Human geneticists curb use of the term ‘race’ in their papers

Field still struggles with how to accurately describe populations, study finds

BYRODRIGO PÉREZ ORTEGA

2 DEC 2021

SCIENCE

Geneticists are working to remove harmful racial categories from their descriptions of human populations.

DAVIDE BONAZZI/@SALZMANART

Human geneticists have mostly abandoned the word “race” when describing populations in their papers, according to a new study of research published in a leading genetics journal. That’s in line with the current scientific understanding that race is a social construct, and a welcome departure from research that in the past has often conflated genetic variation and racial categories, says Vence Bonham, a social scientist at the National Human Genome Research Institute who led the study.

But alternative terms that have gained popularity, such as “ancestry” and “ethnicity,” can have ambiguous meanings or aren’t defined by genetics, suggesting researchers are still struggling to find the words to accurately describe groups delineated by their DNA, according to the study.

In the 19th and 20th centuries, many geneticists embraced the idea that there were races, such as “Negroid” or “Caucasian,” that were distinct biological groups; such “race science” helped perpetuate discrimination and inequality. (Scientists have now thoroughly demonstrated the lack of a biological basis to racial categories.)

To better understand how geneticists have used population descriptors over time, Bonham and an interdisciplinary team dove into the archives of The American Journal of Human Genetics (AJHG), which has the longest history in the field of genetics.

Editors of AJHG gave the team access to the journal’s entire archive. The researchers quantified specific terms in the full text of 11,635 articles published from 1949—the year the journal started—to 2018. They found the word “race” appeared in 22% of papers in the first decade, but its usage declined to 5% of papers in the most recent decade.

The decline in usage of “race” reflects how geneticists slowly came to understand race as “a social category with biological consequences,” the team writes in its paper, published today in AJHG.

The researchers also found that terms associated with racial groups, such as “Negro” and “Caucasian,” which were used in 21% and 12%, respectively, of papers in the first decade, started to decline after the 1970s. In the last decade, fewer than 1% of papers used those terms. This decline confirms such labels are “not based on immutable biological order but shift in tandem with social context,” the authors write.

“This paper provides a window to view the history of a society of scientists that had a big impact in how racial terminology and racial thinking was used,” says Rick Kittles, a geneticist at City of Hope National Medical Center who was not part of the study.

When “race” is used in genetics papers today, the study found, it’s more likely to be accompanied by the terms “ethnicity” or “ancestry,” perhaps because the ambiguity of the terms led researchers to simply combine them and therefore dodge their definitions. “That just means that geneticists are as confused as everyone else,” says Fatimah Jackson, a biological anthropologist at Howard University who was not part of the study.

The National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine recently established a committee to produce a consensus report on the use of “race” and other terms as population descriptors in health disparities research. Other researchers are exploring how to adopt an antiracist posture in genetic publications. “One can’t be cavalier about how one describes populations,” says Bruce Korf, a geneticist at the University of Alabama, Birmingham, and editor-in-chief of AJHG. “You need to be intentional.”

“Although the paper deals specifically with the use of language, the words in many cases have deeper roots that we must face as a community,” Korf writes in an accompanying editorial. He says AJHG is updating its author guidelines and working on the phrasing of population descriptors.

To acknowledge that past geneticists helped shape the racial categories still used to discriminate today, the American Society of Human Genetics (ASHG), which publishes AJHG, yesterday announced the launch of a yearlong project to explore past injustices perpetrated through genetics, such as eugenics. Kittle, who is part of the new initiative, says it was spurred by the Black Lives Matter movement. “It’s important to recognize [ASHG’s past links to racism] in an effort to correct and provide a healing in the future,” he says. And in the next 2 days, researchers will discuss the history of eugenics in a series of talks at the National Human Genome Research Institute.

“About time,” Jackson says about ASHG’s new initiative. She hopes panelists “look into the deep historical roots and come up with alternative models that will guide us.”

“This won't be the end of it,” Jackson says. “But it’s the right direction.”


doi: 10.1126/science.acx9759

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Rodrigo Pérez Ortega
Twitter
Author
Rodrigo Pérez Ortega is a science journalist covering life sciences, medicine, health, and academia.

How bad is Omicron? Some clues are emerging, and they’re not encouraging

New variant appears to evade immunity and shows signs of being more transmissible

BY KAI KUPFERSCHMIDT, GRETCHEN VOGEL

7 DEC 2021
SCIENCE

The departure terminal at Cape Town International Airport on 3 December. Many countries have halted travel from southern Africa in a bid to slow Omicron’s spread.

DWAYNE SENIOR/BLOOMBERG VIA GETTY

Testing stations and hospital wards in Gauteng, South Africa’s most populous province. A company’s Christmas party in Oslo, Norway, that became a superspreading event. Infection patterns in the United Kingdom.

Scientists are scouring patchy evidence from around the world to better understand Omicron, the new SARS-CoV-2 variant, and what it might mean for the next phase of the pandemic. Three weeks after Omicron was discovered, there are still mostly questions, but a few hints have emerged—some worrisome, others more encouraging.

Researchers are focusing on three key questions: Can Omicron evade immunity from vaccines or previous infections? How transmissible is it? And how much severe disease will it cause?

The most solid clues so far pertain to the first question—and they are not reassuring. The genome alone—with more than 30 mutations in the all-important spike protein—suggested the variant might well be the best yet at dodging our immune defenses. And early data from South Africa seem to confirm that worry: A study published last week that analyzed 35,670 reinfections among nearly 2.8 million positive tests carried out through late November suggested an earlier infection with COVID-19 only offers half as much protection against the new variant as it does against Delta. That’s a sign Omicron is able to escape at least some of the immune system’s defenses, and it suggests COVID-19 vaccines may be less effective against the new variant as well. How big a problem that will become depends on whether vaccinations and previous infections still protect against severe disease, says Justin Lessler, an epidemiologist at the University of North Carolina. Chapel Hill.

Whether Omicron is more transmissible than its predecessors—as both Alpha and Delta were—is harder to judge. Omicron cases in South Africa have risen steeply in the past few weeks, but that could be explained in part by chance or the variant’s ability to infect those who are vaccinated or had a previous infection.

But Jeremy Farrar, head of the Wellcome Trust, sees cause for concern. “The evidence that this is more transmissible is getting stronger every day,” he says. In the United Kingdom, the number of positive polymerase chain reaction tests in which the gene encoding the spike protein cannot be detected (a sign of a likely Omicron infection) is increasing rapidly. In Oslo, a company Christmas party at a restaurant became a superspreading event, with at least 120 people testing positive; 19 cases so far have been confirmed as Omicron. (All attendees were vaccinated and had tested negative before the event.) In Denmark, 53 of 150 high school students who attended a party went on to test positive for Omicron.

