OPINION

Africa’s billionaire boom masks a crisis for the many

The surge in African billionaires signals elite capture rather than economic progress, locking millions into poverty.

Tafi Mhaka
Al Jazeera columnist
Published On 1 Aug 2025

Prince Andrew, Duke of York speaks to Aliko Dangote during the London Global African Investment Summit at St James' Palace on December 1, 2015 in London, England [Anthony Devlin-WPA Pool/Getty Images]


On July 9, 2025, I was overwhelmed by a profound sense of despair and disappointment upon reading a report from Oxfam International, a globally recognised NGO, revealing that just four of Africa’s richest billionaires hold a combined wealth of $57.4bn. According to Oxfam, this figure exceeds the total wealth of approximately 750 million Africans, roughly half of the continent’s population.

Moreover, the top 5 percent of Africans now control nearly $4 trillion in wealth, more than double the combined assets of the remaining 95 percent.

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Gutted

Titled Africa’s Inequality Crisis and the Rise of the Super‑Rich, the report profiles the four wealthiest individuals on the continent. At number one is Aliko Dangote of Nigeria, estimated to be worth $23.3bn. Next is Johann Rupert and his family from South Africa, with about $14.2bn in wealth. Following them are Nicky Oppenheimer and his family, also South African, with a fortune of $10.2bn. Finally, Egyptian Nassef Sawiris holds approximately $9.4bn in net worth.

I find myself among the bottom 95 percent, the hopeful yet under‑resourced individuals who have laboured for modest incomes while yearning for socioeconomic transformation. At the dawn of the 21st century, in 2000, Africa had no billionaires. Today it is home to 23 billionaires, predominantly male, whose combined wealth has soared by 56 percent over the past five years, reaching an astounding $112.6bn.

Today, no two nations better illustrate Africa’s stark wealth disparity and oligarchic dominance than Nigeria and South Africa, and no business leader exemplifies the rise of crony capitalism on the continent more than Aliko Dangote.

Here is why.

Twenty‑five years ago, Dangote was simply an ambitious multimillionaire businessman. Then, on February 23, 1999, he made a substantial donation to General Olusegun Obasanjo’s presidential campaign. That seemingly benign investment proved decisive for his business trajectory.

A year later, the Obasanjo administration embarked on a sweeping privatisation of state‑owned enterprises, aiming to liberalise the economy, attract private investment and foster domestic entrepreneurship under the Backward Integration Policy (BIP). Dangote acquired Benue Cement in 2000 and Obajana Cement in 2002, laying the foundations for Dangote Cement, now Africa’s largest cement producer.

Between 2010 and 2015, Dangote Cement reportedly paid an effective tax rate of less than 1 percent on profits of approximately 1 trillion Nigerian naira (about $6bn at 2015 exchange rates). Dangote himself became Nigeria’s richest entrepreneur in 2007, attaining billionaire status amid the company’s rapid expansion.

Since then, the quid pro quo strategies between Dangote and the Obasanjo administration have become a conventional aspect of Nigerian politics and business, albeit a controversial one.

Critics argue that the BIP has stifled competition and fostered monopolistic practices in key sectors like sugar and cement, disproportionately benefitting politically connected elites – including Dangote – at the expense of smaller enterprises and ordinary Nigerians.

Nigeria is richly endowed with natural resources and possesses world-class human capital. Nevertheless, more than 112 million people, nearly half of Nigeria’s population, live in poverty, based on the most recent population estimates of around 227 million. At the same time, the country’s five wealthiest individuals, dominating sectors such as oil and gas, banking, telecommunications, and real estate, have amassed a combined fortune of $29.9bn.

The dysfunctional system that has enabled Nigeria’s “big five” entrepreneurs and fostered oligarchic patterns is not unique to Nigeria. South Africa, Africa’s most industrialised nation, confronts similar but distinct challenges in its post-apartheid era.

After apartheid ended on April 27, 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) introduced Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) and Broad-Based BEE initiatives (BBBEE). These policies aimed to advance the effective participation of Black people in the economy, achieve higher growth, increase employment and ensure fairer income distribution.

However, over time, the ANC itself acknowledged that these affirmative action programs have not appreciably benefitted most Black South Africans, especially Black women. In the 31 years since apartheid, economic conditions have only marginally improved. While a few Black business leaders have emerged, they continue to succeed within a system engineered to favour a narrow elite.

One such example is Patrice Motsepe, a mining magnate and among Africa’s richest individuals, with an estimated net worth of approximately $3bn. Supporters view him as a tangible beneficiary of post-apartheid economic transformation, but critics, including economist Moeletsi Mbeki, argue that his wealth reflects crony capitalism rather than broad-based entrepreneurship. Motsepe, who is also the brother-in-law of President Cyril Ramaphosa, remains a rare exception in a system marked by elite capture.

