Residents Of Cities In Russian North Feel Increasingly Insecure Because Of Shortage Of Policemen – OpEd

 March 9, 2026 

By Paul Goble

The shortage of policemen across the Russian Federation has hit residents of cities in the northern portions of that country especially hard and they say they no longer feel secure because there is little chance any police will show up if they call to report crimes, Denis Zagorye of The Barents Observer says. 

Most of the northern regions are suffering from even greater shortages of police than the national average, the journalist reports, citing both regional media (nord-news.ru/news/2026/03/02/?newsid=211461) and interviews with local people (ru.thebarentsobserver.com/zarezut-prihodite-na-severe-rossii-ne-hvataet-policejskih/446058).

The situation is deteriorating in most of them, but the regional governments lack the funds to do anything about it. Instead, Zagorye says, they are relying on Moscow to provide such moneys – but as of now, the central Russian government hasn’t, and people in the north are increasingly alarmed.  

It may very well be that the specter of “a police state without enough police” (jamestown.org/war-against-ukraine-leaving-russian-police-state-without-enough-police/)  will occur in the northern cities of Russia, places where private citizens disproportionately have their own weapons and may use them if they can no longer count on officials to protect them.

Russia Struggles To Find A Response To U.S.–Israel Attack On Iran – Analysis

March 5, 2026 

The Jamestown Foundation
By Dr. Pavel K. Baev


The U.S.–Israeli airstrikes against Iran that began on February 28 shocked Moscow. Russian experts argued that the narrow agenda of U.S.–Iranian talks in Geneva, focused on Iran’s nuclear enrichment, indicated U.S. preparations for a limited strike centered on Iranian nuclear assets as in June 2025 (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, February 26).

Some state-affiliated media speculated about low support for a military operation in the Middle East in the United States (Izvestiya, February 26). The Kremlin did not, at least publicly, anticipate the United States’ massive first strike on Iranian leadership (Kommersant, March 1). Russian President Vladimir Putin staged an emergency virtual meeting of his Security Council after the strikes. Unlike the usual protocol, the Kremlin did not publish a word on the proceedings (RIA Novosti, February 28).

Following the strikes, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement condemning U.S. and Israeli “aggression” (Russian Foreign Ministry, February 28). The Kremlin did not offer any material support despite its Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Iran, signed in January 2025 (Russian Foreign Ministry, October 2, 2025; Radio Svoboda, February 23). Russia’s clandestine delivery of air defense weapons to Iran over the past few years did not make much difference—the Kremlin cannot spare any significant number as the range and accuracy of Ukrainian missile strikes grow (Meduza, February 28). The foreign ministry statement does not mention the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which Iran joined in July 2023. The SCO hosted a multilateral military exercise, “Sahand-Anti-Terror,” in December 2025 (Vpoanalytics, December 10, 2025).

Moscow’s statement also does not reference BRICS, which Iran joined in January 2024. Iran has taken part in several naval exercises with its partners, including the “Maritime Security Belt” exercise with Russian and People’s Republic of China (PRC) combat ships in the Strait of Hormuz, just a week prior to the ongoing hostilities (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, February 19) [1][1]BRICS is a loose political-economic grouping originally comprised of Brazil, Russia, India, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and South Africa,…. Earlier this month, Nikolai Patrushev, the chair of the Russian Maritime Board and one of Putin’s old cronies, even predicted that BRICS exercises would deter Western “piracy” (AiF.ru, February 17).


The day of renewed U.S. attacks, France called for an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council. Russia quickly followed up, presenting the step as a joint initiative with the PRC (Interfax, February 28). The meeting was predictably inconclusive, but Russian envoy Vasily Nebenzya condemned the U.S.–Israeli attack in much stronger language than PRC ambassador Fu Cong, who merely communicated deep diplomatic concern (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, March 1). Nebenzya expressed particular outrage that the United States planned the attacks while engaging in negotiations with Iran, claiming that the United States “stabbed [Iran] in the back” (Komsomolskaya Pravda, March 1).

Some Russian tabloids suggest that this timing should be a warning to the Kremlin as it continues to engage in Geneva with the same duo of U.S. negotiators, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner (MK.ru, March 1). U.S.–Russia talks are presently on pause, and the plan to continue them in Abu Dhabi is probably off the table. The Kremlin, however, is repeatedly sending contradictory messages about its readiness to accept U.S. security guarantees for Ukraine and its intention to withdraw from the talks if Kyiv refuses to retreat from the Donetsk region (Radio Svoboda, February 28; Novaya Gazeta Evropa, March 1)


Moscow is most concerned about the effect of the ongoing U.S.–Israeli airstrikes on oil prices. Oil prices are always a matter of keen Russian interest, but, given Russia’s economic crisis and sanctions on its oil exports, it is currently a top priority (Izvestiya; Komsomolskaya Pravda, March 1). As the crisis of state finances keeps deepening, the Kremlin is cutting spending and raising taxes, risking economic stagnation (The Moscow Times, February 25).

