How to deal with the Infodemic – The role of Disinformation in the Corona Crisis..and some answers

BY ADMIN ON MAY 5, 2020 ALL

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Dis- and misinformation can spread just as viciously as a virus – especially via social media – it erodes trust in governmental policy and measures against the pandemic and as a consequence weakens the commitment of the population to support and to live with pandemic restrictions2. Media dynamics that can be observed at the moment are not new. It is similar to that of other news situations – be it a terrorist attack or a plane crash: first, something bad happens, then information spreads in social media within minutes, finally media reports. People read posts or articles, look for more information, for certainty. But because there is still little secure knowledge, there is room for rumors, misinformation, and even conspiracy theories. The effect is intensified by the fact that the level of knowledge around the center of the news situation – in this case, coronavirus disease – can change constantly, and what seems certain today could be disproved tomorrow.

The poisoning impact of the mixture of unsecured information, out-of-context or false news, and conspiracy theories was visible during the Ebola crisis 2014 in West Africa and 2018 in DR Congo. Experts have agreed that misinformation was one of the lead contributors to the Ebola outbreak. During the Ebola epidemic in the DRC, there were rumors that ‘white people’, ‘the central government in Kinshasa’, or the ‘international aid organizations’ were behind the outbreak. Trust in medical workers and aid organizations was low and people didn’t cooperate with authorities, which lead to a very quick distribution of the virus epidemic.

On the other hand, it is a fact that we see in the context of the current Corona Pandemia a very interested, Information-dedicated public. Generally, people worldwide are able to access a lot of different sources – and many of these sources are originated in science. Theoretically, there is access to a variety and high quantity of well researched professional and fact-based information!

This is also the result of a current analysis of the Reuters Institute3 which examined the Info-use since the beginning of March disclosing general trends in global news consumption on Corona: News use is up in all the examined countries, and most people are using either social media, search engines, video sites, and messaging applications (or combinations of these) to get news and information about coronavirus. And there is a second result too: people with low levels of formal education rely less on professional news organizations for news and information about coronavirus and are more likely to rely on social media and messaging applications. 

The problem is not that there is not enough reliable news – the problem is the amount and irritating quantity of new and a digital distribution, where fact-checking does not play a sufficient role – be it on the side of the platforms, be it on the side of the users. Mis- and disinformation can proliferate when there is a lack of, or conversely, an overabundance of information. In this sense we are really confronted with an “infodemic” – a word raised by WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus on 15 February (“we’re not just fighting an epidemic; we’re fighting an infodemic”)

Social Media play a special role

It is not only the Reuters Institute research that marks the special role Social Media is playing in proliferating wrong, misleading, or half-true information. We see the above-mentioned linkage between people with low levels of formal education relying more on social media and messaging applications. And we witnessed the real consequences of viral disinformation even in very developed media markets like the UK or other European countries: Even there, disinformation is often followed by quite real violent actions: In recent weeks, more than 20 mobile phone masts have been damaged in Great Britain, a few days after conspiracy theorists claimed that there is a connection between the mobile phone standard 5G and Covid-19.

Disinformation is more harmful in weaker media markets

But disinformation is of course even more harmful in countries with weaker communication infrastructure –be it technically, professionally, or politically. If there is a weak internet penetration, an economically unsustainable media market, low journalistic capacities, or censorship by the government – disinformation will get broader audiences and a lot of shares, especially on social media. And these weaker media markets are very often the countries where the pandemic is still in its early stages – and where the disease will hit a population with low access to news organizations.

A very important factor for disinformation going viral is influencers. A source for false and misleading information, conspiracy, and even pure lies not only spread by social media users, are political leaders – not just on Twitter but also in government press conferences. A current example is the proposal by the American president to inject people with disinfectants or to introduce strong light into their bodies. If political decision-makers spread such disinformation, the consequences are often devastating. They are engines distributing information – be it right or wrong, news or fake!4 

Limiting the impact of disinformation? Forget the one-fits-all-solution!

