Showing posts sorted by relevance for query CHINA IMPERIALISM. Sort by date Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query CHINA IMPERIALISM. Sort by date Show all posts

Saturday, November 20, 2021

IMPERIALISM IS STATE CAPITALISM
Report shows China's growing clout at World Bank, global institutions



FILE PHOTO: The Chinese national flag is seen in Beijing, China

Andrea Shalal
Thu, November 18, 2021

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - With over $66 billion in total capital, China has passed Japan to become the second largest contributor to the system of development banks that provide some $200 billion in subsidized loans to poor countries each year, a new report said Thursday.

While China still receives loans and other aid from multilateral institutions like the World Bank and U.N. agencies, it has also emerged as one of the most powerful donors, according to the Center for Global Development.

It said that China, the world's second largest economy after the United States, is the fifth largest overall donor across the range of United Nations agencies focused on development, including the U.N. Development Program, World Food Program, and World Health Organization.

Beijing's role as a major donor, shareholder, aid recipient, and commercial partner of international institutions gives it "uniquely influential position," the think tank said, citing a detailed look at China's role at 76 global institutions.

"There’s been a lot of attention to China’s Belt and Road lending to developing countries, but a lot less on its growing footprint at global institutions like the World Bank," said Scott Morris, a senior fellow at the center.

China's expanding role at these institutions - and its role as the world's largest creditor - has raised concerns in the United States and elsewhere in recent years, but Morris cautioned against viewing its role at the banks as a threat.

"This isn't necessarily a cause for alarm," Morris said. "It’s better for everyone to have China working inside the system instead of outside of it."

Some of the increase has been driven by automatic contributions based on the size of China's growing economy. But Beijing has also scaled up its voluntary donations, including at the World Bank’s low-income lending arm, the International Development Association, where it is now the 6th largest donor.

(Reporting by Andrea Shalal; Editing by Mark Heinrich)






China’s State Capitalist Imperialism


In the first of a two-part article Per-Åke Westerlund looks at the rise of Chinese imperialism and what it means for building international workers’ solidarity against international capitalism.

Per-Åke Westerlund, ISA International Executive

China becoming the workshop of the world was the main driver of capitalist globalisation of the last decades. Multinational companies, particularly from the US, earned super profits and couldn’t care less about the dictatorship and conditions for workers in China. This was a win-win process for the ruling classes in both states — economic growth and low inflation assisted in hiding and softening the building up of contradictions.

This process could not go on forever and started to reverse. With similarities to German imperialism versus the British Empire up to WW1, US imperialism today is challenged by Beijing across all fields — economy, technology, finance, military and international relations. Imperialism “give[s] rise to a number of very acute, intense antagonisms, frictions and conflicts”, Lenin explained, and in his time this eventually led to war. Today, we have a Cold War.

Long-term imperialist confrontation

The record of US imperialism is crystal clear. Washington has never hesitated to use war and force to sustain its power. It is the mightiest military power the world has ever seen. The challenger, Chinese imperialism, is a brutal dictatorship against working people and any opposition. These two forces are now positioned for a long-term global imperialist confrontation. The Cold War will vary in intensity, contain new twists and alliances, but will not go away. This happens parallel with an escalating armaments race, record increases in military expenditure and arms exports.

Socialists and the working class must have an independent, revolutionary socialist position and organize struggle against all imperialist forces. No imperialist power, let alone military forces, will ever “liberate” the oppressed. US capitalist politicians that now suddenly condemn the dictatorship in China have turned a blind eye to it for decades — and still do the same to dictatorial regimes such as in Saudi Arabia. Neither can the fight against US imperialism in any way justify support for the regime in Beijing. However, there are certain “left” groups that supported US bombings in Libya in 2011 and others that label criticism of the Chinese dictatorship as supporting US imperialism.

There is no doubt who benefits from the regime in China today. It is an extremely unequal society with 878 dollar billionaires, an increase of 257 in 2020 and far more than the 649 billionaires in the US. In the same process, education, healthcare and housing are largely privatized and workers have no rights in the workplaces. Land grabbing by the authorities and environmental scandals and problems are frequent.

Real socialists are defined by supporting workers’ struggles everywhere. Workers in China fighting for their rights meet severe repression from the regime, including abductions, torture and prison. The state machine of oppression is enormous — millions are employed in the police, military, intelligence agencies and the enormous surveillance apparatus. This system works in cooperation with private and state Chinese companies — but also US and Western companies in the country. Capitalists and governments internationally fear revolutionary movements in whatever country — they sometimes hypocritically give support in order to derail these struggles and hug them to death.

