The Trilateral Fortress: “Why the fall of Damascus didn’t end the Middle East’s long war”
A large poster depicting Saudi Arabia, Syria, Oman, and Lebanon leaders alongside U.S. President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is placed on a billboard to highlighting the push for diplomatic relations in Tel Aviv, Israel on June 26, 2025. [Mostafa Alkharouf – Anadolu Agency]
by Jasim Al-Azzawi
January 12, 2026
The geopolitical shorthand for Iranian power used to be the “Land Bridge”—a 1,000-mile artery of influence stretching from the Zagros Mountains to the Mediterranean. In December 2024, that bridge collapsed into the rubble of the Assad regime. With rebels pouring into the capital of Damascus, Washington-Tel Aviv orthodoxy held that Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” had finally been beheaded. This was a moment of rash exuberance.
However, it became evident in January 2026 that this festive assessment was also hasty. The bridge, far from disappearing, has been replaced by something much more intense and turbulent: The Trilateral Fortress.
Without the Syrian buffer zone, the clerical regime in Tehran, the Shiite-dominated security apparatus in Baghdad, and the battle-hardened Hezbollah have merged into a survivalist bloc. This is no longer an ambitious empire trying to export the revolution. Those days are finished. This is now a transnational paramilitary operation aimed at averting the meltdown of the three remaining poles. The ‘Syrian Void’ has not removed the threat to the US and Israel—it has simply shifted the battle line to the doorsteps of Baghdad and Tehran.
The domestic mercenary shift
However, the most terrifying expression of this new reality is now taking place on Iranian streets. As the “Economic Uprising” of 2026 enters its second month, following the “12-Day War” in June 2025 and the subsequent hyperinflation, the Islamic Republic has launched a desperate strategic response. With its security factions either exhausted and potentially switching sides, the IRGC has called on its trusted allies for help in saving the regime.
Reports coming in from the entry points in Mehran and Shalamcheh point to the importation of some 850 fighters from the ranks of Hezbollah and the Iraqi militias, who have gained combat experience in the Syrian Civil War, into the restless provinces of Iran. They are placed in these areas because they have no cultural or emotional affinity with the protesters in Iran, which would otherwise cause them to hold back when the use of force becomes necessary. In the Trilateral Fortress, Hezbollah is not merely the Lebanese Border Guard but rather the Primary’ Special Forces’ node for the expertise required in suppressing urban dissent so that the Supreme Leader remains in power.
“The survival of the core now dictates the movement of the periphery; IRGC no longer seeks to guard the border, but rather the throne itself, behind a foreign shield to dull a domestic sword,” The Mercenary Pivot states in its 2026 Iranian Uprising analysis for the Institute of Middle East Security Studies.
Iraq: The brittle link
Now that Syria is out, Iraq has transformed from a transit country into the alliance’s new central treasury or “rear guard.” In turn, following the UN “Snapback” sanctions in 2025, Tehran has become entirely reliant on banking transactions in Iraq and oil-for-gas swaps to keep its economy afloat. By doing this, however, the US-Israeli alliance has created a new “Trilateral Trap” in which some of the Iranian missile and drone command offices may currently be based in Iraq’s infrastructure.
However, a key distinction must be made regarding the resilience of these three tenets. Hezbollah is a resistance movement that is impossible to beat; it has managed to resist Israeli attacks and assassinations for decades and has now become an integral part of the Lebanese landscape. Similarly, Iran has also become a seasoned player during the “Long Siege” and has managed to resist US attempts through pressure, bombings, and sanctions for almost five decades now.
The softer, more brittle component of this Trilateral Fortress is Iraq itself. Contrary to the ideological blocs in Beirut and Tehran, the Iraqi state can best be characterized as a makeshift amalgam of antagonists with hostile allegiances, dependent to the point of vulnerability on the international financial network and on the auctions of the United States dollar. This fissure has been identified by the United States, which has found itself in its midst. Special Envoy Mark Savaya has adopted the same maximalist position, declaring that 2026 marks the end of the “uncontrolled weapons” era. Savaya has remained adamant that the PMF be eliminated or neutralized.
