India

Bulldozer is a Sign Hindutva is Flat

The author searches for meanings in the symbol of a bulldozer as they are unleashed on the streets of India to demolish all in their path.

Brahma Prakash
24 May 2022

Image Courtesy: Tribune India

Like my ideologue, John Berger, I keep looking for a figurative image to understand the art and ideology of our time. For some time now, I have been searching for a complex definition of Hindutva: Its possible grey areas. Its coated meanings. Its teeth hidden in the tongue and belly like a bulldozer itself. I was looking for a figurative image that captures its dynamite power. Its unbridled emotions. Its automobility. I looked for a body and machine that captured its muscle and movement. Its muscular politics.

I was trying to understand the electric power of Hindutva that makes the words viral and puts the body in a trance. Perhaps an installation work of Hindutva that instils the fear of aligning aesthetics and anaesthesia together. I was looking for an artefact. An object that has cultic and exhibitory values but can equally cut the body like the swords of the Ram Navami procession. I was looking for an image that brings artillery and artefact together. Music and terror together. Slogan and silence together. Fun and violence together. I was looking for a toy of Hindutva that steals the love and instils the violence in children’s minds, like the toy gun culture of the US empire. I was looking for the object that rolls all these things together in one bundle like a bulldozer itself.

The figurative image for the Hindutva that I have found is that of a bulldozer—moving and bulldozing. It was open, out there, in body and spirit, politics and procession, sign and sensation, mobs and automobility, manhood and machinehood. It is a device that becomes biopolitical as well as geopolitical in its domination. It moves to demolish; it moves to displace; it moves to dominate. It moves to decimate. It moves to dismiss any prospect of dialogue. It moves to move the earth where one stands. It moves to create a new site for the settlers at the expense of the livelihood of the others.

In India, the bulldozer does not remain a machine. It has become an artefact now. It has entered the popular psyche. There is a massive demand for bulldozers. People are offering it as wedding and birthday gifts. There is massive demand for bulldozer toys. A report says bulldozer pichkaris sold like cakes in Banaras during Holi. There are popular songs and music tracks dedicated to the device. The media is full of news and views of it. Leaders are trying to name themselves after it—bulldozer baba, bulldozer mama, brother bulldozer, and so on. Bulldozer is a new bull of Indian politics. In a medicine shop in Bihar, a young man was asking for a bulldozer (condom). I checked. In fact, there is a JCB condom. Its promotion says, “It restores the confidence and relieves you of the inferiority complex.” Clearly, the bulldozer is a sign of the insecurity of Hindutva masculinity.

FLATNESS OF HINDUTVA

I soon realised that Hindutva doesn’t hold complexity. It simply cannot. It is not interested in complex seeing. Perhaps we do not need a complex definition for Hindutva. Bulldozer is a sign that Hindutva is flat. It wants to excavate everything; the soil that nurtures the soul, the food that nourishes the body, and the home that gives us a sense of belonging. It wants to dig out everything. It plans to smoothen out history. It wants to cut down the raising hands. It wants to roll down the raising heads. It wants to make everything flat and transparent, going with the agenda of neo-liberal politics. For Hindutva, everything is an exhibition, from faith and religion to nationalism. It is a remarkable show of politics on a spectacular level. How will we know unless you show? It is a neo-liberal formation of Hinduism in destructive form. Some say the bulldozer brings development.

Of course, there is a difference between Hinduism and Hindutva. But not in the way the liberals want to show us; Hinduism is good, Hindutva is bad. The differences lie in the ways they disclose themselves. Hinduism maintains pretensions, Hindutva is flat. One is ceremonial, the other is a show. When it comes to caste hierarchy, let us be brutes; if Hinduism is cunning, Hindutva is crude. What Hinduism does with its’ accommodating ideology’, Hindutva does it by othering! What lower castes were to Hinduism, Muslims are to the Hindutva. One maintains its ideology through hegemony; the other wants to maintain it by brute force symbolised by the bulldozer. Hate remains the common, and so the hierarchy.

One cannot hide by saying Hindutva is dangerous for Hinduism. In fact, Hindutva has given a new lease of life to Hinduism, which was facing a crisis from its lower castes. Check the geography. Hinduism has expanded its territory. The expansion becomes only possible through the ideology of Hindutva. The Hindutva of today is the Hinduism of tomorrow. What we are facing is the normalisation of Hindutva ideology as Hinduism. Hindutva is a general manifestation of Hinduism in a neo-liberal regime. We can say that Hindutva is not an aberration. It is the religion in its true Sanatani sense.

One cannot hide by saying Hindutva is inspired by western ideology; it has its Indian roots too. Did we forget its history: how dissenters were punished, women were burnt, and Buddhism was crushed in its own land? What we are witnessing is new but not so new. Do we believe that the hatred we see today was made in seven or ten years? It has been accumulating for years and is outpouring now. It has found its opportune time and moment.

The bulldozer is a sign that Hindutva is flat! Made of iron, its heart is flattened, and its eyes are flattening. It sees nothing. It hears nothing. It wants to make everything flat. It believes in the uniformity of all. The most insidious thing Hindutva does with life and culture is make everything flat. It sees things in black and white—you are a Hindu or a Muslim. You are nationals or anti-nationals. You are with Us or against Us. Its art, rhetoric, epics and sculptures typically follow and fall on this line. It makes everything flat. Have you seen the Bollywood movie? The Kashmir Files? In the movie, politics falls flat, and so does difference, without addressing the gaps. See the sheer flatness of the Statue of Unity, the world’s tallest monument, standing in front of the Narmada; it is spectacular. It asks for the gaze but does not unveil. It does not gape. It remains straight. Nothing is better than a bulldozer to represent this art of Hindutva. Flat. Brute. Massive. A spectacular machine. It does not hide anything. It does not have revealing power. Flatness becomes its clarion call. The art of bulldozer has a flatness of aesthetics. It reminds us of futurism—the art of the fascists.

If Hinduism is represented by the figure of a Brahmin with a ponytail, Hindutva reminds me of the figure of Brahmarakshas. In many folk narratives, the figure is shown as a huge but mean figure. It is a scary figure with horns and tentacles on his head and a ponytail. He hangs upside down on a tree. Like a bulldozer, the figure has a swishing tail, carnivore teeth and sharp nails. Despite their differences, Brahmins, Brahmarakshas and bulldozers keep looking for sacrifices. Sometimes they capture the mind. Sometimes they rip apart the body; sometimes, they rip apart the land.

BULLDOZER, TOO, HAS A HISTORY

The deployment of bulldozers against the minorities might be new in India, but it has a long genocidal history. Before the bulldozer came into the world, ‘bulldozer’ was the term deployed to intimidate Black people in parts of the United States. Bulldozing was used to describe intimidation by violent and unlawful means. The lawlessness of the bulldozer is not new, nor is the violence inscribed in the term. In the United States of the 1870s, the term “bulldose” was used for administering a large and efficient dose of any medicine or punishment.

