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Saturday, November 23, 2024

Trump, Trumpism, and the Polycrisis

By Jeremy Brecher
November 22, 2024
Source: Strike!


Image via Strike!/Jeremy Brecher


“Polycrisis” is a word that has recently come into use to characterize the way crises in many different spheres – ranging from geopolitics and economics to climate and pandemic – are aggravating each other and even converging. Trump and Trumpism, like similar leaders and movements around the world, took off in the era of polycrisis and reflect many of its themes. They are also likely to severely aggravate the dynamics of the polycrisis.

Although Trump and Trumpism are deeply rooted in American history, they are also an aspect of the emerging era now widely referred to as the global polycrisis. The polycrisis shaped many of the conditions that promoted the rise of Trumpism. Trumpism, in turn, echoes many of the themes of the polycrisis. Trump’s actions will go out not into a peaceful world order, but into a world order in polycrisis, where the effects of almost any actions are difficult to predict. And his actions are likely to significantly aggravate the polycrisis, in particular making it more violent, unpredictable, and folly-ridden.

Trump and Trumpism must be understood in the context of the polycrisis. In his address to the 2024 Republican National Convention, Donald Trump said,


We have an inflation crisis that is making life unaffordable, ravaging the incomes of working and low-income families, and crushing, just simply crushing our people like never before. They’ve never seen anything like it.

We also have an illegal immigration crisis, and it’s taking place right now, as we sit here in this beautiful arena. It’s a massive invasion at our southern border that has spread misery, crime, poverty, disease, and destruction to communities all across our land. Nobody’s ever seen anything like it.

Then there is an international crisis, the likes of which the world has seldom been part of. Nobody can believe what’s happening. War is now raging in Europe and the Middle East, a growing specter of conflict hangs over Taiwan, Korea, the Philippines, and all of Asia, and our planet is teetering on the edge of World War III, and this will be a war like no other war because of weaponry. The weapons are no longer army tanks going back and forth, shooting at each other. These weapons are obliteration.[1]

Trump’s description of the world is like a distorting funhouse mirror reflection of reality – the reality of the polycrisis. However fallacious his interpretations and proposals, terrifying threats are a reality in the era of polycrisis.

In reality, inflation has ravaged the incomes of working and low-income families, and the recent inflation is only one manifestation of an out-of-control global economy that has been crushing people since the Great Recession of 2007. In reality, millions of people have been driven from their homes around the world by war, globalization, and climate change. In reality, misery, poverty, disease, and destruction to communities has in fact been occurring, not as a result of immigration, but of the dismantling of public programs that reduce poverty, disease, and destruction. War is indeed raging in Europe and the Middle East, and a growing specter of conflict does hang over Taiwan, Korea, the Philippines, and all of Asia. Our planet is indeed teetering on the edge of World War III, and that would indeed mean “obliteration.” That is the reality of the polycrisis.

Trump’s claims that he and he alone can fix the problems he describes would be laughable if they weren’t so dangerous. But the real reality is as scary as the one he portrays. It is little wonder that millions of ordinary people are suffering from anger, fear, and pain. They are reacting to reality.

The era that preceded the polycrisis, roughly from the fall of the Soviet Union to the Great Recession, was marked by unilateral global hegemony by the United States. It was marked by a neoliberal globalization which imposed unregulated corporate power on every country and institution. It saw political power determined by elections in most countries, however unequal those elections may have been. And it saw governments and corporations at least shadowboxing against the threat of climate change.

This relatively stable if unjust world order has been transformed into the polycrisis. Unipolar US hegemony has been replaced by multiplying wars, the rise of Great Power conflict, and the decline of international cooperation inside and outside the UN. It has also been marked by fragmentation of the global economy and Great Power struggle to dominate what are still global economic networks. International climate protection has become a transparent sham, and major political forces, including the soon-to-be leader of the world’s most powerful country, deny the reality of climate change. The remaining institutions of democratic rule have been shredded by a transition to transparent plutocracy on the one hand and the rise of movements, parties, and national leaders who resemble the classic fascists who rose a century ago – similarly the product of burgeoning global disorder.

The past dozen years have witnessed the rise of movements in dozens of countries that resemble the classic fascism of 1920-1945. They manifest smashing of democratic institutions, contempt for constitutions and laws, utilization of violence for political purposes, scapegoating of racial, ethnic, gender, political, and other minorities, hostility to transnational cooperation, authoritarian dictatorship, and a variety of related characteristics. To include the many manifestations of this phenomenon, rather than exclusively those who proclaim themselves fascists, I refer to it as the new “para-fascism.”

Donald Trump is a paragon of this new para-fascism. His rise to power has coincided with that of para-fascists around the world. In Europe these include Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy; the Law and Justice Party in Poland; Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz in Hungary; ruling coalitions in Sweden and Finland; Marine Le Pen’s National Rally; Geert Wilders’ Freedom Party; and Alternative Fur Deutschland, among others. In South America similar parties control or share governmental power in Uruguay, Argentina, and until recently in Brazil. In Asia, India’s government under Modi and the Philippines under Duterte and Marcos, Russia under Putin, Turkey under Erdogan, and Israel under Netanyahu have become increasingly para-fascist. China has moved to an expanded nationalism and an authoritarian recentralization of power, though it differs in many ways from other para-fascisms.

Para-fascism – and notably Trumpism — is a child of the polycrisis. The Great Recession, while not the cause of the polycrisis, can serve as a convenient marker for its emergence; as Philippine scholar and activist Waldon Bello noted, the “buildup of fascist movements and parties didn’t start till 2011, i.e. post-Great Recession.” The polycrisis helped make possible the rise of Trump and other para-fascist leaders. They in turn reflected, echoed, and even incorporated many features of the polycrisis:The polycrisis embodies the breakdown of international cooperation and the rise of national conflict. Trumpism is characterized by hatred of globalism and celebration of ethno-nationalism.
The polycrisis is a period of declining US hegemony, Great Power conflict, and war. Trump’s overriding theme, “Make America Great Again,” is a direct response to this reality.
The polycrisis is marked by the emerging conflict between the rising power of China and the relatively declining power of the US – sometimes referred to as an example of the “Thucydides trap.” The demonization of China and the attack against Chinese development has been a central theme of Trump’s approach to international affairs – one echoed by President Joe Biden during the Trump “interregnum.”
The polycrisis represents a transition from globalization’s global economic integration to Great Power battles to control global economic networks. Trump’s pugilistic economic nationalism represents both a reflection and an intensification of this trend.
The polycrisis has seen the decline of democracy and the breakdown of limits on plutocracy. Trump puts this tendency on steroids with his outright attacks on democratic institutions and his transformation of plutocracy into kleptocracy – aka politics by theft.
The polycrisis has seen a near total failure to restrain the climate destruction that is no longer just a threat but an everyday reality. Trump not only denies the reality of climate change but aims to do everything in his power to aggravate it through expanded fossil fuel extraction and burning.

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Notwithstanding his claims to fix the threats people are facing, Trump in power will only aggravate the polycrisis. The rubbishing of safeguards provided by democratic governance will amplify irrational policymaking and exacerbate popular feelings of powerlessness and alienation. Outlandish increases in military spending, designed to implement the fantasy of renewed US global domination, will lead instead to ruinous nuclear and conventional arms races. Trump’s style of provocation, deliberate unpredictability, and unrestrained folly will lead to intensified conflict, strange shifts in alliances, deliberately aggravated chaos, and wars. His energy policies will put climate catastrophe on steroids. This exacerbated polycrisis will produce a self-amplifying feedback loop that will increase the fear and anger that are prime sources – and prime resources — of Trumpism.

[1] “Read the transcript of Donald J. Trump’s Convention Speech,” New York Times, July 19, 2024. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/19/us/politics/trump-rnc-speech-transcript.html



Jeremy Brecher is a historian, author, and co-founder of the Labor Network for Sustainability. He has been active in peace, labor, environmental, and other social movements for more than half a century. Brecher is the author of more than a dozen books on labor and social movements, including Strike! and Global Village or Global Pillage and the winner of five regional Emmy awards for his documentary movie work.



Life With and After Trump

November 21, 2024
Source: Originally published by Z. Feel free to share widely.





How does one take seriously having a vaccine denier in charge of public health? How about having the world’s richest corporate owner in charge of cutting regulatory agencies? Or having the other foxes in the henhouse, much less Oval office-ing the degenerate ringmaster himself? I would guess all who read this article feel outrage and horror, but also more than a little scared.

Do you go to bed at night or get up in the morning with thoughts, fears, and dread that you want to jettison? Turn off the news. Turn it off. Turn it off. Enough already. Set aside the articles. Stop the flow. Netflix calls. A novel beckons for attention. Go for a walk, get some fresh air. Maybe have a drink or ten. Perhaps throw a fit, or maybe just snarl a lot.

