Showing posts sorted by relevance for query 2008 CRASH. Sort by date Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query 2008 CRASH. Sort by date Show all posts

Monday, June 09, 2025

 

The Fraudulence of Economic Theory


Ever since the economic crash in 2008, it has been clear that the foundation of standard or “neoclassical” economic theory — which extends the standard microeconomic theory into national economies (macroeconomics) — fails at the macroeconomic level, and therefore that in both the microeconomic and macroeconomic domains, economic theory, or the standard or “neoclassical” economic theory, is factually false. Nonetheless, the world’s economists did nothing to replace that theory — the standard theory of economics — and they continue on as before, as-if the disproof of a theory in economics does NOT mean that that false theory needs to be replaced. The profession of economics is, therefore, definitely NOT a scientific field; it is a field of philosophy instead.

On 2 November 2008, the New York Times Magazine headlined “Questions for James K. Galbraith: The Populist,” which was an “Interview by Deborah Solomon” of the prominent liberal economist and son of John Kenneth Galbraith. She asked him, “There are at least 15,000 professional economists in this country, and you’re saying only two or three of them foresaw the mortgage crisis” which had brought on the second Great Depression?

He answered: “Ten or twelve would be closer than two or three.”

She very appropriately followed up immediately with “What does this say about the field of economics, which claims to be a science?”

He didn’t answer by straight-out saying that economics isn’t any more of a science than physics was before Galileo, or than biology was before Darwin. He didn’t proceed to explain that the very idea of a Nobel Prize in Economics was based upon a lie which alleged that economics was the first field to become scientific within all of the “social sciences,” when, in fact, there weren’t yet any social sciences, none yet at all. But he came close to admitting these things, when he said: “It’s an enormous blot on the reputation of the profession. There are thousands of economists. Most of them teach. And most of them teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless.” His term “useless” was a euphemism for false. His term “blot” was a euphemism for “nullification.”

On 9 January 2009, economist Jeff Madrick headlined at The Daily Beast, “How the Entire Economics Profession Failed,” and he opened:

At the annual meeting of American Economists, most everyone refused to admit their failures to prepare or warn about the second worst crisis of the century.

I could find no shame in the halls of the San Francisco Hilton, the location at the annual meeting of American economists. Mainstream economists from major universities dominate the meetings, and some of them are the anointed cream of the crop, including former Clinton, Bush and even Reagan advisers.

There was no session on the schedule about how the vast majority of economists should deal with their failure to anticipate or even seriously warn about the possibility that the second worst economic crisis of the last hundred years was imminent.

I heard no calls to reform educational curricula because of a crisis so threatening and surprising that it undermines, at least if the academicians were honest, the key assumptions of the economic theory currently being taught. …

I found no one fundamentally changing his or her mind about the value of economics, economists, or their work.”

He observed a scandalous profession of quacks who are satisfied to remain quacks. The public possesses faith in them because it possesses faith in the “invisible hand” of God, and everyone is taught to believe in that from the crib. In no way is it science.

In a science, when facts prove that the theory is false, the theory gets replaced, it’s no longer taught. In a scholarly field, however, that’s not so — proven-false theory continues being taught. In economics, the proven-false theory continued being taught, and still continues today to be taught. This demonstrates that economics is still a religion or some other type of philosophy, not yet any sort of science.

Mankind is still coming out of the Dark Ages. The Bible is still being viewed as history, not as myth (which it is), not as some sort of religious or even political propaganda. It makes a difference — a huge difference: the difference between truth and falsehood.

The Dutch economist Dirk J. Bezemer, at Groningen University, posted on 16 June 2009 a soon-classic paper, “‘No One Saw This Coming’: Understanding Financial Crisis Through Accounting Models,” in which he surveyed the work of 12 economists who did see it (the economic collapse of 2008) coming; and he found there that they had all used accounting or “Flow of Funds” models, instead of the standard microeconomic theory. (In other words: they accounted for, instead of ignored, debts.) From 2005 through 2007, these accounting-based economists had published specific and accurate predictions of what would happen: Dean Baker, Wynne Godley, Fred Harrison, Michael Hudson, Eric Janszen, Stephen (“Steve”) Keen, Jakob B. Madsen, Jens K. Sorensen, Kurt Richebaecher, Nouriel Roubini, Peter Schiff, and Robert Shiller.

