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Wednesday, November 13, 2024


ENVIRONMENT: TO BREATHE OR NOT TO BREATHE?

Sheheryar Khan 
Published November 10, 2024
DAWN
Passengers wait for a train at a railway station amid smoggy conditions in Lahore on November 3, 2024 | AFP

The onset of smog season in October results in a decline in air quality across Punjab, on either side of the Pakistan-India border. Lahore and Delhi are traditionally the worst affected, with the Pakistani city recording “unprecedented” pollution levels.

The air quality index, which measures a range of pollutants, exceeded 1,000 in Lahore last week — it is considered “unhealthy” at the level of 100 and “hazardous” when it is 300 or more — according to data from IQAir, an air quality monitor.

The situation, in Lahore and elsewhere in Pakistan’s Punjab, is being made worse by the political and policy inertia of the Punjab government.

Every year, there are multiple studies and reports published on the subject and policy dialogues are convened to add to the public discourse. Despite these efforts, one question looms large: why, despite having ample scientific data and understanding of pollution patterns, has the government failed to take decisive action?

Despite having ample data and understanding of pollution patterns, Punjab has failed to take policy decisions to combat the year-round smog problem, thereby subjecting its residents to “hazardous” levels of pollution in winter…

The answer lies not in a lack of awareness, but in a deeply rooted knowledge-action gap, where the presence of scientific knowledge fails to translate into policy change, because of political and institutional barriers.

Over the past decade, environmental scientists, both locally and globally, have made substantial progress in identifying the root causes of air pollution. Detailed data have mapped out the major culprits: industrial emissions, agricultural stubble burning, vehicular emissions and construction dust. Seasonal spikes, most notably in winter, occur due to temperature inversions, trapping pollutants close to the ground and amplifying smog.

Similarly, there have been several studies on the socio-economic impacts of smog, especially related to deteriorating public health. Yet, despite having this data readily available and witnessing the devastating health and economic impacts of air pollution, policy responses remain fragmented, inconsistent and slow.

Punjab’s Environmental Policy

One might assume that simply knowing the causes of pollution would lead to swift action, but the science-policy relationship is rarely straightforward. Despite clear scientific evidence of the problem, decision-makers are caught between competing interests, fragmented responsibilities, and the political weight of environmental regulations on influential sectors.

For instance, while it is well-known that stubble-burning contributes significantly to smog, attempts to curb this practice have been largely ineffective. Farmers, already struggling with limited financial resources, view alternatives — such as crop residue shredders — as too costly, even with government subsidies, and continue with stubble-burning every year.

Over in the industrial sector, rather than enforcing stricter regulations or increasing support for alternatives, policymakers have often resorted to temporary shutdowns of industrial sites or limited brick kiln operations. Such actions fail to address the core issues and provide only brief respites from poor air quality.

Temporary shutdowns only reduce emissions momentarily and do not tackle the long-term pollution generated daily by factories and kilns. Addressing these issues would require establishing enforceable, year-round standards, incentivising cleaner technologies and alternative fuels, and ensuring a robust system for regular inspections and penalties for non-compliance.

AQI levels in Lahore between Nov 2-4, 2024: Lahore saw its AQI reach an “unprecedented” level of over 1,000, more than three times the level considered “hazardous” to health | IQAir

Political Stakes and Misplaced Priorities


A core reason for inaction lies in the political and economic stakes tied to air pollution and misplaced priorities. Punjab’s industrial sector, one of the primary contributors to pollution, is also a major economic driver. Implementing stringent regulations could slow down production, impact profits and even lead to job losses.

Similarly, agricultural practices such as stubble-burning are deeply entrenched, and sudden changes could lead to significant disruptions in an already strained agricultural economy. Even though these sectors have been identified as critical polluters, the government is reluctant to pursue measures that could be politically costly.

As far as the issue of misplaced priorities is concerned, a case in point is the development model of Lahore, which has relied on road infrastructure projects with the aim to ease traffic congestion in the city. This has resulted in the construction of signal-free corridors across the city. This also means that, during the construction phase of these projects, the cement and dust particles are likely to remain suspended in the air, contributing to the bad air quality.

Consequently, there is an incentive for citizens of the city to use private transport which, as a result of these corridors, will be much quicker for daily commutes than public transport. The entire development model of Lahore incentivises more vehicles on roads, rather than focusing on a public transport policy that doesn’t incentivise use of private transport and vehicles.

State’s Responsibility

With the recent passage of the 26th Amendment, the constitution of Pakistan now enshrines the “Right to a Clean and Healthy Environment” under Article 9A. This amendment mandates the government to protect citizens from environmental harm, making it incumbent on the state to address the severe air quality crisis.

Now that the evidence unequivocally shows air quality levels have reached hazardous levels, the government’s responsibility to act is more pressing than ever. To put it simply, government action against the smog crisis is a public health imperative.

What Punjab needs now is not more data, but a concerted, integrated approach that prioritises public health over short-term, knee-jerk, gimmick-oriented solutions, such as using mist machines on the streets of Lahore.

Way Forward


Much of the data points to automobiles as a major contributor of emissions and pollution. There is existing regulation on shifting to cleaner Euro-V fuels across the country, but that is only part of the solution.

The preponderance of old vehicles with inefficient engines is equally responsible for emissions, which is why the automobile legislation should focus on an effective motor vehicle-testing regime and a plan to phase out old/polluting vehicles. Additionally, there should be a focus on public transport legislation, whereby incentives are provided to citizens and organisations to take up public over private transport.

This was also among the recommendations of a recent policy report published by the World Wide Fund for Nature Pakistan (WWF-Pakistan), titled Situational Analysis of Air Quality in Lahore.

Among other things, the report lays emphasis on the need for an efficient mass transit system. It says that expanding Lahore’s mass transit options can mitigate vehicular pollution. Lahore’s Metro Bus and Orange Line Metro Train have been effective, but further development of affordable, efficient mass transit across the city would encourage public use, thus reducing private vehicle reliance and emissions over the long term.

Such a developmental project also makes political sense and is in line with the political parties’ emphasis on large-scale infrastructure projects that are tangible signs of ‘development’ and progress.

There is a need to influence policy and decision-making to consider environmental factors as part of the planning process. Lahore, and Pakistan as a country on the whole, requires a solid, integrated green and sustainable plan for urban expansion. Presently, cities grow and central business districts develop without proper zoning strategies and without keeping in mind the environmental footprint of such development.

Each year, the cost of inaction becomes more apparent. The time has come to bridge this knowledge-action gap by implementing policies that reflect both scientific insight and on-the-ground realities of Punjab’s social and economic landscape.

If the government can move beyond the political inertia that has paralysed efforts thus far, there is hope that Punjab’s air can one day be breathable again.

The writer is a Commonwealth Scholar at the University of Bristol in the UK

Published in Dawn, EOS, November 10th, 2024


An unwanted fifth season

November 11, 2024 
DAWN



PUNJAB’S unwanted fifth season — smog — is currently in full bloom. Air quality in cities like Lahore, poor throughout the year, is at its toxic worst between October and January, with AQI readings well above 500 on most days.

The government’s response so far hinges on school closures and the enforcement of location-specific lockdowns. While keeping vulnerable groups, like children, away from public spaces filled with poisonous air is understandable, it is unlikely that air quality will be much cleaner at home.

Protest and despair at poor air quality is now a standard ritual during these months. Since at least 2015, when the onset of smog became sharply apparent in October, environmentalists and other experts have deliberated on what can be done to solve the issue. The answers are wide-ranging, and the absence of government ownership of the problem in the first few years didn’t help.

Almost a decade on, we can claim some clarity on the proximate causes of the air quality crisis. We know, thanks to source apportionment studies, that transport and industrial emissions are a major source of the problem, when averaged out through the year.

On account of further work, by Cambridge- and Oxford-based scientists Abdullah Bajwa and Hassan Sheikh, we know that vehicle fleet age, two-stroke engines in motorcycles and rickshaws, along with fuel quality are significant features of the problem.


Air quality is an issue that cannot be privatised beyond the mere use of air purifiers in private spaces.

We also know that crop burning in East Punjab contributes to the spike in smog levels during these current months, partly because of wind direction and the inversion of temperature that keeps particulate matter suspended in the air for longer.

Knowing all what we know now, the set of solutions available to us is also fairly clear. Changes in fuel quality, enforcement of fitness standards to phase out polluting vehicles, stricter regulations on industrial emissions, and the development of mass transit solutions to reduce the number of private vehicles on the road are all steps adopted by cities that grappled with air quality issues during the 20th century. In the present context, we have the additional option of ensuring public transport doesn’t add to the problem, mainly by inducting New Energy Vehicles.

Similarly, given that emissions do not respect the Radcliffe line, fenced or otherwise, cross-border collaboration between the two Punjabs is a categorical necessity. Domestic standards and interventions mentioned earlier will clear up the air, through the year on average, but spikes during October-November require the two countries to cooperate more closely and forge a collective solution.

Like with many other public policy issues in Pakistan, offering a set of solutions is not necessarily the problem. In fact, many of these interventions have been identified by the government itself, including through its own source apportionment studies carried out in the last few years. The challenge for us is one of state capacity and fiscal resources. It is precisely this challenge that makes one far more pessimistic about the short- and medium-term prospects for cleaner air.

State capacity is the ability of public sector institutions to implement whatever rules, regulations, objectives it sets out to achieve. As sociologist Michael Mann put it, this ability itself is of two types of power — despotic, which usually relies on punitive and coercive capacity; and infrastructural, which relies on cooperation, coordination, and behavioural shifts.

