Showing posts sorted by date for query MONOPOLY CAPITALISM. Sort by relevance Show all posts
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Thursday, February 12, 2026

Under Capitalism, Democracy Stops at the Economy

Source: Jacobin

The dominant mode of socialist analysis of contemporary capitalism very often focuses on its corruption or decay through financialization, monopolization, deregulation, or corporate influence over politics. Financial parasitism, the extraction of rent by “technofeudal” overlords, and political corruption are seen as aberrations that have sapped capitalism of its competitive vitality, resulting in exploding economic inequality and working-class precarity and culminating in the present neofascist Trumpian nightmare.

At the same time, such accounts gesture toward a social democratic politics of class compromise, insofar as workers and “productive” industrial capitalists — that is, their bosses — are assumed to share an interest in “restoring competitiveness” by reining in tech monopolies or excessive financial speculation while expanding government spending. Socialist strategy, therefore, should be oriented around revitalizing American capitalism, albeit in a somewhat more progressive guise.

Clara Mattei’s Escape From Capitalism offers an important corrective to these perspectives. In many ways, it is the book we have been waiting for, providing an introduction to capitalism as well as a critique of neoclassical economics, while rejecting oversimplified populist framings targeting corporate greed, big finance, or monopoly power as the primary political problems to be overcome. Mattei insists the problem is capitalism itself: not a system that is broken and in need of repair but one that is functioning correctly and in need of being abolished.

As she argues, there is a fundamental contradiction between “the logic of profit” and “the logic of need.” Far from signaling a problem for the system, capital benefits from — even requires — the deprivation of the majority. The immiseration of workers and growing authoritarianism are thus not failures of capitalism but consequences of its basic drives. Competitiveness, meanwhile, is a problem, not a solution, for workers.

Maintaining exploitation, Mattei argues, requires specific policies — namely austerity, through which the state disciplines workers by imposing material insecurity. The formation of mainstream economics, she shows, was inextricably bound up with its ability to legitimate austerity by cloaking capitalist interests behind pretensions of neutrality. Such claims to objectivity, along with reliance on complex mathematical models, depoliticized economic questions, facilitating their placement in the hands of unelected “experts” and reinforcing forms of authoritarian governance.

Achieving genuine democracy, for Mattei, requires recognizing the economic system, economic policy, and economic theory as inescapably political sites where class power is constituted and exercised. Analyzing capitalism historically, as Mattei does, reveals the functioning of power in each of these areas and shows that no outcome is predetermined, posing a powerful challenge to the fatalism that is today a major barrier to working-class mobilization.

The Capital Order

The book begins by explaining, with enviable clarity, how “the capital order” is built on two “basic pillars,” labor markets and private ownership of the means of production, which support the “roof” of profit. Mattei is careful to note that markets preexisted the rise of capitalism proper. What marks the decisive qualitative break with prior economic systems is not merely a quantitative increase in trade but generalized market dependence, whereby “our society now relies on the market for our survival and reproduction.”

Echoing Karl Marx’s analysis of “so-called primitive accumulation,” Mattei emphasizes that the historical emergence of capitalism bore no resemblance whatsoever to the comforting neoclassical myth of the peaceful expansion of markets alongside rising productivity. The consolidation of absolute property rights took place through widespread, violent expropriation at the hands of the state — events “written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire,” in Marx’s powerful formulation. Far from markets displacing states, Mattei insists that the coercive laws of competition and state power have worked hand in hand to uphold the capital order.

Mattei insists that capitalism has, from the very beginning, been marked by the accumulation of wealth at one pole and the accumulation of misery at the other — what Marx called “the absolute general law of capitalist accumulation.” This provides the basis for Mattei’s argument that the logic of profit is fundamentally at odds with the logic of need.

The purpose of capitalist production is not the creation of use-values to support human flourishing but the endless accumulation of exchange-value by one class through its control over the labor of another. To treat the neoliberal degradation of the working class as a symptom of capitalism’s failure, rather than as an extension of its inner logic, is to depoliticize the antagonism between need and profit, capital and labor. It implies that a strong, competitive capitalism necessarily benefits workers, and thus that the interests of workers and capitalists are not inherently opposed. In fact, the strength of capital has always been predicated on the subordination of human needs to the imperative to profit.

As Mattei argues, economic growth represents “the logical progression of the capitalist class.” Technological development is driven by the imperative to maximize exploitation, enabling each worker to produce more in a given period of time. Absent labor organization, the system will tend to automate away the highest-paid jobs, throwing workers out of work, swelling the ranks of the jobless, and increasing competitive pressure on all wages. Meanwhile, if wages rise faster than productivity — leading to declining rates of exploitation and diminished returns for capitalists — the lack of profit will lead to reduced investment and layoffs, again expanding the reserve army of the unemployed.

Thus, workers ultimately can’t win in capitalism: higher wages only mean that the “golden chain of their own making” that binds their fortunes to the power of capital has been, for a time, “loosened somewhat.” Growth, in other words, is not a win-win for capital and workers, as is so often claimed. Class discipline is baked into its very logic. Working-class politics, therefore, cannot be limited to fighting for higher wages but must aim at escaping from capitalism altogether.

