Seven European countries urge ‘immediate halt’ to Sudan violence

Seven European countries have called on Sudan's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) to immediately stop their assault on El-Obeid, a city in Sudan's North Kordofan state, warning of credible signs that a major offensive could be imminent as civilians face worsening shortages of food, water and fuel.


Issued on: 24/06/2026 - RFI

Fighters from Sudan's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces celebrate in the streets of El-Fasher after capturing the Darfur city in October 2025. The fall of El-Fasher has fuelled fears of a similar offensive against El-Obeid. © AFP

Britain, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway issued a joint statement on Tuesday saying the situation had reached a critical moment in the city, which remains under Sudanese army control.

"We call on the RSF to halt its attack immediately," the statement said.

The appeal came a day after the United States, the European Union, the African Union and the United Nations expressed concern over escalating violence around El-Obeid.

UN warns of an 'imminent risk of mass atrocities' in Sudan's Kordofan

Daily attacks

RSF forces have been massing around El-Obeid for 12 days while the city comes under daily and intensive attacks.

International organisations have warned of an imminent risk of atrocities and raised fears of a repeat of the El-Fasher scenario, after the Darfur city fell to the RSF following a lengthy siege.

"There are now credible signs of an imminent offensive. This is a critical moment, and the international community must act," the seven countries said in their statement.

Repeated drone strikes in recent weeks have "killed civilians and driven acute shortages of fuel, food and water", it added.

"Civilians must be able to leave safely, and all parties must ensure rapid, safe and unhindered humanitarian access."

Sudan rights groups blame RSF paramilitary for drone strikes that hit civilians

Life under siege

Several medical centres in El-Obeid have been hit by RSF drones. The city's main power station and water facilities have also been targeted. Water and electricity supplies have been cut, while residential neighbourhoods have come under drone attacks.

A refugee camp was struck on Monday, killing two people and injuring around 10 others, including several children, the Sudan Doctors Network said.

Aid agencies have warned that conditions inside the city are rapidly worsening.

"If the siege is not lifted and if unconditional access for humanitarian aid is not allowed, within weeks, or at most one or two months, we will reach the same tragic levels we saw in El-Fasher," Mohamed Refaat, Sudan chief of mission for the International Organisation for Migration, told the French news agency AFP.

Sudan civil war enters 'deadlier' phase due to use of drones, says UN

European warning

Aid agencies, including the IOM, had intermittent access to El-Obeid in recent months but have now suspended missions as insecurity worsens on key routes, Refaat said.

"Last year, the world watched in horror as the Rapid Support Forces raped, pillaged, and murdered their way through El-Fasher – leaving nothing but devastation and death in their wake. This cannot be repeated," British Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper said in a statement.

"El-Obeid is on the precipice of an atrocity that will deepen the wounds already inflicted on Sudan in El Fasher."

(with newswires)

SAVE OUR SEAFARERS 

UN launches Hormuz evacuation for 11,000 stranded seafarers

Copyright AP

By Leticia Batista Cabanas

Published on 23/06/2026 - EURONEWS

The operation follows a peace agreement between the United States and Iran that ended months of conflict and allowed commercial shipping to resume through one of the world's most important maritime routes.

The UN's International Maritime Organization (IMO) said on Tuesday that it would begin an operation to evacuate more than 11,000 seafarers stranded in the Gulf after the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.

The operation follows a peace agreement between the United States and Iran that ended months of conflict and allowed commercial shipping to resume through one of the world's most important maritime routes.

IMO Secretary-General Arsenio Dominguez said the evacuation would be carried out in cooperation with regional countries and the shipping industry. "This large-scale operation will be carried out in close cooperation with Iran, Oman, all other coastal States in the region, the United States and the maritime industry," Dominguez said in a statement.

He added: "We have secured the necessary safety guarantees and have thoroughly verified the conditions for safe navigation to support these operations."

Iran had effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz after the outbreak of war on 28 February following US and Israeli strikes. The disruption drove up global oil prices and interrupted shipments of energy and other commodities, including fertiliser. Thousands of sailors were left unable to leave the region as vessels remained stuck in Gulf waters.

Shipping traffic has increased since the US-Iran agreement came into force. According to data from shipping analytics platform Kpler, at least 36 commodity vessels passed through the Strait of Hormuz on Monday, the highest level of traffic since the war began.

The IMO said two temporary routes through the strait could be used during the evacuation and that ships would receive individual instructions.

Dominguez welcomed the agreement between Washington and Tehran, saying: "After months of hardship and distress for thousands of innocent seafarers, and negative impact for the whole world, I welcome with deep satisfaction the peace agreement concluded between the United States and Iran."

He added that the deal marked "a decisive step towards restoring maritime security and bringing to an end the unacceptable attacks against civilian shipping."

