It’s possible that I shall make an ass of myself. But in that case one can always get out of it with a little dialectic. I have, of course, so worded my proposition as to be right either way (K.Marx, Letter to F.Engels on the Indian Mutiny)
The author says Russia’s latest Duma vote did what the Kremlin wanted: opposition was barred and United Russia kept a rubber-stamp majority Putin can call a mandate for the Ukraine war.
Two quieter votes may matter more. In South Ossetia, Moscow-backed Marat Kambolov—an official from North Ossetia—won the presidency after a deeper cooperation pact and a sacked local governor, which the piece reads as a step toward annexation if Russia loses leverage in Armenia, even though Tbilisi and the world still formally oppose border changes.
In Udmurtia, émigrés and locals used an anonymous online ballot to pick a 10-member opposition assembly under journalist Andrey Grigoryev, reviving a 1990 sovereignty line for all peoples of the republic. Moscow faces a cross-ethnic protest vote; other émigré groups face a test of who can claim to speak for a region.
The outcome of Russia’s latest Duma “election” has been as expected. The Kremlin banned opposition figures from taking part, whose presence might have cost the ruling United Russia Party its constitutional majority. As a result, the Kremlin has gotten almost precisely what it sought. The elections resulted in an even more tightly controlled Russian parliament that will rubber-stamp whatever Russian President Vladimir Putin asks for. He will use these results to claim the legitimacy of his regime and overwhelming Russian popular support for his war against Ukraine (e.g., CNN, September 21).
Because the Duma vote involved all of Russia and because the Kremlin trumpeted its supposed importance, the just-completed Russian vote unsurprisingly attracted enormous attention both in Russia and abroad. Two other “Russian” elections held at the same time, though they drew far less attention, appear set to prove more fateful. First, a Kremlin-backed Russian citizen was elected as president of South Ossetia, the Georgian breakaway territory Moscow helped wrest from Tbilisi in 2008 (OC Media, September 9; Vot Tak, September 19; Kavkazskiy Uzel, September 20; RITM Eurasia, September 21). Second, an opposition assembly in the Udmurt Republic in Russia’s Middle Volga region was selected via a secure internet channel (Region.Expert, September 18; Udmurtia, accessed September 22). The first sets the stage for Russia’s annexation of South Ossetia, and the second challenges the Kremlin by laying the groundwork for a legitimate alternative to Moscow’s rule there, as well as for opponents of Putin’s rule in emigration who do not move to organize similar bodies in similar ways.
After Putin invaded Georgia in 2008, South Ossetia along with Abkhazia became partially recognized states, controlled, especially in the case of South Ossetia, by Moscow, and have diplomatic relations with only a handful of countries. Many expected Moscow would annex South Ossetia and join it to Russia’s North Ossetian republic just north of the border. That has not happened for at least three reasons. First, international opposition to border changes, including in the South Caucasus, continues (EXO FM, August 7). Second, Moscow wants to deepen its rapprochement with Georgia, a goal that could be compromised if it absorbed one or both breakaway republics (Svobodnaya Pressa, August 8). Third, the Russian government is getting almost everything it wants without the downsides of annexation and the other financial costs of doing so, including having a military base there (Window on Eurasia, June 12, 2024).
In recent months, significant changes appear to have set the stage for eventual annexation (see EDM, June 26). First, the international community, while still officially opposed to annexations, has shown through its response to Moscow’s moves against Ukraine and Donbas that it is not prepared to take action when and if they happen. Second, Georgia, while still opposed to annexation, has fewer choices than it did and might not end its cooperation with Moscow even if Russia annexed South Ossetia. Third, the Russian military base in South Ossetia has become vastly more important for Moscow given that Russia may soon lose its base in Armenia or be forced to reduce its size and capabilities to remain (see EDM, September 8; Window on Eurasia, September 19).
Since his actions began last spring, Putin has been seen as willing to move toward annexation. He signed a far more comprehensive cooperation agreement with Tskhinvali, giving Russia even more control over that republic. He sacked the governor and endorsed Marat Kambolov as his successor, an Ossetian from the north whose entire career has been in the Russian Federation. This is a step the Kremlin had never taken before, and it has now been formalized by the snap election in that republic on September 18 (OC Media, September 9; Vot Tak, September 19). While some observers expect that these moves reflect a desire by Putin only to clean up the increasingly troubled situation in the South Ossetian government, most view them as another step toward annexation. They argue, however, that the move may not be imminent, since Kambolov will have to gain control of the government there (OC Media, September 9).