This foundation in Marxian economic theory allows Mattei’s analysis to move beyond populist exhortations about “the greed” of “the billionaire class,” which typically focus on income  distribution rather than the underlying processes through which wealth is produced. Income stratification, she shows, is distinct from class. The latter is not about how much money one makes but where it comes from — that is, one’s position within the social relations of production.

So, too, does this framework help to ground racial and gender inequalities in the class relations that structure hierarchies both between and within such groups. The ostensible strength of populist framings is the claim that more substantial economic theory, which would illuminate the structural roots of inequalities of wealth and power, is “too hard,” “too complicated,” or “too scary” for mass consumption. Yet Mattei’s text neither relies on the jargon that might deter the uninitiated nor sacrifices political urgency. Bringing the systemic sources of power relations in our society into focus, instead, points the way toward the systemic changes necessary to bring about genuine democracy.

Especially important is Mattei’s understanding of competition as the central force driving accumulation, rejecting the “monopoly capital” arguments that have long dominated heterodox economics. Far from being confined to an early stage of capitalism, competition remains the source of the system’s extraordinary dynamism and resilience. Market dominance, she claims, is inherently temporary and always under pressure from rivals. The race for innovation and the tendency to lower prices “cannot be stopped” — and indeed is reproduced on a larger and more destructive scale as units of capital grow through concentration and centralization.

Crucially, competition is by no means a benefit to workers, as neoclassical economics suggests, supposedly allowing them to choose a different employer if their labor is not fairly compensated. On the contrary, it anchors Marx’s “general law,” compelling firms to maximize exploitation and guaranteeing the production of a surplus population. For Mattei, competition is pivotal for the “logic of profit,” disciplining workers and reinforcing their dependence on the market.

Mattei’s arguments coincide with our own work on financialization as well as on the Amazon corporation. As we showed in The Fall and Rise of American Finance, insofar as financialization has increased the mobility of capital, facilitating its circulation geographically as well as across sectors, it has intensified the competitive dynamism of the system at a global scale. The more easily capital can be withdrawn from assets with relatively low returns and allocated to those with relatively high returns, the more intense the competitive disciplines on all investments to maximize returns becomes.

Similarly, our research on Amazon — a key example cited by Mattei — has shown how, far from being a monopoly, as is often claimed, that firm is in fact ferociously competitive. Rather than the high prices, technological stagnation, inefficiency, and inflated profits that monopoly theory would expect, Amazon has been compelled to continuously fight to sustain and renew its position through unceasing innovation and restructuring — especially by minimizing circulation time and costs, thus helping to maximize the production of profit in the minimum time, and slashing prices.

This challenges the “technofeudal” hypothesis, which implies that many contemporary economic and social ills can be attributed to the malfunctioning of capitalism as a result of the monopoly power of a group of tech firms that drain value from “productive” capitalists. Such accounts largely draw on the work of Lina Khan, anti-trust guru and former Federal Trade Commissioner under Joe Biden, albeit dressed up in more radical-sounding language.

The implication is that “restoring competition” would benefit workers and industrial capitalists alike. Yet paradoxically, Amazon — perhaps more than any other firm — illustrates precisely how damaging competition is for workers. Cutthroat price competition has led to the most ruthless exploitation through relentless downward pressure on wages and continuous innovations in the automation, surveillance, and discipline of labor processes in warehouses employing thousands of workers — scenes which resemble passages straight out of Capital: Volume 1. Nor is taking on “speculative” finance likely to produce the “good” industry-led capitalism for which liberals pine. Mattei’s analysis helps us see that the massive harms visited upon workers in the neoliberal period is the result of competition, not its absence.

Austerity and the Capitalist State

If many on the Left see capitalism today as ailing, European social democracy (or even its far more limited cousin, the New Deal) is frequently offered as the cure — extending the argument that workers and capitalists have a shared interest in “restoring” a strong and competitive capitalism. Indeed, social democratic regimes are often taken to have resolved the contradiction between capitalism and social justice, and between the priorities of private profit and those of democracy and equality. Even as these regimes impose increasingly harsh austerity, they are invoked as proof that we can have unlimited economic growth and accommodate democratic demands for income redistribution and the welfare state.

For Mattei, however, the intensification of austerity that has marked the crisis of these regimes is not merely a policy choice or political failure, but a structural necessity imposed by the “logic of profit” itself as it visibly asserts its antagonism to the “logic of need.” Fighting austerity, therefore, cannot mean installing a more progressive capitalism but requires transcending it altogether. Rather than defending capitalism, it is up to socialists to expose the limits of reform within it — and to make the case for a different economic and social order.

As Mattei argues, capitalist economies require authoritarian political management in order to sustain relations of class power and exploitation. Macroeconomic policy, she shows, is nothing more than a system of social control: tweaking the knobs, pulling the levers, and indeed turning the screws of policy to secure ruling-class power while accommodating workers’ demands within the bounds of profitable accumulation. Especially crucial is the state’s role in enforcing austerity, which sustains workers’ dependence on markets — and therefore on capitalist employers — by depriving them of the means to survive outside of wage labor.