“None of this alone tells us that this is more transmissible,” says Kristian Andersen, an infectious disease researcher at Scripps Research. Superspreading events, for instance, have been a hallmark of SARS-CoV-2 from the start. “But Omicron is really rare still, so the fact that we see early cases being associated with superspreading events is quite concerning,” Andersen says.

Early signs that Omicron causes less severe symptoms than previous variants offer some reassurance. Doctors in South Africa are reportedly seeing a larger proportion of mild COVID-19 cases in the hospital than at the start of earlier waves. The number of hospital patients infected with SARS-CoV-2 has been rising rapidly, but that includes “incidental” cases—patients seeking care for other reasons who test positive for the virus as well. Data through 6 December indicate the number who needed oxygen support was lower than in previous waves, suggesting fewer patients are suffering the serious lung damage from COVID-19 that has put so many in the hospital during the pandemic.

But it’s too early to tell whether Omicron is really more benign. Many early cases in South Africa have been linked to a university outbreak and occurred in young people, who are less susceptible to severe disease. Previous infections could also be providing some protection, as could the steadily climbing vaccination rate in South Africa. Or it might simply be too early to see many serious cases, which can take weeks to develop and always make up a small proportion of the total number. “I haven’t seen anything yet that tells me whether this is as severe or less severe, or more severe,” Farrar says. “At the moment, my working assumption is that the clinical syndrome of illness is the same as previous variants.”

If that assumption holds, but the virus spreads more rapidly than Delta, more people would get severely sick in a short time period, which could mean a huge extra burden on health care systems that are already stretched thin—especially in places with low vaccine uptake and low levels of infection-induced immunity.

Even if Omicron causes milder disease, rapid spread could still quickly overwhelm hospitals in many places. “A small percentage of a large number is still a large number,” says genomicist Mads Albertsen of Aalborg University, who serves on a panel advising the Danish government on SARS-CoV-2 variants. And it’s not just about deaths and hospitalizations, says Mary Bushman, an epidemiologist at Harvard. “Part of what we need to think about is whether it’s causing Long Covid,” Bushman says.

More data from countries with different vaccination patterns will soon give a better picture of the threat Omicron poses. Scientists are particularly interested to see whether people who have had a booster shot are better protected.

In the meantime countries are scrambling to slow the variant’s spread, with few signs of success. Bans against travelers from southern Africa are quickly losing their justification now that the virus seems entrenched in dozens of countries. Denmark, which has identified 183 Omicron cases so far, is trying to contain spread by broadening quarantine rules—asking not just people infected with the new variant and their close contacts to isolate, but also the close contacts of close contacts. But the rapid spread already makes that strategy impractical, Albertsen says.

That means it’s down to the standard defenses such as wearing masks, social distancing, vaccination, testing, and isolation for those who test positive. “It’s doing the basics well that matters, whatever the variant is called,” Farrar says. Maria Van Kerkhove, an epidemiologist at the World Health Organization, says countries should pay extra attention to getting all of their vulnerable people fully vaccinated, including the elderly and those with conditions that can worsen COVID-19. “These are the people that governments should be targeting right now,” she says.

Van Kerkhove is exasperated that with Omicron on their doorstep, many countries in the Northern Hemisphere haven’t done enough to control big winter outbreaks of Delta. “We’re not even out of the middle of this pandemic yet,” she says, “and we’re moving in the wrong direction.”

doi: 10.1126/science.acx9789

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Kai Kupferschmidt
Twitter
Author
Kai is a contributing correspondent for Science magazine based in Berlin, Germany. He is the author of a book about the color blue, published in 2019.

Gretchen Vogel
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Author
Gretchen Vogel is a contributing correspondent for Science magazine based in Berlin, Germany.

Decades of Impunity Paved Way for Myanmar’s Coup

Justice, Solidarity Crucial to Confront Abuses Past and Present

Shayna Bauchner
Researcher, Asia Division


On December 10, 2019, Abubacarr Tambadou, then Gambia’s justice minister, posed a question to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague. “Why is the world standing by and allowing such horrors again in our lifetime?”

It was the first day of hearings in Gambia’s case alleging Myanmar violated the Genocide Convention in its atrocities against ethnic Rohingya in Rakhine State. It was also the first time the abuses of the Myanmar military had been laid out before an international court.

Over three days, Gambia’s legal team described the Myanmar military’s mass killings, rape, and torture that spurred more than 730,000 Rohingya to flee to Bangladesh. The team painted a picture of an armed force unrepentant in its brutality, maintaining power by terrorizing civilians for decades, unchecked. In January 2020, the ICJ unanimously ordered Myanmar to protect the 600,000 Rohingya remaining in Rakhine State from genocide.


Click to expand Image
Anti-coup protesters run from teargas deployed by the police during a demonstration in Yangon, Myanmar, March 1, 2021. © 2021 Sipa USA via AP Images

On February 1, 2021, the same generals that orchestrated the atrocities against the Rohingya staged a coup. Since then, the junta has carried out a bloody crackdown on the pro-democracy movement with the same callous disregard for life that has long driven their scorched-earth operations in ethnic minority regions.

Police and soldiers have killed more than 1,300 people and arrested more than 10,000 protesters, journalists, and others. The methodical and systematic post-coup abuses, like those inflicted on the Rohingya, amount to crimes against humanity. The roots of the coup and the bloodshed that’s followed lie plainly in the impunity that the military has enjoyed since first taking power in 1962.

Two years ago, people rallied across Myanmar in support of the government and then de facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who unreservedly defended the military at The Hague. This week, Suu Kyi was sentenced to prison by the generals she backed.

Since the coup, many protesters have sought to atone for the long history of anti-Rohingya hostility in Myanmar. The opposition National Unity Government committed to ending the Rohingya’s statelessness and other abuses. With solidarity campaigns, activists are reimagining Myanmar as a state strengthened by its multiethnic, multireligious makeup.

Against this shifting backdrop, the ICJ case moves forward. The court will next hold hearings on the preliminary objections Myanmar filed 10 days before the coup.

There is no quick route to justice in Myanmar, but never has the call for it been louder.

