Showing posts sorted by relevance for query CHINA IMPERIALISM. Sort by date Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query CHINA IMPERIALISM. Sort by date Show all posts

Saturday, November 20, 2021

IMPERIALISM IS STATE CAPITALISM
Report shows China's growing clout at World Bank, global institutions



FILE PHOTO: The Chinese national flag is seen in Beijing, China

Andrea Shalal
Thu, November 18, 2021

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - With over $66 billion in total capital, China has passed Japan to become the second largest contributor to the system of development banks that provide some $200 billion in subsidized loans to poor countries each year, a new report said Thursday.

While China still receives loans and other aid from multilateral institutions like the World Bank and U.N. agencies, it has also emerged as one of the most powerful donors, according to the Center for Global Development.

It said that China, the world's second largest economy after the United States, is the fifth largest overall donor across the range of United Nations agencies focused on development, including the U.N. Development Program, World Food Program, and World Health Organization.

Beijing's role as a major donor, shareholder, aid recipient, and commercial partner of international institutions gives it "uniquely influential position," the think tank said, citing a detailed look at China's role at 76 global institutions.

"There’s been a lot of attention to China’s Belt and Road lending to developing countries, but a lot less on its growing footprint at global institutions like the World Bank," said Scott Morris, a senior fellow at the center.

China's expanding role at these institutions - and its role as the world's largest creditor - has raised concerns in the United States and elsewhere in recent years, but Morris cautioned against viewing its role at the banks as a threat.

"This isn't necessarily a cause for alarm," Morris said. "It’s better for everyone to have China working inside the system instead of outside of it."

Some of the increase has been driven by automatic contributions based on the size of China's growing economy. But Beijing has also scaled up its voluntary donations, including at the World Bank’s low-income lending arm, the International Development Association, where it is now the 6th largest donor.

(Reporting by Andrea Shalal; Editing by Mark Heinrich)






China’s State Capitalist Imperialism


In the first of a two-part article Per-Åke Westerlund looks at the rise of Chinese imperialism and what it means for building international workers’ solidarity against international capitalism.

Per-Åke Westerlund, ISA International Executive

China becoming the workshop of the world was the main driver of capitalist globalisation of the last decades. Multinational companies, particularly from the US, earned super profits and couldn’t care less about the dictatorship and conditions for workers in China. This was a win-win process for the ruling classes in both states — economic growth and low inflation assisted in hiding and softening the building up of contradictions.

This process could not go on forever and started to reverse. With similarities to German imperialism versus the British Empire up to WW1, US imperialism today is challenged by Beijing across all fields — economy, technology, finance, military and international relations. Imperialism “give[s] rise to a number of very acute, intense antagonisms, frictions and conflicts”, Lenin explained, and in his time this eventually led to war. Today, we have a Cold War.

Long-term imperialist confrontation

The record of US imperialism is crystal clear. Washington has never hesitated to use war and force to sustain its power. It is the mightiest military power the world has ever seen. The challenger, Chinese imperialism, is a brutal dictatorship against working people and any opposition. These two forces are now positioned for a long-term global imperialist confrontation. The Cold War will vary in intensity, contain new twists and alliances, but will not go away. This happens parallel with an escalating armaments race, record increases in military expenditure and arms exports.

Socialists and the working class must have an independent, revolutionary socialist position and organize struggle against all imperialist forces. No imperialist power, let alone military forces, will ever “liberate” the oppressed. US capitalist politicians that now suddenly condemn the dictatorship in China have turned a blind eye to it for decades — and still do the same to dictatorial regimes such as in Saudi Arabia. Neither can the fight against US imperialism in any way justify support for the regime in Beijing. However, there are certain “left” groups that supported US bombings in Libya in 2011 and others that label criticism of the Chinese dictatorship as supporting US imperialism.

There is no doubt who benefits from the regime in China today. It is an extremely unequal society with 878 dollar billionaires, an increase of 257 in 2020 and far more than the 649 billionaires in the US. In the same process, education, healthcare and housing are largely privatized and workers have no rights in the workplaces. Land grabbing by the authorities and environmental scandals and problems are frequent.

Real socialists are defined by supporting workers’ struggles everywhere. Workers in China fighting for their rights meet severe repression from the regime, including abductions, torture and prison. The state machine of oppression is enormous — millions are employed in the police, military, intelligence agencies and the enormous surveillance apparatus. This system works in cooperation with private and state Chinese companies — but also US and Western companies in the country. Capitalists and governments internationally fear revolutionary movements in whatever country — they sometimes hypocritically give support in order to derail these struggles and hug them to death.

International Socialist Alternative stands for solidarity and support to workers’ struggle in China, Hong Kong and internationally. Any struggle on working conditions, jobs, wages, the environment, education and other important fields immediately becomes a struggle against the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) dictatorship in Beijing. Eventually brutal state repression will be used also against local grievances or protests. Therefore, democratic demands — the right to protest, to organize trade unions, freedom of the internet and media — are central in any struggle in China and Hong Kong, and intimately linked to the fight for improved living conditions and environment. Democratic demands become revolutionary since they are a threat to the regime and can only be achieved by revolutionary mass struggle of the working class.

Socialists must be prepared for the confrontation between US imperialism and Chinese imperialism. Real working class internationalism means solidarity and struggle against the global capitalist and imperialist system, for workers and the oppressed to take power.

What is imperialism?


The classic Marxist analysis is Lenin’s Imperialism, the Highest stage of Capitalism, written in 1916. In order to understand and explain the new phase, he analyses global capitalism, not only one or two countries, and the processes over a longer period. This is what Marxists today call perspectives. Imperialism develops with concentration of capital. Growing giant companies become monopolies, “a general and fundamental law of the present stage of development of capitalism”. Linking up with and controlled by banks, this means finance capital comes to power. It is capitalism in decay and parasitic: “the bulk of the profits go to the ‘geniuses’ of financial manipulation”. There is no longer any “border” between speculative and productive capital.

All the features of imperialism described by Lenin have existed for decades in China. The economy is producing for a mass market, in China and globally, but appropriation of profits is private, to both foreign and Chinese capitalists. A few monopolies dominate in all spheres of the economy — finance, energy, internet etc., and in China with state-capitalist characteristics. Lenin in Imperialism stressed how the major companies in Germany and elsewhere had a “personal link-up” to banks and to the government. This was also the case with confiscation and speculation in land, an issue that has led to many protests in China.

Private companies and powerful capitalists in China are working hand-in-hand with the CCP state dictatorship. Top billionaires are members of the CCP and government ministers, generals and party leaders are richer than any other governments globally. Lenin’s concept of “Plutocracy and Bureaucracy” — the super-rich and the state — has reached perfection in China in the shape of state capitalism. However, as in all capitalist societies, this in no way creates stability, but piles up contradictions and prepares new crises.

No super-imperialism

Lenin argued strongly against the theory of Karl Kautsky, that imperialism would merge into one union, ”ultra-imperialism”. That theory implied that wars and conflicts would cease, while financial exploitation would continue. This was an argument contrary to Marxism, which defines the bourgeoisie as national capitalist classes, unable to overcome their national interests. Further, the theory of super-imperialism fostered illusions in a peaceful development of imperialism. It was Lassalle’s theory of the bourgeoisie as “one gray mass”, instead of understanding its inner conflicts and splits, set on a global stage.