He should have added several others. Paul Krugman, wrote a NYT column on 12 August 2005 headlined “Safe as Houses” and he said “Houses aren’t safe at all” and that they would likely decline in price. On 25 August 2006, he bannered “Housing Gets Ugly” and concluded “It’s hard to see how we can avoid a serious slowdown.” Bezemer should also have included Merrill Lynch’s Chief North American Economist, David A. Rosenberg, whose The Market Economist article “Rosie’s Housing Call August 2004” on 6 August 2004 already concluded, “The housing sector has entered a ‘bubble’ phase,” and who presented a series of graphs showing it. Bezemer should also have included Satyajit Das, about whom TheStreet had headlined on 21 September 21 2007, “The Credit Crisis Could Be Just Beginning.” He should certainly have included Ann Pettifor, whose 2003 The Real World Economic Outlook, and her masterpiece the 2006 The Coming First World Debt Crisis, predicted exactly what happened and why. Her next book, the 2009 The Production of Money: How to Break the Power of Bankers, was almost a masterpiece, but it failed to present any alternative to the existing microeconomic theory — as if microeconomic theory isn’t a necessary part of economic theory. Another great economist he should have mentioned was Charles Hugh Smith, who had been accurately predicting since at least 2005 the sequence of events that culminated in the 2008 collapse. And Bezemer should especially have listed the BIS’s chief economist, William White, regarding whom Germany’s Spiegel headlined on 8 July 2009, “Global Banking Economist Warned of Coming Crisis.” (It is about but doesn’t mention nor link to https://www.bis.org/publ/work147.pdf.) White had been at war against the policies of America’s Fed chief Alan Greenspan ever since 1998, and especially since 2003, but the world’s aristocrats muzzled White’s view and promoted Greenspan’s instead. (The economics profession have always been propagandists for the super-rich.) Bezemer should also have listed Charles R. Morris, who in 2007 told his publisher Peter Osnos that the crash would start in Summer 2008, which was basically correct. Moreover, James K. Galbraith had written for years saying that a demand-led depression would result, such as in his American Prospect “How the Economists Got It Wrong,” 30 November 2002; and “Bankers Versus Base,” 15 April 2004, and culminating finally in his 2008 The Predator State, which blamed the aristocracy in the strongest possible terms for the maelstrom to come. Bezemer should also have listed Barry Ritholtz, who, in his “Recession Predictor,” on 18 August 2005, noted the optimistic view of establishment economists and then said, “I disagree … due to Psychology of consumers.” He noted “consumer debt, not as a percentage of GDP, but relative to net asset wealth,” and also declining “median personal income,” as pointing toward a crash from this mounting debt-overload. Then, on 31 May 2006, he headlined “Recent Housing Data: Charts & Analysis,” and opened: “It has long been our view that Real Estate is the prime driver of this economy, and its eventual cooling will be a major crimp in GDP, durable goods, and consumer spending.” Bezemer should also have listed both Paul Kasriel and Asha Bangalore at Northern Trust. Kasriel headlined on 22 May 2007, “US Economy May Wake Up Without Consumers’ Prodding?” and said it wouldn’t happen – and consumers were too much in debt. Then on 8 August 2007, he bannered: “US Economic Growth in Domestic Final Demand,” and said that “the housing recession is … spreading to other parts of the economy.” On 25 May 2006, Bangalore headlined “Housing Market Is Cooling Down, No Doubts About It.” and that was one of two Asha Bangalore articles which were central to Ritholtz’s 31 May 2006 article showing that all of the main indicators pointed to a plunge in house-prices that had started in March 2005; so, by May 2006, it was already clear from the relevant data, that a huge economic crash was comning soon. Another whom Bezemer should have listed was L. Randall Wray, whose 2005 Levy Economics Institute article, “The Ownership Society: Social Security Is Only the Beginning” asserted that it was being published “at the peak of what appears to be a real estate bubble.” Bezemer should also have listed Paul B. Farrell, columnist at marketwatch.com, who saw practically all the correct signs, in his 26 June 2005 “Global Megabubble? You Decide. Real Estate Is Only Tip of Iceberg; or Is It?”; and his 17 July 2005 “Best Strategies to Beat the Megabubble: Real Estate Bubble Could Trigger Global Economic Meltdown”; and his 9 January 2006 “Meltdown in 2006? Cast Your Vote”; and 15 May 2006 “Party Time (Until Real Estate Collapses)”; and his 21 August 2006 “Tipping Point Pops Bubble, Triggers Bear: Ten Warnings the Economy, Markets Have Pushed into Danger Zone”; and his 30 July 2007 “You Pick: Which of 20 Tipping Points Ignites Long Bear Market?” Farrell’s commentaries also highlighted the same reform-recommendations that most of the others did, such as Baker, Keen, Pettifor, Galbraith, Ritholtz, and Wray; such as break up the mega-banks, and stiffen regulation of financial institutions. However, the vast majority of academically respected economists disagreed with all of this and were wildly wrong in their predictions, and in their analyses. The Nobel Committee should have withdrawn their previous awards in economics to still-practicing economists (except to Krugman who did win a Nobel) and re-assigned them to these 25 economists, who showed that they had really deserved it.

And there was another: economicpredictions.org tracked four economists who predicted correctly the 2008 crash: Dean Baker, Nouriel Roubini, Peter Schiff, and Med Jones, the latter of whom had actually the best overall record regarding the predictions that were tracked there.

And still others should also be on the list: for example, Joe Weisenthal at Business Insider headlined on 21 November 2012, “The Genius Who Invented Economics Blogging Reveals How He Got Everything Right And What’s Coming Next” and he interviewed Bill McBride, who had started his calculated riskblog in January 2005. So I looked in the archives there at December 2005, and noticed December 28th, “Looking Forward: 2006 Top Economic Stories.” He started there with four trends that he expected everyone to think of, and then listed another five that weren’t so easy, including “Housing Slowdown. In my opinion, the Housing Bubble was the top economic story of 2005, but I expect the slowdown to be a form of Chinese water torture. Sales for both existing and new homes will probably fall next year from the records set in 2005. And median prices will probably increase slightly, with declines in the more ‘heated markets.’” McBride also had predicted that the economic rebound would start in 2009, and he was now, in 2012, predicting a strong 2013. Probably Joe Weisenthal was right in calling McBride a “Genius.”

