Thursday, August 01, 2024

 South Africa

It’s time for the left to talk



Saturday 27 July 2024, by Amandla!





The 2024 national and provincial elections represent a critical turning point in South African politics. The results are a massive setback for the ANC, which is now forced into a humiliating coalition with theDemocratic Alliance. For Cosatu and the SACP, they represent a huge disaster. In effect, they signal the last rites for the Tripartite Alliance, which may continue in name but will have no effect in the political shaping of things. We have to ask: will the dramatic reversal in fortunes of the once dynamic and powerful workers movement be sufficient to bring about a shake-up. sufficient for a new path for the Left to be realised?

In 2007, Amandla published an editorial on the outcome of the 2007 ANC Polokwane Conference, entitled “Zuma victory: a call for the left to vuka”. Once again we make the call for the Left to recalibrate. Failure to do so will usher in a long period where we will be marginal and largely irrelevant to politics. In the face of the real possibility of the extreme rightwing coming to power in France, this is precisely what the Left was able to do. Communists, Greens, Social Democrats and Trotskyists successfully united and defeated the threat of the extreme right— at least for the moment. The situation in South Africa is different, but something similar is required.

What happened in the elections?

The ruling ANC has been implementing harsh austerity and introducing the privatisation of key industries. In those circumstances, the Left might have been celebrating its paltry 40% vote. However, a closer analysis of the elections should put a stop to any false triumphalism.

For a start, the ANC did not lose support to the Left. There was no genuine Left party standing in the elections. The Economic Freedom Fighters is the closest we get to something resembling a Left party, if one is willing to ignore its anti-democratic commandism, history of involvement in corruption, dubious financiers, and parliamentarism. And it also lost support; it received over 350,000 fewer votes than in 2019 and will now have five fewer MPs.

The big winner was Jacob Zuma’s uMkhonto weSizwe Party (MKP), only formed a mere six months before the election. It won almost 15% of the vote and will have 58 seats in Parliament. It is now the third largest party in Parliament, after the ANC and the DA. The MKP is a party led by a disgraced former president of the ANC and the country, who is facing corruption charges for his involvement in the arms deal, who is a misogynist and rape accused, centrally involved in facilitating state capture and corruption amounting to hundreds of billions of rands. The fact that such a party is able to garner almost 2.5 million votes (2 344 000) tells us a lot about the state of politics, especially class politics in South Africa.

Rise of a populist politics

It is not possible to characterise MKP’s economic policies as reactionary.After all, its manifesto advocates a series of redistribution programmes, nationalisation of key sectors of the economy, greater regulation of big business, and an end to austerity and neoliberalism. But its social policies are regressive and right-wing. Of equal concern is that it is a thuggish party which will not hesitate in mobilising storm troopers against those who stand in its way. It will continue to attack and deligitimise institutions necessary for defending the democratic gains achieved in ending Apartheid.

This thuggish, ultra-nationalist politics is complemented by the rise of the Patriotic Alliance, which wants to drive foreign migrants out of South Africa. No one should be fooled by its jovial, charismatic leadership. It focuses on the resentment of the so-called ‘coloured’ population, especially those in the rural areas. And it has grown from nothing (6,660 votes in 2019) to now having 330,425 votes, nine members of Parliament and a ministerial position in the new government.

The PA is the closest political formation to fascism in South Africa. It has weaponised the issue of foreign nationals, especially illegal immigrants, to win electoral support. Together with MKP, it signals the potential for the growth of an extreme right-wing type of politics, with particular South African features.

Aiding the growth of these parties is the great disillusionment of South Africans, who have had their hopes of a better life killed off by the destruction of jobs, collapse of services, and failures of local government. The deep alienation in society can be seen in the millions who stayed away from the elections. Part of the ANC’s poor performance is that, of the 41 million eligible voters, only 27 million registered, and just 16 million went to vote, Even though this was characterised as the most important election since 1994, the percentage poll dropped from 66 to 58 percent.

It is MKP, and parties like the PA, with their populist and demagogic message, which are better placed to capture the attention of these disgruntled layers. There is nothing progressive that can be read into the millions who have become disillusioned with one person one vote! It is in this sense that we say, once again, the Left must Vuka.

Government of National Unity

The ANC was always going to disguise getting into bed with the Democratic Alliance through the formula of a government of national unity. And in many ways the alliance with the DA, IFP and the rest makes it easier for Ramaphosa to push through the structural reforms demanded by the IMF, and make big business the drivers of South Africa’s stalled development.

Opposition in the ANC itself will now be neutralised by Ramaphosa’s new partners. Therefore, there should be no doubt that the Government of
National Unity will, at the very least, be a continuation of Ramaphosa’s ‘neoliberalism light’. The more likely outcome will be neoliberalism on steroids: greater budget cuts, more rapid privatisation, retrenchment of public sector workers, subsidies to incentivise capital investment, and even greater use of precarious forms of labour. Given the weakness of the labour movement on the one hand, and the depth of the economic crisis on the other, tough times lie ahead.