 

ALSO SEE Myanmar: Protesters Targeted in March Massacre | Human Rights Watch (hrw.org)

Rising religious radicalism in Indonesia: roots and shoots


AHMAD FUAD FANANI 

- 17 NOV, 2021

Although religious radicalism potentially could cause many problems in society, the issue has been contentious in Indonesia. Some people believe that radicalism is a myth created by “the West”. For them, the term radicalism has a negative implication to discredit Muslims and to conquer Islam. According to this view, Western governments often apply a double standard when they deal with Muslims (Sihbudi, 2002)

However, suicide bombings that have occurred in Indonesia in recent decades, such as in Bali (2002 and 2004), the Australian Embassy (2004), the JW Marriot Hotel Jakarta (2009), Cirebon (2010), Surabaya (2018), Mako Brimob Depok (2018) and other places prove that radicalism is not a myth. Testimony from one of the Bali bombers, in which he described the group’s scenario for a suicide bombing, proved this fact.

Ali Imron explained in detail how his group persuaded and recruited bombers to conduct the suicide bombing using a car, a motorbike and a explosives vest. He surveyed locations to find where foreigners most often gathered. He asserted that the Bali bomb was a counterattack in response to the USA and its allies invading Afghanistan. Imron added that his group is responsible for serial acts of terror in Indonesia. As Sidney Jones asserts, the threat of terrorism and radicalism in Indonesia is a real fact, even if there are few who are radical and committed to using violence.

Ideology has contributed to the rise of religious radicalism. Some view it as the responsibility of Indonesian Muslims to join the struggle to Islamise the secular government and system. Radical groups such as Front Pembela Islam (FPI-Islamic Defenders Front), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI-Indonesia Islamic Warrior’s Council), and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI-The Party of Liberation) are active and influential in promoting their ideology to society, under the protection of the right to freedom of expression. Alvara Research Consulting’s survey in 2017 found that one in five students supports the formation of a caliphate to change the system of Indonesian government. This survey of 4,200 Muslims students showed that nearly one in four students was ready to join the struggle to establish such a caliphate.

There are also social factors in the rise of religious radicalism in Indonesia. People can be radicalised when living as a minority group and frequently received discriminatory treatment from the majority. Muslims living in regions where they are a minority religion were radicalised into violence with their Christian neighbours, which then escalated to the point where some groups called for other Muslims to travel to the Moluccas and Poso to wage jihad on Christians.

Political factors have also been a source of rising religious radicalism in Indonesia. Even though the founding fathers agreed that Indonesia is a neutrally religious state and must protect all citizens, some politicians deny this and play on their religious identity. Some parties and religious organisations in Indonesia actively campaign against candidates based solely on their religion, demanding voters not elect non-Muslim leaders. The has been a serious problem in Indonesia since the reformation era. In several regions, governors and mayors have agreed to formally implement sharia bylaws in regional law to boost their Islamic credentials ahead of elections. This political strategy can exacerbate religious radicalism because the laws position Muslims as a majority group with special rights. Utilising these laws as justification, fanatical religious groups often discriminate against minority groups. These groups will be increasingly radicalised because they have more room and legitimacy for their violent actions. The experience of Pakistan and Afghanistan, which rigidly implement shariah bylaws resulting in increasing prominence, should be taken into account. In both countries, women and minority groups became second class citizens and were discriminated against by state and radical groups.

Social media is also often used to broadcast hoax information that contributes to the rise of religious radicalism. For example, during the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election, radical groups which supported Anies Baswedan-Sandiaga Uno published a statement that Muslims who supported Basuki Tjahaya Purnama (Ahok)-Djarot Saiful Hidayat could be categorised as the enemy of Islam.

Although radicalism and terrorism cannot be equated, they are closely related. Maarif (2002) and Ghufron (2017) have argued (separately) that radicalism is related to how people understand and express their religion, and terrorism is committed to using violence for political purposes. However, radicalism can turn into terrorism, and people who are followers of radical groups are targeted by terrorist recruiters. As a consequence, if government and society do not pay serious attention to radical groups, they may find they cooperate with terrorist groups instead.

Furthermore, terrorist groups target recruitment at younger generations. Radical groups often disseminate their ideology in senior high schools and universities. Recently, authorities detained several students in the State Islamic University (UIN) Jakarta for allegedly being involved in bombing and other violent actions. Moreover, the phenomena of suicide bombers, in Serpong (2011), the exposure of NII’s network (Negara Islam Indonesia-the Islamic State of Indonesia), and bombers of JW Marriot hotel (2009) and the perpetrators of the Klaten bomb (2011) shows they are often young people from schools and universities.

In several cases, radical groups have infiltrated universities and schools. Radical groups also recruited young generations from several places such as mosques. The young generation is becoming the main target of radical groups because they are in a transitional period, forming their identity and being easily influenced by others. They are susceptible to the ideologies of radical groups which use the internet as the tool of propaganda.

Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Perdamaian’s (Research Institute on Islam and Peace, LAKIP) study in 2010 showed this in its survey of 10 areas in Jakarta at the end of 2010. This survey found that more than 50% of high school students agree that the use of violence is justified in Islamic teaching. They believe that Muslims are permitted to use violence to defend Islam. They agree that the use of violence against people who insult Islam is a legitimate action. The survey also showed that 21 % of teachers stated that the state ideology of Pancasila is no longer relevant. MAARIF Institute’s 2011 research mapping the problems of radicalism in the State Senior High Schools in 4 areas (Pandeglang, Cianjur, Yogyakarta, and Solo) also confirmed these findings. The research, conducted in 50 schools, revealed that schools have become the arena in which to disseminate ideology. Because the schools are so open, radical groups have exploited this opportunity to spread their ideas and widen their networks. As a result, many students’ understanding of Islam has become more monolithic, and they easily blame others for social, economic, and political problems that they perceive to jeopardise Muslims.

The rise of religious radicalism can trigger conflict in society. For radical groups, society is divided into “us” and “them”. Groups that reject radical ideas will be classified as “them”. Because of their demarcation from other groups in society conflicts occurs. The application of the doctrine “us vs. them” also contributes to increasing intolerance of religious minority groups. Ahmadiya and Shi’ah groups often became the target of violent actions by radical groups. A series of attacks against Ahmadiya and Shi’ah followers have occurred in many areas in Indonesia. Christians have also been prevented from building houses of worship in some areas. Maarif argues that the “us and them” paradigm is contradictory to Islamic values, and based on an archaic historical contexts.

It is time for the Indonesian government to pay serious attention to the slippage between radicalism and terrorism, and the mechanism that terrorists use to recruit others to their ideologies. Otherwise it risks to the consequences of a rise in religious violence.