“Iraq cannot be either a partner of the global finance system or a shelter for the people who intentionally damage that system. The year 2026 will be the final goodbye for the era of the militia; your time is up,” stated Savaya, possibly an indication that the former Iraqi military generals, ex-pilots, and military intelligence personnel dissolved by Paula Bremer are being secretly re-established by US special forces for the purpose of toppling the Iraqi government at the appropriate moment.
The myth of neutralization
The present policy of “containing” Iran by removing its regional limbs has now come to a point of diminishing returns. The fall of Damascus only managed to trap the beast. By early 2026, the trilateral bloc had instead increased its nuclear hedging and integration in response to its growing isolation. The borders between IRGC, Hezbollah, and Iraqi militias have become strictly vestigial; instead, they now act as a single organism in their defensive nature.
The US and Israel no longer find themselves dealing with a “proxy network,” let alone a nuclear-ambitious proxy alliance. The effort to isolate Iran has instead invited a degree of trilateral integration that has made traditional diplomacy seem impossible. However, this trilateral integration contains a deadly fault. The survival of this Iranian regime is now linked to a country, Iraq, that lacks the strength to withstand the full power of American economic war.
A new strategic reality
The downfall of the Assad regime was a historic blow to Iranian prestige; however, it did not shatter the ideological resistance movement but instead removed the “soft” political aspects of the alliance, leaving the “hard” radical foundation intact.
The West must realize that the “Trilateral Fortress” cannot be dismantled by old-world maps. While Hezbollah and Tehran are prepared to weather a thousand strikes, the political structure in Baghdad is likely to buckle first. Mark Savaya’s mission is clear: by forcing Iraq to choose between the dollar and the militia, the US is aiming at the triangle’s weakest point. The uprising in Iran may be the final blow from within, but the breaking of the Iraqi link is the key to dismantling the fortress from the outside.
“The Fortress is only as strong as its most brittle pillar; if Baghdad yields to the pressure of the state and the dictate of the dollar, the wall around Tehran finally crumbles,” predicts a December 2025 report by the Global Risk Intelligence, titled: The fragility of the Baghdad link: Economic pressure and the PMF.
The war for the Middle East hasn’t ended; it has simply moved home.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.
The geopolitical shorthand for Iranian power used to be the “Land Bridge”—a 1,000-mile artery of influence stretching from the Zagros Mountains to the Mediterranean. In December 2024, that bridge collapsed into the rubble of the Assad regime. With rebels pouring into the capital of Damascus, Washington-Tel Aviv orthodoxy held that Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” had finally been beheaded. This was a moment of rash exuberance.
However, it became evident in January 2026 that this festive assessment was also hasty. The bridge, far from disappearing, has been replaced by something much more intense and turbulent: The Trilateral Fortress.
Without the Syrian buffer zone, the clerical regime in Tehran, the Shiite-dominated security apparatus in Baghdad, and the battle-hardened Hezbollah have merged into a survivalist bloc. This is no longer an ambitious empire trying to export the revolution. Those days are finished. This is now a transnational paramilitary operation aimed at averting the meltdown of the three remaining poles. The ‘Syrian Void’ has not removed the threat to the US and Israel—it has simply shifted the battle line to the doorsteps of Baghdad and Tehran.
The domestic mercenary shift
However, the most terrifying expression of this new reality is now taking place on Iranian streets. As the “Economic Uprising” of 2026 enters its second month, following the “12-Day War” in June 2025 and the subsequent hyperinflation, the Islamic Republic has launched a desperate strategic response. With its security factions either exhausted and potentially switching sides, the IRGC has called on its trusted allies for help in saving the regime.
Reports coming in from the entry points in Mehran and Shalamcheh point to the importation of some 850 fighters from the ranks of Hezbollah and the Iraqi militias, who have gained combat experience in the Syrian Civil War, into the restless provinces of Iran. They are placed in these areas because they have no cultural or emotional affinity with the protesters in Iran, which would otherwise cause them to hold back when the use of force becomes necessary. In the Trilateral Fortress, Hezbollah is not merely the Lebanese Border Guard but rather the Primary’ Special Forces’ node for the expertise required in suppressing urban dissent so that the Supreme Leader remains in power.