And also, Mike Whitney at InformationClearinghouse.info and other sites, headlined on 20 November 2006, “Housing Bubble Smack-Down,” and he nailed the credit-boom and Fed easy-money policy as the cause of the housing bubble and the source of an imminent crash.

Furthermore, Ian Welsh headlined on 28 November 2007, “Looking Forward At the Consequences of This Bubble Bursting,” and listed 10 features of the crash to come, of which 7 actually happened.

In addition, Gail Tverberg, an actuary, headlined on 9 January 2008 “Peak Oil and the Financial Markets: A Forecast for 2008,” and provided the most detailed of all the prescient descriptions of the collapse that would happen that year.

Furthermore, Gary Shilling’s January 2007 Insight newsletter listed “12 investment themes” which described perfectly what subsequently happened, starting with “The housing bubble has burst.”

And the individual investing blogger Jesse Colombo started noticing the housing bubble even as early as 6 September 2004, blogging at his stock-market-crash.net “The Housing Bubble” and documenting that it would happen (“Here is the evidence that we are in a massive housing bubble:”) and what the economic impact was going to be. Then on 7 February 2006 he headlined “The Coming Crash!” and said “Based on today’s overvalued housing prices, a 20 percent crash is certainly in the cards.”

Also: Stephanie Pomboy of MacroMavens issued an analysis and appropriate graphs on 7 December 2007, headlined “When Animals Attack” and predicting imminently a huge economic crash.

In alphabetical order, they are: Dean Baker, Asha Bangalore, Jesse Colombo, Satyajit Das, Paul B. Farrell, James K. Galbraith, Wynne Godley, Fred Harrison, Michael Hudson, Eric Janszen, Med Jones, Paul Kasriel, Steve Keen, Paul Krugman, Jakob B. Madsen, Bill McBride, Charles R. Morris, Ann Pettifor, Stehanie Pomboy, Kurt Richebaeker, Barry Ritholtz, David A. Rosenberg, Nouriel Roubini, Peter Schiff, Robert Shiller, Gary Shilling, Charles Hugh Smith, Jens K. Sorensen, Gail Tverberg, Ian Welsh, William White, Mike Whitney, L. Randall Wray.

Thus, at least 33 economists were contenders as having been worth their salt as economic professionals. One can say that only 33 economists predicted the 2008 collapse, or that only 33 economists predicted accurately or reasonably accurately the collapse. However, some of those 33 were’t actually professional economists. So, some of the world’s 33 best economists aren’t even professional economists, as accepted in that rotten profession.

So, the few honest and open-eyed economists (these 33, at least) tried to warn the world. Did the economics profession honor them for their having foretold the 2008 collapse? Did President Barack Obama hire them, and fire the incompetents he had previously hired for his Council of Economic Advisers? Did the Nobel Committee acknowledge that it had given Nobel Economics Prizes to the wrong people, including people such as the conservative Milton Friedman whose works were instrumental in causing the 2008 crash? Also complicit in causing the 2008 crash was the multiple-award-winning liberal economist Lawrence Summers, who largely agreed with Friedman but was nonetheless called a liberal. Evidently, the world was too corrupt for any of these 33 to reach such heights of power or of authority. Like Galbraith had said at the close of his 2002 “How the Economists Got It Wrong“: “Being right doesn’t count for much in this club.” If anything, being right means being excluded from such posts. In an authentically scientific field, the performance of one’s predictions (their accuracy) is the chief (if not SOLE) determinant of one’s reputation and honor amongst the profession, but that’s actually not the way things yet are in any of the social “sciences,” including economics; they’re all just witch-doctory, not yet real science. The fraudulence of these fields is just ghastly. In fact, as Steve Keen scandalously noted in Chapter 7 of his 2001 Debunking Economics: “As this book shows, economics [theory] is replete with logical inconsistencies.” In any science, illogic is the surest sign of non-science, but it is common and accepted in the social ‘sciences’, including economics. The economics profession itself is garbage, a bad joke, instead of any science at all.

These 33 were actually only candidates for being scientific economists, but I have found the predictions of some of them to have been very wrong on some subsequent matters of economic performance. For example, the best-known of the 33, Paul Krugman, is a “military Keynesian” — a liberal neoconservative (and military Keynesianism is empirically VERY discredited: false worldwide, and false even in the country that champions it, the U.S.) — and he is unfavorable toward the poor, and favorable toward the rich; so, he is acceptable to the Establishment.) Perhaps a few of these 33 economists (perhaps half of whom aren’t even members of the economics profession) ARE scientific (in their underlying economic beliefs — their operating economic theory) if a scientific economics means that it’s based upon a scientific theory of economics — a theory that is derived not from any opinions but only from the relevant empirical data. Although virtually all of the 33 are basically some sort of Keynesian, even that (Keynes’s theory) isn’t a full-fledged theory of economics (it has many vagaries, and it has no microeconomics). The economics profession is still a field of philosophy, instead of a field of science.