The first recorded use of the term goes back to 1876, when its meaning and chilling effect were there but not yet the machine. Ahead of the US presidential election of 1876, Black American voters were on the receiving end of severe beatings and lashings for participating in their rights in the form of “bulldose”—“a dose fit for a bull”. They would be thrashed, whipped and often lynched. “Many were bulldosed into silence,” writes Andy Hollandbeck in In a Word: The Racist Origins of ‘Bulldozer’. He also writes that bulldozing got a clear meaning, ‘to coerce or restrain by use of force’. The invention of the massive machine made the term more concrete. Bulldozer brought the figurative image of its powerful meaning: using brute force.

The arrival of the bulldozer in India is not a coincidence; it symbolises the ideology of the time. The bulldozer does not move much, but it marks the genocidal connection beyond geographical boundaries. It was there against the Blacks in the United States. It is there in China against the minorities. It is used in Palestine by Israeli authorities. It has been at the centre of indigenous and ethnic displacement across the world. In this regard, Pranay Samajula writes, “The fact that bulldozers have cropped up in both India and Israel as a chilling symbol of state repression itself is common to both cases: in both India and Israel, the far-right regimes that govern the two countries share a common vision of an ethnic-majoritarian apartheid state, and willing to go to extreme lengths to realise that vision.”

Long before the demolitions and displacements in Delhi and Madhya Pradesh, Israeli authorities deployed it against Palestinians in massive ways. The machine came, carrying legacy and meaning, and so did the chilling memories and effect. What is this connection between unknown territories? We are not sure if Indian authorities have learnt from white or Jewish supremacists, but their genocidal connection is clear. Their bulldozing connection is clear. So clear is its brutality of power and the flatness of its aesthetics.

Brahma Prakash is Assistant Professor of Theatre and Performance Studies at the School of Arts and Aesthetics, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. The views are personal.

SEE LA REVUE GAUCHE - Left Comment: Hinduism Is Fascism 

India: Is the ruling BJP's 'Hindutva' approach a civilizational principle?

The difference between Hinduism as a religion and Hindutva as a political ideology has been a topic of heated debate in India for years.



Since the BJP was re-elected to power in 2019, tensions between Hindus and Muslims have escalated

Election season is underway in five Indian states, and the big question is whether Prime Minister Narendra Modi's Bharatiya Janta Party's (BJP's) core Hindu nationalist agenda will continue to be well-received by the over 180 million eligible voters.

The defining credo of the BJP since 1989 has been "Hindutva," a political ideology that promotes the "values" of the Hindu religion as being the cornerstone of Indian society and culture.

The BJP's continuous reliance on an aggressive Hindutva plank has given it electoral success in the past. However, the BJP's political opponents say the party's ultra-nationalist rhetoric, based on Hindu nationalism, threatens to displace secularism as the foundation of India's constitution.

The politicization of the Hindu religion has also been combined by the BJP in recent years with more aggressive policies that India's Muslim community says treats them as second-class citizens.

Yogi Adityanath, a Hindu monk and chief minister of Uttar Pradesh, India's most populous state, has emerged as a poster child for the Hindu right-wing.

He recently described the election in the northern Indian state as an "80% versus 20%" contest, which roughly corresponds to Uttar Pradesh's Hindu and Muslim population proportion.
Hindu-Muslim tension in India

Since the BJP was again elected into power in 2019, tensions between Hindus and Muslims have escalated.

Watch video 02:34Uttar Pradesh candidate pushes anti-Muslim message

A citizenship law passed in 2019 called the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) fast-tracks citizenship of Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi and Christian immigrants from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh who arrived in India before 2015. However, critics say it excludes fast-tracking citizenship rights for Muslims.

In 2020, Muslim-majority neighborhoods in Delhi were the scene of violent riots that were set off by protests against the CAA. Mobs of mainly Hindu men targeted Muslim homes and businesses.

Two days of bloody violence left 53 dead, including both Hindus and Muslims, and more than 200 wounded.

More recently, a controversy over women wearing the Islamic headscarf "hijab" in schools and colleges has sparked tension and protest in southern India between Hindus and Muslims.

"The proliferation of anti-Muslim hate forms the architecture of Hindutva," rights activist Shabnam Hashmi told DW.

"Hate speech against Muslims in India has gained momentum, with several right-wing and Hindutva leaders calling for a Muslim 'genocide' with no response from the government," she said.

How intertwined are Hindutva and Hinduism?

Hindutva was first proposed as a political idea in 1928 in a pamphlet written by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar titled "Hindutva: Who is a Hindu?"

"Hinduism has many texts including the Vedas, the Puranas while Hindutva has one central political pamphlet," Congress lawmaker Shashi Tharoor wrote in a recent social media post.

The BJP says Hindutva is a vehicle for social development and governance.

UP Chief Minister Adityanath said at a recent BJP rally that "Hindutva and development are complementary to each other. Those who are opposing Hindutva are in fact opposing development and Indianness

Watch video 02:51 Controversy over hijab at India's educational institutions

Hindutva is 'not divisive'

However, Tom Vadakkan, a Christian member of the BJP from the southern Kerala state, said that there is room from pluralism in Hindutva, despite it being rooted in Hinduism as a religion.

"There should be no hair-splitting about Hinduism and Hindutva. They are conjoined, and a historical reality which is civilizational. We live in a pluralistic society and there is no attempt to impose the party's ideology on any denomination," he told DW.

"Hindutva does not mean divisive politics," he added.

Muslim BJP member Mukhtar Abbas Naqvi, a minister of minority rights in Modi's government, presented a different point of view, contending that Hindutva is not associated with religion but is rather a guiding civilizational principle.

"It is because of Hindutva that we talk about unity in diversity," said Naqvi during a heated television debate over Hindutva in December 2021.

Shazia Ilmi, a BJP spokesperson, told DW that Hindutva was being misinterpreted by the media and denied that the BJP discriminates against Muslims, adding that social development under the political ideology provides benefits for all of India's ethnic groups.

A major new Pew Research Center survey of religion across India, based on nearly 30,000 face-to-face interviews of adults conducted in 17 languages between late 2019 and early 2020, found that Indians of all religious backgrounds overwhelmingly say they are very free to practice their faiths.

K J Alphons, a BJP lawmaker and a former minister, told DW that sectarian strife in India should not be blamed on Hindutva politics.

"We are a huge country with nearly 1.4 billion people. Many of these incidents involving Muslims or Christians are economic in nature and not religious. These are isolated incidents and to see a conspiracy in such isolated incidents is unfair," he said.

SEE LA REVUE GAUCHE - Left Comment: Search results for HINDUISM IS FASCISM 

Modi Led Hindutva Politics: A Threat To Indian Citizenship – OpEd

 April 24, 2024 

By Bhabani Shankar Nayak

Mr. Narendra Damodardas Modi, serving as the 14th Prime Minister of India, has successfully completed two terms in office and is now seeking re-election for a third term in the forthcoming 18th Lok Sabha elections. Widely recognised as a prominent figure in Hindutva politics, Modi is often viewed as the face of a political ideology marked by division and animosity. Throughout his tenure, Modi has been disseminating misleading information to sway public opinion in his favour. One of the most contentious aspects of his leadership has been his portrayal of Indian Muslims as outsiders or “intruders.” This rhetoric not only underscores his divisive approach but also exacerbates religious tensions, leading to increased polarisation and communal strife in the country. Such divisive tactics not only undermine the unity of India but also pose a threat to its secular fabric and citizenship rights.