A Left dialogue

This makes it even more urgent for different components of the Left to come together to take stock of these elections, and forge a common approach to the GNU and Ramaphosa’s plan to build a consensus amongst all sectors of society for neoliberal reform—his long-desired social contract.

The Left we are referring to are those activists in popular organisations who believe organisation and struggle are the most important means to confront the current situation, and who oppose subordinating these struggles to nationalist agendas. We are referring to Left formations who are expressing the need to build unity and solidarity, such as those in Cosatu and the SACP calling for a left popular front, those in
Saftu involved in building the Working Class Summit, and those in Amcu who are building a Labour Party. We are also referring to progressive faith leaders who have made calls for a new movement to fill the vacuum left by the United Democratic Front.

We are mindful of the danger of Left sectarianism, and those groups whoreduce the problems facing the workers movement to the question of leadership. It will take much more than denouncing the bureaucrats of mass organisations as sell outs to rebuild working class and popular power. In particular, the dangers of the current situation need to be soberly assessed. We need to come to terms with just how bad the current balance of forces is. We need to hold up a mirror to ourselves, not to beat ourselves up, but to be realistic about what basic action programme we can unite on. Adventurism of sustained general strikes or occupations of cities has to be replaced with a programme capable of closing the gap between the few hundred activists that we are as the Left and the millions labouring in impoverishment.

Although we need to look ahead to the 2026 local government elections, our immediate attention must be on struggling together around the most
immediate needs of poor and working class people. Hand-in-hand with struggling for a basic income grant, in defence of jobs, resisting budget cuts, privatisation, etc, spaces need to be created to discuss politics, where new and common reference points can be developed. At all costs, polarizing ideological polemics, which shed more heat than light, should be avoided.

The elections, and the coming into existence of the GNU, must do for the Left in South Africa what the first round of the French elections did for Communists, Social Democrats, Greens and Trotskyists—they woke up, came together, and forged a minimum programme based on labour and the social movements. Here too, the Left must Vuka!

P.S.

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 Africa/France

A far-right Françafrique





Tuesday 30 July 2024, by Paul Martial

The Rassemblement National’s interest in Africa may be limited, but the few positions it has taken shed light on its positioning and strategy towards the continent. There are two discourses. One is directed at Africa, with condemnations of Françafrique and the CFA franc. [1] This allows a relative porosity between the far right and certain African political forces. The other is aimed at its own electorate. The African continent is presented as a reservoir for immigration and as a threat from Islamist terrorism.

Pandering

Marine Le Pen relies on a network that has been present in Africa for a long time. Far-right militants were fierce supporters of colonialism, fighting to the bitter end against Algerian independence with the OAS. Some were recycled by Foccart and ended up in the Congo alongside the colonialists who tried to create a state in the mining province of Katanga. François Duprat is one of them. A theorist of revolutionary nationalism and notorious anti-Semite, he was one of the advisers to Moïse Tshombé, puppet president of independent Katanga from 1960 to 1963. Subsequently, Duprat was for many years a member of the political bureau of the Front National (FN) and close to Jean-Marie Le Pen.

Mercenary Bob Denard recruited from the ranks of far-right militants to create a sort of French Wagner. They overthrew the government of the Comoros and established a reign of terror. Some of these mercenaries made up the Département Protection Sécurité (DPS), the FN’s security service.

Jean-Marie Le Pen’s trips to Africa

Although in 2015 Jean-Marie Le Pen, then an FN member of the European Parliament, and his daughter, then FN president, declared that apartheid ‘was initially a desire to promote the two communities. We can judge this more or less harshly, but we cannot betray the thinking of those who developed it’. [2] This did not prevent him from meeting some of the pillars of Françafrique.

Le Pen used the presence of former OAS members in Africa to meet African presidents. In 1987, he went to Gabon to greet Omar Bongo. Later, his wife Jany Le Pen visited the First Lady of Cameroon, Chantal Biya, who underlined the convergences of views with the far-right movement. In 2016, Le Pen was invited to the presidential investiture of the dictator of Equatorial Guinea, Teodoro Obiang Nguema, elected after a grossly rigged poll with a score of 93.7%.

With these trips, the far right is gaining credibility and strengthening its base. The other advantage would be financial. Robert Bourgi’s testimony refers to funding by Omar Bongo, corroborated by the former Gabonese Prime Minister Jean Eyeghe Ndong, who recounts the words of the President of Gabon: ‘This gentleman, although he is a racist, still received the kindness of suitcases of money from me’. [3]

Marine following in her father’s footsteps

Marine Le Pen’s trips to Africa have reinforced her international stature. To achieve this, she is benefiting from her father’s network, which she is trying to expand. Lawyer Marcel Ceccaldi, who defended Gaddafi’s son, enabled her to meet Chadian dictator Idriss Déby senior and give a speech at the country’s National Assembly.

Her trip to Dakar, where she met Macky Sall in the midst of an authoritarian drift, owes much to the work of Philippe Bohn, who has held senior positions in major French companies. A close associate of the Republicans, he is now working for the Rassemblement National.

She can also rely on Gilbert Collard, also a lawyer, who had joined Reconquête. He defended the leaders of the Arche de Zoé association, who tried to kidnap several dozen children in Chad for adoption by French families.