What are helpful approaches to debunk dis- and misinformation? To start with bad news: There is no “one-fits-all-solution”. User behavior is locally specific. Differing levels of internet penetration (see data here), the rising scale of Social Media usage (see data here), and the diversity of Social Media usage worldwide create a need for targeted responses. As a consequence, effective and efficient measures to counteract and debunk disinformation must be different from region to region. We need a clear and differentiated picture of the local conditions: people’s favored channels, most trusted sources, level of literacy and media literacy, and preferred languages, formats for receiving and sharing messages5. Starting with this base-line-analysis we could easily develop good ways to limit disinformation. The concrete answers could differ, but they all follow a very principal idea: Target groups where they communicate! 

Let’s deal with local differences

In DRC, where the internet penetration is only 7%, and where word of mouth remains the most common way for information to spread, the direct interaction with multiplicators and communicators in the communities and radio was key to limit disinformation during the Ebola crisis. 

In Cambodia, GIZ is currently supporting the Cambodian Ministry for Health in cooperation with WHO to deliver facts and figures about Corona, because Facebook is the most commonly used social media platform and false or hysterical information circulates widely on the platform.

In Nigeria and Ghana, an open-source software (SORMAS) is part of the answer collecting and communication concrete facts and figures about cases of infections, using Apps or phone calls to take note of them. This was developed by the Helmholtz-Zentrum for infectious disease. GIZ – on behalf of the German Ministry for development cooperation – is helping to implement SORMAS in the Ecowas region. 

For Africa, where only 36% of the population had internet access in 2019 and where traditional media could not fill this gap, especially people in rural areas are cut off from public information, which can lead to severe problems during epidemics. Mobile phones are part of the solution here because more than 80% of Africans have access to mobile phones. 

For these regions, GIZ developed, together with the NGO Viamo, a tool called “Call vs.corona” – a software through which individuals can easily access factual and at the same time entertaining information by participating in a phone quiz, which works as follows: People call a free hotline, where they navigate through prerecorded questions by using their phone keyboard, which works with the most basic phones. Throughout the quiz, people learn about preventive measures such as social distancing and hyenic routines. The voice-response software has advantages over SMS-information, as illiterate people can be reached very easily. Additionally, by using the quiz format, messages are delivered in a concise but humorous way and information on preventive measures against the spread of the virus can be distributed widely.

To help stop the spread of the coronavirus, GIZ is developing new ideas like these examples and is refocusing existing projects. It is taking a wide variety of approaches, from setting up early-warning systems and combating fake news on Facebook, to ensuring barrier-free access to information. What we learned from our work on responding to global health crises in the past, is that there need to be both targeted responses (countering false information on social media, community-based approaches to trustful dissemination of information) as well as support for building up communication infrastructure. 

A successful approach: working on different layers with various partners

Debunking alone will not be successful, because it always comes too late, is a reaction and following media development research result will not have a remarkable outreach to bring the “correct” facts through. To develop customized regional answers it is important to develop them with a local partner, it needs an interdisciplinary approach on competences of users and journalists, on infrastructure and policy. Measures should be taken on very different layers:

1. Technical infrastructure and access to information: internet penetration, media, and platforms
2. Attractive, concise, comprehensive and fact-based content
3. Press freedom – a governmental context where objective information, independent journalism are not oppressed or manipulated
4. Fact-checking engagement of platforms6 and media
5. Good level of digital literacy among users 
6. Verified databases by multilateral/international organizations like the WHO with cross-checked facts and figures as a reference system

After the crisis is before the crisis: building up digital literacy and enhance resilience 

Good crisis management lives from a clear commitment and common understanding of roles, responsibilities, and duties. This is not the case in this crisis: political leaders are spreading wrong and misleading information or only part of the information. States are neglecting the problem or downplaying the disease. The origins of incomplete and misleading information rarely come from simple citizens on social media but from political leaders, propaganda, and the fact that governments simply neglect the facts of the pandemic. 

On the other hand, the Corona-crisis is abused by a number of autocratic regimes to tighten the pressure on independent journalists, on bloggers and citizen reporters, and enhance their censorship of the media system itself. Current examples are Iraq, where the news agency Reuters lost their license, or Egypt where The Guardian reporters who reported about a growing number of infections are forced to leave the country – or China, where state propaganda is now creating a positive frame concerning the pandemic-management and where critical citizen journalists have been arrested. 

