Showing posts sorted by relevance for query ISIS SUFIS. Sort by date Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query ISIS SUFIS. Sort by date Show all posts

Wednesday, June 15, 2022

ISIS WAR ON SUFIS
Afghanistan’s Sufis Are Under Attack

Recent bombing of a mosque in Kabul shows the growing security problems facing the Taliban government
Afghan followers of Sufism recite poetic verses from the Koran at the Pahlawan Mosque in Kabul, Afghanistan / Robert Nickelsberg / Getty Images

As I passed through my final years of high school in Kabul, it did not cross my mind that I might be able to go on and study at university. My father had just died from a long illness and, like so many Afghan teenagers, I was already thinking about how I might be able to support my family. We were poor enough that I had only one set of shirt and trousers to wear to my last two years of classes, so I knew I would have to find a job sooner rather than later.

I graduated from school in 2006 and, although times were tough on a personal level, there was a sense of optimism in much of the country back then. It’s true that security was starting to deteriorate, but memories of the 1990s civil war were still fresh in everyone’s minds, and there was a widespread belief that the international community would not abandon Afghanistan again.

After trying and failing to find a job with various NGOs for reasons none of them cared to explain, I was persuaded by one of my younger brothers to visit a local Sufi — “tasawwuf” — mosque in the hope that it might change my luck. I must admit that I initially laughed at his suggestion, not because I disliked Sufis but because I was skeptical of any practices that went against my belief in the more traditional tenets of Islam. I regard myself as a socially progressive Muslim who shows his devotion to God in conventional ways. I could not see how a visit to this particular mosque might be any better for me than praying in my usual mosque or at home. In the end, however, I agreed to go there to boost the morale of my brother and mother.

We cycled to the Khalifa Sahib mosque in Aladdin, a neighborhood in west Kabul near Parliament and the American University, and sat down to talk to one of its scholarly custodians. I remember him being a kind man who listened quietly from under his flat white turban as I explained about my futile search for a job. He then took out some paper talismans and told my brother to burn or smoke one at night. Another one he gave us was to be put in a glass of water, dissolved and drunk the next morning.

We obeyed his instructions and, while my luck didn’t change in the short term, it did eventually. I later found work as a journalist and graduated with a degree in Islamic law from Kabul University. I do not attribute this change in fortune to the Sufi mosque, but I have always looked back on that visit with fondness. I was a young man — a boy, really — going through a hard time, and it meant a lot to me to receive the kindness of a stranger, however eccentric his advice might have been.

Unfortunately, this memory of a more innocent time has taken on a melancholy hue in recent weeks. On April 29 an explosion ripped through that same Sufi mosque after Friday prayers. At least 10 people, and perhaps more than 50, were killed. There is confusion about whether the blast was a suicide attack or the result of a bomb planted at the scene, but it was not an isolated incident. A week earlier, on April 22, the Mawlawi Sekander Sufi mosque in the northern city of Kunduz was hit by a similar attack that killed at least 33 people and wounded dozens more. The Islamic State group claimed responsibility for that blast and is also believed to have been behind the bloodshed in Kabul. With Shia Muslims as well as Sufis being increasingly targeted, it is clear that attempts are underway to ignite a sectarian war in Afghanistan. History suggests this will not work, but nothing is certain anymore.

Sufism has roots in this country that are far older than the kind of ideology practiced by the Islamic State. While Afghans are often wary of its more esoteric aspects — such as the way worshipers engage in “dhikr” (chanting) to show their devotion to God — its mysticism has traditionally been a source of comfort for many people here. The sick visit Sufi shrines in search of cures for cancer or depression; infertile women go to them looking for the miracle they need to have a child. This has started to change in recent years and of course it would be better if everyone trusted in science, but it seems churlish to rebuke Afghans for finding hope wherever they can. During times of darkness we occasionally need artificial light.

Sufism is not a sect or a type of jurisprudence but a form of Islamic belief that emphasizes the mystical, peaceful aspects of our religion and prioritizes inner contemplation. As far as the Islamic State is concerned, this is enough to make Sufis idolators. But attacks such as the one on April 29 in Kabul are attacks on the heritage and culture of all Afghans. We do not have to be Sufis to understand and appreciate the role that Sufism has played in our history.