Lenin argued “an essential feature of imperialism is the rivalry between several great powers in the striving for hegemony, i.e., for the conquest of territory, not so much directly for themselves as to weaken the adversary and undermine his hegemony”. Modern imperialism meant “the competition between several imperialisms”. US imperialism was the leader of the capitalist bloc following WW2, in a Cold War against primarily the Soviet Union, but also China. The latter two were non-capitalist bureaucratically planned economies ruled dictatorially by “communist” parties that were not actual parties, but the state apparatus. When Stalinism collapsed in the Soviet Union and capitalism was re-established in China, US imperialism seemed to remain as the only superpower.

However, the relationship of forces between the powers will change over time, mainly based on economic strength. The growth of China’s economy relative to the US, and the development of Asia as the main arena for economic growth, meant a gradual shift and challenge. In a sense, it became like the challenge from German capitalism against the British from the 1870s onwards. In key production fields such as steel, Germany went from half the British production level to produce twice as much. Based on the experience of WW1, Lenin asked, “what other solution of the contradictions can be found under capitalism than that of force?” Today, despite both the US and China being capitalist, there is a Cold War. What is holding back a hot war is the existence of nuclear weapons that could destroy the entire globe. As important is the opposition to war from a big majority of the population.

Military incidents and proxy wars such as in Syria are possible, but a full-scale war between the US and China is not on the table for now. The Cold War will continue, and contrary to many predictions, the ruling classes on both sides are likely to lose ground as a result. Initial support for nationalism will be countered by the cost of the conflict and grave internal political, economic, environmental and social crises in both countries and blocs.

Divide the world

In Lenin’s definition of imperialism the development of monopolies and the role of finance capital is linked to globalization: export of capital, the development of multinational and transnational companies and “the territorial division of the whole world among the biggest capitalist powers”. In a few decades in the end of the 1800s, the main imperialist powers divided the world between them. Lenin describes “two or three powerful world plunderers armed to the teeth”. This was a result of an “enormous ‘surplus of capital’… in the advanced countries”. It was forced upon the capitalists as a result of concentration of capital and monopoly. This led to a scramble for resources and markets, for profits and power, in less developed countries where ”the price of land is relatively low, wages are low, raw materials are cheap”. It was also a “struggle for spheres of influence”.

In the 1800s, the British Empire was the top producer for the global market. Its technological superiority in producing textiles, machinery, etc., meant ruin for local small-scale production in other countries, for example in Latin America. Although Lenin described the process as a final partitioning of the globe, he also stressed “repartitions are possible and inevitable”. This of course has been proved again and again since then, not least in the two imperialist world wars. The 1900s also saw US imperialism becoming the dominant imperialist power, pushing other imperialist powers into the back seat.

For a relatively long period, US imperialism accepted China’s economic growth, as Beijing seemed prepared to continue as a kind of subcontractor. However, since Xi Jinping came to power, with the Chinese economy on course to become the biggest in the world, several processes have altered the balance between the two powers. The Chinese state capitalist model looked to be less damaged by the global crisis of 2008–09 and the regime took some bold steps. “Made in China 2025”, released in 2015, targeted Chinese leadership in fields of technology and to become less dependent on the West and the US.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a giant network of agreements between China and governments in more than 100 countries on every continent. Its launch signified that China was following the general law of capital outgrowing national boundaries. BRI’s roads, railways, harbors, airports, pipelines etc will connect the participating states to the Chinese economy via trade, loans and debts. BRI gives China access to infrastructure, energy sources and land. BRI will increase the use of Chinese technology in participating countries. China’s annual foreign direct investment quadrupled from 2009 to 2016, reaching close to 200 billion dollars. In total, FDI outflow from China 2005–2020 was almost 2.1 trillion dollars. A third of this was investments in energy resources.
Railways

In Imperialism, Lenin wrote:

“The building of railways seems to be a simple, natural, democratic, cultural and civilizing enterprise; that is what it is in the opinion of the bourgeois professors who are paid to depict capitalist slavery in bright colors, and in the opinion of petty-bourgeois philistines. But as a matter of fact the capitalist threads, which in thousands of different intercrossings bind these enterprises with private property in the means of production in general, have converted this railway construction into an instrument for oppressing a thousand million people (in the colonies and semi colonies), that is, more than half the population of the globe that inhabits the dependent countries, as well as the wage-slaves of capital in the ‘civilized’ countries.

Two hundred thousand kilometers of new railways in the colonies and in the other countries of Asia and America represent a capital of more than 40,000 million marks newly invested on particularly advantageous terms, with special guarantees of a good return and with profitable orders for steel works, etc., etc.”

34 countries have signed contracts with Chinese companies for construction of new railways in the last ten years. They include China-Laos, Addis Ababa-Djibouti, Mombasa-Nairobi, Lagos-Ibadan, and many other spectacular railways. They are built by the main Chinese railway construction companies, financed by loans from China and also using a high number of Chinese workers and technicians. In total, railway projects worth 61.6 billion dollars were signed between governments and Chinese companies in 2013–2019. Infrastructure projects are not charities, but built to more efficiently transport both imports and exports, giving access to oil, mineral and other natural resources, and building a political link between the CCP regime in China and governments around the world.

Debts


Already in 1916, Lenin also pointed out that finance capital took a strong grip on countries in need. “Numerous foreign countries, from Spain to the Balkan states, from Russia to Argentina, Brazil and China, are openly or secretly coming into the big money market with demands, sometimes very persistent, for loans.” In addition, he showed how loans were linked to export demands: “The most usual thing is to stipulate that part of the loan granted shall be spent on purchases in the creditor country, particularly on orders for war materials, or for ships, etc.”

In the 2000’s, China became the main creditor and exporter of capital. A study by the economists Sebastian Horn, Carmen M. Reinhart, and Christoph Trebesch (Harvard Business Review, February 2020) found that “the Chinese state and its subsidiaries have lent about $1.5 trillion in direct loans and trade credits to more than 150 countries around the globe. This has turned China into the world’s largest official creditor — surpassing traditional, official lenders such as the World Bank, the IMF, or all OECD creditor governments combined.”

Most of the loans are connected to infrastructure and natural resources investments by the Chinese state and Chinese companies. The result is extreme dependence on China by the debtor countries. Most of the loans are based on commercial conditions; only less than five percent are interest free.

“For the 50 main developing country recipients, we estimate that the average stock of debt owed to China has increased from less than 1% of debtor country GDP in 2005 to more than 15% in 2017. A dozen of these countries owe debt of at least 20% of their nominal GDP to China (Djibouti, Tonga, Maldives, the Republic of the Congo, Kyrgyzstan, Cambodia, Niger, Laos, Zambia, Samoa, Vanuatu, and Mongolia).” (Horn, Reinhart and Trebesch).

The investigation of lending by China, up to 2017, underlines its major role in global finance capital. ”When adding portfolio debts (including the $1 trillion of U.S. Treasury debt purchased by China’s central bank) and trade credits (to buy goods and services), the Chinese government’s aggregate claims to the rest of the world exceed $5 trillion in total. In other words, countries worldwide owed more than 6% of world GDP in debt to China as of 2017.” (Horn, Reinhart and Trebesch).

In November 2020, Zambia became the first country during the pandemic to default on its debt payments. Of its 11.2 billion dollar debt, 3 billion is to China, but in reality what is owed to China is much more. The Chinese regime has been particularly interested in the country that is Africa’s second largest copper producer. During the pandemic, Beijing has also promised loans to cover purchase of Chinese vaccines, for example 500 million dollars to Sri Lanka.