The weakness of infrastructural power among Pakistani public sector organisations is fairly clear. Rules and regulations, when they do exist, are subverted by powerful societal actors, or undermined by state officials themselves. When the state attempts to deliver services itself, it runs into significant resource constraints, or falls prey to various forms of inefficiencies.

These weaknesses are both a cause and a consequence of increased privatisation in every domain. People who can afford to opt out of state delivery in domains such as housing, water, health, education, even energy, have done so. The market caters to all such needs, as long as people can pay. With the rich and powerful no longer reliant on the state, there is even less pressure on officials to cater to the needs of those who have no other option.

Air quality, however, is an issue that cannot be privatised beyond the mere use of air purifiers in private spaces. Given the rate at which the AQI index is climbing, even purifiers won’t be able to solve the issue. Sure, the rich will have access to better healthcare and the luxury of not going out unless absolutely necessary, but that doesn’t offer the same type of insulation that an off-grid solar system or generator does against a failing public sector electricity grid.

There is no option, then, but to address the crisis. All the steps mentioned above require not only great fiscal outlay, but also the state to perform at a level of ability and capacity that it has seldom demonstrated in recent years. Will government departments tasked with monitoring vehicle fitness levels step up and increase monitoring?

Will local administrators who carry the responsibility of shutting down polluting industrial units be given the resources and protection to take on powerful interests? Will narrow national security considerations be set aside, and meaningful cross-border collaboration initiated?

Such steps can only take place once there is a level of clarity within the government about the smog issue being a public health crisis bigger than any encountered in the past. And that it requires explicit and dedicated attention over a long period of time to solve. Praying for a change in weather is not a sound strategy; similarly hoping that people forget about it or get used to it won’t save anyone’s lungs. The capacity required to tackle the problem needs to be built by the state, and the time to do it is right now.

The writer teaches sociology at Lums.

X: @umairjav

Published in Dawn, November 11th, 2024




The roads are killing us

Cities cannot become concrete jungles of flyovers and interchanges and still have clean air.
November 12, 2024
DAWN


LAST week, the prime minister found time to inaugurate two flyovers in Islamabad. Despite the ‘live coverage’ on television, it wasn’t a news item that attracted much attention.

Most people were too busy discussing the judiciary, the failed attempt to sell PIA, or the smog in Lahore and the rest of Punjab, with the provincial capital topping pollution charts worldwide.

But as discussion focused on Lahore’s ranking and the filth that most urban residents in Pakis­tan inhale all year, a greyness also descended on Islamabad. By the end of the week, winter sunshine in the capital had disappeared, as had the clear views of the Margalla Hills.

While this is relatively new for Islamabad, it is not unfamiliar. An exceptionally dry spell the previous winter had covered our lives with similar dullness. In other words, the infamous smog has reached the capital too; it will stay until there is rain. True, Islamabad can’t compare with Lahore, but it’s a beginning. And we know how this story ends — in many shades of grey and no sun.

But what does this have to do with the prime minister’s presence at city events in Islamabad, some may wonder. Everything. For while we moan and groan about the poison the people breathe in, day in and day out, and discuss industrial pollution in cities and how the winds from India are to blame, the issue will not be addressed until we change the way we think. Cities cannot become concrete jungles of flyovers and interchanges for the comfort of cars and still ensure blue skies and clean air.

Politicians continue to be obsessed with brick-and-mortar projects, equating them with development and good governance. In this outdated worldview, roads, flyovers and interchanges are the cool kids of development projects. Modern-day Lahore is a testament to it; where concrete crept up on large parts of ‘elite’ Lahore — Gulberg, Liberty, Model Town, DHA. Roads were widened, signal-free corridors added, and when all else failed, flyovers were squeezed in so that cars could zip around.

In the process, the green areas were narrowed and even done away with altogether. Ask those who remember the green belt that made up the Gulberg Boulevard before it was shrunk, planted with palm trees, and the road widened. Few people might remember, but they may have noticed that the wide road is no longer enough for the traffic, which has grown exponentially since.

As Kevin Costner once told us, build and they will come. What we in Pakistan did not and do not realise is that once roads are built, the cars will come; so many that the bigger roads will not be enough either. And with the traffic comes air pollution, which is the far bigger cause of the smog than winds from India.

The same solution/problem was imported to Islamabad during the Gen Musharraf years, when the avenues were widened needlessly. Needlessly because more than a decade after Musharraf has left, traffic in the city is still not enough to warrant these wide avenues. But we continue to build more roads, widen the existing ones, and build flyovers because traffic should whizz through a city the way it does on highways and motorways.

No one complains or protests because it suits the policymakers and the rich — the same people who will petition the courts about Monalstone-crushing, and the sanctity of the Margalla Hills but never about the concrete that is conquering the city. Roads suit those who can afford cars, and hence it is easier to pretend this is not about the environment.

Roads, frankly, are a project for the rich and by the rich. Anyone living in Islamabad will realise this if they glance sideways, while whizzing down a wide road at 80 or 100 kilometres per hour. On either side, ordinary people stand, trying to figure out when they should run across without being run over; they have to run because there is no dignified way of crossing many roads.

The motorists may also notice, if they bothered to look, the people standing patiently at one end of the flyover, hoping for someone to slow down and offer them a lift to the other end. Because that flyover takes a car just seconds to traverse but a pedestrian much longer.

With no public transport and these highway-style roads in the middle of a city, the message for everybody is that a car or a motorbike is essential for life. Without one, the city doesn’t work for you. How can it, for while cars require four- to six-lane roads, people are told to climb up sky-high stairs to cross a road because pedestrian crossings are for the convenience of the motorists.

These pedestrian bridges are surely a desi invention, because never have I seen one in big Western cities where the traffic moves slowly so that people can walk. Indeed, in the rest of the world, urban planners are ripping out flyovers and big roads, thus restricting traffic. But Pakistan continues to move in a different direction. In fact, our idea of public transport also begins with roads. Before the bus is even purchased, roads are built for it.

This hits one all the more in Islamabad, because the capital was conceived as a 15-minute city. Take a close look at any of the older parts of town and it’s evident: the small parks are easily located and wide pedestrian walkways (despite the generators and security guard room encroachments) and small markets are included in every sub-sector, ensuring that a grocery story is within walking distance of every house. Move further away to the newer sectors and most of these amenities are missing; but big roads and the dust are ever-present.

This did become a bit of a rant. But as a layperson, I don’t know how else to say that Pakistani citizens will not enjoy the luxury of clean air till there is an overhaul of our development model and city planning. Dirty air cannot be fixed via piecemeal efforts.

The writer is a journalist.


Published in Dawn, November 12th, 2024



Sunday, November 10, 2024

PAKISTAN

Dream of political stability

In their efforts to maintain ‘political stability’, the rulers have bypassed parliamentary integrity.

Published November 10, 2024 
 DAWN




IT is often believed that engineering political stability is the solution to a nation’s economic and security challenges. The idea of this so-called stability is used to justify the suppression of dissent, stifling of political opposition, and the disregard for democratic principles and transparency in societies. Recent developments in Pakistan seem to prove this observation correct.

The ruling elite has a firm grip on power, and has successfully bypassed parliamentary integrity in its attempt to maintain ‘political stability’. The media often portrays serene images and photos and footage of cultural events in major cities, suggesting that all is well. Yet, sceptics argue that addressing the basis of Pakistan’s political turmoil is necessary for this manufactured calm to find its way to true stability.

Pakistan’s rulers have long lived under the delusion that they can consolidate their grip on power by manipulating parliament and the judiciary; in the process, they often sideline the consent and representation of political parties and rights movements. Such movements and parties are seen as peripheral because they seek certain rights and privileges in exchange for taking part in legislative business. The Balochistan National Party (BNP) of Sardar Akhtar Mengal and the National Party of Dr Abdul Malik are examples of this.

However, the rulers only consider the demands of such parties if their support is crucial for passing laws. The means employed to secure BNP’s votes for the passage of the 26th Constitutional Amendment is one recent example.

Since independence, power politics in Pakistan have always revolved around personalities. This has led to the entrenchment of dynastic politics, which not only weakens political and democratic institutions but is also heavily responsible for failures of governance. These dynasties resist the establishment only when excluded from power; mostly, though, they are not averse to collaborating with each other and sharing power. In this arrangement, the establishment’s influence has grown. Political dynasties remain content as long as their political and business interests are secured.

There is an undeniable nexus between power politics and the economy; power-sharing directly influences economic reforms in all sectors — ranging from agriculture and industry to services. Meanwhile, the challenges faced by marginalised groups and rights movements are linked to internal security, which is often overlooked by the ruling classes. The latter’s illusion of having secured political stability will remain an illusion until voices from the peripheries are accommodated.

Describing these movements and dissenting voices as having been tainted by foreign influence or being traitorous has not addressed the core issues; instead, actions by security institutions driven by such perceptions have compounded the challenges. The economy, particularly in terms of foreign investment, is still very fragile, and can be further affected by deterioration of the security situation.

Political instability in Balochistan and KP’s merged districts has triggered discontent, providing insurgents and terrorists the space to exploit local grievances. Data from the Pak Institute for Peace Studies on recent terrorist activities in the country highlights the concerning expansion of militant influence, especially in KP and Balochistan. In October alone, 100 lives were lost in 48 terrorist attacks — 35 in KP, and nine in Balochistan, and more minor incidents in Sindh and Punjab. These regions have become focal points for militant operations, and reflect a dangerous strategy by these militant groups to destabilise areas where operational freedom may be greater due to geographical or sociopolitical factors. Though less frequent, incidents in Punjab and Sindh signal efforts to expand influence beyond traditional strongholds.

