discussions that come amid tariff pressure from President Donald Trump.

Negotiators are set to hold their first meeting the week of March 16 and convene regularly thereafter, the US Trade Representative's office said.

Under the originally agreed terms, the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) is due to be reviewed in July.

Trump signed and praised the pact during his first presidency, but has reportedly weighed ditching the agreement entirely as tensions with Canada mount.

Since returning to the White House, he has also threatened allies and competitors with fast-changing and sweeping tariffs, although he has created carveouts for a swath of Mexican and Canadian imports entering his country.

For now, Dominic LeBlanc, Ottawa's minister for Canada-US trade, has voiced optimism over the future of the agreement.

LeBlanc is due to be in Washington on Friday where he is set to meet US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer.

"They will discuss the upcoming trilateral review of the (USMCA), as well as bilateral concerns," LeBlanc's spokesperson said.

For the US-Mexico talks, Greer and Mexican Secretary of Economy Marcelo Ebrard have instructed negotiators to "begin a scoping discussion" on needed measures to ensure that benefits of the agreement "accrue primarily to the parties".

This includes "reducing dependence on imports from outside the region, strengthening rules of origin, and enhancing the security of North American supply chains," the USTR's office said in a statement.

LeBlanc last week said that he believed Washington was ready to be specific about their desired USMCA adjustments.

He also indicated in remarks that Trump's dismissive rhetoric about the USMCA does not match his trade team's posture.

(FRANCE 24 with AFP)

2026 In Focus: Five Neuralgic Points Of Global Uncertainty – Analysis

IFIMES
By Dejan Azeski
February 28, 2026 


If anyone thought that 2020 or 2022 marked the peak of global chaos, 2026 suggests that such assumptions may have fallen short. This year is taking shape as a period of exceptional turbulence, fuelled not only by the bombastic rhetoric of world leaders but also by the tangible force of their actions. Five key “neuralgic points” of global uncertainty – the status of Greenland, Iran’s internal and external dynamics, Hungary’s parliamentary elections, the spillover of the Venezuelan crisis towards Cuba, and the prospective formation of an “Islamic NATO” – herald what may become the most complex and unpredictable period of the modern world.

The abduction of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, violent protests in Iran, increasingly serious plans for the annexation of Greenland, and threats against Cuba – these are but a few of the explosive events that have marked the very start of 2026. If the opening weeks are anything to go by, this year indeed holds promise, albeit in a deeply unsettling sense.

After everything we have witnessed over the past five years, there was hope that the coming period might restore at least a semblance of reason. However, the opposite appears more likely: we stand on the threshold of a year defined by unprecedented transformations and political theatre unlike any our generation has ever seen.

The US military rebuffs Trump’s Greenland push, but the plan remains on the table

Recent reports from the United States suggest that Donald Trump has instructed special forces commanders to draft a plan for an invasion of Greenland. Yet, senior military officials are, for the time being, strongly opposed to the idea.


Sources claim that “hawks” within the president’s security circle, led by political adviser Stephen Miller, have been emboldened by the purported success of the operation that led to the arrest of Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro. Their objective is to secure US control over Greenland as soon as possible, before Russia or China makes a strategic move of its own in the Arctic.

British diplomats believe that Trump is additionally motivated by domestic political considerations, namely a desire to divert public attention away from economic woes ahead of the midterm elections later this year, in which Republicans risk losing control of Congress.

The same sources indicate that Trump requested that the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) prepare an invasion plan, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff declined, deeming such an operation illegal and politically untenable without congressional backing. In its place, less controversial options were put forward, such as intercepting Russian “ghost ships” – a clandestine fleet allegedly used by Moscow to evade sanctions – or even limited military operations against Iran.


Diplomatic sources also refer to the existence of a so-called “escalation scenario”, whereby Trump could resort to military force or political coercion to sever Greenland’s institutional ties with Denmark. One diplomatic cable characterised it as “the worst-case scenario”, warning that it could result in the “disintegration of NATO from within”.

