December 14, 2025
EOS/DAWN
Illustration by Abro
The belief that history is a critical guide for predicting the future is facing a severe test. The enduring idea is best encapsulated by former British prime minister Winston Churchill’s 1944 observation: “The longer you can look back, the farther you can look forward.”
The Renaissance period thinker Niccolò Machiavelli argued that the people’s fundamental desires and behaviours remain unchanged across epochs, which is why a close study of past events can aid one to predict future political and social dynamics. The 19th century German ideologist Karl Marx famously noted that history repeats itself, “first as tragedy, then as farce.” The 20th century Spanish philosopher George Santayana warned that those who cannot remember mistakes of the past are condemned to repeat them.
While this concept remains a popular belief, its relevance as a reliable predictive tool has begun to struggle. This is driven by unprecedented shifts in geopolitics, technology and ecology, which are introducing challenges without direct historical parallels. For over a decade, many experts and political commentators have found their predictions consistently wrong. A major contributing factor is their heavy reliance on historical parallels to understand current events — a methodology that is proving insufficient for the new realities of the 21st century.
A powerful early example of this failure actually stretches back to the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The US failed to predict the revolution because CIA analysts could not accurately gauge the political traction of the religious leader Ayatollah Khomeini. The CIA’s analytical framework was largely based on studies of left wing revolutions, and those rooted in secular and nationalist movements since the French Revolution. The CIA lacked experts on the then-unique power of a new kind of radical religious movement that was emerging in Iran.
From Iran in 1979 to America in 2016 and Pakistan today, analysts continue reaching for historical parallels to predict the future. But these parallels no longer apply in a world being reshaped by new social, technological and geopolitical forces
The French philosopher Michel Foucault, however, observing the climate in Iran a year before the revolution, wrote extensively on an event that was challenging the Western understanding of revolutionary upheavals. It was a mass movement taking shape on the basis of religion; a phenomenon for which American analysts and the CIA could not find any suitable historical precedence. This led to flawed conclusions.
The failure to predict the game-changing 2016 US presidential election provides a powerful example of the limitations of relying on historical parallels in the 21st century. Before the election, most major political commentators ridiculed the idea of Donald Trump ever entering the White House. Their assessment was driven by historical precedents involving past charismatic American populists who ultimately failed to capture the presidency.
They compared Trump to figures whose popularity ultimately collapsed. These included the fiery governor of Louisiana Huey Long, who was a serious presidential contender but who became embroiled in political and financial scandals, before being assassinated in 1935.
Then there was the right-wing figure Barry Goldwater, who won the Republican nomination in 1964 but suffered a massive electoral defeat to Lyndon B. Johnson. Goldwater’s supporters mistook his regional popularity for national viability. There was also Ross Perot, dubbed “the billionaire populist”, who managed to secure nearly 19 million votes in the 1992 election but saw his support fade significantly in 1996, before his influence declined.
These were valid historical precedents of non-mainstream figures who failed to reach the White House. However, in 2016, these precedents did not account for the rapid, profound changes reshaping the American political landscape after the 2008 stock market crash.
The unique confluence of factors in the 2010s rendered old comparisons obsolete, marking the beginning of a new history that analysts failed to grasp. Intense distrust in mainstream politics following the 2008 economic crisis created fertile ground for an ‘anti-system’ candidate. ‘Cultural wars’ intensified and a more radical arm of the ‘new right’ began to gain significant traction among large sections of the American electorate.
Rapidly evolving digital technology was cleverly and effectively used, particularly by the radical right, to formulate new ways to construct perceptions of popularity and demonise opponents, bypassing traditional media gatekeepers. Analysts looked back, but the ground beneath them had moved, leading to flawed assessments and conclusions.
The tendency to rely on historical precedents remains particularly entrenched in Pakistani political analysis. This methodology has strongly influenced the discourse surrounding the political survival of former prime minister Imran Khan. Until the recent press conference by the DG ISPR, in which Khan was branded as “mentally unstable” and a “security threat”, only a few analysts or journalists were willing to predict Khan’s complete ouster from the country’s political scene.