International Socialist Alternative stands for solidarity and support to workers’ struggle in China, Hong Kong and internationally. Any struggle on working conditions, jobs, wages, the environment, education and other important fields immediately becomes a struggle against the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) dictatorship in Beijing. Eventually brutal state repression will be used also against local grievances or protests. Therefore, democratic demands — the right to protest, to organize trade unions, freedom of the internet and media — are central in any struggle in China and Hong Kong, and intimately linked to the fight for improved living conditions and environment. Democratic demands become revolutionary since they are a threat to the regime and can only be achieved by revolutionary mass struggle of the working class.

Socialists must be prepared for the confrontation between US imperialism and Chinese imperialism. Real working class internationalism means solidarity and struggle against the global capitalist and imperialist system, for workers and the oppressed to take power.

What is imperialism?


The classic Marxist analysis is Lenin’s Imperialism, the Highest stage of Capitalism, written in 1916. In order to understand and explain the new phase, he analyses global capitalism, not only one or two countries, and the processes over a longer period. This is what Marxists today call perspectives. Imperialism develops with concentration of capital. Growing giant companies become monopolies, “a general and fundamental law of the present stage of development of capitalism”. Linking up with and controlled by banks, this means finance capital comes to power. It is capitalism in decay and parasitic: “the bulk of the profits go to the ‘geniuses’ of financial manipulation”. There is no longer any “border” between speculative and productive capital.

All the features of imperialism described by Lenin have existed for decades in China. The economy is producing for a mass market, in China and globally, but appropriation of profits is private, to both foreign and Chinese capitalists. A few monopolies dominate in all spheres of the economy — finance, energy, internet etc., and in China with state-capitalist characteristics. Lenin in Imperialism stressed how the major companies in Germany and elsewhere had a “personal link-up” to banks and to the government. This was also the case with confiscation and speculation in land, an issue that has led to many protests in China.

Private companies and powerful capitalists in China are working hand-in-hand with the CCP state dictatorship. Top billionaires are members of the CCP and government ministers, generals and party leaders are richer than any other governments globally. Lenin’s concept of “Plutocracy and Bureaucracy” — the super-rich and the state — has reached perfection in China in the shape of state capitalism. However, as in all capitalist societies, this in no way creates stability, but piles up contradictions and prepares new crises.

No super-imperialism

Lenin argued strongly against the theory of Karl Kautsky, that imperialism would merge into one union, ”ultra-imperialism”. That theory implied that wars and conflicts would cease, while financial exploitation would continue. This was an argument contrary to Marxism, which defines the bourgeoisie as national capitalist classes, unable to overcome their national interests. Further, the theory of super-imperialism fostered illusions in a peaceful development of imperialism. It was Lassalle’s theory of the bourgeoisie as “one gray mass”, instead of understanding its inner conflicts and splits, set on a global stage.

Lenin argued “an essential feature of imperialism is the rivalry between several great powers in the striving for hegemony, i.e., for the conquest of territory, not so much directly for themselves as to weaken the adversary and undermine his hegemony”. Modern imperialism meant “the competition between several imperialisms”. US imperialism was the leader of the capitalist bloc following WW2, in a Cold War against primarily the Soviet Union, but also China. The latter two were non-capitalist bureaucratically planned economies ruled dictatorially by “communist” parties that were not actual parties, but the state apparatus. When Stalinism collapsed in the Soviet Union and capitalism was re-established in China, US imperialism seemed to remain as the only superpower.

However, the relationship of forces between the powers will change over time, mainly based on economic strength. The growth of China’s economy relative to the US, and the development of Asia as the main arena for economic growth, meant a gradual shift and challenge. In a sense, it became like the challenge from German capitalism against the British from the 1870s onwards. In key production fields such as steel, Germany went from half the British production level to produce twice as much. Based on the experience of WW1, Lenin asked, “what other solution of the contradictions can be found under capitalism than that of force?” Today, despite both the US and China being capitalist, there is a Cold War. What is holding back a hot war is the existence of nuclear weapons that could destroy the entire globe. As important is the opposition to war from a big majority of the population.

Military incidents and proxy wars such as in Syria are possible, but a full-scale war between the US and China is not on the table for now. The Cold War will continue, and contrary to many predictions, the ruling classes on both sides are likely to lose ground as a result. Initial support for nationalism will be countered by the cost of the conflict and grave internal political, economic, environmental and social crises in both countries and blocs.

Divide the world

In Lenin’s definition of imperialism the development of monopolies and the role of finance capital is linked to globalization: export of capital, the development of multinational and transnational companies and “the territorial division of the whole world among the biggest capitalist powers”. In a few decades in the end of the 1800s, the main imperialist powers divided the world between them. Lenin describes “two or three powerful world plunderers armed to the teeth”. This was a result of an “enormous ‘surplus of capital’… in the advanced countries”. It was forced upon the capitalists as a result of concentration of capital and monopoly. This led to a scramble for resources and markets, for profits and power, in less developed countries where ”the price of land is relatively low, wages are low, raw materials are cheap”. It was also a “struggle for spheres of influence”.

