Thursday, December 05, 2024

 UPDATED

After Aleppo, what will happen to the Kurds of northwest Syria? (Plus statements from Kurdish and Syrian organisations)



Published 
Syrian refugees flee Aleppo

First published in The New Arab.

The momentous takeover of Syria’s second city, Aleppo, and surrounding areas on 29 November by the Islamist Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the Turkish-backed self-styled Syrian National Army (SNA) has significant ramifications for Syria and possibly the wider region.

More immediate, however, is its impact on the hundreds of thousands of Kurds who live in northwest Syria.

As Aleppo collapsed to the lightning HTS-led offensive, the Turkish-backed SNA seized on the momentum to capture the town of Tel Rifaat and surrounding villages from the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG).

Tens of thousands of Kurds have fled from that area. They are enduring freezing winter conditions on their way to the relative safety of the Kurdish-administered territories east of the Euphrates River.

HTS originated as an offshoot of Al-Qaeda called Jabhat al-Nusra and has fought the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad since the early years of the civil war that began in 2011. The group has established itself as Assad’s most formidable adversary in the conflict and has long controlled large parts of Syria’s strategic northwestern Idlib province.

The SNA consists of numerous armed groups that Turkey has used as proxies, mainly against the YPG and the larger multi-ethnic Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), of which the YPG is the backbone. Turkey used these rebels to invade the northwestern Kurdish enclave of Afrin in 2018, displacing tens of thousands of its native population, primarily into the adjacent Tel Rifaat area. These same Kurds now find themselves displaced once again.

Aleppo city has two Kurdish-majority neighbourhoods, Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh. Altogether, there are approximately 500,000 Kurds in this large northwestern area west of the Euphrates River, now largely under HTS and SNA control.

“Kurds have had a bad experience with HTS folks from the Jabhat al-Nusra days,” Mohammed A. Salih, Non-Resident Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute and an expert on Kurdish and regional affairs, told The New Arab.

“The fundamental problem with many Assad opposition groups is that they are chauvinistic toward Kurds, perhaps as a result of decades of Baathist exclusionary nationalist teachings,” he said.

In Salih’s estimation, most of these groups are Islamist extremists, putting them at odds with the majority of Syria’s Kurdish minority.

“Kurds want to deal with a party in the opposition that is willing to take into account their demands for cultural and political rights as a distinct community within Syria,” Salih said. “And even though the majority of Syrian Kurds are Muslims, they are staunchly secular in their way of life and expect this to be respected.”

In his view, Kurdish civilians are undoubtedly in danger due to the current circumstances in Aleppo and other areas west of the Euphrates.

“Kurds cannot trust the HTS or the SNA,” Salih said. “They have good reason for this based on the ideological nature of these groups and their past records both in dealing with them and the non-Sunni, non-Arab and non-Turkmen populations of Syria,” he added. “It’s a very fluid and unpredictable situation.”

Consequently, he believes the “best option” for Kurds is to evacuate east of the Euphrates, where the SDF is in a much better position to protect them. Reports suggest that the YPG has begun pulling forces from the Kurdish-majority neighbourhoods in coordination with HTS to allow Kurdish residents to evacuate.

It’s unclear if HTS can provide security guarantees for any Kurds who decide to remain in their homes in the city.

“In Aleppo, it depends on whether the YPG can reach a reliable understanding with HTS there for Kurdish civilians not to be harmed. There is no guarantee for that,” Salih said.

“In reality, it is more likely that a humanitarian disaster will materialise as a result of the influx of tens of thousands of displaced people to SDF-controlled areas in west Euphrates, which are already stretched thin in terms of resources and governance capabilities,” he added.

Kyle Orton, an independent Middle East analyst, described the present situation for Kurds in northern Syria as “precarious” but believes they have a better chance of surviving under HTS rule than other Syrian minorities.

“In theory, HTS’s Islamist worldview is actually less of a menace to Kurds per se, those that do not have ties to the YPG, since Kurds are Muslims,” Orton told TNA. “Christians and particularly Alawis have the most to fear from HTS rule, again in theory.”

He noted that HTS has made a “concerted effort to present a tolerant face” towards minorities in areas it has controlled, such as Christians in Idlib.

“How long any of this lasts is anyone’s guess: whatever the formal status of HTS’s relations with Al-Qaeda, it is a jihadist-derived entity, and there is every reason for scepticism,” Orton said.

“Assuming HTS does not initiate a concerted campaign of persecution against Kurds in Sheikh Maqsoud and other Kurdish-majority areas it has captured, we should expect most people to stay put,” he added.

“Settled communities will endure great hardships to maintain their homes and only move when they really have no other choice.”

Both analysts see the Turkish-backed SNA as a markedly more significant threat to Kurds than HTS.

“What we are seeing is that there is an actual demographic change campaign against Kurds underway in areas west of the Euphrates, particularly those areas under the control of the SNA. The SNA represents the most anti-Kurdish faction among the anti-Assad opposition groups,” Salih said.

“Kurds in the Tel Rifaat and the entire Shahba region are in danger of retribution by SNA groups whose entire mission at this point at Turkey’s behest appears to be fighting Kurds,” he added. “A mass displacement of Kurds from these areas is already going on.”

Orton also believes the SNA is a “much more worrying” threat to Kurds.

“There is little discipline in SNA ranks, and its fighters carry a much more bitterly ethno-sectarian outlook,” he said. “The chances of indiscriminate attacks on Kurdish populations by the SNA are much higher, and even without a targeted assault, the SNA’s governance methods are much more predatory and chaotic,” he added.

“It will not be so easy to live a ‘normal’ life in areas the SNA administers, and there is every reason to expect a larger outflow of Kurds.”

As if matters couldn’t get any worse, this new crisis could unwittingly end up empowering remnants of the Islamic State (IS) if the SDF has to focus its attention and resources elsewhere. The US has partnered with the SDF against IS for a decade now. The SDF was the main fighting force against IS, dismantling the entirety of its territorial self-styled caliphate on Syrian soil by 2019.

“It has to be assumed that the SDF will take contingency steps to protect its borders, and to that extent, its focus on IS diminishes. Odds are that IS will try to make its presence felt in the current melee,” Orton said.

“It seems likely IS will make its move in the northwest, at the centre of the action, but it could well be within the SDF statelet, especially if developments extend the instability further east,” he added.

Salih also believes the post-29 November turmoil is “inevitably impacting” SDF priorities.

“If Kurds are under attack in northwestern Syria, SDF fighters will have less incentive to prioritise the fight against IS,” he said.

In Salih’s view, this situation “highlights a fundamental miscalculation” in America’s strategy toward Syria’s Kurds, namely focusing exclusively on their joint fight against IS. By doing so, Washington ignored the “dire governance and humanitarian conditions” in the SDF-controlled areas caused by Turkish strikes and now the mass displacement and killing of Kurds in northwest Syria.

“This approach is unsustainable and counterproductive,” Salih said. “If continued, it will only further bolster IS and recreate the conditions for its resurgence.”

Paul Iddon is a freelance journalist based in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan, who writes about Middle East affairs.


Syrian Democratic Forces: ‘We will stand firm and fulfill our historic duty to safeguard the region and its people’

First published at SDF Press Centre on December 1.

This week has witnessed a large-scale attack and substantial shifts have happened. Damascus government forces have deteriorated in Aleppo and other regions. It is no doubt that this attack is orchestrated by the Turkish occupation state, with the ultimate goal of occupying the entire Syrian territory. However, the primary target of this attack remains the areas under the Autonomous Administration to prevent the peaceful coexistence of the region’s diverse peoples, including Kurds, Arabs, Syriacs, and other communities. The Autonomous Administration’s regions are facing a large-scale attack, with a particular focus on the areas of Al-Shahba’a and Aleppo. This constitutes a grave threat to the survival of our people.

This critical moment represents a historic turning point for all Syrians, especially those residing in the Democratic Autonomous Administration. The sole objective of this attack is to our safe areas and ultimately occupy Syrian territory. The aggressor seeks to inflict suffering upon all the region’s peoples.
For several days, our brave fighters have been fiercely resisting the ongoing attacks on the Manbij front and west of the Euphrates.

Our Syrian Democratic Forces have consistently fulfilled their duty to liberate and protect the region. We reaffirm our commitment to these historical responsibilities, regardless of the cost. We will stand firm against these attacks and fulfill our historic duty to safeguard the region and its people. There should be no doubt about our resolve. We urge everyone to heed the call for public mobilization and to coordinate closely with the SDF and Internal Security Forces. It is imperative that we stand united in these challenging times.

In these historic days, we call upon our people to join forces in the defense of their villages, cities, and the entire region. We must participate in the people’s revolutionary war and fulfill our duty to protect our homeland. We call upon the youth of the region, including Kurds, Arabs, Syriacs, Assyrians, Armenians, and Circassians, to fulfill their historical role by joining the resistance fronts and enlisting in the ranks of the SDF, YPG, and YPJ.

