Taliban’s new ploy

Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry 

Published October 19, 2025 

DAWN

The writer is chairman, Sanober Institute, and former foreign secretary of Pakistan.

THE Afghan Taliban regime is living under an illusion. Visiting India, its interim foreign minister recently stated that Afghanistan had defeated the British, the Soviets and the Americans. No, they had not. The Afghan rulers of the time were decisively defeated in the second Anglo-Afghan war (1878-80) by the British, enabling the latter to effectively make Afghanistan a buffer zone in the Great Game between the Raj and the Russian empire. Abdul Rahman Khan accepted the Durand Line as the border with British India, which was endorsed by subsequent Afghan rulers. As for the Soviets, it was the concerted effort by the US and Pakistan that pushed them out and rescued the Afghan people in the 1980s. America’s presence in Afghanistan since 2001 also ended only when the US itself decided to exit in August 2021 because of American public opinion turning against distant wars and the strategic depth the Taliban had received in Pakistan.

For over four years now, the world has expected the Taliban to honour their commitments under the 2020 Doha peace accord with the US. However, they have violated all three promises: forming a true representative government, respecting women’s rights, and not allowing terrorist entities on Afghan soil.

With Pakistan, the Taliban have adopted a particularly hostile attitude, having lately embarked upon a two-pronged manoeuvre. The first prong is teaming up with India to not only benefit from Indian investments in healthcare, education and infrastructure, but to also doubly squeeze Pakistan under the mistaken belief that Pakistan’s enemy is their friend. For its part, India, which has severely criticised Taliban in the past, has reversed its policy in order to leverage the Taliban against Pakistan, just as the Taliban are leveraging it against Pakistan. India hopes to wean the Taliban further away from Pakistan and even China.

The second prong is an upsurge in the Taliban’s kinetic aggression to destabilise the Pak-Afghan border (Oct 11-12, 2025) while ignoring Pakistan’s consistent protests against the Taliban’s support to the TTP (and other anti-Pakistan elements) who have killed children and other innocent civilians in Pakistan. For now, Pakistan has repulsed the assaults and inflicted heavy losses on the Taliban forces and their TTP associates. However, it is evident that the Taliban won’t heed Pakistan’s advice to not allow terrorist elements on their soil. Instead, the Afghan leadership tends to shift the burden of any action to Pakistan, arguing that these terrorists should be handled inside this country. The Taliban media is also spreading disinformation, taking a leaf out of the Indian media’s playbook.


Why are the Taliban inimical towards Pakistan?

Why are the Taliban so ungrateful and inimical towards Pakistan? It appears that they are trying to be nationalist in order to garner support from the wider Afghan society. Perhaps they wish to give the impression that they aren’t under Pakistan’s influence. They are hosting the TTP probably as a leverage against Pakistan. In doing all this, they are overestimating their power potential, and may be in for a rude shock. It would be prudent for them not to underestimate Pakistan’s resolve to defend its borders and defeat Taliban-backed terrorists.

How should Pakistan deal with the Taliban? Several steps can be considered in the immediate term: One, Pakistan should maintain its robust defence at the borders with Afghanistan (and India). Only strength can deter aggression. Two, it should send a clear message to Kabul that the doors for dialogue are open, provided the Taliban firmly commit to ending their support to the TTP. If they do not commit to that, then kinetic options wou­ld remain on the table. Three, Paki­s­tan must keep up the pressure on the Taliban through diplomatic outreach to Saudi Arabia (now a partner in mutual defence), China, Russia, Iran, the Central Asian Republics, Turkiye, the UAE and America. Given the Taliban’s past association with Al Qaeda, the global community would not want to see the Taliban hosting terrorist entities again. Pakistan should also register its complaints in the UN under the UNSCR 1988 (1267) sanctions regime.

In the medium term, Pakistan should develop a nationwide consensus on a review of its previously generous policies regarding Afghan refugees, scholarships for Afghan students, special desks in its hospitals for Afghans, collecting custom duties on transit trade through Pakistani ports, and media outreach to Afghan society. Experts could be invited to suggest doable measures. In the long term, an effort could be mounted to win the hearts and minds of our nationals living in the erstwhile Fata region bordering Afghanistan through development work. They are the first line of defence against terrorism from Afghanistan.

Published in Dawn, October 19th, 2025

Another Doha pact

Muhammad Amir Rana 

Published October 19, 2025

DAWN

THERE is little optimism or even enthusiasm surrounding the post-ceasefire talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan taking place in Doha. Yet, it would be unwise to dismiss them outright. If one assesses the potential pragmatically, these discussions could evolve into a ‘Doha pact’ of their own, echoing the 2021 agreement between the Taliban and the US that altered the regional geopolitical landscape.

Facilitated by Qatar and Saudi Arabia, the Taliban have agreed to sit down with their Pakistani counterparts in Doha to discuss bilateral relations and the possible extension of the ceasefire, which was initially agreed upon for just 48 hours after recent border clashes between the two countries.

Should the two sides reach an understanding akin to the earlier Doha accord, where the Taliban provide verifiable guarantees that the TTP and other Afghan-based militants will not operate against Pakistan, it could prove transformative. Such an agreement would not only redefine the troubled bilateral relationship but could also reshape the regional landscape. The prospects for transnational connectivity, trade and mega infrastructure projects linking Central and South Asia would expand dramatically, offering tangible improvements to the lives of millions across the region.

However, the Taliban leadership does not have such a vision, and the major problem with the Taliban leadership lies in its deeply conventional mindset in both political and religious thinking. This rigidity stems mainly from their madressah education, whether in Pakistan or Afghanistan. Most of their leaders, whether graduates or dropouts, share the same worldview, cutting across all factions and shades of leadership, from the so-called ‘moderates’ like Abbas Stanikzai to the Haqqanis and hardliners such as Mullah Abdul Hakim Haqqani.


The Taliban perceive the world as something that must learn to accommodate them.