I get all that. And I am not going to tell you that going to meetings or attending them online, reading or writing calls to action, thinking about what to do and how to do it, and urging friends, neighbors, workmates, and family to join you in it will banish the nightmares and bring on only joyous dreams. To fight the power can certainly have inspiring, energizing, and joyous moments, but it will also have plenty of frustrations, strains, drains, and flat out boring moments. It is, however, the only thing that can lead to better days.

In that context, as dreadful as things may now feel, as immobilizing as Trump’s barbarity may feel, the current humane, radical, and/or revolutionary task is to block near-term Trumpian successes while preparing to pursue longer term positive campaigns and agendas. Why? Five reasons. To prevent continued and new Trump-inspired damage at home and abroad.To show that Trump is beatable. He is not someone to start supporting or to double down in support of. Don’t do it. He is someone to usher into ignominy.To prevent structural changes we would have to later roll back.To develop vision we truly desire and means to win it, not just to survive.To contribute to and, yes, to enjoy emergent hope and community.

Trump’s appointments aim to establish a police state. Please read that again. That is our immediate setting. It is not rhetoric. It is not hyperbole. His appointments will seek to trash democracy and participation and increase corporate control. They will try to normalize my-way-or-the-highway rule. Trump’s appointments are not only unqualified and even anti-qualified, they are also shock and awe provocations. They are bludgeons to rob our initiative, but despite their weirdness, each is also smartly attuned to Trump’s perverse, homicIdal aims.

Trump himself is simultaneously a nightmare and a sick joke. As a wannabe dictator, he seeks dominance. As a degenerate clown, he caterwauls toward history’s garbage bin. Which persona will predominate?

As Trump tries to dramatically change society from its horrendously flawed present into a drastically worse future, I believe more than enough people will extricate from his lies, see through his false promises, and overcome their understandable fear and depression to resist both Trump and his appointees. Enough people will resist his border, deportation, spying, coercing, impoverishing, repressing, sickness-inducing, militaristic, misogynistic, racist, and corporatist agendas to scuttle his aims.

Indeed, resistance is already surfacing. But resistance doesn’t automatically succeed. To win, resistance must become a persistent, continuous and unified force. It must attract and retain steadily more public participation. It must manifest increasingly more mutual aid and solidarity. It must raise social costs that elites do not wish to meet. Is that possible? And is it possible before Trump solidifies his support and transforms institutions to his specifications?

Most of Trump’s voters mainly supported what they thought was a positive possibility that he would shake things up so that they might benefit. They wanted change and rightly thought he would cause change. He successfully deflected their realizing it would be change for the worse.

Trump’s voters also secondarily supported prospects of his overcoming problems that don’t exist or fears that are greatly exaggerated but which he will only make worse. And finally, some of Trump’s voters thought he would protect old ways of living against new disorienting trends.

So how do we raise social costs for Trump and more for elites that support or simply put up with his aims?

If we uncompromisingly reach out to many of Trump’s voters while we (and Trump’s own actions) reveal Trump’s true aims and do so while Trump is restrained by fierce resistance, many and we should hope even most of his voters will reject what they come to see as Trump’s negative effects.

On the other hand, if we do not reach out to Trump’s voters and if we do not block Trump in coming months then even his weakly supportive voters will see Trump pull off one programmatic step after another, each of which he will celebrate as serving their interests, as freeing them, and as punishing their enemies, and in that case their tenuous support for him may become deeper and more intense. People who voted for him but voted down ballot for the likes of AOC or for reproductive rights or for a higher minimum wage, or who voted for Trump but would have preferred to vote for the likes of Bernie Sanders, may fall deeper and more intensely in thrall to him. To prevent that is essential.

Activism to block Trump’s agenda needs to welcome and to provide supportive opportunities for participation and leadership to voters for Harris as well as to non voters and indeed to anyone who is already horrified by the specter of a Trump-defined future but who lacks prior experience of active dissent and is thus not already plugged in. Activism should welcome all, but offer suitably different strokes for different folks.

We can’t stop Trump much less move on to win positive change without greater numbers. True enough, you might agree, but you may nonetheless have doubts about succeeding. And I get that things look grim, but does anyone need that point repeated over and over again? To say it will be hard to block Trump and to reverse MAGA and to finally fully rebut fascism’s morbidity is true. But to say that it won’t happen, or at any rate that it won’t happen for years and years, is self-fulfilling unwarranted defeatism. We have to face facts, yes, but not spin them into worse than they are. Defeatism feeds fascism.

Okay, you may feel, but why is defeatism unwarranted? Trump won a big battle. True, but we won many progressive referendums for increased minimum wages, reproductive rights, labor gains, and other progressive results, including in red states. Still, Trump will forever claim a mandate, and will certainly try to parlay his actually narrow electoral victory of between 1% and 2% into some immediate Trumpist gains.

He will try to bludgeon or shock passive acceptance. He will point to whatever early reactionary Trumpian gains he manages to enact to try to galvanize support for more reactionary steps. If in response we move quietly aside or we even jeer in righteous anger while we predict our own coming defeat, we will indeed be defeated.

To resist Trump’s every effort, to start to reverse them and to tirelessly tatter his aura of invulnerability, to reduce rather than ratify people’s fear of him, and to interrupt and then hack away at his level of support and build sufficient active unified resistance to finally replace him is all mandatory. And it will happen. But how fast it will happen, which includes with how little human and social loss along the way, will depend mainly on two things.

First, Trump’s overreach and rate of personal unravelling, and second the pace with which resistance spreads, becomes wholistic rather than atomistic, and reaches out to inspire ever wider activist rejection of Trump’s agenda.

That sounds nice, you might think, but is it real? What about the people who voted Democrat? And beyond them, what about the Democratic Party itself? Won’t they be a dead weight of passive resignation? Or won’t they, however well meaning, drag growing opposition to Trump into Democratic Party let’s get back to business as usual-ism? Will we prevent full blown fascism but return to from where fascism emerged?

Just as Trump’s voters are not peas in a pod, so too for Harris’s voters. Some Harris voters will abstain from resisting Trump, perhaps too comfortable, too scared, too convinced it is futile, or sometimes maybe even donning a red hat. Some will resist Trump but with the express intention of returning to fondly remembered business as usual. Some will begin to resist, including people at higher and higher levels of income and influence, but only the more they feel that Trump’s actions are generating resistance that may come for them next. Not praiseworthy, but relevant. And already happening.

Some will want to return to pre-Trump stability but also to enact some serious and meaningful gains for various constituencies and even regarding sustainability for all of humanity. That is also already happening. It’s praiseworthy but not fundamental. And some will want to move past all of that to prepare the way to win fundamentally new economic, political, and social relations. That is praiseworthy and fundamental, but very far from predominant.

How many people will move toward which new posture will not depend exclusively on peoples’ genes or even their personalities. Nor will it depend only on their incomes or their social identities. It will depend somewhat on all of that but also, and crucially, more on what they encounter in coming weeks and months, including on our words and the scope and effectivity of our resistance, and how welcoming our efforts are to new participants.

The Democratic Party will of course reject fundamental change, and for the most part it will even reject meaningful gains whenever it feels they might expand beyond meaningful to fundamental. The avalanche of essays, interviews, and talks that have recently railed at today’s Democratic Party as an agent of oppressive hierarchy and injustice are correct. It is.

Then again, such observations have been correct even in just my own experience, ever since the mid 1960s. And have been correct from still earlier, way earlier, for people even older. I tend to wonder, therefore, when I read such observations, especially in progressive and seriously leftist venues, who are they written for? Once or twice, as a kind of gentle here’s what we all know reminder, I might understand. But over and over in such venues, as if only the author knows? As if it is some kind of newly discovered wisdom? It seems to me that the people who read those essays in progressive outlets already know what they are being told. So what is the editorial point?

The real world truth is that a very large component of resistance to Trump is going to come from organizations and also spontaneous projects with considerable history and even deep roots in Democratic Party activities. If this is not the case, our prospects for preventing full-on fascism will be insufficient. So rather than disparaging such efforts, it seems to me that to try to discern, describe, and debate what to do next along with but not literally melting into such efforts will be more helpful.

When some left writers seem to carelessly dismiss every elected or appointed Democrat much less every voter for Harris as abettors of genocide, misogyny, racism, and corporate domination, they are wrong in the same way as when some left writers seem to carelessly write off all of Trump’s voters as lunatic fascists. These narratives not only ridicule and reject people who are needed for resistance to win, but even people who are already hell bent on resisting.

