The alleged use of chemical weapons in Ukraine: How the international community can investigate

Commentary | 9 May 2024


Ahmet Üzümcü |Former Director-General of the OPCW, Former Permanent Representative of Turkey to NATO

There have been disturbing reports about the use of chemical weapons by Russia against Ukrainian troops. It is alleged that chloropicrin and riot control agents were used to dislodge Ukrainian soldiers from entrenched positions on the front with Russia. Russia denies these allegations.

Chloropicrin was widely used during the First World War and is now included in the list of Schedule 3 chemicals in the Annex on Chemicals of the Chemical Weapons Convention. States parties are permitted to produce this chemical in large commercial quantities for purposes not prohibited by the Chemical Weapons Convention (e.g., agriculture); however, they were included in the list because they can pose a risk due to their lethal or incapacitating toxicity. Thus, if such chemicals are used to harm people, they are chemical weapons under what is known as the “general purpose criterion”. Regarding riot control agents, States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention are allowed to possess and use them for their defined purpose, but it is strictly prohibited to employ them as a method of warfare.

The allegations against Russia are serious and pertain to the credibility and integrity of the Chemical Weapons Convention regime. An international, independent and impartial mechanism must investigate them. Different mechanisms have been used in the past decade, particularly in Syria.

Under the Chemical Weapons Convention, the mechanisms of a challenge inspection and an investigation of alleged use can be activated upon the request of any State Party. The Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has no authority to invoke them. However, this mechanism has not been activated since the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997.

The allegations against Russia are serious and pertain to the credibility and integrity of the Chemical Weapons Convention regime. An international, independent and impartial mechanism must investigate them. Ahmet Üzümcü
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In 2013, the United Nations Secretary-General’s Mechanism (UNSGM) was activated to investigate allegations of use of chemical weapons in Syria. Syria was not yet a member of the OPCW; thus, the UNSGM based on the 1925 Geneva Protocol was the only available mechanism for that purpose. The UNSGM, composed of a group of experts from the OPCW and the WHO, investigated the chemical attack in Ghouta and determined the use of sarin, a nerve agent. After Syria joined the Chemical Weapons Convention in October 2013, while the elimination of its chemical weapons program was underway, the allegations of use continued. Considering that the OPCW could not remain indifferent to these allegations, I established a Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) modelled upon many years of international practice in United Nations bodies. The Syrian government accepted the Terms of Reference we developed. The FFM has now investigated more than eighty reported incidents and determined that chemical weapons were used in more than twenty of them. However, neither the UNSGM nor the FFM were mandated to identify the perpetrators of the attacks.

In August 2015, the United Nations Security Council established the OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM), which conducted in-depth investigations based on the findings of the FFM. In the reports it produced, the JIM concluded that the Syrian armed forces had used chemical weapons in three cases and ISIS in another one. Due to a Russian veto, the Security Council did not extend the JIM’s mandate at the end of 2017.

In June 2018, the OPCW Conference of States Parties adopted, at a special session, a decision on “Addressing the Threat from Chemical Weapons Use”. A new mechanism called the “Investigation and Identification Team” (IIT) was established based on this decision. After exhaustive investigations that again followed best practices for international fact-finding mechanisms, the IIT concluded that the Syrian armed forces were the ones responsible for the use of chemical weapons in five cases and ISIS in one. The IIT continues to work on incidents wherein the FFM has determined that chemical weapons were used in Syria.

Meanwhile, in March 2018, following the chemical attack on Yuri Skripal and his daughter in Salisbury, the British Government requested technical assistance from the Secretariat of the OPCW under Article VIII, paragraph 38(e) of the Chemical Weapons Convention. OPCW experts travelled to the United Kingdom to provide the requested technical assistance, including sending the samples they collected to two independent laboratories outside the United Kingdom, which confirmed the findings of the British authorities. A nerve agent, Novichok, was used. In September 2020, the German Government made a similar request and invited an OPCW technical team to take samples from Alexei Navalny, who was brought for treatment to Germany after he was poisoned in Russia. The use of Novichok was again determined. However, in both cases, the OPCW was not mandated to determine the identity of the perpetrators.

One of the strengths of the OPCW’s robust verification and compliance regime has always been its level of expertise and objectivity in the area of chemical weapons. The international community could leverage these strengths to test the veracity of the allegations that have been levelled against Russia about chemical weapons use during the armed conflict in Ukraine. Ahmet Üzümcü
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Based on paragraph 20 of the June 2018 decision of the OPCW Conference of States Parties, the OPCW Director-General has been given the mandate to provide technical expertise to identify the perpetrators, organisers, sponsors or those who are otherwise involved in the use of chemical weapons, if requested by a State Party investigating the possible use of chemical weapons on its territory. This mechanism has not yet been implemented in any country other than Syria.

I have summarised above the different mechanisms employed in the recent past to investigate allegations of the use of chemical weapons. I believe that one of them might be activated to investigate reported incidents in Ukraine. Whichever is selected may not enjoy the support of the whole membership; however, if one of the options is chosen, it needs to be practical and produce concrete results despite the challenges associated with the ongoing conflict. One of the strengths of the OPCW’s robust verification and compliance regime has always been its level of expertise and objectivity in the area of chemical weapons. The international community could leverage these strengths to test the veracity of the allegations that have been levelled against Russia about chemical weapons use during the armed conflict in Ukraine. The States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention should support such an initiative for two reasons: first, to provide a deterrent effect against further alleged uses of chemical weapons, and second, to uphold the integrity and credibility of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which is one of the pillars of the rules-based international order.

The opinions articulated above represent the views of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position of the European Leadership Network or any of its members. The ELN’s aim is to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time.