Detroit Three, union set to open bargaining against backdrop of tariffs, CUSMA review

By

The Canadian Press

Opens in new window

Published: June 18, 2026 

TORONTO — Against the backdrop of U.S. tariffs battering local automakers, uncertainty linked to upcoming trade talks and the “incursion” of Chinese electric vehicles into Canada, the union representing nearly 19,000 Canadian auto workers says it’s bracing for the most significant labour negotiations in its history.

Talks between Unifor and the Detroit Three automakers are set to kick off Monday in Toronto as their current collective agreements are set to expire Sept. 20.

Unifor, which typically uses pattern bargaining for its auto sector negotiations, will go toe-to-toe with Ford Motor Co. first, just as it did three years ago. Talks with Stellantis and General Motors are expected to follow.

The decision by Canada’s largest private sector union to target Ford reflects the “difficult” conditions hanging over the sector right now, said Unifor national president Lana Payne.

Autoworkers have been facing “unprecedented uncertainty” from the ongoing trade war, she said, and there’s little indication a resolution is around the corner, despite the looming July 1 deadline to formally extend the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement.

“This is the most consequential round of auto bargaining that we have done in our history, and I say that knowing that we went through a global financial crisis in 2008-2009 where two of the automakers, it wasn’t a guarantee that they would survive,” Payne said in an interview.

The federal and Ontario governments spent billions on bailouts to Chrysler and General Motors in the wake of the financial crisis, when auto manufacturers seemed on the brink of collapse.

“But this is ... on a much larger scale, I would say, given if we’re unable to resolve the tariff situation and find a path forward here through the CUSMA review, it will have massive long-term implications for the Canadian auto industry.”

She called Ford the “most stable employer” of the trio since U.S. tariffs on the industry began last year, touting Ford’s Windsor, Ont., engine plants that “haven’t missed a beat” in that time, along with the company’s ongoing $5 billion investment in its operations.

A 25 per cent tariff on all cars and trucks not built in the U.S., along with their parts, remains in place. CUSMA-compliant auto and truck parts are not currently subject to that levy.

“As a union, we can’t afford to sit on the sidelines and just wait for those conditions to improve,” said Payne.

“All of this is going to be a massive challenge, but bargaining does one thing for us. There are many things that are outside of our control right now. Bargaining is one thing that is inside our control.”

When it comes to the union’s priorities, job security is paramount.

Both General Motors’ Ingersoll assembly plant and Stellantis’ Brampton assembly plant sit idle. The union says nearly 6,500 total jobs have been lost in the auto manufacturing sector since February 2025, citing Statistics Canada data.

Meanwhile, the Detroit Three face new competition after the federal government opened the door to Chinese-made electric vehicles. In a deal announced earlier this year, Ottawa pledged to reduce its 100 per cent tariff on Chinese EVs to 6.1 per cent, with an annual cap of 49,000 vehicles.

“Obviously, wages and pensions are important to how we can make improvements to the living standards of our members and they are priorities, there’s no doubt about it, but job security and getting investments in our plants is critical right now,” said Payne.

For Ford, both stability and flexibility are key as it contends with an evolving landscape, as it says rising costs, new competitors and shifting product demand are reshaping its considerations around potential investments.

Unifor National President Lana Payne speaks during a rally calling for the protection of Canadian jobs, at the union's Constitution Convention in Vancouver, on Thursday, Aug. 28, 2025. THE CANADIAN PRESS/Darryl Dyck

The company said its $5-billion spend, the majority of which has already been committed, involves the retooling of its Oakville, Ont., assembly plant to support the launch of its Ford Super Duty pick-up trucks. The funding has also gone toward Ford’s first stamping plant in Canada which it said will provide jobs for 100 employees at the site.

Other chunks of funding have been allocated to Ford’s Windsor facilities, including its Essex engine plant which is being expanded to support production of its 7.3-litre engine line.

Ford said it hopes those commitments, along with its long-standing relationship with the union, can serve as a foundation for talks.

But while a win for the union would mean securing firm product allocation commitments from the three companies, it could face a bumpy road getting there, said Ryan Robinson, an automotive research leader at Deloitte.

The CUSMA review will play a central role at the bargaining table, he said, but manufacturers have to be prepared for a wide variety of outcomes given the unlikelihood one will emerge in the short-term. That includes a potential scenario in which manufacturers have to meet more stringent requirements for a vehicle to qualify for CUSMA compliance.

Robinson added that if tariffs survive the CUSMA review, an outcome that seems likely, it’s going to be “a pretty tough sell” for manufacturers to raise their product allocations for Canadian plants.

“Everything boils down to essentially how comfortable the Detroit Three are in where the CUSMA negotiations are going to settle,” Robinson said.

“For the manufacturers, I think it’s all about having that comfort that they can make money building vehicles or allocating vehicles to their Canadian manufacturing footprint. And that’s a big question mark right now.”

