Op-Ed: From Allende to Maduro – the price of resources and defiance
From Chile to Venezuela, battles over who controls strategic resources have repeatedly shaped regime change, foreign intervention and political fallout across the Americas.
When Chilean socialist President Salvador Allende nationalized the copper industry in 1971, he moved to bring foreign-owned copper mines —primarily controlled by US corporations such as Anaconda and Kennecott— under state control through the creation of Codelco (Corporación Nacional del Cobre de Chile/ National Copper Corporation of Chile).
With this, Allende directly challenged corporate and US strategic interests tied to the country’s most valuable export. Washington responded with economic pressure, diplomatic isolation and covert destabilization by the CIA. Two years later, a US-backed military coup overthrew Allende, who died during the assault on the presidential palace, cementing his legacy as a cautionary example of the risks faced by leaders who seek to reclaim control over resource wealth.
Venezuela followed a similar trajectory, with resource nationalism reshaping its economy and foreign relations and culminating most recently in the capture and extradition of President Nicolás Maduro to New York to face criminal charges, another instance of a leader removed after defying foreign control over critical assets.
The roots of that confrontation stretch back decades. In the mid-2000s, then-president Hugo Chávez accelerated the nationalization of the oil sector, imposing tougher contract terms on foreign producers. Exxon Mobil and other major companies left the country. Chávez framed the move as a defence of economic sovereignty, but it carried lasting geopolitical consequences.
After his death, Maduro’s government struggled to offset collapsing oil output. In 2019, Maduro and Delcy Rodríguez, then vice president and now acting president, announced a five-year mining plan to expand mineral extraction as an alternative source of revenue.
Venezuela also moved last year to revive its coal industry, aiming to export more than 10 million tonnes in 2025, though it remains unclear whether that target was reached. The US Geological Survey estimated coal production at about 100,000 metric tons in 2019 from reserves totalling 731 million metric tons. Output of other minerals, including nickel, bauxite, iron ore and gold, has declined sharply over the past decade, mirroring the broader deterioration of the oil sector.
Absolute gain
On Saturday, the US launched “Operation Absolute Resolve”, a large-scale strike against Venezuela that resulted in the capture of Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, with US authorities accusing them of leading a narco-terrorism conspiracy.
The operation marked the largest US military intervention in Latin America since the 1989 invasion of Panama and its most direct bid for regime change since the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
The Trump administration said Maduro would face corruption charges linked to major drug flows into the US. The strike followed months of escalating pressure, including the interception of oil tankers off Venezuela’s coast and actions against vessels Washington said were involved in narcotics trafficking. Trump openly linked the intervention to Venezuela’s energy wealth, saying the US would oversee a transition and suggesting US oil companies could return within about 18 months to rebuild production after years of collapse.
Few international observers expressed sympathy for Maduro or his inner circle. His government has been widely described as undemocratic and repressive, and as a source of regional instability. A recent United Nations report documented more than a decade of killings, torture, sexual violence and arbitrary detention by state-linked forces against political opponents. Maduro is also accused of stealing Venezuela’s 2024 presidential election and of fuelling economic and political disruption across the region by presiding over the exodus of nearly eight million migrants.
Broken system
Venezuela’s economic breakdown had already accelerated after oil prices fell below $30 a barrel in 2016, pushing the country into a deep political and financial crisis, according to the Council on Foreign Relations.
Chronic power failures further crippled oil and mining operations, eroding the state’s ability to monetize its resources.
While oil dominates headlines, analysts say Venezuela’s longer-term relevance to the US may lie in minerals critical to modern industry and defence. Chilean mining consultancy GEM says the country’s geology, particularly the Guiana Shield, is highly prospective for iron ore, bauxite, gold, nickel and other minerals aligned with US critical-mineral priorities.
Production data show how far the sector has fallen. Official gold output dropped from 5.95 tonnes in 1999 to about 30 kg in 2023, a decline of roughly 19% a year. Iron ore production fell from 14.1 million tonnes to about 2.5 million tonnes, while bauxite slid from more than 4 million tonnes to roughly 250,000 tonnes. According to GEM, the losses reflect failing power supply, infrastructure decay, security risks and regulatory instability, not depleted resources.
Juan Ignacio Guzmán, GEM’s CEO, said the opportunity lies in rehabilitation rather than new mine development. Restarting idle mines and processing plants could take one to three years if governance and market access are restored, while formalizing informal gold and coltan production would require a longer horizon. Any reintegration into global supply chains, he said, depends on sanctions clarity, restored rule of law and credible environmental and social safeguards.
The comparison with Chile remains instructive. Chile’s copper nationalization ultimately stabilized a core industry under stronger institutions. Venezuela’s experience, capped by direct US intervention, shows how resource wealth can instead become a lever for external power when infrastructure and governance collapse.
Across decades and ideologies, the pattern has been consistent. In the Americas, asserting control over strategic resources has carried heavy consequences, while the ability to seize them has rested with those willing and able to intervene.