They perceive the world as something that must learn to accommodate them or strive to understand them, while they see no reason to change themselves. They consider themselves victorious, having defeated great powers, and believe the world should now deal with them on their terms. Consequently, they show little willingness to reconsider their orthodox, religiously driven policies of moral policing or their severe restrictions on women and other vulnerable segments of society, despite appeals from respected religious scholars across the Islamic world.

Their mindset is incompatible with evolving global norms, and even with the political realities of authoritarian yet relatively modern Muslim societies. Why, then, should others be expected to give them time or understand their so-called compulsions, which they often cite when discussing terrorism-related issues with Pakistan and neighbouring countries? Why should Pakistan and others continue to listen to them and at what cost? Must Pakistan continue to bleed at the hands of the TTP and other militant groups while the Taliban offer themselves as mediators between the state and terrorists?

In contrast, when militant groups rooted in Al Qaeda and Daesh captured parts of Syria, their behaviour, both internally and in their engagement with the world, was notably different. One understands that Afghanistan is not Syria. Syria, despite its devastation, is attempting to rebuild through a fragile but ongoing national consensus and is showing a willingness to align, at least partially, with regional and global norms. The Taliban, by comparison, have failed to foster any such consensus at home.

Unlike in Syria, where elements of the leadership remain visible, reachable, and at times open to dialogue with world powers, including the US and Russia, the Taliban’s supreme leader, Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada, remains hidden. The reasons for his seclusion are unclear. Officially, it is attributed to ‘security concerns’, but these explanations no longer hold much weight. What is he afraid of? Lack of confidence, fear of dissent, or simply an inability to step out of a wartime mindset? No one truly knows who is making decisions on his behalf. The Taliban’s internal communications are riddled with contradictions, and myths continue to swirl around their leadership.

One recent example illustrates this opacity and confusion. Reports emerged that Mullah Hibatullah had ordered an internet shutdown across Afghanistan, citing concerns that WhatsApp and other social media apps were spreading obscenity, vulgarity, and music. Yet, just a few days later, he reportedly asked an aide why he was no longer receiving WhatsApp messages. When informed that the services had been suspended on his own orders, he reluctantly directed that internet access be restored.

Such incidents, while almost absurd on the surface, reveal a deeper problem within the Taliban’s governance structure — a leadership trapped between ideological rigidity and the demands of a connected, modern world.

The Taliban leadership is neither innovative nor forward-looking in shaping better relations with its neighbours, particularly Pakistan and China, despite the long-term advantages such engagement could bring. Instead, they continue to rely on the old Afghan template of suspicion and defiance towards Pakistan, a posture that frustrates Islamabad even more than the persistent terrorist threat the country faces daily.

India, fully aware of these sensitivities, has been quick to exploit the Taliban’s posture to its advantage, skilfully playing on Pakistan’s insecurities. For the Taliban, this dynamic serves as a convenient balancing act, using the Indian card to counter Pakistan’s pressure on issues of terrorism and border security-related affairs.

In Doha, the Taliban are unlikely to change. Neither Qatar nor Saudi Arabia possess the leverage to compel them to abandon their closest militant ally, the TTP. China, too, has failed to persuade them on this issue, and it remains unclear what strategy the Gulf mediators can employ to convince the Taliban to address Pakistan’s concerns about cross-border terrorism seriously. The likelihood is that the Taliban will continue to deny responsibility, insisting that the TTP problem is an ‘internal matter’ for Pakistan and offering, at best, vague proposals for dialogue.

To avoid embarrassing their hosts, the ceasefire between Afghanistan and Pakistan may be extended for a few weeks. But the real solution does not lie in diplomatic gestures or temporary truces. It lies in the Taliban’s willingness to completely sever ties with all forms of terrorism, something they had promised to the US in the original Doha Agreement, and a commitment they may now be compelled to make once again, this time to Pakistan.

The writer is a security analyst.

Published in Dawn, October 19th, 2025

As Pakistan battles Afghan Taliban, fears of major war rise

Haroon Janjua in Islamabad

DW

October 13, 2025

Both Pakistani forces and the Taliban in Afghanistan are reeling after deadly clashes. Observers warn that border violence could escalate into a full-blown conflict.

Both Pakistan and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan claim to have inflicted heavy losses on the opposing side

 (file photo)Image: Wakil Kohsar/AFP

Fierce fighting erupted between the Pakistani military and Afghan Taliban forces over the weekend, marking the deadliest conflict between the neighbors since the Taliban returned to power in Kabul in 2021.

Both Pakistani officials and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan claim to have inflicted heavy losses on the opposing side.

The Taliban said on Sunday that they had killed 58 Pakistani soldiers in overnight border operations. Pakistan's army gave far lower casualty figures, saying 23 of its troops were killed. The Taliban also claimed to have captured 25 Pakistani army posts.

Pakistan's military claimed to have killed more than 200 Afghan fighters. The Taliban said only nine soldiers on its side were killed.

Claims from both sides could not be independently verified. Access to the border region remains heavily restricted.

Pakistan, Afghan Taliban border clashes: What's next? 05:28

 

Why are Pakistan and Afghan Taliban fighting?

Tensions between the countries, which were once allies, increased after Islamabad demanded that Kabul take action against the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a separate group closely linked to the Afghan Taliban.

The TTP seeks to impose a hard-line interpretation of Islam, particularly on Pakistan's northwestern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, which borders Afghanistan.

According to Pakistan's government, the group operates from Afghan soil with impunity. The Afghan Taliban deny that.

TTP militants have stepped up attacks against Pakistani security forces in recent years.

A UN report this year found that the TTP "receive substantial logistical and operational support from the de facto authorities," referring to the Taliban government in Kabul.

More than 500 people, including 311 troops and 73 policemen, were killed in attacks from January through September 15, the AFP news agency reported, citing a Pakistan military spokesman.