The ‘predictions’ of Khan’s return were rooted in several historical assumptions about the power structure in Pakistan. These included the fact that the establishment has historically demonstrated a willingness to change its mind about opposed politicians, often ‘allowing’ them to return to power; and the perception that the establishment has never been as aggressively opposed to a leading politician hailing from Punjab than it has to non-Punjab politicians.
Conversely, Khan himself has consistently drawn upon the historical tragedy of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the former East Pakistani politician. Khan’s narrative suggests that the establishment’s refusal to allow Mujibur Rahman to assume power after his 1970 victory ultimately led to the breaking away of East Pakistan, implying similar dire consequences if his (Khan’s) ‘mandate’ is denied.
Despite the strong hold of these historical analogies on public discourse, current facts suggest that most of these precedents are struggling to remain relevant in the face of various new political realities. It is these realities that have fundamentally driven the creation of the current government in Pakistan and dictated the establishment’s current state of mind, making past dynamics a less reliable guide for the future.
The world is rapidly moving into unprecedented territory, necessitating political and state structures purpose-built to effectively address novel local and international challenges. The introduction of new technologies has compounded these challenges. Many of the new realities lack clear historical precedents. They are demanding innovative and unprecedented solutions rather than relying on past playbooks.
This line of thinking is being used to justify measures such as the controversial 27th Amendment to the Pakistani Constitution. The proponents of the amendment argue that it is a way to adapt to new internal and external realities. Critics of the amendment will continue to misfire, though, because their critiques are largely rooted in an understanding of politics that remains tied to historical precedents and traditional political norms that do not account for the unprecedented nature of contemporary challenges the state is facing.
The past remains essential for context but, in the 21st century, it has ceased to be the definitive teacher.
Published in Dawn, EOS, December 14th, 2025
Nadeem F. Paracha is a researcher and senior columnist for Dawn Newspaper and Dawn.com. He is also the author of ten books on the social and political history of Pakistan.
He tweets @NadeemfParacha
Illustration by Abro
The belief that history is a critical guide for predicting the future is facing a severe test. The enduring idea is best encapsulated by former British prime minister Winston Churchill’s 1944 observation: “The longer you can look back, the farther you can look forward.”
The Renaissance period thinker Niccolò Machiavelli argued that the people’s fundamental desires and behaviours remain unchanged across epochs, which is why a close study of past events can aid one to predict future political and social dynamics. The 19th century German ideologist Karl Marx famously noted that history repeats itself, “first as tragedy, then as farce.” The 20th century Spanish philosopher George Santayana warned that those who cannot remember mistakes of the past are condemned to repeat them.
While this concept remains a popular belief, its relevance as a reliable predictive tool has begun to struggle. This is driven by unprecedented shifts in geopolitics, technology and ecology, which are introducing challenges without direct historical parallels. For over a decade, many experts and political commentators have found their predictions consistently wrong. A major contributing factor is their heavy reliance on historical parallels to understand current events — a methodology that is proving insufficient for the new realities of the 21st century.
A powerful early example of this failure actually stretches back to the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The US failed to predict the revolution because CIA analysts could not accurately gauge the political traction of the religious leader Ayatollah Khomeini. The CIA’s analytical framework was largely based on studies of left wing revolutions, and those rooted in secular and nationalist movements since the French Revolution. The CIA lacked experts on the then-unique power of a new kind of radical religious movement that was emerging in Iran.
From Iran in 1979 to America in 2016 and Pakistan today, analysts continue reaching for historical parallels to predict the future. But these parallels no longer apply in a world being reshaped by new social, technological and geopolitical forces
The French philosopher Michel Foucault, however, observing the climate in Iran a year before the revolution, wrote extensively on an event that was challenging the Western understanding of revolutionary upheavals. It was a mass movement taking shape on the basis of religion; a phenomenon for which American analysts and the CIA could not find any suitable historical precedence. This led to flawed conclusions.
