Libyan Marshal Haftar's intelligence chief killed in Benghazi car bombing

Copyright AP Photo

By Aleksandar Brezar

Published on 12/08/2026 - EURONEWS

Fawzi al-Mansouri was assassinated outside a mosque in an LNA stronghold, in what analysts said was a major blow to the Haftar family's security credentials and could delay a US-brokered plan to reunify Libya's rival governments. No group has claimed responsibility.

The head of military intelligence for the Libyan National Army (LNA) led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar has been killed in a car bombing in Benghazi, authorities confirmed on Tuesday

Fawzi al-Mansouri was assassinated on Monday when an explosive stuck to his car detonated as he was leaving a local mosque at night, the statement said.

Al-Mansouri was a senior figure within the LNA's intelligence apparatus and had close ties to the Haftar family.

He played a key role in the LNA's campaign against jihadist groups, including the so-called Islamic State group (IS), between 2014 and 2017 in eastern Libya.

Al-Mansouri, whom the LNA described as a "heroic martyr," was also a leading figure during Haftar's 2019 offensive to seize the capital Tripoli in an operation backed by Russia and Egypt.

Haftar's offensive was eventually beaten back by forces loyal to the Tripoli government, which was in turn supported by Turkey.

Khaled Haftar, the son of Khalifa and LNA's chief of the general staff, said in a statement that an investigation was opened, adding that "indicators point to a despicable terrorist tactic".

"Terrorism is a project targeting the entire region, not just Libya," the statement added.

The bombing was a setback to efforts by the Haftars to paint a picture of stability in the areas they control.

"An attack of this sophistication in an LNA stronghold is also a major blow to the group's security credentials," analyst with UK-based Verisk Maplecroft Hamish Kinnear said.

"The intelligence required to target such a high-profile figure successfully is indicative of significant capabilities on the part of the responsible actor," Kinnear added.

Authorities have yet to identify the perpetrators.

Tripoli government condemns 'terrorist attack'

Libya has been split between rival administrations since NATO's intervention helped topple Muammar Gaddafi in 2011.

Two governments are currently vying for power: the UN-recognised administration in Tripoli, led by Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibah, and a rival administration in Benghazi backed by the elder Haftar, who is considered the de facto ruler.

Dbeibah has governed since 2021 following a UN-brokered political agreement but without a fresh electoral mandate, as a planned December 2021 election was cancelled amid disputes over candidate eligibility and the legal basis for the vote.

His government has faced sustained domestic opposition, including protests in Tripoli earlier this year over electricity cuts.

Related

• Libya’s strongman with friends in high places: All you ever wanted to know about Khalifa Haftar
• Tripoli erupts in protests over power cuts with calls to topple government

A former Gaddafi general and close ally who defected and lived in the US for nearly two decades before returning to Libya after 2011, Haftar built the LNA into the main force in the east and south.

FILE: Libyan army forces and vehicles are stationed in a street in the capital Tripoli, 22 July 222 AP Photo

The Tripoli-based government issued a statement denouncing a "terrorist attack" against al-Mansouri, saying it condemned the killing "regardless of one party's positions or alliances".

Khaled's office later said in a statement that authorities arrested a "terrorist cell in Benghazi that was preparing to carry out acts of sabotage" but did not say whether it was linked with al-Mansouri's killing.

Authorities in Benghazi held al-Mansouri's funeral on Tuesday afternoon, publishing photos that showed armed men in military fatigues with the attendance of senior LNA officials at the ceremony, including Khaled and Saddam Haftar.

In a statement, the LNA said it would "not cease fighting terrorism and will continue our struggle for the stability and security of Libya, as well as for the unification of its institutions".

US wants Saddam to take over Libya?

Libya holds Africa's largest proven oil reserves, which have fuelled both sides of the political divide.

Yet efforts remain under way to unify the country's executive powers under a Washington-mediated plan that the LNA has publicly backed.

Under the leaked terms of the plan, Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibah would remain in charge of the Tripoli-based government while Lieutenant General Saddam Haftar — also Khalifa's son — would be elevated to a senior national executive role, possibly heading a unified presidential structure.

Saddam Haftar was appointed deputy commander-in-chief of the LNA in August 2025 as part of a restructuring that effectively distributed operational command among Khalifa's main heirs.

FILE: Deputy Commander of the LNA, Lt Gen Saddam Haftar looks on during his meeting with the Greek foreign minister in Athens, on Monday, 15 June 2026 AP Photo

"None of this bodes well for a US plan to re-unify Libya," Kinnear said, adding that under the roadmap, neither side "is likely to be satisfied with their respective positions for long".

"A new, destabilising power struggle could soon emerge."

Libya expert Jalel Harchaoui said the killing would "disrupt, or at the very least delay" the US-brokered deal.

"The agreement rests on two premises: that security reigns supreme in Benghazi, and that for senior officers, loyalty to Saddam (Haftar's son and heir apparent) guarantees protection in the Benghazi stronghold," Harchaoui explained

But "a bomb that kills the head of military intelligence as he leaves a mosque undermines these premises," he said.

Meanwhile, reunification would "require some gestures of openness toward reform and change within the army", Harchaoui concluded.

Africa Corps Work At Libyan Air Bases Raises Concerns

 
File photo of Russia deploying fighter jets to Libya to support Russian state-sponsored private military contractors operating on the ground there. Photo Credit: U.S. Africa Command

August 12, 2026
By Africa Defense Forum

Key Takeaways:

Russia is expanding its military infrastructure and presence at six Libyan air bases (including Al-Jufra, Al-Khadim, and Maaten al-Sarra), using them as hubs for weapons, personnel, and operations after losing its Syrian transit role

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Bases such as Maaten al-Sarra and Al-Khadim enable Russia to supply arms and support operations in the Sahel, Sudan, and Central African Republic, while complicating Libya’s unification efforts.

Recent construction (hangars, housing, defenses, and runway upgrades) and the presence of Russian personnel and mercenaries demonstrate a sustained effort to deepen Moscow’s foothold in North Africa.

Russian work at six Libyan air bases shows that Moscow is expanding its military foothold in North Africa, while transferring weapons, mercenaries and other fighters to war zones.

Russia is planning, funding, building and offering personnel to complete infrastructure projects at six Libyan air bases: Al-Jufra, Al-Khadim, Al-Qardabiyah, Brak al-Shati, Maaten al-Sarra and Tamanhint, according to the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency’s Tearline Project.