Pakistan's government has also accused India of backing the Pakistani Taliban and other insurgent outfits in a bid to destabilize Pakistan. India denies such accusations and says Pakistan itself is involved in supporting secessionist militant groups operating in India-administered Kashmir.

Tensions flare at Afghan-Pakistan border  02:33

 

Fragile cross-border situation

Last week, the Afghan Taliban accused Pakistan of bombing Kabul and a market in the country's east.

Pakistan's government did not confirm or deny the airstrikes. But Pakistan has repeatedly stressed the right to defend itself against what it said is a surging cross-border militancy.

Afghan Taliban forces said they launched attacks on Pakistani troops late Saturday as a "retaliation for airstrikes carried out by the Pakistani army on Kabul."

Michael Kugelman, a Washington-based South Asia analyst, told DW that the latest clashes between Pakistan and Afghanistan are "driven by Islamabad's failure to curb Afghanistan-based anti-Pakistan terrorism."

"Despite trying various strategies, including talks and limited military operations primarily within Pakistan, success has been elusive," Kugelman said. He added that "intensified counterterrorism operations" against targets in Afghanistan by Pakistan have now sparked a Taliban response, leading to the escalation.

Though the fighting seems to have largely ended for now, the situation remains fragile and tensions run deep.

The clashes also prompted a halt in border trade between the countries as Pakistan closed crossings along the 2,600-kilometer (1,600-mile) frontier.

The move stranded scores of loaded goods vehicles on either side, a Pakistani industry representative told the Reuters news agency.

Trade between Afghanistan and Pakistan halted as Pakistan closed border crossingsImage: Shahid Shinwari/REUTERS
Will TTP increase attacks?

Omar Samad, former ambassador of Afghanistan to Canada and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, told DW that hostility between the two sides "can escalate into widespread violence and military action beyond what we are experiencing" and cause irreparable damage to the relationship between the countries.

"Tensions between the Pakistan military establishment and the de facto Afghan government have been rising for the past two years, partly caused by missteps, misunderstandings and mismanagement," Samad said.

Kugelman is of the view that one consequence of the crisis could be increased reprisal attacks by the TTP, "which has a strong presence in Pakistan despite its main base in Afghanistan."

He said the Afghan Taliban were not a match for Pakistan's military, despite being capable of staging operations at border posts.

"Thus, TTP reprisals, possibly encouraged by the Afghan Taliban, remain a major concern for Pakistan's future," he said.

Imtiaz Gul, a security expert and executive director of Center for Research and Security Studies in Islamabad, had a similar view.

"Pakistan will now face a growing threat of increased militancy from TTP more than ever after the clashes with Afghanistan," he told DW. "It now requires a strengthening of counterterrorism operations and intelligence capabilities to combat these threats and eliminate terrorism."

Women and girls in Afghanistan see no hope for the future  02:49

Is it time to deescalate?

Despite the rocky relationship between the governments, the neighbors have made attempts over the past year to improve ties.

In May, Pakistan's government announced that it would upgrade its diplomatic ties with the Afghan Taliban and designate an ambassador to Kabul, even though Islamabad has yet to formally recognize the Taliban government.

The neighboring nations also share close historical, cultural and people-to-people ties.

Millions of Afghans who fled their war-ravaged country over the past 40 years have found shelter in Pakistan.

But, amid strained ties with the Afghan Taliban, Pakistan's government started a massive initiative to repatriate approximately 4 million Afghans living in the country in 2023.

Pakistan's government has since deported more than 800,000 Afghans, creating another source of tension with Kabul.

'No time for deception'

Samad said both sides should hold constructive talks to resolve their issues instead of engaging in belligerent tactics.

"Despite bravado and hubris, both countries have vulnerabilities and strengths that are unmatched and contradictory," Samad said. "Afghans have little to lose against overwhelming military odds, but Pakistan is fragile from within."

"Now is the time for statesmanship, caution and honest dialogue," Samad said. "There is no time for deception, spin and bluster," he added.

Under Taliban shadow, Afghans in Pakistan look to Germany  03:52

Edited by: Srinivas Mazumdaru


Haroon Janjua Journalist based in Islamabad, focusing on Pakistani politics and societyJanjuaHaroon

Afghanistan-India-Pakistan: Renewed Flashpoint – Analysis

October 14, 2025 
By SATP
By Ajit Kumar Singh

The overnight clashes of October 11–12, 2025, along the volatile 2,640-kilometre Durand Line between Afghanistan and Pakistan marked one of the deadliest confrontations in recent years, resulting in several deaths and reigniting deep-seated tensions across South Asia. The violence followed Pakistan’s controversial airstrike in Kabul on October 9, 2025, which Islamabad claimed targeted Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) chief Noor Wali Mehsud. The attack, however, allegedly struck a crowded civilian market, killing at least 15 non-combatants.

The incident triggered a spiral of artillery exchanges, drone strikes, and cross-border incursions across Pakistan’s northern sectors, particularly in Afghanistan’s Kunar and Paktika provinces. By dawn on October 12, heavy smoke was visible over Pakistan’s Bajaur and Khyber districts, as satellite imagery captured destroyed outposts and damaged fencing. The fighting also paralyzed vital trade arteries, including the Torkham and Spin Boldak crossings that handle over USD 2.5 billion in annual bilateral commerce, leaving thousands of traders stranded and compounding the economic distress in both countries. As of October 13, a fragile ceasefire mediated by Saudi and Qatari officials was in place, but hostility persisted.

Pakistan’s military swiftly characterised its actions as defensive operations, framing its response as a legitimate countermeasure to what it called “unprovoked Taliban aggression” against more than 20 border checkpoints. The Inter-Services Public Relations detailed a series of precision airstrikes and commando raids that reportedly neutralised over 200 Taliban fighters and associated TTP operatives, while dismantling 21 Afghan positions and several terrorist training camps inside Afghan territory. Islamabad confirmed the deaths of 23 Pakistani Security Force (SF) personnel and injuries to 29 others.