Moscow and Kambolov may move more quickly toward annexation, especially if Moscow loses its base in Armenia. If so, that by itself would make the vote in South Ossetia more significant than the orchestrated elections in the Russian Federation.
If what is taking place in South Ossetia reflects Kremlin calculations and interests, another electoral development far removed from the North Caucasus does not. That is Udmurtia, a Middle Volga republic with a long history of resisting Moscow from the Russian Civil War to this day (Window on Eurasia, September 14, 2019, August 13, 2023, February 22, 2022). Its tradition in that regard is typically ignored because the republic is small, with only 1.5 million residents, two-thirds of whom are ethnically Russian and only one-fifth are ethnically Udmurt. These Finno-Ugric people are traditionally animist but are now counted by many as Russian Orthodox.
In recent years, Moscow has responded by repressing the Udmurt minority, arresting protesters and driving even more into emigration, where the Udmurts are increasingly active (Window on Eurasia, March 1). Instead of retreating into a narrow nationalism, however, that emigration has retained its internationalist positions. Last year, it reissued its 1990 declaration of sovereignty for all the peoples of the republic (Window on Eurasia, September 21, 2025). Last month, it planned to create an independent national assembly through an election on September 20 (Udmurtia, accessed September 22). That election, organized under the leadership of journalist Andrey Grigoryev, naturally had to be held online using a new internet technology that allows voters to remain anonymous (Region.Expert, September 18; OpaVote, accessed September 22).
Details about the election beyond a report that 10 members were elected to the assembly have not been announced (Facebook/Sergey Antonov, September 21). Still, the very fact that such an election was held to fill such a body represents a serious challenge to Moscow, as well as to émigré groups of ethnic Russians, individual national groups, or a combination of both. For Moscow, the challenge comes from individuals willing to stand as candidates and from the readiness of people both in the republic and in the emigration to vote in an election the Russian government opposes, all the more because it encourages Russians and non-Russians to work together against Moscow. For émigré groups, in turn, the challenge of what the Udmurts have done is almost equally great. Their action calls into question both the claims of groups without such a demonstration of backing to speak for their regions and republics and the unwillingness of many to reach across ethnic lines to seek greater freedom, autonomy, and even independence for their regions. As a result, this “Russian” election may also have a greater impact than the much-ballyhooed one for the new Duma.
About Paul Goble Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com View all posts by Paul Goble →
Three weeks after a Svalbard court allowed seizure of a Russian ship to enforce a 2023 ICC award to a Ukrainian company, Norway’s justice ministry reversed the seizure, citing Svalbard’s treaty status and the need for signatories to supply their people on the islands.
The ministry treats the original court ruling as valid when issued but bars this seizure and similar future ones; the author says Moscow will read that as an Oslo retreat and a win over what Russia called “state terrorism.”
The piece warns that yielding after Putin’s protest may invite Russia to test Western limits around ICC rulings and North Atlantic islands, raising the risk that a Svalbard-type incident could escalate toward a Russia–NATO clash.
Three weeks ago, a Norwegian court allowed for the seizure of a Russian ship in Svalbard in fulfillment of a 2023 decision of the ICC to compensate a Ukrainian company for Russian seizures of its assets. Putin expressed outrage, and now the Norwegian justice ministry has overruled that court decision.
The ministry said that the special status of Svalbard means that countries signatory to the treaty governing use of that land must have confidence they can supply their citizens on the island, a not unreasonable position but one that Norwegian experts say Moscow will treat as a retreat by Oslo and a victory by Russia over what Moscow called “state terrorism.”
The justice ministry’s action means that Svalbard court’s decision will be declared valid at the time it was made but that the ministry’s action means that the seizure will be reversed and future seizures of that type, regardless of the status of the court which ordered them, will not be allowed.
What makes this course of events worrisome is that it is likely to encourage Russia and its supporters to believe they can get Western countries to vacate ICC decisions by Moscow’s protests and that they will continue to test the limits of Western tolerance by further raising the stakes.
Given Moscow’s current moves against NATO countries and especially against European islands in the North Atlantic like the Svalbard archipelago, what Norway has done may cause the Kremlin to expand its subversive activities to a point that Western countries will find it impossible to accept.
Fawzi al-Mansouri was assassinated outside a mosque in an LNA stronghold, in what analysts said was a major blow to the Haftar family's security credentials and could delay a US-brokered plan to reunify Libya's rival governments. No group has claimed responsibility.