Neoclassical economics has been important for legitimating this order, rendering exploitation invisible and concealing the class character of state policy behind a veil of objective scientific expertise. So-called “pure economics” reinforces the narrowing of democracy to the “political sphere,” from which “the economy” is excluded. In doing so, it depoliticizes even the political sphere itself, facilitating the concentration of power in the hands of technocrats understood to be impartially solving purely technical problems.

Capitalist states enact three forms of austerity: fiscal, through restraint on social spending; monetary, through interest-rate policy; and industrial, through limitations on labor rights. As has been widely noted, the “assault on trade union freedoms” has been central for ratcheting up exploitation over the neoliberal period alongside cuts to welfare programs. Less obvious is the role of monetary austerity, which has become increasingly important with the empowerment of central banks in recent decades. As Mattei explains, monetary policy is guided by the so-called Phillips curve, which posits an inverse relationship between inflation and unemployment: as one rises, the other falls.

Raising interest rates increases unemployment, pressing down on wages as competition among workers for jobs intensifies. The explicit objective is to maintain what economists call the NAIRU — the “just-right” level of unemployment necessary to secure working-class docility. What is coded as “controlling inflation,” Mattei argues, in fact means “protecting profits” and attaining a target rate of exploitation. Unemployment, she emphasizes, is not a natural state of human affairs but a necessary feature of the capitalist system and a political choice.

That austerity, in case after case, has not spurred significant economic growth has led Keynesian critics on the Left to deride such policies as “failures.” Instead, they point to the need to stimulate aggregate demand and boost employment through redistribution and fiscal expansion. Mattei’s critical point, however, is that austerity is not a mistaken attempt to generate growth, nor has it in fact failed. Its implementation is not the product of technical misunderstanding or erroneous theory; it is a profoundly political mechanism for maintaining the capital order. And far from being contingent, austerity is a necessary structural imperative for sustaining the class discipline that underpins profitability.

Austerity is thus “not a neoliberal aberration” but an enduring feature of macroeconomic governance, forming the framework within which all public spending must operate. State economic policy, in this sense, is not simply an effect of shifting economic ideas but capitalist strategy forged in the crucible of class struggle. While the state may respond to workers’ demands by organizing reforms, austerity enforces hard limits on how far these can go, lest they undermine the commodification of labor on which capitalism depends.

While Mattei unfortunately does not explore this history, her framework helps to clarify the structural limits of social democratic politics. Social democracy aims to secure reforms that benefit workers without challenging private ownership of the means of production or the boundaries of capitalist democracy. Although nominally committed to socialism, the history of social democratic parties since World War II is not one of gradual advance toward socialism, but of accepting “managed capitalism”  as the ultimate political horizon.

The imperative to limit worker demands to what capital could support, and their absorption within the machinery of the capitalist state, reinforced these parties’ top-down, bureaucratic structures. They stifled activism and confined political engagement to electoral channels rather than cultivating the democratic capacities necessary for socialist transition. This orientation was underpinned by the rise of Keynesian economics, which allowed these parties to claim that reforms would benefit, not threaten, profits. They positioned themselves as  better managers of capitalism than their conservative rivals, presenting their programs as a “win-win” for capital and labor.

Social democracy has always relied on the forms of austerity Mattei identifies to enforce market discipline. Social programs had to be calibrated, through fiscal restraint or the countervailing force of monetary policy, to ensure they did not undermine the compulsion to perform wage labor. Workers’ demands were also contained through industrial austerity, especially corporatist arrangements that integrated trade unions and business associations into the state.

These institutions managed class conflict by administering “incomes policies” that prevented wage growth from squeezing profits. But it was the end of the postwar boom and the 1970s crisis that really brought down the hammer of austerity. Falling profits demanded increasing exploitation through cuts to real wages and social expenditures. Suddenly, the corporatist mechanisms that had anchored distributional bargains as well as class discipline became instruments for securing wage restraint as social democratic regimes embraced the “new reality” of global competitiveness. Having long  accepted the constraints of capitalism as fundamental political limits, these parties had neither the imagination nor the capacity to forge an alternative to neoliberal austerity and market reform.

Mattei’s analysis thus helps explain why social democratic regimes could never “decommodify” labor, as theorized by Danish sociologist Gøsta Esping-Andersen. To be sure, these states decommodified certain social services — health care, transportation, education — by providing them free at the point of use rather than through purchase on the market. These reforms are major victories for workers and can help illuminate what a social system emancipated from market dependence and oriented toward meeting social needs could look like. Yet even the most expansive welfare states have not — and could not — decommodify labor itself.