The air bases are scattered throughout the country and hold an array of military equipment, including air defense systems, MiG-29 fighter planes and drones. Russian military personnel and mercenaries operate them. Russia also reportedly plans to invest in Tobruk Port and Tobruk Air Base.

Russia used Syria as a Middle Eastern transit hub for equipment, weapons and personnel until the fall of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad in December 2024. The Kremlin then pivoted to Libya. After Russia initially failed to secure a port in Libya, it expanded inland.

“The Maaten al-Sarra airbase provides a key example,” wrote Frank Talbot, nonresident senior fellow with the North Africa Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Rafid Hariri Center & Middle East program. “This strategically located airbase near the borders with Chad and Sudan is a staging point for Russia’s destabilizing operations across the Sahel.”

The air base in southern Libya sat abandoned since 2011 until Russia deployed Syrian soldiers to reestablish it in December 2024. The Kremlin can directly supply Burkina Faso, Mali and Sudan from Maaten al-Sarra, Italian news agency Agenzia Nova reported. Russian technicians and Syrian troops have restored runways and warehouses at the base.

“A Russian presence at Matan al-Sarra would provide Moscow with the ability to ship arms to Sudanese or Chadian territory quietly,” analyst Andrew McGregor wrote for The Jamestown Foundation’s Eurasia Daily Monitor online publication.

Russia’s military presence in Libya also is hindering Tripoli’s fragile unification process by stifling efforts to expel foreign troops and mercenaries. “It remains an obstacle to a lasting peace settlement, enabling foreign-backed domestic factions to resist peace efforts,” analyst Ali Bin Musa wrote for the Middle East Council on Global Affairs.

Located about 100 kilometers east of Benghazi, the Al-Khadim air base has been used as a hub for conducting operations, supplying arms, and trafficking resources in and out of the restive region, including delivering weapons to Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces during the country’s civil war.

Last year, three new hangars, a recreational center, a possible communications tower, and potential temporary housing units or support buildings were built at the base, Tearline reported. What appear to be barracks were added in 2026.

In 2025, All Eyes on Wagner, an open-source investigative project, documented the travels of a man working for Gazprom, a Russian energy company. The man had traveled from Al-Khadim to a Russian-controlled mine in the Central African Republic in 2023 and posted pictures of his journey on Instagram.

“Al Kadim itself appears to be hosting Russian personnel regularly,” Tearline reported. “Using social media geolocation tools, we were able to identify a Russian citizen deployed on al Kadim.” The person was an officer with Russia’s 102nd Motorized Rifle Infantry Division.

Russian paramilitary forces have used the Al-Jufra Air Base in central Libya since 2019. Recent upgrades to the base include renovated hangars and the construction of small buildings, fences, berms and sheds, according to Tearline.

Russian forces first were observed at Al-Qardabiyah Air Base in 2022. The base is attached to Sirte International Airport. Russian forces built new infrastructure, refurbished runways and set up “new perimeter defenses” at Al-Quardabiyah in 2024, The Telegraph reported. A hangar was repaired at the base this year.

Since March 2024, Russian forces have expanded their operations at Brak al‑Shati Air Base in central-southwest Libya. At least one new hangar and two buildings likely used for aircraft maintenance have been built recently, according to Tearline. The number of Russian personnel at the base has increased from 300 to 450 since December 2024.

By mid-2023, Russia’s Wagner Group mercenaries, which preceded the Africa Corps, reportedly used the Tamanhint Air Base in southern Libya to launch military operations and facilitate arms shipments to Sudan. Expansion projects, including likely new housing quarters, a resurfaced road connecting a runway to hangars and runway modifications have been reported recently.

 

The Russia, Ukraine drone war shifts to crippling ports

The escalating drone war between Russia and Ukraine has shifted to crippling ports and as the missile gap between the two adversiries narrows, both sides are feeling the pain. / bne IntelliNewsFacebook

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By Ben Aris in Berlin August 1, 2026

Ukraine's long-range drone campaign has entered a new phase, shifting from attacks on Russia's military infrastructure to systematic strikes on the commercial ports, grain terminals and oil export facilities that underpin both Moscow's wartime economy and Kazakhstan's energy exports.

Russia has countered by targeting Ukraine’s six commercial ports of which Odesa is the key transport asset that accounts for two thirds of Ukraine’s seaborne exports by volume and half by value.

Both Ukraine’s and Russia’s ports have already been brought to standstills that will hurt export revenues and has already caused Ferrexpo, a leading Ukrainian metallurgical plant, to shut down production as its warehouses are full to bursting. Russian exports of oil are likely to be impacted as well, although it has several alternative export channels to ease the pressure.

Attacks are escalating as part of the unfolding brutal tit-for-tat missile war and have simultaneously disrupted Russia's two most important Black Sea export businesses: agricultural exports and crude oil shipments.

On July 30, the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) again suspended tanker loadings at its marine terminal near Novorossiysk after Ukrainian drones struck two oil tankers waiting to load crude. Hours earlier, Ukrainian analyst Kyrylo Shevchenko reported that Russian attacks on Ukrainian ports and Ukraine's own strikes on Russian grain terminals had left both sides' Black Sea trade under increasing pressure.

Kyiv is widening its economic warfare strategy beyond refineries to target the logistics network that moves Russia's most valuable exports. As IntelliNews reported, Ukraine's strategy of attacking Russia’s oil refineries has settled into a routine of damage, repair and restart that make for spectacular headlines, but after having reduced the throughput by an estimated 45%, according to the Financial Times, has seen the fuel crisis abate in the last weeks as Russia imports petrol from friendly states such as Belarus, Kazakhstan and India. As oil analyst Sergey Vakulenko put it in a recent paper: Russia oil refinery sector is battered but not broken.

Vakhtang Partsvania argued in a comment for Riddle Russia that Bankova, Ukraine’s presidential administration, has become dissatisfied with its previous strategy of hitting oil refineries is working terminals, such as the week-long attacks on Primorsk and Ust-Luga, which temporarily reduce traffic, but the damage can be quickly repaired and the port soon goes back to work, as tank farms are designed to lose individual tanks rather than whole facilities, and loadings usually resume once pipeline and rail links survive, says Partsvania.

The Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) has refined its strategy, using new and more accurate long-range “sanctions”, as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has taken to calling them: Ukraine has been aiming at the more sophisticated and difficult to replace equipment in the refineries that is starting to put them out of action completely. For example, the Moscow refinery was hit in May and will not come back online until the start of next year, Reuters reports.