In the 1800s, the British Empire was the top producer for the global market. Its technological superiority in producing textiles, machinery, etc., meant ruin for local small-scale production in other countries, for example in Latin America. Although Lenin described the process as a final partitioning of the globe, he also stressed “repartitions are possible and inevitable”. This of course has been proved again and again since then, not least in the two imperialist world wars. The 1900s also saw US imperialism becoming the dominant imperialist power, pushing other imperialist powers into the back seat.

For a relatively long period, US imperialism accepted China’s economic growth, as Beijing seemed prepared to continue as a kind of subcontractor. However, since Xi Jinping came to power, with the Chinese economy on course to become the biggest in the world, several processes have altered the balance between the two powers. The Chinese state capitalist model looked to be less damaged by the global crisis of 2008–09 and the regime took some bold steps. “Made in China 2025”, released in 2015, targeted Chinese leadership in fields of technology and to become less dependent on the West and the US.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a giant network of agreements between China and governments in more than 100 countries on every continent. Its launch signified that China was following the general law of capital outgrowing national boundaries. BRI’s roads, railways, harbors, airports, pipelines etc will connect the participating states to the Chinese economy via trade, loans and debts. BRI gives China access to infrastructure, energy sources and land. BRI will increase the use of Chinese technology in participating countries. China’s annual foreign direct investment quadrupled from 2009 to 2016, reaching close to 200 billion dollars. In total, FDI outflow from China 2005–2020 was almost 2.1 trillion dollars. A third of this was investments in energy resources.
Railways

In Imperialism, Lenin wrote:

“The building of railways seems to be a simple, natural, democratic, cultural and civilizing enterprise; that is what it is in the opinion of the bourgeois professors who are paid to depict capitalist slavery in bright colors, and in the opinion of petty-bourgeois philistines. But as a matter of fact the capitalist threads, which in thousands of different intercrossings bind these enterprises with private property in the means of production in general, have converted this railway construction into an instrument for oppressing a thousand million people (in the colonies and semi colonies), that is, more than half the population of the globe that inhabits the dependent countries, as well as the wage-slaves of capital in the ‘civilized’ countries.

Two hundred thousand kilometers of new railways in the colonies and in the other countries of Asia and America represent a capital of more than 40,000 million marks newly invested on particularly advantageous terms, with special guarantees of a good return and with profitable orders for steel works, etc., etc.”

34 countries have signed contracts with Chinese companies for construction of new railways in the last ten years. They include China-Laos, Addis Ababa-Djibouti, Mombasa-Nairobi, Lagos-Ibadan, and many other spectacular railways. They are built by the main Chinese railway construction companies, financed by loans from China and also using a high number of Chinese workers and technicians. In total, railway projects worth 61.6 billion dollars were signed between governments and Chinese companies in 2013–2019. Infrastructure projects are not charities, but built to more efficiently transport both imports and exports, giving access to oil, mineral and other natural resources, and building a political link between the CCP regime in China and governments around the world.

Debts


Already in 1916, Lenin also pointed out that finance capital took a strong grip on countries in need. “Numerous foreign countries, from Spain to the Balkan states, from Russia to Argentina, Brazil and China, are openly or secretly coming into the big money market with demands, sometimes very persistent, for loans.” In addition, he showed how loans were linked to export demands: “The most usual thing is to stipulate that part of the loan granted shall be spent on purchases in the creditor country, particularly on orders for war materials, or for ships, etc.”

In the 2000’s, China became the main creditor and exporter of capital. A study by the economists Sebastian Horn, Carmen M. Reinhart, and Christoph Trebesch (Harvard Business Review, February 2020) found that “the Chinese state and its subsidiaries have lent about $1.5 trillion in direct loans and trade credits to more than 150 countries around the globe. This has turned China into the world’s largest official creditor — surpassing traditional, official lenders such as the World Bank, the IMF, or all OECD creditor governments combined.”

Most of the loans are connected to infrastructure and natural resources investments by the Chinese state and Chinese companies. The result is extreme dependence on China by the debtor countries. Most of the loans are based on commercial conditions; only less than five percent are interest free.

“For the 50 main developing country recipients, we estimate that the average stock of debt owed to China has increased from less than 1% of debtor country GDP in 2005 to more than 15% in 2017. A dozen of these countries owe debt of at least 20% of their nominal GDP to China (Djibouti, Tonga, Maldives, the Republic of the Congo, Kyrgyzstan, Cambodia, Niger, Laos, Zambia, Samoa, Vanuatu, and Mongolia).” (Horn, Reinhart and Trebesch).