Some European officials go even further, arguing that the destabilisation of NATO is precisely one of the objectives of the hardline MAGA faction surrounding Trump. Given that Congress would in all likelihood refuse to authorise a formal US withdrawal from NATO, the occupation of Greenland could compel European member states to leave the Alliance of their own accord, effectively bringing it to an end.

At the same time, several European states have deployed troops to Greenland under a NATO mission, both to reinforce security in the Arctic and to deter any potential unilateral action by Washington.

For the first time in over two centuries, the United States finds itself in open strategic disagreement with the United Kingdom and France – a grave precedent in modern transatlantic history.

Iran: between mounting domestic destabilisation and external confrontation

The wave of protests that engulfed Iran at the end of last year and continued throughout 2026 represents the most formidable test of the Islamic Republic’s stability in recent decades. Although the demonstrations have not resulted in a political breakthrough, they have laid bare profound structural frailties of the Iranian system – economic, social, and legitimacy-based.


The economic factor remains the key driver of discontent. Prolonged international sanctions, the depreciation of the Iranian rial, rampant inflation and chronically high youth unemployment have created an explosive social mix. However, the protests rapidly assumed an overtly political character, as reflected in slogans directed against Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and in the symbolic rehabilitation of the monarchist narrative (“Long live the Shah”). Such rhetoric suggests that part of Iranian society is no longer seeking partial reforms within the existing system, but rather its fundamental transformation.

The bellicose rhetoric of US President Donald Trump regarding a “readiness to help” the demonstrators must be understood within the wider framework of US strategy towards Iran. Washington combines a normative discourse on human rights with a classic policy of deterrence and pressure. Threats of military intervention function primarily as strategic signals – to Tehran, but also to regional partners such as Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE – confirming that the American security architecture remains active.

Nevertheless, a direct military intervention would entail enormous risks: the destabilisation of the Strait of Hormuz, escalation through Hezbollah and Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria, and a potentially broader conflict with Russia and China, which view Iran as a pivotal element of the emerging multipolar order.

The Iranian authorities interpret the protests as part of a long-standing Western strategy of “soft subversion”– a narrative that has served as a central pillar of the regime’s legitimacy since 1979. The introduction of communication blackouts and the brutal repression of demonstrations indicate that Tehran does not see the protests as a social phenomenon, but rather as an existential threat to the regime.

At the same time, Iran is striving to consolidate its relations with Moscow and Beijing, positioning itself as a cornerstone of the anti-Western axis, particularly in the context of the war in Ukraine, the crisis in the Middle East, and the intensification of global major-power competition.

The European Union has condemned the repression and voiced support for the demonstrators, but it remains constrained in its ability to project strategic power. EU policy towards Iran balances normative discourse (human rights, democracy) and pragmatic interests (the nuclear agreement, energy, migration), thereby limiting its effective influence on the ground.

Iran today stands at a strategic crossroads: public discontent is growing, yet the regime continues to command robust repressive and ideological instruments of control. Meanwhile, escalating US rhetoric heightens the risk of inadvertent confrontation within an already fractured Middle Eastern security landscape.


The protests in Iran are, therefore, not merely an internal matter – they form part of a broader global rivalry among major powers, in which Iran represents a crucial geopolitical node between the West, Russia and China.

Parliamentary elections in Hungary: a turning point for Central Europe’s geopolitical course

One of the defining political questions in Europe this spring is whether Hungary will see a change in government. The forthcoming parliamentary elections are not relevant solely for Budapest; they carry wider geopolitical implications for Central and Eastern Europe, particularly in light of Hungary’s strategic role as Ukraine’s western neighbour and, at the same time, an internal “dissenter” within the European Union.

According to the latest polls, the opposition currently holds an advantage, yet long-serving Prime Minister Viktor Orbán still holds substantial political, institutional and media leverage. After nearly fifteen years of uninterrupted Fidesz rule, a dip in approval ratings is to be expected. However, the central question remains: is there an opposition capable of capitalising on voter dissatisfaction and offering a credible alternative to the existing illiberal model of governance?