The last chapter of my America’s Empire of Evil presents what I believe to be the first-ever scientific theory of economics, a theory that replaces all of microeconomic theory (including a micro that’s integrated with its macro) and is consistent with Keynes in macroeconomic theory; and all of which theory is derived and documented from only the relevant empirical economic data — NOT from anyone’s opinions. The economics profession think that replacing existing economic theory isn’t necessary after the crash of 2008, but I think it clearly IS necessary (because — as that chapter of my book shows — all of the relevant empirical economic data CONTRADICT the existing economic theory, ESPECIALLY the existing microeconomic theory).

Eric Zuesse is an investigative historian. His new book, America's Empire of Evil: Hitler’s Posthumous Victory, and Why the Social Sciences Need to Change, is about how America took over the world after World War II in order to enslave it to U.S.-and-allied billionaires. Their cartels extract the world’s wealth by control of not only their ‘news’ media but the social ‘sciences’ — duping the public. Read other articles by Eric.

Monday, September 11, 2023

How it went down: Three accounts of the Lehman bankruptcy


By AFP
Published September 10, 2023

The defunct Lehman Brothers company sign is sold at Christie's auction house in London -
 Copyright AFP Ben STANSALL


Elodie MAZEIN

A key catalyst for the 2008 global financial crisis, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers still reverberates for those who lived through it. Here are the accounts of three who were there.

– Paolo Battaglia, neophyte banker –

After interning in the summer of 2007, the young Italian felt mainly excitement in July 2008 at landing a job in Lehman’s private equity division in London.

“It was the start of a new adventure, my first job out of school,” Battaglia recalled. “At the time, Lehman was a prestigious and rewarding place to work.”

“Of course, I was aware it was not an easy moment for the industry and for Lehman in particular, but until the very last day, nobody expected Chapter 11 as a realistic outcome,” he said, referring to bankruptcy protection proceedings.

When it became clear Lehman would not survive as a stand-alone entity, the thinking was that it would be acquired by another heavyweight such as Bank of America or Barclays.

But on Monday, September 15, 2008, Battaglia and other employees arrived at the office to find bankruptcy administrator PWC distributing leaflets in the lobby, “basically instructing employees not to enter into any transactions anymore,” he recalled.

Everything changed overnight.

“It was a surprise that things stopped so abruptly,” said Battaglia who considered himself lucky to have worked in a division that was more shielded from the layoffs.

He worked through mid-2010 for a fund that was bought by Lehman colleagues before moving to Goldman Sachs, where he still works.

“I got the best I could have in a very unfortunate situation. The options were very limited.”

“I am sure events were thoroughly scrutinized and if nobody was charged it was because there was no crime,” he said. “We tend to associate bankruptcies with crime but it was just another business venture going bad.”

Battaglia views the recent crises hitting Credit Suisse and a slew of US regional banks as completely different, saying, “there are much more policy tools and experienced knowledge of regulators and markets to manage this kind of situation than 15 years ago.”

– William Dudley, troubled regulator –

William Dudley had a full schedule on the weekend before Lehman Brothers’ Monday morning bankruptcy — first a conference at Princeton University, then the wedding of a friend attended by associates in finance.

Dudley, who was vice president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York at the time, went ahead with these events.

“You can’t really start cancelling things because that makes people even more nervous about what’s going on,” he said. “It was very strange going to the wedding and acting like nothing much is going on.”

Dudley had spent the early part of Saturday morning working on a plan to save Lehman.

“In reality, the story for me begins a bit earlier because Dick Fuld was on the board of directors of the Federal Reserve of New York so I had some interactions with him through 2007 and 2008,” Dudley said of Fuld, who led Lehman from 1994 until its demise in 2008.

“I was quite concerned that (Fuld) was in denial about the risks that the economy was facing, the financial system in general and Lehman Brothers in particular.”

Dudley shared his views with colleagues in the summer of 2008, but “my memo landed with a resounding silence,” Dudley said.

When Lehman filed for bankruptcy protection, the initial reaction “was not that bad,” Dudley recalled.

But the situation quickly shifted into a contagion as investors rushed to withdraw funds and cover their exposure.

Could Lehman have been saved?

“Right behind Lehman, there were other (groups) in trouble like AIG,” said Dudley.

“Maybe I should have been more forceful,” he said. “But it might have been too late already.”

But recent bank troubles have been more visible compared with 2008, Dudley said. “You actually knew why the firms were getting into difficulties.”

– Oliver Budde, whistleblower –

Oliver Budde resigned from Lehman Brothers in 2006, troubled by company practices. But the attorney was back at Lehman on the fateful morning when the firm filed for bankruptcy protection.

“I was actually at the building on the Monday morning when pandemonium broke out, when everyone started walking out with their stuff,” he recalled.

There was “a lot of sadness, a ‘can’t believe this is happening’ sort of shock,” he said.

In the early afternoon, Budde spotted Fuld “sneaking out the back way and leaving in his black Mercedes limousine with his own driver.

“I took a picture,” he said. “It’s a souvenir for me.”

Budde, who was living in Vermont at the time, spent the evening commiserating with former colleagues.