The investigation of lending by China, up to 2017, underlines its major role in global finance capital. ”When adding portfolio debts (including the $1 trillion of U.S. Treasury debt purchased by China’s central bank) and trade credits (to buy goods and services), the Chinese government’s aggregate claims to the rest of the world exceed $5 trillion in total. In other words, countries worldwide owed more than 6% of world GDP in debt to China as of 2017.” (Horn, Reinhart and Trebesch).

In November 2020, Zambia became the first country during the pandemic to default on its debt payments. Of its 11.2 billion dollar debt, 3 billion is to China, but in reality what is owed to China is much more. The Chinese regime has been particularly interested in the country that is Africa’s second largest copper producer. During the pandemic, Beijing has also promised loans to cover purchase of Chinese vaccines, for example 500 million dollars to Sri Lanka.

The purpose of Chinese loans and connections to governments and presidents is not to improve the lives of the poor masses in these countries. On the contrary, payments on debts take an increasing share of public expenditure, working conditions worsen with increased exploitation and poverty increases as it does now in Zambia. Many regimes in the Belt and Road Initiative are authoritarian, constantly attacking democratic rights. The Chinese regime and system is an integral part of the global capitalist system.




Saturday, April 19, 2025

 

One should not camouflage capitalist and imperialist China as “socialist” A reply to Immanuel Ness and John Bellamy Foster


Published 

camelion

First published at Spectre.

Every historic period has its “big questions.” One of the most debated among Marxists in the last years is the issue of imperialism in general and the class character of China in particular.

Recently, Immanuel Ness and John Bellamy Foster, two US-based scholars, have each published a long essay in which they try to apply the Marxist theory of imperialism to the conditions of the twenty-first century.1 Both are progressive authors, and Foster is also the editor of the well-known magazine Monthly Review.

In their respective essays, the two academics criticize what they call “Western Marxism.” They accuse the representatives of this tendency of failing to understand the nature of modern imperialism and, consequently, of adapting to the Western powers. Ness denounces several authors, including myself, as “neo-conservative Marxists” and “New Cold War theorists” who supposedly “support the expansion of US dominance in Eastern Europe, East Asia, West Asia, Africa and beyond.”

While Foster and Ness make a number of largely correct criticisms of several left-wing authors who ignore or underestimate the relevance of imperialist superexploitation of semicolonial countries (the so-called Global South), both fail to understand the essence of the Marxist theory of imperialism. Worse, they advocate a policy of support for the new Eastern Great Powers, praise China as a “socialist” country, and make the case for the ideology of a “multipolar world system.”

Ness and Foster’s essays suffer from a number of theoretical weaknesses — starting from their borrowing of the mechanist philosophical concept of Stalinism (the idea of one “principal contradiction” to which other “side contradictions” are subordinated) to their erroneous understanding of Lenin’s theory of imperialism. However, in this essay, I will limit myself to critique of their thesis that China is a “socialist” country.2

Restoration of capitalism in the 1990s

Ness and Foster consider imperialism to be a US-  or Western-led political system. It will be interesting to see how they explain the recent Trump-Putin rapprochement and the resulting split between US and European imperialism. In any case, they believe that China is an anti-imperialist and “socialist” state. As Foster writes:

More difficult still for those seeking to characterize China as imperialist in the classical sense is that rather than seeking to join the U.S.-dominated rules-based imperial order or to replace it with what could be considered a new imperialist order, Chinese foreign policy has been geared to promoting the self-determination of nations, while opposing bloc geopolitics and military interventions. Beijing’s threefold Global Security Initiative, Global Development Initiative, and Global Civilization Initiative together constitute the leading proposals for world peace in our era. The People’s Republic of China has few military bases abroad, has not carried out any overseas military interventions, and has not engaged in wars at all except in relation to the defense of its own borders.3

Ness similarly characterizes the USSR before 1991 and China (as well as North Korea) today as “actually existing socialism.”

This is absolute nonsense. In fact, as we have elaborated in other works, China became a postcapitalist state dominated by bureaucratic dictatorship after 1949. After the brutal crushing of the workers and students in May-June 1989 and the cul-de-sac of the previous policy of limited market reforms, the leadership around Deng Xiaoping moved to restore capitalism in the 1990s.4

The result has been a radical transformation of labor relations, the emergence of both a new bourgeoisie and a large private sector, and the capitalist restructuring of state-owned industry. Today, most employees work outside the state sector, whose share of total urban employment declined from 61.0 percent in 1992 to 22.7 percent in 2006. A World Bank report published in 2019 estimates that state-owned enterprises accounted for between 5 and 16 percent of employment.5 According to another World Bank report, wholly or majority state-owned firms accounted for 40 percent of real value added in manufacturing in 1998, but for less than 7 percent in 2013.6