Providing workers with the means to survive without undertaking wage labor would be tantamount to granting them an unlimited strike fund. And in practice, labor force participation in these regimes has not been lower than in “liberal” models, as one would expect if the compulsion to undertake wage labor had truly been relaxed, but higher. If anything, social democratic regimes embedded workers more deeply in market relations. Even in the strongest welfare state regimes, the entire society, and all state expenditures, remained dependent on competitiveness and profitability.

Globalization and Empire

In the book’s penultimate chapter, Mattei turns to analyzing capitalism as a global system, simultaneously attempting to account for persistent hierarchies on the world market while emphasizing that the most decisive conflicts in global capitalism are not between states, but within  them. The exploitation of workers in both core and peripheral economies, she insists, is the lifeblood of global capitalism.

This means that it is mistaken to suggest that working classes in the global core somehow “exploit” workers and peasants in peripheral states, as is sometimes suggested by contemporary accounts of the “imperial mode of living.” Such arguments often rely on versions of the “labor aristocracy” thesis, according to which monopoly firms in the Global North have effectively bought off workers there through higher wages and consumption standards financed through the super-exploitation of workers in the Global South. This framework winds up perversely suggesting that workers in core states have actually benefited from globalization rather than being among its principal victims. In fact, far from blocking the forces of real competition, globalization has been about intensifying them, increasing market dependence and entrenching austerity everywhere.

At the same time, Mattei frames her chapter around the “dependency” of the global periphery, and the “development of underdevelopment” through the structure of the international system. These theories, which emerged initially in the 1960s, contend that core economies systematically drain value from the periphery through “unequal exchange” as the latter export cheap primary commodities and import expensive value-added goods.

Exploitation is thus primarily understood to operate through international trade rather than class relations within each society. It follows that working classes in the core are not likely to be forces for transformative change; on the contrary, they are more likely to support the imperial domination of the periphery on which their privileged position depends. Thus, in their seminal work Monopoly Capital, Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy argued that revolutionary agency would, if anywhere, arise from national liberation movements in the so-called Third World — which might in turn inspire marginalized populations within the United States to undertake analogous national struggles. This called for national class alliances between workers, peasants, and national bourgeoisies to transform the international economic system.

The apparent tension between these two perspectives leaves Mattei’s analysis somewhat unclear at times. While dependency theory accurately described the terms of world trade in the 1950s and 1960s, subsequent history — which is not discussed by Mattei — points strongly to the primacy of class struggle within states rather than conflict between them.

In the 1950s, it was the American state that underwrote so-called import substitution industrialization (ISI), through which protected national industries displaced imports from the core, as part of a wider project of integrating peripheral economies into the US-led global order. And it was peripheral bourgeoisies that, having been strengthened through the ensuing process of economic development, came to favor discarding those protections as they sought fuller integration into the American empire.

Indeed, as Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin argued, the American Empire has operated to a significant extent as an “empire by invitation.” As it oversaw the emergence of an integrated global capitalism stitched together by cross-border flows of trade and investment, the American state came to articulate the general interests of global capital, eroding any distinctly “national” bourgeoisies.

In this way, the restructuring of the American Empire eroded the foundations for class compromises in the core and periphery. While the postwar Bretton Woods system placed certain constraints on the movement of capital, providing a stable framework for global integration and the consolidation of the American Empire. Its supersession by a regime of free capital mobility following the 1970s crisis enabled capitalists to circulate investment globally virtually cost-free. With capital’s ability to relocate production wherever labor and regulatory costs were cheapest, it became increasingly difficult for workers to compel it to enter into domestic distributional bargains.

Unwilling to challenge the internationalization of capital, social democracy instead embraced it through “progressive competitiveness” strategies that aimed to entice capital to invest at home through subsidies and upskilling national workforces. But the expansion of skilled labor on the periphery and the adaptation of advanced technologies to low-wage zones led to the displacement of industrial employment from the core to the periphery, rising precarity and inequality, and mounting pressure on welfare state programs.

The deepening of global integration within the American Empire intensified competitive discipline and reinforced monetary, fiscal, and industrial austerity. The effects were precisely the opposite of what dependency theory had anticipated: deindustrialization and downward pressure on wages, job security, and living standards among the most privileged workers in the core states, alongside industrialization in the periphery.

The global integration of finance that tied the system together locked states into fiscal austerity and increased pressure to roll back taxes and cut social spending. Such cuts to programs for working people coincided with massive tax breaks for the wealthy, reinforcing the upward distribution of income. Globalization also fortified industrial austerity, severely straining labor rights and collective-bargaining regimes while imposing tight limits on worker mobilization, wage growth, and all forms of industrial democracy. Meanwhile, a highly volatile floating exchange rate system imposed strict demands on more powerful central banks, and the technocrats who managed them, for continuous intervention to fight inflation and support currency stability — and thus to secure class discipline through monetary austerity.

Mattei’s historical analysis, however, is largely confined to the 1920s. As such, the book does not explore the interconnected histories of social democracy, developmentalism, and the American Empire. Assessing social democratic regimes is crucial for substantiating her argument about the structural nature of austerity, precisely because these regimes are typically understood to be its very opposite. Their crisis and retrenchment from the 1970s onward had everything to do with their long-standing embrace of the American Empire and their fundamental unwillingness to challenge capitalism.