So, yes, the Democratic Party is part of the repressive, oppressive society that has spawned Trump, produced Trump’s voters’ warranted alienation and anger, and also manipulated and distorted some of the perceptions of Trump’s and indeed of all voters. So of course we don’t want to swear allegiance to the Democratic Party. We even want to keep it in our minds and not forget that it is, as a whole, very much not our ally, but the opposite. But, at the same time, to prevent Trump implementing gain after gain and increasing his support by himself touting his every gain will depend in large part on how many Harris voters resist and, indeed, on how many Democratic Party affiliated actors and organizations resist.

But in that case, a question arises. As we fight to reveal and reject Trump, what do we who aren’t about returning to business as usual seek instead? What do we desire for life after Trump? Is it premature to even ask? After all, we know we have to remove Trump before we can construct better than what we had before Trump.

Indeed, this was one of the costs of a Trump victory. If Harris had won we would now be able to fight for positive and even fundamental change toward a much better future. With Trump having won, we have to first fight against vicious negative fundamental changes that would impose a much worse future. It is also true that on the road to life after Trump Republican majorities in the Senate and House will need to be erased. And then Republican ownership of the White House will need to be erased as well. That is another price of Harris losing. But that isn’t our final goal. Of course not.

It is true, however, that to work to remove Trump can tend toward, can welcome, and can even celebrate and enforce business, government, culture, and households as they were before Trump—or it can begin to inspire desires for and even develop means to win gains toward implementing gains that go fundamentally beyond yesterday’s normal. For that matter, the wherewithal to resist fascism will thrive better if it is fueled and oriented by positive desires for more than restoring the conditions and circumstances that earlier led us toward fascism. We all know that, don’t we? We all know that getting back to everything being broken for us but working fine to serve power and wealth is not our ultimate aim, don’t we?

But if the whole goal isn’t only for the Democrats to win midterm elections in two years so the House and Senate become Democrat dominated, and only for Democrats to win the Presidency in four years so a Democratic Administration replaces Trump (or Vance), then what do we want? If those interim steps are important but not defining, then what do we want for life after Trump?

My answer is, I want Life After Capitalism, After Misogyny, After Racism, After War, After Ecological Denial. What’s your answer? But I am not delusional. We are not going to do all that in four years. What we can do, however, while we stop Trump, is to also think through our aims and methods and begin to implement new approaches able to keep going forward after Trump, even as they are also essential to defeating Trump.

Sanders, AOC, Michael Reich, maybe even Gavin Newsom, and plenty of others whose work I don’t know are saying something halfway similar. They are saying that they in the Democratic Party need to jettison the practices and commitments that their Party has been emphasizing for decades. Those folks are not revolutionaries the way I, for example, prefer. But the odd thing is that they do appear to be self critical of their team. They are saying they have failed. But they are not saying they give up, Trump wins. They are not saying to Trump, go ahead and trample everything. They are not saying they will just try to survive until Trumpism runs out of energy.

No, they are saying that they are not only going to fight, they are going to change their ways, or at least try to. They are going to try to reach out more widely and more aggressively to people who work and not to people who own workplaces, or in some cases, those who boss those who obey. Okay, I won’t belabor that some of them, yes, some of them in the Democratic Party, even if saddled by not yet fully rejecting such basics as private ownership and patriarchy, are sincerely taking stock and seeking to change their ways. But I will merely say that we need that and should welcome that, and not ridicule it and them, and call it mere manipulation.

And I will add, can’t we do as much regarding our team? Our movements? Our organizations? To blame Harris, Democrats, mainstream media, social media, widespread ignorance, rampant apathy, malignant cynicism, all past American history, and even in some degree the whole population is all true enough. It may even be an important part of usefully understanding our emerging context. But what about our own faults? What about the problems we have, within our team.

There is going to be resistance. A whole lot of resistance. What are some things we might want to consider about how our resistance unfolds? Maybe that growing in size and scope and not in verbosity or outrage is the primary measure of success. Maybe that each perspective welcomed as part of the whole needs to respect and welcome and even support and nurture and certainly not rail at and reject every other perspective welcomed as part of the whole. Maybe that to tell ourselves things we already know is not near as important as to find ways to constructively communicate with those who we don’t know and don’t yet agree with. Maybe that to raise social costs for elites is our only road to success and for that it needs to be all willing hands on deck, in turn reaching for unwilling hands too.


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Michael Albert`s radicalization occurred during the 1960s. His political involvements, starting then and continuing to the present, have ranged from local, regional, and national organizing projects and campaigns to co-founding South End Press, Z Magazine, the Z Media Institute, and ZNet, and to working on all these projects, writing for various publications and publishers, giving public talks, etc. His personal interests, outside the political realm, focus on general science reading (with an emphasis on physics, math, and matters of evolution and cognitive science), computers, mystery and thriller/adventure novels, sea kayaking, and the more sedentary but no less challenging game of GO. Albert is the author of 21 books which include: No Bosses: A New Economy for a Better World; Fanfare for the Future; Remembering Tomorrow; Realizing Hope; and Parecon: Life After Capitalism. Michael is currently host of the podcast Revolution Z and is a Friend of ZNetwork.



Thursday, June 27, 2024

Dynamics of the Polycrisis


By Jeremy Brecher
Senior Strategic Advisor, LNS Co-Founder
June 26, 202
Source: STRIKE!



Listen to the audio version >>

“Polycrisis” is a word that has recently come into use to characterize the way crises in many different spheres – ranging from geopolitics and economics to climate and pandemic – are aggravating each other and even converging. This commentary, the second in a series on “The Polycrisis and the Global Green New Deal,” gives an overview of polycrisis dynamics. Subsequent commentaries in this series will look at some of these dynamics in greater depth and at how the polycrisis can be addressed by the development of a global insurgency and a multi-level Green New Deal.




“Polycrisis” is a buzzword, but one that, like “globalization” a few decades ago, captures something important about what is going on in the world. Crises can no longer be understood as crises “in” international relations, economics, governance, or climate. Rather, the crises in these different spheres are increasingly aspects of the polycrisis.

The key concept for the polycrisis is interaction. It cannot be understood by simple cause-and-effect models within a single sector or even within the world order as a whole. The interaction of forces, acts, and events determines its patterns and its course.

There are many dynamics operating within the polycrisis; this commentary focuses on some of the most important ones. Obviously, others could be listed as well – and still others are likely to emerge as the polycrisis proceeds. However, these should be enough to show why no single aspect of the crisis in the world order can be understood, let alone addressed, without regard to the others.

There are contradictory tendencies both within and among these dynamics. For example, there is a fracturing of globalization but at the same time continued growth in world trade and the concentration of global economic power. Such contradictions make it of limited value to extrapolate these polycrisis dynamics into longer-term trends, other than the probability of increasing conflict and chaos.

I will sometimes use categories like geopolitics, deglobalization, governance, and climate. These are meant merely as categories of convenience. They are simply loose groupings of loosely related phenomena. They are not intended as analytical categories for understanding the polycrisis. On the contrary, the polycrisis is defined by the extent to which its dynamics cross all such categories.

Many topics will reemerge repeatedly both in this Commentary and throughout this series. That is a necessary consequence of the intertwined, interactive character of the polycrisis. Here is a synopsis of some of them.

Unleashed warfare: The past two years have seen more violent conflict than at any time since the end of World War II, according to the Uppsala conflict data program.[1] Great power rivalry has rapidly moved from a period of relative détente and unipolar US dominance, through the rising tensions of “the new cold war,” to direct military engagement with great power surrogates in Ukraine, the Asian Pacific, and the Middle East. The three great powers, China, Russia, and the US, are cajoling and bribing lesser countries to join their blocs. Lesser countries are resisting, trying to support each other in that resistance, playing off great powers against each other, and trying to make a cafeteria of alliances with different powers in different arenas. The whole dynamic has the eerie appearance of choosing up sides for World War III.

Vicious circles of conflict: While great powers may perceive their own actions, such as augmenting preparation for war, as defensive, they are often perceived by their opponents as aggressive and threatening. They may therefore be met with actions that further escalate conflict. The result is an interactive “vicious circle” of escalation. This process can often lead to results that are intended by nobody but that have devastating consequences for the protagonists as well as for bystanders – World War I is often held up as a classic example. The current arms race and expansion of weapons production is another obvious example. Threats to use nuclear weapons from officials in Russia and Israel, along with the termination of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty — the cornerstone of the transition from the Cold War to an international arms control regime – indicate where such uncontrolled escalating conflict is headed. The cycle of escalation can be seen in the threat by France that NATO troops might be sent to Ukraine, followed by Russia’s counter-threat that NATO troops in Ukraine would mean war with Russia with a high risk of nuclear war that would destroy Europe.