“I had seen that these men were not to be trusted,” he said. “In one sense, I was vindicated by Lehman’s bankruptcy.”

Budde had left his job as vice president and assistant general counsel in 2006, troubled by what he saw as tricks that top executives used to inflate their compensation and not disclose it to investors.

The firm made no changes even after regulators revamped the rules in 2008 to improve transparency.

“It was still hidden,” he said. “It was outrageous to me. So that’s when I became a whistleblower.”

Between April and September of 2008, Budde sent five emails to US authorities, while copying Lehman’s board and legal staff.

“No one ever contacted me, even afterward,” Budde said.

“I’m quite proud of my actions. I did the right thing by reporting my concerns to the authorities.”

Lehman could have been saved through a managed sale to Barclays, but the British firm “got a much better price” for major Lehman assets it acquired during the bankruptcy proceeding.

The worst market crashes



By AFP
September 11, 2023


The global pandemic caused stock markets around the world to crash in 2020 - Copyright AFP/File TIMOTHY A. CLARY

Fifteen years ago, on September 15, 2008, the Lehman Brothers investment bank went bankrupt, a victim of the global financial crisis during which stock markets crashed.

Below is a reminder of the other major crashes in history:

– 1637: Tulip mania –

The first speculative bubble of modern history involves exotic tulips. Prices for coveted varieties of the flower soar in the Netherlands at the beginning of the 17th century before the bubble bursts in 1637.

The blooms lost nine-tenths of their previous value.

– 1720: South Sea Bubble –

In early 18th century England, people are falling over each other to buy shares in the South Sea Company, set up to trade in slaves with South America and restructure the public debt.

When the shares crash, many investors are ruined.

– 1882: French crash –

The French economy suffers its worst crisis of the 19th century following the collapse in January 1882 of the share price of Union Generale bank which causes the Paris and Lyon stock exchanges to crash.

– 1929: Wall Street collapse –

October 24, 1929 becomes known as “Black Thursday” on Wall Street after a bull market implodes, causing the Dow Jones to lose more than 22 percent of its value at the start of trade.


Wall Street: — © Digital Journal

Stocks recoup most lost ground during the day but the rot has set in: October 28 and 29 also see huge losses in a crisis that marks the beginning of the Great Depression in the United States and a global economic crisis.

– 1987: Black Monday –

Wall Street crashes again on October 19, 1987, on the back of large US trade and budget deficits and interest rates hikes.

The Dow Jones index loses 22.6 percent, causing panic on markets worldwide.

– 1998: Russian crash –

In August 1998, the ruble collapses due to speculation linked to falling oil prices and the ripple effect of the 1997 Asian economic crisis.

Moscow declares a 90-day moratorium on the payment of its foreign debt and cannot borrow again on international markets for over a decade.

– 2000: Dot.com bubble –

The start of the millennium sees the deflation of the tech bubble caused by venture capitalists throwing money at unproven companies.

From a record 5,048.62 points on March 10, 2000, the US tech-heavy Nasdaq index loses 39.3 percent in value over the year.

Many internet startups go out of business.

– 2008: Subprime crisis –

The 2008 global financial crisis is caused by bankers in the United States giving subprime mortgages to people on shaky financial footing and then selling them off as investments, fuelling a housing boom.

When borrowers become unable to pay their mortgages, the stock market crashes and the banking system buckles, culminating with the dramatic bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.

Millions of people lose their homes.

– 2015: Chinese boom-bust –

The popping of a Chinese stock market bubble in the summer of 2015 causes the benchmark Shanghai index to plummet by over 40 percent over several weeks, despite government intervention to try to stop the crash.

– 2020: Pandemic –

Global stocks crash in March 2020 after the World Health Organization declares Covid-19 a pandemic that will put much of the world under lockdown.

The Dow Jones loses 26 percent in four days, one of its biggest-ever drops.

But the rapid response by national governments, which dig deep to keep their economies afloat, helps most markets rebound within months.




US judge says 2008 bank fraudsters got off easy


By AFP
September 11, 2023

Judge Jed Rakoff says the US government failed to impose meaningful punishments on senior bankers involved in the 2008 financial crisis 
- Copyright AFP TIMOTHY A. CLARY

John BIERS

US officials took a victory lap last month to commemorate their response to the 2008 financial crisis, pointing to $36 billion in fines as proof that banks have been held accountable.

But to US District Judge Jed Rakoff, who has criticized the Department of Justice (DoJ) for not criminally prosecuting senior bankers, such fines amount to an “easy cop-out” failing to achieve justice or discourage future chicanery.

“I don’t think it has a meaningful deterrent effect,” Rakoff told AFP as he reflected on the government’s enforcement record 15 years after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy.

“For the company, it’s a cost of doing business,” Rakoff said.

Rakoff bases this assessment in part on his 15 years in corporate law before being named to the bench.

The corporate defendants Rakoff represented made a “huge distinction” between financial penalties and prison time, seeking to avoid the latter at all costs because they’d “heard how terrible (prison) is,” he recounted.

“And so it follows from that, if you are fairly confident that, even if you don’t get away with it, the worst that will happen is your company will pay a lot of money, then you’re much more ready to go and do it,” said Rakoff.