Economic costs mount

With its limited access to the sea, the Russian counteroffensive is hurting Ukraine more than the pain Ukraine is inflicting on Russia. Every day that Greater Odesa's ports remain idle costs an estimated $70mn in delayed exports, according to Shevchenko. In June alone the three ports handled $2.1bn of exports out of Ukraine's total monthly exports of $3.5bn.

During the first half of 2026, 34mn tonnes of cargo—roughly two-thirds of Ukraine's total exports of 50.7mn tonnes—passed through Greater Odesa, which also handles around 60% of Ukraine's cross-border cargo traffic. Russian attacks have already eliminated roughly one-third of Ukraine's Black Sea grain export capacity. That comes at a time where the Ministry of Finance (MinFin) already says there is a $20bn hole in the budget thanks to inflated defence costs.

Still, the pain to Russia is also significant, at a time when its economy has slowed sharply and the budget deficit is swelling alarmingly. Three of the country's largest Black Sea grain terminals—NZT and KSK in Novorossiysk and ZTKT at Taman, together capable of handling more than 20mn tonnes annually—have restricted truck deliveries following repeated Ukrainian drone attacks. According to Shevchenko, operations at Taman have effectively stopped, while shipping through the Sea of Azov has largely frozen.

The impact is now starting to show up in the export statistics. Russian wheat exports in July fell to just 1.5mn tonnes, their lowest monthly level since 2017 and roughly one-third below the same month last year. The decline threatens between $10bn and $15bn of annual grain trade if disruptions continue. Moscow is exploring alternative export routes through the Baltic and Caspian Seas, but Shevchenko says there is so far little evidence that those corridors are absorbing the lost Black Sea volumes.

CPC in the firing line

The innocent bystander in this slugfest is Kazakhstan which sends 80% of its oil to international markets via the CPC pipeline and the Russian port of Novorossiysk.

The CPC said drones struck the Marshall Islands-flagged tanker Nissos Sifnos, which was loading Tengiz crude from the consortium's Single Point Mooring-3 at the weekend. The attack ignited a fire near the vessel's cargo manifolds before being extinguished by the crew with assistance from three CPC support vessels.

A second tanker, the Isle of Man-flagged Marathi, was attacked around six nautical miles from the terminal while approaching to load. CPC said neither vessel suffered casualties or oil spills and both remained afloat, but loading operations were suspended once again while inspections continue.

The consortium made an unusually pointed political statement, noting that the attacks had occurred despite repeated appeals from Astana and other international shareholders—including approaches made through the US State Department—calling for international energy infrastructure not to be targeted.

The terminal occupies a unique position in Eurasian energy markets. Although located on Russia's Black Sea coast, the 1,511km CPC pipeline primarily exports crude from western Kazakhstan. Its shareholders include Transneft, KazMunayGas, and subsidiaries of Chevron (NYSE: CVX), ExxonMobil (NYSE: XOM), Lukoil and a Rosneft-Shell joint venture. Every disruption therefore affects Kazakhstan's export revenues as much as Russia's, highlighting the increasingly international economic consequences of the conflict.

Taken together, the Black Sea has become one of the war's principal economic battlefields on a par with the twin closure of the global chokepoints of Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab at the end of the Red Sea.

For much of the conflict, Ukraine focused on breaking Russia's naval blockade and reopening its own export corridor from Odesa. Russia, meanwhile, repeatedly attacked Ukrainian port infrastructure in an effort to choke Kyiv's agricultural and metal exports and the Ukrainian economy is already beginning to shut down as a result. Ukraine continues to lose export revenue every day its ports are disrupted, while Russia's own grain terminals, oil export infrastructure and shipping are increasingly exposed to Zelenskiy’s long-range “sanctions” after the formal EU and US sanctions have delivered little to pressure Putin into talks.

Despite Russia’s clear advantage in the drones vs missiles arms race and Kyiv’s nearly exhausted supply of PAC-3 interceptor missiles, neither side appears capable of protecting its commercial maritime infrastructure completely. Both now face the same difficult choice: absorb the economic cost of interrupted trade or reroute exports through longer, more expensive overland and alternative maritime corridors.

The result is that the economic war in the Black Sea is becoming increasingly symmetrical. At the same time Ukraine’s missile development programme is also rapidly closing the gap with Russia as new classes of long-range and more powerful missiles appear such as the famed Flamingo cruise missile, which is already in service, and the F-9, Ukraine’s first true cruise missile, that is expected to appear at the end of this year.

What began as an attempt to blockade Ukraine's exports has evolved into a contest in which ports, grain terminals, oil tankers and shipping lanes on both sides of the sea have become legitimate military targets, raising the cost of trade for Moscow and Kyiv alike.

Ukrainian Drone Attacks On Refineries Far From Only Threat To Russia’s Oil Industry – Analysis


An oil refinery in Kstovo, in Russia's Nizhny Novgorod region, is seen burning after a Ukrainian strike. Photo Credit: Generalstaff.ua, RFE/RL

July 31, 2026
By Paul Goble

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian refineries have sparked a country-wide gas shortage and cost Moscow significant export earnings. They are far from the only threat to Russia’s oil industry. Other, less dramatic threats are likely to prove more significant.

Much of Russia’s pipeline network and tanker capacity, dating from Soviet times, is aging and increasingly prone to leaks, reducing the flow of oil to refineries and export markets on which the Kremlin relies while fueling growing anger among Russians.

As older fields are exhausted, Russia is being forced to develop new ones in the Far North, where global warming threatens infrastructure and collapse and requires money Moscow lacks or refuses to spend to prevent new disasters.

Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian refineries have sparked a country-wide gas shortage and cost Moscow significant export earnings. They are far from the only threat to Russia’s oil industry and even to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s standing (see EDM, December 22, 2025, July10, 14). Other underlying threats, while less dramatic so far, may prove more significant, as they could reduce Russia’s production and earnings over time (see EDM, June 25).

Much of Russia’s domestic pipeline network and tanker capacity, dating largely from Soviet times, is aging and increasingly prone to leaks that reduce the flow of oil over the longer term to refineries as well as to export markets on which the Kremlin relies, while sparking ever more domestic anger among Russians (Window on Eurasia, April 14, 2024, July 24; Novye Izvestia, June 24, 2025; Meduza, September 3, 2025; Arctida, July 14). As Russia’s older fields are exhausted, it is being forced to develop new and more distant ones in the Far North, where global warming threatens infrastructure collapse and requires money Moscow does not have or is unwilling to spend to prevent new disasters (Window on Eurasia, August 18, 2021, May 17, December 6, 2025; see EDM, March 4, 2025; Nasha Versia, February 10).