The purpose of Chinese loans and connections to governments and presidents is not to improve the lives of the poor masses in these countries. On the contrary, payments on debts take an increasing share of public expenditure, working conditions worsen with increased exploitation and poverty increases as it does now in Zambia. Many regimes in the Belt and Road Initiative are authoritarian, constantly attacking democratic rights. The Chinese regime and system is an integral part of the global capitalist system.




Thursday, July 21, 2022

COMRADELY IMPERIALISM
China's winning approach to African investment


Many African decision-makers see their relationships with Europe as recipients of aid, rather than as equal partners on the ground, according to the Friedrich Naumann Foundation. DW examines why this gives China an edge.



This expressway in Nairobi, Kenya was built by a Chinese state-owned company


The Nairobi Expressway winds through the metropolis like a giant river on stilts. It stretches over 27 kilometers (17 miles) through the heart of the Kenyan capital and connects the West African country's most important airport with Nairobi's central business district, the National Museum and the Presidential Palace.

Construction under the aegis of China took only two years. Now the toll road is helping to relieve the city's congested traffic arteries.

China's state-owned companies are increasingly ahead of their European competitors with swift decisions and speedy implementation of contracts in Africa. That's according to a study published in June by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom, a German organization for liberal and libertarian politics. The foundation is affiliated with Germany's Free Democratic Party, currently in a coalition government with Chancellor Olaf Scholz.


IS ZAMBIA SLOWLY BECOMING CHINESE?
Railway of friendship
When the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA) project was completed in 1976, it was China's largest single foreign-aid package and a symbol of Beijing's support for newly independent African countries. China dispatched nearly 50,000 engineering and technical personnel to work on TAZARA. However, this mighty project has been waning since the late 1990s. Now the train transports more copper than people.
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Europe exports values


More than 1,600 decision-makers from 25 countries were surveyed, including top managers, employees of NGOs and civil servants.

Their answers paint a picture of a Europe that seeks above all to export its values to Africa, while loans, excavators and workers come from China.

"The Clash of Systems" is how the foundation describes the results of the online survey conducted by Kenya's Inter Region Economic Network think tank.



China also financed a railway that was launched in 2019

Europeans are perceived by decision-makers as having an edge on most performance indicators, according to Stefan Schott, a project manager for East Africa and the Global Partnership Hub at the Friedrich Naumann Foundation.

Social standards, the provision of jobs for locals, environmental standards and the quality of products stand out, he said.

On a list of 17 criteria, Chinese companies come out ahead on only four indicators — they make decisions more quickly, implement projects faster, interfere less in internal affairs and have fewer qualms about using corruption.


UGANDA: A BATTLE FOR SACRED LANDS AS NATURE WINS NEW RIGHTS
Guardians of the land
Alon Kiiza, an elder of the area's Indigenous Bagungu community, lives in the rural Buliisa district at the epicenter of this ongoing, foreign-led scramble for the continent's natural resources. The 88-year-old is among many there watching the industrial hubbub with concern. "Drilling for oil will disturb the ecosystem," he said. "The spirit of the land does not connect well with these machines."
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'Paternalistic behavior' a problem

"Obviously, these are the most important factors; there is no other way to explain the success of the Chinese in Africa," Schott said in an interview with DW.

Europeans would have to draw their conclusions from this. It also affects their reputation for imposing regulations, he said.

"The paternalistic behavior of the Europeans is a problem; the Africans have difficulties with that," Schott emphasized.

Watch video03:28
Is China Africa's new colonial power?

In view of this realization, what is the recommendation for German and European Africa policy?

"We would never advise throwing the European values of democracy, human rights, sustainability overboard. That would damage Europe's position," said Schott.

But countries would have to examine whether one should approach conditions in Africa with European standards.

"If the best standards are so high that the Chinese always receive the bid for business, you haven't done any good for the social situation," he said.

The European Union talks about values, he said, but if a constructed road leads to a village, that's also a value.
A European investment bank for Africa?

Schott also brought up the idea of a European investment bank, with a mandate for quick decisions. To facilitate this speed, all 27 EU member states would not have to be consulted in advance.

The partnership at eye level, which European politicians like to emphasize, must definitely be examined.

"The survey participants don't see that, but rather perceive Africa as an aid recipient," Schott added.


The EU wants to invest in Africa — but puts strong values on good governance before any finances are agreed

For James Shikwati, a Kenyan economist and co-author of the study, this is precisely the crux of the matter: Europeans are stuck in their outdated view of Africa, Shikwati told DW.

They dictate to Africans what they need and are trapped in their own value system, which holds them back. Europe emphasizes governance, while the Chinese focus on "hardware," the concrete infrastructure to touch.

"They ask: Which road should be built from where to where? But the Europeans first check how many insects walk over it," said Shikwati, laughing. "It doesn't work that way in Africa," he added.
Rethinking required on both sides

Europe needs to tailor its investment plans and approaches to engagement to specific regions and manage them flexibly, he said.

For Africa, that means offering competitive and strategically focused policies rather than fighting existing ones, Shikwati added.

That's the old Europe, he said, but what's needed is a new way of thinking. "It's not just about migrants coming from Africa, but the incentive should be the huge opportunities that exist in Africa for investment and development."

Only 4% of Chinese investment flows to Africa, the economist said. The rest goes to the United States, Europe and other regions.

But that 4% has produced a lot in poor African countries in just under 20 years — while consolidating China's influence as the continent's most important trading partner.

How many elections a government holds and how human rights are respected is important, Shikwati stressed.

However, this will not bring about a major turnaround for African countries.

This article was originally published in German

SEE 

  • https://www.leftcom.org/.../2020-08-21/bukharin-on-state-capitalism-and-imperialism

    2020-08-21 · As we have already noted, for Bukharin, imperialism and state capitalism were linked to militarism and the inevitability of more wars. As he says in the article which follows, …

    • Estimated Reading Time: 14 mins
    • Joseph Schumpeter, State Imperialism and Capitalism (1919)

      panarchy.org/schumpeter/imperialism.html

      Imperialism is not seen as the most advanced stage of capitalism but as the clear sign that pre-capitalistic (i.e. feudal) aspects survive in capitalism. This results from the subservience of …

    • https://www.socialistrevolution.org/imperialism-the-highest-stage-of-capitalism-a...

      2022-02-02 · Lenin has already explained that imperialism is not a feature or attitude of capitalism: it is the highest state of capitalism itself, an inevitable outcome of free …

    • https://www.socialistalternative.org/2021/05/09/chinas-state...

      2021-05-09 · US imperialism was the leader of the capitalist bloc following WW2, in a Cold War against primarily the Soviet Union, but also China. The latter two were non-capitalist bureaucratically planned economies ruled dictatorially by …

    • Imperialism and the Final Stage of “Capitalism” - Liberal Currents

      https://www.liberalcurrents.com/imperialism-and-the-final-stage-of-capitalism

      2018-05-10 · The idea that imperialism was a natural part of the internal “logic of capitalism

    •  


    • PLO Lumumba | Why Africa is Attractive To China | China Is Africa's New Colonial Master | Part 1

      Jun 7, 2020


      Africa Web TV

      China is Africa's new colonial master according to PLO Lumumba. He is a staunch Pan-Africanist who has delivered several powerful speeches alluding to or about African solutions to African problems.  Lumumba is the director of The Kenya School of Laws. 