• ABOUT THE AUTHOR

   AHMAD FUAD FANANI

  Ahmad Fuad Fanani is a PhD scholar at the Department of Political and Social Change in the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, the Australian National University (ANU). He is also a researcher at MAARIF Institute for Culture and Humanity and a visiting lecturer at Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta. His research interests are democracy, global political Islam, contestation of religious authority, contemporary Islamic political thoughts, and Islamic movements in South East Asia.

Modern-day slavery: Vietnamese women domestic workers in Saudi Arabia


A TEENAGE DAUGHTER MOURNS THE DEATH OF HER MOTHER, A VIETNAMESE DOMESTIC WORKER WHO PERISHED IN SAUDI ARABIA IN NOVEMBER 2020. IMAGE COURTESY DUY NHÂN.

ANGIE NGOC TRAN - 29 NOV, 2021

The recent death of an underage woman, H Xuân Siu, an ethnic minority Jarai from DakLak, Vietnam, who was recruited to work as a domestic worker in Saudi Arabia, shocked the world. More details, exposed on Facebook by her sister-in-law and other news outlets reveal an exploitative transnational labour export system that sends young and old women from poor areas in Vietnam to work as domestic workers in the private homes of their visa sponsors in the Gulf states. As of 2020, nearly 7,000 women are employed as domestic workers for Saudi families. While COVID-19 exacerbates the vulnerability of all overseas migrant workers, it is worse for domestic workers because they are invisible and isolated in their sponsors’ houses, and are completely at the mercy of their sponsors. The Kafala (visa sponsorship) system dictates the employment conditions for foreign guest-workers in the Gulf states. In domestic work, the sponsor is the head of household and also the employer, whose authority goes unquestioned and unsupervised. Domestic workers are tied to the original sponsors who can deport them if they are not pleased with the workers’ service, or transfer them from one household to another without any consent from the workers (a rampant practice during COVID-19). Workers cannot venture outside because their passports are confiscated by their employers as soon as they set foot in the destination countries. From then on, many are treated as slaves, not knowing whether they will be paid or not, going hungry, and enduring physical and sexual abuses until they manage to return to Vietnam.

H Xuân Siu was only 16 when recruited by VINACO, a recruitment company in Vietnam which is a member of VAMAS, a Vietnamese Association of Manpower Supply sanctioned by the Ministry of the Interior since 2003. VINACO is alleged to have increased her age in order for her to work in Saudi Arabia. After two years of working there, she pleaded to return home but died of heart failure at 18. But she died having made allegations of physical abuse perpetrated by her sponsor, which were recorded in phone conversations with her friends. The family pleaded to bring her body home but VINACO refused unless the family accepted the incorrect age they put on her passport (which listed her birth year as 1996, rather than the correct year of 2003). This delay caused her final burial to take place in Saudi Arabia on November 4, 2021, devastating her family in Vietnam.

However, there are other tragic cases that have not been brought to the attention of the global community. A young woman (of Kinh descent) died abruptly and was buried in Saudi Arabia from COVID-19 while employed as a domestic worker for a family in Riyadh City. She left behind two young children and a frail father. She promised to return to her family for good in October 2020, and the family waited and waited until the bad news came in December. In conversation with the journalist who wrote this article, I found out that the sponsor had owed her back wages and only paid them to the family when the violation was exposed in Vietnamese article, which pressured the local government to intervene on behalf of this poor family.

Social media and independent news outlets have exposed these abuses and how these domestic workers were abandoned not only by the recruitment companies, but also by the Vietnamese embassy there. They found rampant physical abuses of Vietnamese domestic workers in Saudi Arabia. Speaking on behalf of a group of domestic workers in a deportation camp in Riyadh, a female domestic worker recorded a poignant SOS message addressed directly to the Vietnamese Prime Minister, the Vietnamese Embassy there and the internet community to bring them home because they have been stuck there (some for over a year) due to many abuses not of their own making. Other sources show photos of physically and sexually abused workers who took refuge in a Riyadh shelter after running away from their Saudi sponsors.

Why are these abuses hidden until it is too late for some women? We need to understand the self-sustaining and coherent transnational labour brokerage system that exploits and abuses domestic workers, in order to demand reforms and justice for these domestic workers.

In 2014, the Vietnamese and Saudi Arabian governments signed a five-year labour agreement to send women from Vietnam to work as domestic workers in Saudi Arabia. It included an automatic renewal clause, supposed to be activated in 2019. This agreement benefits ministries of both governments, the recruitment companies from both sides, and the sponsors’ households in the host country; the program rests on the backs of migrant workers, 100% are women of different ethnic groups from Vietnam who earn US$400 per month, working 7 days a week and over 12 hours per day. After a lot of searching, I could not find any announcement about the renewal or any update of the terms. But I found reports of the VAMAS decision on December 17, 2020, to form and appoint the leaders for the Department on the Middle East Domestic Help Market, with the general president of VINACO joint stock company as one of the leaders serving on this board. This suggests that this bilateral labour agreement has been renewed with all of the existing stipulations that imperil potential domestic workers.

Even under increasing global pressure, Saudi Arabia excluded domestic migrant workers from the so-called reform of the Kafala system which went into effect on March 14, 2021. Domestic workers and farmers continue to be the least protected, most vulnerable to abuse, and not covered by the labour law. Under this half-hearted Kafala system, domestic workers are still denied all protections, including the right to join trade unions or strike.

Reading exchanges on the public Facebook page on Saudi Arabia reveal all types of contract violations endured by domestic workers: not having enough food to eat, no break times in a 12-hour plus workday, not receiving personal hygiene items and medical supplies as contractually agreed, and not receiving wages in full. Their passports are confiscated, so they cannot even leave the house or use their passports to buy a commercial plane ticket home using their own savings. Many domestic workers have finished their 2-year contracts but are stranded in Saudi Arabia due to COVID-19 and want to go home to reunite with their families. Most cannot afford exorbitantly expensive chartered airfares (upwards of US$3000) to return to Vietnam. Most are completely at the mercy of the sponsors who make false promises to buy plane tickets for them. VINACO has representatives in Riyadh but they have turned a blind eye to workers’ pleas, as aptly described by a common Vietnamese saying: “Leaving babies stranded in the market-place.”