The current war is a noble struggle for humanity and human dignity. It is a war to protect the values of freedom and civilization against the obscurantist ideologies of ISIS and Erdogan. This is a war for light and liberation, a war that guarantees a future of coexistence and brotherhood among peoples.

We urge the young men and women of the region to join the SDF and contribute to building a free future. We are confident that with the active participation of our youth, we can repel this attack and thwart the plans of the Turkish occupation and its mercenaries.

SDF General Command
December 1, 2024


Syrian Democratic Council: ‘We hold the Syrian regime accountable for the ongoing crisis in the country’

First published at Syrian Democratic Council on December 2.

The Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) strongly condemns the resurgence of violence in Syria. It expresses deep concern over the overall developments in the country, including the takeover of Aleppo city and the countryside of Hama by Turkish-backed armed groups without resistance.

The SDC condemns the threats faced by Syrian civilians across the country. Also, it calls on the international community to take immediate and effective action to halt the escalating violence in northwestern Syria. It urges the exertion of maximum pressure on all conflicting parties to cease fire. The goal is to engage in comprehensive new peace talks that represent the Syrian people and their aspirations. These talks should include the participation of all relevant Syrian parties without exclusion.

The SDC holds the Syrian regime accountable for the ongoing crisis in the country, blaming it for rejecting all initiatives aimed at preventing a humanitarian disaster in Syria. Furthermore, it directly holds the Turkish occupation accountable for the recent escalation of violence in northwestern Syria.
Additionally, it expresses deep concern over the dire humanitarian situation faced by the displaced people from al-Shahbaa region. Moreover, it calls upon the United Nations and the UN Security Council to intervene immediately. It urges the international community to take swift action to protect all Syrian civilians from the imminent threat posed by Turkish-backed groups, which have previously committed war crimes, genocide, and forced displacement.

The SDC warns of the dangers of the Islamic State ISIS) exploiting the recent escalation in northwestern Syria. In addition, it calls on the US-led Global Coalition to strengthen its support for the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in their fight against ISIS. Consequently, it expresses serious concerns regarding the anxieties of Iraqi people, and emphasizes the need for cooperation between Iraqi forces and the SDF, in coordination with the Global Coalition, to enhance the fight against terrorism.

On the other hand, the SDC affirms the importance of the Russian Federation’s role in supporting a comprehensive political solution. At the same time, it reiterates its openness to engage in dialogue with Turkey, rejecting all pretexts used to justify further occupation of Syrian territory.

Therefore, under these critical circumstances, the SDC assures these matters for the Syrian people as follows:

1- The continuation of conflicts among Syrian parties only serves the enemies of the Syrian people and exacerbates the suffering of civilians. Therefore, the SDC calls for prioritizing engaging in the national dialogue over the use of force.

2- The SDC calls for an end to all violations targeting specific components of the Syrian society. Also, it reaffirms that Kurds and other national and religious minorities are an integral part of Syria’s history and people.

3- The Syrian crisis can only be resolved through a just political solution that guarantees the rights of all Syrians and achieves justice, freedom, and equality. This solution should be free from any external interference or attempts to impose a new reality by force.

In conclusion, Syrian national dialogue is the sole pathway to resolving the Syrian crisis experienced by the Syrian people as a whole. The SDC is open to dialogue with all Syrians to strengthen Syria’s unity, security, and sovereignty. It also appeals to all patriotic Syrians in all regions of Syria to resist incitement, revenge, and malicious propaganda. It also emphasizes the importance of adhering to the political solution that is in line with UN Resolution 2254, which ensures a democratic transition. This transition should strengthen Syria’s unity and sovereignty, within the framework of a decentralized democratic political regime that meets the aspirations of all Syrians.

Syrian Democratic Council
December 2, 2024


Women’s Protection Units: ‘Led by women, our people have shown great resilience in the face of these attacks’

First published at Women’s Protection Units on December 2.

Over the past several days, our region, along with all of Syrian territory, has been subjected to a large-scale attack from multiple fronts. It began in Aleppo, where the Syrian people were left face to face with horrific massacres. Simultaneously, these attacks targeted our areas in North and East Syria, where we have demonstrated relentless resistance against these extensive assaults, particularly in the regions of Shahba and Aleppo. Our people, led by women, have shown great resilience in the face of these attacks.

Our people in Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh, who have gained extensive experience in resistance and warfare over the years, have once again organized themselves against these assaults. Operating under the name of the Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh Protection Forces, they have thwarted dozens of attacks by mercenaries of the Turkish occupation state.

Undoubtedly, the war continues on multiple fronts. Unfortunately, several young men and women of the Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh Liberation Forces have fallen captive to these mercenaries. These barbaric mercenaries, who have no regard for the ethics or laws of war, have heinously violated the dignity of the women prisoners, using them as tools for propaganda on their media outlets. They have shamelessly declared to the captive women that they would once again sell them in slave markets. Such actions are utterly inhumane and must not be tolerated.

As the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ), we strongly condemn the brutal acts of the Turkish occupation mercenaries against the captured women and pledge that we will avenge them. We call upon international organizations, particularly Amnesty International and the International Committee of the Red Cross(ICRC), as well as all women’s and human rights organizations, to fulfill their duties in protecting these women who defended their neighborhoods and cities. We insist on the necessity of safeguarding their rights as prisoners of war.

The atrocities committed today by the Turkish occupation mercenaries against the captured young women mirror those carried out by the terrorist organization “ISIS” in 2014 in Sinjar, Mosul, and Raqqa, where thousands of women were sold in slave markets. These actions represent the patriarchal mindset that reached its peak with “ISIS” and Erdogan’s mercenaries. They are well aware that Kurdish women have written heroic epics against their barbaric practices, resisting to the very end. This is why their inhumane practices have escalated to the level of outright hostility against women.

We direct our call to women’s rights organizations, civil society organizations, prominent figures, freedom advocates, and democrats to protect the captive women. It is imperative to expose the brutality of the Turkish occupation state and its mercenaries on a global scale, revealing the extent of their terrorism and holding Erdogan and the Turkish occupation state accountable for this war and the atrocities committed against the captured young women.

As the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ), we once again condemn the captivity of the female fighters from the Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh Protection Forces. We affirm that we will hold the Turkish occupation state and its mercenaries accountable on the frontlines of resistance. In this context, during these historic days marked by extensive attacks on our regions and Syria as a whole, we declare that we stand on the frontlines to protect all women and our people. We also call upon all young women, wherever they may be, to join the ranks of the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) and take their place on the frontlines of defense. Only in this way can we protect our land and dignity.

The General Command of the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ)
02.12.2024


Kurdistan Democratic Communities Union: ‘It is necessary to be organized, prepare self-defense and prevent occupation’

Published at KCK on December 1.

Once again, it is aimed at deepening the chaos and conflicts in Syria through the deployment of reactionary fascist gangs. For this purpose, the gangs that are being fed by Turkey are directed firstly against Aleppo and are now headed towards Hama and other cities. Simultaneously, an invasion attack was launched against Shahba. At the same time, there are attacks on all of Northern and Eastern Syria. Unfortunately, the Syrian state lacked the will to face the attacks, did not take a stance to defend the people, and abandoned all the places where the gangs were headed. As a result, all the peoples of Syria are facing the threat of a massacre.

A global plan is being executed against the Middle East and Syria. The Turkish state is taking advantage of this situation to realize its genocidal, colonialist, racist, and expansionist aims. It wants to eliminate the gains of the peoples, particularly the Kurdish people, and realize the Kurdish genocide. Behind the attacks launched by these gangs stands the Turkish state and the aforementioned aims of the Turkish state. It is very clear that this offensive will be the cause of more massacres and genocide in Syria and the Middle East. They aim to break the peoples against each other and deepen the existing problems. Giving a role to the Turkish state both in Syria and the Middle East will lead to extremely dangerous consequences.

As a movement, we have always been in favor of all peoples living together, equally and freely, in Syria, and we have strived for this to be realized. The creation of a democratic Syria is the only correct solution for the benefit of all Syrian peoples. We believe that the construction of a democratic Syria is a project that would also contribute to the democratization of the Middle East and the solution of its problems. The Turkish state, on the other hand, intervenes in the situation in Syria with racist, genocidal, and expansionist ambitions and thereby blocks the democratization of Syria and the development of democratization in the Middle East. It approaches Syria with an anti-Kurdish mentality and has set as its main goal the elimination of the democratic autonomous administration. This has led to the deepening of the insoluble situation in Syria. The aim of the Turkish state is to eliminate the democratic autonomous administration, to prevent the development of a democratic solution in Syria, and to take Syria under its domination. The attacks launched again recently by the gangs serve also this purpose. The Turkish state is preparing to take action against Rojava with the attack of the gangs and to eliminate the revolution by occupying Rojava.