He added that he wasn’t familiar enough with the details to comment on the bank failures earlier this spring that spurred emergency actions by the Federal Reserve and other regulators.

“To me, it’s a matter of simple morality,” Rakoff said. “Companies do not commit crimes in the moral, intentional sense. It’s individuals within the companies who make the decisions that ‘we’re going to do the wrong thing here, because it’s going to make our company a lot of money.’

“And those are the moral failings that need to be punished.”

Consistently going soft on corporate criminals puts at risk the reputation that US markets “are among the most honest in the world and the most reliable,” Rakoff said.

“And when you have fraud that goes unprosecuted over time, it tends to undercut that confidence. And that is a serious, I think, problem for the United States.”

– Speaking out –

Appointed to the US District Court for the Southern District of New York by former President Bill Clinton in 1996, Rakoff is known for publicly taking on major judicial dilemmas more than colleagues.

He garnered attention in 2002 when he issued a ruling that found the death penalty unconstitutional, a decision that was quickly overturned on appeal.

Rakoff emerged as a critic of the government’s enforcement approach to the 2008 crisis, blocking a $33 million Securities and Exchange Commission settlement with the Bank of America.

In a scathing ruling, Rakoff in September 2009 dismissed the case as a “contrivance designed to provide the SEC with the facade of enforcement, and the management of the bank with a quick resolution of an embarrassing inquiry.”

While Rakoff later approved a modified settlement, citing the need for judicial restraint, he won praise as a rare check on Wall Street at a time of public rage against Big Finance.

After consulting court officers, Rakoff in 2014 began publishing essays questioning the enforcement response to the financial crisis, and in 2020 he authored a book critiquing the US justice system and addressing issues such as mass incarceration.

The DoJ last month announced that Swiss-based investment bank UBS would pay $1.4 billion to settle US charges that it defrauded investors in the sale of mortgage-backed securities.

The DoJ’s original complaint quoted a UBS mortgage official as referring to a pool of loans as “a bag of sh[*]t,” and another employee as calling a group of loans “quite possibly better than little beside leprosy spores.”

The UBS case marked the final major settlement under a DoJ-led working group established in 2012. The DoJ cited $36 billion in civil penalties as bringing accountability to “those who break the law and undermine the well-being of American families,” said an agency press release.

But Rakoff, a former federal prosecutor, likened such fines to a slap on the wrist — a retreat from the prosecutions in the early 2000s of top executives from Enron, Worldcom and other companies.

Limited resources explain some of the change, with DoJ focusing more on terrorism cases after the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks, Rakoff said.

A bigger issue is a shift in strategy. Prosecuting CEOs involves a painstaking process that typically requires charging people lower in the company and getting them to cooperate to catch a big fish.

“But those are hard cases to make,” Rakoff said. “They take a long time and sometimes you won’t be able to prove it in the end.”

By contrast, it may take six months to get a settlement, and “you can have a big splash in the papers: ‘Today Bank X pled guilty to a criminal offense and paid $5 billion.'

Monday, January 21, 2008

What Goes Up...

Must come down. And of course its not a recession...pleads the powers that be...it's a correction.......or maybe it's just fortunes fate (being lady luck and her magick number seven).....actually it's worse than either a correction or recession it's pending stagflation.

Toronto Stock market takes biggest one-day plunge in seven years

TSX suffers worst week in seven years

Stock markets sustain even more losses Friday

Where to find a foothold amid downward spiral

Stock markets crash, Sensex tanks 1440 pts
Hindu, India -
Mumbai (PTI): The stock markets went into a downward spiral at mid-session on Monday, with across the board selling pressure that shaved off 1440 points ...

MARKETS CRASH ACROSS EUROPE Experts Warn of Stock Market Hysteria
Spiegel Online, Germany -
The trigger for the market crash was the news from WestLB on Monday morning. Over the weekend, the bank had to admit to a billion-euro capital requirement ...
World Stock Markets Crash
Arab News, Saudi Arabia -
DUBAI/LONDON, 22 January 2008 — Global stock markets plunged yesterday, with Tokyo tumbling to its lowest level in more than two years as US President ...
US Stock Markets Crash and Burn Whilst The Fed Fiddles
US Stock Markets - Near Term Bottom or Waterfall Crash?

Hauntingly Familiar
Here we are once again, suddenly embroiled amid a frenzy of financial crisis, and looming bail-out interventions.

The jury is still out as to whether or not this crisis will turn out to be “the big one” that will take down the entire house of cards.

Inevitably, the day will come when no form of economic stimulus or monetary policy interventions will be sufficient enough to provide remedy to the decades of sub-standard stewardship rendered by our elected officials.

Until such a day of reckoning arrives, we can not discount the possibility that the present cast of self-perceived masters-of-the-universe and their monopoly stronghold, which is rapidly fracturing, will prevail once again.


The 3 Forces Behind a Market Crash
Back in 1934, Benjamin Graham, the creator of securities analysis, wrote that there are three forces behind a market crash.
  1. The manipulation of stocks.
  2. The lending of money to buy stocks.
  3. Excessive optimism.

Let's assess the level of each factor today.

This article was originally published on Feb. 15, 2007. It has been updated.
Post-mortem: Why did the markets crash?