International labour and migration organizations, including the International Labour Organization (ILO), International Organisation for Migration (IOM), and Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) need to pay attention to abuses suffered by domestic workers who are still stuck in Saudi Arabia. They need to scrutinise the genuine implementation of the VAMAS code of conduct and hold its recruitment company members, including VINACO, accountable to and compliant with their code of conduct. Evidence shows that VINACO has been doing exactly the opposite of the code of conduct to which they subscribe and they continue to lead the Department on the Middle East Domestic Help Market to ensure that this system functions for their benefit. Moreover, the promise made by the Deputy Minister for International Labor Affairs of Saudi Arabia as signatory of the 2014 labour agreement on fair and humane treatment of domestic workers needs to be fulfilled by the Saudi Ministry of Labor, especially when this agreement appears to have been renewed for five more years.

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In limbo: Migrant workers struggle with the Myanmar coup and COVID-19
As their travel documents expire Myanmar migrants risk becoming undocumented and excluded from legal protections by shortcomings in both Myanmar and Thai migration policies.
ROISAI WONGSUBAN 09 JUNE, 2021

Worse yet, there is no monitoring of the proper implementation of the terms of the contracts. While the revision of the Vietnamese Law 72 (2006), Law 69/2020/QH14 (starting January 1, 2022) forbids brokerage fees, this stipulation does not help Vietnamese domestic workers when the Kafala system is still in place: “migrant worker can end a contract with a recruitment company if it is not implemented correctly.” The contract is signed between the sponsor and the Vietnamese domestic workers (many do not have a high school degree, only speak Vietnamese and cannot even keep their passports) and witnessed by a Saudi recruitment company sanctioned by the Saudi government. According to this common contract, the Vietnamese recruitment company and the Vietnamese Embassy play no role in Saudi Arabia to protect their citizens when their rights are violated and they want to end the contract. The embassy only makes announcements when a tragic event happens or when claiming that they “do not leave anyone behind”. Meanwhile some Vietnamese newspapers called out the need to protect Vietnamese citizens’ legal rights and interests while working overseas and reported cases of recruitment companies’ leaving workers stranded in Saudi Arabia.

At the time of writing, it is uncertain whether the Saudi sponsors will fulfill their side of the contract: buying plane tickets home for the workers who have served them past the end of the 2-year contracts. What is clear is that hundreds, if not thousands, of Vietnamese workers desperately want to fly home to their families, but the sponsors have been dragging their feet to buy the plane tickets for them. COVID-19 has given them an excuse to continue exploiting these workers who work tirelessly to care for sponsors’ children and families, while their own families await their return and while most workers are unable to afford commercial or chartered plane tickets.

If this is not modern-day forced labour and slavery, then what is? It would be a mockery to the vision of international labour standards, human decency and compassion enshrined by the ILO, IOM and other UN organizations not to intervene to rescue these stranded domestic workers. Both the Vietnamese and Saudi Arabian governments should pay for humanitarian flights to bring those domestic workers who wish to return home, so they can reunite with their families. It is long overdue for the global community to put pressure on the transnational labour brokerage system to prevent these modern-day slavery practices.

• ABOUT THE AUTHOR

   ANGIE NGOC TRAN

  Angie Ngọc Trần is Professor of political economy at the California State University Monterey Bay. Her research focuses on labor movements and resistance in Vietnam and transnational migration patterns of guestworkers. Her book, Ethnic Dissent and Empowerment: Economic Migration between Vietnam and Malaysia (University of Illinois Press, January 2022), focuses on the Kinh, Hoa, Cham Muslims, Khmer and Hrê, integrating ethnicity, class, gender, religion, cultural resources, and third space of dissent and empowerment.

The “Timor Crisis” and Dom Bonaventura’s plea for help: Houben’s archival investigations


A MARKER STONE ON TIMOR AT THE BORDER OF THE DUTCH EAST INDIES WITH THE PORTUGUESE ENCLAVE OF OECUSSI.

JAMES FOX - 01 DEC, 2021

The struggle for independence in Timor Leste has prompted renewed interest in the figure of Dom Bonaventura, the traditional ruler of Manufahi, who led the single most threatening Timorese uprising against the Portuguese. Now recent research in the Dutch archives has uncovered a missive from Dom Benaventura and offers a unique glimpse of his precarious situation under siege at his stronghold on the south coast of Timor. This research is to be found in Vincent Houben’s Histories of Scale: Java, the Indies and Asia in the Imperial Age, 1820–1940 that includes a key chapter on the Timor crisis of 1910-1912 as part of his remarkable re-examination of Indonesia’s colonial history.

Presented as a contribution to current debates on global and imperial history, Houben’s Histories of Scale engages with a diversity of issues: Javanese rural capitalism and the transport of coolie labour, policies of indirect rule and consequent border disputes and the effects of the two World Wars on nationalist movements in Indonesia. At its core, this history consists of six densely researched ‘pericentric’ case studies that cast local developments within a larger-scale framework. Each case highlights the role of a specific colonial figure of note.

In one of these cases, Houben examines the role of Johannes Augustinus Dezentjé and the local capitalisation and economic fluctuation of his extended network of plantations formed from apanage lands leased from the Central Javanese court; in another case, he examines the involvement of Jacob Izaak van Sevenhoven in the affairs of native states of Cirebon, Palembang and Surakarta and the tightening of a colonial policy of indirect rule; in yet another case, he looks at the role of the Dutch labour inspector D.R.J. van Lijnden, who considered the testimony of Javanese coolie labourers in British North Borneo who were part of a Dutch scheme that transported labour to British and French colonies in the region. Houben’s assessment of all of his cases in their particular contexts reflects a research perspective of over thirty years and an unparalleled intimate exploration of Dutch archival sources.

One of the most interesting of these cases chosen for scrutiny by Houben is that of the Gerret Pieter Rouffaer, a prolific Dutch ethno-commentator on Indonesian affairs who dared to compare Dutch and Portuguese colonial rule on Timor.

Houben uses Rouffaer to focus on the years from 1910 to 1912, a time of serious border conflicts between the Dutch and Portuguese prompted by substantial unrest in Portuguese Timor – a period that Dutch colonial authorities labelled the “Timor Crisis”. To appreciate Houben’s remarkable archival findings that deal with this period requires some historical background on the situation on Timor to which the Dutch were responding

The Timor Situation in an Eastern Indonesian Context

Disputes over borders between the Netherlands and Portugal had begun, initially beyond the borders of Timor, in a struggle for control of the islands and seas from Flores to Alor over which both European colonial powers contented.