An extraordinary process is taking place both in Rojava and in all of Syria. The Turkish state is taking advantage of the situation and trying to implement its policies of occupation and genocide. For this purpose, it is trying to carry out massacres and eliminate the autonomous administration by invading Northern and Eastern Syria by both backing the gangs and taking action itself. Against this, our peoples must organize everywhere on the basis of self-defense, defend themselves, and prevent any occupation and massacres. The dangers that arise can only be overcome by developing the self-defense of the people. Our people must be vigilant; they must defend themselves without waiting for help from elsewhere. Our people must act together and integrate with the defense forces wherever they are. The process has made it vital to develop the Revolutionary People’s War. Based on this, our peoples must organize and act on the basis of the strategy of revolutionary people’s war by developing their self-defense.

Co-Presidency, KCK Executive Council


Kurdistan National Congress: Escalation in Syria as Islamists loyal to Turkey launch attack on Kurdish areas

First published at KNK on November 29.

Following the outbreak of the heaviest fighting in Syria in several years, Kurdish areas are now under acute threat from attacks by jihadist groups cooperating with Turkey. While the Islamist group Haiat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda formerly known as al-Nusra Front, has been advancing on Aleppo since Wednesday and fighting with the Assad regime’s forces, the Turkish-loyal mercenaries of the so-called Syrian National Army (SNA) are currently preparing a major attack on the Kurdish region of Tal Rifaat in northwestern Syria. The Turkish army is already bombing the region from the air and on the ground. Attacks on the Kurdish town of Ain Issa have also been reported. According to local sources, Turkey has also opened the border to northwestern Syria, allowing more jihadist fighters to enter Syria.

Tal Rifaat is home to several hundred thousand Kurdish refugees who were forced to flee in 2018 following Turkey’s war of aggression on Efrîn (Afrin) in violation of international law. Since then, the SNA, an alliance of various Islamist organizations and former IS fighters, and the Turkish army have controlled the region. Human rights organizations fear that the SNA’s attacks could once again drive refugees out of Efrîn. Ethnic cleansing of the Kurdish population took place in Efrin during the Turkish occupation. Since then, Turkey has expelled the majority of Kurds in the region and settled people of Arab origin, leaving the Kurdish population as a minority in the region. Systematic human rights violations such as abductions, expulsions, torture and sexual violence under the rule of Islamist militias have been reported from the region. Now the people of Tal Rifaat face a similar fate. Aleppo’s Kurdish population, which lives mainly in the neighborhoods of Shasmeqsûd and Eşrefiyê, is also threatened by the advance of Haiat Tahrir Al-Sham, an offshoot of al-Qaeda. This group has repeatedly attacked areas of Kurdish self-rule in the past during the Syrian civil war.

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is a jihadist alliance that has controlled Idlib province in northwestern Syria since 2017, formed by the merger of several Islamist groups, including the al-Qaeda affiliate Nusra, which rebranded as Fateh al-Sham in 2016. Listed as a “terrorist” organization by the UN Security Council, HTS has expanded its influence into SNA-held northern Syria, often with the tacit approval of Turkey. HTS seeks to project an image of respectability and governance reliability, despite reports of an increasingly totalitarian regime and Islamist theocracy in Idlib. The international community should be wary of HTS’s expansion into Turkish-occupied territory, as it has been linked to anti-Semitic propaganda and has ties to al-Qaeda, despite efforts to distance itself from its jihadist roots. Notably, a perpetrator involved in a foiled terrorist attack in Munich expressed sympathy for HTS, highlighting the group’s continued relevance in the broader landscape of extremist threats.



Gilbert Achcar: What is happening in Syria? (Plus Leila al-Shami: ‘Our dream of an Assad-free Syria has returned with Aleppo rebel advance’)



Published 
Free Syria flag

First published in Arabic at Al-Quds al-Arabi. Translation from Gilbert Achcar's blog.

In just a few days, after having remained relatively static for a few years, Syria has turned anew into a theatre of war of movement, in what looks like a resumption of the last major displacement of the battlefronts that took place in 2016, when the Assad regime regained control of Aleppo with Iranian and Russian support and Turkish complicity. Here we are now, facing a surprise attack accompanied by a sudden expansion of the forces of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (Organization for the Liberation of al-Sham, i.e. Syria, commonly referred to by its Arabic acronym HTS), the Salafi jihadist group that has controlled the Idlib region in northwestern Syria since 2017.

As is well known, the origin of the group goes back to Jabhat al-Nusra, which was founded in 2012 as a branch of Al-Qaeda in Syria, then announced its defection from the organization under the name Jabhat Fath al-Sham in 2016, before absorbing other groups and becoming Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham the following year. The HTS invasion of Aleppo in recent days was carried out at the expense of the Syrian regime’s army, backed by Iranian and Russian forces. As for the Turkish role, it was again one of complicity, but in the opposite direction this time, as HTS has become dependent on Turkey, which is its only outlet.

Let us take a closer look at this mayhem, starting with the Turkish role. At the beginning of the popular uprising in Syria in 2011, Ankara aspired to impose its tutelage over the Syrian opposition and through it over the country in the event of its victory. It then soon cooperated with some Arab Gulf states in supporting armed groups raising Islamic banners, when the situation got militarized and transformed from a popular uprising against a sectarian, despotic family rule into a clash between two reactionary camps, exploited by a third camp formed by the Kurdish movement. These developments paved the way for the Syrian territories to become subjected to four occupations, in addition to the Zionist occupation of the Golan Heights that began in 1967: Iranian occupation (accompanied by regional forces affiliated with Tehran, most notably Lebanon’s Hezbollah) and Russian occupation backing the Assad regime; Turkish occupation in two areas on Syria’s northern border; and US deployment in the northeast, in support for the Kurdish forces confronting ISIS or its remnants.

So, what happened in recent days? The first thing to stand out was the rapidity with which the Assad regime forces collapsed in the face of the attack, recalling the collapse of the Iraqi regular forces in the face of ISIS when it crossed the border from Syria in the summer of 2014. The reason for these two collapses lies mainly in the sectarian factor, their common feature being that the Alawite majority in the Syrian forces and the Shiite majority in the Iraqi forces had no incentive to risk their lives defending the Sunni majority areas under their control targeted by the attack. Add to this the resentment created by the existing regime’s failure to create incentivizing living conditions, especially in Syria, which has been undergoing an economic collapse and a major increase in poverty for several years. Last Saturday, the Financial Times quoted an Alawite saying: “We are prepared to protect our villages and towns, but I don’t know that Alawites will fight for Aleppo city ... The regime has stopped giving us reasons to keep supporting it.”

What is clear is that HTS, along with other factions under Turkish tutelage, have decided to seize the opportunity created by the weakening of Iranian support for the Assad regime that resulted from the great losses suffered by the Lebanese Hezbollah, Iran’s main armed wing in Syria, due to Israel’s onslaught on Lebanon. This weakening, combined with the weakening of Russian support due to the involvement of the Russian armed forces in the invasion of Ukraine, created an exceptional opportunity that HTS did seize. It is also clear that Turkey blessed this attack. Since 2015, Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s shift towards playing on the Turkish nationalist chord, along with his alliance with the Turkish nationalist far right, meant that his primary concern has become the fight against the Kurdish movement. In 2016, Ankara stabbed the Syrian opposition forces in the back by allowing the Syrian regime to retake Aleppo with Iranian and Russian support, in exchange for Russia allowing it to launch Operation Euphrates Shield and seize the Jarabulus area and its surroundings, north of the Aleppo Governorate, from the Kurdish forces that were dominant there.

This time too, Ankara took advantage of the attack by HTS on Aleppo to unleash its Syrian suppletive forces against the Kurdish forces. Erdogan had previously tried to reconcile with Bashar al-Assad, offering him support in extending his regime’s control over the vast area where the Kurdish movement is dominant in the northeast. However, the latter’s insistence that Turkey hand over to him the areas it controls on the northern border thwarted the effort. Erdogan then turned against the Assads again and gave his green light to HTS’s attack, angering the backers of the Syrian regime. The “difference of viewpoints” that Iran’s foreign minister alluded to during his visit to Ankara after the start of the attack, consists in the fact that Tehran sees the greater threat in HTS, while Ankara sees it in the Kurdish forces. Despite a common hostility towards the Kurdish movement, Tehran, Moscow and Damascus had concluded a long-term truce with it, waiting for the circumstances to change to allow them to resume the offensive for the control of the whole Syrian territory, while Ankara’s relationship with that movement has remained extremely hostile, in contrast with its cooperation with HTS which controls the Idlib region.

As for Israel and the United States, they are cautiously monitoring what is happening on the ground, as the two parties – the Assad regime and HTS – are almost equally bad in their eyes (despite the UAE’s efforts to whitewash the regime and Ankara’s efforts to whitewash HTS). The Zionist state’s main concern is to prevent Iran from seizing the opportunity of this new battle to strengthen its military presence on Syrian territory and find new ways to supply Hezbollah with weapons through it.