By April 2025, South Africa’s official unemployment rate stood at 32.9 percent, equating to about 8.2 million people actively seeking work, while the broader rate, including discouraged jobseekers, rose to 43.1 percent. Around the same time, approximately 34.3 million South Africans, or more than half the population, were living in poverty.

Meanwhile, the Oppenheimer family, whose immense fortune in diamond mining has deep historical roots tied to South Africa’s colonial past, continues to expand its wealth. A Harvard Growth Lab study published in November 2023 concluded that three decades after the end of apartheid, the economy is defined by stagnation and exclusion, and current strategies are not achieving inclusion and empowerment in practice.

Unsurprisingly, the most prominent beneficiaries of BEE initiatives have been ANC insiders and aligned business elites, including President Ramaphosa, former Gauteng Premier Tokyo Sexwale, Saki Macozoma, a former ANC MP, and Bridgette Radebe, sister to Motsepe and wife of ANC stalwart Jeff Radebe.

This distinct class of elites starkly contrasts with BEE’s intended beneficiaries, everyday South Africans. Instead, these individuals are grappling with the lingering consequences of oligarchic state capture, widespread corruption, poor service delivery, and sustained cuts to education and health budgets.

Nigeria shares this pattern. At the very least, Dangote’s vast wealth should represent the pinnacle of success in a thriving African economy. Instead, he exemplifies Africa’s most prominent and wealthiest oligarch, demonstrating how proximity to political power can create controversial paths to fortune. Regrettably, almost every African country has its own Dangote or Motsepe whose influence hinders fair and inclusive economic development.

Crony capitalism is a sharp break from free market ideals, where political connections override merit and innovation. This distortion breeds corruption, economic inefficiency and social inequality. It also weakens democratic norms by allowing private interests to gain excessive influence over public policy.

A 2015 study by Columbia University concluded that wealth accumulated by politically connected oligarchs has a strongly negative impact on economic growth, while the fortunes of unconnected billionaires have little effect. This finding suggests African economies could grow more rapidly if the enormous influence of politically connected elites was curtailed.

Now is the time for meaningful reform.

African nations must implement a wealth tax on high-net-worth individuals and direct the revenue towards essential services in impoverished areas.

According to Oxfam, a modest tax increase consisting of a 1 percent levy on wealth and a 10 percent income tax on the richest individuals could generate $66bn annually, equivalent to 2.29 percent of Africa’s gross domestic product, and help close critical funding gaps in education and electricity access.

Above all, African countries must adopt economic policies focused on equity to reduce poverty and improve wellbeing.

We, the neglected and disenfranchised 95 percent, stand against oligarchy.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance

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Tafi Mhaka
Al Jazeera columnist
Mhaka, a social and political commentator, has a BA Honours degree from the University of Cape Town

Africa has the capital. Now it needs the tools to fund its own development

Joseph Atta-Mensah
August 1st, 2025
LSE

Africa’s development financing gap is not just about money—it’s about missed opportunities. With billions in remittances, pension funds, and sovereign wealth, the continent has the capital. But, as Joseph Atta-Mensah writes, without the right tools, these resources remain underused.

Africa does not need to beg for development finance. It already has the capital. The continent generates wealth through vast natural endowments, growing institutional capital, and a vibrant diaspora.

Yet year after year, African governments struggle to meet their basic development financing needs, leaving health, education, climate, and infrastructure gaps unresolved.

The numbers are daunting. To achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030, Africa needs to mobilise an additional £148 billion annually. The continent also faces massive infrastructure deficits, requiring up to £134 billion annually to close gaps in energy, transport, and digital connectivity. The agricultural sector alone requires £41 billion each year for sustainable modernisation, while health, education, water, and clean energy collectively demand over £158 billion annually. Climate change adds another layer of urgency, with an estimated £2 trillion needed for adaptation and mitigation by 2030.

Trapped capital and misaligned systems

But here’s the paradox: the money is already in Africa. Remittances to Africa reached £71 billion in 2022. Since 2008, they have exceeded both foreign direct investment (FDI) and official development assistance (ODA). African pension funds hold assets worth an estimated £369 billion and are projected to grow to over £5 trillion by 2050. Sovereign wealth funds, currently estimated at between £95 and £104 billion, are also on the rise. Together, these sources represent nearly 15 per cent of Africa’s GDP, compared to 2 per cent of GDP for ODA and 1.7 per cent for FDI. Yet less than 3 per cent of African pension assets are invested in critical sectors like infrastructure. Much of the capital remains parked in low-yield assets abroad, not due to lack of intent but because domestic financial ecosystems are not designed to absorb it.