There are four main Sufi orders in Afghanistan and the wider region: the Chishti, the Qadiriyya, the Suhrawardiyya and the Naqshbandi. The Chishti originated near Herat in western Afghanistan, and some of our greatest poets were Sufis. The most famous of them, Jalaluddin Rumi, was born in Balkh in northern Afghanistan in the early 13th century. The United Nations cultural agency (UNESCO) celebrated his work in 2007, the same year I went to the Sufi mosque in Kabul. The U.N. secretary-general at the time, Ban Ki-moon, described Rumi’s work as “timeless” and praised his “humanist philosophy.” We Afghans also claim Abdur Rahman Baba, a 15th- and 16th-century Sufi poet from Peshawar, as one of our own and continue to draw inspiration from his writing.

Afghan Sufis fought against the Soviet occupation of our country in the 1980s, just like more hardline jihadists. Three of the seven Sunni mujahedeen parties during that time were led by Sufis. They may not have been as militarily effective as their rivals, but their followers still made enormous sacrifices in the name of defending Afghanistan and Islam.

Although the Taliban’s relationship with the Sufi community is complex, it is certainly not openly hostile. Afghan Sufi scholars have been vocal in their support for the current government and often refer to Sirajuddin Haqqani, the minister of interior, using the honorific “Khalifa” — a title traditionally given to Sufi disciples who reach scholarly levels of enlightenment. The respect seems both genuine and mutual, and it is arguably a good example of the compromises we Afghans need to make if we want our country to move forward. The shamans who always used to roam around Kabul collecting alms are no longer visible on the streets and seem to have been discouraged from carrying out their rituals in public since the Taliban’s takeover, but that is the only sign I have noticed of the Islamic Emirate possibly acting against Sufism.

This cordial relationship between the government and the Sufi community may be only a small cause for optimism, but it is worth noting. Given the increased activity of the Islamic State of late and the criticisms that have rightly been leveled at some of the Taliban’s more repressive social policies, we need to recognize that there is still some cause for hope. Whether this can be built on may well depend on whether security gets significantly worse.

A month after the attack on the Sufi mosque in Kabul, the Taliban marked the sixth anniversary of the death of their former leader, Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, who was killed by a U.S. drone strike in Pakistan in 2016. To honor his memory, several senior officials attended a commemorative event on May 22 in a wedding hall in Kabul, the kind of place that would once have been the scene of raucous late-night parties. Although the atmosphere was measured, the meeting was revolutionary in its own way. The former head of the Taliban’s political office in Doha and current deputy foreign minister, Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai, used the occasion to call for girls’ schools to be reopened and for women’s rights to be respected. Even that meeting, however, was not allowed to pass peacefully. An explosion hit several vehicles parked outside, causing unknown numbers of casualties. This time a group calling itself the National Liberation Front claimed responsibility. Exactly who they are and what they want is unclear.

These kinds of mysterious attacks took place regularly under the governments of Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani, and the Taliban will be keen to ensure they do not get out of hand. This spring we have often been without electricity in Kabul because the pylons in the north of the country that supply the city are being routinely targeted in sabotage operations. On the streets here no one is quite sure whether to blame rebel groups linked to the old Northern Alliance or hostile states — or, perhaps, both. Even as I write these lines at home now, I have just heard an explosion in the near distance. I will wait for the sound of ambulance sirens or a call from a friend or relative to find out if anyone was hurt.


Fazelminallah Qazizai is the Afghanistan correspondent at New Lines
June 1, 2022
“Letter from Kabul” is a newsletter in which our contributors provide their own unique glimpses into life on the ground in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan

SEE



Tuesday, October 07, 2014

THE CURRENT CRISIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
AND THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM;  KURDISTAN


A Letter I have sent to Her Majesties Loyal Opposition in regards to the Parliamentary Debate On Air Strikes