Finally, by stirring up sectarian animosities, these developments are pushing away the only hopeful perspective that arose in recent years in Syria, constituted by the massive popular protests against the deterioration of living conditions that have been taking place in the country since 2020. These protests began in the Suwayda region (inhabited by a Druze majority) in the territories controlled by the regime, and quickly turned into demanding Bashar al-Assad’s departure and the fall of the regime, thus reviving the spirit of the popular, democratic, non-sectarian uprising that Syria witnessed amid the Arab Spring, thirteen years ago. Let us hope that the unity of the people’s interests in livelihood and emancipation will, in a not-too-distant future, lead to the renewal of the original Syrian revolution and allow the country to be reunited on the democratic basis that the pioneers of the 2011 uprising dreamed of.


Our dream of an Assad-free Syria has returned with Aleppo rebel advance

Leila al-Shami

First published at The New Arab.

Eight years after Aleppo was subjected to a brutal starvation siege, pounded by the Assad regime, Russian and Iranian bombs and thousands of its residents massacred or forcibly displaced, the Free Syria flag flies over the citadel.

The rebel advance and consequent crumbling of regime forces took everyone by surprise, rapidly changing the map of power across northern Syria which had remained largely frozen since 2020 power-sharing agreements between Russia, Turkey and Iran.

In a few days Aleppo and Idlib province came under the control of rebel groups dominated by Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS).

The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army meanwhile launched an offensive in and around Tel Rifaat, under the control of the Kurdish-led, and US-backed, Syrian Democratic Forces.

Clashes were reported between opposition factions and the regime in the southern province of Daraa, whilst in Druze-dominated Suwayda, popular protests were held in support of Syrians in the north.

Syrians inside the country and abroad, were taken by surprise.

Many celebrated — whilst holding their breath, not daring to hope that this could signal the endgame for the regime.

For years, Assad has raped, tortured, starved, bombed and gassed the populace into submission. He’s been kept in power by foreign support and foreign bombs. But today Russia is bogged down in Ukraine and Iranian military infrastructure in Syria (including its proxy Hezbollah) has been decimated by Israeli strikes.

In recent days, Assad, isolated and no doubt panicking, has been frantically calling upon his Gulf allies for support.

By contrast, the rebels, seizing on this moment of weakness, look stronger and more unified than ever before, using new drone weaponry and capturing weapons stores from retreating regime forces who have put up little resistance.

Assad’s vengeance: When, not if

The rapid liberation of territory has given millions of Syrians hope that they may soon return home, and some already are. Syrians were filled with emotion to see videos circulated of prisoners, including many women, liberated from regime prisons. Over 100,000 remain in Assad’s gulag or disappeared.

But Syrians are also fearful. They fear regime reprisals against civilians. The regime and Russia are now bombing hospitals and camps for the displaced in Aleppo and Idlib in retaliation.

Doctors at a hospital in Aleppo appealed for support as they lacked capacity to deal with the influx of injured.

There are reports Iranian-backed Shia militia are entering the country from Iraq to bolster Assad’s forces.

Syrians also fear what may come next. There is no longer an organised democratic opposition inside the country — Assad made sure of that. The militias that are reclaiming territory are diverse in their composition but include authoritarian, extremist and in some cases foreign backed groups. They don’t represent Syrian’s revolutionary aspirations.

The rebels which advanced out of Idlib united under Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS).

HTS is an authoritarian Islamist militia, dominant in northern Syria. It has its roots in Al Qaeda but has significantly moderated in recent years and is a Syrian nationalist, not foreign jihadist, organisation.

It is the de facto local administration in Idlib running institutions, services and humanitarian assistance through the Syrian Salvation Government.

There have been constant wide-spread popular protests against the militia and its leader Mohammed al-Johani for their abuses and authoritarian rule.

Those who wield arms do not represent the aspirations of the majority. Regardless, supporters of the regime repeatedly slander all opposition to Assad as ‘terrorists’ using cut and paste War on Terror, Islamophobic and Zionist narratives to dehumanise them, reduce their diverse struggle to its most authoritarian components and legitimise regime violence against them.

Minority groups in particular are fearful, despite attempts by the alliance to reassure them; issuing statements ensuring the protection of minorities and calling for unity amongst all Syrians.

HTS has even set up a hotline for citizens in Aleppo and Idlib, so they can report any abuses or security incidents.

So far, religious minorities have been unmolested and Christians in Aleppo as well as religious leaders such as Bishop Ephrem Maalouli have issued statements that they are currently safe and prayers continue in churches.

Syrian Kurds, meanwhile, fear the advances of Turkish-backed forces and threats to their hard-won autonomy, especially given concerns over an anticipated American withdrawal leaving them vulnerable and isolated. Already, disturbing videos have circulated showing abuses against Kurdish-led forces.

Turkish-backed groups are unpopular amongst Syrians in general due to corruption, abuses and constant infighting. The Turkish state, once seen as an ally of the revolution, is now viewed with disdain due to its efforts to normalise with Assad and the surge of xenophobic attacks on Syrian refugees in Turkey.

Once again dominant ‘left’ narratives seek to deny Syrians any agency and view all events through a never-changing geo-political lens. Conspiracies circulate of foreign machinations behind recent events.

But foreign states are not interested in the overthrow of the regime, much less in Syrian self-determination.

The US, despite its anti-regime rhetoric, has only given partial support to rebels, enough to pressure Assad to the negotiating table not change the balance of power. US military intervention focused on defeating ISIS, not the regime.

Israel has a useful partner in a regime which, despite its anti-Israel rhetoric, only ever used its weapons to crush domestic opposition (and in many cases Palestinian resistance) rather than liberate Syrian territory from Israeli occupation.

Turkey’s interests focus on crushing Kurdish autonomy and returning refugees. Undoubtably, all of these states will now scramble to influence the course of events, ensuring their interests are protected and any outcome works in their favour.

Syrians are under no illusions; whatever comes after Assad will be a mess. The whole region is engulfed in flames.

But for millions of Syrians nothing can be worse than this genocidal fascist regime which has murdered hundreds of thousands, completely destroyed the country, handed it over to foreign powers, devastated the economy, caused half the population to flee their homes, and which now runs the country as a drugs cartel exporting the amphetamine Captagon.

Should the regime fall, millions of Syrians will be able to return home, allowing civil activism to resume once more. If Assad falls, there is a chance to hope, and hope has been in short supply amongst Syrians.

Leila Al-Shami is co-author of Burning Country: Syrians in Revolution and War and co-founder of From the Periphery media collective.


Warring in Syria: New Phases, Old Lies


A new bloody phase has opened up in Syria, as if it was ever possible to contemplate another one in that tormented land. Silly terms such as “moderate” are being paired with “rebels”, a coupling that can also draw scorn.

What counts as news reporting on the subject in the Western press stable adopts a threadbare approach.  We read or hear almost nothing about the dominant backers in this latest round of bloodletting.  “With little warning last Wednesday, a coalition of Syrian rebels launched a rapid assault that soon seized Aleppo as well as towns in the nearby Idlib and Hama provinces,” reported NBC News, drawing its material from the UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.

We are told about the advances of one organisation in particular: Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an outgrowth of Jabhat al-Nusra, a former al-Qaeda affiliate.  While the urgent reporting stressed the suddenness of it all, HTS has been playing in the jihadi playground since 2017, suggesting that it is far from a neophyte organisation keen to get in on the kill.

From Al Jazeerawe get pulpier detail.  HTS is the biggest group in what is dubbed Operation Deterrence of Aggression.  HTS itself comprises Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, Liwa al-Haqq, Jabhat Ansar al-Din and Jaysh al-Sunna.  That umbrella group is drawn from the Fateh al-Mubin operations centre, which is responsible for overseeing the broader activities of the armed opposition in northwestern Syria under the control of the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG). It is through the offices of SSG that HTS delivers essential goods while running food and welfare programs.  Through that governance wing, civil documentation for some 3 million civilians, two-thirds of whom are internally displaced people, has been issued.

The group, headed by Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani, himself an al-Qaeda recruit from 2003, then of Jabhat al-Nusra, has done much since its leader fell out with Islamic State and al-Qaeda.  For one, HTS has a series of goals.  It purports to be an indigenous movement keen on eliminating the Assad regime, establishing Islamic rule and expelling all Iranian militias from Syrian soil.  But megalomania among zealots will always out, and al-Jawlani has shown himself a convert to an even broader cause, evidenced by this remark: “with this spirit… we will not only reach Damascus, but, Allah permitting, Jerusalem will be awaiting our arrival”.