Modi’s policies and governance have often been evident for marginalising minorities, lower castes, and the working classes. This marginalisation can be traced back to the core principles of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which is deeply influenced by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), an organisation espousing a racist Eurocentric ideology. The RSS’s emphasis on cultural nationalism and its hierarchical view of society have shaped the BJP’s approach, leading to policies that often neglect the rights and welfare of marginalised communities.

Modi’s past remarks about Indian Muslims, first likening them to “puppies” and now branding them as “intruders,” offer a telling insight into the nature of Hindutva politics rather than merely reflecting on Modi’s personal beliefs. These comments indicate a troubling tendency to overlook and undermine the secular and inclusive principles that are at the heart of India’s Constitution.

Indian Muslims have been an integral part of the country’s fabric, actively participating in its democratic processes and contributing significantly to its growth and progress. They have made invaluable contributions across various fields such as social work, science, education, history, culture, religion, language, and literature. Their role in India’s anti-colonial struggles and nation-building efforts has been substantial, often involving sacrifices that have helped shape the nation’s identity, ethos and destiny. Hindutva political forces collaborated with British colonialism in their aim to create a Hindu Rashtra. In contrast, anti-colonial Muslim leaders not only participated and sacrificed their lives but also helped shape India’s secular and scientific ethos as a modern constitutional democracy.

By branding Indian Muslims as “intruders,” Mr. Modi not only undermines the sanctity of the Indian Constitution but also negates the rich tapestry of contributions that Muslims have made to India’s diverse heritage. Such rhetoric not only threatens to erode the concept of Indian citizenship but also perpetuates a divisive narrative that undermines national unity. Moreover, Modi’s statements are deeply offensive to all Indians who uphold the principles of equality, secularism, and the rights enshrined in the Constitution. Modi and his Hindutva forces send a message that contradicts the inclusive vision of India as a pluralistic society where every citizen, regardless of their religious or cultural background, has an equal stake and contribution to make in the deepening of Indian democracy. Muslims are as much shareholders of Indian democracy as any other citizens of India.

In essence, Mr. Modi’s remarks reflect a broader Hindutva challenge to India’s foundational values and principles. The Hindutva ideology is a foreign import that has intruded into the fabric of Indian politics, society, and culture. While claiming to represent authentic Indian values, its ethnonationalistic tendencies and focus on religious and ethnic identity have more in common with European ideologies than with India’s rich and diverse history, society, and culture. Rather than drawing from India’s pluralistic traditions and composite culture, Hindutva’s roots can be traced back to European concepts of ethnonationalism, religious nationalism and racialised democracy. This imported ideology of Hindutva politics has sought to redefine Indian pluralistic identity in narrow, exclusionary terms, often at the expense of religious and cultural minorities.

Historically, there are parallels between Hindutva and the ideologies that emerged in Europe during the early 20th century. One of the most striking comparisons can be drawn with Nazi Germany, where ethnonationalism and religious intolerance were central tenets of the regime. The ideology of Adolf Hitler, with its emphasis on racial purity, scapegoating of minorities, and use of fear and hatred to mobilise the masses, seems to provide a blueprint for Hindutva political practices in India. In both cases, fear and hatred are employed as powerful tools to manipulate public opinion and garner electoral support. The Hindutva ideology can be seen as a true intruder in Indian politics, society, and culture, drawing inspiration from European ethnonationalism rather than India’s own rich traditions. Its reliance on fear, hatred, and divisive tactics undermines the principles of secularism, pluralism, and unity that are integral to India’s democratic ethos.

By stoking communal tensions and promoting a divisive agenda, Hindutva politicians seek to consolidate their power base and rally support among certain segments of the population. This approach not only undermines India’s secular and democratic principles but also threatens to unravel the country’s social fabric by fostering mistrust and animosity among its diverse communities. It’s crucial to recognise that such divisive ideologies are antithetical to the pluralistic ethos that has been a hallmark of Indian civilisation for centuries. India’s strength lies in its diversity, and any attempt to impose a monolithic vision of identity runs counter to the country’s democratic values and inclusive heritage.

The tactics employed by Hindutva politics, including its anti-Muslim propaganda and diversionary strategies, serve multiple purposes for its proponents. First, these tactics serve to distract from the ideological shortcomings and lack of substantive policy achievements within the Hindutva framework. By focusing public attention on divisive issues and fostering communal tensions, Hindutva leaders like Mr Modi can deflect scrutiny from their governance failures and policy inadequacies. Secondly, by creating a climate of fear and suspicion, Hindutva politics seeks to consolidate its voter base by appealing to religious and ethnic identities. This strategy aims to rally support among certain segments of the population by portraying minorities, particularly Muslims, as the ‘other’ or as threats to national identity and security.

However, in the long run, such divisive politics by Hindutva forces have detrimental effects on both India and its people. Firstly, it undermines the social fabric of the country by fostering mistrust and animosity among its diverse communities. India’s strength has always been its pluralistic ethos, which celebrates its rich cultural, linguistic, and religious diversity. Hindutva’s divisive agenda threatens to erode this diversity by promoting a narrow and exclusionary vision of Indian identity. Secondly, the focus on divisive issues and religious polarisation detracts from addressing the real challenges facing the country, such as economic development, social inequality, and progressive governance reforms. By prioritising dominant identity politics over issues that affect the daily lives of ordinary citizens, Hindutva politics hampers India’s progress and development. Lastly, the international perception of India as a secular and democratic nation is also at risk due to Hindutva’s divisive agenda.

Therefore, Hindutva politics may offer short-term electoral gains by exploiting religious and ethnic divisions, its long-term consequences are detrimental to India’s unity, progress, and international standing. By prioritising divisive tactics over inclusive governance, Hindutva weakens the fabric of Indian society and undermines the democratic values that are integral to India’s identity. Mr. Modi’s bid for a third term is a continuation of his divisive Hindutva politics, characterised by misinformation, religious polarisation, and marginalisation of vulnerable groups. His leadership style and policies reflect the broader ideological framework of the BJP, influenced by the RSS’s racist Eurocentric worldview, which prioritises certain segments of society at the expense of others.

The 18th Lok Sabha elections in India present an opportunity to mend the fractured republic led by the Hindutva figurehead, Modi. The crisis facing Indian democracy under Hindutva politics highlights the urgent need for political transformation to uphold the principles of secularism and inclusivity that are fundamental to India’s democratic values. Instead of employing divisive tactics that marginalise communities based on religion or ethnicity, it’s crucial to nurture unity. It is time to defeat Modi, BJP, and RSS to steer India away from a destructive path politically, socially, culturally, religiously, and economically. Progress and prosperity in India depend on secular solidarity.

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Bhabani Shankar Nayak works as Professor of Business Management, 

Guildhall School of Business and Law, London Metropolitan University, UK.