When in 1838, the Dutch carried out an attack on the town of Larantuka at the eastern end of Flores, Lisbon claimed that this was a provocative assault on a Portuguese possession. Not long afterwards when a Portuguese ship fired on a perahu from Macassar, the Dutch reciprocated by claiming this incident as an armed offense on their colonial authority. Several years later, in 1846, the Dutch initiated discussions with Portugal on acquiring their territories in the Indies, an offer that was officially declined in 1851. Instead, ‘Timor and the ‘Solor Islands’ including parts of Flores, were declared a separate province of the Portuguese Indies.

However, the impoverished governor in Dili continued negotiations with the Dutch authories and, without authorisation from Lisbon, agreed to relinquish claims to Solor, Flores and its nearby islands for an immediate payment of 80,000 florin (followed by a further payment of 120,000 florin). The Dutch responded immediately, made these payments, and laid official claim to the islands from Flores to Alor.

Although the Portuguese governor was recalled in disgrace, his agreement could not be undone. So, after further negotiations in 1854, an agreement of exchange of territories was reached and, finally, ratified in 1859: the Portuguese ceded their claims to the islands of Flores, Solor, Adonara, Pantar and Alor to the Netherlands Indies, while the Dutch ceded the domain of Maubara on the north coast of east Timor to the Portuguese and agreed to recognise Portuguese claims to Oecussi and the tiny enclave of Noilmuti in central west Timor. In turn, the Portuguese agreed to recognise Dutch authority over the domain of Maucatar along the central southeastern border between east and west Timor.

The struggle to maintain possession of their eastern most islands and the concessions of 1859 that they were forced upon them prompted the Portuguese to turn inward in their governance of what remained of their presence on Timor. They became ever more wary of threats of unrest among the local population of the island and began what became annual expeditions enlisting rulers of supposed allies in one area to subdue the rulers in another rebellious area. René Pélissier, in his Timor en Guerre, documented no less than sixty such Portuguese-led military expeditions between 1847 and 1913, culminating in the large-scale slaughter of the Manufahi rebellion.

The loss of connections with other islands in eastern Indonesia—particularly with the town of Larantuka which was one of the oldest Portuguese settlements in the region—left East Timor isolated and adrift from its historical origins. The first Portuguese-speaking settlers to establish a base at Lifao on Timor had come from Larantuka and this connection had been maintained, particularly through close religious ties: Larantuka’s sodalities and confraternities regularly participated in the religious celebrations in Dili lending them an historical authority. But the Florenese participation in Timorese affairs went well beyond the religious: up to the early 1850s, Malay-speaking volunteers from Sika, known as the Companhia de Moradores de Sica, were regularly recruited for military service in East Timor.

The use of local Malay, which was particularly prominent in Larantuka, provided links among the other islands of eastern Indonesia. So, when these connections were severed, the Portuguese sought to encourage a new lingua franca. Initially, the Catholic Church encouraged the use of Galoli, preparing catechisms in this language. In the end, however, establishment of the Jesuit Soibada College in 1898 in an important Tetun-speaking area gave a crucial impetus for the use of Tetun. Soibada became responsible for training all of the schoolmasters (mestre-escolas) who taught throughout East Timor and provided the official staff for the colonial government in Dili.
Houben on the ‘Timor Crisis’ of 1910-1912

These factors set the scene for Houben’s account of the “Timor Crisis”. He begins his narrative in 1910 by discussing the provocations of the orientalist G.W. Rouffaer who after a brief visit to Timor had the temerity to compare Portuguese and Dutch colonial regimes on either side of the border. Rouffaer, most of whose previous experience was on Java, found that the Portuguese activities were more in line with what he regarded as “advanced” colonialism. Not only did the Portuguese have more efficient military communications and apparently better roads, they had also institutionalised plantations on their half of the island. Dutch Timor was less well organised and certainly there were no plantations.

When Dutch authorities became aware of Rouffaer’s assertions, there was irritation followed by a stout response. Syne Kok, the Dutch controller stationed on the border with Portuguese Timor, whom Rouffaer had judged incompetent, wrote a 92-page, point-by-point refutation. Syne Kok was at the time mobilising troops to defend Dutch border territories. In June 1911, he led one such expedition that gathered information along the border areas that included the enclave of Maucatar, which the Dutch controlled. The Portuguese were relying on African troops whom they had brought from Mozambique to reinforce their own native moradores. It was reported that a contingent of forty of these African soldiers had occupied Lakmaras cutting off Dutch access to their enclave of Maucatar. Far from being pacified, as Rouffaer had claimed, there was considerable local unrest in much of Portuguese Timor.

Matters continued to escalate rapidly. On the 18th of July, shooting broke out at Lakmaras. Three African soldiers were killed and a Portuguese lieutenant and sergeant, nine African soldiers and six moradores and their wives were taken to Atupupu for sea transport to Kupang.

On receiving word of this incident, the Governor-General Idenburg in Batavia ordered the Dutch Resident in Kupang, Vorstman, to telegram his apologies to Filomeno da Cârama de Melo Cabral, the Governor of Portuguese Timor to deescalate the situation. Instead of passing on Idenburg’s message, Vorstman defended the actions of Major Pluimmetz.

Drawing on documents from the “Secret-Cabinet Archives” in the Dutch Colonial Archives, Houben provides a clear idea of the heated missives exchanged at this time. Defending his position as a matter of “national interest”, Vorstman wrote:

“The Portuguese were convinced that the Dutch are people (…) whom you can deceive, can fool, tease, take their territory from, kill their population, allow that strangers take their chiefs prisoner; despite this, they remain calm and decent and only protest on paper.”

However, according to Vorstman, when the “Dutch lion had shown its teeth,” the Portuguese capitulated.

For all his passions, Vorstman was immediately suspended and Infantry Colonel C.H. van Rietschoten dispatched to Kupang as the Civil and Military Resident of Timor. Van Rietschoten endeavoured to conduct regular exchanges, in diplomatic French, with the Governor of Portuguese Timor to mollify the situation, but by the middle of 1912 these exchanges had become far less amiable, especially as the Portuguese were by then reacting to a major uprising, the Manufahi Revolt, in their territory.

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The Manufahi Revolt from the Dutch Perspective

The Manufahi revolt was a major uprising in Portuguese Timor led by a traditional ruler, Dom Bonaventura da Costa Souto Maior, the eldest son of a ruler, Dom Duaete, who had previously led an uprising against the Portuguese. He was closely allied with a number of other traditional rulers, liuriai, from the domains (reino) on the south coast of Portuguese Timor, particularly those of Suai, Camanasa and Raimean. He had been able to enlist sufficient popular support to mount major opposition to the Portuguese, forcing them to bring in extra military auxiliaries, including an increasing number of African soldiers, to quash this rebellion.