The head of military intelligence for the Libyan National Army (LNA) led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar has been killed in a car bombing in Benghazi, authorities confirmed on Tuesday
Fawzi al-Mansouri was assassinated on Monday when an explosive stuck to his car detonated as he was leaving a local mosque at night, the statement said.
Al-Mansouri was a senior figure within the LNA's intelligence apparatus and had close ties to the Haftar family.
He played a key role in the LNA's campaign against jihadist groups, including the so-called Islamic State group (IS), between 2014 and 2017 in eastern Libya.
Al-Mansouri, whom the LNA described as a "heroic martyr," was also a leading figure during Haftar's 2019 offensive to seize the capital Tripoli in an operation backed by Russia and Egypt.
Haftar's offensive was eventually beaten back by forces loyal to the Tripoli government, which was in turn supported by Turkey.
Khaled Haftar, the son of Khalifa and LNA's chief of the general staff, said in a statement that an investigation was opened, adding that "indicators point to a despicable terrorist tactic".
"Terrorism is a project targeting the entire region, not just Libya," the statement added.
The bombing was a setback to efforts by the Haftars to paint a picture of stability in the areas they control.
"An attack of this sophistication in an LNA stronghold is also a major blow to the group's security credentials," analyst with UK-based Verisk Maplecroft Hamish Kinnear said.
"The intelligence required to target such a high-profile figure successfully is indicative of significant capabilities on the part of the responsible actor," Kinnear added.
Authorities have yet to identify the perpetrators.
Tripoli government condemns 'terrorist attack'
Libya has been split between rival administrations since NATO's intervention helped topple Muammar Gaddafi in 2011.
Two governments are currently vying for power: the UN-recognised administration in Tripoli, led by Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibah, and a rival administration in Benghazi backed by the elder Haftar, who is considered the de facto ruler.
Dbeibah has governed since 2021 following a UN-brokered political agreement but without a fresh electoral mandate, as a planned December 2021 election was cancelled amid disputes over candidate eligibility and the legal basis for the vote.
His government has faced sustained domestic opposition, including protests in Tripoli earlier this year over electricity cuts.
A former Gaddafi general and close ally who defected and lived in the US for nearly two decades before returning to Libya after 2011, Haftar built the LNA into the main force in the east and south.
FILE: Libyan army forces and vehicles are stationed in a street in the capital Tripoli, 22 July 222AP Photo
The Tripoli-based government issued a statement denouncing a "terrorist attack" against al-Mansouri, saying it condemned the killing "regardless of one party's positions or alliances".
Khaled's office later said in a statement that authorities arrested a "terrorist cell in Benghazi that was preparing to carry out acts of sabotage" but did not say whether it was linked with al-Mansouri's killing.
Authorities in Benghazi held al-Mansouri's funeral on Tuesday afternoon, publishing photos that showed armed men in military fatigues with the attendance of senior LNA officials at the ceremony, including Khaled and Saddam Haftar.
In a statement, the LNA said it would "not cease fighting terrorism and will continue our struggle for the stability and security of Libya, as well as for the unification of its institutions".
US wants Saddam to take over Libya?
Libya holds Africa's largest proven oil reserves, which have fuelled both sides of the political divide.
Yet efforts remain under way to unify the country's executive powers under a Washington-mediated plan that the LNA has publicly backed.
Under the leaked terms of the plan, Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibah would remain in charge of the Tripoli-based government while Lieutenant General Saddam Haftar — also Khalifa's son — would be elevated to a senior national executive role, possibly heading a unified presidential structure.
Saddam Haftar was appointed deputy commander-in-chief of the LNA in August 2025 as part of a restructuring that effectively distributed operational command among Khalifa's main heirs.
FILE: Deputy Commander of the LNA, Lt Gen Saddam Haftar looks on during his meeting with the Greek foreign minister in Athens, on Monday, 15 June 2026 AP Photo
"None of this bodes well for a US plan to re-unify Libya," Kinnear said, adding that under the roadmap, neither side "is likely to be satisfied with their respective positions for long".
"A new, destabilising power struggle could soon emerge."
Libya expert Jalel Harchaoui said the killing would "disrupt, or at the very least delay" the US-brokered deal.
"The agreement rests on two premises: that security reigns supreme in Benghazi, and that for senior officers, loyalty to Saddam (Haftar's son and heir apparent) guarantees protection in the Benghazi stronghold," Harchaoui explained
But "a bomb that kills the head of military intelligence as he leaves a mosque undermines these premises," he said.