Opposition leader Péter Magyar has accused former European Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi of failing to “disclose the full truth” regarding an alleged Hungarian espionage affair that has for months eroded Orbán’s political legitimacy. According to his claims, Hungarian intelligence operatives, posing as diplomats, attempted to recruit staff within EU institutions, while Várhelyi reportedly concealed key information from his tenure as Hungary’s ambassador to the EU.

Magyar further accused Minister János Lázár of supervising the deployment of intelligence operatives in Brussels during his time in office, which the opposition cites as evidence of the systemic politicisation and instrumentalisation of state institutions in the interests of the ruling elite.

Orbán, however, is far from a passive political actor. Historian Anne Applebaum links him to ideological circles close to the American MAGA movement, arguing that he has developed an illiberal model of governance that formally relies on democratic institutions while fundamentally transforming their normative and functional substance. Against this backdrop, Orbán has strategically reframed the elections as a referendum on support for Ukraine and its potential EU membership, thereby mobilising a nationalist voter base and shifting the focus away from domestic scandals towards issues of sovereignty, identity and war.

The outcome of the elections remains uncertain. Orbán still retains the ability to adjust electoral legislation and institutional procedures, while opposition actors may face administrative marginalisation or disqualification. Consequently, Hungary’s electoral process is increasingly viewed as a test of the resilience of democratic institutions within the EU.

An added paradox is that Péter Magyar was once a close ally of Orbán, while his former wife, Judit Varga, was one of the key figures in Fidesz and served as Minister of Justice. Magyar maintains that he left Fidesz due to the party’s departure from its pro-European orientation; his detractors, however, portray his political realignment as driven by personal ambition and opportunistic repositioning.

The election campaign has been further encumbered by serious personal allegations. Judit Varga publicly accused Magyar of domestic violence and blackmail, branding him a traitor. Her statements, made following a court hearing in Budapest, triggered profound public polarisation and galvanised pro-government media outlets against the opposition leader. Magyar denied the accusations, describing them as a politically motivated smear campaign, and released audio recordings that allegedly point to political pressure on the judiciary, further reinforcing perceptions of institutional corruption and the erosion of the rule of law.

The Hungarian elections thus represent more than a national political contest: they serve as an indicator of Central Europe’s future geopolitical direction, its stance towards Ukraine and Russia, and the internal cohesion of the European Union in confronting growing trends of illiberal democracy.

Broader political context: a crisis of legitimacy and fragmentation of the political elite

The divorce between Judit Varga and Péter Magyar in 2023, coupled with the subsequent scandal surrounding an amnesty in a paedophilia case, has severely undermined the credibility of the Orbán government and accelerated the process of fragmentation within the ruling elite. These developments created space for a new political dynamic, in which Magyar capitalised on the institutional and societal vacuum to establish the opposition Tisza party. According to current polls, Tisza holds the lead ahead of the fateful parliamentary elections scheduled for April.

A potential change of government in Hungary would carry broader geopolitical implications far beyond national borders. Orbán’s downfall could weaken the illiberal bloc within the European Union and redefine Budapest’s relations with Ukraine, Russia and its transatlantic partners. Conversely, his political survival would further consolidate the populist axis in Europe, deepening ideological and political rifts across both the EU and NATO.

Regional danger: Venezuela’s crisis spills over into Cuba

US President Donald Trump delivered a stark warning to the Cuban authorities, urging them to strike a deal with Washington. “There will be no more oil or money going to Cuba – zero! I strongly suggest they make a deal before it is too late,” Trump wrote on the platform Truth Social.

Trump noted that for decades, Cuba had survived on vast quantities of oil and financial aid from Venezuela in exchange for “security services” provided to the regime. “Most of those Cubans are dead from last week’s US operation, and Venezuela no longer needs the protection of thugs and blackmailers who held the people hostage,” the American president added.