To keep public alarm over the current crisis from spreading to these deeper, longer-term problems, the Russian government has played down these risks, blocking coverage of many of these developments in the central media and even ending the release of data that could allow others to track and report on what is happening (Yesli Byt’ Tochnym, March 22, 2023; IStories, July 14, 2025).


Environmental activists, both in Russia and internationally, have been sounding the alarm and documenting their concerns with evidence drawn from government sources, where leaks of another kind are also a problem for the Kremlin. The most prominent coverage of the oil industry’s problems has come from the Bellona organization in Norway, which gained fame for reporting on Soviet-era dumping of nuclear waste in the Arctic, and from Arctida, a Russian émigré group that tracks developments in the northern regions of the Russian Federation (The Moscow Times, March 31; Arctida, July 14). Arctida’s coverage is significant for tracking problems in the Russian oil industry that extend beyond the refineries Ukrainian drones have destroyed.

In the wake of those attacks, Raya Levashova, climate and environment analyst at Arсtida, has drawn particular attention to these broader problems. More than half of Russia’s 250,000-kilometer (155,342-mile) oil pipeline network is worn out, she notes, and should be repaired or replaced because leaks are now a significant problem. In some places, as much as 80 percent of the oil-carrying infrastructure needs to be replaced now (Arctida, July 14). She adds that, in 2023, the last year Moscow released such data, there were 14,716 major pipeline ruptures, spilling oil into the surrounding environment, contaminating it and limiting the flow of oil to refineries. That figure, already alarming, has almost certainly grown since then, which explains why Moscow has worked so hard to keep such information under wraps.


The Arctida analyst says worse is yet to come as the number of such leaks will skyrocket in the coming years as Rosneft builds a new 9,000-kilometer (5,592-mile) network in the Russian Far North, where it is developing new fields. This pipeline system will be new and thus avoid the problems of aging infrastructure, yet global warming, melting permafrost, and the company’s unwillingness or inability to spend the money needed to ensure its stability could certainly increase the risk of leaks. Rosneft is upbeat about the new routes, saying shipments from the Taymyr Peninsula will begin this September. Levashova sees little reason to accept those claims. Only 700 kilometers (435 miles) of the projected 9,000 kilometers (5,592 miles) have been laid as of June, and the company faces serious problems coping with global warming’s impact on pipeline stability (Arctida, July 14).

Levashova says environmentalists such as her are worried that as the project proceeds, the risk of leaks will rise dramatically and harm the fragile ecosystems of the High North. Rosneft’s approach, she argues, is based on the assumption that environmental conditions will remain stable rather than deteriorate, despite scientific projections. Even pipeline segments that are stable today will be at risk as temperatures rise and the permafrost melts further. Specifically, the relatively inexpensive but low-capacity thermosyphons (passive heat exchange systems that allow for the circulation of air in the ground) that the company is installing will no longer work effectively since they rely on larger differences between air and ground temperatures than those already present in many places in the Russian North and expected across the entire region in only a few years (Arctida, July 14).

Even “at current rates of warming,” she concludes, “localized engineering solutions can no longer guarantee the safety and stability of industrial pipelines; the risks of deformation and loss of containment are rising in step with the climate crisis. In addition, this crisis is being worsened in part by the oil being burned after traveling through these pipes.” She points out that the Russian government has failed to impose fines stiff enough to discourage Rosneft and others from cutting corners, thereby allowing the companies to build in ways that make accidents more likely. Moscow has instead reduced rather than strengthened environmental protections and enforcement (Novaya Gazeta, June 24). As Levashova puts it, “It is often more cost-effective for Russian oil companies to pay fines and compensate for damage than to invest” to prevent such disasters (Arctida, July 14).


Taken together, these trends mean the oil crisis in the Russian Federation will not end even if Ukrainian attacks on refineries do, unless Moscow redirects spending to ensure its pipelines and tankers are safe. The Putin regime is unlikely to take those steps, even with prices remaining high due to the U.S. conflict with Iran. The consequences for the Russian economy and for people across the Russian Federation—first in the Far North, then more broadly—could be enormous and, over time, exceed those of the current Ukrainian drone attacks (Yesli Byt’ Tochnym, September 22, 2023; Arctida, March 25, 2025; East Russia, May 13, 2025; Caspy.Land, July 9).

This article was published by the Jamestown Foundation

About Paul Goble
Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com .
View all posts by Paul Goble →

Fire reported at another Wildberries warehouse in Russia

Copyright AP photo

By Nathan Rennolds

Published on 02/08/2026 EURONEWS

Video footage circulating on social media appears to show a large blaze at the warehouse, with flames engulfing the building and huge plumes of black smoke billowing into the sky.

A fire broke out at a Wildberries warehouse in Russia's Samara region on Sunday following an attack, the company's press service has said.

In a post on Telegram, the Russian online retailer said there were currently no reported casualties and that "logistics chains have been reorganised."

"The receipt of deliveries and dispatch of orders are now being handled at other facilities," it added.

Video footage circulating on social media appears to show a large blaze at the warehouse, with flames engulfing the building and huge plumes of black smoke billowing into the sky.

In July, Ukrainian forces targeted multiple Wildberries logistics facilities across Russia as part of Kyiv's "long-range sanctions" against Moscow, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy saying the warehouses were involved in supplying drone parts and navigation equipment for the Russian military.

Wildberries was founded in 2004 by Russian billionaire Tatyana Kim and has gone on to become the country's largest online marketplace. Products offered on its website now include items such as knives, helmets, camouflage, and night-vision devices.

Russian strikes on Ukraine

In a social media post on Sunday, Zelenskyy said Russian forces had launched around 1,900 drones, roughly 1,600 aerial bombs, and 144 missiles against 16 regions of Ukraine this week.

"Today, Sumy was struck by aerial bombs. In Brovary, one person was killed in a drone strike, and six people were injured," he wrote.

The Ukrainian air force said Russia attacked Ukraine with 133 drones and loitering munitions overnight.