Breakdown of international cooperation: The world’s great problems can only be addressed through international cooperation. Such cooperation has never been strong but it has been real, operating through the various branches of the United Nations, through cooperation among governments, and through international organizations of many kinds. But even this weak cooperation has been undermined by the predominance of geopolitics and other aspects of the polycrisis. This is evident in the arena of security, where periodic attempts at international cooperation have been blocked by the ambitions of the great powers. It is obvious in the failure of international cooperation to protect the earth’s climate. It is apparent in the decline of economic cooperation and the rise of economic nationalism and rival blocs. It is clear in the failure of global public health cooperation in the face of the COVID pandemic and the weakness of subsequent cooperation to prevent or contain future pandemics. And it is revealed in the failure to control the widely recognized threats of new technologies, such as nanotechnology, drones, and Artificial Intelligence.

Thucydides trap: At the end of the Cold War the US had its “unipolar moment” of global hegemony, but now faces economic, political, and military challenges from countries around the world. While no power currently seeks to replace the US as global hegemon, many countries and regions are resisting the efforts of the US to control them. In a pattern well-known in history and often characterized as the “Thucydides trap,” the rising wealth and power of China is coming into conflict with the desire of a hegemonic United States to maintain its global dominance. The polycrisis is greatly aggravated by the US belief that the loss of US domination is the cause of the polycrisis and that restoring unipolarity and global domination is both feasible and the key to overcoming the polycrisis. In reality, no increase in US geopolitical and military power is likely to contain let alone reverse the polycrisis. Conversely, there is little reason to believe the polycrisis can be resolved simply by weakening US power and replacing it with a polycentric world order of less great but still self-aggrandizing states.

War crime wave: Mass atrocity violence has grown rapidly, due to the proliferation of wars, the support by the geopolitically motivated great powers for their own and their allies’ war crimes, and the abandonment of UN and other international implementations of the “duty to protect.” The killing of 1,200 Israelis, followed by the killing of more than 36,000 (and counting) Palestinians. These war crimes followed the mass killing of civilians in Syria and Ukraine, the internment of one million Uyghurs and other Muslims in China, war crimes in Ethiopia, ethnic cleansing in Sudan’s Darfur province, and the displacement of two million Rohingya and other Muslims in Myanmar. Kate Ferguson of the NGO Protection Approaches says, “We face the likelihood that this violence is going to characterize the next political era. In fact, I wonder if we’re not already in that era.”[2]

Fragmented globalization: For the four decades after 1980 a process of economic globalization increasingly integrated the global economy. Soviet, Chinese, and US trade blocs largely dissolved. Companies moved production around the globe to wherever labor, environmental, and other costs were lowest. Production developed into a transnational “global assembly line.” Huge financial flows raced around the globe – often producing global financial crises. International trade agreements and institutions like NAFTA and the World Trade Organization moved the world toward a single little-regulated market. But, largely as a result of growing economic nationalism and burgeoning great power conflict, economic warfare has broken out among the great powers. The US is trying to hobble Chinese economic development, for example by its “chip war” intended to prevent China from accessing advanced computer chip technology. In the context of the Ukraine war, the EU and Russia have battled over energy trade. US industrial policy to subsidize “green” production in the US has been seen in Europe as the opening of a trade war to make European clean energy goods uncompetitive in the US market. While this process is sometimes described as “deglobalization,” in fact transnational economic activity continues to grow, but in the form of a struggle to control fragmented transnational economic networks.




“Deglobalization” is not, however, leading to a restoration of the integrated national economies that preceded the era of globalization; in 2023 goods traded across borders reached an all-time high.[3] Rather, deglobalization is leading to bullying designed to line up countries in support of one or another superpower. For example, US semiconductor companies, at the instigation of the US government, recently coerced a Persian Gulf technology company to break off cooperation with Chinese manufacturers. While such coercive “friendshoring” could potentially lead to the re-emergence of trade blocs, at present it is creating more of an economic war of all against all. Lesser countries and businesses seek to “mix and match” their allegiances, but they meet heavy pressure to choose up sides.

Geopolitics trumps all: Deglobalization is part of a broader trend: the subsumption of the economic and indeed all else to the geopolitical conflict of the great powers. The slogan of the Clinton era, “It’s the economy, stupid!” is being reversed to read “It’s the enemy, stupid!” Whether in trade, health, energy, or political alliances, geopolitical “necessities” are increasingly overriding all other public, and even private, interests.

Inequality: The dynamics of plutocratic policymaking, crony capitalism, deregulation, detaxation, and subsidy of fossil fuels and the wealthy are driving more extreme inequality. Despite the fragmentation of globalization, global concentration and centralization of capital continue apace; consider, for example, Nippon’s pending purchase of U.S. Steel. Since 1995, the share of global wealth possessed by billionaires has tripled, from 1% to over 3%; 2020 marked the steepest increase in global billionaires’ share of wealth on record. The share of wealth of the global top 0.01% rose from 7% in 1995 to 11% in 2021. Over the past two decades the gap between the average incomes of the top 10% and the bottom 50% of individuals within countries has almost doubled. The share of income presently captured by the poorest half of the world’s people is about half what it was 200 years ago. The poorest half of the world’s people own just 2% of total wealth, while the richest 10% of the global population own 76%.[4]

Democracy deficit: Ostensibly most of the world’s governments are in some sense democracies. The great majority of them hold some kind of elections that purportedly select their national leaders. Historically the extent to which ordinary people have been able to influence the actions of their governments has varied from country to country and from time to time. However, everywhere at all times it has been quite limited, even in the most “democratic” countries. The ability of ordinary people to make governments serve their interests and wishes has sharply diminished throughout the world. The dominance of neoliberal practice has delegitimated action by government to serve public purposes. The capacity of governments to shape social realities has declined in tandem. With the worldwide concentration of wealth and the power it provides, most governments have moved closer to what can be described without exaggeration as plutocracies, in which actual power resides with a tiny minority of wealthy individuals and organizations. The inability of government to provide benefits for ordinary people has led to deep popular alienation from the institutions of government and politics. At the supranational level, there is little if any institutionalized opportunity for ordinary people to affect global governance and the world order.

Rise of fascist and para-fascist movements: Extreme right and fascist movements have arisen in many places around the world and have won governing authority or participation in governing coalitions in Argentina, Italy, Poland, Sweden, Finland, Russia, India, and Israel – not to mention the once and perhaps future President Donald Trump in the US. While these movements vary somewhat from country to country, they have strong common themes, including fear of and hostility toward immigrants; anti-feminism, homophobia and transphobia; and a backlash against perceived progressive social change, such as the now worldwide “war on woke.”[5] All scorn democratic principles; encourage violence; scapegoat disempowered social groups; follow charismatic leaders; and whip up a mass base.[6] These movements are linking up through international organizations and networks and are providing each other support.


Climate crisis: The last months of 2023 were the hottest in 125,000 years. Global warming is causing heat waves, disease outbreaks, floods, droughts, and melting of Arctic and Antarctic ice caps. The longer-term business-as-usual structure of the world order, with its nation-state rivalry, great power dominance, drive for unlimited capital accumulation, domination of governments by fossil fuel interests and the wealthy, and pathetically inadequate capacity to represent global human interests, has been more than adequate to promote the continuation and expansion of fossil fuel extraction and burning. But the polycrisis is aggravating the climate crisis and making it more intractable. For example, after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, government financing for fossil fuels increased sharply and subsidies almost doubled from 2020 rates.[7] Meanwhile, the climate crisis is aggravating other aspects of the polycrisis. Drought in Panama, for example, has cut the number of ships that can go through the Panama Canal by half, aggravating supply chain pressures and therefore inflation.[8] Desertification has forced mass migration, which in turn has provided fodder for anti-immigrant fascist and para-fascist movements in the US, Europe, and elsewhere. The earth has recently passed a number of irreversible climate “tipping points” that will guarantee additional global warming even if fossil fuel burning is reduced.

Incoherence: In the complex, contradictory, chaotic world of the polycrisis, apparent trends and tendencies conflict. In that context, policies of nation states and other actors are likely to be incoherent and even self-contradictory, producing unintended side effects far different from their intent. For example, US interest in a two-state solution in Palestine has been combined with unwavering support for an Israel that has said it will oppose a two-state solution under all conditions. A purported commitment to reducing greenhouse gas emissions has been combined with a licensing of huge fossil fuel extraction projects in Alaska and the Gulf South.

Unpredictability: The polycrisis as a whole and the interaction of its different elements make rational anticipation of future developments extremely difficult. Consider the unanticipated eruption of the COVID pandemic; the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war; and the war and genocide in Gaza. The subsidies and trade barriers the US erected to block import of “green” goods from China also caused disruption in the economies of its European allies. European restrictions on Russian fossil fuel exports led to a boom in Russian energy sales in the rest of the world. US support for Israeli genocide in Gaza led to unanticipated attacks in the Red Sea by the Houthi.