An increase in Russian oil export revenues because of the strikes’ effect on the global supply may reduce the urgency of unpopular financial measures, but the relief will only be temporary. Damage to the Russian economy caused by the enormous costs of the Kremlin’s war of attrition against Ukraine is likely to turn into a long-term deformity (The Bell, February 23; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 26). Sanctions are squeezing the margins of profits of Russian oil exporters, who have to operate through multiple intermediaries and rely on the “shadow fleet” of tankers, another one of which was seized by Belgium last weekend (RBC, March 1).

For some Russian officials and oligarchs, the hostilities in Iran merely mean the end of tough competition with Iran in the PRC and Indian oil markets (Lenta.ru, February 25). For Russian President Vladimir Putin, however, these attacks are intensely personal. The attacks’ first target was Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei—Putin’s letter of condolences decried his “assassination” as a “cynical violation of all norms of human morality and international law” (The President of Russia, March 1).

Russian analysts and jingoist bloggers argue that the elimination of the top leadership cannot crack the solid foundation of the Iranian system of governance, and so the U.S. strategy of regime change is set to fail (Kommersant; TopWar.ru, March 1). These arguments are irrelevant for Putin, who is obsessed with personal safety and tolerates no elite dissent in his authoritarian, dictatorial system (Carnegie Politika, February 13). The story about the attempted Ukrainian drone strike on the Valdai presidential residence in late December was exposed as a crude fake, but the massive strike on Khamenei’s residence in Tehran has reignited Putin’s fears of a “decapitating” attack (Nastoyashee Vremya, January 5; Meduza, March 1).


There is speculation that Putin views the horrible death of the former Libyan ruler, Muammar Gaddafi, as a cautionary tale of the costs of regime change for authoritarian leaders. He may have tried to mitigate this possibility by granting sanctuary to former Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad. The United States’ capture of Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro appeared to be a particular case, but the extermination of Khamenei and his family may convince Putin that the United States is willing to kill or capture the leader of a disagreeable state. Putin’s fears could escalate to paranoia, which may not be conducive to making a peace deal for Ukraine. Putin likely hopes that the United States will be preoccupied with Iran for many weeks to come, which might ease pressure on him to accept a compromise short of his maximalist war aims. He cannot fail to see, nevertheless, that Russia’s inability to help one of its few remaining strategic partners exposes its war-aggravated weakness, which is a poor negotiating position. 

About the author: Dr. Pavel K. Baev is a senior researcher at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO).

Source: This article was published by The Jamestown Institute

The Jamestown Foundation

The Jamestown Foundation’s mission is to inform and educate policy makers and the broader community about events and trends in those societies which are strategically or tactically important to the United States and which frequently restrict access to such information. Utilizing indigenous and primary sources, Jamestown’s material is delivered without political bias, filter or agenda. It is often the only source of information which should be, but is not always, available through official or intelligence channels, especially in regard to Eurasia and

Azerbaijan’s Distancing From Russia May Lead To Former Soviet Space’s Demise – Analysis

NO GOD

 February 11, 2026

By Paul Goble

Russian President Vladimir Putin has suffered a major geopolitical defeat as a result of his full-scale invasion of Ukraine. He has accelerated the steps other former Soviet republics have been taking to distance themselves from Moscow (see EDM, July 22, 2025, February 3).

Nowhere have these moves been more fateful than in Azerbaijan. Baku now counts countries far beyond the borders of the former Soviet space other than Moscow as major partners. Azerbaijan’s relations with Moscow have sharply deteriorated over the last several years (see EDM, January 15, 2025, January 15).

As a result, there are signs that Azerbaijan may soon break with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), an organization that Moscow has long hoped would prevent post-Soviet states from moving away from Russia (Minval Politika). Baku has made steps to strengthen relations with other outside powers, such as the United States, Türkiye, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in particular (see EDM, May 1, 14, September 10, 2025, January 28). These strengthening relations are promoting the demise of the former Soviet space as a geopolitical reality and the unchallenged Russian sphere of influence, regardless of the relationships they maintain with Moscow. 

The limited territorial gains Putin has made as his expanded war in Ukraine enters its fifth year are far overshadowed by other developments. Not only have Russia’s losses in lives, treasure, and even legitimacy at home overshadowed this ongoing conflict, but its geopolitical defeats across the former Soviet space have been gaining traction. Country after country in the post-Soviet space have been distancing themselves from Moscow and breaking with, or at least not fully participating in, Moscow-organized structures such as the CIS. That has been recognized in Moscow and alarmed Russian analysts, who see it as a sign of Russia’s decline, even if it is sometimes ignored or downplayed in other capitals (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 11, 2023).