All of these measures conform to the same Jihadi fundamentalism that would draw funding from any Western intelligence service, provided they are fighting the appropriate villain of the moment.  We should also expect routine beheadings, frequent atrocities and indulgent pillaging.  But no, the cognoscenti would have you believe otherwise.  We are dealing, supposedly, with a different beast, calmer, wiser, and cashed-up.

For one thing, HTS is said to be largely self-sufficient, exercising a monopoly through its control of the al-Sham Bank and the oil sector through the Watad Company.  It has also, in the words of Robin Yassin-Kassab, become a “greatly moderated and better organised reincarnation of Jabhat al-Nusra.”  This could hardly cause cheer, but Yassin-Kassab at least admits that the group remains “an authoritarian Islamist militia” though not in the eschatological fanatical mould of its forebears.  “It has a much more positive policy towards sectarian and ethnic minorities than ISIS.”  Fewer beheadings, perhaps.

A fascinating omission in much commentary on these advances is Turkey’s outsized role.  Turkey has been the stalking figure of much of the rebel resistance against the Assad regime, certainly over the last few years.  Of late, it has tried, without much purchase, to normalise ties with Assad.  In truth, such efforts stretch as far back as late 2022.  The topics of concern for Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoĝan are few: dealing with the Kurdish resistance fighters he sorely wishes to liquidate as alleged extensions of the PKK, and the Syrian refugee problem.  The Syrian leader has made any rapprochement between the two states contingent on the withdrawal of Turkish forces from Syria.

With Damascus proving icily dismissive, Ankara got irate.  Indeed, there is even a suggestion, if one is to believe the assessment by Ömer Özkizilcik of the Atlantic Council, that Turkey was instrumental in initially preventing the rebels from attacking as far back as seven weeks ago.

Much in the latest spray of analysis, along with unfolding events, will require much revisiting and revision.  There is the issue of lingering Turkish influence, and whether Erdoĝan’s words will mean much to the charges of HTS as they fatten themselves on the spoils of victory.  There is the behaviour of HTS, which is unlikely to remain restrained in a warring environment that seems to treat atrocities as mother’s milk.  (Al-Jawlani has not shown himself to be above the targeting and massacring of civilians.)  The retaliation from the Syrian government and Russian forces not otherwise deployed against Ukraine also promises to be pitilessly brutal.

Then there are the untold consequences of a Syria free of Assad, a fate longed for by the coarsened righteous in Western circles and emboldened al-Jawlani.  This is certainly not off the books, given that both Iran and Russia are preoccupied, respectively, with Israel and Ukraine.

Were the regime, bloodthirsty as it is, to collapse, yet another cataclysmic tide of holy book vengeance is bound to ripple through the region.  Never mind: the babble about God and theocracy will be happily supplemented by covert operations and arms sales, all overseen by a wickedly smiling Mammon.

Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He lectures at RMIT University, Melbourne. Email: bkampmark@gmail.comRead other articles by Binoy.

Neocons Try Again in Syria


This originally appeared at Consortium News.

A day after Israel agreed to a ceasefire in Lebanon last week the long dormant war in Syria reignited as jihadist forces seized the city of Aleppo and advanced virtually unhindered in its quest to overthrow the Syrian government until finally meeting resistance from the Syrian Army backed up by Russia. This is the last chance for neocons in the United States to topple Syrian President Bashar al-Assad before Donald Trump, who tried to withdraw U.S. troops from Syria, resumes the presidency in 49 days.

On the neocon list of ways to make the world safer for Israel, Iran originally occupied pride of place. “Real men go to Tehran!” was the muscular brag. But Prime Minister Ariel Sharon was persuaded to acquiesce in a less ambitious plan – to “do Iraq” and remove the “evil dictator” in Baghdad first.

As the invaders/occupiers got bogged down in Iraq, it seemed more sensible to “do Syria” next. With the help of “friendly services,” the neocons mounted a false-flag chemical attack outside Damascus in late August 2013, blaming it on President Bashar al-Assad, whom U.S. President Barack Obama had earlier said, “had to go.”

Obama had called such a chemical attack a red line but, mirabile dictu, chose to honor the U.S. Constitution by asking Congress first. Worse still for the neocons, during the first days of September, Russian President Vladimir Putin pulled Obama’s chestnuts out of the fire by persuading Syria to destroy its chemical weapons under U.N. supervision.

Obama later admitted that virtually all of his advisers had wanted him to order Tomahawk cruise missiles into Syria.

Morose at CNN

I was lucky enough to observe, up-close and personal, the angry reaction of some of Israel’s top American supporters on Sept. 9, 2013, when the Russian-brokered deal for Syria to destroy its chemical weapons was announced.

After doing an interview in Washington on CNN International, I opened the studio door and almost knocked over a small fellow named Paul Wolfowitz, President George W. Bush’s former under-secretary of defense who in 2002-2003 had helped craft the fraudulent case for invading Iraq.

And there standing next to him was former Sen. Joe Lieberman, the Connecticut neocon who was a leading advocate for the Iraq War and pretty much every other potential war in the Middle East.

On the tube earlier, Anderson Cooper sought counsel from Ari Fleischer, former spokesman for Bush, and David Gergen, long-time White House PR guru.

Fleischer and Gergen were alternately downright furious over the Russian initiative to give peace a chance and disconsolate at seeing the prospect for U.S. military involvement in Syria disappear when we were oh so close.

The atmosphere on TV and in the large room was funereal. I had happened on a wake with somberly dressed folks (no loud pastel ties this time) grieving for a recently, dearly-departed war.

In his own interview, Lieberman expressed hope-against-hope that Obama would still commit troops to war without congressional authorization. I thought to myself, wow, here’s a fellow who was a senator for 24 years and almost our vice president, and he does not remember that the Founders gave Congress the sole power to declare war in Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution.

The evening of Sept. 9 was a bad one for more war and for pundits who like to joke about “giving war a chance.”

Menendez: ‘I Almost Vomited’

The neocons would face another humiliation three days later when The New York Times published an op-ed by Putin, who wrote of growing trust between Russia and the U.S. and between Obama and himself, while warning against the notion that some countries are “exceptional.”

Sen. Bob Menendez (D-NJ), then chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and an Israeli favorite, spoke for many Washington insiders when he said: “I was at dinner, and I almost wanted to vomit.”

Menendez had just cobbled together and forced through his committee a resolution, 10-to-7, to authorize the president to strike Syria with enough force to degrade Assad’s military. Now, at Obama’s request, the resolution was being shelved.

Cui Bono?

That the various groups trying to overthrow al-Assad had ample incentive to get the U.S. more deeply involved in support of that effort was clear. It was also quite clear that the government of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had equally powerful incentive to get Washington more deeply engaged in yet another war in the area – then, and now.

NYT reporter Judi Rudoren, writing from Jerusalem had the lead article on Sept. 6, 2013, addressing Israeli motivation in an uncommonly candid way. Her article, “Israel Backs Limited Strike Against Syria,” notes that the Israelis have argued, quietly, that the best outcome for Syria’s at the time two-and-a-half-year-old civil war, at least for the moment, was no outcome.

Rudoren wrote:

“For Jerusalem, the status quo, horrific as it may be from a humanitarian perspective, seems preferable to either a victory by Mr. Assad’s government and his Iranian backers or a strengthening of rebel groups, increasingly dominated by Sunni jihadis.

‘This is a playoff situation in which you need both teams to lose, but at least you don’t want one to win, we’ll settle for a tie,’ said Alon Pinkas, a former Israeli consul general in New York. ‘Let them both bleed, hemorrhage to death: that’s the strategic thinking here. As long as this lingers, there’s no real threat from Syria.’”

US Arming ‘Moderate Rebels’

Instead of Tomahawks, Obama approved (or winked at) covert action to topple Assad. That did not work out very well. An investment of $500 million to train and arm “moderate rebels” yielded only “four or five still in the fight,” as then-CENTCOM commander Gen. Lloyd Austin explained to Congress on Sept. 17, 2015.

In late September 2015 at the U.N., Putin told Obama that Russia is sending its forces into Syria; the two agreed to set U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov off to work out a ceasefire in Syria; they labored hard for 11 months.

A ceasefire agreement was finally reached and approved personally by Obama and Putin. The following list of events beginning in the fall of 2015 is instructive in considering how the revived conflict might work out (probably minus U.S.-Russian talks), if the ongoing jihadi attack on Syrian forces continues for more than a few weeks.

Does 2015 Chronology Foreshadow 2025?

Sept. 28, 2015: At the U.N., Putin tells Obama that Russia will start air strikes in Syria; invites Obama to join Russia in air campaign against ISIS; Obama refuses, but tells Kerry to get together with Lavrov to “deconflict” U.S. and Russian flights over Syria, and then to work hard for a lessening of hostilities and political settlement in Syria – leading to marathon negotiations.

Sept. 30, 2015: Russia starts airstrikes both against ISIS and in support of Syrian forces against rebels in Syria.