      He is an admirer of Patrice Lumumba and Thomas Sankara, the deceased and assassinated revolutionary leaders of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burkina Faso, respectively. Patrick Loch Otieno Lumumba has referred to and quoted them several times in his speeches.

      This speech on how to make Africa work was delivered in Ghana in 2019.


      0:00 Africa is Attractive

      2:48 Globalisation

      6:45 Africa can be great again

      10:54 New threats 

      12:50 Learning from China

      14:42 China taking over African minds

      16:20 Africa agenda 2063

      21:01 African leaders

    •  Part 2 is here - https://youtu.be/EgsiZO_8xE8


    • Tuesday, October 01, 2024

      Russian imperialism: Economic and military aspects

      Renfrey Clarke1 cites statistics compiled by two groups of economists (Guglielmo Carchedi and Michael Roberts; Gaston Nievas and Alice Sodano) showing that the United States and a few other rich countries benefit from surplus value created by the labour of workers in a large number of poorer countries.

      Clarke writes:

      Together, the results reached by these two sets of authors show that the imperialist bloc — roughly, the so-called G7 powers plus less influential but still wealthy states — gains close to 3% of its GDP each year from exploiting the Global South. The net transfer of wealth from poor countries to rich has gouged a huge chunk — far greater than aid donations — out of the ability of the South to improve the well-being of its citizens. Recent years, moreover, have shown a pronounced trend for the scale of this plunder to increase.

      Clarke views these figures as a reflection of the “persistent draining of wealth from subject portions of the globe” under imperialism. This is essentially correct. But Clarke draws certain conclusions that are mistaken.

      Looking specifically at Russia and China, Clarke notes a net outflow of surplus value from them to countries such as the US. He concludes that Russia and China are therefore not imperialist. However, he does not look in detail at the relations between Russia and China and those countries that are much poorer than them. Russian capital exploits workers in some extremely poor countries, such as Sudan. If surplus value flows from these countries to Russia, how does this affect our analysis of Russia? Is Russia simultaneously a victim of Western imperialism and an exploiter of countries poorer than itself?

      Clarke argues that socialists should support Russia and China in any conflict with imperialist countries. He says that, because Ukraine is supported by the US and other imperialist countries, we should support Russia in its war against Ukraine. But Russia’s invasion of Ukraine looks a lot like the actions of an imperialist power. Economic statistics are not the sole basis for deciding if a country is imperialist. We also have to look at factors such as military strength and military interventions abroad.

      Tsarist Russia

      Vladimir Lenin considered tsarist Russia to be imperialist, even though it was economically backward. It had some modern industry, but much of this was foreign-owned or financed by loans from foreign banks. As Leon Trotsky wrote:

      Heavy industry (metal, coal, oil) was almost wholly under the control of foreign finance capital, which had created for itself an auxiliary and intermediate system of banks in Russia....We can say without exaggeration that the controlling shares of stock in the Russian banks, plants and factories were to be found abroad, the amounts held in England, France and Belgium being almost double that in Germany.2 

      It is reasonable to assume that there was a net outflow of surplus value from tsarist Russia to the West.

      Nevertheless, Lenin considered Russia as imperialist. He said “the epoch of imperialism has turned all the ‘great’ powers into the oppressors of a number of nations…”3 Russia was no exception, even though it was relatively backward economically. Lenin spoke of Russian imperialism as “crude, medieval, economically backward and militarily bureaucratic.”4 

      In Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, Lenin said:

      Imperialism is capitalism at that stage of development at which the dominance of monopolies and finance capital is established; in which the export of capital has acquired pronounced importance; in which the division of the world among the international trusts has begun; in which the division of all territories of the globe among the biggest capitalist powers has been completed.5

      But in other writings, Lenin made the point that not all imperialist powers display every feature in a fully developed form:

      The last third of the nineteenth century saw the transition to the new, imperialist era. Finance capital not of one, but of several, though very few, Great Powers enjoys a monopoly. (In Japan and Russia the monopoly of military power, vast territories, or special facilities for robbing minority nationalities, China, etc., partly supplements, partly takes the place of, the monopoly of modern, up-to-date finance capital.)6 

      Russia today

      In terms of economic statistics, Russia is an intermediate country located between the world’s richest and poorest nations. Russia is poorer than the US and Western Europe, but richer than most countries. For example, Russia’s per capita GDP in 2022 was fourteen times as high as that of Sudan.7 But in considering whether a country is imperialist, we should not only look at economic statistics. Lenin considered tsarist Russia imperialist due to factors such as its colonial possessions, military strength and domination of oppressed nationalities, among others.

      Russia today intervenes militarily in other countries. The invasion of Ukraine is an obvious example, but not the only one. Russia has intervened in other former Soviet Union countries, such as Georgia, and fought two wars to suppress the Chechen independence movement. Russia also intervenes militarily in Syria in support of the extremely repressive Bashar al-Assad regime. Since 2015 Russian planes have bombed rebel-controlled areas in Syria, causing widespread damage and loss of life.

      Russia has also intervened militarily in various African countries. The Wagner Private Military Company has played a major role there, with the Russian state’s approval. Wagner PMC exploits the local people where it intervenes. In particular, it profits from gold mining.8 [8] Wagner’s intervention has been particularly disastrous in Sudan, where it helped build up the strength of the Rapid Support Force (RSF). This armed force began as an adjunct to the regular army, helping to violently suppress the democracy movement. Later, due to its leader’s ambitions, the RSF came into conflict with the army, resulting in a devastating civil war. Wagner supplied training and equipment to the RSF, including armoured vehicles and helicopter gunships.

      Russia's military interventions far from its borders reflect its nature as an imperialist power. Russia is weaker than the US, both economically and militarily. But unevenness among imperialist powers is normal. Tsarist Russia was much weaker than Germany, but Lenin still considered Russia an imperialist power. 

      China presents a mixed picture, combining semi-colonial and imperialist features. On the one hand, much of China’s industry produces goods under contract to US and other Western transnational corporations. In this respect it resembles a semi-colony. On the other hand, China is increasingly investing in Africa and Latin America to obtain raw materials for its industries, a pattern traditionally associated with imperialist powers.

      Inter-imperialist rivalry

      Imperialism is not static. Imperialist powers can rise and fall. This contributes to inter-imperialist conflict, as rising powers challenge dominant ones. Inter-imperialist conflict can lead to disastrous wars, such as World War I and II. But it can, at times, have positive side-effects. For example, a government or movement fighting against one imperialist power may be able to receive aid from a rival power. During WWI, Germany sent weapons to Irish rebels planning an uprising against British rule. During WWII, the US sent military aid to various resistance movements against German imperialism in Europe and Japanese imperialism in Asia. It even sent aid to the Soviet Union.