He further emphasised that Venezuela can now count on the support of the United States – “the most powerful military in the world” – and that Washington stands ready to preserve regional stability. He reiterated that oil and money from Venezuela would cease to flow to Cuba, calling on the authorities in Havana to find a swift solution.

Venezuela, long Cuba’s primary oil supplier, has come under renewed pressure following the arrest of President Nicolás Maduro by US forces. Trump has reportedly requested that interim President Delcy Rodríguez redirect Venezuelan oil to the United States, a move that would deprive Cuba of a vital energy and financial lifeline.

Global media outlets cite US intelligence assessments warning of severe problems within the Cuban economy. According to information from multiple sources, key sectors, such as agriculture and tourism, are burdened by frequent power outages, trade sanctions, and other economic challenges. The potential loss of oil and financial support from Venezuela could further destabilise the Cuban administration, which has ruled the island since Fidel Castro’s 1959 revolution.

This situation illustrates how regional political upheavals in Venezuela directly affect Cuba’s strategic and economic position, rendering the island vulnerable to geopolitical pressures and evolving power dynamics in Latin America.

Turkey joins the alliance of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan – is an Islamic NATO taking shape?

Turkey is preparing to join a defence alliance between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, whose principle of collective defence stipulates that any act of aggression against one member shall be treated as an attack on all. According to sources familiar with the negotiations, the creation of this so-called “Islamic NATO” is at an advanced stage, with an agreement expected to be reached imminently.

Geopolitical realignment in the Middle East and South Asia

The anticipated expansion of the defence alliance could lead to a significant shift in the regional balance of power. It bears recalling that the Saudi-Pakistani pact, signed in September last year, includes a collective defence clause reminiscent of Article 5 of NATO – an alliance of which Turkey is a member and which commands one of the world’s largest military forces.

Sources indicate that the interests of Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are increasingly converging across the Middle East, South Asia and parts of Africa. Ankara views the alliance as an instrument for strengthening its own security and deterrence, particularly amid growing uncertainty over the commitment of the United States and NATO under Donald Trump’s administration.

Analysts assess that Saudi Arabia would contribute financial power, nuclear capabilities, ballistic missiles and manpower to the alliance, while Turkey would bring military experience, a developed defence industry and geopolitical influence in the region. Pakistan, for its part, would offer strategic connectivity in South Asia and a long-standing tradition of military cooperation with both countries.

Turkey’s accession to the alliance would signal a new phase in relations between Ankara and Riyadh, following years of tension. In recent years, the two countries have intensified economic and military cooperation, including a recent joint naval meeting held in Ankara.

Turkey and Pakistan share a decades-long military partnership encompassing F-16 upgrades, drone technology transfers and joint exercises. Turkey’s entry into the alliance could further consolidate this trilateral bloc, creating a regional counterbalance to traditional Western influence and potentially redefining the geopolitical dynamics of the Middle East, South Asia and North Africa.


IFIMES – International Institute for Middle-East and Balkan studies, based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, has special consultative status with the Economic and Social Council ECOSOC/UN since 2018. IFIMES is also the publisher of the biannual international scientific journal European Perspectives. IFIMES gathers and selects various information and sources on key conflict areas in the world. The Institute analyses mutual relations among parties with an aim to promote the importance of reconciliation, early prevention/preventive diplomacy and disarmament/ confidence building measures in the regional or global conflict resolution of the existing conflicts and the role of preventive actions against new global disputes.

THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE

Life After Mencho: A Shifting Landscape Of Organized Crime In Mexico – Analysis

Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes (aka “el Mencho”). Image: Grok

March 4, 2026 
Geopolitical Monitor
By Jose Miguel Alonso-Trabanco

As a phenomenon whose behavior is driven by long-range impersonal forces rather than whimsical vicissitudes, the evolution of organized crime in Mexico has proved to be quite dynamic and ductile. The latest progression of this fast-paced trajectory is the Mexican military operation in which Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes (aka “el Mencho”), nominal leader of the New Generation Jalisco Cartel (CJNG), was killed. As retaliation, his henchmen targeted private businesses, state-owned banks and security personnel. Cartel hitmen also disrupted transit through roadblocks in various highways, urban centers, rural communities and tourist spots across Mexico. Everyday economic cycles and recreational activities came to a halt in nearly half of the country, even in regions far away from the epicenter of these events.