In the words of Russian journalist Stanislav Kucher back in 2023, what his country and the world are now witnessing is “the final collapse of the [Soviet Union] in the form of the departure of its ‘fragments’ from the orbit of the Russian Federation.” At present, he continues, “Russia has only one ally in the post-Soviet space: Belarus. The rest will either fence themselves off and arm themselves, or smile sweetly and then go ahead and arm themselves as well.” Given that, he concludes, “never before” has the CIS States been so meaningless and divided (Telegram/@StanislavKucher, December 7, 2023). Some of these have simply cut back their relationships with the CIS and Moscow, while others have slammed the door. The point, Kucher says, is they have left (see EDM, February 7, 2023).

Another Moscow expert, Aleksandr Dyukov of the Institute of Russian History, is even more despairing. He noted in November 2025 that the CIS has not achieved either of its two original purposes as a forum for “a civilized divorce” of the former union republics and as the basis of the maintenance of ties that had linked them together and could lead to the formation of a new union state (Svobodnaya Pressa, November 26, 2025).

Ever more of the former union republics are entering into relationships with each other and with other countries in ways that exclude Russia, Dyukov continues. Many of them are now its “competitors” rather than its “strategic partners,” however often they, or people in the Russian capital, say otherwise. Azerbaijan is a critically important example of this. It has built an alliance with Türkiye, thus becoming a competitor rather than an ally of Russia (see EDM, June 23, 2021). It will continue to act in that way even if its relations with Moscow should become more polite in the future.

There are compelling reasons for Dyukov’s pessimism. For over a decade, some in Baku have been calling for Azerbaijan to adopt a more independent line (Window on Eurasia, July 22, 2014). Both anger about Moscow’s overbearing language and actions, and especially Azerbaijan’s ever-closer ties with Türkiye and the United States, have fed those feelings. Relations with the United States have progressed through the U.S. role in brokering a settlement to Azerbaijan’s conflict with Armenia and through plans for the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) corridor, which will link Azerbaijan with the West.

Many in Baku are also celebrating U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance’s visit to the Caucasus this week (see EDM, August 12, 2025;Azernews, February 10). Just how far things have gone in that direction is reflected in an article by influential Baku foreign policy commentator A. Shakur, published on February 5 by the Minval outlet (Minval Politika, February 5). He writes, like aging actors who are of no interest to anyone but their aging fans, Russian officials have gone through the motions of trying to keep the CIS and the former Soviet space alive. In recent years, however, they have been capable “only of organizing informal summits” that the leaders of other countries may or may not attend. He pointedly notes that Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has missed the last two (seeEDM, January 15).

Shakur continues:

In the 1990s, both Moscow and the West seriously considered that the CIS would become the framework under which the former Soviet republics would merge into a new confederation or federation. Publicly, the organization was presented as ‘a civilized divorce;’ but in reality, repeated attempts were made to establish supranational structures within it (Minval Politika, February 5).

Since then, he argues, “the CIS itself has in effect entered a vegetative state.” It has been an organization Moscow has “continued to try to use to promote supranational elements, including in such seemingly harmless areas as the teaching of the Russian language in other countries,” but that has lost all real significance (see EDM, October 31, 2024).

Those efforts and meetings cannot hide the reality that the CIS is already half dead, he continues. The three Baltic countries were never members, Georgia and Ukraine have left after Moscow invaded them, and Moldova and Armenia are preparing to withdraw. According to him, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan may soon follow, given their problems with Russia (Minval Politika, February 5). If Azerbaijan leaves, such exits will become even more likely. That will be the end, because Moscow has few resources at present to do anything about this approaching end of the former Soviet space. Its economy is not doing well, and both its use of force against its neighbors and mistreatment of citizens of these countries in Russia are only driving ever more of these states away from Russia.

Equally, or perhaps even more important, Shakur continues, countries beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union are “strengthening their positions,” including, but not limited to, the Organization of Turkic States, the PRC, the European Union, and the United States (see EDM, February 19, October 23, November 19, 20, 2025, January 21, 28). Shakur points out that “Azerbaijan’s closest allies—Türkiye and Pakistan—are not CIS members—nor are many of its main economic partners” (see EDM, October 23, 2024; Minval Politika, February 5).