Is Washington’s Move The Spark For A New Age Of Regional Power? – Analysis
January 7, 2026
By A. Jathindra
The recent U.S. military operation against Venezuela and the capture of President Nicolás Maduro have sparked sharp criticism and condemnation. Maduro now awaits trial in New York City. Once again, it is evident that international politics is not guided by international law but by the interests of great powers and their alliances. Some critics, even within the United States, have described this as President Trump’s “Putinization of U.S. foreign policy.” Yet the deeper question is whether any individual president can override America’s institutional structures and act against national interests—or whether such actions reflect a broader continuity of U.S. hegemony in the region.
Historical Parallels: Panama and Venezuela
History offers striking parallels under the great-power rivalry. In 1989, President George H. W. Bush ordered the invasion of Panama, capturing dictator Manuel Noriega and indicted him under U.S. law. The Bush administration justified the intervention on grounds of Panama’s violations of the canal treaty, drug trafficking, and the killing of a U.S. Marine officer. During the election in 1989, Noriega had annulled election results and installed a classmate as president, prompting Washington to act decisively.
Thirty-six years later, President Trump has taken a similar course against Venezuela. The criticism has been just as widespread, with the United Nations condemning the move as a violation of sovereignty. True to form, Washington showed little concern for such objections. As Asanka Abeyagoonasekera points out, the situation appears to be managed on the basis of “act first, stabilize later.” Yet, as with Panama and Iraq, this episode may soon fade amid new waves of political turmoil.
The parallels are not exact. In Panama, Noriega’s national assembly declared war on the United States. In Venezuela, Maduro’s regime retained power through fraudulent elections, echoing Noriega’s tactics but without a formal declaration of war. In both cases, however, military action followed failed economic and diplomatic pressure. Reagan’s administration had tried to persuade Noriega to step down through diplomacy, but Bush—then vice president—opposed compromise. Similarly, Washington had long pressured Maduro through sanctions before resorting to force.
Venezuela’s Path to Confrontation
Venezuela’s troubled relationship with the United States dates back to Hugo Chávez’s rise in the 1990s. His socialist agenda and anti-American rhetoric enhance ties with China, Iran and Russia strained ties with Washington, and a U.S.-backed coup attempt in 2002 failed to remove him. After Chávez’s death in 2013, Nicolás Maduro carried forward his predecessor’s policies, deepening the crisis. Maduro retained power through fraudulent elections in 2018 and again in 2024, despite widespread opposition. By late 2025, Trump warned Maduro to step aside, but with sanctions failing to secure a smooth transition, Washington opted for regime change by force.
On the surface, Washington’s surprise move appears aimed at controlling the world’s largest proven oil reserves in Venezuela. But at a deeper level, it is about asserting control over the Western Hemisphere. The growing Chinese presence in Latin America is a serious concern in Washington. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio underscored this when he declared: “This is the Western Hemisphere. This is where we live—and we’re not going to allow the Western Hemisphere to be a base of operation for adversaries, competitors, and rivals of the United States.” Maduro’s capture came just hours after he met with Chinese diplomats to reaffirm their strategic partnership.
In 2017, Trump’s National Security Strategy (NSS) announced a U.S. focus on great-power competition, principally with China, marking a shift after decades of Middle Eastern preoccupation. The removal of Maduro aligns with the broader strategic shift outlined in the NSS released in December 2025. The document underscores the intervention as emblematic of a revived Monroe Doctrine, reframed as the “Trump Corollary”: “After years of neglect, the United States will reassert and enforce the Monroe Doctrine to restore American preeminence in the Western Hemisphere… We will deny non-Hemispheric competitors the ability to position forces or control vital assets in our Hemisphere.”
The Monroe Doctrine and Its Legacy
The Monroe Doctrine, first articulated in 1823, warned European powers against interference in the Americas. Theodore Roosevelt expanded it in 1904, asserting U.S. “international police power” to quell unrest in the region. Franklin D. Roosevelt later attempted a “Good Neighbor” policy of non‑intervention, but Cold War realities prevented Washington from adhering strictly to this principle.
The CIA waged a shadow war, orchestrating coups and toppling several heads of state across Latin America to block Soviet influence. Against this backdrop, Venezuela is not the first country in the region to see its leader overthrown or seized with direct U.S. involvement—and it will not be the last.
The Trump Corollary represents a return to this older logic: the Western Hemisphere as America’s sphere of influence, where external powers—China and Russia today, rather than Europe—must be excluded. It signals a reassertion of regional dominance, justified in the name of security and access to strategic geographies.
Regional Hegemony: Old Patterns, New Context
The question now is whether Washington’s ambitions end with Venezuela—or whether this marks a broader return to Cold War-style regional dominance. History suggests that when smaller states fail to act as “good neighbors,” interventions by great powers become inevitable. India’s interventions under Indira Gandhi illustrate this dynamic in South Asia. As Henry Kissinger observed, “to create order, it is necessary to create it within regions first and then relate them to each other.”
Against this backdrop, Washington’s move in Venezuela may signal not just a tactical strike but the reassertion of regional hegemony. The door may once again be open for major powers to intervene militarily in their neighbors’ affairs when they are deemed “bad neighbors.”
A. Jathindra is a Sri Lankan-based independent political analyst and head of a think tank, Centre for Strategic Studies -Trincomalee (CSST).
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