This episode and its immediate aftermath have gone viral on a global scale through both mainstream channels and social media. As the dust is settling after the initial backlash wave, an atmosphere of tense calm prevails, at least for the time being, but the ghost of “el Mencho” is now haunting Mexico. To keep things in perspective, this man was no ordinary street thug. While his centrality had diminished due to ailing health, he had become Mexico’s most powerful and ruthless criminal warlord. Under his leadership, the New Generation Jalisco Cartel (CJNG) had risen —especially after the recent partition of the Sinaloa Cartel— as one of the world’s largest criminal empires. For the Mexican state, this operation represents a Zeitenwende which, after a hiatus of suspicious unresponsiveness, highlights both the material ability and the political will to engage nonstate antagonists, even if this confrontation comes with meaningful risks and costs. Once again, the gloves are off.
Profile of the New Generation Jalisco Cartel

The New Generation Jalisco Cartel was born as an offshoot of cells once tied to the Sinaloa Cartel, which later absorbed both minor regional groups from Western Mexico and paramilitary squads established to exterminate the so-called “Knights Templar.” These remnants joined forces to transform a second-rate subnational nonstate actor into a major criminal multinational empire with branches in most of Mexico, the US, Latin America, Europe, Asia, and even Africa.

The cartel’s governance model is a hybrid that integrates corporate and paramilitary components. Not unlike the diversification of the Japanese keiretsu, the CJNG was involved in various profitable operations, including drug trafficking (especially fentanyl), clandestine mining of industrial and precious metals, extortion rackets, cybercrime, fuel contraband, human trafficking, the control of cash crops, and the systematic predation of all sorts of businesses, as well as money laundering schemes. This spatial and economic expansion was facilitated by a strategy which enabled the integration of smaller surrogates. Therefore, rather than a vertical hierarchical pyramid, the CJNG is semi-decentralized network or constellation of criminal satrapies. This confederation has been strengthened through mergers, contractual partnerships and franchises. On the other hand, the CJNG has achieved substantive firepower, underpinned by the acquisition of assault rifles, RPGs, landmines, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), anti-aircraft guns, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). In the hands of assassins trained by military defectors and foreign mercenaries with experience in overseas warzones such as Colombia and Ukraine, these weapons have been wielded to orchestrate attacks against the Mexican armed forces, law enforcement, rival groups, and even unarmed civilians. The cartel is also notorious for embracing technological innovations such as AI, cryptocurrencies, and social media platforms.


Although it exists primarily as a money-making machine, this organization has followed an operational playbook that borrows the asymmetric tactics of nonstate militias such as terrorists, separatists, and insurgents. In this particular arena, the CJNG shares more common denominators with the Colombian FARC, Hezbollah, Blackwater, the Wagner Group and African nonstate militias than with old-school Italian mafias, Chinese triads or the Japanese Yakuza. Through the proliferation of armed violence and psychological warfare, the growth of this group has weakened the ability of the Mexican state to ensure the monopoly of force and the full-fledged control of the country’s territorial hinterland. Based on a zero-sum logic, such development represents a threat for both national security and the Westphalian sovereignty of Mexico. Finally, the hitherto unchecked metastasis of this problem would not have been possible without the organic complicity of elite political and economic enablers. As is known, the growth of organized crime necessarily requires the secretive collaboration of “friends in high places.”
Domestic Fallout from El Mencho’s Death

The fate of the New Generation Jalisco Cartel is unclear because the governance structure of organized crime is a fertile ground for a chronic backstabbing disorder. Considering existing precedents, strategic foresight suggests that four scenarios can be envisaged: 1) a smooth consensual succession, 2) a hostile takeover, 3) a bitter power struggle followed by violent balkanization or 4) a gradual disintegration.