Meanwhile, reunification would "require some gestures of openness toward reform and change within the army", Harchaoui concluded.
Africa Corps Work At Libyan Air Bases Raises Concerns
File photo of Russia deploying fighter jets to Libya to support Russian state-sponsored private military contractors operating on the ground there. Photo Credit: U.S. Africa Command
Russia is expanding its military infrastructure and presence at six Libyan air bases (including Al-Jufra, Al-Khadim, and Maaten al-Sarra), using them as hubs for weapons, personnel, and operations after losing its Syrian transit role
. Bases such as Maaten al-Sarra and Al-Khadim enable Russia to supply arms and support operations in the Sahel, Sudan, and Central African Republic, while complicating Libya’s unification efforts.
Recent construction (hangars, housing, defenses, and runway upgrades) and the presence of Russian personnel and mercenaries demonstrate a sustained effort to deepen Moscow’s foothold in North Africa.
Russian work at six Libyan air bases shows that Moscow is expanding its military foothold in North Africa, while transferring weapons, mercenaries and other fighters to war zones.
Russia is planning, funding, building and offering personnel to complete infrastructure projects at six Libyan air bases: Al-Jufra, Al-Khadim, Al-Qardabiyah, Brak al-Shati, Maaten al-Sarra and Tamanhint, according to the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency’s Tearline Project.
The air bases are scattered throughout the country and hold an array of military equipment, including air defense systems, MiG-29 fighter planes and drones. Russian military personnel and mercenaries operate them. Russia also reportedly plans to invest in Tobruk Port and Tobruk Air Base.
Russia used Syria as a Middle Eastern transit hub for equipment, weapons and personnel until the fall of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad in December 2024. The Kremlin then pivoted to Libya. After Russia initially failed to secure a port in Libya, it expanded inland.
“The Maaten al-Sarra airbase provides a key example,” wrote Frank Talbot, nonresident senior fellow with the North Africa Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Rafid Hariri Center & Middle East program. “This strategically located airbase near the borders with Chad and Sudan is a staging point for Russia’s destabilizing operations across the Sahel.”
The air base in southern Libya sat abandoned since 2011 until Russia deployed Syrian soldiers to reestablish it in December 2024. The Kremlin can directly supply Burkina Faso, Mali and Sudan from Maaten al-Sarra, Italian news agency Agenzia Nova reported. Russian technicians and Syrian troops have restored runways and warehouses at the base.
“A Russian presence at Matan al-Sarra would provide Moscow with the ability to ship arms to Sudanese or Chadian territory quietly,” analyst Andrew McGregor wrote for The Jamestown Foundation’s Eurasia Daily Monitor online publication.
Russia’s military presence in Libya also is hindering Tripoli’s fragile unification process by stifling efforts to expel foreign troops and mercenaries. “It remains an obstacle to a lasting peace settlement, enabling foreign-backed domestic factions to resist peace efforts,” analyst Ali Bin Musa wrote for the Middle East Council on Global Affairs.
Located about 100 kilometers east of Benghazi, the Al-Khadim air base has been used as a hub for conducting operations, supplying arms, and trafficking resources in and out of the restive region, including delivering weapons to Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces during the country’s civil war.
Last year, three new hangars, a recreational center, a possible communications tower, and potential temporary housing units or support buildings were built at the base, Tearline reported. What appear to be barracks were added in 2026.
In 2025, All Eyes on Wagner, an open-source investigative project, documented the travels of a man working for Gazprom, a Russian energy company. The man had traveled from Al-Khadim to a Russian-controlled mine in the Central African Republic in 2023 and posted pictures of his journey on Instagram.
“Al Kadim itself appears to be hosting Russian personnel regularly,” Tearline reported. “Using social media geolocation tools, we were able to identify a Russian citizen deployed on al Kadim.” The person was an officer with Russia’s 102nd Motorized Rifle Infantry Division.
Russian paramilitary forces have used the Al-Jufra Air Base in central Libya since 2019. Recent upgrades to the base include renovated hangars and the construction of small buildings, fences, berms and sheds, according to Tearline.
Russian forces first were observed at Al-Qardabiyah Air Base in 2022. The base is attached to Sirte International Airport. Russian forces built new infrastructure, refurbished runways and set up “new perimeter defenses” at Al-Quardabiyah in 2024, The Telegraph reported. A hangar was repaired at the base this year.