Pakistan’s Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi denounced the Afghan actions as “barbaric and unprovoked,” vowing a calibrated response. Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry summoned the Afghan Ambassador, condemning Kabul for providing sanctuary to TTP cadres, while denying that its October 9 airstrike had violated Afghan airspace. Pakistan further invoked Article 51 of the UN Charter, asserting that its cross-border actions constituted legitimate self-defence.

The Taliban administration in Kabul offered a starkly different account, depicting the clashes as a justified retaliation against blatant Pakistani violations of Afghan sovereignty. The Defense Ministry confirmed retaliatory strikes on Pakistani border outposts as a response to the October 9 bombing that killed civilians. Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid claimed that their forces eliminated 58 Pakistani soldiers while sustaining only nine fatalities, portraying the outcome as proof of Afghan military superiority. The Taliban described the confrontation as a defence of the Islamic Emirate’s territorial integrity against Islamabad’s “imperialist encroachments,” vowing to protect the Afghan side of the Durand Line, which they continue to reject as an artificial colonial boundary. While independent verification remains limited, reports from local Pashtun networks indicated that Taliban units briefly overran some Pakistani border posts.

By midday on October 12, artillery exchanges subsided following urgent mediation by Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Riyadh, leveraging its extensive financial and religious influence, pressured both sides to cease hostilities, warning that instability could jeopardise Hajj pilgrim logistics and USD 10 billion in Gulf remittances to the region. Qatar complemented these efforts by hosting virtual talks, invoking its past role in the Doha Accords. Both Kabul and Islamabad accepted the ceasefire, with Taliban Acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi crediting Saudi and Qatari diplomacy for “averting a greater calamity.” Nevertheless, the truce remained fragile. On October 13, Torkham remained closed, halting an estimated USD 50 million in daily truck traffic. United Nations observers reported approximately 5,000 displaced civilians, primarily Pashtuns, caught in the crossfire.

The record of Afghanistan–Pakistan border clashes dates back to April 2007, when the first SF-to-SF confrontation erupted over disputed outposts, establishing a pattern of recurring violence driven by fencing disputes and militant infiltration. According to South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) data, at least 39 such incidents occurred up to October 10, 2025, causing 60 deaths on the Pakistani side — 41 SF personnel and 19 civilians. The Durand Line continues to represent one of South Asia’s most combustible borders. As of 2025, Pakistan reports 98 per cent completion of its border fence, a project that has repeatedly triggered Afghan opposition. In 2024 alone, 16 SF-to-SF confrontations were documented, resulting in eight Pakistani deaths (five SF personnel and three civilians) and 24 persons injured – all SF personnel. Afghanistan acknowledged 19 deaths (eight SF and 11 civilians) and 25 military personnel injured in 2024.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees assessments highlight that such periodic exchanges have displaced thousands of civilians annually, further eroding confidence in bilateral security arrangements. The first nine months of 2025 recorded 12 SF-to-SF clashes before the October 11 escalation, resulting in three Pakistani SF fatalities and nine injured (six SF and three civilians). Kabul’s official tallies for the same period included one SF fatality and six injured (three civilian and three military). Analysts correlate the Taliban’s 2021 return to power with a 25 per cent uptick in such encounters, attributed to Pakistan’s USD 500 million fencing project.

Beyond state-on-state engagements, cross-border militant infiltration from Afghan territory into Pakistan has surged, primarily involving TTP operatives. SATP data shows 17 infiltration attempts in 2025 (up to October 10), resulting in 202 fatalities – 194 militants killed during counter-operations and eight Pakistani SF deaths – along with 33 injured (25 SF and eight militants). This represents a marked escalation from 2024, which recorded 19 attacks causing 74 deaths (68 militants and six SF personnel) and 14 injured (nine SF and five militants).

These infiltration attempts, largely launched from Afghan provinces such as Kunar and Nangarhar, embody Pakistan’s core grievance that Kabul tolerates TTP sanctuaries. Islamabad cites this evidence to justify its “hot pursuit” doctrine of limited cross-border strikes. The persistent threat has also imposed economic costs: repeated Torkham closures in 2025 have already inflicted USD 300 million in trade losses. While Pashtun leaders denounce the fencing as a “wall of shame,” Pakistani military officials insist it is a defensive necessity.

Saudi Arabia’s and Qatar’s mediation has proven central to preventing further escalation. Building on earlier interventions, Riyadh dispatched senior envoys, linking restraint to prospective USD 1.5 billion in bailout funding and Afghan wheat support. Kabul reciprocated by promising to restrict TTP cross-border movement. Qatar hosted a trilateral video dialogue, proposing the establishment of joint border monitors. Both Pakistan and Afghanistan publicly thanked the Gulf mediators. However, as of October 13, the implementation of joint patrols had yet to begin, illustrating the ceasefire’s fragility. Analysts interpret the Gulf mediation as motivated partly by the protection of Gulf investments in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, and regional Hajj security concerns.

At the centre of these developments was the ongoing visit of Taliban Acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi to India, which ran from October 9 to 16, 2025. The visit, the highest-level Taliban delegation to India since 2021, took place amid the border crisis and underscored Kabul’s attempt to diversify its diplomatic ties. Muttaqi met External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar in New Delhi, where both sides agreed to elevate India’s Kabul mission to full embassy status and reopen USD 500 million in humanitarian corridors for Afghan aid. In joint statements, Muttaqi expressed Afghanistan’s “enduring affinity” for India and interest in channelling USD three billion investments through Iran’s Chabahar Port to bypass Pakistani trade routes.

During an October 12 Press Conference, Muttaqi criticised Pakistan’s “rogue elements” for fostering Islamic State-Khorasan Province networks and warned that Afghanistan would safeguard its sovereignty if Islamabad rejected dialogue. His remarks drew sharp reactions in Pakistan, where officials accused India of orchestrating Kabul’s rhetoric to isolate Islamabad diplomatically.