Together, these commitments made the rollback of the gains of the postwar “Glorious Thirty Years” all but inevitable as investment was liberalized. Indeed, globalization imposed what Gindin described as a “polarization of options” on working classes: break with globalization and begin moving toward greater democratic control over investment or accept neoliberal restructuring. This aligns closely with Mattei’s argument, but the urgency of her perspective, and its relevance to present debates, is weakened by her limited engagement with the conjuncture.

Socialism and Class Formation

Mattei’s overriding — and crucially important — point is that workers have no interest in strengthening capital. Focusing on the supposed “failures” of austerity, monopoly, financial speculation, and the like obscures the social harm produced by capitalism’s normal operation. Such perspectives frame politics as a struggle within capitalism rather than against it, and cast the working class as a potential ally of a supposedly “progressive” fraction of capital that, it is hoped, might embrace pro-worker policies that would enhance profitability and competitiveness.

In reality, rising levels of working-class precarity are not signs of the breakdown of capitalism, but conditions of its strength. While economic growth may allow workers to win higher wages and improved living standards, the satisfaction of needs is subordinated to profitability. Social democracy legitimates capitalism by illustrating how humane it can supposedly be. But the hard limits on these regimes, and the structural necessity of austerity, deprivation, and exploitation, pull the mask off a system guided not by the production of useful goods but by the inhuman, “phantom-like” law of value.

It is these contradictions of accumulation, rather than the collapse of capitalism, that Mattei argues have now fueled the rise of an authoritarian hard right in the United States as well as Europe and beyond. The anger generated by decades of downward pressure on living standards and the retrenchment of welfare states through increasingly harsh austerity — both of which have been very functional for capital — has created fertile ground for far-right politics.

Yet once in power, such forces have only deepened austerity, often unleashing truly brutal attacks on workers and the poor. Moreover, because the class power and exploitation at the heart of the capital order are largely invisible, and because the intensification of market dependence through austerity heightens competition among workers, movements such as MAGA have been able to channel these frustrations into resentment at migrants and other racialized and gendered Others, rather than toward capital itself.

Mattei powerfully argues that overcoming this world of universal alienation requires a struggle for democracy: the assertion of conscious, collective control over economic and social life. This, she suggests, entails an interlinked project of democratizing economic theory, economic policy, and the economy itself. The fight against austerity, in Mattei’s view, is not merely about implementing a different economic policy, but moving toward an entirely different economic order. Necessary to support this is an economic theory that centers what neoclassical economics conceals: exploitation, unemployment, and austerity are not laws of nature but of capitalism.

Insofar as programs for social provision inevitably run up against the logic of profit, sustaining them inherently demands a rupture with capitalism itself. Any left government will ultimately face a stark choice between retreating to austerity or pressing forward. When that moment arrives, workers must be organized and prepared for the necessary break with capitalism. Prioritizing the logic of need thus entails a continuously expanding struggle for democracy and an increasingly radical challenge to capital.

It is thus critical that struggles for reform be framed in socialist terms — not as projects to strengthen capital or boost competitiveness but as efforts to build the capacities to break with the capital order. Central to this task, however, is class formation, which is absent from Mattei’s analysis. As Marx and Friedrich Engels emphasized in The Communist Manifesto, this entails “the formation of the proletariat into a class, and hence a political party.” To be sure, the working class always already exists in some abstract “objective” sense. But in practical terms, it is fragmented across an enormous range of income levels, occupations, educational backgrounds, gendered and racialized conditions, and so on.

Class formation is the political process through which these individuals come to recognize themselves as part of a class with common interests opposed to the logic of profit. This is the distinctive role of a socialist party: to develop the democratic capacities of workers through political education, debate, and collective action. In this way, the party does not merely represent the working class but actively constitutes it as a political force capable of transforming society.

This gap in Mattei’s analysis leads her to miss a crucial dimension of the critique of social democracy: social democratic parties articulate the working class and its interests in a way that departs substantially from a socialist conception. Most importantly, this involves obscuring the antagonism between the logic of profit and the logic of need by implying that fighting for social needs does not necessarily involve opposing capitalism itself.

In the absence of an analysis of class formation, Mattei tends to conflate workers’ immediate economic demands — such as higher wages or even quitting their jobs — with explicitly socialist politics. Thus, she frames the 1979 Volcker Shock, when the Federal Reserve raised interest rates to nearly 20 percent, triggering mass unemployment to break inflation, as suppressing not only workers’ wage demands but also nascent “anti-capitalist alternatives.” Yet what this event and its aftermath truly revealed were the limits of a trade-union model that confined its demands to wage militancy rather than building shop-floor power, let alone advancing a broader political transformation. Because capital retained full control over investment, once profits clashed with rising real wages, exploitation had to be increased.

