Authoritarians can lose elections, but should we be less concerned?
This is the story you often hear: In the old days, the military, fascists or communist parties seized power, destroyed democracy and suppressed people's freedoms. But today it is different: Populist parties attack democracy from within, infiltrate its institutions, destroy its debates through disinformation and, once in office, refuse to relinquish power.
This story, however, does not hold up. Not just because military coups are on the rise again (some are talking of a coup epidemic in Africa). And not just because, as I have argued here, the term "populism" is analytically weak and politically counterproductive — let me use the term "soft authoritarians" instead.
The story does not hold up because there are not many countries in Europe where soft authoritarians have come to power and are not giving up. Only Hungary and Serbia fit the description.
In Poland, soft authoritarians lost parliamentary elections last year. In Slovakia they lost elections in 2020 — but won again in the last parliamentary elections. In other countries, soft authoritarians have joined coalition governments without being able to cement themselves in power for the long term.
Last weekend, the Turkish opposition triumphed in mayoral elections across the country, a stinging rebuke to long-serving President Erdoğan (who is more of a hard authoritarian, but is also usually described as a 'populist').
What's wrong with them?
So, what's wrong with these soft authoritarians? Are they not as bad as they are made out to be? After all, they allow themselves to be defeated in elections. Putin would not do that; he has all serious opposition candidates killed or imprisoned.
Political scientists talk about hybrid regimes. They have the core features of democracies, such as regular elections with some competition, legal opposition and freedom of speech. At the same time, the rules are rigged and manipulated to ensure that elections are not really competitive.
Imagine a football team that can only play with nine players and the referee is an employee of the other team. You can still win the game, but it is much harder. Forget about equal chances.
A hybrid regime is attractive to a leader. You excite everyone with regular elections, the opposition is hopeful, change is in the air, but in the end, you win the elections again. The impression remains that your country is a democracy and that you are simply a very popular leader. This has worked well for Erdoğan, Orbán and Serbia's Vučic.
We could have a long discussion about whether such hybrid regimes represent a distinct, stable form of government — a third form of government alongside democracy and dictatorship — or whether there is simply a continuum between ideal democracy (which is nowhere to be found) and dictatorship, and some countries just happen to be somewhere in the middle.
The more important point is the distinction. Where on a continuum would we place certain political systems? Or how exactly would we define hybrid systems? Erdoğan's rule is far harsher and more repressive than Orbán's in Hungary. His regime might be better described as authoritarian, even if the opposition can win local elections.
But that does not mean Hungary is a democracy. The elite linked to the ruling FIDESZ party is not accountable to the Hungarian people. Elections are unfair and do not meet Hungary's commitments to the OSCE. The tax-funded state media is a propaganda channel for Orban and FIDESZ. It has become difficult to distinguish between party and state. Hungary's elections to the European Parliament in June will not be democratic.
In other words, hybrid regimes should not be confused with a new variant of democracy that we should get used to (what many call "illiberal democracy"; another unfortunate term). Their violations of democratic norms are serious, blatant and ongoing.
How to deal with this
What are the policy implications? First, once a state is on course to become, or is already entrenched as a hybrid regime, do not think that tinkering with this or that element will change anything. The EU made a big mistake recently by unfreezing up to €10.2 billion of funds for the Hungarian government, with most people assuming the money was paid in response to Orbán's blackmail over Ukraine support.
Second, if the EU wants to influence such states (be they member states or EU candidates), it needs to have its eyes on the ball all the time. It cannot afford to divide its efforts between different services, with one addressing hostile corporate takeovers by the ruling party and another with changing laws against civil society organisations. They are all connected parts of authoritarianism and corruption.
Third, our public debates should reflect the nature of these challenges. If we continue to operate with imprecise and misleading terms like populism or illiberalism, we obscure the challenge to democracy. We need to focus on the bottom line.
Prime Minister Meloni of Italy may support the EU line on Ukraine, but she has also proposed constitutional reforms that would lead to an extreme concentration of power in the prime minister. That is a democracy problem.
Hybrid regimes have no inherent core that prevents them from becoming full-fledged autocracies or returning to democracy through elections. It depends on many things, especially public opinion and the regional and international environment.
In democracy, as in security, the biggest risk for Europe is that Trump will be re-elected, emboldening soft and hard authoritarians alike. It is time to step up the pressure on hybrid regimes and pre-empt a Trump contagion in Europe.
AUTHOR BIO
Michael Meyer-Resende is the executive director of Democracy Reporting International, a non-partisan NGO in Berlin that supports political participation.
DISCLAIMER
The views expressed in this opinion piece are the author's, not those of EUobserver.
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