The Taliban regime in Afghanistan has intensified accusations against Pakistan for sponsoring Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP) terrorism to destabilize the country, alleging that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence provides safe havens, training camps, and logistical aid across the porous Durand Line border, particularly in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. These claims escalated amid 2025 border clashes, with Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid warning on October 12, 2025, that Pakistan ignores Islamic State presence on its soil, demanding expulsion of key members and revealing recruit funnelling through Karachi and Islamabad airports for attacks planned from there.

On September 11, Taliban’s intelligence chief Abdul Haq Wasiq stated that ‘foreign powers’, implying Pakistan, dispatch IS-KP operatives abroad, noting that the group holds no Afghan territory but poses an external threat warranting international action. According to reports, IS-KP mounted 24 attacks in Afghanistan in 2024, killing 135 civilians and 22 Taliban fighters; 16 IS fighters were also killed in these operations. These attacks dropped to 11 in 2025 (till October 12), with two civilian and 35 Taliban fatalities, as well as 11 IS terrorists – signalling reduced civilian tolls but persistent regime assaults, amid bolstered defences. Pakistan counters that Taliban-controlled Afghanistan harbours TTP militants, fuelling mutual reprisals and proxy war fears that threaten regional stability.

Muttaqi’s visit signalled a strategic recalibration in Afghanistan’s regional posture, shifting from historical dependence on Pakistan toward engagement with India. Pakistan denounced the India–Afghanistan joint communiqué as a “malign diversion” and expelled several Afghan diplomats in protest. The timing of the visit, coinciding with the Durand Line clashes, amplified its geopolitical weight.

The diplomatic shifts now risk redefining South Asia’s security equilibrium. Pakistan, once the principal sponsor of the Taliban, finds itself in open confrontation with the forces it helped ascend to power in Kabul. Economically, India’s renewed engagement with Afghanistan offers Kabul a pathway to bypass Pakistani toll routes. Yet the regional security fallout has already been tangible: TTP attacks in Pakistan surged following Muttaqi’s India meetings. Observers note that, while Saudi and Qatari diplomacy may temporarily calm tensions, lasting peace along the Durand Line will require verifiable Taliban action against TTP sanctuaries and sustained bilateral dialogue, including talks reopening the issue of the permanent border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The October 2025 border crisis encapsulates the fragility of Afghan–Pakistani relations, where overlapping insurgencies, disputed borders, and external alignments perpetuate instability. The Saudi-Qatari ceasefire has temporarily halted escalation, yet structural grievances remain unresolved. A Pakistan increasingly isolated by an Afghan–Indian rapprochement may intensify counter-insurgency as well as covert operations, risking wider regional repercussions. As Torkham’s gates tentatively reopened on October 13, a semblance of normalcy returned. However, until Kabul and Islamabad reconcile their divergent approaches to the Durand Line, terrorist sanctuaries, and trade sovereignty, the frontier will remain a powder keg. In the words of Amir Khan Muttaqi from New Delhi, “Afghanistan craves peace first — but its resolve is eternal.”

Ajit Kumar Singh
Senior Fellow; Institute for Conflict Management


SATP

SATP, or the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) publishes the South Asia Intelligence Review, and is a product of The Institute for Conflict Management, a non-Profit Society set up in 1997 in New Delhi, and which is committed to the continuous evaluation and resolution of problems of internal security in South Asia. The Institute was set up on the initiative of, and is presently headed by, its President, Mr. K.P.S. Gill, IPS (Retd).

Taliban visit to India upsets Pakistan, signals New Delhi's changing Afghan posture

Dr. S. Jaishankar (left, centre) - External Affairs Mininister of India meeting the Afghan delegation / India External Affairs Mininister - X

FacebookTwitterLinkedInTelegramFlipboardFeedly

By bno Chennai Office October 13, 2025

India’s hosting of the Taliban’s Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi marked a pivotal moment in New Delhi’s pragmatic realignment of its Afghan policy, reflecting a calculated effort to secure national interests amid shifting regional dynamics and ongoing security challenges.

The visit, notable for its diplomatic symbolism and the controversy surrounding a press conference, took place against the backdrop of violent border clashes between Pakistan and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), as well as mounting scrutiny over women’s rights in Afghanistan and India’s diplomatic engagement standards. Until recently, India’s interaction with the Taliban regime was limited to humanitarian aid and emergency support managed by a small technical team at its shuttered Kabul embassy.

Muttaqi’s visit, made possible through a temporary UN travel exemption, marked a shift from this cautious stance. India announced that its technical mission would be upgraded to a fully operational embassy during the minister’s stay, while unveiling six new development projects and expanding trade opportunities. This engagement came without extending formal diplomatic recognition to the Taliban government.

The decision to open diplomatic channels likely reflects recognition of the realities on the ground rather than endorsement of the regime. The Afghan foreign minister expressed similar pragmatism, encouraging Indian firms to invest in mining and reconstruction, and pledging that Afghan territory would not be used for hostile activities against other nations. The joint statement issued after prolonged discussions outlined several key commitments.

India reaffirmed its support for Afghanistan’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, and promised assistance for forcibly repatriated Afghan refugees. Both sides condemned all forms of cross-border terrorism, avoiding direct reference to Pakistan but clearly alluding to recent attacks and border incidents linked to Islamabad.

Development cooperation was expanded, with India resuming infrastructure and humanitarian projects across Afghan provinces. The Taliban assured India of security guarantees, stating that no group would be allowed to plan or launch attacks against third countries from Afghan soil. Both governments also agreed to maintain dialogue aimed at promoting regional peace, stability, and mutual trust, signalling their rejection of external interference.

These commitments directly address India’s national security concerns, particularly after the Pahalgam attack earlier this year, which reportedly involved coordination from Afghan territory. The timing of Muttaqi’s visit coincided with rising violence between Pakistani forces and the Taliban’s affiliate group in Pakistan, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan(TTP).