      Today, Ukraine receives aid from the US and western Europe in its fight against Russian imperialism. Meanwhile Cuba and Venezuela, facing US sanctions that amount to an economic blockade, are able to trade with Russia and China. This trade is crucial in enabling Cuba and Venezuela to defy US imperialism. But the fact that, in some cases, Russia plays a somewhat positive role (for example with Cuba and Venezuela) does not negate its imperialist character.9

      • 1

        Renfrey Clarke: "Imperialism: Now we have some numbers" https://links.org.au/imperialism-now-we-have-some-numbers

      • 2

        Trotsky, History of the Russian Revolution, vol. 1, p. 27-28, Sphere Books, London, 1965

      • 3

        Lenin Collected Works, vol. 22, p. 360

      • 4

        LCW, vol. 22, p.359

      • 5

        LCW, vol. 22, p. 266-267

      • 6

        LCW, vol. 23, p. 115-116

      • 7

        According to World Bank figures, the nominal per capita GDP of Russia in the year 2022 was $15,345. In the same year Sudan had a nominal per capita GDP of $1,102.

      • 8

        Adam Tooze: "The Sudan Crisis" https://adamtooze.substack.com/p/chartbook-209-the-sudan-crisis-and

      • 9

        For more on Russian imperialism, see Chris Slee “Russian imperialism: Economically weak, militarily strong” https://links.org.au/russian-imperialism-economically-weak-militarily-strong

      Political imperialism, Putin’s Russia, and the need for a global left alternative: Interview with Ilya Matveev

      [Editor's note: Ilya Matveev will discuss the topic of “Imperialism(s) today” at the online conference, “Boris Kagarlitsky and the challenges of the left today”, on October 8. The Boris Kagarlitsky International Solidarity Campaign is organising the conference as part of its campaign for Kagarlitsky's release from Russian prison, after his jailing for speaking out against the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. As a conference co-sponsor, LINKS International Journal of Socialist Renewal encourages all readers to register for the event.]

      Ilya Matveev is a Russian socialist and political economist. Currently a visiting scholar at the University of California, Berkeley, he is also a member of the Public Sociology Laboratory research group based in Russia. In this extensive interview with Federico Fuentes for LINKS International Journal of Socialist Renewal, Matveev discusses the two logics of imperialism, how they help us explain the different paths that China and Russia took to become imperialist powers, and the left's need for a shared global vision of progressive change.

      Over the past century, the term imperialism has been used to define different situations, and at times been replaced by concepts such as globalisation and hegemony. How valid is the concept of imperialism today and how do you define it?

      The main debate regarding imperialism is whether to view it as a theory for understanding global capitalism, or as a policy of aggression or coercion by a powerful country towards a weaker one. Lenin argued that imperialism was a global characteristic of late stage capitalism: the economic logic of imperialism was built into his definition. But that is the problem with Lenin’s definition, because you cannot explain every specific act of imperialist aggression through economic motives alone. If you define imperialism as a characteristic of global capitalism, then it might make sense to substitute it with terms such as globalisation, which is sometimes referred to as a kind of “new imperialism”. But if we treat imperialism as a systematic policy of aggression towards a weaker country through military, political and/or economic means, then it does not make sense to equate globalisation with imperialism.

      Economics can drive imperialism, but the two are not the same thing. There is no eternal law that states imperialism must always coincide with the needs of capital. Moreover, imperialism can be driven by other factors. [British-American geographer] David Harvey, building on [Italian economist] Giovanni Arrighi’s work, suggests two logics of imperialism: the economic logic of capital and the geopolitical logic of the state. The interaction between these two logics can be complex: sometimes their needs coincide, sometimes not. Moreover, these logics are not universal. The logic of capital is more universal, in that capitalist contradictions are more or less the same everywhere. But the same can not be said for political imperialism. There is no universal logic of political imperialism: different countries will have different motives and strategies. This can lead to contradictions between the two logics. That is why we should not collapse them into one.

      Are there elements, however, of Lenin’s works on imperialism that remain relevant today?

      Lenin’s most important contribution in this area was to develop the ideas of English liberal author John Hobson to their logical conclusion. Hobson, who wrote a famous book called Imperialism, wanted to prove that imperialism was an aberration, and that capitalism and trade would ultimately bring peace to the world. But he had some unorthodox economic views that led him to develop a theory that when you have huge inequality within a country, you end up with excess capital that cannot be reinvested profitably at home and therefore needs to be invested abroad. For Hobson, this was the “economic taproot” of imperialism, because when you reinvested capital abroad, you needed to create conditions for your investments to be profitable. This could, for example, mean coercing other countries to accept your investments. You also needed to protect those investments and trade routes, which required a big navy. So, this economic logic created the need to use force in international affairs. Hobson’s ideas made him a renegade within the liberal tradition, because he discovered that trade did not always lead to peace; instead, for Hobson, capitalist contradictions created the demand for a more aggressive foreign policy.

      Lenin took Hobson’s idea but said he was wrong about being able to reform capitalism. Lenin said capitalism will always produce a demand for external aggression because there will always be a surplus of capital. Uneven and combined development meant there would always be more developed and less developed capitalist countries, and developed capitalist countries would seek to export their capital to less developed countries and apply political pressure to ensure these investments were profitable. Reforming capitalism was therefore impossible. Lenin also envisioned that competing national capitals in developed capitalist countries would lobby their governments to help them gain a greater share of the world market. The problem was that once the whole world was divided among the different national capitalist blocs, the only option left for further expansion was war. Global war was therefore inevitable: it was built into the logic of capitalism.

      These two ideas were Lenin’s most important contribution. He was the most consistent proponent of these two ideas: that capitalism breeds imperialism, because more developed countries will always need new outlets for their investments; and that capitalism breeds inter-imperialist rivalries, because powerful countries will inevitably clash as they seek to expand their share of the global market. Lenin’s big contribution was explaining the economic motives behind imperialism and inter-imperialist rivalry. The problem though, as I mentioned, was that he abstracted this economic logic from any kind of ideological or political considerations.

      After the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, world politics was completely dominated by US imperialism. In recent years, however, a shift seems to be taking place. We have seen China’s rise, Russia invade Ukraine, and even nations such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, among others, deploy military power beyond their borders. How do you view these current dynamics within global politics?

      After World War II, the world approached something similar to Karl Kautsky’s idea of ultra-imperialism. Kautsky disagreed with Lenin’s concept of inter-imperialist rivalry and suggested the possibility that imperialist countries could create a cartel or alliance in order to jointly exploit the rest of the world. He called this ultra-imperialism. We saw something similar to this under US hegemony in the post-WWII period, and especially from the ’80s onward with the collapse of the Soviet Union. During this time, the West collectively ruled over and exploited the rest of the world. This was possible because the economic logic of imperialism went into decline after World War II as Keynesian policies placed limits on the overaccumulation of capital. Instead, the driving logic of imperialism in this period was political; namely, the US’ vision for the world and its fights against Communism. Starting in the ’80s, however, overaccumulation re-emerged as a result of neoliberal policies. This was at the peak of what we could say was something similar to ultra-imperialism, during which a united West forced structural adjustment programs and neoliberal policies onto every peripheral country.

      What we have now is the disintegration of this US-led ultra-imperialism. The problem was that the US tried to have it both ways. It wanted strong consumption at home, so it borrowed money from China. And it also wanted to export capital abroad. The end result was China’s transformation into an economic powerhouse, which posed a threat to US economic dominance. It is this economic conflict that ultimately drives the political conflict between the two today. In my opinion, China’s leaders do not actively want to confront the US. But their economic ambitions, driven by the objective contradictions of capital accumulation in China, have forced them to become more assertive. I also do not think that the US actively wants a confrontation with China. But, here again, the economic logic of imperialism is very powerful and difficult to counteract. That is what drives the US-Chinese conflict. We are left with not so much a multipolar world as a reemerging bipolar world. The confrontation between China and the US, while still manageable for now, is only growing. All this creates a very combustible situation, one that is no longer similar to ultra-imperialism, but more like the period before World War I.