In 2023, Unifor’s bargaining with the Detroit Three resulted in a deal that secured base wage gains for production workers of nearly 20 per cent, along with a long list of other improvements including to pensions, job security, a faster path to seniority, bonus pay and more vacation days.

At that time, the union entered talks from a position of relative strength, said Larry Savage, a labour studies professor at Brock University. This go-round, it heads into bargaining “from a position of relative weakness” due to external pressures.

“That makes it very difficult for the union to craft a strategy that is static,” Savage said.

“As a result of that, I think it’s unlikely that Unifor will secure the same gains it managed to win in the last round.”

Savage said workers should prepare for a very “tense” round of talks, which could feature “credible threats” by their employers to shift production out of Canada. With Chinese EVs likely to increase low-cost competition in the Canadian auto market, Savage said it undercuts the union’s ability to use strikes as a potential tool to secure new investment or job guarantees.

“I think it’s going to be an incredibly difficult round of bargaining for Canadian auto workers,” he said.

Payne acknowledged the tough task ahead, but said the union believes it can “create our own leverage” at the bargaining table.

“We are not in a situation where we’re saying that we’re accepting concessions,” the union president said.

“The reality is this tariff crisis can’t be solved with concessions in a workplace. It’s so much greater than that. It has to be solved at a negotiating table between Canada and the United States.”

This report by The Canadian Press was first published June 18, 2026.

Sammy Hudes, The Canadian Press

 

Saudi Arabia’s Decided Who Its Future Superpower Partner Is, And It’s Not the US

By Simon Watkins - Jun 23, 2026

• Saudi Arabia appears to be recalibrating back toward China and Russia after the Iran conflict, with recent high-level meetings focused on expanding energy cooperation.
• 
  
• The shift reflects a decade-long evolution that began after the 2014-2016 oil price war, when China deepened its influence in Saudi Arabia through investment, energy deals, support for Aramco, and alignment with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s economic ambitions.
• 
  
• Riyadh's confidence in U.S. security guarantees has been shaken by Iranian strikes on key Saudi energy infrastructure during Operation Epic Fury.

Since the replacement of Russia by China as the primary would-be superpower rival to the U.S., Saudi Arabia has sought to balance its relationships with Beijing and Washington -- sometimes leaning more one way, and sometimes the other. Until the 2014-2016 Oil Price War, the U.S. was the core relationship; after the war had finished, it was China and Russia; and then, from the start of U.S. President Donald Trump’s second term in office, it was the U.S. again. However, in the aftermath of Operation Epic Fury against Iran, this looks set to shift once more back to China and Russia, with a series of high-level meetings between Chinese and Saudi Arabian officials taking place last week. One of these -- between the deputy head of China’s National Energy Administration, Song Hongkun, and Saudi Aramco’s Downstream President, Mohammed Al Qahtani -- focused on boosting global energy security and bilateral oil and gas cooperation between the two sides. So, how has the global oil market arrived at this point, and what happens next?

The genesis of the current position lies in the financial devastation to OPEC countries of the 2014-2016 Oil Price War, fully analysed in my latest book on the new global oil market order. Before the conflict started, there had been a broad and deep relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia based on a landmark agreement between Washington and Riyadh formulated at a meeting on 14 February 1945 between the then-U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Saudi King at the time, Abdulaziz Al Saud. The deal was this: the U.S. would receive all the oil supplies it needed for as long as Saudi Arabia had oil in place, in return for which the U.S. would guarantee the security of the ruling House of Saud and, by extension, of Saudi Arabia. This worked well enough to survive the 1973 Oil Crisis, in which Riyadh led an oil embargo alongside its OPEC brothers against the U.S. and its allies for helping Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. However, it did not truly survive the 2014-2016 Oil Price War, as by then the U.S.’s shale oil sector had become a serious global oil-producing force, making the country much better able to withstand lower-for-longer oil prices than Saudi Arabia and its fellow OPEC members. Moreover, Washington regarded this, effectively, as a second oil price war instigated by Saudi Arabia as one breach too many of the fundamental relationship agreement of 1945.Related: Iran Says U.S. Agreed to Unblock $12 Billion in Frozen Funds

Following the financial devastation of 2014-2016 Oil Price War for Saudi Arabia and its OPEC brothers, they had little choice but to admit Russia to the wider ‘OPEC+’ grouping to restore the organisation’s shattered credibility in the global oil markets. China, in turn, was able to leverage the new-found power of its ally into extending its own influence in the Middle East’s leading energy state through a series of wide-ranging agreements made after 2016, and its immediate focus on laying the groundwork for these was a rising star in Riyadh -- then-Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS). From the first year of the 2014-2016 Oil Price War, Saudi Arabia’s government budget went into deficit -- to double digit levels of GDP in the first full year of the war -- and it stayed in deficit until the end of 2021. At the same time, MbS was not the natural successor to King Salman, with the heir-designate to King Salman being Prince Muhammad bin Nayef, but the young Prince had an idea that he believed would help him progress -- an initial public offering (IPO) of Saudi Arabia’s flagship firm, Aramco.  