Coinciding with Muttaqi’s visit, Pakistan conducted military operations targeting TTP leaders inside Afghanistan, followed by airstrikes on multiple border towns. The TTP retaliated by attacking police training facilities and border outposts, causing heavy casualties on both sides. As hostilities intensified, Pakistan accused Afghanistan of harbouring TTP militants and launched further artillery and airstrikes along the Durand Line.

The Taliban claimed to have inflicted several Pakistani casualties and captured a number of border posts, underscoring the deteriorating situation and complicating both India’s outreach and Pakistan’s regional calculations. In New Delhi, Amir Khan Muttaqi’s first press conference at the Afghan embassy drew widespread criticism after female journalists were barred from attending.

The exclusion triggered condemnation from Indian media associations, opposition parties, and international observers. Indian opposition leaders described it as gender discrimination, while journalist unions called it deeply concerning. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs distanced itself from the event, clarifying that it was organised independently by the Afghan embassy.

At a subsequent press conference attended by female journalists, Muttaqi attributed the incident to a technical oversight rather than deliberate intent. He stated that girls’s education was not prohibited in Afghanistan, claiming that 2.8mn out of 10mn schoolchildren were girls in his country. The controversy, however, renewed global attention on restrictions facing Afghan women and raised questions about India’s commitment to gender equality in its diplomatic engagements.

Muttaqi’s visit and India’s recalibrated approach highlight New Delhi’s attempt to safeguard its strategic interests in Afghanistan from both Pakistani interference and the influence of regional militant groups. India’s goals include restoring its presence in Afghan development and mining sectors to counter Pakistan and China, ensuring Afghan soil is not used for cross-border attacks, maintaining open diplomatic channels for crisis management and humanitarian coordination, and reaffirming its rights-based approach by publicly responding to gender exclusion.

Critics, however, argued that India’s response to the press controversy was too restrained. This pragmatic engagement reflects India’s evolving foreign policy in a region defined by fluid alliances and enduring instability. By reopening its embassy, India is neither endorsing the Taliban regime nor retreating from Afghanistan. Rather, it is positioning itself to influence outcomes in Central Asia while countering Pakistani and Chinese ambitions.

For the Taliban, the visit offered a platform to seek legitimacy, investment, and diplomatic credibility. For Pakistan, it was viewed with unease as India refrained from supporting its claims of Afghan complicity with the TTP and avoided direct criticism of Islamabad in the joint communiqué. The future of India-Taliban relations remains uncertain and will depend on the Taliban’s ability to uphold its security assurances and gradually expand women’s participation in public life. India’s continued engagement will test whether it can balance strategic pragmatism with its stated democratic principles.

The visit marked the emergence of a new phase in Indian diplomacy, characterised by engagement without recognition, investment without illusion, and cautious advocacy for rights within the confines of regional power politics. It is a policy born of necessity but pursued with quiet determination.

Friends Or Foes: The Conflict Of Interests Between Pakistan And The Taliban In Containing Tehrik-I-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) – Analysis

How Kabul and Islamabad’s Non-Cooperation has Turned a Terrorism Threat into a Multi-Faceted Regional Crisis.

Members of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Photo Credit: Mehr News Agency

October 20, 2025 
By Farahnaz Amini

The Taliban’s ascension to power in Afghanistan in 2021 affected the area’s most complicated geopolitical relationship: the unstable relationship between Kabul and Islamabad. This analysis will show that the deeply divergent interests between the Afghan Taliban and Pakistan regarding the containment of the terrorist group Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has become a full blown regional security crisis. The TTP is seen by Pakistan as a direct threat to its sovereignty and expected that its former ally (the Taliban) would take action against TTP. However, the Taliban has been unwilling to take military action, due to ideological, ethnic, and political factors, and instead has created a sanctuary in eastern Afghanistan for the TTP.

This has shifted Pakistan’s long-held policy of creating a “strategic depth” to one of “strategic insecurity”, leading Pakistan and the Taliban toward a “border cold war”. The consequences of the rivalry extend well beyond the Durand Line, and include the serious undermining of regional counter-terrorism cooperation (prompting alarming Chinese concerns regarding security of the CPEC corridor), and the exacerbation of a major Humanitarian Crisis arising from the forced migration of Afghan refugees.
Introduction: When “Strategic Depth” Becomes “Strategic Insecurity”

The security situation in South and Southwest Asia, particularly along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, has long been one of the most complicated security challenges in the region. At the center of this complexity is the triangular relationship involving the Afghan Taliban, Pakistan, and the resurgence of the TTP. The TTP, established in the early 2000s, has become an armed group that primarily targets the Pakistani state, but utilizes Afghan soil, as noted in PIPS’s report on security in international relations in 2024. This reality creates unique security issues within Pakistan, and for the wider region, as established by Suparna Banerjee, a researcher at the PRIF think tank. The experience is more than just a direct security threat to Pakistan; it has evolved into a broader stability challenge that extends far beyond the region at both ends of the border.

Historically, Pakistan tried to utilize the Taliban, and other militant groups, as tools of influence in Afghanistan to counter India’s role. This policy has often been described as “strategic depth,” and it resulted in tacit and at times even direct support for armed groups in Afghanistan (Hameed Hakimi, 2024, Al Jazeera). However, the Taliban’s reassertion of power in 2021, as well as the TTP’s increased activity, has further doubled the complexity of this relationship by highlighting a deep-seated interest conflict between the Taliban and Pakistan.

The first impact relates to the effects that border security and internal stability have on both countries. According to recent UN Security Council reports (2025), TTP cross-border attacks, retaliatory Pakistani military operations and reciprocal political pressures have created border regions that have become grey zones where neither the Taliban nor the Pakistani state hold total sway over the populace. This has turned border regions into transit routes for arms, militants, and human trafficking, creating trans-regional repercussions.