The character of China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) itself had also drastically changed in the 1990s and 2000s. They no longer operate as part of a bureaucratically planned economy as was the case before capitalist restoration took place in the early 1990s. Since then, through a series of reforms, China’s SOEs were radically transformed and started operating on the basis of the capitalist law of value. By the end of 2001, 86 percent of all SOEs had been restructured and about 70 percent had been partially or fully privatized. Many enterprises were either merged or closed. According to the then-minister in charge of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, 3,080 SOEs — with 199.54 billion yuan (24.1 billion USD) of nonperforming loans written off — were closed down or went bankrupt in the years between 1994 and 2002.7 The number of SOEs fell from 64,737 in 1998 to 27,477 in 2005. From 1998 to 2004, six in ten SOE workers were laid off.8 To put it in absolute numbers, according to official figures, about 50 million workers were laid off between 1993 and 2004.9

In the course of this process, many SOEs have undergone a mixed-ownership reform. Over four thousand privatization projects have been carried out by central SOEs from 2013 to 2020, with private capital investment reaching a cumulative amount of 1.5 trillion yuan. By 2020, more than 70 percent of central SOEs have implemented mixed-ownership reform, resulting in the share of private capital in central SOEs rising from 27 percent at the end of 2012 to 38 percent.10 As a result, profits massively increased in the SOEs. While the average Return on Assets of such enterprises was only 0.7 percent in 1998, this figure rose to 6.3 percent in 2006.11 As explained by The World Bank: “Many SOEs were corporatized, radically restructured (including labor shedding), and expected to operate at a profit….As a result, the profitability of China’s SOEs increased.”12

An international comparison shows that the profit rate of China’s monopolies is not in bad shape in relation to their Western rivals. While China’s corporations in the Fortune Global 500 list — of which two-third are state-owned — had a lower profitability than those from the United States or United Kingdom in 2020, their profitability was higher than their Japanese and Western European rivals. (See Table 1)13

Table 1. Profit Margin of the Fortune Global 500 Corporations, 2020
Table 1. Profit Margin of the Fortune Global 500 Corporations, 2020 

The emergence of a new bourgeoisie

As the process of capitalist accumulation evolved, a new bourgeoise emerged in the 1990s. By the end of 2024, the country’s 55 million registered private enterprises made up over 92 percent of all businesses in China.14 While the state-capitalist sector continues to play a key role in the economy, private capital has massively expanded its position among the largest corporations. The share of SOEs among China’s top one hundred listed companies declined from 78.1 percent in 2010 to 51 percent in 2024. (Bear in mind that, as mentioned above, such SOEs often have a minority share of private shareholders.) The share of companies with mixed-ownership (these are firms in which the state owns an equity stake between 10 and 50 percent) stagnated at about 14 percent, while the share of private corporations has increased to 34.4 percent.15

Consequently, social inequality increased dramatically, and income and wealth have concentrated in the hands of the ruling class and the upper middle layer. Before the beginning of the reform process in 1978, the share of national income going to the top 10 percent of the population was 27 percent, equal to the share going to the bottom 50 percent. This changed massively in the following decades and by 2015, the income share of the bottom half was just below 15 percent while the share of the top decile had increased to 41 percent.16 The elite’s share of national wealth has increased even more. The top 10 percent own 67.8 percent and the top 1 percent own 30.5 percent! (See Table 2)17

Table 2. Income and Wealth Distribution in China, 2021
Table 2. Income and Wealth Distribution in China, 2021 

A research team around the progressive economist Thomas Piketty has demonstrated in a recently published book that the level of private wealth concentration in China (30.5 percent) is now nearly the same as in India, somewhat below that of the United States and clearly higher than that of Western Europe. In India, the top 1 percent own about 33 percent of private wealth, in the United States the share is 35 percent and in Western Europe it is about 22 percent.18 Likewise, as Piketty, Yang, and Zucman note in another paper, the Chinese top decile has a wealth share (67 percent in 2015) which is getting close to that of the United States (72 percent) and is much higher than in a country like France (50 percent).19

In other words, “socialism” in China exists only in official textbooks and party congress speeches. Economic and social reality demonstrate that the country had already become capitalist three decades ago.

China’s rise as an imperialist power

China is not only a capitalist state. In the years after the Great Recession of 2008, it has also become an imperialist power. Today, it is home of 31.8 percent of global manufacturing, more than double the share of the United States.20 It is the leading exporter of goods (17.5 percent) and is second—behind the United States—in outbound foreign direct investments.21

Critics try to relativize China’s large global share in manufacturing by referring to the role of Western corporations operating in China. But such an objection is unfounded. Foreign multinationals operating in China account for about one-quarter of the output value and the profits of the industrial enterprises. In other words, the large bulk of China’s manufacturing output and profits are controlled by domestic corporations.22 Furthermore, the foreign companies operating in China are unexceptional and not unique to China,  as such corporations also play a sizable role in Western economies.