This prompts “a fundamental question,” the commentator says. “What practical purpose does the CIS have for Azerbaijan, especially given Russia’s continuing ambitions within it,” including the use of naked force as in Ukraine? “Has the time not come,” he then asks rhetorically, “for Baku to leave this platform altogether?” If it takes that step, Shakur suggests, that will do more than destroy the CIS. It will undermine the notion that the post-Soviet space is more relevant to the geopolitical calculations of other countries than the interests and location of its current or past members (Minval Politika, February 5). There are hopeful signs that this new thinking is spreading not only in Moscow but also in Western capitals.

• This article was published by The Jamestown Foundation

Dubai: The Emerging Financial Mecca – Analysis

December 29, 2025 
By Richard Rousseau


Throughout history, cities have attracted investors, artists, entrepreneurs, and wealthy individuals from beyond their native countries and regions. The Hanseatic cities of the 13th and 14th centuries, for example, were at the heart of the revival of trade at the end of the Middle Ages. They were also places where more freedom reigned. Genoa and Bruges took up the mantle from the 15th century onward. Starting in the 17th century, Geneva and Switzerland became popular destinations because of their freedom and security.

Beirut, in the Middle East, acquired the status of a financial center and a meeting point of cultures in the 1960s and ’70s. Starting in the 1980s, Singapore also played a key role as an economic and financial magnet in Asia. In recent years, Dubai and the United Arab Emirates have emerged as preferred destinations for investing and securing capital.
New global financial hub

In less than fifty years, Dubai has transformed from a regional trading port into one of the world’s most dynamic financial centers. It is now the leading financial center in the Middle East, surpassing Bahrain and Riyadh. This financial shift began in the 1990s and was solidified by the establishment of the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) in 2004. The DIFC is an offshore financial zone that operates under Anglo-Saxon law and is independent of the local legal system.

Dubai enjoys a stable political system and maintains excellent relations with the United States, Europe, China, and Russia. It is renowned for its high level of internal security and low crime rate. Its tax regime is competitive, offering no income tax, a moderate corporate tax rate of 9%, and total exemption within the DIFC zone. Thanks to these advantages, Dubai attracts wealthy individuals from the Gulf, India, Pakistan, and Africa, as well as Russian and Chinese families and, increasingly, European families. Privacy, the legal stability of the DIFC, and low corporate taxes further fuel this growth.

According to the British immigration consultancy Henley & Partners, the UAE has been top destination for high-net-worth individuals in 2025, with an anticipated 9,800 arrivals representing $63 billion in assets. This surpasses the United States (7,500 arrivals totaling $43.7 billion) and Switzerland (3,000 arrivals totaling $16.8 billion), putting the UAE far ahead of Singapore and Hong Kong. Over 130,500 millionaires have already settled in the UAE, including 81,000 in Dubai. Among them are 28 billionaires, which is a 98% increase from ten years ago.

For instance, Dubai is expected to surpass Paris, which has 160,100 millionaires and 22 billionaires. Wealthy families favor Dubai because they can easily establish themselves there. The city’s regulations are more flexible than those in Geneva, Singapore, or Hong Kong. Furthermore, Dubai offers all the amenities affluent individuals expect, including high-end services, a high-performing healthcare system, leisure activities, shopping malls, and luxury boutiques. The international airport provides access to capital cities worldwide, notably via Emirates, one of the world’s leading airlines.
dubai people cityThe Challenge of Islamic Finance

Dubai is competing with Kuala Lumpur to become the world capital of Islamic finance. The authorities also intend to establish the city as a hub for fintech companies to develop the crypto-asset market. Many cryptocurrency companies are leaving Hong Kong or London to establish a presence there. Within the DIFC, more than 8,000 financial institutions are present, employing 48,000 people. Twenty-seven of the world’s 29 most important banks have offices there, including five of the largest Chinese banks. JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, BlackRock, and others have also chosen Dubai.

Over the past ten years, the size of banking assets has grown 200% to reach $240 billion. The DIFC has also become a major insurance hub for Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. However, Dubai is not without its weaknesses. Its rapid, speculative growth leaves it vulnerable to price changes and corrections in the financial or real estate sectors. The financial market is not very diversified, with few local companies listed. Reputational risk persists due to money laundering and opaque capital flows. After putting the UAE under close watch for a period of time, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an intergovernmental organization established in 1989 at the behest of the G7 to formulate policies aimed at combating money laundering and safeguarding specific interests, decided to include it on its gray list for the years 2022–2025.

Although this designation has since been lifted, the threat remains. The UAE Ministry of the Interior has stated that it has handled 521 money laundering cases in recent years in collaboration with international organizations. Over one billion dollars has been seized. In 2023, Dubai implemented a low corporation tax and a 5% Value Added Tax (VAT) to set itself apart from offshore havens. Being named a tax haven is no longer mainly advantageous for the wealthy.