The absence of investable pipelines, weak regulatory safeguards, and high perceived risks deter investment at home. Africa’s fragmented financial systems, shallow capital markets, and limited credit enhancements make it easier for capital to leave the continent than to productively contribute to it.

Meanwhile, Africa loses an estimated £65 billion annually through illicit financial flows. These leakages—from trade mis-invoicing, tax evasion, and corruption—erode the very foundation of domestic resource mobilisation. The outflows drain public revenues, undermine economic sovereignty, and deprive governments of the resources needed for development.

A system that punishes the vulnerable

Africa’s economies face an unfair financial system where countries pay a risk premium of 100 to 260 basis points more than peers with similar fundamentals, making borrowing needlessly expensive. The result is a development model that depends heavily on external debt and aid—neither of which is reliable or sustainable.

Africa’s voice is often marginal in global financial institutions, where decisions are dominated by wealthier countries with greater voting power that reflect their financial contributions rather than the needs of those most affected. This leaves African countries with little influence over policies that directly affect their economies, and they are left to bear the brunt of their consequences.

The Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FFD4), which took place in Spain at the beginning of July 2025, was a missed opportunity for African leaders to rewrite the rules. Rather than seeking more aid or temporary relief, the continent must demand structural reforms to both domestic and global financing systems.

The tools to mobilise capital

Rather than asking for more aid or softer loans, African countries should demand structural changes that enable them to finance their own development. This means showing that Africa is ready with the vision, leadership, and financial muscle to chart its own path. The following strategic actions are recommended:

Formalise remittance flows to unlock investment potential: Governments should promote the use of formal channels for remittances by expanding digital financial services, lowering transaction costs, and improving financial inclusion. When remittances flow through banks and regulated platforms, recipients gain access to savings, credit, and investment products—turning personal transfers into tools for long-term economic development.

Leverage diaspora bonds and remittance securitisation: African countries should tap into diaspora savings by issuing well-structured diaspora bonds and securitising future remittance flows. Success requires transparency, sound governance, and clear communication to build trust. When aligned with national priorities, these instruments can channel stable, long-term capital into infrastructure and development projects.

Scale up blended finance to unlock institutional capital: To mobilise long-term capital from pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, and diaspora remittances, African governments must develop investable project pipelines and enabling policy environments. Blended finance platforms—such as public-private partnerships, guarantees, concessional loans, and first-loss capital—can reduce risk and attract private investment. These tools are especially vital for financing clean energy, sustainable mining, and blue economy initiatives. Africa’s rich biodiversity and carbon sinks can also generate revenue through high-integrity carbon markets and conservation finance.

Reform global and regional financial architecture to retain and direct capital: Africa must push for a fairer global financial system—one that reallocates Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), strengthens African development banks, and corrects credit rating biases. Regionally, bolstering institutions like the AfCFTA and deepening capital markets will help reduce currency risk, expand innovation, and build a foundation for self-financed development.

Strengthen domestic revenue systems and deepen capital markets: To fund its development from within, Africa must retain more of the wealth it already generates. This means modernising tax systems, closing loopholes, and curbing illicit financial flows that drain billions each year through mispricing, evasion, and corruption. At the same time, Africa must unlock more value from its natural assets—particularly through fair, transparent contracts and domestic value addition—ensuring resource revenues stay on the continent. Strengthening capital markets will also enable governments and businesses to access long-term finance domestically, reducing dependence on external debt.

The future is African, but only if Africa builds it

Africa’s future should not hinge on external goodwill or concessional aid. The capital is already here, flowing through remittances, embedded in sovereign funds, and held in pension reserves. What’s missing is the architecture to move it from potential to power. As global leaders gathered at FFD4, African policymakers should have shown that the continent is not merely waiting for solutions; it is ready to lead them.

Financing Africa’s development is not just possible. It’s necessary, urgent, and inevitable. The time has come for governments, financial institutions, and regional bodies to take ownership, build the tools, and align resources with Africa’s development priorities. The continent has the means. Now it must build the will.

Photo credit: Sue Thompson used with permission CC BY-ND 2.0



About the author

Joseph Atta-Mensah
Joseph Atta-Mensah is a Senior Fellow at the African Centre for Economic Transformation. Until his retirement in August 2023, he held several senior leadership positions, including Director roles, at the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. He previously served as a Senior Economist at the Bank of Canada. He holds a PhD in Financial Economics from Simon Fraser University, British Columbia, Canada.