      But some, basing themselves on Lenin’s definition, would question the idea that China is imperialist.

      If we look at the world today, what do we see? We see the rise of China as an alternative centre of capital accumulation within the global capitalist system that exports capital through huge global projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative. The motivation of these projects is economic: China has a capital surplus and industrial overcapacity, so it needs new outlets for reinvesting capital and exporting goods. To achieve this, China has begun scrambling around the world for new markets. This has started a clash with the US, the world hegemon, which also requires outlets for its goods and investments. This means the cooperative relationship which existed while the US used China as a production platform is now slowly becoming antagonistic. Chinese capital, backed by the Chinese state, is now so powerful that US capital does not want to cooperate with it anymore. Instead, it fears China’s rise and expects Chinese capital to become a powerful competitor. That is why US capital has begun enlisting the help of the US state to counter this threat.

      We are left with a classic inter-imperialist rivalry, as described by Lenin. You have two powerful centres of capitalism clashing over outlets for their investment and goods. This, in turn, is leading to the creation of political blocs around these centres of capitalist accumulation: the US has the West behind it, China has Russia. In this sense, the economic logic of imperialism is still relevant for understanding today's world.

      How then does Russia fit into this scenario? Can it also be defined as imperialist?

      In Russia’s case, there is a different dynamic at play. Russian capital was never powerful enough to challenge the West; it was always a junior partner to Western capital, which preferred to cooperate with Russian capital in order to better exploit Russian natural resources and profit from Russia’s role as a sub-imperialist power in the post-Soviet world. Western capital used Russia to extract surplus value from post-Soviet countries. To give one example: [the majority Russian state-owned gas company] Gazprom had a lot of international investors, including the huge trillion-dollar US asset management company BlackRock. When Gazprom expanded into and profited from Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, etc, Blackrock also profited. Western capital was OK with Russia being a regional power as long as it provided Western capital with a window for making profits in the region. Economically speaking, there was no real contradiction: Russian and Western capital cooperated and both profited from this cooperation.

      But starting in 2014, the political logic of Russian imperialism began to decouple from the economic logic. Before then, Russian imperialism was based on a sub-imperialist arrangement: it had an aggressive policy towards countries in the post-Soviet region, but the West profited from its actions and therefore had a direct stake in Russian imperialism. But in 2014, Putin broke the script by annexing Crimea. At that point Russia stopped being a sub-imperialist power and chose the path of confrontation with the West. It broke the rules that the West had set for the Russian government and Russian capital. Yet there was no real economic logic to this move, as it only made life more difficult for Russian capitalists. There was no economic logic to annexing Crimea. While Crimea has some natural resource deposits, to exploit them Russia would need to invest a lot of money. Moreover, Crimea is today a net recipient of Russian energy and federal government funding. Therefore, the explanation for its annexation cannot be found in economic motives; the explanation lies in the realm of Russian ruling class’ ideology.

      So, the cases of China and Russia are different. With China, you have a more classic imperialism, as described by Lenin. With Russia, you have a different kind of imperialism — a political imperialism that is decoupled, to some extent, from economic interests.

      Are you suggesting that, unlike the imperialist powers that arose in Lenin’s time, Russian imperialism has no economic foundation and can solely be explained by political-ideological factors?

      I am not saying that Russian imperialism is entirely different to other imperialisms or that it has no economic basis at all. Starting in 1999, Russia began to recover from the crisis of the ’90s: up until about 2008, it experienced a period of strong economic growth with an annual growth rate of about 7%. During this period, Russian companies became powerful global corporations. While Russian capital was not as powerful as Western capital, it became a serious player on the global market. At the same time, there was an overaccumulation of capital inside Russia as a result of high energy and commodities prices.

      These emerging Russian companies needed to reinvest their surplus capital somewhere — and they opted to reinvest in post-Soviet countries. Their aim was to reconstruct something similar to the supply chains and economic ties that existed during the Soviet-era. The difference, however, was this time Russian capital would be in control. During the Soviet Union, you had an integrated Soviet economy; now we were dealing with a Russian economy dominating the other economies of the region. This then created pressure on the Russian government to be more assertive in the post-Soviet region. So, in this sense, the classic Leninist economic logic of imperialism is relevant to the Russian case, particularly during the 2000s when Putin first comes to power.

      But it is important to re-emphasise that when Russia was staking its claim over the post-Soviet region during this first period, it did so in a cooperative rather than confrontation manner with the US and the West. This was not just limited to economic cooperation between Western and Russian capital; there was also geopolitical cooperation between the Russian and Western states. For example, Russia cooperated with NATO in its war on Afghanistan: Russia was NATO’s biggest supplier of oil and resources, and provided the NATO coalition with logistical land and airspace routes. In 2011, Russia sold transport helicopters to the US for the government it had installed in Afghanistan in a deal worth more than US$1 billion. Clearly, despite any disagreements or tensions that existed, the West viewed Russia as a junior partner, at least until 2014.

      Ultimately, there was nothing inevitable about Russia becoming an enemy of the West if we limited ourselves strictly to economic logic. Russia could have remained a sub-imperialist power that jointly profited from the post-Soviet space with Western capital. It could have been like Turkey is today, which appears to act independently but is careful to not spoil relations with the West. Or like Brazil, which has had leaders such as Lula [da Silva] who may have very militant rhetoric and disagree with the US on many points, but maintain relationships with the US that are far from extremely confrontational. Russia was comparable to these countries, in that they all benefited economically from being a junior partner of the West, even if certain tensions or contradictions existed.

      So, what led to this change in Russia’s positioning towards the West?

      To understand this change, we have to look at the political logic at play. Putin feared that the West was plotting regime change against him. Putin was also clearly incapable of comprehending popular movements and social revolutions. For Putin, popular movement was a contradiction in terms, because people could never do anything by themselves; any such movements were always being controlled and manipulated from the outside. So, when the Arab Spring [of 2010-11] occurred, Putin saw it as nothing more than the West seeking to destabilise Middle Eastern countries.

      Then came the [2014] Maidan Revolution in Ukraine. Putin refused to accept that this could be a real popular movement driven by people’s genuine frustration with the government and repression. Instead, he saw Maidan as the US using Ukraine as a pawn in its chess game with Russia. Maidan transformed Putin’s understanding of everything. Because if Maidan was a move by the West against Russia, then according to Putin’s logic, Russia had to respond by violently crushing this move and making one of its own. Ultimately, Putin’s fear of regime change coloured every calculation he made. It led him to conflate a political threat to his regime with a Western security threat to Russia. Generally speaking, NATO was not threatening Russia in any conventional military sense. But for Putin, NATO was behind Maidan, which he viewed as a plot against his rule.

      The result was that Russia became a much more aggressive imperialist country after 2014: annexing Crimea, arming separatists in the Donbas, and occupying parts of eastern Ukraine, are all ultimately explained by Putin’s ideological fear that the West was plotting regime change. In reality, the West was perfectly fine with Putin as a capitalist ruler that facilitated Western companies’ access to Russian natural resources and the post-Soviet region. Putin was also fine with this, until he feared the West was plotting against him. This ultimately explains why Russia embarked on its confrontation with the West.