So, what caused this bloodbath? While the first prognosis of the crisis was that fears of recession in the US brought in the market crash in India, some experts hinted that the markets might be entering a phase of consolidation.

Experts point out that the market movements are based on internal, technical parameters. "The current movements have been caused by margin pressure and heavy selling by the FIIs in the face of bad global clues," market analyst Ashwini Gujaral says.

The global cues were very weak over the weekend. The European markets declined quite heavily on Friday, while the US indices underwent a milder fall. Asian markets were down heavily on Monday morning and there was enough indication that another global sell-off was under way.


SEE:

Black Gold

U.S. Economy Entering Twilight Zone



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Tuesday, October 28, 2008

STFU 'W'



If I was generous I would say that poor George W. spent the last year as the American economy tanked, viewing the pending crash through rose coloured blinders. As you have read here for the past two years I have predicted the pending crash that brought the market tumbling down last month. It was simple to read in the tea leaves of market excess, or market 'exuberance' as Greenspan called it. But for George W. it was all about denial. The market fundamentals were strong he asserted right up to a few weeks ago. America he had claimed for months is NOT in a recession, denying the obvious. In January oil began its upward spiral, and America was in its third month of downaward spiral. America was in a recession everyone knew it, only George continued to deny it.


Like WMD, which he beleived existed in Iraq, he also believed there was no recsssion, and hence no problem with the market, despite the year of declining housing prices and the ensuing subprime crash.


So it should come as no surprise that the guy who lied to the American people about WMD, could easily lie to himself, and hence the American people, about there being no recession.


Unlike the first U.S. President named George who created the myth of the Honest Presidency, with the allegorical fiction about the cherry tree, this President George has put to bed that myth. While the first George confessed to chooping down the tree this George denies there was a tree.


And so he should not be surprised that over the past three weeks every time he has assured Americans that they need not panic about a market crash, the market responds by crashing further.


It's poetic justice.


Everyone now accepts that W is either a compulsive liar, or a self-deluded fool. What a condemnation the market makes everytime W opens his mouth.


Someone should tell the lame duck to sit down and shut up.



President Bush Speaks on Ailing Economy
Friday Address Marks 10th Time Bush Has Recently Spoken About Volatile Markets
Oct. 10, 2008



President Bush tried to reassure the nation today that the economy is strong enough to weather the current crisis, but by the time Bush stopped speaking nine minutes later, the market had dropped another 107 points.


Following the previous nine times the president specifically addressed the economic crisis, the market ended the day on an upturn on five occasions and closed down the other four.

What the G-7 Should Be Doing To Fix the Financial Crisis

TIME - 10 Oct 2008

Global stock markets were sending an unmistakable signal too: panic. The Dow Jones industrial average finished its worst week ever, off about 22%. On Friday, the market swung wildly, dropping 500 points on three occasions, then vaulting into positive territory before coughing up its gains in the last half-hour of trading to finish the day down 128 at 8,451. The NASDAQ managed a small gain. But European and Asian markets were pummeled again.



DOW PLUNGES 733 POINTS ; Worst Decline Since 1987
Thursday, October 16, 2008
When President Bush speaks, many listen - but apparently investors haven't been reassured by his many speaches about the market meltdown this month.



SEE:



No Austrians In Foxholes



CRASH



Black Gold



The Return Of Hawley—Smoot



What Goes Up...



Wall Street Mantra



Bank Run



U.S. Economy Entering Twilight Zone



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Thursday, March 31, 2022

Wall Street bonuses soar by 20%, nearly 5 times the increase in US average weekly earnings

Due to Washington inaction, millions of essential workers continue to earn poverty wages, while the reckless bonus culture is alive and well on Wall Street.


SOURCEInequality.org

While inflation has wiped away wage gains for most U.S. workers, just-released data reveal that Wall Street employees are enjoying their biggest bonus bonanza since the 2008 crash.

Institute for Policy Studies analysis of new New York State Comptroller bonus data:

The Inflation Divide

  • The average annual bonus for New York City-based securities industry employees rose 20 percent to $257,500 in 2021, far above the 7 percent annual inflation rate. By contrast, typical American workers lost earnings power in 2021. Average weekly earnings for all U.S. private sector employees rose by only 2 percent between January 2021 and January 2022, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Unlike hourly wage data, average weekly earnings reflect the fact that many Americans had to cut back on work hours last year, largely due to Covid-related illness, lack of child care, and other family care pressures. The average weekly hours worked by U.S. private sector employees dropped from 35.0 to 34.5 between 2020 and 2021.

Return to Pre-Financial Crash Bonus Levels

The average Wall Street bonus of $257,500 in 2021 was far higher than any year since the 2008 financial crash. The second-highest was the 2017 average bonus of $209,046, adjusted for inflation. These bonuses come on top of base salaries, which averaged $254,000 in 2020.

Wall Street pay v. the minimum wage

  • Since 1985, the average Wall Street bonus has increased 1,743 percent, from $13,970 to $257,500 in 2021 (not adjusted for inflation). If the minimum wage had increased at that rate, it would be worth $61.75 today, instead of $7.25.
  • The total bonus pool for 180,000 New York City-based Wall Street employees in 2021 was $45 billion — enough to pay for more than 1 million jobs paying $15 per hour for a year.