Dubai does not seek to supplant New York or London; rather, it is positioning itself as a premier worldwide financial hub, comparable to Singapore. Dubai is currently ranked 11th among financial cities, whereas Paris has the 18th position, Shanghai is 8th, and San Francisco is 5th.

Dubai’s rise is based on a strategy combining political stability, legal innovation, and international openness. While the Gulf city remains exposed to certain structural risks, it continues to attract talent and capital at an unprecedented rate. It is now establishing itself as an essential link in the financial geography of the 21st century.

Richard Rousseau, Ph.D., is an international relations expert. He was formerly a professor and head of political science departments at universities in Canada, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and the United Arab Emirates. His research interests include the former Soviet Union, international security, international political economy, and globalization. Dr. Rousseau's approximately 800 books, book chapters, academic journal and scholarly articles, conference papers, and newspaper analyses on a variety of international affairs issues have been published in numerous publications, including The Jamestown Foundation (Washington, D.C.), Global Brief, World Affairs in the 21st Century (Canada), Foreign Policy In Focus (Washington, D.C.), Open Democracy (UK), Harvard International Review, Diplomatic Courier (Washington, C.D.), Foreign Policy Journal (U.S.), Europe's World (Brussels), Political Reflection Magazine (London), Center for Security Studies (CSS, Zurich), Eurasia Review, Global Asia (South Korea), The Washington Review of Turkish and Eurasian Affairs, Journal of Turkish Weekly (Ankara), The Georgian Times (Tbilisi), among others.

SURENDER SAYS CZAR PUTIN

Putin warns of force if Ukraine rejects peace talks ahead of Trump-Zelenskyy meet

Putin said Russia would use force if Ukraine rejects peace talks after heavy attacks on Kyiv, while Zelenskyy said the strikes showed Moscow's desire to continue the war.



Russian President Vladimir Putin.

India Today World Desk
New Delhi,

Dec 28, 2025 

Russian President Vladimir Putin on Saturday said Moscow believed Kyiv was in no rush to end the conflict through peaceful means, warning that Russia would achieve all objectives of its so-called “special military operation” by force if diplomacy failed.

Putin’s remarks were reported by Russian state news agency TASS and came amid intensified Russian military action against Ukraine. The statement followed a massive overnight barrage in which Russia launched around 500 drones and 40 missiles at Kyiv and surrounding regions, killing at least one person and injuring about 27 others.
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Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said the prolonged, 10-hour bombardment was clear evidence that Moscow had no intention of ending the war it launched in February 2022, a conflict that has since claimed tens of thousands of lives.

The Kremlin earlier said Putin had visited a Russian military command post, where he received briefings from Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov and commanders overseeing the “Centre” and “East” groupings of Russian forces. Russian officials later claimed fresh territorial gains, saying their troops had captured towns in Ukraine’s Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia regions.

Zelenskyy is set to meet US President Donald Trump in Florida on Sunday, as discussions continue on possible pathways to end the nearly four-year-long war. Talks are expected to include security guarantees and territorial disputes, particularly in Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia.


WHAT ZELENSKYY SAID

Zelenskyy arrived in Canada on Saturday for talks, en route to his meeting with Trump, just hours after Russia pummelled Kyiv with drones and missiles in its latest attack on the capital.

Later the same day, Russia claimed further advances along different sections of the frontline. Zelenskyy said the renewed assault underscored Russia’s unwillingness to pursue peace, calling the attacks “Russia’s answer to our peace efforts.”

He reiterated that Ukraine remains committed to a diplomatic resolution, but said Moscow’s actions showed it was determined to prolong the war.

WHAT CANADA PM SAID

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney on Saturday said achieving lasting peace in Ukraine would require cooperation from Russia, strongly condemning the latest Russian strikes on Kyiv as “barbaric.”

“We have the conditions for a just and lasting peace, but that requires a willing Russia,” Carney said, according to AFP, while speaking during a stop in Halifax, Nova Scotia, on his way to meet Trump in Florida.

Carney also announced CAN$2.5 billion (US$1.82 billion) in new economic assistance for Ukraine, saying the funds would help unlock international financing needed to begin rebuilding the country even as the war continues.

- Ends

Arms Control Putin-Style Goes Nowhere – Analysis

December 28, 2025 
The Jamestown Foundation
By Dr. Pavel K. Baev

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s offer on September 22 to extend the limitations on the strategic nuclear forces set by the Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START) between the United States and Russian Federation appeared reasonable and meaningful (U.S. State Department, April 8, 2010; President of Russia, April 8, 2010, September 22).