The failure to predict the game-changing 2016 US presidential election provides a powerful example of the limitations of relying on historical parallels in the 21st century. Before the election, most major political commentators ridiculed the idea of Donald Trump ever entering the White House. Their assessment was driven by historical precedents involving past charismatic American populists who ultimately failed to capture the presidency.
They compared Trump to figures whose popularity ultimately collapsed. These included the fiery governor of Louisiana Huey Long, who was a serious presidential contender but who became embroiled in political and financial scandals, before being assassinated in 1935.
Then there was the right-wing figure Barry Goldwater, who won the Republican nomination in 1964 but suffered a massive electoral defeat to Lyndon B. Johnson. Goldwater’s supporters mistook his regional popularity for national viability. There was also Ross Perot, dubbed “the billionaire populist”, who managed to secure nearly 19 million votes in the 1992 election but saw his support fade significantly in 1996, before his influence declined.
These were valid historical precedents of non-mainstream figures who failed to reach the White House. However, in 2016, these precedents did not account for the rapid, profound changes reshaping the American political landscape after the 2008 stock market crash.
The unique confluence of factors in the 2010s rendered old comparisons obsolete, marking the beginning of a new history that analysts failed to grasp. Intense distrust in mainstream politics following the 2008 economic crisis created fertile ground for an ‘anti-system’ candidate. ‘Cultural wars’ intensified and a more radical arm of the ‘new right’ began to gain significant traction among large sections of the American electorate.
Rapidly evolving digital technology was cleverly and effectively used, particularly by the radical right, to formulate new ways to construct perceptions of popularity and demonise opponents, bypassing traditional media gatekeepers. Analysts looked back, but the ground beneath them had moved, leading to flawed assessments and conclusions.
The tendency to rely on historical precedents remains particularly entrenched in Pakistani political analysis. This methodology has strongly influenced the discourse surrounding the political survival of former prime minister Imran Khan. Until the recent press conference by the DG ISPR, in which Khan was branded as “mentally unstable” and a “security threat”, only a few analysts or journalists were willing to predict Khan’s complete ouster from the country’s political scene.
The ‘predictions’ of Khan’s return were rooted in several historical assumptions about the power structure in Pakistan. These included the fact that the establishment has historically demonstrated a willingness to change its mind about opposed politicians, often ‘allowing’ them to return to power; and the perception that the establishment has never been as aggressively opposed to a leading politician hailing from Punjab than it has to non-Punjab politicians.
Conversely, Khan himself has consistently drawn upon the historical tragedy of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the former East Pakistani politician. Khan’s narrative suggests that the establishment’s refusal to allow Mujibur Rahman to assume power after his 1970 victory ultimately led to the breaking away of East Pakistan, implying similar dire consequences if his (Khan’s) ‘mandate’ is denied.
Despite the strong hold of these historical analogies on public discourse, current facts suggest that most of these precedents are struggling to remain relevant in the face of various new political realities. It is these realities that have fundamentally driven the creation of the current government in Pakistan and dictated the establishment’s current state of mind, making past dynamics a less reliable guide for the future.
The world is rapidly moving into unprecedented territory, necessitating political and state structures purpose-built to effectively address novel local and international challenges. The introduction of new technologies has compounded these challenges. Many of the new realities lack clear historical precedents. They are demanding innovative and unprecedented solutions rather than relying on past playbooks.
This line of thinking is being used to justify measures such as the controversial 27th Amendment to the Pakistani Constitution. The proponents of the amendment argue that it is a way to adapt to new internal and external realities. Critics of the amendment will continue to misfire, though, because their critiques are largely rooted in an understanding of politics that remains tied to historical precedents and traditional political norms that do not account for the unprecedented nature of contemporary challenges the state is facing.
The past remains essential for context but, in the 21st century, it has ceased to be the definitive teacher.
Published in Dawn, EOS, December 14th, 2025
Nadeem F. Paracha is a researcher and senior columnist for Dawn Newspaper and Dawn.com. He is also the author of ten books on the social and political history of Pakistan.
He tweets @NadeemfParacha
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