The second impact concerns the loss of regional cooperation in counter-terrorism. Neighboring countries and major regional powers—including China, India, Iran and Russia—have failed to create joint working plans due to the lack of transparency from the Islamabad and the perception of a dual policy in how to deal with the Taliban, as stated in the International Crisis Group (ICG) July 2023 report. Weakening cooperation complicates crisis management and provides fertile ground for the rise of militant groups.

Moreover, as indicated by UNAMA (the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) in its 2024 reports, the humanitarian disaster as a result of the conflict and Pakistan’s policy of forced expulsion of Afghan refugees has enormous socio-economic dimensions. The situation indicates that the conflict between the Taliban and Pakistan is no longer simply a political-military question, but a complex security, humanitarian, and regional crisis.
Context: From Fraternal Ties to Strategic Tensions

The relationship between the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani state cannot be described merely as two independent actors; since its inception in the 1990s, Pakistan has played a critical role in the Taliban’s emergence and ascendance. Banerjee’s PRIF report, highlighting that the Taliban emerged in 1994 during Afghanistan’s civil war. Islamabad, prioritizing “strategic depth” against India, welcomed the Taliban’s emergence and backed them financially, militarily, and politically within weeks.

The historical policy of Pakistan towards Afghanistan was based on two main principles: precluding Indian influence in Kabul, and advancing a friendly government in Kabul. For this reason, the Taliban were a tool of Pakistan’s ideology and geopolitics. Hakimi in Al Jazeera mentioned that in the 1990s, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan was central to the Taliban’s supply of equipment, training, and guidance.

However, this collaboration was based solely on transient interests. The report of PIPS (2023) indicates that once the Taliban were removed from power in 2001, Pakistan pursued a dual-policy approach, cooperating with the U.S. while covertly establishing networks of unwelcome support.

The primary point of rupture arose with the establishment of the TTP in 2007. The UN Security Council report (2025) indicates that, from Islamabads’s perspective, the TTP posed an explicit threat to the national security of Pakistan, and yet the Afghan Taliban refrained from taking action against the group because of ideological and ethnic ties. Following the Taliban seizure of power in 2021, Pakistan was left disappointed; the opportunity to normalize relations and bring security to Pakistan diminished as TTP attacks against Pakistan increased, with Islamabad regularly accusing the Taliban of supporting the TTP and providing them a safe haven.

According to Banerjee, the cross-border ethnic and religious relationship and the internal political calculus of the Taliban are the chief reasons why the Taliban refused to confront the TTP. The report from PIPS summarizes it well: the change in the nature of their relationship is not only consequential for the two countries, but also establishes the conditions for pervasive insecurity throughout the broader South Asia to Central Asia region.
Conflict of Interests: Held Hostage by Ideology and Geography

Although Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban appear to share historical, religious, and ethnic ties, the PIPS report (2024) states that in today’s political reality, their interests concerning the TTP are sharply opposed.
1. Pakistan’s View: The Nightmare of National Security

The resurgence of the TTP in Pakistan since 2022 is a sobering revival and distillation of a relevant past nightmare. According to the UN Security Council (2025) has documented that the TTP has conducted dozens of violence and violent attacks against military forces and government buildings and facilities, or stronger language might say that there has been dozens of violence and violent attacks, just unqualified language. The UN Security Council (2025) and Banerjee (2025) report that the TTP more than doubled attacks between 2022 and 2024, many of which were planned and conducted from Afghan soil. This has significantly reversed Pakistan’s “strategic depth” into its own instability, or even its own strategic stability into instability.
2. The Afghan Taliban’s View: Political Expediency in Silence

Ideologically speaking, there is much in common between the Afghan Taliban and the TTP. According to Banerjee, this ideological similarity, in conjunction with ethnic affinities and domestic political considerations, makes the Taliban reluctant to militarily engage the TTP. The UN Security Council (2025) report indicated that TTP members move freely and have found safe haven in parts of eastern Afghanistan.
Ramifications: Spreading Insecurity and Humanitarian Disaster

The conflict between the Taliban and Pakistan is far more than a bilateral crisis.
1. Instability along the Durand Line

Banerjee reports (2025) that cross-border exchanges of fire at locations such as Torkham and Spin Boldak have resulted in significant human casualties and economic losses. Such volatility has a direct impact on hundreds of thousands of civilians and has prevented a fast and efficient voluntary return process for refugees, according to 2024 UNHCR data.
2. Undermining Regional Counter-Terrorism Cooperation

As indicated in the PIPS report published in 2024, Pakistan’s two-timing policy has resulted in a diminishing trust among the various actors in the region. China, a key long-term partner which has invested billions of dollars into the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), is particularly worried about the spread of instability in and around the border areas. The International Crisis Group (ICG) cautioned in 2023 that the increased activity by Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) would pose a serious threat to China’s projects in the region.
3. Humanitarian Crisis and a New Wave of Migration

According to the UNAMA report of 2024, increasing border skirmishes and subsequent airstrikes between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the developing humanitarian crisis. Amnesty International also reported on Pakistan’s policy of forced and mass expulsion of Afghan refugees in 2024 has put over 1.5 million people at risk and is generating social and economic instability in the region.
Conclusion

The interests of the Afghan Taliban and Pakistan concerning the containment of the TTP represent a geopolitical hostage crisis with disastrous consequences at both domestic and regional levels. The rift between the two parties has lead to border areas that are unsecured areas where the militant attacks are being planned without any checks. This insecurity affects Pakistan directly, while threatening the stability of South and Southwest Asia.

The lack of counter-terrorism cooperation among neighbors and regional powers has enabled armed groups to thrive. To counter the spread of instability, states must develop transparent policies, enhance security and counter-terrorism cooperation, and coordinate humanitarian responses to protect civilian populations, otherwise a continued crisis at the border, increasing militant attacks and severe regional consequences will occur.

Farahnaz Amini

Farahnaz Amini is from Afghanistan she is a Master's student in International Relations at the University Islam International Indonesia (UIII). She holds a Bachelor's degree in Journalism from Balkh University. Her research interests include security and politics in South Asia, particularly Afghanistan, and the role of organizations in addressing gender-based violence. Her current study focuses on the political motivations of Pakistan and Iran and the economic consequences of mass refugee expulsions in the region.