While all these examples could to some extent have been predicted, they were no more certain than many other events that were just as reasonably predicted, but that did not in fact transpire. In 2023 escalating conflict between the US and China over Taiwan and massive currency defaults were both widely predicted, for example, but did not transpire. The policies of Donald Trump during his presidency were so self-contradictory and erratic that efforts at predicting them would have been absurd; the same applies to a possible future Trump presidency. (Such wild shifts and inexplicabilities have been normal in past fascist regimes.) Perhaps the only thing that can be confidently predicted in the polycrisis is the likelihood of intensified unpredictability.

Decline of social learning: Governments and societies can learn from the feedback from their actions. After the devastation of the Great Depression, countries around the world adopted financial regulation and Keynesian budgetary policies to stabilize the growth of their economies. After coming to the verge of nuclear holocaust in the Cuban Missile Crisis, US President John Kennedy backed away from Cold War belligerence and moved toward advocating a form of common security; the US and the Soviet Union began moving toward détente and arms control. After the string of financial crises that culminated in the Great Recession, many developing countries began accumulating financial reserves to protect against currency crises. But so far there is scant evidence of any social learning regarding the dynamics of the polycrisis. Military build-ups and aggression seem to be met with arms races and further aggression. The cascading evidence of climate catastrophe is met by doubling down on fossil fuel extraction and burning. No feedback loops seem to connect these actual results to the actors and actions that could correct their causes.

The folly factor: Perhaps the most pervasive dynamic of the polycrisis is folly. Rational pursuit of self-interest has become increasingly scarce in the polycrisis. This is evident in the incoherent, self-contradictory, foolish behavior of powerful institutions. Governments and corporations pursue expansion of fossil fuel extraction and burning even though they have every reason to know that it will lead to their own destruction. Countries engage in military build-ups, even though they have every reason to know that they will only provoke reciprocal build-ups among their opponents, leading to augmented mutual threat. Corporations fight to dismantle financial regulation, even though experience has shown that such deregulation will lead to greater financial crashes. But it is also folly for the people of the world to acquiesce or even participate in the destruction of our world. To engage in actions every day that may be intended to provide a better life, but that in practice are destroying the very basis of wellbeing for ourselves and our progeny. To allow ourselves to be sucked along by the blandishments of the powerful.

While folly has been an abiding feature of human life, today’s polycrisis grows out of and also augments the fundamental folly that, in today’s world, self-preservation can be attained without common preservation.[9]

Fixing one or another aspects of the polycrisis is unlikely to establish stability, let alone sustainability or justice. Nor is change – even revolutionary change — in one or another nation likely to long resist the dynamics of the polycrisis. There is little reason to think that the disordering of the world order will automatically lead to socialism or some other possibly more positive alternative. But the polycrisis does foreclose some old and open some new possibilities for collective action. We will explore these in later commentaries in this series.


[1] Uppsala conflict data program, Uppsala conflict data program. See also Paul Post, “Not a World War, But a World at War,” The Atlantic, November 17, 2023 https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2023/11/conflicts-around-the-world-peak/676029/#

[2] Julian Borger. “World Faces ‘Heightened Risk’ of Mass Atrocities due to Global Inaction.” The Guardian, December 8, 2023, sec. Law. https://www.theguardian.com/law/2023/dec/08/un-and-us-efforts-to-stop-mass-atrocities-have-waned-activists-warn.

[3] Tim Sahay. “A Year in Crises.” Phenomenal World. December 21, 2023. https://www.phenomenalworld.org/analysis/a-year-in-crises/.

[4] World Inequality Report. “The World #InequalityReport 2022 Presents the Most Up-To-Date & Complete Data on Inequality Worldwide”: World Inequality Report 2022. October 9, 2021. https://wir2022.wid.world/executive-summary/.

[5] Walden Bello, “Fascism 101: Why We Need to Spell It out ” 2023. Portside.org. December 22, 2023. https://portside.org/2023-12-22/fascism-101-why-we-need-spell-it-out?utm_source=portside-general&utm_medium=email

[6] Alberto Toscano, “The Rise of the Far Right Is a Global Phenomenon.” In These Times, November 21, 2023. https://inthesetimes.com/article/global-far-right-meloni-milei-putin-bannon-orban?link_id=5&can_id=1058857240102273c369153e44c89a13&source=email-escalating-settler-violence-in-the-west-bank-dont-pave-paradise-your-neighbor-the-nuke-maker&email_referrer=email_2139925&email_subject=donald-trump-makes-a-mockery-of-populism-why-workers-are-dying-from-heat.

[7] Fiona Harvey, “World behind on almost every policy required to cut carbon emissions, research finds.” The Guardian, November 14, 2023. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/nov/14/world-behind-on-almost-every-policy-required-to-cut-carbon-emissions-research-finds.

[8] Jonathan Yerushalmy. “Changing Climate Casts a Shadow over the Future of the Panama Canal – and Global Trade.” The Guardian, December 22, 2023. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/dec/22/changing-climate-casts-a-shadow-over-the-future-of-the-panama-canal-and-global-trade.

[9] Jeremy Brecher, Common Preservation in a Time of Mutual Destruction (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2021). Many of the systems concepts that underlie the interpretation in this commentary are developed further in this book.




Jeremy Brecher is a historian, author, and co-founder of the Labor Network for Sustainability. He has been active in peace, labor, environmental, and other social movements for more than half a century. Brecher is the author of more than a dozen books on labor and social movements, including Strike! and Global Village or Global Pillage and the winner of five regional Emmy awards for his documentary movie work.

Tuesday, February 20, 2024

Nuclear Waste and the Polycrisis

February 20, 2024

Origin and Nature of the Nuclear Legacy

Nuclear technology [1] has been in use internationally in a multitude of forms (e.g., for civil power generation, nuclear weapons, naval population, and medical applications) for approximately 80 years, and has been a long-term component of the global energy system (albeit with a relatively small and falling total contribution).  Although it is a relatively young innovation compared to some key human technologies (such as electricity and the internal combustion engine) and very young compared to others (such as wheels and agriculture), it has in those eight decades already had a big impact on human societies, including the generation of a legacy which has the potential to persist over timescales greatly exceeding the duration of complex human societies to date.  This is primarily in the form of radioactive wastes, which are defined as materials arising from nuclear technologies and processes which have no further use, and comprise a complex mix of different materials containing a wide range of radioactivity types and concentrations. The ionising radiation these wastes emit and the radionuclides (and other non-radiological toxins) they contain require suitable management to control the biohazards they present.

Civil nuclear power generation has been one of the primary contributors to radioactive waste generation, and these wastes have accumulated at hundreds of sites (where they were generated, and/or in consolidated form at centralised facilities) in more than 30 nations worldwide.  Much of the early management approaches in the burgeoning phases of the nuclear industry were quite ah-hoc, and the risks of radionuclides with some very long half-lives [2] being stored in aging and deteriorating infrastructure have become increasingly recognised.  The unique risk profile of nuclear wastes has therefore in recent decades compelled governments and other authorities to seek a remedial strategy which is commensurate with the challenge whilst also being effective, passively safe, robust from a scientific and engineering perspective, and economically, socially and politically acceptable.  Not all nuclear nations have yet started to develop these long-term plans in detail but in those nations that have, the approach most commonly settled upon [3] as a final solution for their waste legacies is geological disposal.

This describes the permanent emplacement of containerised waste materials [4] within engineered structures in stable rock masses at depths of approximately ≥ 500 m, so that the radioactivity is isolated by these barriers from the surface environment and biosphere.  These facilities may comprise mined repositories or deep boreholes (with the former currently being the generally preferred solution) and in either case they are intended to contain, slow and attenuate the migration of radioactivity over prolonged timescales.  In the countries where these facilities will be implemented, they will be huge national projects requiring continuous investments of resources, expertise, and political will over decades (or even a century or more) to build, operate, monitor and close.  These projects represent quite unique endeavours in a modern world in which governmental foresight and planning rarely extends beyond the next few years.  Indeed, as I have previously pointed out, geological disposal facilities will be in all likelihood the closest we have to the ‘cathedral thinking’ that historical societies demonstrated in building legacies which endured through time.

Influence of the Polycrisis

Several countries have made material progress towards achieving geological disposal (notably Finland, where first disposals of spent fuel into the Onkalo repository are planned to occur during 2024-25 [[1]]).  However, for most nations with ambitions to deal with their nuclear legacies this way, the lead in times will be long and wastes are being ‘passivated’ and put into interim long term storage [5] pending disposal facilities becoming available.   In the context of the 2020s and beyond, we must therefore consider these unique projects in light of long term developing global risks and trends.