Since March 2024, Russian forces have expanded their operations at Brak al‑Shati Air Base in central-southwest Libya. At least one new hangar and two buildings likely used for aircraft maintenance have been built recently, according to Tearline. The number of Russian personnel at the base has increased from 300 to 450 since December 2024.
By mid-2023, Russia’s Wagner Group mercenaries, which preceded the Africa Corps, reportedly used the Tamanhint Air Base in southern Libya to launch military operations and facilitate arms shipments to Sudan. Expansion projects, including likely new housing quarters, a resurfaced road connecting a runway to hangars and runway modifications have been reported recently.
Sunday, August 02, 2026
The Russia, Ukraine drone war shifts to crippling ports
The escalating drone war between Russia and Ukraine has shifted to crippling ports and as the missile gap between the two adversiries narrows, both sides are feeling the pain. / bne IntelliNewsFacebook
Ukraine's long-range drone campaign has entered a new phase, shifting from attacks on Russia's military infrastructure to systematic strikes on the commercial ports, grain terminals and oil export facilities that underpin both Moscow's wartime economy and Kazakhstan's energy exports.
Russia has countered by targeting Ukraine’s six commercial ports of which Odesa is the key transport asset that accounts for two thirds of Ukraine’s seaborne exports by volume and half by value.
Both Ukraine’s and Russia’s ports have already been brought to standstills that will hurt export revenues and has already caused Ferrexpo, a leading Ukrainian metallurgical plant, to shut down production as its warehouses are full to bursting. Russian exports of oil are likely to be impacted as well, although it has several alternative export channels to ease the pressure.
Attacks are escalating as part of the unfolding brutal tit-for-tat missile war and have simultaneously disrupted Russia's two most important Black Sea export businesses: agricultural exports and crude oil shipments.
On July 30, the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) again suspended tanker loadings at its marine terminal near Novorossiysk after Ukrainian drones struck two oil tankers waiting to load crude. Hours earlier, Ukrainian analyst Kyrylo Shevchenko reported that Russian attacks on Ukrainian ports and Ukraine's own strikes on Russian grain terminals had left both sides' Black Sea trade under increasing pressure.
Kyiv is widening its economic warfare strategy beyond refineries to target the logistics network that moves Russia's most valuable exports. As IntelliNews reported, Ukraine's strategy of attacking Russia’s oil refineries has settled into a routine of damage, repair and restart that make for spectacular headlines, but after having reduced the throughput by an estimated 45%, according to the Financial Times, has seen the fuel crisis abate in the last weeks as Russia imports petrol from friendly states such as Belarus, Kazakhstan and India. As oil analyst Sergey Vakulenko put it in a recent paper: Russia oil refinery sector is battered but not broken.
Vakhtang Partsvania argued in a comment for Riddle Russia that Bankova, Ukraine’s presidential administration, has become dissatisfied with its previous strategy of hitting oil refineries is working terminals, such as the week-long attacks on Primorsk and Ust-Luga, which temporarily reduce traffic, but the damage can be quickly repaired and the port soon goes back to work, as tank farms are designed to lose individual tanks rather than whole facilities, and loadings usually resume once pipeline and rail links survive, says Partsvania.
The Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) has refined its strategy, using new and more accurate long-range “sanctions”, as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has taken to calling them: Ukraine has been aiming at the more sophisticated and difficult to replace equipment in the refineries that is starting to put them out of action completely. For example, the Moscow refinery was hit in May and will not come back online until the start of next year, Reuters reports.
Economic costs mount
With its limited access to the sea, the Russian counteroffensive is hurting Ukraine more than the pain Ukraine is inflicting on Russia. Every day that Greater Odesa's ports remain idle costs an estimated $70mn in delayed exports, according to Shevchenko. In June alone the three ports handled $2.1bn of exports out of Ukraine's total monthly exports of $3.5bn.
During the first half of 2026, 34mn tonnes of cargo—roughly two-thirds of Ukraine's total exports of 50.7mn tonnes—passed through Greater Odesa, which also handles around 60% of Ukraine's cross-border cargo traffic. Russian attacks have already eliminated roughly one-third of Ukraine's Black Sea grain export capacity. That comes at a time where the Ministry of Finance (MinFin) already says there is a $20bn hole in the budget thanks to inflated defence costs.