Pakistan Losing Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: TTP Resurgence And The Taliban’s Revenge – Analysis

 

Members of Pakistan Taliban 'Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan' (TTP). Photo Credit: Tehran Times

 February 28, 2025  

By Aritra Banerjee

Pakistan’s long history of supporting jihadist groups as strategic assets has come full circle. The country is gradually losing its Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province to terrorism. 

The number of attacks on by the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has more than tripled between 2021 and 2024, according to the Jihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor. 

While Islamabad has sought to externalise blame, particularly towards Afghanistan and India, the reality is that TTP’s rise, fragmentation, and resurgence are primarily consequences of Pakistan’s own policies. From fostering militant proxies to botched counterterrorism efforts and failed negotiations, Islamabad’s miscalculations have enabled TTP to evolve into one of the country’s gravest security threats.

The Origins: Pakistan’s Hand in TTP’s Creation

TTP did not emerge in a vacuum. It was the inevitable result of Pakistan’s decades-long policy of nurturing jihadist groups, particularly the Afghan Taliban, to serve its geopolitical objectives in Afghanistan and Indian-administered Kashmir. Many of the militants who later formed TTP were trained in Pakistan’s religious seminaries and fought alongside the Afghan Taliban in the 1990s. Following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) became a sanctuary for Al-Qaeda, Afghan Taliban leaders, and their Pakistani jihadist allies.

The turning point came when Islamabad, under U.S. pressure, launched military operations in ex-FATA, disrupting this safe haven but alienating the very tribal networks it had long relied on. These operations were executed with heavy-handed tactics, displacing thousands and creating a deep sense of betrayal among Pashtun tribes. By 2007, TTP had officially formed under Baitullah Mehsud, uniting disparate militant factions against the Pakistani state—a direct consequence of Islamabad’s earlier tolerance of jihadist networks and its subsequent crackdown on them.

Failed Counterterrorism: A Cycle of Blunders

Pakistan’s counterterrorism efforts against TTP have been defined by inconsistency and short-sightedness. While major military operations like Zarb-e-Azb (2014) and Radd-ul-Fasaad (2017) significantly weakened TTP, they failed to eliminate the group entirely. Instead, TTP’s leadership and fighters found sanctuary across the Durand Line, where they regrouped under Afghan Taliban patronage. Islamabad’s reluctance to sever ties with the Afghan Taliban, even as they harbored TTP militants, reflects Pakistan’s strategic contradictions.

Furthermore, Pakistan’s reliance on brute force, including indiscriminate airstrikes and mass detentions, has deepened local grievances in ex-FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). The region remains politically and economically marginalised even after its merger with KP in 2018. The Pakistani military’s continued presence and allegations of human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings, have fueled resentment, providing TTP with fertile ground for recruitment.

The Taliban Factor: Pakistan’s Strategic Misfire

Islamabad’s support for the Afghan Taliban was premised on the expectation that a Taliban-led Afghanistan would curb TTP’s activities. This assumption proved disastrously flawed. When the Taliban seized Kabul in August 2021, they not only refused to act against TTP but also released hundreds of its operatives from Afghan prisons, further emboldening the group.

Despite Pakistan’s repeated requests, the Taliban have shown little inclination to rein in TTP, underscoring the limits of Islamabad’s influence. The Taliban’s ideological affinity with TTP and their unwillingness to recognise the Durand Line as a formal border only complicate Pakistan’s position. In reality, the Taliban’s victory reinvigorated TTP, inspiring a surge in terrorist attacks in Pakistan, which rose dramatically from an average of 14.5 attacks per month in 2020 to 45.8 in 2022.

Negotiating with Terror: Islamabad’s Strategic Folly

Pakistan’s repeated attempts to negotiate with TTP have only strengthened the group. Since 2004, Islamabad has signed at least nine peace agreements with TTP, each time granting the militants greater legitimacy and space to regroup. The latest round of negotiations in 2021—brokered by the Afghan Taliban—saw Pakistan release over 100 TTP prisoners in exchange for a short-lived ceasefire. TTP predictably violated the truce, resuming attacks and making unrealistic demands, including the imposition of Sharia law and the reversal of ex-FATA’s merger with KP.

By engaging in negotiations, Pakistan not only legitimised TTP but also revealed its own strategic weakness. The failure to impose clear red lines in talks further emboldened the group, signaling that Pakistan lacked the resolve for decisive action.

The Road Ahead: Reckoning with Past Mistakes

Pakistan’s TTP problem is not an external conspiracy; it is the product of decades of flawed policies. The state’s longstanding tolerance for jihadist groups, its failure to integrate ex-FATA, and its misplaced faith in the Afghan Taliban have all contributed to TTP’s resurgence.

If Pakistan is to defeat TTP, it must first abandon its selective approach to militancy. The state can no longer differentiate between “good” and “bad” jihadists. This means severing all ties with groups like the Afghan Taliban and taking decisive military and political action to neutralise TTP. Additionally, addressing governance failures in ex-FATA and KP—through legal reforms, economic development, and genuine political inclusion—is critical to undercutting TTP’s recruitment base.

For too long, Pakistan has sown the seeds of its own insurgency. If Islamabad continues to avoid reckoning with its past mistakes, the cycle of militancy will only persist, threatening the country’s internal stability for years to come.

Aritra Banerjee is a Defence, Foreign Affairs & Aerospace Journalist, Co-Author of the book 'The Indian Navy @75: Reminiscing the Voyage' and was the Co-Founder of Mission Victory India (MVI), a new-age military reforms think-tank. He has worked in TV, Print and Digital media, and has been a columnist writing on strategic affairs for national and international publications. His reporting career has seen him covering major Security and Aviation events in Europe and travelling across Kashmir conflict zones. Twitter: @Aritrabanned