The Dutch became peripherally involved in the revolt because of their presence in the disputed enclave of Maucatar in the central southwest of Timor, but also because of another anti-Portuguese uprising that occurred at the same time in the enclave of Oecussi. At different times, refugees fleeing the Portuguese were received and settled in west Timor, bringing with them detailed accounts of what was occurring in areas under Portuguese control.

Houben utilises the Dutch archives to give a glimpse of these developments. Of considerable significance, for the Dutch, was the uprising in Oecussi, led by the local ruler Dom Joâo Da Cruz Hornai, which on the 22nd of March 1912 killed two Portuguese non-commissioned officers and took control of the port of Pante Macassar. The Portuguese, in turn, besieged the port and were able to reoccupy it on the 31st of March and regarrison it with 150 African soldiers. Thereupon the Timorese besieged the port and continued their siege for more than a year. When the Portuguese finally managed to break this siege, the ruler Da Cruz Hornai and many of his followers sought refuge in west Timor and were settled by the Dutch away from the Oecussi border.

The Manufahi revolt, which had begun in 1911, continued through into September of 1912 when Dom Bonaventura’s besieged supporters were overrun and crushed into submission. By May 1912, as a consequence of this uprising, the Dutch had begun accepting refugees. The first of these were members of the ruling family of Kailako who sought refuge in Dutch territory. This was followed by a larger contingent from Ermera, members of whom had been taken by the Portuguese to fight at Manufahi but had, instead, returned to their domain and had then fled across the border to avoid Portuguese reprisal.

One of Houben’s most important archival finding is a letter sent in July by Dom Bonaventura to Van Rietschoten, the Resident of Timor, pleading for Dutch intervention. This letter, in Malay, is a document of historic importance that deserves full consideration.

ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF LETTER FROM DOM BONAVENTURA DA COSTA SOUTO MAIOR TO COLONEL C.H. VAN RIETSCHOTEN

Click above to read an English translation of the letter.

At the time when this letter was sent on the 17th of July, the Manufahi uprising had been ongoing for over nine months and the Portuguese governor, Philomeno da Câmara, had assembled a formidable force of over 9000 men. Pellissier reports that this force consisted of 34 officers and 590 first-line soldiers, including the reinforcements from Mozambique, plus 647 second-line moradores (mainly regular Timorese soldiers) plus 8000 auxiliaries (arraiais) recruited specifically from other Timorese reino to support the campaign. Dom Bonaventura and his supporters were under siege at his hilltop redoubt at Leo Lako, which would fall on the 10th of August.

Van Rietschoten’s reply to Dom Bonaventura was that no direct Dutch assistance could be offered but that the Dutch would grant refuge to him and his people in Dutch Timor. Dom Bonaventura escaped the siege at Leo Lako but was reportedly captured on the 26th of October. In the end only forty refugees, including the ruler of Raimean who had also escaped the Manufahi massacre, were able to reach Dutch Timor and were given settlement.

Pellissier estimates that there may have been 20,000 or more deaths as a result of the Manufahi campaign, not just because of the fighting but because of severe dysentery that afflicted the assembled troops. Official figures were much lower. So ended the largest and most concerted Timorese uprising against colonial rule.

• ABOUT THE AUTHOR

   JAMES FOX

  Professor James J. Fox was educated at Harvard (AB ‘62) and Oxford (B Litt. ‘65, DPhil. ‘68) where he was a Rhodes Scholar. He has taught at various American Universities: Harvard, Cornell, Duke and Chicago and at various European Universities: Leiden, Bielefeld and the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales. He is a Foreign Fellow of the Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences and a Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia. Professor Fox’s area of primary interest is Indonesia, with special focus on Java and eastern Indonesia. He has carried out considerable research in Timor, most recently in East Timor. More generally, his interests are in comparative issues affecting the whole of the Asia Pacific region.

 

NBSEAS: In Search of New Social Democracy: Insights from the South—Implications for the North

NEW MANDALA - 07 DEC, 2021

In his new book In Search of New Social Democracy: Insights from the South—Implications for the North (Zed-Bloomsbury), Olle Törnquist has returned to findings from fifty years of research on democracy and social rights movements in especially Indonesia, India and the Philippines, to address the major puzzle of our time: why the vision about development based on social justice by democratic means has lost ground, and if there are openings.

In this episode of the Nordic Asia Podcast Kenneth Bo Nielsen is joined by Olle Törnquist to discuss the main results and arguments in what he calls his endbook.

Olle Törnquist is a Swedish global historian and Professor Emeritus of Politics and Development at the University of Oslo, Norway. He has written widely on radical politics, development and democratisation.

The Nordic Asia Podcast is a collaboration sharing expertise on Asia across the Nordic region, brought to you by the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies (NIAS) based at the University of Copenhagen, along with our academic partners: the Centre for East Asian Studies at the University of Turku, Asianettverket at the University of Oslo, and the Stockholm Centre for Global Asia at Stockholm University.

We aim to produce timely, topical and well-edited discussions of new research and developments about Asia.

Transcripts of the Nordic Asia Podcasts: http://www.nias.ku.dk/nordic-asia-podcast

ROYAL LOOT CHEAP LIKE BORSCHT
'Majestic' tiaras of Josephine Bonaparte sold in UK


The elaborate jewel-encrusted tiaras are thought to have belonged to the French empress Josephine Bonaparte 

AFP/Daniel LEAL

Tue, December 7, 2021

A pair of "highly rare" centuries-old headpieces encrusted with jewels and believed to have belonged to the French empress Josephine Bonaparte sold at auction in London Tuesday for nearly £600,000 ($795,000, 710,000 euros).

The two tiaras -- offered from a private British collection dating back at least 150 years -- are thought to have been given to Napoleon Bonaparte's wife by his sister Caroline early in the 19th century, according to Sotheby's.

Both headpieces, each part of a parure -- a set of matching jewellery designed to be worn together -- are set with gemstones engraved with classical heads, several of which are possibly ancient, the auction house said.

The more ornate of the duo -- comprising carnelian, enamel and gold -- fetched £450,600, while the other sold for £126,000, as part of a "Treasures" sale of various valuable and rare items.

"These majestic jewels mounted with cameos and intaglios certainly evoke the style of the grand Empress Josephine -- her rank as wife of Napoleon Bonaparte, her impeccable taste and her interest in the classical world," said Kristian Spofforth, of Sotheby's.