A range of natural and anthropogenic phenomena are emerging and strengthening which will have a bearing on the practicality of geographically dispersed projects of the scale, duration and complexity of geological disposal.  This general predicament is increasingly labelled as the polycrisis, and is characterised as the multifaceted, interacting, synchronising and worsening plethora of threats and challenges that humanity faces at global scale.  The polycrisis will interact with human systems in complex and multifaceted ways, and geological disposal provides a unique case study of how these interactions could manifest; the following paragraphs explore some of the different potential impacts:

(i) The first realm of polycrisis impacts is logistics and supply chains. Geological disposal facilities will be large, complex and will make use of extensive quantities of specialist equipment, technology and materials, which by necessity will be sourced via global supply chains.  A key aspect will be provision of material for the subsurface engineered barriers, which are fundamental to providing effective long-term containment.  These will make extensive use of specialist clay minerals (notably bentonite [1]) which are available in economic deposits in only a few locations globally, therefore millions of tonnes of this material will need to be shipped long distance to under-construction repositories [[2]].

Multiple phenomena associated with the polycrisis have the potential to impact transport and logistical systems (particularly the multiple global chokepoints [[3]]) including damage to infrastructure and disruption of key routes from the effects of climate change, pandemics, and geopolitical strife and conflicts.  Indeed, the vulnerability of key global trade routes and chokepoints (specifically, the Suez and Panama Canals) has very recently been highlighted; the confluence of several events and trends have conspired to create simultaneous disruptions which have already impacted global trade.  Extrapolation of this and equivalent polycrisis-related phenomena could seriously challenge the material needs of potentially multiple geological disposal facilities being constructed simultaneously in different locations globally.

(ii) The construction and operation of geological disposal facilities will represent an enormous financial commitment in each nation where they are pursued, and these costs will also continue over timescales far in excess of broadly equivalent major infrastructure projects. Ensuring that these projects are ‘seen through’ to a final closure stage [6] [[4]] will therefore be reliant not only on individual’s nations fiscal situations, but also on the global financial system remaining solvent and stable over extended timeframes.  The polycrisis may present threats to this vital financial foundation in several different forms.

Firstly, climate change has and will continue to drive increased incidence of extreme weather, which due to the close coupling of virtually all parts of the human system with the climate, will cause impacts including infrastructure damage and population displacements.  A second order effect of this is cumulative costs (e.g., of abandoning land and rebuilding damaged infrastructure); insurance is one of the main buffers against these costs, but whole regions have increasingly become effectively uninsurable due to the frequency of climate damages [[5]] [[6]], and increasing prevalence of climate change will continue this trend.  Secondly, depletion and scarcities of fundamental resources and energy may cascade through multiple aspects of society, which will likely continue to drive inflationary tendencies and debt growth as societies increasingly attempt to ‘pull resources forward’ in time [[7]].  The polycrisis will therefore likely act as on ongoing drag on the global economic condition, and in this situation of dwindling resources, the essentials of maintaining societal function and stability (e.g., food provision, law and order, etc.) may be given priority over what could potentially become increasingly regarded as a ‘gold-plated’ luxury primarily for the benefit of future generations.

(iii) Geological disposal projects will require that a high degree of engagement and trust is established between the communities hosting disposal facilities, general populations, and the nations in question’s institutions (including local and national government, regulators and civil service), media, and the scientific authorities making the case for waste disposals being safe. This will need to be maintained over long time periods (the duration of the disposals and closure) to ensure ongoing consent and financial (and other) support remains in place [1].  The polycrisis could create progressively greater challenges to this as a result of changing trends in the way that information is being disseminated and used at societal and global scale, which is becoming a fundamental aspect (both cause and effect) of the polycrisis.

Communications and information management (along with other key aspects of society such as materials and energy) have been marked by numerous inflection points in terms of growth and change; inventions such as writing, the printing press, and most recently computing have driven profound changes.  This has continued into recent timeframes with exponential changes in the volume, nature, accessibility and application of information due to the internet, social media and increasingly, artificial intelligence.  In this recent context, misinformation and ‘fake news’ have experienced rapidly growing prevalence and reach, and have increasingly impacted trust in and the effectiveness of politics and institutions, challenged the authority of truthful information, and the cohesion of groups and societies [[8][9]].  This could feasibly challenge the future viability of many aspects of societies but large, centralised ‘science’ projects such as geological disposal could in particular face ‘de-legitimatisation’ and faltering support which could ultimately threaten their delivery and completion.

In terms of the mechanisms by which the polycrisis could impact the implementation of geological disposal, the above points are far from exhaustive, but are a representative cross-section of the types of challenges that societies may face in applying large and expensive engineering solutions to problems (and perhaps in applying complexity as a problem-solving strategy in a more general sense) as the polycrisis deepens in future.  These sorts of challenges could therefore also feasibly apply to other future ‘big science’ responses to major challenges (e.g., geoengineering to address climate change).  However, it is the impacts that can’t be readily foreseen that may present greater challenges; the complex systems dynamics underlying the polycrisis are inherently unpredictable and counter-intuitive, and may see impacts ‘coming out of left field’ in ways that societies can’t and won’t expect and predict (as per the Tale of Two Canals example cited above).

Influence on the Polycrisis

Given that the polycrisis has the potential to impact the implementation of geological disposal in myriad ways, it is not a huge leap of logic to surmise that failures to implement these plans could themselves potentially contribute to the worsening of the polycrisis.  Enhancing feedback mechanisms of this sort will likely be key features and drivers of the polycrisis, and the following paragraphs explore examples of how these interactions and feedbacks may feasibly operate in the context of geological disposal:

(iv) The first and most direct risk from long-term failure to implement geological disposal relates to radioactive wastes remaining in surface storage in multiple locations globally. As global economic conditions likely become more challenging in coming years and decades (as described in ii above) a very worst case scenario would be the release and migration of concentrated stocks of radioactivity into the environment [7]. The impacts of such events would manifest in different ways at different scales, all of which could feed into the general polycrisis predicament through effects such as contamination of land and water resources, forcing of evacuations and migrations, and the sowing of panic and disruption.

At the large scales at which Earth Systems operate, radionuclides are described in the ‘planetary boundaries’ framework as comprising environmental ‘novel entities’ [8], with the potential to generate Earth System effects [[10]].  However, the mechanisms of this are currently poorly understood, and even large-scale migrations of radioactivity on the environment (as occurred due to nuclear weapons testing in the 1950-60s and from events such as the 1986 Chernobyl accident) do not appear to have generated broad-spectrum Earth System impacts in an equivalent way to the mass burning of fossil fuels (i.e., which has perturbed the global carbon cycle) and agriculture (i.e., which has perturbed the nitrogen/phosphorus cycles).  However, at smaller scales (i.e., regional, national or local) the impacts of such releases may be more acute and apparent, with potential for radioactivity to accumulate in environmental media (e.g., soils at local scale) and generate non-trivial risks.  Past radiological releases (as occurred at Chernobyl) have led to areas undergoing abandonment or evacuation, and this could therefore be a feasible outcome of the release of radioactivity from stored wastes.

(v) A potential secondary consequence of a future failure to effectively manage the radioactive waste legacy in different nations around the world may be in the form of changes in societal perceptions of risk, and trust in the ability of national institutions and authorities to manage such risks. ‘Radiophobia’ (fear of radiation and radioactive substances) is a phenomenon which co-developed with the appearance and spread of nuclear technologies, and a future scenario in which radioactive materials enter the environment without there being a remedial solution (i.e., geological disposal having not been implemented), could contribute to socio-political shifts.

Specifically, rising risks to people and the environment from a historical waste legacy which governments were unable or unwilling to decisively manage could generate an ongoing reduction in collective trust in institutions and belief in their ability to manage challenges arising from the polycrisis (even if lack of trust was a contributory factor in geological disposal not occurring in the first instance, as described in iii).  Although risks from radioactive release would likely be relatively small compared to other aspects of the polycrisis (e.g., climate change) the particular nature of radiophobia could mean that a failure to achieve geological disposal could form a significant aspect of a wider, self-reinforcing trend of growing disengagement with politics and civic society, and reducing effectiveness of governance and ability to manage escalating risks and disruption.

Wider Context and Conclusion

Nuclear technology has been a presence in technical civilisation for a number of decades, and has in that time been influential in a way few other technologies have.  Its most significant consequence is likely the legacy of radioactive wastes it has generated, which has accumulated in a variety of storage locations distributed through nations around the world.  Geological disposal has moved from the drawing board to reality (in some countries at least) as a means to remedy this problem, but implementing these plans will likely comprise some of the biggest, most complex and long-lived individual engineering projects civilisation has ever attempted.  To add to this challenge, geological disposal will likely be underway in parallel to global civilisation facing an unprecedented litany of challenges that have the potential to escalate into a collective predicament labelled as the polycrisis.