One message for Africa…

The relations she has forged with past and present African potentates in no way prevent Marine Le Pen from playing the role of defender of Françafrique and the sovereignty of African countries, based on an ethno-differentialist ideology. This idea, developed by the New Right, is that each territory should be dedicated to one ethnic group, thus avoiding any mixing. This ideology is common to all rightist identity-based politics. It meets with the approval of certain ‘patriotic’ movements existing in West Africa or ‘neo-Panafricanists’, most of whom are in the pay of Putin.

…Another for the electorate

As for the discourse in France, the Rassemblement National’s African policy is approached primarily through the prism of immigration. Countries refusing to admit ‘undesirable nationals’ expelled from France would be penalised. Visas, money transfers and development aid would be abolished. The latter would in any case be reduced and should only benefit French companies. Marine Le Pen is obviously opposed to ‘repentance speeches’, as she defends the positive aspects of colonisation.

The policy of the Rassemblement National boils down to finding allies in Africa and discriminating against Africans in France.

P.S.

If you like this article or have found it useful, please consider donating towards the work of International Viewpoint. Simply follow this link: Donate then enter an amount of your choice. One-off donations are very welcome. But regular donations by standing order are also vital to our continuing functioning. See the last paragraph of this article for our bank account details and take out a standing order. Thanks.

Footnotes

[1The term “Françafrique” is used to refer to France’s sphere of influence in former French and Belgian colonies in sub-Saharan Africa. The CFA franc refers to two currencies, the West African CFA franc, used in eight West African countries, and the Central African CFA franc, used in six Central African countries.

[2Pour Jean-Marie Le Pen, l’apartheid était «au départ une volonté de promotion des deux communautés» – Libération (liberation.fr)

[3Un dirigeant africain évoque des valises pour Le Pen (lejdd.fr)

In Kenya, a whiff of revolution

Sunday 28 July 2024, by Paul Martial

For the past two months, Kenya has been shaken by severe turbulence. With a debt of more than 76 billion dollars, Kenya is under attack from the IMF, which has demanded far-reaching economic reforms that President Ruto hastened to implement. These include the introduction of multiple taxes on basic necessities. Measures considered by the international financial institution to have ‘medium risk’ social consequences. A serious mistake!

From #RejectFinanceBill2024…

The 2024 Finance Bill included taxes on products consumed by the middle and poor classes. Bread was taxed at a rate of 16%, as were mobile phone money transfers, which mainly affect people with a low level of bank penetration, and cars at a rate of 2.5%. Other products were targeted, such as cooking oil, sanitary towels and foreign exchange transactions.

These punitive taxes, as the Kenyans called them, were a serious blow to an already precarious social situation. Across the country, hundreds of thousands of young people took to the streets and even occupied Parliament, forcing MPs to flee underground.
Ruto’s government responded with a ferocious crackdown, leaving 41 people dead, dozens injured and hundreds abducted by the security forces. Some were found dead with signs of torture.

But the mobilisation was such that the Finance Bill 2024 was withdrawn, and the Director of Police was forced to resign. Finally, Ruto sacked his entire government.

… to #RutoMustGo

But there was no end in sight. The mobilisation against the tax increases turned into an anti-government mobilisation. There are several reasons for this development. Ruto was elected on a populist platform against the dynasties of the rich and by claiming to satisfy the people on the street like the ‘boda boda’, motorbike drivers, or the ‘mama mboga’, small grocery sellers. For those familiar with this politician’s background, everything pointed to demagoguery. Indeed, Ruto began his political career supporting the dictator Daniel Arap Moi by being in charge of ‘Youth for Kanu “92” (Kanu being the presidential party). It was on this occasion that he became rich. The rest of his political career has been one of broken promises and demagogic rhetoric. While he promised to defend the poor, his policies have been exactly the opposite.

His last card is to form a government of national unity with the aim of bringing together the country’s elites to save a corrupt system.

Young people are well aware that even if the Finance Bill 2024 is withdrawn, other equally anti-social measures will be imposed. In other words, there is nothing to expect from this government or any other politician to solve the country’s problems.
It’s not just a generation gap between these young people and the ruling elite. It is above all a political divide.

Generation Z in the fight

This mobilisation was structured through social networks. It had no structure or leaders, which was one of its strengths, as it prevented the authorities from cracking down on the leaders as they usually do. The strength of this movement was also its democracy: in the virtual discussion forums, everyone could put forward their own vision of how the mobilisation should be run.

As the struggle continues and the question of power is raised in concrete terms through the demand for Ruto’s resignation, alternative proposals must emerge. Left-wing organisations and activist networks in Kenya have an important role to play in linking up with the workers’ unions and proposing immediate measures to meet people’s aspirations. This is a decisive challenge for the coming weeks.

P.S.

If you like this article or have found it useful, please consider donating towards the work of International Viewpoint. Simply follow this link: Donate then enter an amount of your choice. One-off donations are very welcome. But regular donations by standing order are also vital to our continuing functioning. See the last paragraph of this article for our bank account details and take out a standing order. Thanks.