Dear Mr. Mulcair and Mr. Dewar;
 I am a concerned Canadian who sees the current ISIL Iraq Syria strategy as flawed as do you.
Mr. Dewar you were there, you know who is fighting on the ground and who is not. It is the democratic, progressive Kurds who have overcome forty years of sectarianism to come together to fight ISIL early on, to fight them in Syria as the only opposition we should support in Syria.
They declared a unilateral ceasefire and peace negotiations with Turkey, who has refused to this date to become involved either in the Syrian conflict or the defeat of the ISIL and other Islamic Jihadists. It is the Kurds who stand alone defending embattled Yezidi, Christians, Sufis, and Shia minorities. 
The Yezidi in particular feel strongly about their autonomy in any post ISIL situation, which would only occur if we were to recognize Kurdistan and make that a condition or recognition.
There is no Iraq it is a failed country now, a century after its creation by the British after WWI. There is Kurdistan and the rest of Iraq. In effect in the last twenty years, Kurdistan has come into existence as a political, geographical, historical, economic and military fact.
After  the invasion of Iraq by the US this became even more evident in post Saddam Iraq as the Kurds controlled the North of the country where there is oil. The Shia and some Christians, and Sufi's in the South also have control of oil there.
It is the Kurds in Syria who are our natural Canadian ally, they are pluralistic, secular, social democratic, feminist, and fit Canadian valuesmore than any other group in the region.
Here is the third way, a way to effectively change the military political geographical and historic conditions in the Middle East, recognize or begin talks to recognize Kurdistan with the Kurds, to settle Kurdish and especially Yezidi refugees, to provide military aid as well as humanitarian aid to the joint armed forces of Kurdistan, the Pershmarga.
No one has made this an issue. Because of Turkey and its influence in NATO and hoped for entry into the EU, but that impacts us little we can afforded to make this effort because we are removed from those impediments.
I urge you to please consider that great debate tactic we see so little of in these Yes No debates, the alternative affirmative.
Yes we will support a humanitarian and limited mission to aid the Pershmarga specifically, the Kurds in general and begin Canadian government talks to recognize Kurdistan by giving it limited diplomatic recognition in order to show our seriousness, and to taketheir issue for independence and recognition to the UN, and other world forums during this discussion of Iraq and Syria, because  NO ONE else will.
I have advocated this for the past year in social media, it is at this late hour as we prepare for war that I write you to consider this seriously. It is unexpected, it is a win win for Canada and Kurdistan, it is historic to be the first country to recognize the Kurdish State which is doing its best to defeat the Islamic State in the Levant.