The polycrisis has the potential to challenge the implementation of geological disposal through a wide range of mechanisms, but it is the inherently unpredictable threats which may present the biggest challenges to achieving it.  If the various aspects of the polycrisis were to slow, challenge or prevent geological disposal being achieved, the unmitigated legacy could itself feasibly feed into the polycrisis via actual and/or perceived risks.  This complex relationship between the radioactive waste legacy and the wider context of the human predicament indicates that nuclear technology (more so than many others) may represent a ‘technology trap’ [9] in that historical commitments to its development have locked current and future generations into addressing the complex risks and externalities it has generated.  However, whether or not the pursuit of nuclear technology has been on balance a net benefit for humanity, the waste legacy it has generated persists and grows year on year, and we must therefore work to reduce risks to future generations, who might have much less resilience and adaptive capability.

Where the inherently unknowable future nature and threat of the polycrisis is concerned, the precautionary principle of minimising risks wherever possible should win out.  By that measure, geological disposal should be seen as an investment (or even an opportunity) in as much as it allows societies to gain control a discrete risk whilst that is still possible (i.e., before the effects of climate change, financial instability and misinformation really start to degrade global capabilities).  Therefore, any solutions we have within our collective gift that will contribute to getting risks under control now (particularly relatively limited and well bounded ones such as nuclear waste) before the polycrisis starts to really gain traction (for which the analogy ‘fixing the roof whilst the sun shines’ seems apt) should be urgently seized upon with everything we can collectively muster as a civilisation.

[1] Specifically, nuclear fission technologies; systems based on fusion processes are still largely experimental.

[2] The longest-lived anthropogenic radionuclides will remain hazardous on the order of >100,000 years.

[3] After eliminating low-credibility options such as launching waste into space or dropping it into volcanoes.

[4] This primarily refers to higher hazard wastes which contain higher concentrations of radionuclides in more volatile forms; lower hazard wastes will primarily be managed via alternative, cheaper approaches such as shallow burial.

[5] This frequently involves the waste materials being processed into stable solid forms using encapsulants such as cement, followed by emplacement in dedicated storage facilities.

[6] This will likely consist of sealing up of the facility, followed by a period of monitoring, and potentially the leaving of surface ‘markers’ to warn future generations of the hazards buried there.

[7] Release of radionuclides would likely not occur from passivated wastes, but could feasibly occur from any waste materials remaining in uncontrolled storage conditions.

[8] Others include chemical pollutants, microplastics and nano-materials.

[1]. El-Showk, S. (2022) Final Resting Place.  Science, 375, 6583.

[2].  SKB (2017) Developing Strategies for Acquisition and Control of Bentonite for a High Level Waste Repository.  Technical Report TR-16-14.

[3] Baily, R., Wellesley, L. (2017) Chokepoints and Vulnerabilities in Global Food Trade.  Chatham House Report.

[4]. Sandia National Laboratories (1993) Expert Judgement on Markers to Deter Inadvertent Human Intrusion into the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.  Available online: https://wipp.info/ [Accessed 06 February 2024].

[5]. United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security (2023) Uninsurable Future.  Available online:  https://interconnectedrisks.org/tipping-points/uninsurable-future [Accessed 02 February 2024].

[6]. Financial Times (2024) Overlapping crises could fracture the global financial system.  Available online: https://www.ft.com/content/71bd6ac7-43c9-45e2-ab85-020dded0d8b3 [Accessed 02 February 2024].

[7]. Hagens, N. (2020) Economics for the future – Beyond the superorganism.  Ecological Economics, Volume 169, 106520.

[8]. World Economic Forum (2023) How to rebuild trust in institutions: results, results, results.  Available online: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2023/12/how-to-rebuild-trust-in-philanthropy-results-results-results/ [Accessed 02 February 2024].

[9]. Jørgensen, P. S. et al. (2023) Evolution of the polycrisis: Anthropocene traps that challenge global sustainability.  Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 379: 20220261.

[10]. Persson, L. et al. (2022) Outside the Safe Operating Space of the Planetary Boundary for Novel Entities.  Environmental Science & Technology, 56, 3, 1510–1521.

Saturday, August 03, 2024

The Gaza War: The Glory of the Polycrisis
August 3, 2024
Source: Labor 4 Sustainability


This commentary, the fifth in a series on “The Polycrisis and the Global Green New Deal,” takes the war that began in Gaza and is spreading throughout the Middle East as a laboratory for dissecting the dynamics of the concatenation of crises now being referred to as the “polycrisis.”

In previous commentaries in this series we have explored the emergence and dynamics of the polycrisis. In this commentary we will see how these dynamics are playing out in the increasingly global struggle that first broke out in Palestine at the end of 2023.

Conflict in the Middle East has been endemic for a very long time. It would not take a global polycrisis to ignite a new round of war and escalation. But the global polycrisis gives the current war in the Middle East some distinctive elements, and conversely what started as the war in Gaza vividly illustrates what the polycrisis means in practice.
Backstory

European anti-Semitism, from the expulsion of the Jews from England in 1290 and from Spain in 1492 to the extermination of six million Jews by the Nazis, created a worldwide diaspora. This led many diasporic Jews to seek a national home, and a small number of pioneers began to establish settlements in the predominantly Arab territory historically known as Palestine. In World War I Britain attacked and ultimately replaced the Ottoman Empire as the ruler of Palestine. During the war Britain announced support for a “national home for the Jewish people” in Palestine. Jews were divided on how to relate to their Arab neighbors, but a Zionist movement opted to seize Arab lands and establish an Israeli state. They won support from many countries, including the US and the USSR. The establishment of the Israeli state was followed by repeated wars between Israel and its Arab neighbors, nearly all won by Israel.

In the post-World War II period the US developed a policy for de facto control of the Middle East based on the “strategic dyad” of Israel and Iran. The purpose was to maintain control of Middle Eastern oil and contain Arab nationalism and leftism. However, the Iranian revolution of 1979 turned Iran into an opponent of the US role in the Middle East. As a result, the US became dependent on Israel as its primary “reliable” ally in the Middle East, supplemented by Saudi Arabia and other conservative monarchies. The effort to restore stable US dominance in the Middle East contributed to numerous wars not only in Palestine but in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in and near the region. With the failures of US military operations there, the US turned to an effort to stabilize relations between Israel and the Arab monarchies through a series of agreements known as the Abraham Accords, first signed in 2020.

The Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023 and Israel’s subsequent attack on Gaza, initiated a dynamic that illustrates many aspects of the polycrisis. In this commentary I will focus primarily on the first few months of the conflict; while much has happened in the meantime, the dynamics visible from early days have so far persisted.
Polycrisis dynamics in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
Palestinians transport the injured to the Indonesian Hospital in Jabalia, north of the Gaza Strip on October 9, 2023. Photo Credit: WAFA (Q2915969) in contract with a local company (APAimages), Wikipedia Commons.

While many elements of the Gaza war and its ramifying effects resemble various examples from the past, the overarching context of global polycrisis that I have described in previous commentaries gives them a different significance and portends a different result.[1]

Unpredictability The Hamas attack on Israel shows the unpredictability of events in the polycrisis. Despite their enormous espionage and surveillance resources, neither the US nor Israel nor any other state appears to have had or taken seriously advance knowledge of the devastating attack that Hamas had been preparing for months. Indeed, in a speech just a week before the Hamas attacks, US national security advisor Jake Sullivan proclaimed, “The Middle East is quieter today than it has been in decades.”[2]

“Butterfly-wing effect” The vast violence and disruption unleashed in and beyond at least half-a-dozen countries by the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel illustrates the disproportionate scale of cause and effect that characterizes the polycrisis. It would be hard to find a fitter illustration of chaos theory’s paradigm example of non-linear causation: the wind from a butterfly’s wing that at an early stage can shift the direction of a mighty storm.

Proliferation The war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza and its rapid spread to at least five countries (so far) and the Red Sea exemplify the overall proliferation of war in the era of polycrisis. Further, the conflict polarized and mobilized a dozen other nations and armed groups for war. As the Guardian synopsized the early stages of this process:

Within hours of the outbreak of the Gaza war, the Hezbollah Shia militia in Lebanon began to fire on northern Israeli towns and villages in solidarity with Palestinians, triggering Israeli air strikes in response, and Houthi forces in Yemen attacked ships in the Red Sea with real or perceived Israeli connections.

At the same time the West Bank erupted in protests at the bombing of civilians in Gaza and extremist Jewish settlers quickly sought to ride the wave of Israeli anger by seizing Palestinian land and terrorizing its residents.

Each of these theatres of conflict has the potential to ignite a much-feared Middle East conflagration, and the past few days have demonstrated just how easily escalation, intended or not, could bring Israel into open confrontation with Iran and suck in the US too.

The US moved two aircraft carriers and their accompanying strike groups to the region as American bases in Syria and Iraq came under repeated attacks from Iran-affiliated groups, drawing swift retaliation from Washington.