New START is due to expire on February 5, 2026, and even experts in Moscow who are loath to join the ranks of “patriotic” drum-beaters found Putin’s proposition timely and useful (Kommersant, October 7). The Kremlin, however, did not pursue follow-up actions. Deputy Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov sourly confirmed the failure of opening a dialogue on that traditional high-priority track, despite Russian media celebrating Putin’s offer and U.S. President Donald Trump saying that extending NEW START sounded like a good idea (TASS, October 5; Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, December 8).

Putin’s offer has now all but disappeared. The only trace of it is in the leaked memo, known as the “28-point plan,” which was published in all Russian mainstream media (Kommersant, November 21). Russian experts pointed out a mistake in point 17, which confused New START with START I, stating, “The United States and Russia will agree to extend the validity of treaties on the non-proliferation and control of nuclear weapons, including the START I Treaty.” Russian media concluded that the document was an “odd hybrid” of various drafts prepared by incompetent mediators (Rossiiskaya gazeta, November 21). It is unclear whether this point—or the reference to the long-expired treaty—will survive the presumed reduction of the peace plan to 20 points or its division into four separate packages (RBC, December 8). The absence of any mention of strategic arms control in the new U.S. National Security Strategy is clear. Russian commentators appeared to find this omission flabbergasting (Vedomosti, December 5; Kommersant, December 7). Following the document’s publication, the Russian Foreign Ministry expressed disappointment at the lack of a U.S. vision for maintaining the balance of strategic forces (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 8).

Nuclear deterrence has traditionally been central to Russian security thinking. The Russian National Security Strategy approved by Putin in July 2021 places great emphasis on maintaining strategic stability. It prescribes maintaining nuclear capabilities at a level sufficient for neutralizing growing threats, which it claims are caused by the U.S. dismantlement of the system of arms control (Russian Security Council, July 2, 2021). The new Russian Nuclear Doctrine, approved in November 2024, elaborates on this priority and defines conditions for a decision on the first use of nuclear weapons (President of Russia, November 19, 2024). The Kremlin’s preoccupation with nuclear matters came into focus when the Russian Security Council convened an emergency meeting on November 5 to deliberate an appropriate response to Trump’s presumed order to resume nuclear testing (see EDM, November 3; President of Russia, November 5). Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov omitted Russian violations of various agreements when he claimed that the United States would breach the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1996) (Kommersant, November 5)

That misunderstanding about nuclear testing has been mostly cleared up. The problem of Russia seeking status as an equal nuclear power to the United States, however, remains. The Kremlin’s desire for a leading role on the world stage is underpinned by sustained efforts at modernizing its nuclear arsenal (Rossiiskaya gazeta, December 8). Much of the new U.S. National Security Strategy denies Russia the status of a major global power in the emerging multipolar world, not least due to its full-scale invasion of Ukraine (Nezavisimaya gazeta, December 7). From this perspective, Russia’s role is reduced, and it is uncertain where a possible end to the hostilities will leave Russia (Vzglyad, December 9).

Putin has sought to counter this challenge by simultaneously narrowing and widening the agenda of the ongoing peace talks (see Jamestown, November 26). The former is achieved by focusing peace negotiations on the demand to award Russia the unconquered part of Ukraine’s Donetsk oblast (Republic.ru, December 3). The latter is attempted by impressing upon Washington, D.C., the importance of discussions on strategic stability, primarily by announcing tests of new weapon systems, such as the Burevestnik cruise missile and the Poseidon unmanned underwater vehicle, both nuclear-powered and capable of carrying nuclear warheads (Profile, November 11). The Kremlin has proposed a range of presumably lucrative joint projects, including constructing a tunnel connecting Alaska and Chukotka, to persuade the United States to look beyond what the Kremlin perceives as pesky details of territorial exchanges (Izvestiya, October 20).

Putin’s offer to stick to the limits set by New START was not as far-fetched as the Bering Sea tunnel, and it probably had a hidden agenda. Putin did not suggest an exchange of data or a resumption of verification procedures, which were affected by his February 2023 decree suspending Russia’s participation in New START (President of Russia, February 21, 2023; Forbes.ru, September 25). Moscow has no reason to suspect that U.S. nuclear arms will exceed the agreed-upon ceilings, but it probably seeks to hide the shrinking of its arsenal to well below the limits. The only part of the hugely expensive modernization program that is on track, with only slight delays, is the construction of Borei-class submarines. Putin inaugurated the eighth one (Knyaz’ Pozharsky, Князь Пожарский) in July, which joined the Northern Fleet without performing the mandatory launch of the Bulava missile (see EDM, May 30; President of Russia, July 24; Korabel.ru, August 3). Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces need to retire all of the old heavy intercontinental missiles (SS-18 and SS-19) and the lighter Topol (SS-25) as well, but the new Sarmat (SS-X-29) missile, which Putin announced as ready for deployment in March 2018, failed one test in September 2024 and exploded early in another one on November 28 (Meduza, September 25, 2024; Verstka.media, November 28). Russia’s Long-Range Aviation, which has performed hard combat missions since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, is currently in an even worse state. Poor maintenance has caused many incidents—including the crash of a Tu-22M3 bomber in the Irkutsk oblast last April—while a dozen planes were destroyed and many more seriously damaged in Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb on June 1 (Meduza, April 2; The Moscow Times, June 6). Current production levels of the Tu-160 bombers at the Kazan plant reach only a couple of planes a year, while the PAK-DA project for the stealth bomber has been postponed indefinitely (Radio Svoboda, June 28; 1.ru, September 20).