What is certain is that the beheading of a large-scale criminal syndicate does not mean that the metaphorical hydra has been dismantled. After all, the removal of a CEO does not mean that the company he used to run has been extinguished. In the short term, the so-called “kingpin strategy” is useful to destabilize criminal networks and to restore deterrence through the demarcation of red lines. However, the Mexican state can leverage this turning point to undermine the cartel’s hidden financial infrastructure, introduce stricter customs enforcement mechanisms and go after the group’s “fellow travelers.”

In the long run, these measures could further the decline and fall of this particular criminal enterprise. Nonetheless, as serious security professionals know, the complete structural eradication of organized crime is unlikely because there are powerful incentives that guarantee the survival of this underworld ecosystem. In the case of Mexico, these include the gravitational pull of market forces, a dispersed geographical configuration, and a flourishing cultural industry that promotes the aspirational attractiveness of the narco lifestyle for young men and women through narratives, songs, fashion, Netflix productions, Instagram influencers, and even semi-religious rituals.

Yet the dismemberment of large organizations could de facto reshuffle the balance of power in a manner that favors the authority of the Mexican government. In the long run, the degradation and fragmentation of large criminal consortiums would make the problem more manageable through state-sanctioned coercion, containment strategies, backchannel negotiations, and informal agreements for the ordered redistribution of spheres of influence. The point is that the state can turn the tables with the ability to permanently keep in check these partially de-fanged criminal rings. Although kosher solutions (i.e. the rule of law, better policing, community crime prevention) are preferable in principle, the testament of history and Machiavellian wisdom teach that an expedient and effective pacification requires unsavory decisions. Bad must begin so that worse remains behind.

For the Mexican government, the elimination of “el Mencho” is a game-changing political triumph. This milestone represents a “clean break” from the puzzling policy of “hugs, not bullets,” followed by President Sheinbaum’s predecessor. Although the precise details remain obscure, the rationale behind the previous approach has been attributed to neglect, détente, and even transactional Faustian pacts. The liquidation of this “high-value target” is also helpful to restore the socio-political legitimacy and professional reputation of the country’s military and civilian security services.


Nevertheless, meaningful risks persist, including the prospect of asymmetric retaliatory attacks calculated to sabotage governance, public order, political stability, and economic exchanges. Military headquarters, senior policymakers, governmental facilities, foreign interests, corporate nerve centers, tourist attractions, symbolic sites, power plants, crowded entertainment venues and infrastructure projects could be targeted. The upcoming organization of three matches of the 2026 FIFA World Cup in Mexican cities opens windows of opportunity for such malicious purposes. The materialization of these hypothetical threats would lead to the loss of political capital, diplomatic credibility, economic benefits and “soft power.”

For an organization like the CJNG, the narco-terrorist attacks launched by Pablo Escobar against Colombian government officials and civilians are perhaps precedents worth replicating, especially considering its state-of-the-art expertise in kamikaze drones and targeted assassinations. In addition, the high-profile political associates of this cartel, who are being gradually sidelined by the current Mexican government, also have incentives to seek revenge. Readiness is therefore a major challenge for Mexican intelligence services, armed forces and law enforcement. On the other hand, the removal of a senior drug lord is expected to facilitate the progress of trade negotiations and the renewal of the North American geoeconomic bloc as a strong trilateral partnership conditionally undergirded by the securitization of strategic industries, supply chains, and critical minerals. For Mexican economic statecraft, access to the US consumer market as an engine of dynamism, manufacturing productiveness, industrial policies, technology transfers, and strategic-grade “nearshoring” investments remains an imperative.
International Dimension

Based on the new prescriptive strategic guidelines for national security and defense presented by the second Trump administration, the US geopolitical perimeter in the American hemisphere is now regarded in DC as a major priority. This redefinition is not just simply a new theoretical innovation masterminded by the US strategic community. Such perception is reflected in the recent capture of Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro, the attempt to control Greenland and a hawkish foreign policy approach towards pivotal regional states with varying profiles, such as Panama, Colombia, Cuba and even Canada.