Tehran’s Houthi allies have meanwhile been firing on the US-led “Prosperity Guardian” naval task force assembled to protect shipping in the Red Sea. American warships shot down dozens of drones and also a handful of ballistic missiles. US Central Command issued a statement to say that Washington had “every reason to believe that these attacks, while launched by the Houthis in Yemen, are fully enabled by Iran.[3]

Escalation Tit-for-tat escalation illustrates the polycrisis dynamic of a “systemic self-amplifying feedback loop,” aka a vicious circle. Mohamed Khaled Khiari, a UN assistant secretary-general, told security council members that, while most of the exchange of fire between Israel and Hezbollah had been around the border, some strikes were going deeper into each other’s territory, “raising the spectre of an uncontained conflict with devastating consequences for the people of both countries.” Khiari added that “the risk of miscalculation and further escalation is increasing as the conflict in Gaza continues.”[4] A similar dynamic is manifested in the escalating conflict between the US and various non-state groups it alleges are proxies for Iran.

Glocalism As discussed in a previous Commentary, a characteristic of the polycrisis is the intertwining of local non-state actors with international power centers. The wars now touching at least five countries in the Middle East show the interpenetration of local non-state actors and international power politics.

Limits of US hegemony The ability of the US to supply the weapons and diplomatic support that are essential to Israel’s genocide in Gaza shows the continuing power of the US; but the inability of the US to effectively control the other players in the Middle East shows the change from the unipolar era. The US relation to Israel in particular shows how little even the greatest remaining great power is able to impose its own interests, even on those who are supposedly its allies. While in the past the US has from time to time successfully pressured Israel to back off from its military actions, in this case the tail so far is wagging the dog. The limits of US hegemony are also indicated by its inability to shape world opinion, the International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice, or the UN General Assembly, and its isolation within the UN Security Council. The US has become both the greatest of the world’s Great Powers, and, in the memorable phrase of Spiro T. Agnew, a “helpless, pitiful giant.”

Neither unipolar nor bipolar The dynamics of the Gaza war exhibit neither the bipolar character of the Cold War nor the US hegemony of the “unipolar moment.” While the US role so far is quite consistent, the role of the other great powers is ambiguous. The supposedly overarching geopolitical antagonism between the US and China is so far a relatively minor factor – even though China has been mediating between Palestinian factions, the US has gone so far as to politely ask China to intercede with Iran on its behalf. The future may well see a great power polarization around the Middle Eastern war, but at the moment Great Power rivalry is subordinated to other factors.

Post-colonial disunity The so-called “West,” defined as the European colonial powers and white settler colonial states, initially functioned as a bloc, lining up with Israel. Over time, especially with Israel’s genocidal action in Gaza, this unity has become progressively less solid. According to commentator Eldar Mamedov, EU-NATO countries are “entirely split over Israel, Iran, and Houthis.” There is “no sign so far that the EU is gearing up to join the U.S. conflict with the Iran-backed forces in Syria and Iraq, either militarily or through diplomatic support.”[5]

Breakdown of peacemaking The inability of the UN to impose a ceasefire, despite the overwhelming international support for such a move, is an example of the general breakdown of peacemaking capacity in the polycrisis era.

Breakdown of norms and moral limits The initial Hamas attack on Israel and the rapid development of what is undoubtedly the most visible genocide in world history on the part of Israel illustrate the general breakdown of international norms and any sense of moral or human rights limits on state action. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs says that the situation in the Middle East had probably “never been worse” since it began collating records in 1991. Jeff Feltman, a senior fellow at the UN Foundation, says: “The combination of humanitarian crises across the Middle East – including the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza – have put more strains than most of us have ever seen on the financial ability of donors to respond and the ability of humanitarian actors to meet the needs.” Jens Laerke, a senior official at OCHA, says, “Despite 70 years of international efforts to solve problems by diplomacy and by non-violent means, leaders around the world are now reaching for the gun to resolve their differences as a first option. The question is: are we entering an age of war?” As one journalist put it, such actions reveal “a collective erosion of self-restraint and the rule of law.”[6]

Cascading consequences Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea illustrate the way in which consequences cascade across different sectors of the world order in the era of polycrisis. The attacks sharply impeded world transit and trade, as shipping companies rerouted their vessels via circuitous, expensive routes. The volume of traffic moving through the Red Sea’s Bab al-Mandab strait was cut in half.[7] The trade impact was particularly strong in vulnerable countries like Egypt.

The Houthi attacks, unsurprisingly, led to internal pressures in the US to retaliate, even at risk of provoking a wider war, including the possibility of a US war with Iran. US warships were sent into the Red Sea, ostensibly to protect against Houthi attacks. Iran in turn sent warships into the Red Sea. US attacks on Houthi and other alleged “Iran surrogates” led to a breakdown of the Yemen peace process. As Guardian columnist Nesrine Malik put it,

All of this is happening in a wider context of crises and divisions in individual countries. Each escalation results in a rippling series of repercussions. Houthi attacks in the Red Sea have diverted commercial traffic headed to North America and Europe away from the waterway, affecting Egypt’s much-needed revenues from the Suez canal and potentially the country’s stability in the middle of a prolonged financial crisis.[8]

Nascent rise of the nonaligned Overwhelming votes in the UN General Assembly, and the isolation of Israel and the US, even in the Security Council, point to the possible emergence of a non-aligned global coalition that could potentially challenge international crimes and the struggle for great power hegemony. However, the inability of this potential “great power” to even slow down the genocide in Gaza also illustrates that it is not yet able to exercise significant power.

As the Israeli attack on Gaza continued month after month, the genocide death count grew steadily higher. Tit-for-tat escalation between Israel and Hezbollah made full-scale war increasingly likely. In mid-June, when Hezbollah released a drone video of potential targets in northern Israel, Israeli officials warned of “an all-out war” in which Hezbollah will be destroyed and Lebanon would be sent “back to the Stone Age.” Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah thereupon threatened a war with “no restraint and no rules and no ceilings.”[9] In late June Iran’s mission to the United Nations warned that if Israel embarks on a “full-scale military aggression” in Lebanon, “an obliterating war will ensue” and that in such an event, “all options, including the full involvement of all resistance fronts, are on the table.”[10] Even if the various parties agree to a ceasefire, it is less likely to be a step toward peace than primarily a means to acquire military and political advantage before the next round of war and genocide.

The events triggered by the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel show the irrationality, unpredictability, uncontrollability, and folly that human actions have acquired in the era of the polycrisis. While events are unpredictable, the dynamics of the polycrisis have made it substantially less likely that this story will have a happy or even bearable outcome.

[1] I deal here only with the military and geopolitical aspects of such interaction. The economic, governance, environmental, and other aspects will be dealt with in later commentaries.

[2] Nesrine Malik, “Fears are rising of ‘regional escalation’ in the Middle East. But that wider war is already here,” The Guardian, January 8, 2024. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/jan/08/israel-gaza-middle-east-escalation

[3] Julian Borger, “Middle East is sliding closer to the edge of a wider regional conflict,” The Guardian, December 31, 2023. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/31/middle-east-sliding-closer-wider-regional-conflict-israel-iran-us

[4] Ibid.

[5] Eldar Mamedov, “EU-NATO Countries Entirely Split over Israel, Iran, and Houthis,” Responsible Statecraft, February 7, 2024. https://responsiblestatecraft.org/houthis-europe-eu/

[6] Mark Townsend, “Middle East thrust into ‘apocalyptic’ humanitarian crisis by war and turmoil,” The Guardian, January 22, 2024. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/jan/22/middle-east-apocalyptic-humanitarian-crisis-war-humanitarian-aid-israel-gaza-yemen; and Patrick Wintour, “Seemingly disparate Middle East conflicts show collective erosion of self-restraint,” January 20, 2024. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/20/seemingly-disparate-middle-east-conflicts-show-collective-erosion-of-self-restraint

[7] Atticus Canham-Clyne, “Hamas’s allies expose limits and liabilities of US power,” Responsible Statecraft, February 7, 2024. https://responsiblestatecraft.org/us-hamas-middle-east/

[8] Nesrine Malik, Ibid. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/jan/08/israel-gaza-middle-east-escalation

[9] Khaled Elgindy, “Biden’s mixed messages to Israel are coming home too roost,” Responsible Statecraft, July 2, 2024. https://responsiblestatecraft.org/biden-netanyahu-israel-lebanon/

[10] Tom Ambrose, “Middle East crisis: Iran sounds warning on Israel ‘aggression’ in Lebanon – as it happened,” The Guardian, June 29, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2024/jun/29/israel-gaza-war-middle-east-iran-lebanon-hamas

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Jeremy Brecher is a historian, author, and co-founder of the Labor Network for Sustainability. He has been active in peace, labor, environmental, and other social movements for more than half a century. Brecher is the author of more than a dozen books on labor and social movements, including Strike! and Global Village or Global Pillage and the winner of five regional Emmy awards for his documentary movie work.