The BLA’s recent vehicle-borne suicide attack targeting Chinese nationals in Karachi exemplifies this tactic, indicating an attempt to disrupt crucial economic partnerships. Similarly, militants from the TTP are reportedly pushing into Balochistan’s Pakhtun belt and parts of Punjab, including districts bordering KP such as Mianwali. This suggests a calculated plan to broaden their reach.

As militants attempt to regroup and to increase their violent tactics in KP, local communities have become very vocal about their fears. Protests have persisted for months since the Taliban’s resurgence in Swat and the surrounding areas. Residents, often supported by social and political groups, have organised rallies, gatherings, and jirgas to express their concern at the re-emergence of militant groups and the rising arc of violence in their areas. They have also been vocal about their distrust of the government and security forces, and have criticised their inability to ensure durable security. This growing disillusionment underscores the urgent need to adopt a more comprehensive approach to counter violence and public grievances.

The PTM’s jirga last month highlighted the growing frustration of marginalised communities with contentious state policies on counterterrorism, resource distribution, and political rights. Similarly, the presence of the Baloch Yakjehti Council is an indicator of the growing concern in Balochistan with the ruling elites’ management of provincial affairs.

Our ruling circles must broaden their political perspective to genuinely include peripheral political and rights movements, including those from Balochistan, KP, and Sindh, in the national discourse.

Many of the rights movements have appeared willing to negotiate and work within the existing political framework if respectfully approached by a government that has genuine intentions. A serious, inclusive dialogue could pave the way for meaningful reforms and reduce discontent. The ruling elite’s commitment to such an approach would signal a shift from superficial gestures to a more sustainable, participatory model of governance.

Given our rulers’ assertion that Pakistan is now on the path of stability and economic growth, there should be no hesitation on the government’s part to engage dissenting voices from Balochistan and KP. Sadly, our history is witness to the fact that whenever Pakistan appears to stabilise, the arrogance of the power elites tends to rise. This pushes the country back onto a slippery slope. The post-9/11 economic growth, for example, eventually dissipated due to Gen Musharraf’s misadventures in Balochistan and the creation of a judicial crisis. Power circles must rethink their approach.

The writer is a security analyst.


Published in Dawn, November 10th, 2024

Monday, September 23, 2024

THE DREADED ISI

Pakistan appoints Lt General Asim Malik as head of powerful spy agency


Lt Gen Asim Malik to replace Lt Gen Nadeem Anjum as Director General of ISI and will take charge on Sept.30, 2024.
Photo / X

Tariq Butt, Correspondent

Lt General Muhammad Asim Malik has been appointed as the Director General of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISi) to take charge of the position on September 30, the state-run Pakistan Television (PTV) announced on its official X account.

The new appointee is currently serving as the adjutant general at the General Headquarters (GHQ) of Pakistan Army in Rawalpindi, the statement said.

He will be replacing Lt Gen Nadeem Anjum, who was picked up for the position in 2021 by then-prime minister Imran Khan on the insistence of the then army chief Qamar Javed Bajwa.

In October 2021, then-Major General Asim Malik had been promoted to the rank of lieutenant general and was then appointed the adjutant general.

During the course of his military career, he served in the Balochistan infantry division and commanded the infantry brigade in Waziristan, the PTV said and highlighted that he had been awarded a Sword of Honour during his army service.

Other than that, Gen Malik also served as the chief instructor at the National Defence University (NDU) in Islamabad and as an instructor at the Command and Staff College Quetta.

The military officer is a graduate of Fort Leavenworth in the United States and Royal College of Defence Studies in London, the statement added.

He belongs to a military family and his father Ghulam Muhammad was also a lieutenant general in the Pakistan Army.

The outgoing ISI chief retired from the army service last year, but was retained in this post after he was given extension in service.

The post of ISI director general, usually a serving military officer, is one of the most powerful positions in Pakistan, at the intersection of domestic politics, the military and foreign relations.

While the ISI chief technically reports to the prime minister, he is controlled by Pakistan’s army chief.


The shadow games of Pakistan's ISI

Friday, 23 August 2024 | Bhopinder Singh


Often accused of overstepping its professional bounds, ISI has become a player in domestic politics, international intrigue, and personal vendettas

Spy novelist John Le Carre describes spies as complicated and lonely beings, living double lives. Such seclusion makes deception, intrigue and unrequited ambition, their default mode. The fact that they know the deep and dark secrets but are still expected to comply by restrains occasionally leads them to flex their ‘privilege’ (read, confidential information) towards reckless ends. Because they are dangerously privy to so much dirt, they fear their ambition.

Like the proverbial Ceaser’s wife, must always be above suspicion – but often aren’t.Pakistan’s notorious spy agency Inter-Services-Intelligence (ISI) is infamous for going beyond its professional remit and dabbling in domestic politics, commercial interests or even partaking in cross-border dalliances, beyond their approved mandate. If the Pakistani Army Chief is the real power (pretence of civil politicians, notwithstanding), arguably the second most powerful person is the DG-ISI. Supposed loyalty to the Army Chief or to the PM (in times when the Army takes a backseat and politicians have an upper hand) is implicit, though, in the Pakistani narrative, backstabbing is common.

Ironically for such a powerful ‘number two’ post, there have been 29 DG-ISIs so far, and only one has ascended to the post of Army Chief i.e., the current Army Chief, General Asim Munir. It is reflective of the slippery slope that the post entails which invariably ends up making some power centres in Pakistan unhappy about their conduct e.g., Clergy, Politicians, Americans/Chinese or even their alma mater, the Pakistani ‘establishment’.

Even the current Army Chief, General Asim Munir was abruptly moved out as the DG-ISI as the then PM Imran Khan felt uncomfortable with his conduct (karma later evened out the equation as Imran finds himself languishing in the jail today). Seemingly the profile is for a loyal, unquestioning and low-key DG-ISI who does the job is satisfied with obscurity (shouldn’t be overambitious) and effectively rides into the sunset after retirement, without much fuss. Given the opportunity, lure and access, many do try to take their chances.

There is a curious case of one DG-ISI who did get appointed as the Army Chief, but his tenure was only for a few hours and the same does not go in official records as having become the Pakistani Army Chief. Lt Gen Ziauddin Butt was a typical DG-ISI who went across the Afghan border to meet the dreaded leader of the Taliban, Mullah Omar, to negotiate – he was in the thick of the dark corridors and machinations of the Pakistani State.

Ziauddin had direct access to the other competing power centre i.e., PM Nawaz Sharif, and was a willing accomplice in Sharif’s attempt to remove Pervez Musharraf as the Army Chief. Before the coup(or countercoup as Musharraf calls it), ‘General’ Ziauddin was hastily appointed the Army Chief and then immediately dumped by the Pakistani Army which refused to back their DG-ISI’s ambition. Spymaster’s gambit failed. Ziauddin was not the first or the last of DG-ISIs to harbour personal ambition beyond what was warranted constitutionally. The shadowy likes of Lt Gen Akhtar Rahman, Hamid Gul, Shamsur Kallu, Zaheerul Islam etc., operated with questionable interests. Yet another one who is in the news for harbouring extraconstitutional ambitions and paying the price for the same is the former DG-ISI, Lt Gen Faiz Hameed. Forced into premature retirement over his dubious role amid the recent turf war between the Pakistani ‘establishment’ (led by previous and current Army Chiefs i.e. Qamar Bajwa and Asim Munir, respectively) against the Imran Khan dispensation – he has been brought back to public news for having misused his then powerful position and arm-twisting people in some realty deal.

While he was earlier afforded a relatively face-saving ‘early retirement’ (though everyone knew better), he could be embarrassingly court-martialed to score fresh brownie points against the deposed Imran Khan dispensation (which Lt Gen Faiz Hameed is popularly believed to be identified with). Many acts of Lt Gen Faiz Hameed did suggest a rather megalomanic, cavalier and overreaching conduct that did not behove the role of spymasters, but perhaps the personal ambition had got the better of him. As the roll of the dice played out, the narrative changed and with it, he too was ousted. Only he is back for a possible second round of infamy and disrepute if the current dispensation has its ways.Whereas the unhinged politicians like Imran Khan who are desperately trying to save their skins and ingratiate themselves to the Pakistani ‘establishment’ (after realising that they are not going anywhere) have disowned and thrown Lt Gen Faiz Hameed under the proverbial bus! Instead of backing their henchman who did their bidding, Imran said, “if Faiz Hameed was involved, it should be investigated” and he welcomed the enquiry!

The whole saga says a lot about the unprofessionalism and complete absence of loyalty in overall governance, as exemplified by Lt Gen Faiz Hameed or by Imran Khan – the former was disloyal to his institution, and the latter to his word. As Israeli Michael Bar-Zohar notes in Mossad: The Greatest Missions of the Israeli Secret Service, “Dirtiest actions should be carried out by the most honest men”, perhaps former DG-ISI Faiz Hameed wasn’t one and will pay the price, again.

(The writer, a military veteran, is a former Lt Governor of Andaman & Nicobar Islands and Puducherry. The views are personal)

Unity, faith, discipline – The ISI of Pakistan

Global Defense Insight
January 28, 2022


ISI was established by Australian army commander Major-General Walter Cawthorne, then Deputy Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Army, in the aftermath of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947-8. Later, he became the chief of Australia’s Secret Intelligence Service. Cawthrone based ISI’s design on the British intelligence service MI-6 and the United States’ CIA.

Author Hein G. Kiessling’s book “Faith, Unity, Discipline – The ISI of Pakistan” gives readers a fascinating historical look into the secret world of one of the most admired and dreaded secret services of the modern age.

Kiessling explains ISI’s start and how it was first charged with carrying out foreign operations. He also goes into great detail on the pivotal events that changed the path of history and made ISI what it is today.