HINDUTVA IS FASCISM

Modi accused of using hate speech for calling Muslims 'infiltrators'

Remarks by India's Prime Minister at a campaign rally on Sunday drew fierce criticism that he was peddling anti-Muslim tropes


The Associated Press
Krutika Pathi
Published Apr 23, 2024 •

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi listens to Bharatiya Janata Party President JP Nadda speak during an event organized to release their party's manifesto for the upcoming national parliamentary elections in New Delhi on April 14.

 PHOTO BY MANISH SWARUP /THE ASSOCIATED PRESS


NEW DELHI (AP) — India’s main opposition party accused Prime Minister Narendra Modi of using hate speech after he called Muslims “infiltrators” — some of his most incendiary rhetoric about the minority faith, days after the country began its weeks-long general election.

The remarks at a campaign rally Sunday drew fierce criticism that Modi was peddling anti-Muslim tropes. The Congress party filed a complaint Monday with the Election Commission of India, alleging he broke rules that bar candidates from engaging in any activity that aggravates religious tensions.

Critics of the prime minister — an avowed Hindu nationalist — say India’s tradition of diversity and secularism has come under attack since his Bharatiya Janata Party won power a decade ago. They accuse the party of fostering religious intolerance and sometimes even violence. The party denies the accusation and says its policies benefit all Indians.

At a rally in the state of Rajasthan, Modi said that when the Congress party was in government, “they said Muslims have the first right over the country’s resources.” If it returns to power, the party “will gather all your wealth and distribute it among those who have more children,” he said as the crowd applauded.

“They will distribute it among infiltrators,” he continued, saying, “Do you think your hard-earned money should be given to infiltrators?”

Mallikarjun Kharge, the Congress party’s president, described the prime minister’s comments as “hate speech,” and party spokesperson Abhishek Manu Singhvi called them “deeply, deeply objectionable.”

The party sought action from the election commission, whose code of conduct forbids candidates from appealing “to caste or communal feelings” to secure votes. The first votes were cast Friday in the six-week election, which Modi and his Hindu nationalist BJP are expected to win, according to most surveys. The results come out on June 4.

Asaduddin Owaidi, a Muslim lawmaker and president of the All India Majlis-e-Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen party, said on Sunday: “Since 2002 till this day, the only Modi guarantee has been to abuse Muslims and get votes.”

While there have long been tensions between India’s majority Hindu community and Muslims, rights groups say that attacks against minorities have become more brazen under Modi.

Muslims have been lynched by Hindu mobs over allegations of eating beef or smuggling cows, an animal considered holy to Hindus. Muslim businesses have been boycotted, their homes and businesses have been bulldozed, and places of worship set on fire. There have been open calls for their genocide.

Modi’s remarks referred to a 2006 statement by then-Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of the Congress party. Singh said that India’s lower castes, tribes, women and, “in particular the Muslim minority” deserved to share in the country’s development equally.

“They must have the first claim on resources,” Singh said. A day later, his office clarified that Singh was referring to all of the disadvantaged groups.

In its petition to the election commission, the Congress party said that Modi and the BJP have repeatedly used religion and religious symbols and sentiments in their election campaign with impunity. “These actions have been further bolstered by the commission’s inaction in penalizing the prime minister and the BJP for their blatant violations of electoral laws,” it said.

“In the history of India, no prime minister has lowered the dignity of his post as much as Modi has,” Kharge, Congress’ president, wrote on social media platform X.

The commission can issue warnings and suspend candidates for a certain amount of time over violations of the code of conduct.

“We decline comment,” a spokesperson for the commission told the Press Trust of India news agency on Monday.

In his speech, Modi also repeated a Hindu nationalist trope that Muslims were overtaking the Hindu population by having more children. Hindus make up 80% of India’s 1.4 billion people, while the country’s 200 million Muslims are 14%. Official data shows that fertility rates among Muslims have dropped the fastest among religious groups in recent decades, from 4.4 in 1992-93 to 2.3 between 2019-21, just higher than Hindus at 1.94.

Modi’s BJP has previously referred to Muslims as infiltrators and cast them as illegal migrants who crossed into India from Bangladesh and Pakistan. Several states run by the BJP have also made laws that restrict interfaith marriage, citing the unproven conspiracy theory of “love jihad,” which claims Muslim men use marriage to convert Hindu women.

Through it all, Modi has largely stayed silent, and critics say that has emboldened some of his most extreme supporters and enabled more hate speech against Muslims.

As ethnic violence rages on in Manipur, Indian government accused of looking the other way

NPR/PBS

Apr 23, 2024 

By —Zeba Warsi


Indian Prime Minister Modi hopes to secure a third term in elections now underway. He's promising voters a rising, united India. But in India’s northeast, a state is at war with itself. Hundreds are dead, tens of thousands displaced and the government is accused of looking the other way. Zeba Warsi reports with support from the Unity Productions Foundation. A warning, some details are disturbing.

Read the Full Transcript


Notice: Transcripts are machine and human generated and lightly edited for accuracy. They may contain errors.

Geoff Bennett:

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi hopes to secure a third term in elections that are now under way, his promise, a rising united India.

But, in India's northeast, a state is at war with itself. Hundreds are dead, tens of thousands are displaced, and the central government is accused of looking the other way.

Producer Zeba Warsi got rare access to the deeply divided state of Manipur.


And a warning:

Some details in her report are disturbing.


Zeba Warsi:

It feels like a militarized border between two warring countries. But it's a road between two districts in an Indian state.

Across 40 miles, we crossed a dozen checkpoints controlled by Indian security forces and civilian militias to reach the Christian minority stronghold Churachandpur.


Ichan Lunginlal, Churachandpur, India, Resident (through interpreter):

Our fathers and forefathers lived together in Manipur. But the ethnic conflict in Manipur has been so sudden.


Zeba Warsi:

Thirty-one-year-old Ichan Lunginlal is a Hindu from the majority Meitei Tribe who was married to Lalneo Lunginlal, a Christian of the minority Kuki tribe. They fell in love as teenagers. Their youngest daughter is 6-year-old Lamkholhing.


Ichan Lunginlal (through interpreter):

We could not spend even one day apart. It felt like a love straight out of a movie. It was difficult for us to spend any time away from each other.


Zeba Warsi:

They did not consider themselves star-crossed, but their love story ended when Manipur's fault lines cracked.


Ichan Lunginlal (through interpreter):

I spoke to him and asked, how is the situation right now? He responded and said the situation has become tense now. I could also hear his voice shaking, but he still consoled me and said: "Don't worry."


At around 11:

00 p.m. to 12:00 a.m., I received a call from my husband, and I could hear him shouting: "Ichan, Ichan, they have found me and they are going to kill me."


Zeba Warsi:

What began last may as a protest over political participation and state benefits turned into an armed conflict between two tribes and religions that engulfed the state in flames. Entire villages were razed and hundreds of churches burned.

The bulk of the dead and missing belong to the Christian Kuki minority, including Lalneo Lunginlal. He was last seen in this video with two other Christian Kuki men left to bleed on the street.