This strategic conception diagnoses that, in contemporary security environments (shaped by complex interdependence), resurgent interstate geopolitical tensions and emerging vectors of nonstate threats are increasingly entwined. In this view, Mexico is well positioned as a scalable bridge of interconnectedness through which problematic flows —synthetic opioids, illegal immigrants, triangulated Chinese goods, agents of foreign powers or nonstate actors— are infiltrating the US for hostile purposes. As US thinkers like Samuel Huntington and George Friedman have argued, the US and Mexico will likely collide due to diverging demographic and territorial interests. From this perspective, although a bit of chaos in Mexico is tolerable, a black hole of anarchy in a neighboring state with so many overlapping ties to the US is unacceptable. Washington cannot afford to let Mexico become a failed state because it fears the effects of potentially contagious spillovers, power voids and harmful externalities.

This is the context in which the official reclassification of fentanyl as a “weapon of mass destruction” and of Mexican criminal syndicates as “foreign terrorist organizations” must be understood. Under intermittent US diplomatic pressure and threats of both unilateral military interventions and coercive tariffs, the Mexican government has set aside ideological preferences and embraced a policy that blends strategic acquiescence, bilateral security collaboration, and appeasement. Out of pragmatism, the days in which there was little cooperation in the fields of defense, security, and intelligence are behind. Symbolically, the CJNG leader’s head on a silver platter is a better “sacrificial offering” than the meta-legal rendition of second-rate drug lords and has-beens. This accomplishment of this operation performatively telegraphs the US security establishment that Mexico is willing to do what is needed to restore its bona fide credentials as a reliable security partner. Furthermore, as an operational success comparable to the targeted assassinations of both Osama bin Laden or IRGC General Qassem Soleimani, the neutralization of the most wanted Mexican drug lord is a boost for the political ambitions of President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio. As the architects of the Trump corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, these senior GOP figures can leverage the incremental success of this new hemispheric security agenda to further their political projects.


Nevertheless, triumphalism on both sides of the border may be premature because things can get worse before they get any better. Mexican criminal organizations have proved to be exceedingly resilient. The downfall of major syndicates is usually followed by the rise of direct or indirect heirs, especially in faraway peripheral regions with a prohibitive topology. Moreover, as great powers scramble to advance their preferred versions of world order, the resulting security competition brings yet another layer of volatility and even encourages the emergence of wild cards. For example, if a regime change in Cuba occurs via a messy collapse rather than through a controlled demolition or a Richelovian deal, former regime personnel —including military and intelligence officers— may be recruited by Mexican criminal groups. Their experience with grey-zone tactics and irregular conflict in the operational theatres of contested flashpoints across the Global South (hardly transferable to legitimate business) makes them highly attractive. Aside from the self-evident economic benefits of choosing a lucrative workstream that handsomely rewards their tradecraft, there is also an incentive to join forces against the US as a common enemy.

In the worst-case scenario, such shadow symbiosis has the potential to generate a FARC-like hybrid threat in which the distinction between organized crime businesses and militant “anti-imperialist” struggle is blurred. With the firepower and cash of Mexican criminal syndicates and the Cubans’ expertise in all sorts of covert shenanigans, involvement in shady businesses and clandestine international connections, this nonstate “red menace” would be a force to be reckoned with.

For the most hardline and ideologically charged factions of the ruling coalition, increasingly alienated by the “impure” pragmatism of the Mexican head of state and the alignment of her administration to Washington’s orbit, the rise of this golem would be a good opportunity for revanchism. For extra-regional great powers interested in challenging the Americans, this revolutionary joint venture would mean a chance to fuel agitation in the most relevant state for US homeland security. This criminal mutation, under the theatrical facade of “popular resistance”, would deepen Mexico’s security crisis with a counterinsurgency nightmare. It is in Mexico’s best interest that the State Department and the upper echelons of the Cuban military apparatus manage to achieve a deal that ensures hemispheric security and regional stability.

This article was published by the Geopolitical Monitor.com

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