Many Chinese companies successfully operate on the world market. The largest capital exports by Chinese corporations since 2020 have taken place in three sectors — automotives, basic materials, and energy — collectively accounting for a peak of 77 percent of total FDI in 2024.23

According to a report from the Rhodium Group, in 2024 Asia was the top destination for Chinese outbound investment for the sixth year in a row. New investments in Europe declined for the second consecutive year and continued to shift from Western Europe to Southern and Eastern Europe, with Serbia and Spain as top destinations in 2024. North America’s role continued to shrink with only $7.1 billion or 7.7 percent of total announced investment. Combined Chinese FDI in North America and Europe dropped to the lowest level since 2010. On the other hand, the so-called emerging markets in the Global South saw a greater share of total Chinese investment. Africa and the Middle East both recorded their highest-ever levels of announced Chinese FDI transactions in 2024. Chinese FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa reached an all-time high of $15.2 billion, representing 16.5 percent of newly announced investments in 2024.24

China’s corporations increasingly direct their outbound greenfield FDI from the Western imperialist countries away to the Global South.25 “Saudi Arabia was the largest recipient of Chinese FDI in 2023, with a 10 percent share capital investment. In Asia, 8.4 percent of outflows were directed towards Malaysia, 7.5 percent in Vietnam, 5.2 percent in Kazakhstan and 5 percent in Indonesia. In Africa, Morocco and Egypt attracted 6 percent and 5.1 percent respectively. In Latin America, China invested 4.8 percent of its global outflows in Argentina and 3.7 percent in Mexico. Meanwhile in Europe, Serbia was the main beneficiary with a 4 percent market  share of outward China FDI.”26

In 2019, corporations in the semiconductors sectors received nearly half of their revenues from overseas; those in information technology about 37 percent. In the same year, China had 9 among the world’s top one hundred nonfinancial multinationals by foreign assets (United States 19, France 15, United Kingdom 13, Germany, 11 and Japan 9).27

Based on their rejection of Lenin’s characterization of imperialism as monopolism, Ness and Foster believe that they can downplay the global rise of China’s economy as something secondary. However, China 29did not only become a leading power in terms of industrial output and trade, but also in terms of corporations and individual billionaires. Consequently, by now the Middle Kingdom is able to challenge the hegemonic position of its American rivals. (See Tables 3–5).28

Table 3. Top 10 Countries with the Ranking of Fortune Global 500 Companies (2023)
Table 3. Top 10 Countries with the Ranking of Fortune Global 500 Companies (2023) 
Table 4. Top 5 Countries of the Forbes Billionaires 2023 List
Table 4. Top 5 Countries of the Forbes Billionaires 2023 List 
Table 5. Top 10 Countries of the Hurun Global Rich List 2024
Table 5. Top 10 Countries of the Hurun Global Rich List 2024 

In his essay, Foster argues that China has still been exploited by Western imperialist corporations over the last decade:

Low unit labor costs of goods produced in the Global South have led to widening gross profit margins for multinationals from the center of the system, whose commodities are produced in China and other developing countries and then exported to be consumed in the Global North, where the final selling price of the goods is many times [higher]. As Minqi Li has shown, China in 2017 experienced a net labor loss in foreign trade…, which was equal to forty-seven million worker years; while the United States experienced a net labor gain in the same year of sixty-three million worker years…In this fundamental respect, China is still very much a developing country.32

There is no doubt that Western corporations have gained from foreign investments in China in the past. However, if one makes a total balance sheet of the past three decades, it is evident that China’s monopolies have benefited many times more from the capitalist exploitation of Chinese workers than their American rivals and that the former have massively improved their position vis-à-vis the latter. How else can Foster explain the challenge posed by China’s corporations and billionaires to the United States today in contrast to those corporations marginal role in the 2000s? If there would have been a net surplus in favor of the United States, the latter should have been able to improve their position vis-à-vis China. But, as the growing share of Chinese corporations among the global leading monopolies indicates, these monopolies have gained much more from the massive expansion of China’s economy than their American rivals. We can also see this development in China itself where the revenue share of foreign-invested companies in total revenues of industrial enterprises in China declined from nearly 32 percent (2005) to 20.4 percent (2023).33

Contrary to Foster’s implication, the surplus value of the exploitation of China’s workers — many of them superexploited as internal migrant workers with little legal protection or  access to social services — primarily went into the pockets of Chinese capitalists, not to their US competitors.