The scarcity of data due to wartime Russian censorship obscures the true scale of these setbacks. Putin is keen to deny the degradation of Russia’s strategic arsenal by both engaging in nuclear posturing and demonstrating readiness to discuss issues pertaining to strategic stability. This performance is aimed not only at the United States and Europe, but also at the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The PRC is building up its deterrence capabilities and presented many new weapon systems during its Victory Day parade on September 3, marking the end of World War II, which Putin attended (see China Brief, October 1; Top War, November 10). The PRC has so far refused to engage in any talks on limiting its nuclear arsenal. Moscow cannot embrace the PRC as a party to a treaty prohibiting the first use of nuclear weapons, but instead hopes that Beijing would approve its intention to preserve the framework of New START (RIAC, July 14).

Putin’s offer to extend New START reflects a deeper struggle to achieve recognition for Russia’s status as a global power and a peer competitor to the United States. The Kremlin cannot, nevertheless, develop any innovative framework to address the rapid progress in aeronautics, space, and information/artificial intelligence technologies, which are increasingly foreign to its defense-industrial base. These constraints make performative gestures an important tool for projecting strength and relevance as “European allies enjoy a significant hard power advantage over Russia by almost every measure, save nuclear weapons” (The White House, December 4). This reality may compel Putin to resort to nuclear brinksmanship even more often.

About the author: Dr. Pavel K. Baev is a senior researcher at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO).

Source: This article was published by The Jamestown Foundation

The Jamestown Foundation

The Jamestown Foundation’s mission is to inform and educate policy makers and the broader community about events and trends in those societies which are strategically or tactically important to the United States and which frequently restrict access to such information. Utilizing indigenous and primary sources, Jamestown’s material is delivered without political bias, filter or agenda. It is often the only source of information which should be, but is not always, available through official or intelligence channels, especially in regard to Eurasia and terrorism.

If Europe wants war with Russia, 'we are ready': Putin

Issued on: 02/12/2025 - 

Russian President Vladimir Putin said Tuesday that Russia was "ready" for war if Europe seeks one, accusing Europe of trying to sabotage a deal on the Ukraine conflict before he met with US envoys. FRANCE 24's Gulliver Cragg reports from Kyiv.

Video by:  Gulliver CRAGG

Flaws In Putin’s Art Of No-Deal For Peace Become Apparent – Analysis

December 3, 2025 

The Jamestown Foundation
By Pavel K. Baev


Frantic negotiations for a truce in Russia’s 45-month-long war against Ukraine in the last two weeks of November are likely to continue late into December. U.S. negotiators have faced backlash from other Western leaders following the November 19 leak of a draft U.S.–Russian peace proposal that heavily favored Moscow.

Leaked phone calls between top Kremlin advisers Yuri Ushakov and Kirill Dmitriev and between Ushakov and U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff heightened the controversy (Carnegie Politika, November 27). Ukrainians were shocked by Witkoff’s readiness to integrate many Russian demands into the 28-point proposal. The initial proposal was at least partly drafted during a meeting between unofficial U.S. advisor Jared Kushner, Witkoff, and Dmitriev (The Insider; Reuters, November 26). European leaders were angered by their exclusion from the drafting process. They took issue with the proposed appropriation of frozen Russian financial assets, the majority of which are in European banks and remain a matter of internal debate in the European Union (Meduza, November 21).

Several rounds of revisions and Ukrainian input have curtailed and clarified the now roughly 19-point proposal, which Witkoff is set to present to Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow this week (RBC, November 28). The problem for Putin is that rejecting this updated plan could antagonize U.S. President Donald Trump. Suggesting changes would mean accepting the basic framework of the updated draft, which reportedly dismisses aspects of the Russian demand to address “root causes” of the war by increasing the number of troops that Ukraine is allowed to keep and potentially leaving the question of Ukraine’s future North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership open (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, November 26).