The author reflects on the ISI’s early failures, like Operation Gibraltar, which used irregulars to incite an uprising in Kashmir. Although General Ayub Khan approved the ideas, they did not pay off for Pakistan.

The writer explores the role of the ISI in East Pakistan. Its first attempt to inject religion into politics, which ended in failure, was to get enough support for Jammat-e-Islami in Bangladesh. While the Indian RAW, on the other hand, not only completed its core objective of dismembering Pakistan but also posed a threat to the ISI’s emergence as a secret organization.

For years, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was an underdeveloped and unknown organization. It became well-known in 1979 when Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan in support of their communist ally’s government. To defend the mujahideen against the Soviets, the organization collaborated with the CIA, an American intelligence agency by providing weapons and funding.

Since then, the ISI has expanded its sphere of influence throughout the region. The directorate’s support in Indian-held Kashmir, assistance to the Afghan Taliban, and potential ties to Al-Qaeda are all fiercely debated topics. It also puts the spotlight on the ISI’s participation in the country’s nuclear program and its covert role in the Dr. A.Q. Khan case.

This book provides an excellent overview of the ISI’s participation in internal politics and foreign counter-intelligence operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Afghanistan, and North East India, among other places. It details the events of the 1990s when Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto established an information-sharing network between the ISI and Pakistan’s foreign office for policy research and other purposes.

The author further claims that ISI wields diplomatic power through the appointment of former military generals as ambassadors.

One of the book’s most intriguing parts is its debunking of the misconception that ISI is a rogue organization. The author argues that such an idea does not exist and ISI is a well-established organization with a robust command structure overseeing the directorate’s operations.

Because there is little public discussion about ISI’s actions, the author’s attempt to dispel some of the agency’s clouds is pushed back.

The material in the book comes from the author’s personal networking with ISI professionals, as well as secondary source data, particularly from Indian academics that view ISI through a RAW lens. This book, on the other hand, succeeds in explaining the workings of intelligence as well as Pakistan’s politics and overall policies.

‘ISI didn’t plan the Taliban victory. The US facilitated it,’ says Adrian Levy

Open Conversation with Adrian Levy, author


Ullekh NP  | 27 Aug, 2021


(Illustration: Saurabh Singh)

Adrian Levy has never stayed back this long in London since he was 16, he says. The Covid-19 pandemic has confined him to his London home from where he currently gives interviews on the latest among several books he has co-authored with Cathy Scott-Clark who, these days, is tied up with an upcoming project: on the American use of torture. Like their previous works, their new book Spy Stories: Inside the Secret World of the R.A.W. and the I.S.I. is an explosive volume that talks about the men and methods of the bitterly rival external intelligence agencies of India and Pakistan, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The 360-page book offers valuable insights into various operations launched apparently by ISI and RAW, the 2019 Pulwama attack, the Pathankot airbase attack of 2016, the Parliament attack and also about people and assets.


There is much more in the book than what has often been said about the two agencies.

The duo, known for their superb investigations, have authored books and made films on jihad, geopolitics, strategy and foreign policy, among others. Their books include The Exile: The Stunning Inside Story of Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda in Flight; The Meadow: The Kashmir Kidnapping That Changed the Face of Modern Terrorism; The Siege: The Attack on the Taj; Deception: Pakistan, the United States and the Global Nuclear Weapons Conspiracy.

In his conversation with Open, Levy dwells on the Afghan situation, the role of spy agencies in that country and warns against knee-jerk reactions on the part of the media and analysts to run into judgments on events, saying these could be profoundly damaging. As with terror attacks, he says it is important to understand the distinction between intelligence failures and the intent to allow things to run their course. Excerpts:

How many years did it take you to finish this book?

It’s a continuum for Cathy and myself. Each book is an overlapping enterprise rather than one book or film ending and another beginning. Work goes on concurrently and so it is more horizontal than vertical. For example, when we were doing The Meadow (the 2012 book about the 1995 kidnapping of tourists in Kashmir by an unnamed group to secure the release of dreaded Pakistani militant Maulana Masood Azhar), we had the idea of the Western hostage-taking in mind to look at the wider issue of disappearances. But we couldn’t do it for many years. Finally, after the earthquake happened in Kashmir (in 2005) and the security came down, we got to see the landscape of Kashmir.



Now, building relationships takes a long time. It is a decades-plus-long effort. Cathy must have worked from 1994 to until now, but in terms of specifics, the work on this started in 2009 when we were doing The Siege (on the 26/11 Mumbai attacks). We had this idea then of making a South Asian version of the Israeli film called The Gatekeepers, which is an intriguing, well-made, educative and entertaining documentary feature that got the Israeli security agency Shin Bet to open up. It gave a conflicting, overlapping narrative of oral history, not substantiated by paperwork, how they (members of Shin Bet who agreed to talk) saw the Israeli-Palestinian issue. We had this idea to make a film in which one of us would be on this side of the LoC and the other on the other side. We started conversations in 2009 with everybody, but on either side, not one person wanted to be on camera (from ISI or RAW).

The issue with spies is that they don’t want to be accountable to anyone. We kept working on it, with new RAW chiefs, new ISI chiefs, telling them to own the narrative. Owning the narrative is what Americans had done exceptionally well. But everyone in India and Pakistan rejected it although we kept pleading. So instead of a film we decided to write an oral book based on inputs from all of those we spoke to about ISI and RAW. We were working on the book intensely for four years, travelling to India and Pakistan. But most of these people who spoke to us were people we knew since 1994.



When did you meet Major Iftikhar whom you describe in the book as the nom de guerre for an ISI operations officer?

We met him three years ago, but everyone else who provides the infrastructure were relationships we began when we were kids (laughs) and so they were genial. A lot of meetings, by the way, happened in the Gulf states, Thailand, a proxy territory for a lot of spy agencies. Some meetings took place in France, Germany, Syria, the US and England. These meetings overlapped with another project that is coming up: on American use of torture. We have an extremely thin level of budgeting and so we manage multiple projects together. Otherwise, it would be practically and economically impossible for two people who do freelance work and are not supported by institutions to do such projects.

Do Iftikhar and Monisha (the RAW agent who is a source for the authors) have multiple identities?

Yes. We keep interviews that go back to 1994. All the interviews are taped and transcribed, but we agreed to use trade names. Iftikhar was one of the identities he (the ISI operative) had used. He had five identities all the way from Korea in 1994 up until his vanishing. In fact, Iftikhar was his favourite nom de guerre. Monisha had several identities. She was not in clandestine service. She was an analyst.



In David Muntaner’s 2015 film CIA vs KGB: Battleground Berlin, CIA officers admit that KGB was slightly superior to them because of their ideological drive and commitment. Is that kind of faith-based passion at play between ISI and RAW?

It is a super-interesting question. I have got many different takes on that. I believe that it is true that both outfits take on a different mantle as the time changes. If you take a micro timeline, that is from 9/11 onwards, you can see that there is an evolution of ideology and character within those organisations. It will be tempting initially and incorrectly to say that India is taking on its ideological foe in ISI, which stands for an austere and extreme interpretation of Islam. That is to assume that RAW doesn’t have any politics. I touch upon this because that (giving such a perception) is one of RAW’s biggest achievements. Its projection of itself as benign and vanilla is something it does very effectively.


Owning the narrative is what Americans had done exceptionally well. But everyone in India and Pakistan rejected it. So instead of a film we decided to write a book based on inputs from all of those we spoke to about ISI and RAW. We were working on the book intensely for four years, travelling to India and Pakistan

Both organisations have gone on interesting journeys. Both involve inculcation by a faith and a certain kind of worldview, a deepening of a religious-social worldview. It is certainly true of RAW and certainly true of ISI. Let’s not forget that a new kind of nationalism is emerging in India encouraged by the US post-2001. Therefore, the forces that become corrosive in Pakistan become corrosive in India, too. And yet the story is not told that way. You have jealousies on both sides.



Your book quotes Monisha saying that Lodhi Road (RAW headquarters) is dominated by IPS officers who think Muslims are duplicitous. How do you think such an attitude would restrict intel gathering against ISI?

I am not in the business of writing a transformative policy document. I am reporting (laughs). I will make an observation though. India’s Intelligence Bureau (the main internal intelligence agency), for example, has a certain number of Muslims but senior positions are mostly not filled by them with the probable exception of Asif Ibrahim. The organisation, according to insiders—and it is not my view—suffered incalculably because of that. If you look at all spy organisations across the world, they invest a lot in communities they investigate. In that sense, the transformation of the CIA, MI5, MI6 is all radical. In places like India, such reforms are only on paper.

The result of this attitude could be dangerous. Again, it is very easy to look at everything through the narrow prism of post-2014 politics when BJP returned to power. Actually, it involves a much longer timeline, all the way through various other governments. RAW officers tell you that the organisation does not reflect the humongous gifted communities of India and that it would benefit from being a truly representative security establishment.

Who do you think are the most effective, storied and feared officers of RAW and ISI?

It would be true to say much against the common beliefs that RAW and ISI have both been hugely effective. And yet, because they resist telling stories, what you tend to hear is hugely negative, such as big episodes of infiltration, collapses, the failures like 26/11, etcetera. There are many, many heroes. At a very senior level, I always found that (the late RAW chief) B Raman’s influence just cannot be overstated. He is an extraordinary person who brought in extraordinary changes, professionalism and rigour to RAW.



KC Verma is among such a breed of people who did the impossible, politically as well. A very good example of short-termism is that after 26/11 lots of people said to me that we never imagined the unimaginable. That’s just rubbish, right? What do the security services do? They imagine the unimaginable every day. People like Verma and Raman imagine the unimaginable and try to go into the unimaginable space, including the outreach to Iran, the outreach to China, the balancing of America, Iran and China, the outreach to Russia and so on. They played hugely sophisticated, big-country games that are never really well-documented. The courting of Israel is a story in its own right.