Wall Street bonuses and gender and racial inequality

The rapid increase in Wall Street bonuses over the past several decades has contributed to gender and racial inequality, since workers at the low end of the wage scale are disproportionately people of color and women, while the lucrative financial industry is overwhelmingly white and male, particularly at the upper echelons.

  • The share of the five largest U.S. investment banks’ senior executives and top managers who are male: JPMorgan Chase: 74%, Goldman Sachs: 75%, Bank of America: 64%, Morgan Stanley: 74%, and Citigroup: 64%.
  • In 2021, the leadership of the largest Wall Street banks became slightly more diverse when Jane Fraser, a white woman, became the first female leader of a top-tier U.S. investment bank. The CEOs of the other four banks in that tier are all white males.

Nationwide, men make up 62 percent of all securities industry employees but just a tiny fraction of workers who provide care services that are in high demand but continue to be very low paid. Men make up just 5.4 percent of childcare workers, an occupation that pays $26,790 per year, on average. Men make up just 13 percent of home health aides, who average $27,080 per year.

  • At the five largest U.S. investment banks, the share of executives and top managers who are Black: JPMorgan Chase: 5%, Goldman Sachs: 3%, Bank of America: 5%, Morgan Stanley: 3%, and Citigroup: 4%.
  • Nationally, Black workers hold just 7.2 percent of lucrative securities industry jobs but 27.4 percent of home care and 16.3 percent of child care jobs.

These jaw-dropping numbers are just the latest evidence of unequal sacrifice under the pandemic. While ordinary workers are struggling with rising costs for basic essentials, Wall Street bankers have seen their bonuses rise further into the stratosphere.

Actions to crack down on runaway Wall Street pay are long overdue. Since 2010, the year the Dodd-Frank financial reform became law, regulators have failed to implement that law’s Wall Street pay restrictions. Meanwhile, Congress has failed to raise the minimum wage.

“These two failures speak volumes about who has influence in Washington — and who does not,” Anderson said.

Powerful Wall Street lobbyists have succeeded in blocking Section 956 of the Dodd-Frank legislation, which prohibits large financial institutions from awarding pay packages that encourage “inappropriate risks.” Regulators were supposed to implement this new rule within nine months of the law’s passage but have dragged their feet — despite widespread recognition that these bonuses encouraged the high-risk behaviors that led to the 2008 financial crisis, costing millions of Americans their homes and livelihoods.

In contrast to the Wall Street lobbyists, advocates for the working poor have seen their efforts to raise the federal minimum wage and secure other important worker benefits stalled in Congress. Due to Washington inaction, millions of essential workers continue to earn poverty wages, while the reckless bonus culture is alive and well on Wall Street



‘Jaw-dropping’: Wall Street bonuses have soared 1,743% since 1985

A new analysis finds that if the federal minimum wage had increased at the same rate, it would currently be $61.75 an hour.


SOURCECommon Dreams

Wall Street bonuses

A new analysis out Wednesday estimates that if the federal minimum wage had grown at the same rate as Wall Street bonuses over the past three and a half decades, it would currently be $61.75 an hour instead of $7.25.

According to fresh data from the New York State Comptroller, the average bonus dished out to Wall Street employees jumped 20% to a record $257,500 in 2021 as big banks reported huge profits despite widespread havoc caused by the coronavirus pandemic. Last year’s average Wall Street bonus was the highest since 2006, prior to the Great Recession.

The comptroller’s office points out that while the securities industry comprises just 5% of private-sector employment in New York City, it makes up one-fifth of total private-sector wages.

Taking the new figures into account, Sarah Anderson of the Institute for Policy Studies notes in a report that the average Wall Street bonus has soared by 1,743% since 1985.

“By contrast, typical American workers lost earnings power in 2021,” Anderson writes, noting that high inflation has eroded the modest wage gains seen by ordinary people. “Average weekly earnings for all U.S. private-sector employees rose by only 2% between January 2021 and January 2022, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics.”

“These jaw-dropping numbers are just the latest evidence of unequal sacrifice under the pandemic,” Anderson adds. “While ordinary workers are struggling with rising costs for basic essentials, Wall Street bankers have seen their bonuses rise further into the stratosphere.”

Anderson argues that Wall Street bonuses have been soaring in recent years partly because Section 956 of the Dodd-Frank Act—a financial reform measure enacted in the wake of the 2008 crash—has never been implemented.

“Powerful Wall Street lobbyists have succeeded in blocking Section 956… which prohibits large financial institutions from awarding pay packages that encourage ‘inappropriate risks,'” Anderson writes. “Regulators were supposed to implement this new rule within nine months of the law’s passage but have dragged their feet—despite widespread recognition that these bonuses encouraged the high-risk behaviors that led to the 2008 financial crisis, costing millions of Americans their homes and livelihoods.”

“In contrast to the Wall Street lobbyists, advocates for the working poor have seen their efforts to raise the federal minimum wage and secure other important worker benefits stalled in Congress,” she continues. “Due to Washington inaction, millions of essential workers continue to earn poverty wages, while the reckless bonus culture is alive and well on Wall Street.”