Still, the pain to Russia is also significant, at a time when its economy has slowed sharply and the budget deficit is swelling alarmingly. Three of the country's largest Black Sea grain terminals—NZT and KSK in Novorossiysk and ZTKT at Taman, together capable of handling more than 20mn tonnes annually—have restricted truck deliveries following repeated Ukrainian drone attacks. According to Shevchenko, operations at Taman have effectively stopped, while shipping through the Sea of Azov has largely frozen.
The impact is now starting to show up in the export statistics. Russian wheat exports in July fell to just 1.5mn tonnes, their lowest monthly level since 2017 and roughly one-third below the same month last year. The decline threatens between $10bn and $15bn of annual grain trade if disruptions continue. Moscow is exploring alternative export routes through the Baltic and Caspian Seas, but Shevchenko says there is so far little evidence that those corridors are absorbing the lost Black Sea volumes.
CPC in the firing line
The innocent bystander in this slugfest is Kazakhstan which sends 80% of its oil to international markets via the CPC pipeline and the Russian port of Novorossiysk.
The CPC said drones struck the Marshall Islands-flagged tanker Nissos Sifnos, which was loading Tengiz crude from the consortium's Single Point Mooring-3 at the weekend. The attack ignited a fire near the vessel's cargo manifolds before being extinguished by the crew with assistance from three CPC support vessels.
A second tanker, the Isle of Man-flagged Marathi, was attacked around six nautical miles from the terminal while approaching to load. CPC said neither vessel suffered casualties or oil spills and both remained afloat, but loading operations were suspended once again while inspections continue.
The consortium made an unusually pointed political statement, noting that the attacks had occurred despite repeated appeals from Astana and other international shareholders—including approaches made through the US State Department—calling for international energy infrastructure not to be targeted.
The terminal occupies a unique position in Eurasian energy markets. Although located on Russia's Black Sea coast, the 1,511km CPC pipeline primarily exports crude from western Kazakhstan. Its shareholders include Transneft, KazMunayGas, and subsidiaries of Chevron (NYSE: CVX), ExxonMobil (NYSE: XOM), Lukoil and a Rosneft-Shell joint venture. Every disruption therefore affects Kazakhstan's export revenues as much as Russia's, highlighting the increasingly international economic consequences of the conflict.
Taken together, the Black Sea has become one of the war's principal economic battlefields on a par with the twin closure of the global chokepoints of Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab at the end of the Red Sea.
For much of the conflict, Ukraine focused on breaking Russia's naval blockade and reopening its own export corridor from Odesa. Russia, meanwhile, repeatedly attacked Ukrainian port infrastructure in an effort to choke Kyiv's agricultural and metal exports and the Ukrainian economy is already beginning to shut down as a result. Ukraine continues to lose export revenue every day its ports are disrupted, while Russia's own grain terminals, oil export infrastructure and shipping are increasingly exposed to Zelenskiy’s long-range “sanctions” after the formal EU and US sanctions have delivered little to pressure Putin into talks.
Despite Russia’s clear advantage in the drones vs missiles arms race and Kyiv’s nearly exhausted supply of PAC-3 interceptor missiles, neither side appears capable of protecting its commercial maritime infrastructure completely. Both now face the same difficult choice: absorb the economic cost of interrupted trade or reroute exports through longer, more expensive overland and alternative maritime corridors.
The result is that the economic war in the Black Sea is becoming increasingly symmetrical. At the same time Ukraine’s missile development programme is also rapidly closing the gap with Russia as new classes of long-range and more powerful missiles appear such as the famed Flamingo cruise missile, which is already in service, and the F-9, Ukraine’s first true cruise missile, that is expected to appear at the end of this year.
What began as an attempt to blockade Ukraine's exports has evolved into a contest in which ports, grain terminals, oil tankers and shipping lanes on both sides of the sea have become legitimate military targets, raising the cost of trade for Moscow and Kyiv alike.
Ukrainian Drone Attacks On Refineries Far From Only Threat To Russia’s Oil Industry – Analysis
An oil refinery in Kstovo, in Russia's Nizhny Novgorod region, is seen burning after a Ukrainian strike. Photo Credit: Generalstaff.ua, RFE/RL
Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian refineries have sparked a country-wide gas shortage and cost Moscow significant export earnings. They are far from the only threat to Russia’s oil industry. Other, less dramatic threats are likely to prove more significant.
Much of Russia’s pipeline network and tanker capacity, dating from Soviet times, is aging and increasingly prone to leaks, reducing the flow of oil to refineries and export markets on which the Kremlin relies while fueling growing anger among Russians.