It was his belief, publicly aired in the second half of 2016, that if Saudi Arabia listed 5% of the firm on international stock markets then it would raise at least US$100 billion for the Kingdom in much-needed funds. This figure would also mean a valuation for Saudi Aramco of US$2 trillion, making it by far the most valuable company ever listed in the world, so restoring some of Saudi Arabia’s damaged reputation in the process. MbS also thought that a listing of Saudi Aramco in multiple major financial centres around the world, including the two most prestigious stock exchanges – the New York Stock Exchange and the London Stock Exchange – would project Saudi Arabia’s presence as an international player in financial markets as a whole and not just in the oil sector. All these reasons looked solid enough on the surface and the senior Saudis agreed to go ahead. However, almost immediately that the process began, questions began to emerge from international investors over the corporate structure of Aramco, the degree to which it would be subject to government control, its valuation, its true oil reserves and spare capacity, and the physical security of its fields, among many others. The upshot was that no serious international investor wanted to become too involved in the IPO and nor did the world’s most prestigious stock markets. That put MbS in a tricky position, as he was the original champion of the idea. However, at precisely that point, China offered to buy the entire 5% of Aramco scheduled to be offered in the IPO. Although the offer was eventually declined, MbS never forgot China’s gesture.

Shortly afterwards, in March 2017, a landmark visit to China by Saudi Arabia’s King Salman took place, during which around US$65 billion of business deals were signed in sectors including oil refining, petrochemicals, light manufacturing and electronics. In August that year, the then-Saudi Vice Minister of Economy and Planning, Mohammed al-Tuwaijri, told a Saudi-China conference in Jeddah that: “We will be very willing to consider funding in renminbi and other Chinese products.” The use of the renminbi was -- and remains -- a central plank of China’s strategy to subvert one of the key pillars upon which the U.S.’s global dominance is built -- the use of the dollar as effectively the global reserve and trade currency, as also detailed in my latest book on the new global oil market order. Al-Tuwaijri’s comments came during the visit of high-ranking politicians and financiers from China to Saudi Arabia in August 2017, during which it was also decided that Saudi Arabia and China would establish a US$20 billion investment fund on a 50:50 basis. According to comments at the time from then-Saudi Energy Minister, Khalid al-Falih, this fund would invest in sectors such as infrastructure, energy, mining and materials, among other areas. In August 2022, at the signing of a multi-pronged deal between Aramco and the China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (Sinopec), the president of Sinopec, Yu Baocai, said: “The signing of the MoU introduces a new chapter of our partnership in the Kingdom…The two companies will join hands in renewing the vitality and scoring new progress of the Belt and Road Initiative [BRI] and [Saudi Arabia’s] Vision 2030.” Moving into the fourth quarter of 2022, Saudi Arabia reiterated its commitment to China as its “most reliable partner and supplier of crude oil,” along with broader assurances of its ongoing support in several other areas. This was in line with the earlier comments from Aramco chief executive officer, Amin Nasser that: “Ensuring the continuing security of China’s energy needs remains our highest priority - not just for the next five years but for the next 50 and beyond.”

This, and several similar comments around that time, appeared to confirm that Saudi Arabia had come to regard the U.S. as just another one of its partners -- particular in the realm of providing security -- in a new global order that would see Beijing and its allies share the leadership position with Washington, before attempting to surpass it. This view appears to have re-asserted itself after what Saudi Arabia -- and many of its fellow Middle Eastern states -- see as a failure by Washington to safeguard their security and economic interests during the war with Iran. Despite having invested hundreds of billions of dollars over the years in U.S.-supplied defence equipment aimed at providing the Kingdom with a security umbrella against attacks, Iran was able to hit key targets in the country, including the East-West Pipeline, the Manifa and Khurais oil Fields, the Ras Tanura Refinery and several other oil, natural gas, refining, and petrochemical sites stretching from the Eastern Province to Yanbu Industrial City. These successful Iranian attacks on Saudi Arabia’s critical energy infrastructure underline to Riyadh that, even on a security basis, the use of the U.S. appears limited. These concerns are heightened by the Kingdom’s broader fears that whatever the U.S.-Iran deal finally turns out to be, it will leave Saudi Arabia in a far more vulnerable position than it was before the war began.