In solidarity,
Eugene Plawiuk
Edmonton East


HEY I GOT A REPLY TO MY LETTER ON KURDISTAN FROM TOM MULCAIR
OF COURSE IT IS BOILERPLATE AND TAKES NO CONSIDERATION OF POINTS I MADE
OFF MESSAGE
NDP on combat mission in Iraq
KURDISTAN
Thomas Mulcair
2:05 PM (45 minutes ago)
to me
Thank you for taking the time to get in touch regarding Canada's role in Iraq.
As you know, just four weeks after deploying Canadian Special Forces to Iraq—with no debate or vote in Parliament—Stephen Harper and his Conservative government are seeking to approve a major escalation of Canada's involvement in that war, with no clear end date.
In doing so, the Prime Minister will be sending young Canadian women and men to fight, and perhaps die, in a foreign war without answering the most basic questions on the nature and breadth of our commitment, such as:
- What are this mission's objectives and how do we define success?
- What rules of engagement are in place to prevent civilian causalities?
- How much will this mission cost?
- How many years are we willing to be embroiled in Iraq?
- How can we effectively contain ISIS without deploying substantial ground forces or expanding into Syria?
- What is our exit strategy?
- Do we have a plan to take care of our veterans after we leave Iraq?
These are not hypothetical questions. Like Iraq, Canada's mission in Afghanistan began with only a handful of Special Forces. In the end, more than 40,000 Canadian soldiers served there over 12 long years—160 would never return home, more than 1,000 were wounded, and thousands more still suffer from PTSD.
Watch my speech here http://tinyurl.com/mk9k8fs to hear more about why the NDP can't support this combat mission.
When George W. Bush gave his now infamous "Mission Accomplished” speech less than two months after his initial invasion, he arrogantly proclaimed that major combat operations in Iraq had ended. But tragically, this was only the beginning of a horrific sectarian insurgency that laid the groundwork for the crisis we see today.
While the name "ISIS” may be new to most Canadians, the group was first formed in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion and has since rebranded itself from "al-Qaeda in Iraq” to the "Mujahideen Shura Council” to "the Islamic State”—and now "the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (Syria).”
Everyone agrees that ISIS' brutal actions utterly shock the conscience, but the lessons of the past decade must not go unheeded in our response to such an evil. Simply put: there is no reason to believe that six months of aerial bombardment will succeed where more than ten years of occupation by the world's largest and most sophisticated military failed.
As author and journalist, Jeffrey Simpson, has noted: "The least that can be said for this mission is that everyone associated with it knows – or should know – that air power alone cannot win a victory, presuming the bombing powers can define 'victory'.”
Mr. Harper insists that this war will not be allowed to become a "quagmire,” but his reassurance is cold comfort given that this is precisely what we've seen in Iraq since the fall of Baghdad in April 2003. The Conservative government's own Foreign Affairs Minister—in a moment of uncharacteristic candor—acknowledged that there are "no quick fixes” in Iraq. He called the fight against ISIS, and groups like it, the struggle of a "generation.” Indeed, that may well turn out to be an understatement.
Terrorist organizations have thrived in Iraq and Syria precisely because those countries lack stable, legitimate governments capable of maintaining peace and security within their own borders. Canada's first contribution should be to leverage every diplomatic, humanitarian, and financial resource at our disposal to strengthen political institutions in both those countries and to respond to the overwhelming human tragedy unfolding on the ground.
It's often said that the definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again while expecting different results. That's why Canada, for its part, should be wary of any response that will further destabilize an already volatile region by alienating the very civilians we seek to protect. Peggy Mason, Canada's former UN ambassador for disarmament and special advisor to Joe Clark, has warned that: "Harper's plan to send Canadian warplanes to join the U.S.-led coalition's bombing of Iraq may just make matters worse.”
The struggle against ISIS won't end with yet another Western-led military intervention in Iraq and Syria. It will end by helping the people of Iraq and Syria build the political, institutional, and security capabilities they need to achieve lasting peace themselves. With the credibility Canada gained by rejecting the catastrophic 2003 invasion of Iraq, we are well-positioned to take a lead in this initiative and we should not squander that opportunity.
Again, thank you for your message on this important issue.
Sincerely,

Tom Mulcair, M.P. (Outremont)
Leader of the Official Opposition
New Democratic Party of Canada

Thursday, September 15, 2022

SUFISM
Bangladeshi mystic fights demons with psychiatry


Shafiqul ALAM
Wed, September 14, 2022 


Evil spirits bedevil the families that seek blessings from an elderly Bangladeshi mystic -- but he knows his prayers alone are not enough to soothe their troubled minds.

Syed Emdadul Hoque conducts exorcisms but at the same time is helping to bust taboos around mental health treatment in the South Asian nation, where disorders of the mind are often rationalised as cases of otherworldly possession.

Hundreds of people visit the respected cleric each week to conquer their demons, and after receiving Hoque's blessing a team of experts will gently assess if they need medical care.

Mohammad Rakib, 22, was brought to the shrine after complaining of "possession by a genie" that brought alarming changes to his behaviour.

"When I regain consciousness, I feel okay," he tells Hoque. But his uncle explains that the student has suffered alarming dissociative spells, attacking and scolding his relatives while speaking in an unrecognisable language.

"Don't worry, you will be fine," Hoque says reassuringly, reciting prayers that he says will rid Rakib of the spirit and to help him concentrate on his studies.

Rakib is then led into a room by the cleric's son Irfanul, where volunteers note down his symptoms and medical history.

"We think he is suffering from mental problems," Irfanul tells AFP.

"Once we've taken his details, we will send him to a psychiatrist to prescribe medicines."

- Sufi mystics -

Hoque, 85, and his son are members of the Sufi tradition, a branch of Islam that emphasises mysticism and the spiritual dimensions of the faith.


They are descended from one of the country's most respected Sufi leaders, from whom Hoque has inherited the esteemed title of "Pir", denoting him as a spiritual mentor.



Their hometown of Maizbhandar is one of the country's most popular pilgrimage sites, with huge crowds each year visiting shrines dedicated to the Hoque family's late ancestors to seek their blessings.

Their faith occupies an ambiguous place in Bangladesh, where they are regularly denounced as heretics and deviants by hardliners from the Sunni Muslim majority.