As older fields are exhausted, Russia is being forced to develop new ones in the Far North, where global warming threatens infrastructure and collapse and requires money Moscow lacks or refuses to spend to prevent new disasters.
Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian refineries have sparked a country-wide gas shortage and cost Moscow significant export earnings. They are far from the only threat to Russia’s oil industry and even to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s standing (see EDM, December 22, 2025, July10, 14). Other underlying threats, while less dramatic so far, may prove more significant, as they could reduce Russia’s production and earnings over time (see EDM, June 25).
Much of Russia’s domestic pipeline network and tanker capacity, dating largely from Soviet times, is aging and increasingly prone to leaks that reduce the flow of oil over the longer term to refineries as well as to export markets on which the Kremlin relies, while sparking ever more domestic anger among Russians (Window on Eurasia, April 14, 2024, July 24; Novye Izvestia, June 24, 2025; Meduza, September 3, 2025; Arctida, July 14). As Russia’s older fields are exhausted, it is being forced to develop new and more distant ones in the Far North, where global warming threatens infrastructure collapse and requires money Moscow does not have or is unwilling to spend to prevent new disasters (Window on Eurasia, August 18, 2021, May 17, December 6, 2025; see EDM, March 4, 2025; Nasha Versia, February 10).
To keep public alarm over the current crisis from spreading to these deeper, longer-term problems, the Russian government has played down these risks, blocking coverage of many of these developments in the central media and even ending the release of data that could allow others to track and report on what is happening (Yesli Byt’ Tochnym, March 22, 2023; IStories, July 14, 2025).
Environmental activists, both in Russia and internationally, have been sounding the alarm and documenting their concerns with evidence drawn from government sources, where leaks of another kind are also a problem for the Kremlin. The most prominent coverage of the oil industry’s problems has come from the Bellona organization in Norway, which gained fame for reporting on Soviet-era dumping of nuclear waste in the Arctic, and from Arctida, a Russian émigré group that tracks developments in the northern regions of the Russian Federation (The Moscow Times, March 31; Arctida, July 14). Arctida’s coverage is significant for tracking problems in the Russian oil industry that extend beyond the refineries Ukrainian drones have destroyed.
In the wake of those attacks, Raya Levashova, climate and environment analyst at Arсtida, has drawn particular attention to these broader problems. More than half of Russia’s 250,000-kilometer (155,342-mile) oil pipeline network is worn out, she notes, and should be repaired or replaced because leaks are now a significant problem. In some places, as much as 80 percent of the oil-carrying infrastructure needs to be replaced now (Arctida, July 14). She adds that, in 2023, the last year Moscow released such data, there were 14,716 major pipeline ruptures, spilling oil into the surrounding environment, contaminating it and limiting the flow of oil to refineries. That figure, already alarming, has almost certainly grown since then, which explains why Moscow has worked so hard to keep such information under wraps.
The Arctida analyst says worse is yet to come as the number of such leaks will skyrocket in the coming years as Rosneft builds a new 9,000-kilometer (5,592-mile) network in the Russian Far North, where it is developing new fields. This pipeline system will be new and thus avoid the problems of aging infrastructure, yet global warming, melting permafrost, and the company’s unwillingness or inability to spend the money needed to ensure its stability could certainly increase the risk of leaks. Rosneft is upbeat about the new routes, saying shipments from the Taymyr Peninsula will begin this September. Levashova sees little reason to accept those claims. Only 700 kilometers (435 miles) of the projected 9,000 kilometers (5,592 miles) have been laid as of June, and the company faces serious problems coping with global warming’s impact on pipeline stability (Arctida, July 14).
Levashova says environmentalists such as her are worried that as the project proceeds, the risk of leaks will rise dramatically and harm the fragile ecosystems of the High North. Rosneft’s approach, she argues, is based on the assumption that environmental conditions will remain stable rather than deteriorate, despite scientific projections. Even pipeline segments that are stable today will be at risk as temperatures rise and the permafrost melts further. Specifically, the relatively inexpensive but low-capacity thermosyphons (passive heat exchange systems that allow for the circulation of air in the ground) that the company is installing will no longer work effectively since they rely on larger differences between air and ground temperatures than those already present in many places in the Russian North and expected across the entire region in only a few years (Arctida, July 14).