Ichan Lunginlal (through interpreter):

The mob killed my husband after brutally assaulting him like an animal. I don't think even animals are subject to such levels of violence.


Zeba Warsi:

At the wall of remembrance, Kukis display death, empty coffins in a line, one for every life lost.

This wall bears the human cost of this conflict. The Kuki community calls it state-sponsored ethnic cleansing, and they tell us each picture on this wall has its own story to tell.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi portrays India's future as strong and united. But Election Day in Manipur was marred by violence. The Hindu majority Meitei militia allegedly captured polling booths. They are heavily armed and throughout the conflict accused of killing with impunity.

Civil rights advocates accuse the state government run by Modi's Bharatiya Janata Party, or BJP, of protecting the perpetrators, and exploiting ethnic divisions.


Kim Gangte, Kuki Women’s Human Rights Network:

This is a war crime. This is ethnic cleansing. And, plus, this is a religious persecution.


Zeba Warsi:

Kim Gangte is a Kuki women rights activist who has documented sexual crimes.


Kim Gangte:

Most of our women who are there in the valley, they were being tortured. They were being raped. They were being killed.


Zeba Warsi:

In May last year, two Kuki women were paraded naked, beaten, and sexually assaulted by a mob of hundreds. One of them was allegedly gang-raped.


Kim Gangte:

We are very much Indian. We are very much the daughters and sons of India. We really wonder why the central government is still keeping silent.


Zeba Warsi:

Repeated requests for an interview with state government officials were ignored. After months of silence, Modi addressed the turmoil in Manipur only after the report of a gang-rape.


Narendra Modi, Indian Prime Minister (through interpreter):

In this country, in any corner of this country, in any state government rising above politics, law and order and respect for women is important. I want to assure the countrymen that no culprit will be spared.


Zeba Warsi:

But for the Christian Kuki community, that reassurance rings hollow. They no longer believe in living with the Hindu Meiteis. They want separate union territory, as we saw in the hillside town of Moreh.

Last year, this local economic hub was engulfed in flames. Today, it is heavily guarded by Indian armed forces and nearly inaccessible to anyone outside. After a six-hour wait at a security checkpoint, we were allowed to enter.


David Wapei, Kuki Student Organization:

The moment one community sees the other community, they want to kill each other.


Zeba Warsi:

David Wapei is a Kuki activist in Moreh. He says there is an invisible boundary between these hillside towns and the capital forged on hate.


David Wapei:

There's so much of divisions or mistrust between the two communities that the two communities cannot live together now.


Zeba Warsi:

But Manipur's violence is on both sides. During our visit, an angry Kuki mob set the police station on fire. And more Hindu majority Meiteis have been forced out of their homes and now live in camps restricted to a small corner of the state.


Hijam Kulajit, Imphal, India Resident (through interpreter):

On that day I couldn't take her to her private tutor, as I usually could, as there was pain in my eye. This thought haunts me to this day.


Zeba Warsi:

Hijam Kulajit, a Hindu Meitei, is still to bury his 17 year old daughter with dignity. She was last seen with a classmate after they were abducted by Kuki militias. After weeks of outrage and protests, the accused were arrested, but her body was never found.

Kulajit has made a shrine of memories of his daughter, who had big dreams.


Hijam Kulajit (through interpreter):

She had a cup with future she had a cup with "Future Doctor" written on it. She wanted to become a doctor to help the underprivileged.


Zeba Warsi:

The last drawing she made, the last book she read, her last Father's Day card bring pain, tears, and rage.


Hijam Kulajit (through interpreter):

Prime Minister Narendra Modi did not utter a single word about this case or the violence in Manipur all these month, even though the prime minister's so called slogan is save daughter, educate daughter. Will they be able to bring back my daughter?


Zeba Warsi:

There is no justice for a father who lost his daughter. And there is no closure for victims on both sides, who say they have been neglected.

For the "PBS NewsHour," I'm Zeba Warsi in Manipur, India.

—-

Neel Madhav, Omair Farooq and Alishan Jafri contributed to field producing this piece.

This reporting was supported by a grant from Unity Productions Foundation

Watch

Zeba Warsi  is a foreign affairs producer, based in Washington DC. She's a Columbia Journalism School graduate with an M.A. in Political journalism.

Fading pulse of democracy

Jawed Naqvi Published May 31, 2022

IF Hindutva is a vehicle for fascism, which it is, it must be a bit more than a mere communal ogre. Its other core objectives include women’s subjugation through patriarchy. It has an economic worldview with robust global support, including a fear of egalitarian politics and an alignment with neoliberalism. It seeks to free Brahminical hierarchy from the clutches of Ambdekar’s progressive constitution.

Hindutva thrives on prairie fires it sets — on hijab here, beef-eating there, Hindi versus Urdu, Babar here, Aurangzeb there. Let’s pause on Aurangzeb.

“Exalted son, I was much pleased with the ‘dali’ of mangoes sent by you to the old father. You have requested me to suggest names for the unknown mangoes. When you yourself are very clever, why do you give trouble to your old father? However, I have named them ‘Sudha-ras’ and Rasna-vilas’.” Think of Hindutva’s toxic Hindi-for-Hindus, Urdu-for-Muslims thesis.

The letter from Emperor Aurangzeb (1658-1707) to his son comes from a clutch of missives translated by J.H. Bilimoria from Ruka’at-i-Alamgiri. There is another collection of letters: Dastur-al-Amal Agahi. A ‘learned servant’ of Raja Aya Mal collected these under the raja’s orders from various sources after the emperor’s death.

There is an eye-raising advice to another son in one of the letters. Be watchful of the goings on in Gujarat. No, the advice has nothing to do with any Hindu-Muslim communal upsurge in Aurangzeb’s Gujarat.

On the contrary, the reference is to Maratha forces raiding the traders of Surat, looting Hindu and Muslim businessmen alike. The raiders used the booty in Shivaji’s fabled battles with Aurangzeb’s armies. The emperor dispatched his best generals to protect the merchants of Surat, regardless of their religious profiles, but the Marathas usually outfoxed them. Aurangzeb’s generals who led the campaign against Shivaji were often Hindu Rajput.

Hindutva’s key targets are the erstwhile outcastes, ancient targets from centuries before Aurangzeb’s forbears were born.

A great administrator and an unmitigated religious zealot, Aurangzeb was a bundle of contradictions. He forbade the public recitation of poetry but never ceased to quote verses from classic Persian poets in letters to his sons and others. He ordered the demolition of the temple in Mathura, which was built in the reign of his grandfather Jehangir. He destroyed a temple in Banaras, and these may not have been the only ones. It’s also well known that the puritan Aurangzeb had more Hindu generals and nobles in his camp than did his religiously eclectic elder brother Dara Shikoh.

So what do we do about Aurangzeb? How do we un-ring the bell of history? Should we disband the Anglican Church because it was founded by Henry VIII to commit adultery, nay, murder and adultery? Take Aurangzeb’s revenge on Indian Muslims 400 years after his miserable death? Yes, and no. Muslims too provide the traction Hindutva needs, and they have enough leaders in their fold to fall into the trap.