The illicit relationship with Israel, which took place in the 1990s at a time when it couldn’t even be acknowledged, goes right up to Pegasus today. So, I’ve named some of those people. Anyone who is really interested in this psychology of jihad, who is really interested in the pathology of political movements, wants to be with these people. You want to understand how and what are the influences that lead to the cell splitting, the creation of new ideologies and flavours. There is an enormous knowledge base in RAW and it is never shared with its own people.

What do you think is the role of ISI in the return of the Taliban in Afghanistan?

I think there are some useful handholds: in November 2001, ISI under General Ehsan ul Haq manoeuvred Saudi royals to front a deal to protect the Taliban and that was backed by the Tony Blair government, in parts, in the UK. They warned—collectively—that the movement could not be defeated and should be incorporated into what the US intended to do in Afghanistan.

That proposal was taken by the Saudi royal family and Blair to Dick Cheney who rejected it outright—just as he rejected a side deal with Iran which in 2002 and 2003 offered the bin Laden family and top military commanders in their custody, in return for normalisation of relations with the US. Cheney said then that Iran would fall after Iraq and the Taliban, and the US was not prepared for any deals or normalcy as it invaded Baghdad.

The Taliban victory is inspirational for Islamists, Islamic states but also for anti-imperialists. Taliban are not Al Qaeda. I fear the chaos more than the Taliban. In ungoverned spaces, terror groups could grow as happened in Libya and Syria. So, there’s an argument to help the Taliban quickly govern and increase their capacity

That deal was never forgotten by ISI—and Ehsan’s legacy would live on until 2006-07, when ISI and CIA parted ways, the relationship having soured completelyas ISI would not relinquish the idea. For its part, the US—by now distracted by civil war in Iraq—would not embrace it and could not persuade Pakistan to relinquish its strategic interests.

What we see here is not so much Pakistan’s manifest destiny or even long-haul planning but the abject failure of US policy to launch an impossible low-intensity war in Afghanistan, and then further dilute it with an illegal invasion of Iraq—and finally abandoning both Iraq and Afghanistan, while neighbours in Pakistan continued to hold on to their ambitions.

Imagine if Bush-Cheney had embraced the Saudi-Pak plan at the start and also taken control of the bin Laden family and Al Qaeda military commanders. How many lives would have been preserved? Impossible to know, but a painful thought.

ISI did not plan this victory. And what we are seeing is not the fall of Saigon. It is the failure of Kabul to rule all of Afghanistan, and for a centralised army to represent an ethnocentric nation. Kabul did not equal Afghanistan, ever. Taliban prevailed because the governors of provinces decided not to oppose them, and not to support corruption in Kabul, rather than acceding to the Taliban or their goals and ideals. Provincial governments voted against Kabul and enabled it to be encircled and occupied today. ISI did not do this. The US facilitated it.

How influential do you think RAW is in the Panjshir Valley, the seat of anti-Taliban resistance in Afghanistan?

ISI was attempting to make outreach here—but stumbled over the fact that a corps of officers, all forged in the 1980s war against the Soviets, held sway over Afghan policy. RAW was doing the same, and had contacts but inside the Panjshir Valley there seems to have been a feeling that these links would not amount to anything substantial—in terms of political capital, actual capital or mentoring.



If you look at spy organisations across the world, they invest a lot in communities they investigate. In that sense, the transformation of the CIA, MI5, MI6 is radical. In India, such reforms are only on paper. The result could be dangerous. RAW officers tell you that the organisation would benefit from being a truly representative security establishment

The outcome in Kabul is extraordinary—mostly for what it tells us about the US. The campaign to rout Al Qaeda became a war against the Taliban who were not responsible for 9/11. Seeking vengeance, the US lost its way and—instead of reassuring a terrified world post-9/11 and selling the idea of secular democracy—has worked to undo rules-bound systems.

Talibs are from Afghanistan and have regained power in their country upturning a meandering American project. They are not a terrorist movement but a group with stringent precepts and beliefs. So, let’s wait to see what they have become and what they want to achieve. Previously they have not sought influence or power outside Afghanistan. India, for example, was not their enemy. What is also unknown is what their attitude will be to the foreign radical elements in the country—the Islamic State, Al Qaeda, Pakistan Taliban, and Sunni fighters from Iran and China. Will they continue to win shelter? Will they be allowed to recoup and strike from Afghanistan?

The Taliban victory is, of course, inspirational—for Islamists, Islamic states but also for anti-imperialists. But will it grow movements inside the country or inspire others elsewhere? We don’t know is the short answer. Taliban are not Al Qaeda. There was a fraternal relationship, mentoring by Al Qaeda. And Taliban leaders have been ambiguous in their statements. I fear the chaos more than the Taliban. In ungoverned spaces, terror groups could grow as happened in Libya and Syria. So, there’s an argument to help the Taliban quickly govern and increase their capacity. More government and greater authority rather than a lawless vacuum are preferable.



'Faith, Unity and Discipline: The ISI of Pakistan' reveals the agency's clandestine dynamics

Shantanu Mukharji • 
December 10, 2016,

A book on the ISI is hitting the stands, which exposes every detail of the ISI setup and its functioning




Ordinarily , intelligence agencies involved in espionage and counter-espionage the world over are cloaked in deep mystery with people having negligible or no knowledge of their structure and working. Even if some segments of the society have knowledge, they are distorted and garbled .

For Indians, the Pakistan Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) is seen as a monstrous and dreaded outfit threatening to harm India by fomenting multiple destructive problems. This belief is deep seated in the Indian mindset. But such a perception is not wide off the mark. A book on the ISI is hitting the stands, which exposes every detail of the ISI setup and its functioning. Authored by Hein Kiessling, the book dispels all the misgivings surrounding the ISI and it adequately deals with all the questions about Pakistan’s unwieldy intelligence body which have perhaps not been answered as yet — making it a most readable book on the subject

The author, Dr Kiessling, has lived in Pakistan for thirteen long years (1989- 2002) enabling him to develop a close relationship with the ISI hierarchy and top leadership of Pakistani polity and military. A scholarly personality with history and political science as his forte, Kiessling is a PhD from a well known Munich university. Given his long exposure in Pakistan and close professional interactions with powerful players who mattered , he is best suited to come out with this magnum opus on the ISI.

The highlight of the book in the Indian context is ISI’s direct involvement in funding the Khalistani movement including sheltering of the Sikh extremists in Pakistan. The book adds that ISI threw itself into its Khalistan adventure from the early ’80s. Terrorist training camps for young Sikhs were set up in Karachi and Lahore. ISI had chalked out a three pronged blueprint: to precipitate the alienation of the Sikhs from mainstream India; emphasised the need to subvert the state machinery and trigger off mass agitation launching a reign of terror in Punjab. Further , ISI contributed to the high number of fatalities in Punjab by supplying sophisticated weaponry, adding to the arsenal of Sikh militants .

Continuing his revelations on the ISI machinations, Dr Kiessling writes that ISI had instructed one of the Khalistanis to receive training at a flying college in Mumbai, aimed at crashing at an off shore oil rig. This shows how deeply embedded the notorious ISI was way back in the ’90s, to strike at critical Indian infrastructure.

Glaring revelations are also mentioned in the book about active ISI complicity in the Indian Northeast. In 1990, ISI undercover operatives stationed in Pakistani embassy Dhaka got in touch with Naga insurgent groups — NSCN and ULFA — and commenced supply of arms to the Naga ultras and organised training to ULFA cadres in Pakistan. Several such batches were trained in arms and that eventually saw unleashing of terror in Assam and adjoining places. The Pak embassy Dhaka emerged as the hub of Indian Northeast operations. China too collaborated with ISI in the joint anti India (Northeast) activities which, inter alia, included funding, supply of weapons and providing safe havens to Northeast insurgents, wanted in India.

In the book under review , Kiessling has provided minute details about covert ISI operations in Kashmir, Northeast and Punjab. Readers would find the contents interesting to read themselves rather than to judge by this review alone.

Speaking about the budget of ISI, the author estimates the ‘official’ budget quantum stands today at a whopping USD 300 million. This is in addition to various other channels generating colossal extra funds for the ISI activities from drug trade, counterfeit money, foreign donations etc.

This book is recommended not only for the intelligence community but for all academics and students of Geopolitics to know the truth about the clandestine dynamics the ISI is engaged in to subvert and penetrate the Indian system . There is comprehensive mention of Indian RAW as well, but readers may like to discover themselves the ‘facts’ contained therein.

On the whole, this is worth a read as its 300-plus pages give some insight into the working of this draconian intelligence outfit targeting a diverse range of objectives employing most lethal means. Academically, the book carries the history of the ISI, profiles of their erstwhile chiefs, supported by illustrated plates .

The reviewer is a retired IPS officer and a senior fellow with the Indian Police Foundation. Follow him on Twitter: @Shantanu2818


ISI controlled Osama bin Laden’s Abbottabad compound: Book

The Abbottabad hideout of Osama bin Laden was under ISI control and a Pakistan Army doctor treated the most dreaded terrorist in the world before he was killed in a daring raid by US commandos in 2011.



Published: April 28, 2016 
By Press Trust of India


Washington, Apr 28: The Abbottabad hideout of Osama bin Laden was under ISI control and a Pakistan Army doctor treated the most dreaded terrorist in the world before he was killed in a daring raid by US commandos in 2011, according to a new book. In fact, the doctor Amir Aziz, of the rank of major, who lived in a compound near bin Laden’s hideout in Abbottabad, was rewarded by the CIA with a share of the USD 25 million bounty the US had put up because a DNA sample had conclusively proved the al-Qaeda leader’s identity.