Even “at current rates of warming,” she concludes, “localized engineering solutions can no longer guarantee the safety and stability of industrial pipelines; the risks of deformation and loss of containment are rising in step with the climate crisis. In addition, this crisis is being worsened in part by the oil being burned after traveling through these pipes.” She points out that the Russian government has failed to impose fines stiff enough to discourage Rosneft and others from cutting corners, thereby allowing the companies to build in ways that make accidents more likely. Moscow has instead reduced rather than strengthened environmental protections and enforcement (Novaya Gazeta, June 24). As Levashova puts it, “It is often more cost-effective for Russian oil companies to pay fines and compensate for damage than to invest” to prevent such disasters (Arctida, July 14).
Taken together, these trends mean the oil crisis in the Russian Federation will not end even if Ukrainian attacks on refineries do, unless Moscow redirects spending to ensure its pipelines and tankers are safe. The Putin regime is unlikely to take those steps, even with prices remaining high due to the U.S. conflict with Iran. The consequences for the Russian economy and for people across the Russian Federation—first in the Far North, then more broadly—could be enormous and, over time, exceed those of the current Ukrainian drone attacks (Yesli Byt’ Tochnym, September 22, 2023; Arctida, March 25, 2025; East Russia, May 13, 2025; Caspy.Land, July 9).
About Paul Goble Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com . View all posts by Paul Goble →
Fire reported at another Wildberries warehouse in Russia
Video footage circulating on social media appears to show a large blaze at the warehouse, with flames engulfing the building and huge plumes of black smoke billowing into the sky.
A fire broke out at a Wildberries warehouse in Russia's Samara region on Sunday following an attack, the company's press service has said.
In a post on Telegram, the Russian online retailer said there were currently no reported casualties and that "logistics chains have been reorganised."
"The receipt of deliveries and dispatch of orders are now being handled at other facilities," it added.
Video footage circulating on social media appears to show a large blaze at the warehouse, with flames engulfing the building and huge plumes of black smoke billowing into the sky.
In July, Ukrainian forces targeted multiple Wildberries logistics facilities across Russia as part of Kyiv's "long-range sanctions" against Moscow, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy saying the warehouses were involved in supplying drone parts and navigation equipment for the Russian military.
Wildberries was founded in 2004 by Russian billionaire Tatyana Kim and has gone on to become the country's largest online marketplace. Products offered on its website now include items such as knives, helmets, camouflage, and night-vision devices.
Russian strikes on Ukraine
In a social media post on Sunday, Zelenskyy said Russian forces had launched around 1,900 drones, roughly 1,600 aerial bombs, and 144 missiles against 16 regions of Ukraine this week.
"Today, Sumy was struck by aerial bombs. In Brovary, one person was killed in a drone strike, and six people were injured," he wrote.
The Ukrainian air force said Russia attacked Ukraine with 133 drones and loitering munitions overnight.
Firefighters put out a fire at a major book warehouse following Russian drone strikes in Kharkiv, Ukraine, Saturday, Aug. 1, 2026. Copyright 2026 The Associated Press. All rights reserved
"According to preliminary data, as of 8:00 am, air defences had shot down or neutralised 109 enemy UAVs of the Shahed, Gerber, and Italmas types, ‘Banderole’ loitering munitions and other types of drones in the north, south and east of the country," the air force said in a statement.
Ukrainian forces targeted Russia's Saratov oil refinery and Engels military air base overnight, per Zelenskyy. An oil depot in the Kaluga region and a facility involved in the storage of attack drones in Brysansk were also hit, he added.
Zelenskyy renews calls for Patriot missiles
It comes as the Ukrainian leader made a fresh plea for more Patriot interceptors.
The US-made Patriot is one of the world's most advanced air defence systems and can be used to defend against ballistic and cruise missiles, loitering munitions, and aircraft. The coveted system is expensive and limited in supply, but it is seen by Kyiv as crucial to success in its fight against Russian President Vladimir Putin's invading forces.
"The world has Patriot missiles," Zelenskyy said on Saturday evening. "What matters now is for our partners to make the political decision to provide the necessary packages. The United States knows what we need. Europe knows what we need. Anti-ballistic missiles must protect people – not sit in stockpiles."
On Friday, US President Donald Trump appeared to go back on a promise to let Kyiv build its own Patriot missiles.
"We have not agreed to that. We're talking about it. But it's a hard thing to give away that kind of technology," Trump said during a cabinet meeting - despite having told Zelenskyy at the 2026 NATO summit in Turkey that Washington would give Ukraine a license to build Patriots.
"We'll show them how to do it," Trump said at the summit in July, adding: "This way you can't complain that we're not giving them enough."