The more interesting question, then, is why anti-capitalist alternatives were not seriously on the agenda at all. What was missing from the labor movement and working-class politics that might have opened space for a path other than neoliberal austerity? This was certainly not a matter of needing more of what already existed in that moment: more votes for Democrats, more marginal sectarian parties, or even more union density would not have halted the neoliberal assault. What was required, instead, was a mass, organized, socialist movement rooted in the working class, possessing real power and capable of offering a credible alternative.

Absent this, as workers’ defensive battles of the 1970s were defeated, most saw little choice but to adapt to the constraints of competitiveness and profitability. The profound defeat of the working class that has defined the neoliberal era is therefore not only the result of repression by capital and the state but also persistent limits within the labor movement itself. It is not enough, then, to simply continuously replay past struggles. Getting somewhere better requires that unions be transformed into organs of class struggle — which in turn demands the coordination of a party.

This opens another crucial issue Mattei raises but does not elaborate on. If capitalism is defined by market dependence, escaping it must entail replacing that with economic planning. The problem with workers’ cooperatives and community-run financial institutions is that they remain subject to market discipline. As a result, they reproduce the logic of profit: downward pressure on wages, externalization of environmental costs, and a competitive interest in austerity. Overcoming this requires replacing competition among private firms with macro-level coordination.

As Mattei notes, planning of this kind would differ drastically from that carried out within corporations, which allocate investment based on rates of return and price signals. Planning to serve social needs at the macro scale is infinitely more complex. Rather than “breaking up the banks,” this means envisioning, and fighting for, a project of developing the state capacities to run finance as a public utility. Given the failure of private capital to mobilize investment for the urgently needed green transition, this is no longer only a matter of dreaming of a more just and equitable future — it is essential to avert catastrophe.Email

Stephen Maher is assistant professor of economics at SUNY Cortland and coeditor of the Socialist Register. He is the coauthor of The Fall and Rise of American Finance: From J. P. Morgan to BlackRock with Scott Aquanno and author of Corporate Capitalism and the Integral State: General Electric and a Century of American Power.

Tuesday, February 10, 2026

From Historical Blockage to Radical Rupture: The Ontological Revolution of Socialism

Source: Originally published by Z. Feel free to share widely.

​The intellectual framework of new socialism gains meaning through the transcendence of the three main pillars of modernity: statism, industrialism, and hierarchical rationality. These three pillars have been reproduced in different forms throughout history. Capitalism reinforced them through the dogmas of growth, competition, and the market. Traditional socialism, on the other hand, preserved these three elements under a different guise by expanding the state and centralizing economic planning.

​For this reason, a new conception of socialism cannot be envisioned without a critique of modernity. To criticize modernity requires questioning not only economic relations but also modes of knowledge production, moral norms, perceptions of time and space, and even how society gives meaning to its own existence.

​The knowledge production model of modernity is built upon the concept of “centralized truth.” This understanding produces knowledge not from within society, but through institutions positioned above society. The university, state bureaucracy, fields of expertise, and scientific authorities are the truth-production mechanisms of modernity.

​Although these mechanisms ostensibly defend free thought, they reduce the diversity of social experiences to a single form of rationality. This reductionism destroys the richness of social knowledge. New socialism recognizes the production of knowledge by society and the place of social experiences in the production of truth. Therefore, “truth” is not a piece of information descending from the center to society, but a process arising from the multi-layered life practices of society.

​This new understanding of knowledge is also mandatory for political transformation. Because as long as knowledge production remains centralized, politics remains centralized. As knowledge disperses, politics disperses. As knowledge becomes democratized, politics becomes democratized. Therefore, new socialism aims for the dissolution of structures that monopolize knowledge. Strengthening the social circulation of knowledge is the fundamental condition for strengthening the social subject. This means the reconstruction of society’s capacity to give meaning to itself.

​Reconstructing society’s world of meaning beyond modernity also requires a transformation in the understanding of time. Modernity views time as a linear line: the past is left behind, the future has not yet arrived, and the present is merely a transitional moment on this line. This linear perception of time constantly directs society toward the future; the future is always imagined as a more “advanced,” “larger,” and more “developed” stage.

​This fetishism of progress is the common ground for both capitalist growth and traditional socialist developmentalism. Yet, freedom becomes possible by stepping outside the perception of linear time. Recognizing the cyclical and relational dimension of time returns society to a life suited to its own rhythm. New socialism evaluates time not through criteria of growth and development, but through social harmony and ethical life.

​Modernity’s understanding of space is also open to criticism for new socialism. Modern cities squeeze human relations into technical functionality. Space becomes an area where production and consumption processes are organized. However, the liberation of society is possible through the re-socialization of space. Space is not merely a geography but also a network of social relations. Therefore, new socialism re-relationalizes space. The neighborhood, the commune, locality, and community transform into political subjects. This transformation ensures that politics ceases to be state-centered.

​In this context, one of the most fundamental goals of new socialism is to rebuild society’s own organizational capacity. Under the modern state, society becomes a disorganized entity. The more the state grows, the more society shrinks; the more the state centralizes, the more society becomes passive. This passivity is one of the fundamental psychological structures of modernity that governs social life. The aim of new socialism is to make society an active subject again. When society’s organizational capacity increases, the need for the coercive mechanisms of the state decreases.