Oct. 1, 2015 to Sept. 9, 2016: Kerry and Lavrov labor hard to introduce ceasefire and some kind of political settlement. Finally, a limited ceasefire is signed Sept 9, 2016 – with the explicit blessing of both Obama and Putin.

Sept. 12, 2016: The limited ceasefire goes into effect; provisions include SEPARATING THE “MODERATE” REBELS FROM THE, WELL, “IMMODERATE ONES.”  Kerry had earlier claimed that he had “refined” ways to accomplish the separation, but it did not happen; provisions also included safe access for relief for Aleppo.

Sept. 17, 2016: U.S. Air Force bombs fixed Syrian Army positions killing between 64 and 84 Syrian army troops, with about 100 others wounded – evidence enough to convince the Russians that a renegade Pentagon was intent on scuttling the ceasefire and meaningful cooperation with Russia AND FELT FREE TO DO SO AND THEN MERELY SAY OOPS, WITH NO ONE BEING HELD ACCOUNTABLE!

Sept. 26, 2016: Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov said:

“My good friend John Kerry … is under fierce criticism from the U.S. military machine. Despite the fact that, as always, [they] made assurances that the U.S. commander in chief, President Barack Obama, supported him in his contacts with Russia (he confirmed that during his meeting with President Vladimir Putin), apparently the military does not really listen to the commander in chief.”

Lavrov went beyond mere rhetoric. He specifically criticized Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Joseph Dunford for telling Congress that he opposed sharing intelligence with Russia, “after the agreements concluded on direct orders of Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President Barack Obama stipulated that they would share intelligence… It is difficult to work with such partners…”

Sept. 29, 2016: KERRY’S HUBRIS-TINGED FRUSTRATION: Apparently Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Victoria Nuland, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Samantha Power, National Security Advisor Susan Rice, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, et al. had told Kerry it would be easy to “align things” in the Middle East.

And so, this is how Kerry started off his remarks at an open forum arranged by The Atlantic magazine and the Aspen Institute on Sept. 29, 2016. (I was there and could hardly believe it; it made me think that some of these stuffed shirts actually believe their own rhetoric about being “indispensable.”) Kerry said:

“Syria is as complicated as anything I have ever done in my public life in the sense that there are probably about six wars going on at the same time: Kurds against Kurds, Kurds against Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Sunni, Shia, everybody against ISIS, people against Assad, Al-Nusra… this is a mixed up sectarian and civil war and strategic and proxies, so it is very difficult to be able to align forces.”

Ultimately, Syrian, Russian and Hezbollah forces beat back the jihadists and liberated Aleppo and other parts of the country in spite of U.S. opposition and are being called upon again now to do the same.

Ray McGovern works with Tell the Word, a publishing arm of the ecumenical Church of the Saviour in inner-city Washington. His 27 years as a C.I.A. analyst included leading the Soviet Foreign Policy Branch and conducting the morning briefings of the President’s Daily Brief. In retirement he co-founded Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity (VIPS).

In Ukraine, the Desire to Sacrifice Oneself for the State Is Weak
December 4, 2024
Source: Socialist Project

Photo from the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine (Flickr, CC BY-SA 2.0)

Volodymyr Ishchenko is a Ukrainian sociologist who was politically active and took part in several left-wing initiatives in Ukraine before moving to Germany in 2019. Ishchenko currently works at the Freie Universität in Berlin and continues his research on the Ukrainian “revolutions,” the left, and the political violence of the extreme right, which he has been studying for 20 years. Since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, he has also written extensively in several international media outlets on different aspects of the conflict. He was interviewed by Philippe Alcoy and Sasha Yaropolskaya for the journal Révolution Permanente.

Philippe Alcoy, Sasha Yaropolskaya (PA-SY): Here in the West, there is much reporting of the enthusiasm of Ukrainians to defend their country. Yet today, we see images of young men deserting or refusing to serve in the army. Can you tell us how the Ukrainian population currently feels about the situation of the war with Russia?

Volodymyr Ishchenko (VI): There is no enthusiasm, or at least, this enthusiasm is limited to a much smaller group of people than in 2022. At that time, the enthusiasm was caused not only as a reaction to the Russian invasion but also by the fact that Russia’s initial invasion plan failed in a matter of days. There was not only outrage that Russia had attacked our country but also immense hopes for victory in that spring, and even more so after the Ukrainian counter-offensive in September 2022, with expectations of a greater success of the counter-offensive in 2023.

As we now know, last year’s Ukrainian campaign failed to achieve any of its objectives. We witnessed, instead, the relatively successful advance of Russian forces. This has consequences for how people feel about war. In public opinion, in particular, there are clear trends: when the situation on the front line was good for Ukraine and with chances of improvement, support for negotiations was very low. But when the situation deteriorated and hopes that Ukraine could win the war diminished, support for negotiations increased, while support for, and trust in, Zelensky decreased.

Much indicates that the enthusiasm of 2022 was quite fragile. And this is not the first time that we have seen this kind of dynamic. After the “Orange Revolution” of 2004 and the “EuroMaidan Revolution” of 2014, people had high expectations that quickly yielded to disappointment. A similar dynamic occurred after the election of Zelensky in 2019, and again in 2022. One line of interpretation was that these events were the manifestation of the rise of the Ukrainian nation with a quasi-theological dynamic, as the ultimate outcome of a national liberation struggle.

You mentioned desertion. The number of people trying to escape across the border is high. An even more telling statistic is that of the majority of men subject to military service and aged 18 to 60 who have not updated their data with the military recruitment office. This requirement had been introduced in order to make Ukrainian conscription a little more effective and to avoid resorting to the rather brutal method of grabbing people off the street but rather to try to collect data on all potential conscripts and then to start mobilizing them more effectively. If people do not update the data, they are punished with a large fine, and if they don’t pay it, they invite even more complications in their work and life.

So, it is a very serious matter. Yet despite everything, the majority of Ukrainian men have not obeyed this requirement. And as for Ukrainian men abroad, according to estimates, only a few have updated their data, although everyone was required to do so. This means that the real desire to sacrifice oneself for the state is very low.

Military conscription is becoming increasingly brutal. Videos have emerged of arrests of military conscripts in public and of clashes between police and military personnel on one side, and citizens present at the scene.

PA-SY: Is there a parallel to the situation in Russia on the issue of military conscription? And is there a fear on the part of the state that pushing for a larger conscription could lead to social discontent as in Russia, where for years there was a movement of conscripts’ families, especially wives and mothers, who mobilized to support their husbands and sons?

VI: In Russia, the regime was afraid of launching a large-scale conscription effort. It has tried to find different ways to avoid large waves of military conscription. But I feel that Ukraine, especially when supplies from the United States were low, had no choice, and so it lowered the conscription age. This was accompanied by great brutality on the part of the police.

PA-SY: Are there potential social protests that could arise from this situation?

VI: There is much one can say about this. Unlike Russia, conscription has always existed in Ukraine. So, this is not a single wave of conscription, like the one Putin announced in September 2022 in response to the Ukrainian counter-offensive. The Ukrainian army obtains its soldiers mainly through conscription. Volunteers do not constitute the majority of the Ukrainian army, and their number has become negligible since 2022. All the brutal methods of mobilization are the result of a weak desire to volunteer for the army.

PA-SY: Why is it so weak?

VI: The most generous explanation for the Ukrainian state, and also the one that is repeated in some circles, is that this is simply because the United States did not supply enough weapons. This argument implies a very specific idea of ​​how the war could be won. But it is far from certain that, even if all the weapons and supplies had been delivered in 2022, a decisive victory over Russia could have been won. I won’t speculate about this. But I don’t think that there is a consensus among military experts.

The other side of the coin is that the shipment of weapons to Ukraine is conditional on the effectiveness of Ukrainian mobilization. And so, amendment of the law on conscription this year was linked to the shipment of weapons by the United States. This is confirmed by many Ukrainian politicians. The United States expected Ukraine to make conscription more effective.

Today, the most urgent issue is to reduce the conscription age. It has already been reduced from 27 to 25, and now there is strong pressure to lower it even further, to 22, or even to 18.

There’s a strong argument against this. That is the most fertile demographic cohort of the Ukrainian population, and it is also one of the smallest. In fact, if you send these young people to be massacred, the ability of the Ukrainian population to regenerate its numbers after the war will diminish even further. According to the latest UN projections for the Ukrainian population, by the end of the century it will number only 15 million, compared to 52 million in 1992, right after the disintegration of the USSR.

And this is not even the worst-case scenario. It’s based on the rather optimistic assumption that the war will end next year and that millions of refugees, especially fertile women, will return and be able to contribute to the reproduction of the Ukrainian population, which is not certain, to say the least.