Yes, China’s economy is less developed than the United States’s, but…

Foster is of course right to point out that the United States has a higher productivity than China. But this is hardly an argument against the imperialist nature of the latter. First China has rapidly closed the gap between itself and the United States. As one can see in Table 6 and Table 7, the United States’s per capita income was 75 resp. 24 times that of China in 1990 (depending on the method of calculation). Today it is only 6.5 resp. 3.3 times that of China. In other words, while China was an economic “dwarf” in terms of productivity thirty-five years ago, this is certainly no longer the case.

Table 6. United States and China GDP Per Capita in 1990 and 2023 (in Nominal and PPP US-Dollar)
Table 6. United States and China GDP Per Capita in 1990 and 2023 (in Nominal and PPP US-Dollar) 
Table 7. Comparing United States and China GDP Per Capita in 1990 and 2023 (in Nominal and PPP US-Dollar)35
Table 7. Comparing United States and China GDP Per Capita in 1990 and 2023 (in Nominal and PPP US-Dollar) 

Secondly, the view shared by many Marxists that the United States is the exemplary imperialist state — and the further assumption that any less-developed state cannot be imperialist — is grossly mistaken.  As I have argued elsewhere, Lenin and other Marxist theoreticians considered both the most advanced powers of their time (like Britain, Germany, or the United States) and more “backward” ones (like Russia, Japan, Italy or Austria-Hungary) to be imperialist.36

Thirdly, it is crucial to understand the uneven development of China’s economy.37 Its central and western provinces are much less economically developed. On the other hand, if one takes key industries into account, China is competitive with its Western rivals. The current global arms race in AI development, 5G, chip production, and other high-tech industries shows this very clearly. This becomes more evident when considering China’s strong position in industrial robots. Today, it alone possesses 31 percent of all industrial robots; China’s number of robots installed per employees in manufacturing is higher than that of Germany, Japan, or the United States.38 (See Table 8)

Table 8. Robot Density in the Manufacturing Industry in 2023
Table 8. Robot Density in the Manufacturing Industry in 2023 

Foster argues that “in sharp contrast to China, the United States over its history has intervened militarily in 101 countries, some of these multiple times.”40 It is certainly true that the United States, as the imperialist hegemon for many decades, has a bloody history of military interventions abroad. China, as an imperialist newcomer, does not have quite a comparable record. Likewise, it is also correct that the United States still has a larger military than its Eastern rival (or anyone else).

However, as previously mentioned, US imperialism is not the only type of imperialism, and many imperialist states have undertaken hardly any military interventions since 1945 (for example, Germany and Japan). Furthermore, China has also started to demand complete control on its mare nostrum by claiming the complete South China Sea (China’s designation of what Vietnam calls the East Sea) at the cost of all other neighboring countries. This sea is one of the most important routes in global maritime trade (60 percent of global maritime trade and more than 22 percent of total global trade passes through it) and it has huge reserves of oil and natural gas. Finally,  China is catching up in the military sphere and has become the world’s second-largest arms spender and third-largest nuclear power.

More fundamentally, while Foster and Ness downplay the economic dimension of the Marxist characterization of imperialism — with monopolies at its core — they place heightened emphasis on its military dimension. As a result, only the United States (and its allies) is left as an imperialist power.41 This reveals another similarity between their understanding of imperialism and Kautsky’s: both define imperialism on the basis of foreign policy, rather than its fundamental economic and political characteristics.

As Lenin once noted: “Kautsky divorces imperialist politics from imperialist economics, he divorces monopoly in politics from monopoly in economics in order to pave the way for his vulgar bourgeois reformism, such as disarmament,’ ‘ultra-imperialism’ and similar nonsense. The whole purpose and significance of this theoretical falsity is to obscure the most profound contradictions of imperialism and thus justify the theory of ‘unity’ with the apologists of imperialism, the outright social-chauvinists and opportunists.42

In conclusion, we characterize China as an imperialist Great Power because it is a capitalist state whose economy, corporations, and billionaires are among the strongest in the world and which operate on all continents. Likewise, it has one of the largest armed forces and plays a key role in world politics.

This brings us to the question of how Marxists should define an imperialist state. The formula, which we have developed in past works, and which seems to us the most precise, is the following: An imperialist state is a capitalist state whose monopolies and state apparatus have a position in the world order where they first and foremost dominate other states and nations. As a result, they gain extra profits and other economic, political, or military advantages from such a relationship based on superexploitation and oppression.