Hindutva’s key targets are the erstwhile outcastes, ancient targets from centuries before Aurangzeb’s forbears were born. A Dalit groom could be in trouble in modern India — even if the headlines are mostly about defending or opposing hijab, or the violent hypocrisy around beef-eating etc — if the groom as much as rides a horse to his wedding, deemed an upper caste privilege. Hindutva is about destroying the Nehruvian vision that has protected Muslims, Christians, Dalits, Sikhs, anyone from his long-feared majoritarian putsch now underway.

But Muslim leaders have gained from the polarisation. They sold priceless waqf land in Mumbai for a lark to a billionaire to build a gaudy skyscraper, but they couldn’t negotiate a peaceful settlement over a few square yards to save thousands of lives, and the country from Hindutva. A settlement would have taken the wind out of their adversary’s sails. But it would have also left a few Muslim lawyers with no brief to flaunt.

There’s no debating with Hindutva citing science or reason or modernity. Aurangzeb was not alone, friends say to Hindutva votaries with hope. ‘Hindu rulers demolished Hindu temples too.’ The answer is terse: ‘So what!’ Hindutva’s ranks are under orders to be muscular. So they click pictures of lynching hopelessly vulnerable folk. That the police provide cover helps.

Read: How to dismantle Hindutva?

The Quixotic lot will take on the ‘marauding Muslims’. On their part, Muslims plead pathetically that they stayed back with Nehru and they loved their country as much as he did. ‘Are you doing us a favour?’ Hindutva votaries are known to nip the enthusiasm in the bud. Indians lived in harmony, goes the liberal chorus. Hindus and Muslims celebrated each other’s festivals. Muslim shepherds discovered the Amarnath shrine in Kashmir. There are Hindu motifs in Muslim customs. The two share music and visit many shrines together. ‘So let’s stop it,’ commands the Hindutva ideologue imperviously. ‘Sickular’ is the word he uses for secular.

A court has handed sensitive documents of the survey of a mosque it ordered in Varanasi to Hindu petitioners, telling them not to make them public. We live in hope. If Hindutva leaders have made up their minds about an ancient deity being present in a mosque, suspend reason. Every court case, each TV debate shifts the focus from the wider canvas of Hindutva’s truer objectives. Can a law stall fascism? Let’s change the subject.

Atal Bihari Vajpayee quoted Ali Sardar Jafri’s poem in Lahore to kindle a short-lived hope for India-Pakistan amity, and thereby of relative harmony at home. “You come with the fragrance of the gardens of Lahore. We come with the light of a magical dawn in Banaras. Only to discover there’s no enemy to fight.”

Neither the desired amity nor the coveted harmony is nigh.

Jafri had more realistically described the endgame for Indian democracy, with its political pulse steadily fading away, with or without Aurangzeb as the ruse. “Kaam ab koi na aaega bas ik dil ke siva/ Raaste band hain sab kucha-i-qatil ke siva.” (Heed your heart that still beats as a friend/ All exits are closed except to a treacherous end.)

The writer is Dawn’s correspondent in Delhi.

jawednaqvi@gmail.com

Published in Dawn, May 31st, 2022

LA REVUE GAUCHE - Left Comment: Search results for HINDUISM IS FASCISM 

 

How India’s ‘Hindutva pop’ stars use music to target Muslims

Observers say the increasingly popular genre is triggering violence against Muslims, a minority already marginalized by Hindu nationalists with support from the BJP government.

Upendra Rana sings in one of his YouTube Videos labeled as part of the genre 'Hindutva pop.' YouTube screengrab

August 26, 2022

By 

Hanan Zaffar, Hamaad Habibulla

Sre

(RNS) — Upendra Rana, a singer-songwriter based in the north Indian state of Uttar Pradesh, started by performing at low-key events in and around his village of Rasulpur before launching his YouTube channel in 2019. Since then the unassuming, middle-aged Rana, whom one Indian publication described as dressed like a bank clerk, has amassed close to 400,000 followers, with some of his songs attracting millions of views.

His secret? Rana is a star in an incendiary genre referred to as “Hindutva pop” that paints Muslim Indians as villains who should move to Pakistan, India’s Muslim-majority neighbor.

In a video made last year, Rana is seen praising Yati Narsinghanand Saraswati, a powerful Hindu priest who openly calls for genocide of Muslims and creating an Islam-free India — in a song about the “resurgence” of a Hindu nation.

Rana is unapologetic about anti-Muslim hatred in his songs. “They (Muslims) can’t stand the truth,” he told Religion News Service. “They can say anything about our gods and expect us to be mum. Even then, we are not as violent as them.” 

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RELATED: How American couples’ ‘inter-Hindu’ marriages are changing the faith

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At the same time, he dismisses the idea that his songs are offensive. “I talk about the glorious Hindu kings of the past. Most of their opponents were Muslims. So, whenever I talk about them their opponents would be mentioned. So what’s the harm in that?” he asked.

But many observers say the increasingly popular genre, which emerged after the Bharatiya Janata Party won national elections in 2014, is triggering violence against Muslims, a minority already marginalized by Hindu nationalists with support from the BJP government.

Abhay Kumar, a journalist and activist in New Delhi, believes that Hindutva pop is sponsored by the nationalist government itself. “These songs have led to increased polarization of masses and helped in creating an atmosphere of fear for minorities. Such an atmosphere is beneficial for a few political parties in the country for their electoral gains,” he said.

Sending Muslims to Pakistan is a prominent theme. “Muslalmano ke do sthan, ya Pakistan, ya Qabristan,” goes one popular song — “Muslims deserve only two places, either Pakistan or the graveyard.”

But the threat of Hindutva pop goes beyond taunts and suggestions Muslims don’t belong in India. “These songs have become a precursor to violence against us,” said Amjad Khan, a resident of Khargone, in central India, who watched as a mob whipped up by Hindutva music attacked a Muslim neighborhood there during Muslim-Hindu clashes in April.

Across the “cow belt” — the north and central regions of the country known for their strong tilt toward Hindu conservatism — Hindutva pop has become the soundtrack for anti-Muslim attacks, observers say.

“In many parts where riots took place,” said Aasif Mujtaba, an activist with the Miles2Smile Foundation, which helps rehabilitate those affected by mass violence, “one thing that we found common was that these extremely provocative songs were being played on loudspeakers to mobilize people.”

Pushpak Raja, a creator of Hindutva pop from the central Indian state of Bihar, explains that his mission is to “further the agenda” of India’s ruling Hindu nationalist party. 

He has produced songs supporting government measures such as ending the autonomy of the disputed Muslim-majority region of Kashmir in 2019 and the building of a temple to the Hindu god Ram on the site of a demolished 16th-century mosque in Uttar Pradesh.

“I sing about issues that I feel affect the unity of my nation. If someone is eyeing at our nation with wrong intentions, I sing about it,” said Raja.

“The people who consider this land as their mother would always like my songs,” he added.