      And once Russia started down this path, it was difficult to turn back as the confrontation took on a logic of its own. For example, after Russia annexed Crimea, Ukrainians started to hate Putin and turned to the West for help. Yet that is exactly what Putin wanted to prevent. So what did he do? He became even more aggressive towards Ukraine and ultimately initiated a full-scale invasion, all in the name of preventing a pro-Western Ukraine. But Ukraine’s hatred of Russia was precisely the product of Russia’s own actions. Putin could not understand this, however; for him, this was all just a manifestation of the West plotting against his rule. Paradoxically, while Putin’s convictions were not grounded in reality, the chain of events he unleashed only strengthened his convictions, eventually leading him down the path of this disastrous war. That is why this war was not the result of economic motives; it was driven by ideology.

      What influence do you think China’s rise might have had in Putin’s calculations and in Russia’s shift from a sub-imperialist to imperialist power? It seems possible that China’s presence as an alternative power that Russia could turn to once in confrontation with the West might have influenced the decisions Putin made from 2014…

      That is an interesting question. I agree that Putin had a better sense of these global changes that were afoot compared to Russian economic managers and the government, who viewed this kind of extreme confrontation with the West as unimaginable. Just look at 2022: it was evident at the time that even the most hawkish sectors of the government were not expecting the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Putin, on the other hand, was completely convinced that Ukrainians were all just waiting for Russia to liberate them from Western colonialism and the supposedly small minority of Nazi Bandera types ruling the country. But while holding this fantastical view of Ukraine, Putin was in some ways more prescient than others when it came to the kind of tectonic shifts that were occurring in global affairs and Russia’s place in the world. Putin could sense the possibilities posed by China and semi-peripheral countries such as Turkey, Brazil, and India becoming more autonomous from the US.

      It is worth considering that in 2000, the G7 countries controlled 65% of global GDP, but that by 2021-22 this figure was more like 40-45%. The BRICS bloc of countries represented a slightly bigger share of global GDP when measured in purchasing power parity terms. This represented a huge change in economic and political power. Putin perceived this shift and, as you said, saw the opportunity. He understood that Russia breaking from the West would be very painful, but that it could probably survive in an alliance with China and by trading with semi-peripheral countries that had become powerful in their own right, economically and politically. And he was right about this: while his views on Western motives and Ukraine were wildly inaccurate and biased, his vision of what was happening internationally was quite accurate. This combination of sound and unsound thinking is what ultimately drove the invasion and everything that has happened since.

      Some leftists, relying on Lenin’s definition of imperialism, would argue that the lack of economic motives and Russia’s much weaker economic power as compared to the West means Russia’s war on Ukraine cannot be imperialist. Some even go as far as to impute some kind of anti-imperialist dynamic to Russia’s war. Why, in your opinion, is it important to understand Russia’s war as an act of imperialist aggression?

      This is the problem with economistic definitions of imperialism: when a country does not fit a certain economic profile or you cannot immediately explain a country’s actions on the basis of some kind of economic logic, then the default position is that the country cannot be imperialist or aggressive, and its actions must therefore be defensive. But a country can be aggressive without its actions being driven by specific economic motives.

      If we understand imperialism as a policy of systematic aggression towards a weaker neighbour, then we can see why imperialism defines exactly what Russia has been doing to Ukraine since the ’90s. There were already flashpoints of aggression back then when Russia manipulated gas supplies to Ukraine in order to influence government policies. Then in 2004, Russia tried pressuring Ukraine into electing a pro-Russian presidential candidate, sending spin doctors and covert operatives from Moscow to Kyiv to help defeat [Viktor] Yushchenko. When this failed, Russia sought to coerce Ukraine by halting its supply of natural gas, first in 2006 and again in 2009. Russia also acquired economic assets in Ukraine in order to create an economic platform to use as a political foothold in the country. After this you had the annexation of Crimea, Russia’s participation in the war in the east and, finally, the full-scale invasion in 2022.

      The whole story of Russian-Ukrainian relations in the post-Soviet period is one of Russian imperialism towards Ukraine. How else can you describe this if not imperialism? Moreover, how can this be defined as defensive? Russia’s imperialist actions began well before there was any talk of Ukraine joining NATO: for example, when Russia was interfering in Ukraine’s 2004 elections, Ukraine was in no way connected to NATO. And in what way can Ukraine be said to have attacked Russia? How is that even possible? With what army? Ukraine’s army was practically non-existent before 2014. Ukraine only started strengthening its army as a response to Russian imperialism. It is self-evident that Russia is the aggressor in this relationship. Its aggression has escalated gradually, but Russia has always been the aggressor. By sticking to a solely economic understanding of imperialism, we miss Russian imperialism as a phenomenon.

      In light of everything we have discussed, do you see any possibilities for building bridges between anti-imperialist struggles and struggles in imperialist countries, bearing in mind that different struggles will confront different powers and may therefore seek support from rival imperialist blocs? What should anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist internationalism look like in the 21st century?

      There are, of course, practical aspects to internationalism, such as helping political prisoners. International solidarity campaigns can achieve a lot and have achieved a lot, for example for [jailed Russian anti-war Marxist] Boris Kagarlitsky. Unfortunately, there are a lot of left-wing prisoners in Russia right now. So, in practical terms, this is something the socialist movement can do: have each other's backs by helping political prisoners in Russia.

      But in terms of thinking about this issue more generally, we need to first understand the nature of the current inter-imperialist rivalry compared with the Cold War. Though the Soviet Union was problematic in many respects, there was an ideological component to its foreign policy: it had a vision for another world that represented some kind of alternative. The Soviet Union had an ideological project, even if it was distorted by Stalinism and hollowed out by the cynicism of the elites. This ideological vision influenced the Soviet Union’s attitude towards the Third World, even if there was also a cynical element to its approach to post-colonial movements. But Russia is not the Soviet Union. If we look at Russia today, we see there is no vision of an alternative.

      The only thing Russia offers is confrontation with the West. Russia says: “You need to fight against the West.” But fight for what exactly? What is Russia’s vision of an alternative political, economic model? Russia is an ultra-capitalist country ruled by oligarchs, with huge inequality between people and regions, and a very weak welfare state. The war with Ukraine may have forced these oligarchs to reoriented their business interests towards markets in Asia and move from their London estate to a huge apartment in Dubai. But what difference does that make for an ordinary Russian worker? There is nothing progressive about Russia. The same is true for China: it has no ideological vision beyond capitalism with a large state presence; it offers no alternative vision of progressive change.

      That means progressive movements around the world need to fight for an alternative. They need an alternative vision to guide this global internationalist workers and socialist movement. It also means no compromise with dictatorships or predatory capitalist classes, whether in China, Russia, or the US. Ultimately, this boils down to a very classic vision of imperialism, in which the main enemy is at home. The main enemy of Russian socialists is Russian imperialism; it is not the US or Ukraine. And the main enemy of US socialists is US imperialism. That is the basis for true internationalism: unity against our own imperialist governments and for a shared vision for progressive change in the US, in Russia and in China. This may sound abstract, but it is just sound logic. That is the basis on which we can build bridges between our struggles.