“The survival of the core now dictates the movement of the periphery; IRGC no longer seeks to guard the border, but rather the throne itself, behind a foreign shield to dull a domestic sword,” The Mercenary Pivot states in its 2026 Iranian Uprising analysis for the Institute of Middle East Security Studies.
Iraq: The brittle link
Now that Syria is out, Iraq has transformed from a transit country into the alliance’s new central treasury or “rear guard.” In turn, following the UN “Snapback” sanctions in 2025, Tehran has become entirely reliant on banking transactions in Iraq and oil-for-gas swaps to keep its economy afloat. By doing this, however, the US-Israeli alliance has created a new “Trilateral Trap” in which some of the Iranian missile and drone command offices may currently be based in Iraq’s infrastructure.
However, a key distinction must be made regarding the resilience of these three tenets. Hezbollah is a resistance movement that is impossible to beat; it has managed to resist Israeli attacks and assassinations for decades and has now become an integral part of the Lebanese landscape. Similarly, Iran has also become a seasoned player during the “Long Siege” and has managed to resist US attempts through pressure, bombings, and sanctions for almost five decades now.
The softer, more brittle component of this Trilateral Fortress is Iraq itself. Contrary to the ideological blocs in Beirut and Tehran, the Iraqi state can best be characterized as a makeshift amalgam of antagonists with hostile allegiances, dependent to the point of vulnerability on the international financial network and on the auctions of the United States dollar. This fissure has been identified by the United States, which has found itself in its midst. Special Envoy Mark Savaya has adopted the same maximalist position, declaring that 2026 marks the end of the “uncontrolled weapons” era. Savaya has remained adamant that the PMF be eliminated or neutralized.
“Iraq cannot be either a partner of the global finance system or a shelter for the people who intentionally damage that system. The year 2026 will be the final goodbye for the era of the militia; your time is up,” stated Savaya, possibly an indication that the former Iraqi military generals, ex-pilots, and military intelligence personnel dissolved by Paula Bremer are being secretly re-established by US special forces for the purpose of toppling the Iraqi government at the appropriate moment.
The myth of neutralization
The present policy of “containing” Iran by removing its regional limbs has now come to a point of diminishing returns. The fall of Damascus only managed to trap the beast. By early 2026, the trilateral bloc had instead increased its nuclear hedging and integration in response to its growing isolation. The borders between IRGC, Hezbollah, and Iraqi militias have become strictly vestigial; instead, they now act as a single organism in their defensive nature.
The US and Israel no longer find themselves dealing with a “proxy network,” let alone a nuclear-ambitious proxy alliance. The effort to isolate Iran has instead invited a degree of trilateral integration that has made traditional diplomacy seem impossible. However, this trilateral integration contains a deadly fault. The survival of this Iranian regime is now linked to a country, Iraq, that lacks the strength to withstand the full power of American economic war.
A new strategic reality
The downfall of the Assad regime was a historic blow to Iranian prestige; however, it did not shatter the ideological resistance movement but instead removed the “soft” political aspects of the alliance, leaving the “hard” radical foundation intact.
The West must realize that the “Trilateral Fortress” cannot be dismantled by old-world maps. While Hezbollah and Tehran are prepared to weather a thousand strikes, the political structure in Baghdad is likely to buckle first. Mark Savaya’s mission is clear: by forcing Iraq to choose between the dollar and the militia, the US is aiming at the triangle’s weakest point. The uprising in Iran may be the final blow from within, but the breaking of the Iraqi link is the key to dismantling the fortress from the outside.
“The Fortress is only as strong as its most brittle pillar; if Baghdad yields to the pressure of the state and the dictate of the dollar, the wall around Tehran finally crumbles,” predicts a December 2025 report by the Global Risk Intelligence, titled: The fragility of the Baghdad link: Economic pressure and the PMF.
The war for the Middle East hasn’t ended; it has simply moved home.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.
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