But Sufi mystics have a deeply rooted role in rural society as healers, and Irfanul says his father gives his visitors the opportunity to unburden themselves.

"Those who open up their stresses and problems to us, it becomes easier for us to help," he says. "My father does his part by blessing him and then the medical healing starts."

Hoque is helped by Taslima Chowdhury, a psychiatrist who worked at the shrine for nearly two years, travelling from her own home an hour's drive away in the bustling port city of Chittagong.

"Had he not sent the patients to me, they might never visit a trained psychiatrist in their life," she tells AFP.

"Thanks to him, a lot of mental patients get early treatment and many get cured quickly."

- Veil of silence -



Despite Bangladesh's rapid economic growth over the past decade, treatment options for panic attacks, anxiety and other symptoms of mental disorder remain limited.

A brutal 1971 independence war and the floods, cyclones and other disasters that regularly buffet the climate-vulnerable country have left widespread and lingering trauma, according to a British Journal of Psychology study published last year.

Bangladesh has fewer than 300 psychiatrists servicing a population of 170 million people, the same publication says, while a stigma around mental illness prevents those afflicted from seeking help.

A 2018 survey conducted by local health authorities found nearly one in five adults met the criteria for a mental disorder, more than 90 percent of whom did not receive professional treatment.

But experts say Hoque's referral programme could offer a revolutionary means of lifting the veil of silence around mental health and encourage more people to seek medical intervention.

"It is remarkable given that in Bangladesh, mental problems are considered taboo," says Kamal Uddin Chowdhury, a professor of Clinical Psychology at the elite Dhaka University.

The country's top mental hospital is now engaged in a project to train other religious leaders in rural towns to follow Hoque's approach, he tells AFP.

"They are the first responders," he adds.

"If they spread out the message that mental diseases are curable and that being 'possessed by a genie' is a kind of mental disease, it can make a big difference in treatment."

sa/gle/skc/dhc


Tuesday, May 10, 2022

With spate of attacks, Islamic State group begins bloody new chapter in Afghanistan
A bombing at a mosque in Kabul, Afghanistan, on April 29 killed at least 10 and wounded dozens more. PHOTO: EPA-EFE

KABUL (NYTIMES) - The first blast ripped through a school in Kabul, the Afghan capital, killing high school students. Days later, explosions destroyed two mosques and a minibus in the north of the country. The following week, three more explosions targeted Shi'ite and Sufi Muslims.

The attacks of the past two weeks have left at least 100 people dead, figures from hospitals suggest, and stoked fears that Afghanistan is heading into a violent spring, as the Islamic State's affiliate in the country tries to undermine the Taliban government and assert its newfound reach.

The sudden spate of attacks across the country has upended the relative calm that followed the Taliban's seizing of power in August, which ended 20 years of war. And by targeting civilians - the Hazara Shi'ite, an ethnic minority, and Sufis, who practise a mystical form of Islam, in recent weeks - they have stirred dread that the country may not be able to escape a long cycle of violence.

The Islamic State affiliate in Afghanistan - known as Islamic State Khorasan - has claimed responsibility for four of the seven recent major attacks, according to SITE Intelligence Group, which tracks extremist organisations. Those that remain unclaimed fit the profile of previous attacks by the group, which considers Shi'ites and Sufis heretics.

With the attacks, the Islamic State group's Afghanistan affiliate has undercut the Taliban's claim that they had extinguished any threat from the Islamic State in the country. It has also reinforced concerns about a potential resurgence of extremist groups in Afghanistan that could eventually pose an international threat.

Last month the Islamic State claimed it had fired rockets into Uzbekistan from northern Afghanistan - the first such purported attack by the group on a Central Asian nation.

"ISIS-K is resilient; it survived years of airstrikes from Nato forces and ground operations from the Taliban during its insurgency," said Mr Michael Kugelman, deputy director of the Asia Programme at the Wilson Centre, a think tank in Washington, using an alternate name for the Islamic State Khorasan.

"Now after the Taliban takeover and the US departure, ISIS-K has emerged even stronger."

The Islamic State group's Afghanistan affiliate was established in 2015 by disaffected Pakistani Taliban fighters. The group's ideology took hold partly because many villages there are home to Salafi Muslims, the same branch of Sunni Islam as the Islamic State. Salafists are a smaller minority among the Taliban, who mostly follow the Hanafi school.