"The jewels offered here demonstrate the finest delicate work by the finest French workshops, and, today, there are hardly any comparable pieces in the world.

"When fashions changed, jewellery was broken up and re-modelled, making their survival a truly exceptional one."

Josephine Bonaparte was likely given just the engraved gems, which Sotheby's said were a possible combination of Roman examples dating back to as early as 100 BC as well as more contemporary Italian engravings.

The auctioneers believe the jewels were then mounted for her in the French capital in around 1808 in the neo-classical style, citing marks on the crowns pointing to Paris and its famed goldsmiths of the age.

They were believed to endow the wearer with their various depicted qualities such as heroism, faithfulness and love, all while blazing a trail in the fashion world of the day.

"By being the first to incorporate these cameos and intaglios into her dress, wearing them side by side with pearls and diamonds, she created an entire new fashion that swept Paris and the world, based on neo-classical forms," explained Spofforth.

No details were immediately released Tuesday on the identity of the buyers.

Sotheby's said the tiaras were possibly acquired from Josephine or her estate by British landowner, art collector and politician Edward Lascelles, and then passed on to his descendants.

jj/phz/tgb

Nobel winner hits out at UK, France over Channel migrants

The Zanzibar-born British novelist, whose work has focused on the plight of migrants, received his Nobel prize for literature in London on Monday 

(AFP/ADRIAN DENNIS)More


Tue, December 7, 2021

British novelist Abdulrazak Gurnah, the winner of this year's Nobel Prize for Literature, criticised on Tuesday the "inhumane" responses of the UK and French governments to the Channel migrant crisis.

"There is something quite inhumane I think in the responses of these two governments, particularly I think of the British government," he said in an online press conference the day after receiving his Nobel winner's medal.

"It's rather strange almost to see the language, the narrative that is constructed against or about these attempts to cross," he added.

This year has seen a record number of migrants seeking to cross the Channel from northern France to Britain, risking their lives on one of the world's busiest sea lanes.

Last month saw a tragedy in which at least 27 people drowned.

The issue has become a flashpoint for leaders in London and Paris, provoking a war of words amid rising anti-immigrant sentiment in both countries.

Around 26,000 people have crossed so far in 2021, leading to severe pressure on the UK government which had vowed to reduce migration after pushing through Britain's departure from the European Union.

London has previously mooted exploring ways to turn around migrants' boats in the Channel.

Prime Minister Boris Johnson has also proposed sending back all migrants landing in Britain, a move he claimed would save "thousands of lives by fundamentally breaking the business model of the criminal gangs".

Meanwhile, legislation currently working its way through the British parliament would increase the maximum sentence for migrants entering the UK unlawfully from six months to four years, while convicted people-smugglers could face a life sentence.

The draft law, which ministers have called the biggest overhaul of asylum rules in decades and is based on the idea that people should claim asylum in the "first safe country" they arrive in, has been heavily criticised by rights groups.

Gurnah, who won the prestigious Nobel award in October, has been acclaimed for his novels' focus on the plight of refugees, as well as the effects of colonialism.

The 72-year-old author fled to Britain from Zanzibar in late 1967, later acquiring British citizenship.

In his virtual press conference, Gurnah also said he had been left wondering whether the British government's failure to congratulate him for landing the prize could be down to the fact he is an African-born writer.

"It's possible that that could be the explanation, that they don't quite see this writer as somebody to whom they owe congratulations," he added.

jj/phz/pbr

FASCIST REACTIONARIES

On the web and on the streets, Covid protests get nasty


Germany is struggling to deal with protests against coronavirus restrictions

 (AFP/Yann Schreiber)

Max BIEDERBECK
Tue, December 7, 2021,

A call is out on Telegram for people opposing Covid restrictions to share private addresses of German "local MPs, politicians and other personalities" who they believe are "seeking to destroy" them through pandemic curbs.

Those on the list should no longer be allowed to "live a carefree life," wrote the group called "Coronavirus-Information" in the message that was put online late November.

Since then it has been viewed by 25,000 people.

On Friday evening, a group of corona-sceptics armed with flaming torches massed outside the house of Petra Koepping, the health minister of Saxony state.

The scenes in the stronghold of Germany's far-right, accompanied by thumping drum beats, were reminiscent of Nazi-era marches, drawing condemnation from mainstream politicians.

Olaf Scholz, who is due to take office on Wednesday as Germany's new chancellor, urged society "not to be infected" by such "aggressive" behaviour.

"When such flaming torch processions take place in front of the house of a health minister, that is meant as a threat -- that is not just an expression of opinion, and we as democrats strongly reject that," he said.

Not only in Germany, but also in the Netherlands and Austria, security services have warned of growing radicalisation among coronavirus-sceptics.

And the Telegram list is just one in a multitude of such examples flourishing on social networks in Germany, attracting opponents of coronavirus curbs from mask-wearing to vaccinations.

- 'Dilemma' -

The incoming German government's recent call for compulsory vaccinations has fired up another wave of rage.

Thomas Strobl, who heads the conference of regional interior ministers, warned that mandatory jabs will only "further harden the attitudes of opponents".

Strobl also accused Internet regulators of falling short in clamping down on such threatening calls online.

But Simone Rafael of the anti-racism Amadeu Antonio foundation said that policing the online sphere was easier said than done.

"German politicians are confronted with a dilemma when it comes to networks like Telegram," said the expert on online radicalisation.

The only solution would be to completely shut it down. But in democratic Germany, no one wants that."

As a result, conspiracy theories and violence are spreading. Some users feel so untouchable that they use their real names to threaten people online.

- 'Dead serious' -

While a wave of dissent against corona curbs had been there since the beginning of the pandemic, the hardening of the discourse is palpable today.

"For the followers of such narratives, this is not a joke but something that is dead serious," said Miro Dittrich, specialist in the far-right for the research centre CeMAS.

"They are now reaching a point where they can no longer find solutions to their fictional problems through normal means," he said. As a result, some may turn even to violence.

"We see more and more users on Telegram spreading private addresses in order to attack these people," he said.

Those targeted have voiced fears of growing threats.

"Doctors involved in the fight against the pandemic are reporting increasing hostility and threats," said Susanne Johna, who heads the Marburger Bund, a federation of the sector, in an interview with the Funke newspaper group.

After all, some have shown they are prepared to take a step beyond threats.

A young cashier working at a petrol station who asked a client to put on his mask, as required by the law, was shot dead by the man in September, becoming the first fatal casualty of the increasingly violent corona-sceptic movement.

max/ylf/hmn/dlc/tgb