In his latest book, ‘The Killing of Osama bin Laden’, investigative journalist Seymour Hersh claims that ISI got hold of bin Laden in 2006 after paying bribes to some of the tribal leaders. At the time he was said to be very ill. “Early on in his confinement at Abbottabad, the ISI had ordered Amir Aziz, a doctor and a major in the Pakistani army, to move nearby to provide treatment,” Hersh claims, basing his account on a conversation he had with an unidentified retired Pakistan Army official. (ALSO READ: Pakistan was aware of US operation that killed Osama Bin Laden : US Journalist)

And all this while the Pakistani leadership in particular the army chief and ISI boss repeatedly told the US that they did not know the whereabouts of bin Laden. “It’s understood in Washington that elements of the ISI believe that maintaining a relationship with the Taliban leadership inside Afghanistan is essential to national security. The ISI’s strategic aim is to balance Indian influence in Kabul.

“The Taliban is also seen in Pakistan as a source of jihadist shock troops who would back Pakistan against India in a confrontation over Kashmir,” Hersh said in his book that hit stores early this month. “The Pakistanis also know that their trump card against aggression from India is a strong relationship with the United States. They will never cut their person-to-person ties with us,” a senior retired army official is quoted as saying.

Hersh claims that the CIA came to know about bin Laden’s hideout from a senior Pakistani intelligence official who betrayed the secret in return for much of the USD 25 million reward offered by the US. The said official is now living near Washington along with his family.

Hersh said his information collected from US intelligence and other sources was vetted by former ISI head Asad Durrani.



Pakistan's ISI, a hidden, frustrating power for U.S.


By Reuters
October 8, 2010
By Michael Georgy

ISLAMABAD (Reuters) - Top U.S. defense officials are concerned some elements of Pakistan's main spy agency may be interacting improperly with the Taliban and other insurgent groups, a Pentagon spokesman said on Thursday.
Colonel David Lapan said Pakistani army chief, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, himself a former spy chief, was aware of U.S. concerns about the military's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency and shared some of them.

Here are some questions and answers about the ISI, the most powerful intelligence agency in Pakistan, a country the United States sees as indispensable to its efforts to tame a raging Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan.

HOW POWERFUL IS THE ISI?
The shadowy military intelligence agency has evolved into what some describe as a state within a state.
Widely feared by Pakistanis, it is believed to have a hidden role in many of the nuclear-armed nation's policies, including in Afghanistan, one of U.S. President Barack Obama's top foreign policy priorities.

The ISI is seen as the Pakistani equivalent of the U.S. Central Agency (CIA) -- with which it has had a symbiotic but sometimes strained relationship -- and Israel's Mossad.
Its size is not publicly known but the ISI is widely believed to employ tens of thousands of agents, with informers in many spheres of public life.
Hardline elements within the ISI are capable of being spoilers, no matter what position a Pakistani government might take, a reality the U.S. and Afghan governments should take into account if they attempt to exclude Pakistan from negotiations with the Afghan Taliban.

WHAT ABOUT THE ISI'S PAST?

Created in 1948, the ISI gained importance and power during the 1979-1989 Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and is now rated one of best-organized intelligence agencies in the developing world.

The ISI along with the United States and Saudi Arabia, nurtured the Afghan mujahideen, or Muslim holy warrior guerrillas, and helped them win the war. It helped to plan many of their operations and was the main conduit for Western and Arab arms. It later helped create the Taliban.

Although Pakistan officially abandoned support for the Taliban after joining the U.S.-led war against al Qaeda and Taliban, critics, including Western military commanders in Afghanistan, say it has maintained its ties with, and support for, the Afghan Taliban. The military denies supporting the Taliban but says agents maintain links with militants, as any security agency would do, in the interests of intelligence.

Analysts say the main preoccupation of the ISI, and the Pakistani military, is the threat from nuclear-armed rival India and it sees the Afghan Taliban as tools to influence events, and limit India's role, in Afghanistan.

The ISI was heavily involved in the 1990s in creating and supporting Islamist factions that battled Indian forces in the disputed Kashmir region. Some of those groups have since joined forces with the Pakistani Taliban to attack the state, including the ISI. That militants alliance may be the biggest threat to Pakistan's long-term security, analysts say.

WHAT ABOUT THE ISI'S CURRENT LEADERSHIP?

Lieutenant General Ahmad Shuja Pasha is the director general of the ISI and a close ally of Kayani. Pasha is seen as anti-Taliban, unlike some of his predecessors, and analysts suggest he is using the ISI to broker some sort of deal between factions of the Afghan Taliban and the Afghan government. Although he is seen as relatively moderate, the ISI is almost certain to come under a new wave of pressure as the United States gets increasingly frustrated with the army's perceived reluctance to go after Afghan Taliban fighters who cross the border to attack Western forces in Afghanistan. But the strategic interests of the ISI, headquartered in a sprawling, well-guarded complex in Islamabad, will invariably come first, analysts say.

(Additional reporting by Chris Allbritton; Editing by Zeeshan Haider and Robert Birsel)


The ISI, Pakistan's notorious and feared spy agency, comes in from the cold

In its own land the agency is viewed with awe and dread. Now it is opening up – a little – to western journalists



Declan Walsh
Islamabad
THE GUARDIAN
Wed 5 Aug 2009 


The entrance is suitably discreet: a single barrier near a small hospital off a busy Islamabad highway. Bougainvillea spills over long walls with barbed wire; a plain-clothes man packing a pistol questions visitors. Further along, soldiers emerge to check for bombs.

Then a giant electric gate slides back to reveal a sleek grey building that would not look out of place on a California technology campus. With one difference: nothing is signposted.

Welcome to the headquarters of the Inter Services Intelligence Directorate, Pakistan's premier spy agency. Powerful and notorious in equal measure, for decades the ISI has operated behind a dense veil of secrecy, impervious to allegations of election rigging, terrorist training, abduction and assassination. Many Pakistanis call it the "state within a state".

Now, though, the ISI is coming in from the cold. Over the past year the agency has invited a stream of western journalists into its swish, modern nerve centre. Over tea and PowerPoint briefings, spies give details of some of Pakistan's most sensitive issues – the Taliban insurgency, the hunt for al-Qaida, the troubled relationship with India.

"We've started to open up a little," said an ISI official authorised to speak to the press. "In the past, irrespective of whether we did something, we were getting blamed for it. Now we want to reach out and get our point of view across."

Yet rehabilitating the ISI's image would tax the most inventive spin doctor. For 30 years its covert operations have been at the sharp end of Pakistani policy, supporting Islamist extremists fighting Indian soldiers in Kashmir, and boosting the Taliban to power in Afghanistan.

At home the agency is viewed with awe and dread. It is the eyes and ears of military power, with huge phone and email monitoring capability and a wide network of informers.

Some Pakistanis refer to its agents – who often wear white shalwar kameez – as "the angels". Under President Pervez Musharraf they abducted hundreds of people, some of whom were allegedly tortured.

Recently, though, it has been the agency's turn to be on the receiving end.

Last May suicide bombers hit an ISI office in Lahore, killing a colonel; in the tribal areas militants have killed 57 agents and wounded 86. Security is tight at the Islamabad headquarters, where last month the ISI asked its next-door neighbour – the city authority – to move to another neighbourhood.

Influencing the local press has always been part of ISI operations, usually through bribes, blandishments or intimidation. But it rarely reached out to the foreign press, until now.

"This is totally unprecedented," said Stephen Cohen, a Pakistan expert at the Brookings Institution policy research organisation in Washington. "It seems to be part of a new openness in the military. They're worried about caricatures of Pakistan, especially in the foreign press, such as people saying the country is going to break up in three months."

The briefings, which take place about once a week, belie the agency's gritty image. Reporters are shepherded into a wood-panelled conference room with soft armchairs, a long table and a wall-mounted screen.


Officials in business suits, who could pass for middle management in any company, introduce themselves without full name or job title.

During the interview liveried servants ferry in trays of tea and fried snacks, served on ISI crockery. Smoking is allowed.

Officials speak openly, but journalists expecting them to gush state secrets may be disappointed. Every talk is carefully vetted in advance. "We're opening up but it's not a total glasnost," said the unofficial spokesman.

The ajar-door policy got off to a rocky start last year when the newly appointed ISI chief, Lieutenant General Shuja Pasha, told Der Spiegel that the Taliban had a right to "freedom of opinion". The agency later said he misspoke. Now, though, it is paying dividends. Two weeks ago a front page lead in the New York Times, highlighting Pakistani concerns with the US military surge in Afghanistan, was sourced from an ISI briefing.

The agency was pleased. "That was the first time [the journalist] carried both sides of the argument," said the ISI official. "I think we are getting there."

The bolder media policy is part of a wider global trend. The CIA and MI6 have always maintained relationships with selected journalists, an engagement whose importance has increased amid the furore over torture and abduction allegations.

For journalists, the challenge is to sift fact from propaganda. In a recent briefing to the Guardian, ISI officials suggested Indian officials had orchestrated last November's Mumbai attacks. The Indians wanted to cover up an investigation into Hindu extremism, they said.

Days later Ajmal Kasab, the only surviving gunman from the massacre, told an Indian court how he had been trained by Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistani jihadi outfit with links to the ISI.

In the briefing the ISI also accused New Delhi of supplying arms and explosives to the Pakistan Taliban, even though the Taliban has killed Indians inside Afghanistan.

"Circles within circles," said an ISI official when asked to explain the apparent contradictions. "It makes an excellent plot for a Le Carré novel."