This is an impossible choice. Throughout history, many nations have fought long wars against imperial conquests. And not necessarily only against imperial conquests, by the way. Take revolutionary France. After 1789, France was able to defeat the coalition of the greatest European powers until 1812, when Napoleon was defeated in Russia. For two decades, France defeated all of Europe. Such was the power of revolution. After 1917, revolutionary Russia was able to defeat the coalition of the strongest imperialist powers that all intervened because of the power of its revolution and its ability to build an effective, large, and victorious Red Army. In the Vietnamese War, the Vietnamese defeated France and the United States over a period of decades. Afghanistan defeated the USSR and the United States in a war that lasted from 1979 to 2021. Theoretically, one might think that a small nation could defeat a much larger enemy. But that requires a different social stature and politics than those of Ukraine.

All of these wars were fought by countries that had large peasant populations that could mobilize in large-scale revolutionary or guerrilla wars. In Vietnam, the demographics held up over the decades, despite the genocide that the United States committed, and even though the balance of forces was so lopsided. Such is the power of revolution.

Post-Soviet Ukraine is a very different country. Its demographic structure is very different from Vietnam’s, Afghanistan’s, and even Ukraine’s of a hundred years ago, when it was a largely peasant country with multiple revolutionary armies – the Red Army, Makhno’s anarchist army, armies of the various nationalist warlords – all of whom benefited from the demographics of the peasantry. Today’s Ukraine is a modernized urban society with a declining demographic. It’s not going to be able to wage war for decades.

And there are no revolutionary changes in today’s Ukraine. The three Ukrainian “revolutions” – 1990, 2004, and 2014 – did not create a strong revolutionary state capable of establishing an effective apparatus that could mobilize an army and the economy. The idea behind these “revolutions” was that Ukraine should integrate into the US-led world order as a kind of periphery. This type of integration would benefit only a narrow middle class, some opportunistic oligarchs, and transnational capital.

In Ukraine, the regime is still discussing a rather moderate tax increase – that after two and a half years of war. That says a lot about how much Ukrainians trust the state and about their willingness to defend that state. The question of social class was very important because the conscripts came mainly from the lower classes. These are mainly poor people who could not bribe the recruitment officers to let them go and people who could not find a way to flee the country.

PA-SY: Zaluzhnyi, head of the Ukrainian armed forces, and Kuleba, the foreign minister, were dismissed this year. Could you talk of the political struggles within the Ukrainian bourgeoisie?

VI: Zaluzhny is a potential political opponent of Zelensky. It was dangerous for Zelensky to see a popular general become a politician. This was one of Zelensky’s motives in sending him to the UK as ambassador. As for Kuleba, there was also a problem of trust.

We can analyze this as building a vertical power structure, an informal way of consolidating the elite and of governing the country using both formal institutions, such as the democratic Constitution and the Parliament, but also informal mechanisms. All Ukrainian presidents have tried to build this informal power. Zelensky’s power vertical started to be built before the invasion. But the war offered more opportunities, and his chief of staff, Andrei Yermak, is considered the second most powerful person in the country, with enormous informal power and the ability to build an effective informal structure that consolidates power around the presidential office.

The dynamics of these conflicts, that sometimes break out into public view, remain mostly hidden. They are mainly related to the results at the front and to military developments. In case of bad developments for the Ukrainian army, these conflicts would intensify, and some radical nationalists, even some oligarchs, could raise their heads, and so forth.

A lot depends on the position of the US and the EU and the strategy that Trump will choose. Zelensky has to end this war in a way that could be presented to the Ukrainian public as a victory, for example, by obtaining EU or NATO membership or some generous funding programs for Ukraine, even if it loses territory. With an outcome perceived as a defeat, Zelensky would probably not have much future.

PA-SY: What is the role of the far right in Ukraine?

VI: This topic has been widely discussed in Western media throughout the war. Some liberal media outlets try to portray the Ukrainian far right as less dangerous than the Western far right, because it is fighting on the right side of history against a Russia that is the more important enemy. The Zelensky regime has tried to appeal to these sectors of the far right by holding official ceremonies for the Azov Battalion or celebrating the birthday of Stepan Bandera, the extreme nationalist and Nazi sympathizer. It is difficult to follow from France how this dynamic is evolving as the war progresses.

PA-SY: Is the far right a small but powerful segment due to its presence in the military. Or is it gaining popularity outside of traditional sectors of the far right? Does the far right play a significant role in the Ukrainian political landscape, or is its influence being exaggerated by the media?

VI: When people in the West discuss the Ukrainian far right, I think they are using the wrong point of comparison. For example, in France, the far right, mainly the Rassemblement national, Le Pen’s party, is much less extreme than the movements that we are talking about in Ukraine. Le Pen’s party probably does not use Nazi symbols and has a more sophisticated attitude toward the Vichy collaboration during World War II. They are trying to clean themselves.

But such is not the case in Ukraine. You mentioned Stepan Bandera, who is openly glorified, and even more so the Waffen-SS, especially by members of the Azov Battalion. The degree of extremism of the Ukrainian far right is much greater than that of the West’s far right.

Recently, an international conference, “Nation Europa,” was held in Lviv, the largest city of Western Ukraine, to which groups such as Dritte Weg from Germany, CasaPound from Italy, and similar neo-Nazi groups from many European countries were invited. All major far-right organizations of Ukraine participated, including the Svoboda party and prominent members of Azov/National Corps. These Ukrainian parties, organizations, and military units are generally referred to as the “far-right,” but they have international relations with Western groups that are much more extreme and violent than the mainstream far-right parties. Incidentally, most of the Ukrainian military units that participated in this conference have ties to the Ukrainian military intelligence service, the GUR.

The ideologically sanctioned capacity for political violence of the Ukrainian far right is much greater than that of the dominant far-right parties in the West. They have much more weaponry and many paramilitary movements built around official military units that are capable of political violence. Unlike mainstream Western far-right parties seeking parliamentary status, the power of the Ukrainian far right has always rested on its ability to mobilize in the streets and to threaten violence. They have not been able to get elected, with the exception of the elections of 2012, when the far-right Svoboda party won over 10% of the vote. (But the far right was able to gain much more significant representation and to form the largest factions in many local councils in Western Ukraine.)

Their main source of power comes from their ability to mobilize outside parliament, unlike parties formed by oligarchs (big capital) or by the weak liberals. Ukrainian nationalists can draw on a political tradition that goes back to the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), which was part of a family of fascist movements in interwar Europe. And post-Soviet Ukrainian nationalists have often drawn their inspiration directly from the OUN. This tradition has been upheld in the Ukrainian diaspora, particularly in North America. The Canadian public is only now discovering the number of Ukrainian fascists that its government welcomed after World War II. Other post-Soviet Ukrainian political currents don’t have this advantage of a preserved political tradition.

The members of the Azov battalion have today become very legitimate as war heroes. They enjoy extraordinary media attention and present themselves as an élite unit, a claim that the media uphold. Many Azov speakers have become celebrities. They have also benefited from a certain whitewashing in Western media, which before 2022 referred to them as neo-Nazis. Today, they easily forget this part of history.

And finally, we must think not only about the far right itself but also about the complicity of Ukrainian and Western elites in whitewashing the Ukrainian far right and ethno-nationalism. Not only in Ukraine but also in the West, discussing this topic today can immediately lead to ostracization. For example, Marta Havryshko, a Ukrainian historian who moved to the United States, continues to write critical articles about Ukrainian nationalists, Ukrainian ethno-nationalist politics, the Ukrainian far right, and she receives thousands of threats, death threats, rape threats.

PA-SY: Is Azov, in your view, the main force of the Ukrainian far right? Wasn’t it greatly weakened in the battles of Mariupol and Bakhmut? Do you think that it will still play an important role in the future, in the recomposition of the far right?

VI: On the contrary, Azov has grown, now forming two brigades – the 3rd Assault Brigade and the Azov Brigade of the National Guard. This is in addition to a special unit, the Kraken, which are subordinate to the GUR (military intelligence). Their political appeal and publicity in the media have grown considerably. Their legitimacy has also grown. So, they are not weakened, but strengthened. And contrary to popular myth, they have not become depoliticized.

PA-SY: Are you afraid that after the war, the extreme right, and in particular those that had fought at the front, will be the only force to have a sufficiently coherent ideological project for post-war Ukraine, given the absence of ideology of the neoliberal project for Ukraine and the weakness of the left?

VI: That depends entirely on the outcome of the war. And the range of possible outcomes is still very large. A nuclear war is a possible outcome, although one hopes that it is not the most likely one. In that case, everything we are discussing today will no longer matter. A lasting ceasefire is also possible, but unlikely.

The radicalization of the Ukrainian far right will depend on the stability of Zelensky’s government and the stability of the Ukrainian economy. In the event of the disintegration of state institutions and a failing economy, the nationalists will have a good chance of consolidating their power because they are a very legitimate, very well-known, and militarized political force.