Firefighters put out a fire at a major book warehouse following Russian drone strikes in Kharkiv, Ukraine, Saturday, Aug. 1, 2026. Copyright 2026 The Associated Press. All rights reserved

"According to preliminary data, as of 8:00 am, air defences had shot down or neutralised 109 enemy UAVs of the Shahed, Gerber, and Italmas types, ‘Banderole’ loitering munitions and other types of drones in the north, south and east of the country," the air force said in a statement.

Ukrainian forces targeted Russia's Saratov oil refinery and Engels military air base overnight, per Zelenskyy. An oil depot in the Kaluga region and a facility involved in the storage of attack drones in Brysansk were also hit, he added.

Zelenskyy renews calls for Patriot missiles

It comes as the Ukrainian leader made a fresh plea for more Patriot interceptors.

The US-made Patriot is one of the world's most advanced air defence systems and can be used to defend against ballistic and cruise missiles, loitering munitions, and aircraft. The coveted system is expensive and limited in supply, but it is seen by Kyiv as crucial to success in its fight against Russian President Vladimir Putin's invading forces.

"The world has Patriot missiles," Zelenskyy said on Saturday evening. "What matters now is for our partners to make the political decision to provide the necessary packages. The United States knows what we need. Europe knows what we need. Anti-ballistic missiles must protect people – not sit in stockpiles."

On Friday, US President Donald Trump appeared to go back on a promise to let Kyiv build its own Patriot missiles.

"We have not agreed to that. We're talking about it. But it's a hard thing to give away that kind of technology," Trump said during a cabinet meeting - despite having told Zelenskyy at the 2026 NATO summit in Turkey that Washington would give Ukraine a license to build Patriots.

"We'll show them how to do it," Trump said at the summit in July, adding: "This way you can't complain that we're not giving them enough."

Russia Sustaining War Machine Despite Western Sanctions – Analysis


Image: Grok

July 30, 2026
By Dr. Taras Kuzio


Key Takeaways:

Despite successive Western sanctions packages, Russia’s military-industrial complex has expanded since 2022 by exploiting major sanctions gaps, leaving many defense-linked companies, chemicals, and dual-use technologies outside existing restrictions.

Russia continues acquiring critical military components through intermediary states, parallel imports, and weak export controls, while thousands of companies—particularly in the People’s Republic of China and Hong Kong—facilitate sanctions evasion and sustain Russian weapons production.

Ukrainian intelligence has documented extensive Western-made components in Russian missiles, drones, aircraft, and air defense systems, demonstrating that U.S., European, and Asian technologies remain integral to Russia’s precision-strike capabilities despite sanctions.

The West is still imposing new sanctions on Russia due to its war against Ukraine. On July 23, the European Union adopted its 21st sanctions package against Russia, and on July 28 the U.S. Senate advanced sanctions legislation targeting Russia’s energy sector (Council of the European Union, July 23; Kyiv Post, July 29). Western sanctions, however, have not successfully completely inhibited Russia’s military-industrial complex. The paradox of Russia’s military-industrial complex is that, as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute found, it grew after the imposition of Western sanctions and the decline in arms exports following the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2026). This is because Western sanctions are allowing Russia to continue to build weapons systems that are being used against Ukraine.

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said at the 2025 Group of Seven (G7) meeting, “There’s not a lot left to sanction from our part.” At least half of the Russian companies that supply the military-industrial complex, however, remain unsanctioned (Euromaidan Press, February 9). Rosatom, Russia’s state nuclear corporation, includes 21 companies—e.g., Innovation Hub, Mayak Production Association—that are not sanctioned and have links to the military-industrial complex (Dixi Group, March 4).

The West faces two main difficulties when imposing sanctions against Russia’s military-industrial complex. According to Andrey Zayakin at The Insider, it is “not always clear which goods are being imported specifically for military use.” Additionally, “when one company is sanctioned, a substitute soon appears in its place, and while new Western restrictions are being introduced, the Russian military-industrial complex has time to adapt” (The Insider, February 18). Russia acquires technology through intermediary countries, parallel imports, secondary markets and weak end-user controls (Ukraine Business News, April 9). Western sanctions have slowed down but not ended the supply of Western goods to Russia’s military-industrial complex.


There are no sanctions on chemicals used to produce mechanical lubricants and military-grade tires. Western and Chinese companies provide motor oil additives and lubricants (Kyiv Independent, February 16). Raw glycerine is not sanctioned and continues to be exported to Russia despite its use for the manufacture of propellants and explosives. Russian petro-chemical manufacturers supply the military-industrial complex (Dekleptocracy Project, April 30).

Machine-building equipment from 15 Taiwanese, 13 German, 8 Czech, 6 Swiss, 3 Japanese, and 1 U.S. company was exported to Russia despite its dual-use for the military-industrial complex (Kyiv Independent, June 19). Russia’s leading tank maker, Uralvagonzavod, uses Western machines that require parts and software updates. Ukraine’s military intelligence (HUR) documented 300 Western companies exporting machinery to Russia that is essential to its military-industrial complex (Kyiv Post, March 26, 2025).

Many Western companies continued to supply Russia’s military-industrial complex through corrupt middlemen and via intermediary countries such as Türkiye, Georgia, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan—countries not sanctioned. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) directly, and through Hong Kong, continues to be a major supplier to Russia’s military-industrial complex (Freedom Hong Kong, February 2026).


In February, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed two decrees sanctioning 24 individuals and 27 companies supplying Russia’s military-industrial complex, including those circumventing Western and Ukrainian sanctions from countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Kyrgyzstan, and Georgia (President of Ukraine, February 7 [1],[2]).

The HUR documented 6,000 companies violating sanctions by trading with sanctioned Russian military-industrial complex companies, of whom 4,000 were Chinese (including those from Hong Kong) and the remainder from Türkiye, the Gulf states, the Middle East, and India (The Insider, March 11). A Dutch national registered the Redwing Metal company in Türkiye to re-export components and machinery from the European Union to Russia (Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, June 19). A Polish–Ukrainian investigation found the Polish company Famot Pleszew had exported machinery to Russia (United24 Media, January 25, 2025; FrontStory, March 13). Fifty Western components are used in Russian shipbuilding and by the ship repair companies Kronstadt Marine Plant, Sevmash, and the Baltic Shipyard (Euromaidan Press, March 18).

Russia’s military-industrial complex is assisted by two well-established sanctions evaders—Iran and North Korea. Western components are found in Iranian Shahed drones, which are used to build Russian Geran drones. Iranian drones used to attack Cyprus and the Gulf states during the U.S.–Israeli conflict with Iran used Western components (United24 Media, March 5).