By Simon Watkins for Oilprice.com

THAAD Missile Defense System: A Comprehensive Review

File photo of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. Photo Credit: The U.S. Army Ralph Scott/Missile Defense Agency/U.S. Department of Defense, Wikipedia Commons

June 24, 2026 

The Congressional Research Service (CRS)
By Andrew Feickert


The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system is a key element of U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD). THAAD employs interceptor missiles, using “hit-to-kill” technology. Reportedly, THAAD is capable of engaging targets at ranges of 150–200 kilometers (km). THAAD covers the BMD middle tier and defends a larger area than the Patriot Air and Missile Defense System. It complements the Patriot, the Navy’s AEGIS Missile Defense System, and the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) System.

A THAAD battery consists of approximately 90 soldiers, 6 truck mounted launchers, 48 interceptors (8 per launcher), 1 Army/Navy Transportable Radar Surveillance and Control Mode 2 (AN/TPY-2) radar, and a Tactical Fire Control/Communications component. THAAD provides Combatant Commanders a rapidly deployable capability against short-range (up to 1,000 km), medium-range (1,000–3,000 km), and limited intermediate-range (3,000–5,000 km) ballistic missile threats inside or outside the atmosphere during their final (terminal) phase of flight. THAAD was developed by Lockheed Martin Corporation, headquartered in Bethesda, MD, and is being manufactured in Troy, AL. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is responsible for the development of THAAD. According to the MDA,

MDA is responsible for the sustainment of the THAAD missile defense unique and development items, while the U.S. Army is responsible for the operations and sustainment of the common items. MDA funding provides sustainment for all fielded THAAD batteries, ensures THAAD assets are properly maintained, and crews are trained to meet Combatant Commanders’ needs.

The Army provides soldiers for THAAD units and the ability to field and operate THAAD batteries can be affected by recruiting and retention shortages, as well as the availability of qualified critical technical military occupational specialties.

The Army currently has eight THAAD batteries. The first THAAD battery (A Battery, 4th Air Defense Artillery Regiment, 11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade) was activated in May 2008 at Fort Bliss, TX. According to 2019’s Army Air and Missile Defense 2028, three THAAD batteries are based at Fort Bliss; two batteries are based at Fort Cavazos, TX; one battery is based in South Korea; and one is based in Guam. It is not known to CRS where the eighth THAAD battery is planned to be stationed.

Brief History of the THAAD Program

According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Missile Defense Project, the Army began developing THAAD in 1992. In December 1995, the Army attempted its first THAAD intercept test, which was unsuccessful. Five successive test flights—taking place from 1996 to 1999—also failed. The Army redesigned THAAD and relaxed requirements for intercepting targets at lower altitudes. Between 2006 and 2019, the Army and the MDA conducted 18 THAAD intercept tests. Fourteen of the tests were successful, and four were cancelled prior to launch due to target malfunctions.

THAAD Program Activities

The FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (P.L. 116-283) authorized and funded the procurement of an eighth THAAD battery. On April 21, 2022, Lockheed Martin received a contract totaling $74 million to produce the THAAD battery for the MDA, which was planned to be fielded by 2025. According to the MDA, as of January 2024, the eighth THAAD battery was in production. According to Lockheed Martin, they delivered the minimum engagement package of the eighth THAAD battery to the U.S. government in June 2025.

THAAD Overseas Deployments

THAAD has been deployed on several occasions in response to potential ballistic missile threats. According to an April 2013 Federal Register notice, “The U.S. Secretary of Defense directed the Army to deploy a THAAD battery immediately to Guam on an emergency basis in response to potential North Korean missile launch activity.”

The Guam-based THAAD unit is designated as Task Force Talon, Echo Battery, 3rd Air Defense Artillery of the Army’s 38th Air Defense Artillery Brigade.
South Korea

On July 7, 2016, the U.S. and South Korean governments decided to deploy a THAAD battery to U.S. Forces Korea as a defensive measure designed to ensure the security of South Korea and to protect alliance military forces from North Korea’s use of weapons of mass destruction and conventional ballistic missile threats. The THAAD battery is stationed at a South Korean military base in Seongju, about 130 miles south of Seoul.

2023 Middle East Deployment

On October 21, 2023, the Secretary of Defense directed the deployment of a THAAD battery, as well as additional Patriot battalions, to locations throughout the region to increase force protection for U.S. forces, bolster regional deterrence efforts, and assist in the defense of Israel.

United States Deploys THAAD to Israel

On October 13, 2024, the Department of Defense, currently using a secondary Department of War designation under Executive Order 14347, announced,

The deployment of a Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery and associated crew of U.S. military personnel to Israel to help bolster Israel’s air defenses following Iran’s unprecedented attacks against Israel on April 13 and again on October 1 [2024].
THAAD Use During the June 2025 Iranian Conflict

From June 13 to 24, 2025, the United States and Israel were involved in combat operations against Iran intended to destroy key Iranian military and nuclear facilities. In retaliation, Iran launched a series of regional missile strikes largely directed at Israel. According to one study, THAAD interceptors accounted for almost half of all U.S. and Israeli interceptors used to protect Israel against Iranian medium-range ballistic missiles. The study estimated that 92 THAAD interceptors were used during the conflict out of an estimated supply of 632 interceptors. The study also suggested that it could take three to eight years to replenish the THAAD interceptor stockpile, with each THAAD interceptor valued at approximately $12.7 million.