Western officials quietly support some ISI contentions, such as covert Indian support for nationalist rebels in Baluchistan. But more than anything the briefings reveal how the ISI's world view is framed by its decades-old enmity with India.

"They tell you a lot about themselves even when they don't know it," said Bruce Riedel, a retired CIA official, Obama adviser and trenchant ISI critic. The contradiction at the heart of agency policy, he said, is its support for Islamist militants: "That can't be removed by clever briefings."

Still, the old cliches about the spy collective being a "state within a state" or a "rogue agency" are out of date. These days it is said to be firmly in the grip of the army chief, General Ashfaq Kayani, who previously ran the agency for three years.

But the new openness does underscore the country's fragile balance of power. Two weeks ago The Hindu reported that the ISI's Pasha had invited Indian diplomats to deal with him directly, bypassing President Asif Ali Zardari's government.

"Formally, Zardari has a lot of power. But on the ground he's not too strong right now," said analyst and newspaper editor Najam Sethi.

Despite its new openness, the ISI remains in the shadows. One question stands out: as well as improving its image, is it ready to really change its stripes? At headquarters, nobody can give a straight answer. Circles within circles, as they say.

Sunday, September 22, 2024


PAKISTAN

AS THE OLD IS DYING, A NEW STRUGGLES TO BE BORN

Published September 22, 2024
 DAWN / EOS
Illustration generated using Microsoft Designer

There are a few unique moments in global history when multiple crises, accumulated over a long period of time, express themselves simultaneously with an unprecedented intensity. Such a ‘polycrisis’ combines to form a crisis of legitimacy for the ruling order, highlighting the repressed deficiencies that undergird its apparent stability.

One example of such a moment is the crisis of the global colonial order in the late 19th century, where the scramble for colonies created intense antagonisms between the great European powers of the time. This inter-imperialist rivalry culminated in two World Wars, the rise of fascism, communism and anti-colonial movements, and the emergence of the United States (US) as the primary hegemon in the global order.

The world is now entering another such period of a great transition, with the slow decline of the US and the rapid rise of China. This historical tendency is exacerbated by the polycrisis that involves climate change, economic disintegration, global debt crises, and the emergence of a lethal war industry that combine to undermine the stability of the current order.

An important element of such great transitions is the loss of ideological certainties, with old narratives losing their appeal and being replaced by new ideas, as is being witnessed in the crisis of liberal democracies and the rise of the far-right (and, at times, far-left) parties/figures across the world.

Third World countries such as Pakistan are incorporated into these larger structural tensions that are tearing apart the world today. Beyond the dizzying pace of breaking news, we must decipher the breakdown of the political, economic and ideological anchors that have fallen apart and thrown the Pakistani state into an unprecedented crisis of legitimacy.

Decades of economic, political and social neglect have now metastasised into a scenario that sees Pakistan seemingly heading down a blind alley. Many indicators point towards a worsening of the crises that plague the country. Ammar Ali Jan attempts to answer the questions: how did we as a nation end up here, and is there any way out?

A TIME OF TRANSITION

The multiple hybrid regimes, the rigged elections, the controlled media and a subservient parliament are all failing to cover-up the instability that haunts the present dispensation, demonstrating the intensity of the challenge faced by those who would want a return to ‘normalcy.’

One of the key elements of a crisis of legitimacy is that it destabilises conventional measures through which a crisis is often averted, producing a state of emergency where the past becomes a poor guide to resolve a radically novel situation.

My contention is that the current political, economic and social crisis engulfing Pakistan is part of long-term historical trends, both global and specific to our own history, that are now maturing into a full blown existential threat to our polity. The grievances have accumulated over time, exacerbated by the ruthless exploitation by the ruling elites and their refusal to follow any legal frameworks that may restrain their power.

On the other hand, the changing geopolitical situation, as well as the declining global economy, has meant that there is very little possibility of a bailout by Western powers. The Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) versus the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) drama, and the fissures in the judiciary, military and the media, are reflective of this larger breakdown of structures that once sustained the ruling dispensation.

Moreover, while Imran Khan represents the crisis in its most potent, disruptive element, our tragedy is compounded by the fact that neither he, nor any other political force, has emerged that can present an alternative vision to move beyond the punishing stagnation afflicting our society. The crisis of imagination makes our predicament all the more painful.

We are then living through the ‘End Times’ of a journey that contained much promise, but was derailed by despair, greed and short-sightedness. To discern this fall, the multiple crises of political economy, ideology and political leadership have to be understood in their historical formation that are now combining to impose a permanent form of destabilisation in our system.


The current political, economic and social crisis engulfing Pakistan is part of long-term historical trends, both global and specific to our own history, that are now maturing into a full blown existential threat to our polity. The grievances have accumulated over time, exacerbated by the ruthless exploitation by the ruling elites and their refusal to follow any legal frameworks that may restrain their power.

THE COLLAPSE OF A RENTIER ECONOMY

The roots of Pakistan’s economic crisis lay in the fateful decisions made by our political elites in the 1950s. Pakistan’s independence occurred at a heightening moment of Cold War rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union. American author and journalist William Blum, in his fantastic book titled Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II, explains how the “bipolar world”, split between the capitalist and the socialist camps, did not reflect the actual power imbalance that existed between the two sides.

The Soviet Union had suffered enormous destruction during the Second World War, including the death of 27 million people, as it fought against a punishing Nazi military occupation. On the other hand, the US did not see its mainland get attacked by war, emerging as the primary industrial power (50 percent of global industrial production) and became the primary creditor of the world.

This imbalance explains why the US aggressively thwarted any left-wing movement in Europe and across the colonial world while the Soviet Union maintained, contrary to the Western narrative, a minimalist interventionist position. This was a time of high prestige for left-wing movements, as they had played a pivotal role in anti-fascist and anti-colonial struggles.

Thus, the US, with the aid of the newly formed Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), embarked upon a ruthless campaign of subjugating mass movements in the name of ‘fighting communism’, a crusade that led them to attack or destabilise countries as distinct as Italy, Korea, Angola, Guatemala, Syria, the Phillipines and a host of other countries in the 1950s.

The historian Christopher Simpson meticulously shows how the US camp did not consist of ‘liberal democrats’ but often involved former Nazi sympathisers who were given respectability by the US to fight the “communist threat” in Europe.

In the Third World, this alliance of the ‘free world’ was secured through an alliance with conservative forces that often denounced the more emancipatory ideals of the anti-colonial struggles. The key pillar of this alliance was the military, a conservative force that became the vanguard in the fight against socialism.

The US developed special relations with military officers in countries as diverse as South Africa, Indonesia, Brazil and a host of other developing countries. In other words, developmental funds to these countries were tied to their participation in America’s war against communism, which often meant brutal repression at home.

Pakistan’s ruling elites, always anxious of their place in popular politics, made a Faustian pact with Washington by joining the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in 1954 and the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) in 1955, sealing the country’s fate for decades to come.

Pakistan’s incorporation into the global order as a client state meant a surrender of a sovereign path of development for the country. Pakistan’s economic growth was now permanently tied to its relationship with Washington, with massive aid flows generating impressive growth in the 1960s, 1980s and 2000s. Incidentally, all these growth spurts were experienced under military regimes, solidifying the legitimacy of the institution and strangling the prospects of a democratic polity.

Pakistan’s pre-eminent social scientist Hamza Alavi described this expanding power of the coercive apparatuses by calling Pakistan an “overdeveloped state”, where a “military-bureaucratic oligarchy” controlled the levers of power. The power of the landed and industrial elites was secured through the military that used its role as the primary mediator of imperialist rents to cement its hegemony on the political scene.

The impressive growth stories under military regimes veiled a darker reality. Our economic engine was not fuelled by a long term vision for industrial growth, but was linked to perpetual wars in the region in

which we were expected to participate as proxies. In the 1960s, anchoring Pakistan into the anti-communist camp and wiping out Leftist elements in the nascent postcolonial state was central to the CIA’s strategy for the region.

Not only were Leftist organisations repressed, including the tragic murder of the Communist Party of Pakistan’s secretary general Hassan Nasir, democrats from across the spectrum were declared traitors to the federation, putting in place a tradition that continues to haunt us.

One of the most famous ‘traitors’ of this era was ‘Mother of the Nation’ Fatima Jinnah, who challenged Gen Ayub Khan’s dictatorship and suffered an electoral defeat in a presidential election widely believed to be rigged.


US President John F Kennedy, Gen Ayub Khan, and US Vice President Lyndon B Johnson pictured in the Oval Office in Washington on July 13, 1961: Ayub’s development model, built on extreme forms of class and regional inequality, experienced its slow demise when the US pulled its support after the Pakistan-India war in 1965 | John F Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum

DIGGING THE HOLE DEEPER

This tendency of centralisation of state authority and the demonisation of opponents was further strengthened under Gen Ziaul Haq, whose draconian repression of political activists, including the judicial murder of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, stands out as a particularly brutal period.

To compound the problem, the aid flows to Pakistan were tied to the military junta’s commitment to fighting a US-sponsored Afghan jihad, turning the country into a bastion of right-wing militants from across the Muslim world.

The economic boom during the Zia regime was linked to the construction of this jihadi infrastructure, an infrastructure geared towards war, destruction and bigotry, which wrecked Afghanistan and Pakistan while fuelling conflicts across the region. Less than two decades later, Gen Pervez Musharraf’s economic success was also tied to imperialist rents, this time to dismantle this jihadi infrastructure.

The obverse side of this development model was not only economic inequality, but the recurrent collapse that we faced whenever we were abandoned by Washington. Ayub’s development model, built on extreme forms of class and regional inequality, experienced its slow demise when the US pulled its support after the Pakistan-India war in 1965.