The number of Western components used by Russia’s military-industrial complex is very high, and Western governments are failing to close the channels used to export them to Russia. The HUR maintains an extensive database of components from 33 countries used by the Russian military-industrial complex. As of April, the HUR’s database included 1,635 components used in 218 Russian military-industrial complex plants (HUR, accessed July 29).

After analyzing debris from nearly 500 Russian drones and 50 missiles launched in an October 2025 attack on Ukraine, the HUR found they contained tens of thousands of Western components, which included 1,500 in the Iskander cruise missiles, 405 in the Kalibr cruise missiles, and 192 in the Kinzhal ballistic missiles (President of Ukraine, October 6, 2025). In another analysis of a Russian attack in May, the missiles Russia fired were built this year using 100 components from the United States (Texas Instruments, AMD), Germany (Harting Technical Group), and the Netherlands (Nexperia) (Kyiv Post, May 15). The largest share of components comes from the United States, the PRC, Switzerland, Germany, Japan, and Taiwan. Fewer components are from Czechia, Sweden, and Australia.


The Kyiv Independent, posing as a Russian defense company in 2025, ordered U.S. chips to prove how easy it was to buy them—and, if they had wished, export them to Russia (Kyiv Independent, January 24,March 10, 2025). An investigation by BILD magazine found Russian postal workers in Germany were sending components to Russia (BILD, January 25; United24 Media, January 26). Russia has built military communications systems using radio bridges, antennas and networking equipment from the U.S. company Ubiquiti (The Insider, February 20).

A third of the Russian military-industrial complex companies (e.g., Krasny Oktiabr, National Institute for Aviation Technologies, Yashz Avia) that build SU-57 planes used to launch the devastating KH-59 glide bombs at Ukraine are not sanctioned (Euromaidan Press, April 20). Russian glide bombs include components from the United States (Altera Corporation, Analog Devices, CTS, Texas Instruments, Linear Technology, MaxLinear, Sipex, American Semiconductor, Products Integrated), Ireland (Antena manufacturing, Taoglas), Switzerland (Ublox, TE Connectivity, Axicom STMicroelectronics), Japan (Din-Tek Semiconductor, Okuma Corporation), Taiwan (Akira Seiki), South Korea (Samsung Machine Engineering), and the PRC (Kyiv Independent, November 17, 2025). Components from the German company Guhring LLC are found in the SU-30 Russian fighter jet and S-400 air defense system (The Insider, July 3). The Pantsir S1 air defense system uses 52 Western components (Kyiv Post, May 12; Militarnyy, July 5).

The two main needs of Russia’s war machine are components for missiles and drones that are launched nightly at Ukraine. The Kh-101, 3M-14, KN-23/24, Iskander 9M728, and Kinzhal KH47M2 cruise and ballistic missiles, which have been launched against Ukraine, include components from the U.S. companies mentioned above, as well as AMD, Anderson Electronics, Intel-USA, Motorola, Vicor Corporation, and Microchip Technology, alongside Dutch, Swiss, German, Swedish, Japanese, Taiwanese, and South Korean parts. Eighty to ninety percent of the guidance systems in Russian cruise missiles are Western.

Components from 16 U.S., Swiss, Chinese, and East Asian companies are found in the KH-101 cruise missile—64.3 percent of the components in the KH-101 cruise missile are U.S., 17.9 percent German, 7.1 percent Swiss, 7 percent Dutch, and 3.6 percent Taiwanese. A ballistic missile fired at Kyiv in April 2025 used 116 mainly U.S. components (Kyiv Independent, October 6, 2025). Seven hundred ninety-nine shipments of XP Power microchips were exported from the United Kingdom to Russia via Hong Kong and are used in its KN-23/24 ballistic missiles (The Telegraph, February 16).

Russia’s Lancet and Zala reconnaissance drones use many Chinese components as well as components from 12 U.S. companies (Kyiv Independent, November 21, 2024). Besides the U.S. companies listed above, these also include components built by Nvidia, National Semiconductor, Micron Technology, Xilinx, Qorvo, Bel Fuse and Semtech Corporation.

Russia’s Molniya-2R reconnaissance drone includes Chinese and U.K. (Raspberry Pi5 Microcomputers) components (Euromaidan Press, December 22, 2025). Russia’s Kniaz Veshchiy Oleg reconnaissance drone depends on foreign parts, including 33 U.S., five Swiss, Taiwanese, Dutch, and Chinese components (Euromaidan Press; United 24 Media, April 13).

Russia’s Orion, a plagiarism of the U.S. Reaper drone, is built by 43 Russian companies, a third of whom are not sanctioned. Orion uses components from many U.S. companies listed earlier (Kyiv Independent, November 5, 2025)


The HUR documented U.S., Swiss, Japanese, Taiwanese, Dutch, Irish, and Chinese components in the Shahed 107 Iranian drone rebuilt by Russia as Geran-1 (Kyiv Independent, November 25, 2025). Russia’s Geran-2 drone uses the rotary encoder sensor built by the Austrian company AMS-Osram. The Geran-2 uses a clock buffer built by the Indian company Aura Semiconductor. Russia’s Geran-3 drone (using Iranian Shahed 238 specifications) includes 45 Western components (Euromaidan Press, September 16, 2025). Half of these are from U.S. companies (including Infineon Technology, Sipex Corporation, Adesto Technology, Alpha and Omega, and other U.S. companies listed earlier), with the remainder from Switzerland (seven companies, including U-Blox and STMicroelectronics), Germany (including Infineon Technology and Bosch), the PRC (six companies), United Kingdom (Raspberry Pi, Futura Technical Services), and Japan (Rubycon Corporation) (The Telegraph, February 18).

With turbojet propulsion and triple the speed of the Geran-1, 2, 3, and 4 drones at 300 and 400 miles per hour, Russia’s most advanced Geran-5 drone is a major technological upgrade. Geran-5 bridges the gap between low-cost loitering munitions and high-speed cruise missiles to bypass Ukrainian air defenses. Geran-5 includes components from six U.S. companies (in addition to the U.S. companies listed earlier, Monolithic Power Systems and CTS Corporation), and the German company Infineon (Kyiv Independent, January 22).