THAAD and Operation Epic Fury

On February 26, 2026, the United States, in conjunction with Israel, launched Operation Epic Fury to “dismantle the Iranian regime’s security apparatus, prioritizing locations that pose an imminent threat.” As a result of Iranian retaliation, THAAD has played a role in regional air and missile defense. While information on THAAD-specific intercept rates is unknown, reportedly, “the THAAD system, alongside Patriot and other defenses, contributed to a high interception rate of over 90% against Iranian missiles and drones, particularly in the United Arab Emirates (UAE).” Reportedly, it has been alleged that some THAAD AN/TPY-2 radars were damaged and/or destroyed by Iran, thereby degrading THAAD’s effectiveness. Another reported concern was that the usage rate of THAAD interceptors during Operation Fury further depleted limited interceptor stocks. Reportedly, six THAAD launchers from U.S. Forces, Korea that were deployed to the Middle East to support Operation Epic Fury in March 2026 returned to their bases in South Korea in June 2026.

THAAD to Transfer from MDA to the Army

On March 17, 2026, it was reported that the Army is working with MDA on a plan to transfer THAAD to Army control by FY2027. Reportedly, “bringing THAAD into the Army’s portfolio would place it alongside systems such as Patriot and the Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System, potentially simplifying integration and oversight.” It was also suggested that the Army assuming control of THAAD “could also saddle it with significant long-term costs at a time when the service is trying to shift resources toward new capabilities.”

Estimated THAAD Procurement and Operations and Support Costs

According to a September 2025 American Enterprise Institute (AEI) working paper titled “Build Your Own Golden Dome: A Framework for Understanding Costs, Choices, and Tradeoffs,” incremental costs for a THAAD battery were estimated as $2.73 billion to procure a single THAAD battery, including 192 interceptors, and $32.5 million annually for each THAAD battery for Operations and Sustainment (O&S).
Potential Congressional Oversight Considerations

Adequacy of Current THAAD Force Structure

With the 2024 THAAD deployment to Israel, at least half of the Army’s eight THAAD batteries were, at that time, deployed on operations. Additional THAAD units were likely deployed in early 2026 in support of Operation Epic Fury, with reports suggesting THAAD elements stationed in Korea were deployed to the Middle East to support Operation Epic Fury. It is also possible that additional THAAD units might be required to support the Trump Administration’s Golden Dome homeland missile defense initiative. Given these considerations, Congress might decide to examine the adequacy of Army THAAD force structure. Such an examination might include an assessment to determine the practicality of creating THAAD units in the Army National Guard to meet potential Golden Dome requirements for additional THAAD units.

THAAD Transfer from MDA to the Army

Congress might decide to examine the MDA’s and the Army’s plans to transfer THAAD to Army control. Such an examination could include current and future Army resource and budgetary requirements and how these requirements could affect other ongoing Army modernization efforts. In addition, such an examination could discuss timelines associated with transfer of control and what Army organizational changes could be required to accommodate the Army’s assumption of responsibility for THAAD.

About the author: Andrew Feickert, Specialist in Military Ground Forces

Source: This article was published by the Congressional Research Service (CRS).


About CRS
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) works exclusively for the United States Congress, providing policy and legal analysis to committees and Members of both the House and Senate, regardless of party affiliation. As a legislative branch agency within the Library of Congress, CRS has been a valued and respected resource on Capitol Hill for nearly a century.
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Aluminum’s war shock blunted by dark transits and Chinese supply

Bloomberg News | June 21, 2026

Stock image.

The Iran war caused one of the biggest supply shocks to ever hit the aluminum market, but the runaway price surge that many were bracing for has been blunted by the ingenuity of producers from the Middle East to China.

When the conflict began, market watchers warned that unless the Strait of Hormuz reopened quickly, smelters were likely to run out of raw materials within weeks, potentially forcing widespread shutdowns that would plunge the global market into crisis and send prices to record highs above $4,000 a ton.

Those fears escalated dramatically when Iran targeted smelters in the region in missile strikes, and there was broad agreement that aluminum looked set to be one of the worst-hit commodity markets outside of oil and gas.

However, in recent weeks Middle Eastern smelters have carried out a series of complex logistical operations — including daring voyages through the strait — to replenish reserves of alumina and other raw materials, helping to avert widespread closures in a region that accounts for nearly 10% of global supply. And outside the Gulf, smelters in China and Indonesia have been instrumental in keeping the global market in check as buyers wait for exports to rebound.