Umesh Kumar Rana (no relation to Upendra Rana) is another Hindutva pop artist who has found fame. His interest in music was triggered, he said, when his parents taught him to sing Hindu devotional songs when he was growing up in Uttar Pradesh. But the demand for Hindutva pop convinced him to shift his focus a couple of years ago to sing mostly about “Thakur” pride.

Thakurs are a powerful Hindu community who are traditionally considered “warriors” in India’s caste system.  

Unlike many of his counterparts, he doesn’t invest in building his YouTube audience. Instead he records on small music labels. Like other Hindutva singers, Kumar believes Muslims have gotten more than their share in the country, and it is important now to talk about the “Hindu” pride.

“We have roads and streets named after (Muslims),” he said. “People sing praises about Muslim medieval rulers, but our Hindu kings are demeaned and downplayed. I am trying to change that with my songs.”

The audience for singers like Rana like both the sound and the message. “I listen to the songs of Upendra Rana bhaiya (brother) and others, as I like them,” Rajesh Mishra, a teenager from the Meerut, in Uttar Pradesh, told RNS. “They are not only fast-paced, the kind of music I like, but also teach us about Hinduism and nationalism.” 

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RELATED: Dispute over mosque becomes religious flashpoint in India

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Mishra said many of his friends have started listening to the genre over the last couple of years.

“It is like learning while listening to music,” Mishra said. “We are being made aware about our history, so why should it bother anyone?”

This article is produced by Religion News Service with support from the Guru Krupa Foundation.

OPINION
Everything That's Wrong With Rewriting History Under Hindutva Nationalism

The BJP, with its insistence on the purity of Hindu Rashtra, would sadly reduce the soaring generosity of their founding vision to the petty bigotry of majoritarian chauvinism.

Mahābhāratakālīna Bhāratavarshācā nakāśā: A map showing place names

 in associated with the Mahābhārāt 

Photo: Getty Images

In all the debates about the ruling establishment’s resurrection of history as an instrument of its majoritarian politics, many of us are guilty of not looking beyond the Hindutvavadis’ obvious political misuse of the past to further their interests in the present. In fact, history plays a profoundly important role in the Hindutva conception of Indian nationalism, and it is worth delving into its ideological underpinnings to understand its present significance.

The concept of nationalism arose around the world, as I pointed out in my book The Battle of Belonging, when the absolute power of the traditional ruler became untenable in more complex societies, and power began to be diffused. At that stage, people began to relate to each other by identifiable and unchanging common features that could be considered the attributes of a nation—a political entity broadly understood to be united by a defined geography, ethnicity, language, religion, and culture, common (and idealised) heroes, and a shared identity and sense of community for all its constituent people.

Indian nationalists fighting the British Raj quickly seized on this, and Hindutva ideologues went farther; in keeping with the race doctrines of the times, Savarkar in the 1920s conceived Hindutva as an indefinable quality inherent in the Hindu ‘race’, which could not be identified directly with the specific tenets of Hinduism. To him, the religion was therefore a subset of the political idea, rather than synonymous with it—something many of its proponents today would be surprised to hear. Despite this distinction, Hindutva would help achieve the political consolidation of the Hindu people, since Savarkar also argued that a Muslim or a Christian, even if born in India, could not claim allegiance to the three essentials of Hindutva: ‘a common nation (rashtra), a common race (jati) and a common civilisation (sanskriti), as represented in a common history, common heroes, a common literature, a common art, a common law and a common jurisprudence, common fairs and festivals, rites and rituals, ceremonies and sacraments’. Hindus, defined as possessing these common values and practices, constituted the Indian nation—a nation that had existed since antiquity, since Savarkar was explicitly rejecting the British view that Indian nationhood was a creation of the foreign imperium.

Rightwing idealogues RSS icons Vinayak Savarkar (left), and M.S. Golwalkar

Savarkar’s vision of Hindutva saw it as the underlying principle of a ‘Hindu Rashtra’ that extended across the Indian subcontinent, and was rooted in an undivided India bounded by the mountains and the seas (‘Akhand Bharat‘) corresponding to the territorial aspirations of ancient dynasties like the Mauryas (321 BCE–185 BCE), who under Chandragupta and Ashoka, had managed to knit most of the subcontinent under their control. In the words of a later RSS publication, Sri Guruji, the Man and his Mission, ‘It became evident that Hindus were the nation in Bharat and that Hindutva was Rashtriyatva [nationalism].’

For Savarkar, Hinduness was synonymous with Indianness, properly understood. Savarkar’s idea of Hindutva was expansive: ‘Hindutva is not a word but a history. Not only the spiritual or religious history of our people as at times it is mistaken to be by being confounded with the other cognate term Hinduism, but a history in full.... Hindutva embraces all the departments of thought and activity of the whole Being of our Hindu race.’ In turn, the Hindu ‘race’ was inextricably bound to the idea of the nation. As Savarkar put it, ‘We Hindus are bound together not only by the tie of the love we bear to a common fatherland and by the common blood that courses through our veins and keeps our hearts throbbing and our affections warm, but also by the tie of the common homage we pay to our great civilisation—our Hindu culture.’

However, his idea of Hindutva excluded those whose ancestors came from elsewhere or whose holy lands lay outside India—thereby eliminating Muslim and Christians, India’s two most significant minorities, from his frame of reference. What their place would be in Savarkar’s construction of the nation was not made explicitly clear, but the best they could hope for was a sort of second-class citizenship in which they could live in India only on sufferance.

Portrait of India Christians pray during Easter in Guwahati | Photo: Getty Images

This logic was taken even further by M. S. Golwalkar, the sarsanghchalak or head of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) for three decades (1940–1973), who supplanted Savarkar as the principal ideologue of Hindu nationalism, notably in his 1939 screed We or Our Nationhood Defined and in the anthology of his writings and speeches, Bunch of Thoughts. Golwalkar made it clear in his writings that India was the holy land of the Hindus alone. He writes: ‘Hindusthan is the land of the Hindus and is the terra firma for the Hindu nation alone to flourish upon….’ According to him, India was a pristine Hindu country in ancient times, a place of unparalleled glory destroyed in successive assaults by foreign invaders. He felt that a ‘national regeneration’ was necessary.

The final construction of Hindutva ideology came from Deen Dayal Upadhyay, President of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh and author of Integral Humanism, who argued that India could and should contribute to the world ‘in consonance with our culture and traditions’. That culture and those traditions were, of course, Hindu. In India, ‘there exists only one culture….There are no separate cultures here for Muslims and Christians.’ Every community, therefore, including Muslims and Christians, ‘must identify themselves with the age-long national cultural stream that was Hindu culture in this country’. His logic was that ‘unless all people become part of the same cultural stream, national unity or integration is impossible. If we want to preserve Indian nationalism, this is the only way’. To him, ‘the national cultural stream would continue to remain one and those who cannot identify themselves with it would not be considered nationals’.

To Upadhyaya, the national culture to which he was referring had to be Hindu; it explicitly could not be Muslim. ‘Mecca, Medina, Hassan and Hussain, Sohrab and Rustom and Bulbul may be very significant in their own ways but they do not form a part of Indian national life and stream of Indian culture. How can those who are emotionally associated with these and look upon [the] Rama and Krishna tradition as alien be described as nationals? We see that the moment anybody embraces Islam, an effort is made to cut him off from the entire tradition of this country and connect him to the alien tradition.’