The deteriorating economic situation led to riots across Pakistan in 1968-1969, an unexpected victory of anti-establishment forces in the 1970 elections, and a brutal military operation that ended in the dismemberment of Pakistan, concluding the “Decade of Development” with nothing to show but blood and tears.

The same pattern was repeated in the case of Zia and Musharraf regimes. In both cases, America’s diminishing interest in Afghanistan meant an abrupt drying up of resources for Pakistani governments. While Washington became involved in wars elsewhere, the Afghan wars crippled our polity, leading to a rise in religious extremism, prompting repeated internal military operations, and causing the deaths of at least 70,000 Pakistani citizens, including political leaders.

This boom and bust cycle has created a strong consuming class that has benefitted from this rent-seeking behaviour of the state. Yet, the parasitic nature of our elites can be gauged from the fact that their lifestyles are comparable to their counterparts in places such as India, South Korea etc while being decades behind them in industrial/economic output. Instead, their wealth was owed to their links to the Pakistani state, which in turn depended on borrowed money from the US as part of providing its territory and services for America’s proxy wars in the region.

My contention is that this arrangement has come to a definitive end. The US is no longer an industrial power that can give cheap loans to its client states. With a military budget of US$883 billion and a declining industrial base, its ability to demolish far exceeds its ability to reconstruct, as witnessed in a series of wars across the Middle East.

On the other hand, China’s model is geared towards trade and boosting industrial productivity, an enterprise that our rent-seeking elites are singularly incapable of undertaking, as demonstrated by the botched results of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

It is no wonder that abandonment by the US is leading to outbursts by the political leadership, with Imran Khan claiming that his government was overthrown by the US, while Ishaq Dar recently claimed that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was punishing Pakistan for geostrategic reasons.

This angst is nothing but the painful withdrawal symptoms of a state addicted to proxy wars and the dollars associated with them. The result is an impossible debt burden that continues to get worse, with over 50 percent of our budget geared towards debt servicing. Instead of debating any reforms, the ruling elites are using the state to impose the costs of their own debt-fuelled lifestyles on to the public through increasing taxation.

Today, the political economy of Pakistan appears akin to what American political scientist Jodi Dean has described as “neo-feudalism”, a system where the rich increasingly impose rents upon society to feed their luxurious lifestyles. In other words, we are witnessing the end of citizenship and the emergence of a new kind of mass serfdom, with all the authoritarianism and militarised control such a tendency entails.


A man holds a placard during a protest in Karachi against inflation, unemployment and increased taxation on August 23, 2023: the ruling elites are using the state to impose the costs of their own debt-fuelled lifestyles on to the public through increasing taxation | AFP


IDEOLOGICAL DISARRAY

The state’s narrative about the ideology of Pakistan is also increasingly viewed with cynicism by an ever-growing section of society. As the American professor of history David Gilmartin has suggested, the Pakistan Movement was always an eclectic mix of Muslim nationalism and more mundane local realities that included social categories such as caste, region, language etc.

In other words, the universalising narrative of the state as an Islamic polity had to contend with historical differences, particularly the question of different nationalities/ linguistic groups that constitute Pakistan. This tension was felt in the early years, with conflicts raging in the peripheries during Jinnah’s own lifetime, including severe hostilities and riots, from the erstwhile North Western Frontier Province (NWFP, now Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa) to Dhaka in East Pakistan.

Such tensions were not unique to Pakistan, since most postcolonial national states had to engage with different ethno-national groups to create a unity of purpose. Yet, Pakistan’s fateful decision to join the US camp hastened the centralisation of the state with the excessive power of the military, which viewed assertion of ethnic difference as a negation of the idea of Pakistan.

It was not long before nationalist aspirations were also dubbed as ‘communism’, so that the great anti-communist crusade could be invoked to stifle dissent internally. The tragedy of 1971, where for the first time in human history, a majority population separated from a minority, did not soften the centralising tendencies of the state, as a brutal operation was launched in Balochistan in 1974 to defend the ‘integrity’ of the country.

Similarly, large sections of the Pakhtun population have grown under the shadow of US-sponsored proxy wars fought by the Pakistan state. The militarisation of everyday life, as well as the devastation caused by endless wars, has become an integral part of Baloch and Pakhtun identity.

Unfortunately, constitutional movements — such as the Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement (PTM) and the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) — have also been labelled as ‘traitors’, thus making any compromise increasingly difficult. The vacuum is resulting in the emergence of terrorist organisations, such as the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), that seek to exploit the ethnic cleavages in the country in order to push the region into a vortex of ethnic hate and bigotry.

Perhaps the biggest irony is that the state no longer even has a monopoly over political Islam. The state’s policy of waging jihad was part of a cynical world view of a rentier state rather than being reflective of any deep ideological commitment. As a result, jihadi and other religious forces have taken the initiative away from the state, often dictating Islam to the state rather than being dictated by it.

Gen Musharraf’s compliance in the US-led War on Terror, allowing drone strikes on Pakistani territory, and conducting military operations against religious groups, has hollowed out the state’s claim to be the primary representative of religion, depriving it of a key ideological cement to discipline populations.

The final frontier for the state was its monopoly over ‘Pakistaniat’, an elusive category that has intense emotional appeal for large sections of society. In that realm, PTI and Khan have decisively displaced the military as the primary expression of nationhood in mainland Pakistan.

For decades, the establishment projected Khan as a political alternative in whom the modernist, corporate aspirations of society coalesce with more traditional virtues of piety and personal integrity. After alienating political leaders from the peripheries and the mainstream, Khan was the final line of defence for the state.

Yet, in a bizarrely whimsical manner, the establishment switched sides, hoping that the military’s historical core support base would abandon PTI. Instead, they moved with the PTI, making Khan the embodiment of ‘Pakistani nationalism.’ Consequently, the state no longer has a monopoly over religion or nationalism, while also struggling to fend off intensifying challenges from ethno-nationalist forces.

IS THERE A BEGINNING AFTER THE END?

Adeel Malik, a scholar at the University of Oxford, has recently published some groundbreaking research on the social transformations occurring in society. Access to social media, university education and new employment opportunities have combined to reduce the influence of traditional power brokers across large parts of Pakistan. This fundamental shift has weakened old political parties that garnered their support from these patronage networks.

Such weakness is amplified by the fact that these parties have been targeted by the establishment for decades but have failed to develop any adequate vision for national politics. The result is that their primary politics now revolve around keeping one individual out of power, a task for which they are ready to jettison long-held principles of constitutionalism that they espoused in the past. In other words, they have been reduced to pure negativity, without a clear vision for what they offer to society.

Khan, on the other hand, represents the spirit of the time, insofar as these new social groups are more willing to coalesce around him. Yet, his stint in power was marred by the fact that he and his party offered precious little in terms of new ideas for Pakistan’s political economy. IMF conditionalities, bulldozing bills in the parliament (similar to what we recently witnessed with the clumsy attempt to pass the 26th Constitutional Amendment Bill), helplessness in front of rent-seeking elites while using severe repression against opponents, and very little discussion on redistribution of economic power were the hallmarks of his brief stint in power.

Even today, PTI’s strength remains its ability to harness the anger of the people through the production of a catchy narrative that feeds into the anxieties and aspirations of people. But a narrative is different from ideology, since the former can be moulded anytime to suit the particular audience one is addressing, while ideology requires a consistency of principles over an extended period of time.

This is why we hear very little from PTI in terms of a concrete vision for the future and a lot on how the current dispensation is a hopeless failure. Consequently, we have entered a stage of revolutionary aesthetics that veil a deep conservatism, an intensification of tactical manoeuvres but without any strategic horizons, and an increasing anger towards the status quo without any proposals for an alternative social contract.

What we are then witnessing in these multiple crises is the culmination of an order that began in the 1950s — a status quo that was propped up by foreign powers to do their bidding in the region, a political economy addicted to war, rents and excessive consumption, a failure to innovate, and a refusal to incorporate difference.

It is resulting in the dismantling of ideological underpinnings of the ruling order and a deep political disorientation, exemplified by the lack of imagination exhibited by political parties. In other words, the old order has lost its raison d’etre, and the instability we witness today is a symptom of a deeper crisis that signals the end of a historical epoch.

In moments of great transitions, repetition of old clichés is not possible. A crisis of imagination often turns into a crisis of adequate language itself. To answer the new questions we are confronted with, we must first be willing to situate ourselves in the novelty that stares us in the face.

There is no going back to becoming a client state for the US, just like there is little possibility of sustaining a rent-seeking economy that seeks to sacrifice the future of millions of children to sustain luxuries for the few. The spectre of ethnic hatred and religious extremism are no longer peripheral concerns but are becoming existential threats for our society.

One must remember that after every end, there is a new beginning. The moment is pregnant with extreme danger and unprecedented opportunities. The task of intellectuals in Pakistan is no longer to regurgitate clichés learnt from the West. Certainties have collapsed everywhere, and what we require are bold new ideas that can help us chart our journey anew in this transformed world.

In that sense, despite the tragic situation, there is an opportunity to rethink history and propose a new social contract around issues deemed taboo. Such ideas must be boldly generated and propagated to find new anchorage for Pakistan in the current moment.

The world is out of joint, and to seek illusions instead of truth in such moments will be a great abdication of intellectual responsibility. Our biggest failure will be if we continue to comfort ourselves with the belief that things will go back to a ‘normal’ equilibrium at some point.

The costs of failure are too high for us to remain comfortable in our illusions.

The writer is a historian, academic and political organiser. He is the founder and general secretary of the Haqooq-e-Khalq Party. X: @ammaralijan

Published in Dawn, EOS, September 22nd, 2024