Opinion

Kurdistan region 2035: Hybrid gas-solar power at Iraq’s geopolitical crossroads

December 12, 2025 

Middle East Monitor

The Kawergosk Refinery is a major oil processing facility in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. [Photo by Reza/Getty Images]

by Dr Kamran Yeganegi

Introduction

The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) sits at a hard geopolitical junction. Baghdad seeks tighter federal control over energy, a trend reinforced by recent court rulings and budget mechanisms, according to Iraqi government statements and federal decisions. Turkey holds decisive leverage over northern export and transit routes, while Persian Gulf (also known as the Arabian Gulf) states increasingly project influence through clean-energy investment. In this environment, electricity does not behave as a neutral public service; it functions as leverage.

For years, the KRI’s power system has amplified political vulnerability. Gas shortages have repeatedly translated into power cuts, particularly during peak summer demand, according to data from Iraq’s Ministry of Electricity and parliamentary energy committee briefings. When supply tightens or rules change, households absorb the shock first, businesses follow, and political costs land on Erbil’s institutions.

A hybrid gas–solar strategy offers more than a green upgrade. By widening energy options, it can reduce exposure to external pressure. Solar generation can shave daytime peaks and lower fuel dependence, while modern gas capacity stabilises the grid after sunset. Paired with storage, smarter grid management and credible regulation, hybridisation allows the KRI to move from chronic crisis management toward energy resilience.

By 2035, the question is not whether the KRI will add renewables, but whether it can use hybridisation to rebalance relations with Baghdad, Ankara and Gulf investors. The coming decade will determine whether the region emerges as a more stable energy actor in northern Iraq or remains trapped between politics and power cuts.

Why energy has become the Kurdistan Region’s biggest political battlefield

Energy has become one of the most effective tools of pressure on the Kurdistan Region. What appears technical—generation, fuel supply or grid stability—often carries political intent. Control over electricity increasingly shapes budgets, negotiations and public trust.

Baghdad has steadily centralised energy governance. Court rulings against independent oil exports, tighter contract oversight and conditional budget transfers push Erbil toward compliance. Electricity plays a central role in this strategy. Federal authorities can tighten or relax support to the northern grid, turning kilowatts into bargaining chips. When supply falters, political costs fall not on Baghdad, but on households and businesses in the KRI.

Turkey reinforces this imbalance from the north. Ankara’s control over export corridors and its role in regional gas transit give it disproportionate influence over the KRI’s economic options, a reality highlighted in regional energy transit assessments. Cooperation enables flows and revenue; tension introduces delay and uncertainty. This asymmetry leaves Erbil dependent on a single route that both empowers and constrains it.

From the south, Gulf states enter through clean-energy diplomacy. Investments in solar, grid infrastructure and energy-transition projects project influence without troops or pipelines, as reflected in public investment announcements by Gulf energy firms operating in Iraq. This engagement brings opportunity but also competition, intersecting with Iran’s role as a gas supplier and layering Iraq’s energy system with rival geopolitical agendas.

In this triangular environment—Baghdad, Ankara and the Gulf—electricity ceases to be neutral. Gas shortages translate into political constraint, infrastructure weakness into negotiation disadvantage and public frustration into institutional risk. The KRI’s energy system does not merely respond to politics; it absorbs and amplifies it.

How the hybrid gas–solar model can rebalance power dynamics in the KRI

A hybrid gas–solar system alters the logic of dependence. It does not promise autonomy, but it reduces exposure to disruption and political constraint. Regional energy planning documents and publicly available policy assessments indicate that locally governed generation could significantly reduce exposure to politically induced supply disruptions.

Gas shortages have long exposed the KRI’s grid to disputes beyond Erbil’s control. Disruptions linked to federal infrastructure, contractual uncertainty or regional geopolitics quickly cascade into power cuts. Solar energy changes that equation. Locally generated electricity, governed within the region, limits the scope for external actors to manipulate supply during periods of tension. Even partial substitution reshapes risk.

Hybridisation also improves negotiation dynamics. When the grid relies less on single channels, pressure loses immediacy, a pattern noted in regional energy security assessments. Budget talks with Baghdad, transit discussions with Ankara and negotiations with Gulf investors all shift tone when electricity becomes more predictable. Diversification does not remove politics, but it reduces the cost of refusal.

Investor confidence follows resilience. A balanced energy mix signals institutional credibility and long-term planning. Hybrid infrastructure—paired with clearer regulation—can turn energy from a liability into a strategic asset that attracts capital rather than deters it.

The technologies enabling a hybrid energy future in the KRI

Hybrid energy only matters politically if technology delivers predictability and control. In the KRI, four elements determine whether hybridisation strengthens agency or remains symbolic.

Solar power provides the most immediate dividend. High irradiation allows rapid deployment and local governance of generation, according to regional energy planning assessments. Daytime solar output reduces peak pressure on gas-fired plants and lowers vulnerability to politically induced shortages.

Gas remains essential but redefined. Modern, flexible gas capacity stabilises the grid when solar output falls. When gas plants function as stabilisers rather than sole providers, their political sensitivity declines. The problem is not gas dependence itself, but exclusive dependence.

Storage marks the line between symbolism and strategy. It reduces evening shortages—the moments when public frustration peaks and political pressure escalates, as widely reported during recent summer power crises in northern Iraq. Batteries do not merely store electricity; they store stability.

Finally, grid management matters as much as generation. Smarter monitoring, forecasting and control improve reliability in a system strained by institutional fragmentation, limiting the space for crisis narratives that external actors can exploit.

Geopolitical implications of a hybrid energy architecture in the KRI

A more resilient energy system reshapes political relationships even when formal power structures remain unchanged. For Erbil, hybridisation does not resolve disputes with Baghdad, but it alters the context in which they unfold. Federal leverage increasingly operates through legal rulings, budget mechanisms and regulatory oversight, as reflected in public statements by Iraqi officials and federal court decisions.

Turkey’s influence also recalibrates. A region less reliant on energy exports to survive fiscally gains room to resist pressure when interests diverge. At the same time, electricity trade and grid cooperation shift the relationship toward conditional interdependence.

Iran’s position weakens more subtly. Gas exports have long provided Tehran with indirect influence over Iraq’s power system, a dynamic acknowledged by Iraqi officials and regional analysts. As solar generation and storage expand, exposure to supply fluctuations declines.

The Gulf states enter as quieter power brokers. Clean-energy investment allows them to shape infrastructure rather than rhetoric, diversifying the KRI’s partnerships while embedding it more deeply in regional competition.

Hybrid energy does not neutralise geopolitics; it redistributes it. By lowering vulnerability, the KRI gains agency. By widening partnerships, it complicates external constraint.

Conclusion

The Kurdistan Region of Iraq is approaching a decisive moment. Energy choices made today will shape grid stability, political leverage and social trust over the next decade. Hybrid gas–solar power represents less a technological fix than a strategic recalibration.

Hybridisation does not promise independence from Baghdad, Ankara or regional power politics. It offers something more practical: room to manoeuvre. By reducing exposure to fuel disruptions, transit pressure and single-channel dependency, the KRI can move from reactive crisis management to more predictable governance.

By 2035, the region will either consolidate a more resilient energy position that supports stability and integration, or remain vulnerable to power cuts that shape politics. Hybrid energy is not a panacea, but it provides the foundation upon which any credible future stability must rest.


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