Portrait of India Muslims offer prayers at the shrine of Moinuddin Chisti in Ajmer. | Photo: Getty Images

Muslims, said Upadhyaya, even related differently to India’s past: ‘Some events involve triumph, some our humiliation. The memories of our glorious deeds make us proud; ignominies make us hang our heads in shame.’ But Hindus saw such historical events differently from Muslims. ‘Aggressions by Mohammed Ghori or Mahmood Ghazni naturally fill us with agony. We develop a feeling of attachment to Prithviraj [Chauhan] and other patriots. If instead, any person feels pride for the aggressors and no love for the Motherland, he can lay no claim to patriotism. The memory of Rana Pratap, Chhatrapati Shivaji or Guru Gobind Singh makes us bow down our heads with respect and devotion. On the other hand, the names of Aurangzeb, Alauddin, Clive or Dalhousie, fill us with anger that is natural towards foreign aggressors.’ Only Hindu society, Upadhyaya underscored, felt this way about its heroes, supporting Rana Pratap over Akbar; therefore there was really no ground for doubt that Indian nationalism is Hindu nationalism.
Upadhyaya’s Conclusion Was Blunt: The Muslims Sought ‘To Destroy The Values Of Indian Culture, Its Ideals, National Heroes, Traditions, Places Of Devotion And Worship’.

Upadhyaya’s conclusion was blunt: the Muslims sought ‘to destroy the values of Indian culture, its ideals, national heroes, traditions, places of devotion and worship’, and therefore ‘can never become an indivisible part of this country’. In Upadhyaya’s vision, the inherent consciousness of unity, identical ties of history and tradition, relations of affinity between the land and the people and shared aspirations and hopes, made Hindustan a nation of Hindus. ‘We shall have to concede that our nationality is none other than Hindu nationality. If any outsider comes into this country he shall have to move in step and adjust himself with Hindu nationality.’

But Upadhyaya did not adopt his mentor Golwalkar’s ideas about dealing with India’s Muslims as Hitler had dealt with the Jews. ‘No sensible man will say that six crores of Muslims should be eradicated or thrown out of India,’ he admitted in an article titled ‘Akhand Bharat: Objectives and Means’. ‘[B]ut then they will have to identify themselves completely with Indian life.’ Muslims had to be accommodated within the Indian reality, but on what basis? ‘This unity…can be established only among homogeneous cultures, not among the contrary ones. A preparation of various cereals and pulses mixed together can be prepared: but if sand particles find their way into it, the whole food is spoilt,’ he explained. The way to eliminate these ‘sand particles’ was to ‘purify’ or ‘nationalise Muslims’—to ‘make Muslims proper Indians’. The Congress-led nationalist movement had wrongly tried to forge Hindu–Muslim unity against the British, but ‘unless all people become part of the same cultural stream, national unity or integration is impossible.… A situation will have to be created in which political aspirations of Islam in India will be rooted out. Then and then alone can a longing for cultural unity take root.’

Portrait of India A mural in Delhi depicting a Hindu saint offering prayers. | Photo: Getty Images

The critics of Hindu Rashtra, Upadhyaya argued, found that the term was inexpedient for them in the country’s competitive politics: they were afraid of losing millions of Christian and Muslim voters. Their misconception was that the use of the term excluded Muslim and Christian communities. If both these communities became one with the national cultural mainstream—without any change in their modes of worship—they would be welcome in the new India. All they had to do was to own up to the ancient traditions of India, to look upon Hindu national heroes as their national heroes, and to develop devotion for Bharat Mata. Then they would be fully accepted as nationals of the Hindu India that he envisioned.

In the Hindutva-centred view, history is made of religion-based binaries, in which all Muslim rulers are evil and all Hindus are valiant resisters, embodiments of incipient Hindu nationalism. The Hindut­vavadis believe, in historian Audrey Trus­chke’s words, ‘that India was subjected to repeated defeats over the centuries, including by generations of Muslim conquerors that enfeebled the people and their land. The belief…that Muslim invaders destroyed their culture, religion, and homeland is neither a continuous historical memory nor is it based on accurate records of the past. But… many in India feel injured by the Indo-Muslim past, and their sentiments [are] often undergirded by modern anti-Muslim sentiments.’ As K. N. Panikkar has stated, liberal and tolerant rulers such as Ashoka, Akbar, Jai Singh, Shahu Maharaj, and Wajid Ali Shah do not figure in Hindutva’s list of national heroes. (Indeed, where many nationalist historians extolled Akbar as the liberal, tolerant counterpart to the Islamist Aurangzeb, Hindutvavadis have begun to attack him too, principally because he was Muslim, and like most medieval monarchs of both faiths, killed princes who stood in his way, many of whom happened to be Hindu.)  

 

Heroes and ‘villains’ (Clockwise from top left) Akbar, Maharana Pratap, Bahadur Shah Zafar and Shivaji.

Communal history continues past the era of Islamic rule. Among those Indians who revolted against the British, Bahadur Shah, Zinat Mahal, Maulavi Ahmadullah, and General Bakht Khan, all Muslims, are conspicuous by their absence from Hindutva histories. Syncretic traditions such as the Bhakti movement, and universalist rel­igious reformers like Rammohan Roy and Keshub Chandra Sen, do not receive much attention either. What does is the uncritical veneration of ‘Hindu heroes’ like Maharana Pratap (portrayed now in Rajasthani textbooks as the victor of the Battle of Haldighati against Akbar, which begs the question why Akbar and not he ruled the country for the following three decades) and Chhatrapati Shivaji, the intrepid and courageous Maratha warrior, whose battles against the Mughals have now replaced accounts of Mughal kings in Maharashtra’s textbooks. (The educational system is the chosen battlefield for the Hindutva warriors, and curriculum revision their preferred weapon.)

This is the context in which the current Hindutva campaigns, from textbook revision to challenging mosques built on the ruins of temples, must be understood. Between the ‘civic nationalist’ notion of Indian diversity (which Salman Rushdie celebrated as ‘mongrelisation’) and the Hindutvavadi’s insistence on ‘authentic’ Indian culture—narrowly interpreted, and uncontaminated by colonial influence or “Ganga–Jamuni” hybridity—there lies a chasm. Our nationalist movement and its leaders created a nation built on an ideal of pluralism and freedom: we have given passports to their dreams. This should have been the principal theme of the 75th anniversary of our independence that we celebrate in a few weeks’ time. The BJP, with its insistence on the purity of Hindu Rashtra, would sadly red­uce the soaring generosity of their founding vision to the petty bigotry of majo­ritarian chauvinism.

(This appeared in the print edition as "History and Hindutva Nationalism")

(Views expressed are personal)

Shashi Tharoor is a politician and author

LA REVUE GAUCHE - Left Comment: Hinduism Is Fascism: Modern Hinduism is fascism and racism. It is the origin of what we would call modern Fascism. Based on a religious caste system that is Aryan