Since its founding, the Islamic State group's Afghanistan affiliate has been antagonistic toward the Taliban: At times the two groups have fought for turf, and last year Islamic State leaders denounced the Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan, saying that the group's version of Islamic rule was insufficiently hard line.

Still, for most of the past six years the Islamic State has been contained to eastern Afghanistan amid US airstrikes and Afghan commando raids that killed many of its leaders. But since the Taliban seized power, the Islamic State has grown in reach and expanded to nearly all 34 provinces, according to the United Nations Mission in Afghanistan.

After the Taliban broke open prisons across the country during their military advance in the summer, the number of Islamic State fighters in Afghanistan doubled to nearly 4,000, the UN found.

The group also ramped up its activity across the country, said Mr Abdul Sayed, a security specialist and researcher who tracks the Islamic State group's Afghanistan affiliate and other radical groups. In the last four months of 2021, the Islamic State carried out 119 attacks in Afghanistan, up from 39 during the same period a year earlier. They included suicide bombings, assassinations and ambushes on security checkpoints.

A boys’ school in Kabul that was bombed last month. 
PHOTO: NYTIMES

Of those, 96 targeted Taliban officials or security forces, compared with only two in the same period in 2020 - a marked shift from earlier last year when the group primarily targeted civilians, including activists and journalists.

In response, the Taliban carried out a brutal campaign last year against suspected Islamic State fighters in the eastern province of Nangarhar. Their approach relied heavily on extrajudicial detentions and killings of those suspected of belonging to the Islamic State, according to local residents, analysts and human rights monitors.

For months this past winter, attacks by the Islamic State dwindled - raising some hope that the Taliban's campaign was proving effective. But the recent spate of high-profile attacks that have claimed many civilian lives suggests that the Islamic State used the winter to regroup for a spring offensive - a pattern perfected by the Taliban when it was an insurgency.

A student wounded in the attack on a school, which was in an area of Kabul dominated by Hazara Shiites. PHOTO: AFP

While the Islamic State group's Afghanistan affiliate does not appear to be trying to seize territory, as the Islamic State did in Iraq and Syria, the attacks have demonstrated the group's ability to sow violent chaos despite the Taliban's heavy-handed tactics, analysts say.

They have also stoked concerns that, sensing perceived weakness in the Taliban government, other extremist groups in the region that already have reason to resent the Taliban may shift alliances to the Islamic State.

"ISIS-K wants to show its breadth and reach beyond Afghanistan, that its jihad is more violent than that of the Taliban, and that it is a purer organisation that doesn't compromise on who is righteous and who isn't," said Dr Asfandyar Mir, a senior expert at the United States Institute of Peace.

The blasts have particularly rattled the country's Hazara Shi'ites, who have long feared that the Taliban - which persecuted Afghan Shi'ites for decades - would allow violence against them to go unchecked. The strife has also caused concern in neighbouring Iran, a Shi'ite theocracy.

Many Afghan Shi'ites have been on edge since suicide bombings by the Islamic State at Shi'ite mosques in one northern and one southern city together killed more than 90 people in October. The recent blasts, which mainly targeted areas dominated by Hazara communities, deepened those fears.

Relatives mourning Mohammad Hussein, who was killed in an explosion outside the boys’ school in Kabul, on April 27, 2022. PHOTO: NYTIMES

Late last month, Mr Saeed Mohammad Agha Husseini, 21, was standing outside his home in the Dasht-e-Barchi area of Kabul, a Hazara-dominated area, when he felt the thud of an explosion. He and his father raced to the school down the street, where throngs of terrified students poured out its gate, the bloodied bodies of some of their classmates sprawled across the pavement.

His father rushed to help the victims, but minutes later Mr Husseini heard another deafening boom. A second explosion hit the school's gate, fatally wounding his father.

A week later, Mr Husseini sat under the shade of a small awning with his relatives to mourn. Outside, their once-bustling street was quiet, the fear of another explosion still ripe. At the school, community leaders had been discussing hiring guards to take security into their own hands.

"The government cannot protect us; we are not safe," Mr Husseini said. "We have to think about ourselves and take care of our security."