      Ukraine under Russian occupation

      Saturday 28 September 2024, by Catherine Samary

      Since the fall of President Yanukovych in 2014, all Russian interventions in Ukraine - from the annexation of Crimea and the hybrid war in the Donbass to the February 2022 invasion - have been presented by Putin as responses to an ‘anti-Russian, NATO-backed fascist coup’. A part of the international left has embraced this narrative, unlike the small Ukrainian left in the making. The latter chose to take part in the ‘Maidan uprising’ - as it did later in the armed and unarmed resistance to Russian aggression - by fighting on several fronts. [1] Its approach to Maidan as a non-linear ‘revolution of dignity’, with no model and no final outcome, is attentive to the agency of Ukrainian society, as opposed to the ‘geopolitical’ approaches that ignore it. These two articles look back over the last ten years.

      The Ukrainian crisis of 2013-2014

      A crisis that was neither a "pro-European revolution" nor a "fascist coup under NATO control"

      The aspiration for dignity was embodied differently in several phases of the construction of Ukraine, including the 1991 referendum where the population voted massively in favour of independence, including in the Donbass. After the bureaucratic blockages of the 1990s, a popular mood of "kick them all out" arose, notably in the "orange revolution" of 2004, against electoral fraud, clientelism and corruption [2]

      Ukraine coveted by the EU and Russia

      Certainly, with its 40 million inhabitants , its agricultural and mining resources, its strategic corridor for oil and gas between Russia and the European Union (EU), but also its external debt after the financial crisis of 2008-2009, Ukraine was subject to multiple internal covetousness (its rival oligarchs) and conflicting external offers. Russia proposed a customs union, while waging its "gas wars" and playing on supplies and tariffs; the EU offered a "partnership" (without membership) based on ultra- ¬liberal policies relaying the precepts of the IMF (International Monetary Fund) in the face of debt.

      In this context, President Yanukovych was elected in 2010 in an internationally recognized democratic election. His initial programme aimed for a geopolitical balance desired by the majority of the population and reflected by foreign trade divided roughly into three thirds towards the CIS countries, the EU and China. But the forced privatizations advocated by the IMF/EU were sources of strong social tensions, unlike the generous loan and the reduction in the price of gas offered by Russia that Yanukovych chose at the end of 2013. He imposed his break with the EU without submitting this choice to a democratic vote. Worse, he launched his "Berkuts" (Interior Ministry forces) against the few hundred pro-EU demonstrators. And he had Parliament vote in early 2014 on a package of repressive laws against protest movements, sparking new mass demonstrations marked by several dozen deaths.

      Yanukovych discredited, Maidan angry

      It was popular disillusionment with a president whose oligarchic family practices and repressive excesses had become violent — much more than the European issue — that catalysed the mass popular anger against a discredited president. The occupations of public buildings and Maidan Square, with self- ¬organization, in early 2014 were far from being politically homogeneous. All the institutions of the regime, including the army but also the institutional parties, were in crisis. The presence of Western diplomats in favour of "Maidan" was explicit, since they inserted themselves into the compromise negotiations towards early elections. The rejection of these compromises came from popular demonstrations that demanded the immediate resignation of the president. He fled to Russia. The next day, February 22, 2014, Parliament voted (by 72 per cent ) for his dismissal.

      Yanukovych’s discredit had become such that he could not find refuge in his own armed forces and in the southern and eastern regions of Ukraine where his Party of Regions dominated. He therefore turned to Putin. The latter seized on the crisis to advance his own evolving agenda. In the immediate term, the decomposition of Yanukovych’s regime facilitated the intervention of the "little green men" in Crimea, which was annexed - despite the hostility of the Tatars - after a referendum with the "choice" of remaining in the supposedly "fascist" Ukraine or turning towards Russia. At the same time, there was the hybrid war of Donbass. [3]

      The reality of the far right

      Rejecting the false presentation of the "fascist coup" does not imply ignoring the reality of the far right. As elsewhere, it was composite and evolving. Its divisions concerned both its historical references and the racist and sexist "definition" of the Ukrainian nation ,as well as the conception of its relations with the West (EU, Israel, USA) and the relationship with violence and institutions. Neo-Nazi groups had an increased influence through their role in the "security service" of the demonstrations against the "Berkut " of the regime. However, the Ukrainian far right was very much a minority in electoral terms (although it crossed the 10 per cent threshold in 2014), over-represented in the interim government after the dismissal of Yanukovych. Early elections were held in May 2014, bringing the chocolate oligarch Petro Poroshenko to power. His "anti-terrorist operations" in the Donbass and his support for far-right militias stirred up dimensions of civil war. At the same time, the "pro-Russian" fascist mercenaries were instrumentalized by the Kremlin - giving the war its external dimension, although Putin sought to maintain his profile as a negotiator (in the Minsk meetings).

      The corrupt Ukrainian regime remained, despite its repressive excesses, an "oligarchic democracy" traversed by powerful and recurring social and political movements. The surprise election of the Jewish and Russian-speaking outsider Zelensky in 2019 was further proof of this, a sign of these "revolutions of dignity", such as Maidan, which the Putinist system feared like the plague.


      From hybrid war to war pure and simple

      In 2014, Putin did not want to annex the self-proclaimed "Republics" of Donetsk and Lugansk.

      As Daria Saburova points out : "To ensure control of its former semi-colony, Russia had […] more interest in the reintegration of the separatist territories by Ukraine on condition of the federalization of the country - no strategic decision could then be taken without the agreement of all the members of the federation - than in recognizing their independence or definitively attaching them to Russia, which is what the separatist leaders themselves wanted "

      In this context, the 2015 Minsk agreements (involving Merkel, Hollande, Ukrainian President Poroshenko and Putin) "included several points with a security component (ceasefire, withdrawal of heavy weapons, exchange of prisoners, restoration of the Ukrainian border) and a political component (amnesty for people involved in the separatist movement, constitutional reform of Ukraine establishing a principle of decentralization of power, recognition of a special status for the regions of Lugansk and Donetsk, organization of local elections)".

      From the impasse of the Minsk agreements to the Russian invasion

      They failed because the Russian government wanted to impose a constitutional federalization at its beck and call, without prior withdrawal of Russian troops. Asking for a “return” to these Agreements is to ignore not only the causes of their impasse, but also the changes in context and the effects produced by the war. On the eve of the 2022 invasion, Putin knew that NATO was “brain dead” after the pitiful withdrawal from Afghanistan and in view of the internal dissensions, particularly between the United States and several EU member states, including Germany, interested in importing Russian gas. In addition, the Zelensky government had lost its massive popularity, unable to implement its electoral promises (against corruption and for peace in the Donbass), and Biden had clearly told it that he did not want a war with Russia.

      Strategic annexations

      Putin launched the Special Military Operation with the hope of the rapid fall of the government in Kyiv and a "Crimea effect": a gain in popularity in Russia and towards the Russian-speaking populations of Ukraine by new annexations that he assumed would be as easy as in Crimea. He was wrong. The territorial "withdrawal" also maintains a strategic aim: from 2014, as Daria Saburova explains "The territorial conquests in the East and South of Ukraine" have "as their objective the creation of a land corridor from Crimea to Transnistria." .Now, the experience of the "forced Russification" of the occupied zones is a fact. [4] Finally, as Ilya Budraitskis says , the war is also "a cultural war against the population" (in Russia) itself. [5]

      The support of the Ukrainian left for the popular invention of "commons" in solidarity in the face of social attacks in order to better resist war is our guiding principle and source of "dignity" and hope. [6]

      5 September 2024

      Translated by International Viewpoint from l’Anticapitaliste.

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