PA-SY: What is the situation of the labour movement? There have been some minor strikes in Ukraine since the beginning of the war, especially in the health sector. But it is difficult to know what the real situation is. What is the situation and the capacity of the working class to organize and perhaps play a role, at least to counterbalance the rise of the extreme right in the country?

VI: The working class cannot play any role in the current situation. The labour movement in Ukraine was weak long before the war. The last really massive political strike was in 1993 among the miners of Donbass. They demanded autonomy for Donbass and closer relations with Russia, ironically. But even that strike was linked to the interests of the “red directors” of former Soviet enterprises who had a lot of power in the immediate post-Soviet years. They used the strike to obtain some concessions from the government. Eventually, the strike led to early elections and a change of government. But since then, there has been no large-scale strike.

For three decades, we have seen only small-scale strikes, usually limited to individual companies, at best to certain segments of the economy, and very rarely politicized. Moreover, it was precisely the inability to launch a political strike during the EuroMaidan of 2014 that led to the escalation of violence because that protest movement was unable to put sufficient pressure on a government that was unwilling to make concessions. This gave the radical nationalists the opportunity to promote their violent strategy of protest.

And so yes, since the current large-scale invasion, strikes are banned. The strikes that have taken place are probably informal strikes.

What will happen after the war still depends a lot on how it ends. But from what we understand, the empowerment of the labour movement would require some economic growth so that workers are not laid off. This requires a successful reconstruction of the Ukrainian economy.

In some very optimistic – but not necessarily likely – scenarios, Ukrainian soldiers returning to the Ukrainian economy could demand more from the government. That has indeed happened after some wars, particularly after World War I. But that remains speculative today. Much darker scenarios now seem more likely…

PA-SY: As concerns the situation and the positions of the Ukrainian left, at the beginning of the war, many articles and texts presented the point of view of Ukrainian left activists and explained how blind some of the Western left is for not supporting NATO arms deliveries more. In your articles, you try to present a more nuanced point of view on the war.

How have the positions of the Ukrainian left, the organized left, but also intellectuals, changed since the two years after the invasion? Is the left adopting a more critical position toward the Ukrainian government and NATO’s role in the conflict?

VI: The Ukrainian left has always been very diverse.

Ironically, the largest left party in Ukraine, the Communist Party of Ukraine, supported the Russian invasion. The Communist Party of Ukraine was a very important party… until EuroMaidan. It was the most popular party in the country in the 1990s. The Communist Party candidate won 37% of the vote in the 1999 presidential elections. Even on the eve of EuroMaidan, the Communist Party won 13% of the vote. Although its support had declined, it had significant representation in parliament and effectively supported the government of Viktor Yanukovych. After EuroMaidan, it lost its electoral stronghold in Donbass and Crimea, as these territories were cut off from Kiev. The party also suffered repression due to the government’s “decommunization” policies – the party was suspended, and in 2022, it was permanently banned, as were a number of other so-called pro-Russian parties.

Petro Simonenko, the leader of the party since 1993, fled to Belarus in March 2022. From Belarus, he supported the Russian invasion as an anti-fascist operation against the “Kiev regime.” The communist organizations in the areas occupied by Russia have merged with the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and participated in the local elections organized by Russia in 2023, even entering some local councils. The same merger occurred with the soviet-type Ukrainian trade unions in the occupied areas. Such is the lion’s share of what was called the left in Ukraine.

At the same time, there were much smaller and younger left groups. They were always critical of the communists and integrated better with the democratic socialists and the liberal left in the West. They also had a very different social base than the communists – closer to the pro-Western NGO-ized “civil society” of the middle class in Ukraine. After the invasion began, they were able to communicate their position much more effectively to the West through a kind of identity politics: “We are the Ukrainian left. The stupid and arrogant Western left does not understand anything about what is happening in the country.”

Of course, this position was very problematic, to say the least, from the very beginning. For comparison, the Communist Party had 100,000 card-carrying members in 2014. The young left milieu had no more than 1,000 activists and sympathizers in the whole country, even in the best years of its development, and their numbers have been declining since then, after Euromaidan. Among that left, most supported Ukraine, many volunteered for the army, but they were not able to create a left-wing military unit comparable to the extreme right units, even on a much smaller scale. Many also participated in humanitarian initiatives.

Today, some of them are tending to revise their positions on the war, especially in response to the brutal conscription. It is really difficult to claim that the war is still some kind of “people’s war” when the majority of Ukrainians do not want to fight. The extent to which they are willing to express this revised position also depends on their fear of repression. It is difficult to speak critically of the war in the Ukrainian public sphere. That kind of criticism exists mostly in private conversations, in “friends only” Facebook accounts and so on, and is articulated only very cautiously in publications.

There is also criticism of the ethno-nationalism coming from this left environment because it has become too difficult to ignore how Ukraine has changed in two years, with the spread of discrimination against Russian speakers and the regime’s ethnic assimilation policies. For example, Russian is no longer taught in Ukrainian schools, even as an option, even in massively Russian-speaking cities like Odessa, where probably 80-90% of even ethnic Ukrainian children speak Russian with their parents. A recently introduced bill could ban speaking any Russian in schools, not only in class with teachers, but also during breaks, in private conversations of students among themselves. The bill has already been approved by the Minister of Education.

The third segment of the Ukrainian left is Marxist-Leninist, and is part of what I call the “neo-Soviet revival” that is happening in many post-Soviet countries. They are usually organized in kruzhki – literally ‘circles’. These are proto-political organizations, something more than just Marxist-Leninist reading groups. They are much more popular in Russia, where they are able to create YouTube channels with hundreds of thousands of subscribers. In Russia, Belarus and Central Asia, kruzhki can involve thousands of young people who have not lived a single day in the USSR, but who are critical of the social and political reality of their country and who find in orthodox Marxist Leninism instruments to deal with this reality. They exist and have even developed in Ukraine as well, despite decommunization and the rise of anti-Russian nationalism and anti-communist attitudes.

Almost from the very beginning, these groups opposed their governments and adopted a revolutionary defeatist position. One can wonder whether a social revolution is even possible, as it was a hundred years ago in Ukraine in the collapsing Russian Empire. Nevertheless, from the very beginning, these groups criticized forced conscription, called for internationalism, and did not try to legitimize the actions of the Ukrainian state.


Volodymyr Ishchenko is a political activist in Ukraine and editor of the review Spiln’ya. He is a research associate at the Institute of East European Studies, Freie Universität Berlin.


Netherlands Trains Ukrainians  Operate Donated Minesweep

Dutch minehunter
Royal Netherlands Navy trained Ukrainians to operate two minehunters it will be donating (Royal Netherlands Navy)

Published Dec 4, 2024 6:22 PM by The Maritime Executive

 


The Netherlands reports its Royal Navy has completed an intensive training program for Ukrainians to eventually take command of two retired minesweepers the Netherlands will be donating to Ukraine. The Dutch along with the British and Belgians have committed to donating vessels to Ukraine which it is anticipated will be used to clear mine from the Black Sea and Ukraine’s seaports after the war. The Dutch highlight that Russia has laid many sea mines in the Black Sea.

A total of 35 Ukrainians went through an intensive two-month training program aboard one of the Dutch minesweepers, Makkum which was retired on November 25. The Royal Netherlands Navy notes the program was continuously adjusted based on the experience of the Ukrainians. NATO allies provided instructors and interpreters for the training and technical personnel were also undergoing training at the Naval Academy in Belgium.

The Netherlands plans to transfer the Makkum and her sistership Vlaardingen to Ukraine. Both vessels are part of the Netherlands’ Alkmaar class with the Makkum was commissioned in 1985 and the Vlaardingen commissioned in 1989. Vlaardingen was decommissioned in March while Makkum was decommissioned last month. The first crew is expected to man the Vlaardingen when it is handed over to Ukraine.

 

Makkum was used for the training as it was being decommissioned at the end of November (Royal Netherlands Navy)

 

Both vessels were frequently deployed to NATO during their operational life and participating in many exercises. Each vessel displaces 500 tons and measures 161 feet with a crew ranging between 20 and 34.

The Netherlands highlights that the vessels were also frequently used for clearing legacy ordinance dating to the Second and even the First World War. The officials said that it is estimated that there are still tens of thousands of sea mines, aircraft bombs, and other munitions in the North Sea. Every week, they said, fishermen find explosives off the coast of the Netherlands and Belgium. The two countries have a joint operation for the clearance of old munitions with the mine hunters rendering the explosive harmless.

During her career, Makkum is reported to have cleared 120 explosives from the North Sea. In her last month of service in March 2024, Vlaardingen defused three aircraft bombs found in the North Sea. This included two 500-pounders and a 1,000-pounder.

The Royal Netherlands Navy is building a new class of sophisticated mine hunters. Six vessels are planned with the new Vlissingen scheduled to be handed over to the Navy at the end of 2025. The new ships will include a “hypermodern toolbox” according to the Navy able to deploy unmanned systems to detect and clear explosives.