Historically, sanctions have never been 100 percent effective. Nevertheless, Western governments could take a greater number of steps to tighten sanctions on chemicals, components, and machinery exported to Russia for use by its military-industrial complex. Russia’s military equipment is being used today against Ukraine, but with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intelligence and military leadership predicting Russia could be ready to launch an attack on NATO’s territory between 2027 and 2030, its weapons, which use a high number of Western components, would then be used against the West.

This article was published by The Jamestown Foundation

About Dr. Taras Kuzio

Taras Kuzio is a professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy. He is co-author of The Four Roots of Russia’s War Against Ukraine (Cambridge University Press, 2026); co-editor of Russia and Modern Fascism: New Perspectives on the Kremlin’s War Against Ukraine (Columbia University Press, 2025); Crimea: Where Russia’s War Started and Where Ukraine Will Win (Jamestown Foundation, 2024), and Russian Nationalism and the Russian-Ukrainian War (Routledge, 2022). He can be found on X/Twitter @TarasKuzio
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A Crown Jewel In Peril: Russia’s Arctic Aggression Masks Nuclear Vulnerability – Analysis


File photo of Russian Submarine Vepr by Ilya Kurganov. Source: Wikipedia Commons.

July 30, 2026
Published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute
By Carl Parkin

Key Takeaways:

Russia is expanding Arctic control for trade and military power projection. It is developing the Northern Sea Route into a Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor, requiring Russian permission and icebreaker escorts, while rebuilding bases and prioritizing the region in its foreign policy.

Melting ice is increasing the vulnerability of Russia’s nuclear submarine fleet. Two-thirds of Russia’s sea-based nuclear forces are based on the Kola Peninsula; longer transit times to protective ice and the ice’s retreat toward allied waters erode a key Cold War-era defensive layer.

NATO has an opportunity to exploit this vulnerability but must proceed cautiously. The Alliance is boosting Arctic presence through Arctic Sentry, new ASW assets, and icebreakers. Aggressive tracking of Russian SSBNs could deter gray-zone activity, yet risks provoking overreaction or use-it-or-lose-it pressures.

(FPRI) — Russia sees opportunity in the Arctic. For centuries, ever-present sea ice has made the region hostile to trade or military exploitation. But as the ice melts, that reality is changing. Russia plans to capitalize on the economic benefit of arctic trade, is increasing its military presence in the region, and is leveraging its dominance to conduct disruptive gray zone activity against US allies. But the retreat of arctic ice may not work entirely in Russia’s favor. As the ice melts, Russian nuclear weapons are becoming more vulnerable. Allies must thread the needle between appropriately exploiting this vulnerability, and avoiding Russian overreaction.
Russia’s Arctic Interests

A significant portion of Russia’s Arctic power projection is based on its dominance of regional trade. Russia is expanding the Northern Sea Route (NSR), a long-established shipping route between Russia and Asia, into a broader trade network known as the Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor. Russia maintains tight control over the area by requiring that international vessels obtain both Russian permission and icebreaker escort from its fleet to transit the route.


This behavior is part of a broader pattern of Russian lawfare in the region, leveraging contested legal claims to restrict allied freedom of movement in the Arctic. After Russia passed a law in late 2022 regulating the navigation of warships in the NSR, allied-aligned analysts have debated whether to conduct a freedom of navigation operation there, However, the risks have ultimately outweighed the benefits and Russia maintains de facto dominance over the route.

This dominance is reinforced by a strengthening military posture. Russia has revitalized its Arctic military forces for over a decade by rebuilding Soviet-era bases and modernizing air defense capabilities. In its 2023 foreign policy concept, Russia listed the Arctic as a priority region, second only to its near abroad in Eastern Europe. However, Russia’s foreign policy and military expansion seems to increasingly serve its trade decisions, rather than the other way around. Cargo volumes in the NSR have fallen over the past two years, reaching a new low of 37 million metric tons last year and bucking Putin’s 2018 ambitions of traffic reaching 80 million by 2024. The NSR’s relative economic weakness indicates the true purpose of Russian regional dominance: power projection.

Russia’s lawfare and military expansion facilitates military control, which in turn shields Russia’s gray zone warfare activities. Russia’s “shadow fleet” of vessels, sailing under flags of convenience, has been increasingly implicated in the destruction of undersea infrastructure, as well as its broader sanction-evasionefforts. Russia’s control over the surrounding waters facilitates these activities, allowing the shadow fleet to move with impunity across increasingly broad swathes of Arctic waters.

A Crown Jewel in Peril

While the Arctic is presently a region of Russian strength, it also houses one of Russia’s most precious, and historically most vulnerable, assets: its nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines, or SSBNs. According to US intelligence estimates, two-thirds of Russia’s sea-based nuclear forces are based on the Kola Peninsula – the region of Russian near-Arctic territory closest to the Norwegian border. The peninsula is highly militarized, and sits at the core of Russia’s Arctic power projection. It is home to the headquarters of Russia’s Northern Fleet at Severomorsk and a submarine base at Gadzhyievo, which hosts both Cold War Delta-IV and modern Borei-class ballistic missile submarines.

Russia’s crown jewel of nuclear deterrence did not come to reside in its freezing home by happenstance. During the earliest days of the Cold War, the Soviets had not yet developed intercontinental-range missiles to mount on their submarines. To carry out a nuclear strike against the United States—or to patrol in a region from which they could do so—their SSBNs had to navigate close to the US’s Atlantic and Pacific coastlines. But these locations close to US coastlines were within range of a large network of US passive acoustic sonar sensors called SONOS, which could detect and track Soviet submarines, thereby minimizing the submarines’ value as a deterrent force.

Soviet espionage eventually identified this vulnerability, and the USSR quickly moved to better secure their naval nuclear deterrent. Instead of transiting subs through risky, distant waters, they developed longer-range sea-launched missiles capable of hitting the United States from the Barents Sea and nearby Arctic waters closer to home. To further secure these local submarine patrol areas, the Soviets constructed “bastions,”or zones of layered defenses where SSBNs could safely reside, surrounded by networks of sensors, mines, escorting attack submarines, and other naval assets.


But the layered bastion defense was not the only thing protecting Soviet submarines. The surrounding Arctic ice served, in effect, as a security blanket for vulnerable SSBNs.