​The self-organization of society is not just a political model but also a philosophy of existence. When society organizes itself, the individual becomes not only an economic actor but also a political actor. This political agency takes the individual out of loneliness and strengthens them through social bonds. The modern individual is lonely. The individual of new socialism, however, is a relational being. This relational individual finds freedom not in loneliness but in subjectivity within social bonds.

​The understanding of freedom in new socialism also requires an ethical transformation. Ethics is the invisible law of social life. In modern society, ethics has remained in the shadow of the law. Law is determined by the central authority; ethics is produced by the social conscience.

​Therefore, the expansion of the centralized legal system often means the weakening of social ethics. New socialism sees law not as a mechanism that replaces society’s ethical capacity, but as a tool that strengthens this capacity. As ethics strengthens, the need for a centralized legal system decreases.

​The reconstruction of social ethics also requires placing economic relations within an ethical framework. The purpose of the economy cannot be merely production or growth. The purpose of the economy is to meet social needs and strengthen the ethical foundations of social life. Therefore, it is mandatory to restructure economic relations based on community and with ecological sensitivity. When the economy is not compatible with society’s ethical framework, freedom weakens.

​This point points to the ontological dimension of freedom. Freedom is not an internal state of the individual, but a set of relations that determine the conditions of society’s existence. When society is free, the individual is free; when the individual is free, society rebuilds its own organization in a more creative way. This mutual interaction makes freedom both an individual and a social process. Freedom is not the absence of power, but a form of existence that emerges with the dissolution of power within social relations.

​Within this entire framework, while new socialism aims to transcend the contradictions of modernity, it simultaneously constructs a new social ontology. This ontology offers a new way of knowing regarding society’s own existence. Society is not a hierarchical pyramid but a multi-layered network of mutual relations. Every relationship within this network carries the potential for freedom. Therefore, freedom expands with the reconstruction of social relations. It narrows as hierarchy and power relations increase.

​This intellectual structure carries new socialism beyond old paradigms and turns it into an ethical, political, and ontological project of freedom. Such a project does not wait for the future; it builds its own future in the practices of today.

​The radical transformation of new socialism is not just a theoretical construction but also a reconceptualization of social experience. In the terrain where modernity atomizes the individual and dissolves social bonds, experience is no longer evaluated in a purely economic or political framework as in the past.

​Experience is the sum of social memory, cultural accumulation, ethical relations, and individual creativity. This sum is the most fundamental basis for the reorganization of the social subject. The subject can no longer be defined only by a class or an organization. It is the result of social bonds, cultural diversity, gender relations, ecological consciousness, and historical memory.

​At this point, the radical rupture directly invalidates the classical socialist paradigm that centers the state and central power. The power mechanism of the state is a framework that limits social relations. No matter how well-intentioned it is managed, the centrality of power limits social freedom.

​New socialism makes the state a tool that supports the collective will of the social subject, not a central power. The power-oriented structure of the state functions as a mechanism that absorbs social energy; social organization, on the other hand, is a process that distributes and reproduces this energy. 

Therefore, a free society is a stateless but organized society.

​When women’s freedom is placed at the center of this structure, social transformation is not merely a symbolic change. The dissolution of patriarchal relations requires a restructuring that penetrates even the smallest nodes of power. Women’s freedom is not just gender equality, but the fundamental indicator of society’s capacity to organize itself.

​The dissolution of the patriarchal structure also clears the way for stateless democratic mechanisms, collective ethical norms, and social creativity. Women’s freedom is the ontological foundation of the freedom paradigm. It ensures the formation of a new ethical and relational order at every level of social life.

​Ecology is also an inseparable part of this holistic vision of socialism. Modern capitalism and industrialism treat nature as a means of commodification; they detach humans from nature and reduce living spaces to a single logic of production-consumption.

​Yet, a free society sees nature both as a part of its own life and as a part of social relations. Ecological consciousness is a criterion of social freedom; the value given to nature is directly related to social responsibility and collective will. Therefore, new socialism is a life model that reorganizes both human and nature relations.

​The dogmas of the modern left are forced to dissolve in the face of this radical rupture. The sanctity of the state, the absoluteness of central planning, the idea of a single revolutionary subject, and the linear understanding of history become invalid within the critical framework of Leader Ă–calan’s paradigm.

​History is no longer understood as a process advancing on a single line, but as a multi-layered, multi-subjective, and relational organization. The future is not a utopia waiting for a certain moment to happen, but a process built through the continuous transformation of today’s social relations. Freedom and socialism are no longer goals deferred to the future, but dynamics that must be actively produced at every moment of social life.

​In new socialism, knowledge production also undergoes a radical transformation. Knowledge is no longer produced under the monopoly of central institutions and authorities. It is a product of social experience, collective memory, and cultural accumulation. This distribution of knowledge is the fundamental building block of social organization. When knowledge is democratized, power also disperses. When knowledge remains in a central position, power concentrates. Therefore, social liberation is closely linked to the democratization of knowledge production.