Even the initial 28-point plan departed from many of the Kremlin’s maximalist demands that it has presented as non-negotiable since the start of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which some hyper-nationalist Russian commentators criticized (Topwar.ru, November 24). The initial leaked plan’s ceiling of 600,000 for Ukrainian troops—which Kyiv rejects as a matter of principle—is seven times higher than Moscow’s original demand. Without any restrictions on key weapon systems, Ukraine’s army could become a “steel porcupine,” extensively armed to deter further Russian aggression (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, November 23).

The stance that Putin appears to assume to avoid further compromises is the demand for a full retreat of the Ukrainian forces from the Donetsk oblast, justified by the assumption that continued steady Russian advances are inevitable (Izvestiya, November 27). The real situation in the battle for Pokrovsk is somewhat different from the triumphant reports from Chief of the Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov, but what matters for Putin’s intention to delay genuine peace talks is the assumption that giving up Ukrainian-held territory is unacceptable to Kyiv (The Insider, November 28).



Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy may nevertheless be compelled—amid a very difficult domestic political situation—to take the risk of agreeing to withdraw from Donbas on the condition of Russian retreat from smaller occupied territories in the Dnipro, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, and Sumy regions, if a “stabilization force” of European “coalition of the willing” is deployed, backed by strong U.S. security guarantees (The Moscow Times, November 25; Radio Svoboda, November 27). This diplomatic maneuver is likely to be resented by Ukrainian troops, but their anger can be redirected toward Putin, who is loath to accept any conditions that would ensure Ukraine’s sovereignty and its anchoring to Europe (Novaya Gazeta Europe, November 28).

The main incentive Witkoff can offer Putin to show greater flexibility is the prospect of a new meeting with Trump. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán said during his Moscow visit last Friday that Budapest would be a perfect place to make a peace deal (Izvestiya, November 29). Russian public opinion is ready to accept a cessation of hostilities as a “victory,” and some mainstream pundits are advancing arguments for the benefits of preserving the Kremlin’s territorial gains, even if incomplete, and for rehabilitating the new provinces and restoring Russia’s strength (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, November 24). The Kremlin’s war of attrition has depleted Russia’s human and financial resources, and many regions are reducing payments to sign up for contracts to serve in the war zone (see EDM, October 21; Radio Svoboda, November 30). Underfunding for infrastructure inevitably results in various breakdowns, with the serious damage to the space launch site at the Baikonur cosmodrome in Kazakhstan and the failed test of the Sarmat intercontinental missile just two examples (Naked Science, November 29; The Moscow Times, November 30).

Putin may have a more positive view of Russia’s economic performance than most experts, but the enforcement of new U.S. sanctions against Rosneft and Lukoil has clearly upset him (Kommersant, November 28). The sharp drop in oil export revenues is a serious setback for government efforts to slow the rapidly rising budget deficit, but Putin appears to be less concerned about macroeconomic impacts and more concerned about the unexpected application of U.S. sanctions (Glavportal, November 26). Putin

Putin appears to hope for a swift resumption of unimpeded economic relations with the United States. The drafts disregard EU reservations about lifting sanctions, and the initial 28-point draft contained the odd provision that all “ambiguities of the last 30 years” would be considered settled (Vedomosti, November 21). Corrupt and sanctioned “oligarchs” with close ties to Putin, such as Yuri Kovalchuk and Gennady Timchenko, have already begun discussing new joint ventures, including access to gas fields and rare-earth metals, with anonymous U.S. partners (The Moscow Times, November 30). Ukraine, in the meantime, has expanded its war against the Russian energy sector by directly hitting two tankers of the Russian “shadow fleet” in the Black Sea with naval drones (Vzglyad, November 29).

Putin makes proposals for an end to his war so beneficial for Russia that they are unacceptable for Kyiv, and attempts to blame Ukraine for the lack of peace. This art of no-deal has repeatedly been exposed as fraud through determined efforts by Zelenskyy, his many allies in Europe, and some politicians and experts in Washington. Profits from doing business with Russia are a mirage—the economic environment in Putin’s militarized autocracy would remain, even after a hypothetical ceasefire, harsh and severely corrupt. No beautiful peace can come from the ugly war that makes a lot of sense for the ageing dictator in the Kremlin. If Putin’s calculus is altered by consistent and collective Western pressure, however, a difficult compromise could be reached that would neutralize his obsession with subjugating Ukraine.

About the author: Dr. Pavel K. Baev is a senior researcher at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO).

Source: This article was published by The Jamestown Foundation



The Jamestown Foundation

The Jamestown Foundation’s mission is to inform and educate policy makers and the broader community about events and trends in those societies which are strategically or tactically important to the United States and which frequently restrict access to such information. Utilizing indigenous and primary sources, Jamestown’s material is delivered without political bias, filter or agenda. It is often the only source of information which should be, but is not always, available through official or intelligence channels, especially in regard to Eurasia and terrorism.