SSBNs are pursued by mixed forces of planes, helicopters, and ships, equipped with various sensors designed to detect submarines in their underwater hiding places. Additionally, submarines can be followed, or “tailed,” by other submarines. All of these methods of submarine detection are further complicated by the presence of surface sea ice. Large ships struggle to navigate zones with heavy sea ice and the sensor arrays they tow for submarine detection can be disrupted by unpredictable ice floes. Some anti-submarine planes and helicopters can detect submarines through the ice by identifying the magnetic field disruption caused by their hulls, but their munitions are unable to punch through thick “pack ice,” especially when traveling at the low altitudes required for submarine tracking. Finally, the sound wave detection methods used to tail submarines underwater are made unreliable as they pass into the sonically active marginal ice zone, where ice breakup causes significant acoustic anomalies.

Altogether, the under-ice environment is much safer for submarines than the open ocean, especially when actively evading an opposing anti-submarine warfare (ASW) force. The decline in Arctic ice could remove one of the layers of protection Russia relies on to secure its SSBN fleet, reintroducing an early Cold War vulnerability in a modern context.

Measuring the Danger

Geospatial analysis reveals just how bad this challenge is for Russia. The following figure shows how long Russian submarines would need to traverse to safer under-ice waters, assuming that they could travel in a straight line at maximum speed, a scenario which is unlikely in practice.


Graphic courtesy of Carl Parkin based on data from the National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC)

The figure demonstrates that these transit times are growing longer across all seasons, especially in late summer, when record lows of around 20 hours from the 1980s are blown out of the water by 35+ hour transit times in recent years. Additionally, the upper curve of the graph observed during summer months is stretching horizontally. This indicates that the length of “ice summers,” when traversal times are at their highest, is getting longer, meaning there are more days each year where Russian submarines are further from the protection of ice.

But traversal time isn’t the only variable that should concern Russia—the following figure shows that as the ice melts, it is receding further into the waters of its adversaries. While the 1980s saw sea ice regularly reaching through the gap between the archipelagoes of Svalbard (demilitarized, and controlled by Norway) and Franz-Joseph Land (Russian-owned), the ice is now hiding itself behind Svalbard and moving closer to the coast of allied-controlled Greenland, where US bases create far more dangerous waters for a Russian SSBN.


Graphic courtesy of Carl Parkin based on data from the National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC)

Allied Opportunities

These estimates deserve a caveat: other variables may improve submarine survivability in the Arctic region. A recent study found that changing water temperatures in the Arctic are affecting how sound propagates, perhaps providing a hider’s advantage to SSBNs. The Arctic soundscape is also changing as a whole, with ice breakup and increasing commercial activity creating more ambient noise in the region, which helps mask the sounds of nuclear submarines.

Nevertheless, the changing extent of Arctic sea ice will affect the vulnerability of Russian SSBNs in the future, and alter the overall dynamics of naval warfare in the Arctic. In the mid-1980s, in response to the Soviet bastion strategy, the Allies implemented a new Maritime Strategy designed to be implemented in the event of war. The centerpiece of this plan was a naval surge into the Barents Sea, enabling an aggressive campaign to hunt down Soviet SSBNs. This strategy was criticized at the time for its feasibility in the Arctic’s harsh, icy conditions. As the environment changes, it may become more feasible.

NATO is already rising to meet the Russian threat in the Arctic, in part due to pressure from the Trump administration. In December 2025, NATO reorganized its Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, to include Denmark, Sweden, and Finland, “reinforc[ing its] posture in the High North” and creating a new “strategic bridge between North America and Europe” according to US Air Force General Alexus G. Grynkewich, Supreme Allied Commander Europe. In February of 2026, the Alliance launched the Arctic Sentry vigilance activity, after US President Donald Trump and NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte agreed that “NATO should collectively take more responsibility for the defense of the region.” Arctic Sentry will intensify NATO’s force presence in the Arctic: the United Kingdom will double its troops in the Norwegian arctic to two-thousand over the next three years, and Sweden will lead a new four-thousand strong land force based in Finland. The operation will also involve integrated sensing and the construction of new infrastructure in NATO’s Arctic nations.

The Alliance is also pursuing high profile anti-submarine warfare modernization and expansion efforts. Germany has ordered eight P-8 Poseidon aircraft, massive derivatives of the Boeing 737 equipped with sensors designed to track submarines, and Norway has purchased at least five British Type 26 frigates, another anti-sub platform. To traverse through the ice that still remains in the contested Arctic, the US has signed a pact with Canada and Finland to construct a new fleet of allied icebreaker ships to challenge Russia’s long-held icebreaker dominance.

Altogether, NATO seems well-poised to exploit the emerging vulnerability of Russian submarines in the coming years. It has reason to do so: Russia’s submarine-based harassment is increasing. The UK Ministry of Defense recorded a 30 percent increase in Russian submarines entering British waters in the past two years, and the UK deployed forces in April to deter a covert Russian operation to sabotage its undersea cables. Russian subs may be less likely to engage in escalatory, gray zone activity if they are more aggressively tracked, tailed, and held at risk. While shifting from chasing off attack submarines to chasing down SSBNs may seem like a radical escalation, it is not without precedent given the extreme vulnerability of the Russian submarine force prior to its transition to bastion basing, and the explicit plan to destroy SSBNs laid out in the Maritime Strategy.


While Russia increased the rate and scope of its naval exercises across territorial and allied-aligned waters indiscriminately up until 2022, it now seems to have refocused to a more defensive, preparatory posture in the Barents Sea. This shift could indicate that Russia has recognized the emerging vulnerability to its submarine bastions, and is looking to secure its SSBN force regardless of the state of the Arctic ice. In doing so, Russia has revealed a soft spot. NATO has the opportunity to probe this vulnerability in an attempt to curtail Russian gray-zone activity.

However, regardless of its Cold War precedent, NATO should be cautious when employing this strategy. The Alliance must be explicit that its tracking and tailing of SSBNs is a reaction to Russian submarines’ gray zone activity, intended to re-establish a red line rather than conduct a counterforce first strike. Military innovations that threaten the efficacy of Russia’s nuclear forces have shaken Russia in the past, provoking it to resurrectand complete escalatory Cold War-era weapons proposals, such as the nuclear-powered cruise missile. Inciting further overreactions should be avoided by the Alliance if possible. Furthermore, in a worst case scenario, tracking SSBNs could lead to use-it-or-lose-it pressures in an emerging conflict. NATO should consider the balance of risks and benefits in its approach when attempting to deter future Russian aggression.

About the author: Carl Parkin researches nuclear risk and the history of US defense policy. He is currently a research fellow with the University of Chicago Existential Risk Lab.

Source: This article was published by FPRI


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