Such a definition of an imperialist state is in accordance with the brief definition which Lenin gave in one of his writings on imperialism in 1916: “…imperialist Great Powers (i.e., powers that oppress a whole number of nations and enmesh them in dependence on finance capital, etc.)….”43

Pro-Eastern social imperialism as the political consequences of a flawed theory

The political consequences of Ness and Foster’s mistaken theory are evident: they put the world on its head. For them, imperialism is basically a political power relation resulting in superexploitation of the Global South, not the epoch of moribund capitalism characterized by economic and political monopolism that results in both the superexploitation of the (semi-)colonial countries and interimperialist rivalry. For them, China — a rising Great Power challenging US hegemony — is not imperialist, not even capitalist, but rather a socialist state spreading the message of peace and welfare!

Consequently, they advocate for the creation of a “multipolar world order” as a progressive step forward. In reality, the unipolar and the multipolar world order are just two political versions of one and the same global imperialist system; one is dominated by the United States and the other is characterized by rivalry between several Great Powers — as was already the case in the first half of the twentieth century. Socialists should advocate neither one nor the other, but need to support workers and popular struggles against all Great Powers in order to replace the imperialist system with an international socialist alternative.44 But Ness and Foster advocate support for China and its allies. According to Ness, China and its allies “seek a multipolar world based on the principles of mutual respect found in the Charter of the United Nations.” Surely, Russia — China’s most important ally — has demonstrated such “mutual respect” in its military intervention in Syria in 2015–24 or in its ongoing war against Ukraine! And China’s suppression of workers’ protests and the Muslim Uyghur people in Xinjiang — which Fosters’ Monthly Review shamefully justifies — also reveals the hollowness of “actually existing socialism.”45

It is only consequential that Ness accuses people like me, who have sided with the Syrian and Ukrainian people against Russian imperialism, as “neo-conservative Marxists” and “New Cold War theorists” who supposedly “support the expansion of US dominance in Eastern Europe, East Asia, West Asia, Africa and beyond.” In the field of theory, Ness and Foster refute Lenin’s analysis of imperialism, and in the field of politics they are apologists of China’s Stalinist-capitalist dictatorship.

In the history of the workers’ movement, Marxists had to deal repeatedly with “socialists” who sided with one or the other Great Power. Usually, these forces supported their own bourgeoisie. However, there have also been several occasions where they sided with the ruling class of the rival of their “own” country. In World War I, some “socialists” in Russia sympathized with Germany and some German socialists with France. Likewise, German and Austrian social democrats supported the Western powers against their “fatherland” from 1933 to 1945. The Stalinist parties of these two countries followed a similar policy in the decade after 1935 — except in the first two years of World War II where they switched to a pro-German course due to the Hitler-Stalin Pact.

While the formal arguments differed, their essence was essentially the same: the imperialist rival of their own ruling class was “progressive” or simply the “lesser evil.” This was justified by claiming that these powers were “more democratic,” had “fewer colonies” or followed a “less aggressive foreign policy.” For example, in the period of the Hitler-Stalin Pact, leaders of the Communist International characterized British imperialism in 1940 as “the most reactionary force in the world” whereas they claimed that Germany would have been interested in peace.

Lenin and the revolutionary Marxists in the early twentieth century denounced support for any imperialist power — irrespective if it was more or less “democratic” or if it had more or less colonies — as utterly reactionary.

“From the standpoint of bourgeois justice and national freedom (or the right of nations to existence), Germany might be considered absolutely in the right as against Britain and France, for she has been ‘done out’ of colonies, her enemies are oppressing an immeasurably far larger number of nations than she is, and the Slavs that are being oppressed by her ally, Austria, undoubtedly enjoy far more freedom than those of tsarist Russia, that veritable ‘prison of nations.’ Germany, however, is fighting, not for the liberation of nations, but for their oppression. It is not the business of socialists to help the younger and stronger robber (Germany) to plunder the older and overgorged robbers. Socialists must take advantage of the struggle between the robbers to overthrow all of them.”46

Consequently, they characterized the “advocacy of the idea of ‘defence of the fatherland’” as “social-chauvinism” or “social-imperialism.” “Social-chauvinism, which is, in effect, defence of the privileges, the advantages, the right to pillage and plunder, of one’s ‘own’ (or any) imperialist bourgeoisie, is the utter betrayal of all socialist convictions and of the decision of the Basel International Socialist Congress.”47

Later, revolutionary Marxists called those “socialists” who sided with the imperialist rival of their own ruling class “inverted social-imperialists.”48 Unfortunately, Professor Ness and Foster belong to such a category. They are pro-Chinese social-imperialists.

Michael Pröbsting has been a Marxist activist and author for more than four decades and has been sentenced twice for anti-imperialist activities. As a regular speaker at Gaza demonstrations, he was recently tried for his public support for the armed resistance of the Palestinian people, which ended with a guilty verdict and a suspended prison sentence of six months. He is also editor of www.thecommunists.net.