Now, with analysts, traders and investors staking their bets on where prices are heading next, stark disagreements are emerging on how quickly the market will recover from the squeeze.

“A full-blown physical supply freeze has been averted thanks to a combination of rerouted Middle Eastern alumina imports, rising Chinese exports, and ramping Indonesian production,” said Amelia Xiao Fu, head of commodities strategy at Bank of China International. “While the market managed to survive the last few months by drawing down inventories, these operational buffers have now been decreased.”

Middle Eastern smelters have been forced to make heavy cuts to output, but the clandestine nature of their efforts to shore up their supply chains means the precise scale of the losses is tough to quantify. Meanwhile, a regulatory cap on production in China and power constraints in Indonesia are only adding to the challenge of assessing how quickly supply and demand will rebalance.

Some of the market’s biggest bulls have trimmed their price forecasts in recent days, with JPMorgan Chase & Co. saying that a move to $4,000 a ton is taking longer than expected due to a strong supply response in Asia and an aggressive drawdown in the industry’s hidden inventories.

At the other end of the scale, Goldman Sachs Group Inc. sees prices moving towards $3,000 a ton over the coming year, even after raising forecasts it made at the start of the conflict to reflect a slower rebound in Middle Eastern supplies than anticipated. Futures in London are currently trading around $3,400.

Differences in estimates for aluminum’s underlying supply balance are even starker, with Citigroup Inc. expecting the biggest supply shock in more than 50 years, while Bank of America Corp. expects supply and demand in the 76-million-ton market to be more or less balanced.

Alumina flows

Part of the discrepancy stems from expectations that raw-material shortages have inflicted deeper supply losses on Persian Gulf smelters than they’ve publicly disclosed. But for Ben Ayre, an analyst at ship-tracking firm Kpler, a growing stream of alumina flows into the region signals that, even with Hormuz closed, smelters have made strides in replenishing their reserves.

In recent weeks, a handful of vessels have shown an appetite to move in alumina directly through the strait, switching off their tracking systems to undertake the kind of dark transits that have kept a trickle of oil flowing to global markets through the crisis, according to Kpler’s analysis.

Even greater volumes of alumina have been unloaded in ports in Oman and dispatched to smelters via trucks, in a major test of the region’s logistical capabilities. Thanks to those efforts, imports of the raw material into the Persian Gulf returned to pre-war levels in May, data from the firm show.

“It has resulted in some really novel solutions, and we’ve had to work quite hard to keep up,” Ayre said in an interview. “It’s not unique, but it is somewhat exceptional in terms of its reflection of the value of keeping these operations running.”

Shadow stocks

The challenge in assessing the scale of the supply squeeze doesn’t end in the Gulf, and JPMorgan says the market impact of global shortages has also been blunted by an aggressive drawdown in privately held inventories that are notoriously hard to monitor.

“When we speak with clients there’s a clear sense that it is tight out there, but the first port of call is those invisible stocks,” said Greg Shearer, the bank’s head of base and precious metals research. Still, he believes that it’s only a matter of time before those reserves are depleted and exchange stocks will start being drawn too, driving prices higher. “It’s taking longer than expected, but there are significant deficits that need to be covered.”

China shock

The behavior of Chinese smelters has added another analytical headache. Before the conflict, a bullish mood had swept through the aluminum industry, as smelters in China started to bump up against a regulatory cap on production that looks set to bring a long era of oversupply to an end.

Since the war started, however, official statistics have suggested that Chinese smelters are producing comfortably above that 45-million-ton cap, with April figures pointing to an annualized run-rate of 47 million tons. With exports surging, some analysts are betting that Chinese smelters could solve the global shortage single-handedly if they keep their plants running in overdrive.

In assessing whether they will, analysts need to take a view on how strictly China will enforce the cap, and how far engineers can go in feeding plants with more power than they’re designed to handle. That’s a process that one industry veteran likens to trying to balance an elephant on a finger.

Indonesia wildcard

A final wildcard is a prospective wave of new supply in Indonesia. A surge in Indonesian aluminum exports has sharpened the industry’s focus on its emerging role as a major global supplier, and there’s a growing expectation that producers there will divert scarce power to aluminum plants at the expense of less-profitable nickel operations.

“We always knew there would be capacity additions, but the view up to now was that production would lag because power wasn’t available,” said Amy Gower, head of metals and mining strategy at Morgan Stanley. “We haven’t changed our models yet, but the risk now, with power being reallocated from nickel, is that new supply could come even quicker.”

Taken together, the combination of rebounding Middle Eastern supply, elevated Chinese production and skyrocketing Indonesian output is creating a consensus in the industry that prices will head lower in the long term. But as the US and Iran negotiate a deal to end the war permanently, a debate is still raging about whether the market will face a final squeeze as inventories run dry before the new supply arrives.