MORE ON THIS TOPIC

Monday, July 25, 2022

Afghanistan on the Verge of Religious Terrorism and Sectarian Warfare

July 22, 2022
By Ajmal Sohail



In Afghanistan, the Taliban’s position towards the Salafists has become punitive and ruthless once again. Albeit followers of numerous religious Sects live in Afghanistan, such as Ismailia, Shia, Jafri, Ahle-Hadith/Wahhabis, and Sunni-Hanafi. The position of the Taliban militants concerning the Sunni-Hanafi religion is soft and the level of danger to its followers is very low and even zero, compared to followers of other religions. Nevertheless, there are three religious sects, whose followers are utmost risk, and are under the greatest threat and danger.

These three religious groups are particularly tarnished in Afghanistan, since they are assumed to be the elements of foreign intelligence organizations and are used for a common intelligence goal. The first category is the Shias, whose lives are currently under threat in the country, and there are always deadly attacks on their religious ceremonies. Even the Taliban militants intervene in their rites, while disrupting their religious rituals and beating them up. Meantime, attacks against the Shia religions by the Daesh group or using the name of this group have been intensified, while slaying them, are tactics of foreign intelligence especially CIA.

Steering an intelligence war tactics in the name of religion between Daesh/Salafi and Shia religions in Afghanistan, like Mosul and other parts of Iraq, which will in turn strain the relations between the new administration of the Taliban of Afghanistan and Iran, is part of the CIA’s policy. Because it will force Iran to use the Fatimun proxy group to defend the right of the Shia religion’s followers in Afghanistan. Thus, the practice of anti-Taliban armed forces and fronts against the Taliban to indirectly control the Taliban in Afghanistan is a special part of the US foreign policy. Nonetheless, if the US wants to directly control the Taliban, then they are supposed to intervene militarily, or apply tremendous external pressure on the Taliban, to get them abide by the US policy.

However, after August 15, the United States used some methods to directly control the Taliban, but the result was deleterious. Because the relationship between America and the Taliban has strained and the United States almost lost control over, this organized and faith-based armed militia. Consequently, the United States, with the help of the Daesh group or using its name, incited the followers of the Shiite religion against the Taliban in Afghanistan.

As they want to create such anti-Taliban fronts against the Taliban in Afghanistan letting other countries support them financially, providing them with training centers and sanctuaries, and on the international level, they will be defamed, while benefiting America indirectly. The United States will keep the Taliban amused by claiming to defend the Taliban against those groups, and in some cases, the United States will conduct airstrikes to defend the Taliban against the anti-Taliban fronts. Actually, the US tries to wage a religious and ethnic war in Afghanistan, by means of the Daesh group to multiply the heat of the civil war in Afghanistan.

Moreover, the first juncture of the civil war, is the use of the Daesh group against the Shia religions in Afghanistan, and for the defense of Shia sects, Iran will deploy its proxy-armed groups, namely Fatimiun fighters. Keeping the ethnic war upward in Afghanistan, the main victims are supposedly Tajiks, Hazaras and other non-Pashtun tribes, but the likely victims of this war will be Pashtuns as well.

The second sect’s follower whose lives are under severe threat and danger, are Ahle-Hadith/ Wahhabis/Salafis. The Wahhabi religion has many followers in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, Malaysia, and Indonesia. In Afghanistan, Wahhabis are called by the Taliban as Khariji and the pedigrees of ISIS. Henceforth, its followers have been either killed, missing or persecuted.

Wahhabis, whose financial supporters are said to be the Gulf countries, customarily some of their citizens are active members of Daesh.

The third sect of which followers’ lives are currently under threat in Afghanistan are the Ahle-tasawuf/ Sufis, whose followers were targeted and their worship places have been blown up recently.

Subsequently, a new phase of intelligence warfare between the US’ CIA and Iran’s VAJA, thru their proxies will begin, and Afghanistan will turn into a hotbed of state sponsored Jihadi terrorism, which will in turn extensively divide Afghanistan into numerous fronts. Moreover, the contemporary values such as democracy, peace, political stability, republicanism and social-market economy will remain vague and unachievable.



Ajmal Sohail



Ajmal Sohail is Co-founder and Co-president of Counter Narco-terrorism Alliance Germany and he is National Security and counter terrorism analyst. He is active member of Christian Democratic Union (CDU)as well.