​The relationship between the individual and society is at the center of this paradigm. The individual is not conceived as having a freedom independent of social relations. Freedom is reproduced within social relations. In these relations, the individual is both the subject and assumes the responsibility of the relations. The freedom of society feeds individual freedom. Individual freedom, in turn, strengthens social bonds. This two-way process defines freedom not only as a right but also as a social obligation and a practice of life.

​In new socialism, ethical and political fields are inseparable. Ethical transformation is a prerequisite for the reconstruction of social relations. In modern society, ethics often remains in the shadow of the law, and individuals are prevented from assuming their own responsibilities. In new socialism, ethics is placed at the center of social life. The individual and society regulate their own behavior through collective conscience. This ethics-based life takes the place of central authority and ensures the social continuity of freedom.

​The radical rupture is a holistic paradigm that goes beyond classical socialism and the modern left. This paradigm addresses social, economic, cultural, ethical, gender, and ecological relations within the same integrity. It transcends the boundaries of the state and central power. It subjectivizes society collectively. It re-establishes the relationality between the individual and the community, and between freedom and responsibility. This is not just a theoretical proposal, but a vision of freedom and socialism fed by the practices of today and continuously produced.

​New socialism is not only a proposal for a social order but also an intellectual project that transcends the epistemological and ontological boundaries of modernity.

​While modernity atomizes the individual, it defines society as a mechanical system. This mechanical definition paves the way for hierarchy, centralization, and the concentration of power. New socialism, however, sees society as a network of relations. Every relationship carries freedom, every bond carries responsibility, and every community carries a creative capacity. This ontological transformation allows social life to redefine itself. Society is no longer an object shaped by power, but a subject that continuously produces its own existence.

​Another dimension of the radical rupture is the reconstruction of the collective will. In traditional socialism, the collective will is squeezed into the state or central party mechanisms. Individual subjectivity is often ignored or subordinated to central authority. New socialism processes the collective will within the network of social relations and positions the individual’s subjectivity as an active element within this network. Collective will is no longer a top-down decision-making mechanism, but a horizontal, pluralistic, and continuously reproduced process. In this process, the individual is not just a subject demanding rights, but a creative actor shaping social experience.

​Modernity’s understanding of history also undergoes a radical critique. The traditional left has envisioned the line of history as a linear and progressive process. Revolutions, development, and central planning are seen as steps forward. Yet, new socialism conceives historical experience as a multi-layered, relational, and pluralistic field. The past is not merely a heritage; it is the source of today’s social organization and the vision of future freedom. Making the past, cultural accumulation, and social memory visible again is the fundamental condition for social freedom.

​In this context, social memory is not just historical knowledge, but also the creative source of freedom. Memory serves as a guide in the organization of social relations. When society’s collective memory is strong, individuals and communities can organize their own experiences freely. Memory breaks modernity’s myth of one-way progress and prepares the ground for a free future vision. The future is no longer a distant utopia, but a process built by the continuity of today’s social practices.

​In this new paradigm, economy is not addressed merely as a relationship of production and consumption. Economic relations are redefined together with social and ecological bonds. Capitalist growth and industrial production push the limits of social and natural life; new socialism shapes production within the framework of social needs and ecological balance. When economic processes are made compatible with social ethics and ecological consciousness, the potential for freedom is unlocked. This is not only an economic but also an ontological and ethical restructuring.

​Women’s freedom is at the center of social freedom. The dissolution of patriarchal relations directly increases society’s capacity to question power relations. Women’s freedom functions as a mechanism that disperses social energy and strengthens collective responsibility. Social freedom cannot be completed without women’s freedom. Because patriarchy reproduces power through the state, the economy, and cultural norms. New socialism aims to dissolve patriarchy at these three levels and to re-establish social relations on the basis of equality.

​Knowledge production is also an inseparable component of freedom. Knowledge is not a content received from central authorities, but is produced through social experience and collective memory. The democratization of knowledge is the fundamental condition for social organization and collective will. As knowledge disperses, power also disperses; when knowledge is monopolized, power concentrates. Therefore, knowledge is not merely a tool, but a mechanism that shapes freedom itself.

​The ontological and ethical dimension of freedom is at the heart of the holistic paradigm of new socialism. Freedom is not an internal state of the individual; it is a process reproduced within the network of social relations. The individual becomes free within social relations, and society nurtures individual subjectivity. This two-way process makes freedom both an individual and a social practice. Freedom is not the absence of power; it emerges with the dissolution of power within the network of relations.

​In conclusion, new socialism transcends the boundaries of modernity, the classical left, and the paradigm that centers the central state. It subjectivizes society collectively, positions the individual as a relational being, questions patriarchy and central power, and offers an ecological and ethical framework. In this paradigm, freedom is not merely a right, but a continuously produced process, a form of existence, and the fundamental dynamic of social life.

​New socialism is no longer a utopia deferred for the future, but an existential space built with the relational, collective, and creative social practices of today.