“I think if it was going to happen, it would have happened by now,” said Helen Amos, head of commodities research at BMO Capital Markets. “It’s likely that aluminum is past the peak point of the deficit.”

(By Mark Burton and Julian Luk)

Column: Guinea bets bauxite dominance can reshape aluminum supply

Reuters | June 22, 2026 | 

Large piles of bauxite ore sit at a treatment area storage in Guinea. (Stock image by Igor Groshev.)

The West African country of Guinea has grown to be the world’s largest supplier of bauxite, the raw material ultimately transformed into aluminum.

It’s now looking to use this newfound dominance to exert greater control over both price and industry structure, just as Indonesia has done in nickel and the Democratic Republic of Congo is attempting to do in cobalt.

All three resource giants are struggling to rein in mining sectors that have grown too big too fast, swamping global markets and crashing prices.

Indonesia is using mining quotas, the Congo export quotas, and Guinea looks minded to implement a mix of both as a way of stopping operators exporting more than their mining quotas allow them to produce.

For Conakry, it’s also a chance to emulate Indonesia by capturing more of its resource value by moving from bauxite mining to alumina refining.

Chinese state aluminum producer Chalco’s commitment to a new $1 billion refinery in the country is a sign the strategy is working.

Guinea’s over-production crashes bauxite price.

Bauxite boom

Bauxite is the third most abundant element in the Earth’s crust but is mostly too dispersed or too low quality to allow for conversion into alumina.

Guinea not only boasts the world’s largest reserves of metallurgical bauxite but also produces a high-purity product prized for its natural low silica content.

Thanks to heavy Chinese investment, the country overtook Australia as the world’s largest bauxite producer in 2023 and now accounts for around 40% of global output and 70% of the seaborne export market.

Guinea’s exports jumped by 25% year on year to 183 million metric tons in 2025, which unsurprisingly caused prices to slump by almost half over the course of last year and the first part of 2026.

That is why the government is searching for the most effective way of hitting the brakes without generating the sort of market disruption caused by Congo’s cobalt export quota system.

China has grown increasingly dependent on Guinea’s bauxite.

Chinese dependency

China has become increasingly reliant on Guinea for bauxite to feed its huge aluminum production sector.

Imports of Guinean material mushroomed from just 334,000 tons in 2015 to 149 million tons in 2025, by which point they accounted for 74% of all bauxite imports.

China has its own bauxite reserves but they’ve been depleted by decades of mining and are lower quality than those in Guinea.

Moreover, the country has massively expanded its aluminum smelting capacity this century, requiring a similar build-out in alumina refining, far beyond its domestic bauxite mining capacity.

Guinea’s planned crackdown on its runaway bauxite sector has been well flagged, and Chinese buyers have had plenty of time to build precautionary stocks. March imports from Guinea hit a monthly record of 18 million tons.

But there’s little prospect of breaking the dependency, given the scale of the material flow. What will change, however, is the nature of that dependency.

Alumina ambitions

Chalco’s commitment to building the new 1.2-million-ton-per-year alumina refinery shows how seriously China takes the threat to the flow of raw materials.

It’s the first major overseas investment in alumina by China’s state giant. It’s also the third Chinese-backed alumina refinery project to be announced in recent months.

Guinea’s only existing refinery is the Friguia plant, built in the 1960s and owned first by France’s Pechiney, then by US producer Reynolds and since 2008 by Russia’s Rusal. It was out of action between 2012 and 2018 but is operating again, albeit below its 650,000-ton-per-year capacity.

The Conakry government is aiming for five or six more processing plants with a combined capacity of 7 million tons of alumina by 2030.

The seizure of mining assets from Emirates Global Aluminium last year for its failure to follow through on a commitment to refining has served as a stark warning for other operators.

New industry hub

Guinea is following closely in the footsteps of Indonesia, which banned bauxite exports in 2023 as a way of forcing miners to build out processing capacity.

While Indonesia has plenty of coal-fired power to both refine alumina and smelt the intermediate product into aluminum, Guinea doesn’t currently have sufficient energy resources to go beyond the alumina stage.

But if Guinea can successfully implement its strategy, it will turbo-charge the creation of a West African alumina hub.

Not least because other African bauxite producers are travelling the same value-added pathway to keeping more of their mineral revenues.

Nigeria has signed a $1.3 billion investment deal with Africa Finance Corporation (AFC) to build an alumina refinery, while Ghana is looking to do the same under the auspices of the Ghana Integrated Aluminium Development Corporation.

The African shift from mining to first-stage processing could have transformative effects on the aluminum supply chain.

The seaborne bauxite market will shrink. The global alumina export market will expand and China’s domestic alumina refineries will find themselves in competition with their largest raw material supplier.

(The opinions expressed here are those of Andy Home, a columnist for Reuters.)