This is why dealing with disinformation in the Corona crisis is also about developing suitable instruments to strengthen the resilience of the media, media users, journalists, and citizens in dealing with disinformation, to provide them with suitable instruments to distinguish facts from fake. This is in our own interest because it makes us more confident and resistant in dealing with disinformation, for which not only Corona can be an occasion. In this respect, it is worth working on it, because after the crisis is before the crisis.

Footnotes:

[1] This is the written edited version of my input at the Debate pandemic not panic – disinformation and global health https://www.friendsofeurope.org/events/pandemic-not-panic-disinformation-and-global-health/

This event is part of the Development Policy Forum (DPF), oganised by Friends of Europe, which brings together a number of important development actors, including the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) I work for as the Head of Media and Public Relations, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the European Investment Bank (EIB), the United Nations and the World Bank.

[2] Unchecked medical advice can have a detrimental impact on the health of the population and the healthcare system itself, which lacks capacity. For successful navigation of the crisis it is critically important that people have access to news and information that they trust and that can help them understand the coronavirus crisis, what they can do to protect themselves.

[3] https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/infodemic-how-people-six-countries-access-and-rate-news-and-information-about-coronavirus

[4] Be it in the global north or the global south: the number of misleading contributions to corona is high(this also applies to highly developed media markets in Europe, as research by the Süddeutsche Zeitung and the NDR at the end of April showed. Misinformation is mainly distributed via social media – and the main hotspot is youtube. In only a few days, 18 videos containing misinformation about the coronavirus were viewed more than twelve million times on the video platform youtube. The recipe for misinformation on Corona is very common: Currently, more and more supposed experts from completely unrelated fields are appearing on Social Media. The problem: opinions are mixed up with facts, speculation, and conspiracy theory. These contributions sow doubt but are difficult to verify.

[5] https://www.socialscienceinaction.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/SSHAP-Brief.Online-Information.COVID-19.pdf 

[6] Initiatives from the social media and platforms itself to eliminate and limit false information are very important. For example in Nigeria, where WhatsApp is trying again to limit the amount of misinformation through its platform. The messaging app is deploying changes to its settings that limit how often a message can be forwarded: once a message has now been forwarded more than five times, users will only be able to forward it to one chat at a time.

http://uteschaeffer.de/how-to-deal-with-the-infodemic-the-role-of-disinformation-in-the-corona-crisis-and-some-answers/

Fake not Fact – Who wants reality to disappear, and why?

BY UTE ON OCTOBER 28, 2018I N ALL, ENGLISH ARTICLES



This essay was created for the catalogue of the art-exhibition NEWSFLASH in Nuremberg, organized in cooperation between the Kunsthalle Nürnberg and the Kunsthaus, which misses how digital (dis)information works and what manipulative power it can unfold. What skills do we need to deal with this appropriately and critically? The artists assembled in the exhibition are also looking for answers to this and other questions with their works.

“It’s all fake!” Meanwhile, this English word is being used everywhere to decimate another person’s opinion with a single blow. Even Donald Trump berates reporters from CNN and other media1 as representatives of “fake news”, although he himself is one of those repeatedly spreading false information via Twitter. But to return to the actual meaning: in this context “fake” means incorrect information. That is, the deliberate dissemination of manipulated news and intentionally false reports in order to influence those addressed or to do damage to a group or a single individual. Fake has more than one shape: sometimes it is a completely false, freely invented item of information or pure speculation – as in the case of conspiracy theories regarding 9/11. But far more often, fake combines facts that are actually true, e. g. about a terror attack in Europe, with false information – about the perpatrator, the victims, the course of events. Contexts are deconstructed by repeatedly spreading old information as “current” once again, or media reports are placed in an entirely different context of meaning. Among our neighbours, the effects of disinformation campaigns online are even more clearly discernible than they are here: The British “Yes!” to Brexit. The best ever result for the extreme right’s Front National in the first round of the presidency elections in France: 11.5 million of the 47 million French eligible to vote voted for Marine Le Pen.




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Demonstration of the rightis extremist Front National – today the name of the party changed to Rassemblement National; the party is distributing its propaganda and xenophob messages vial digital media

Here, it is possible to see what destructive power digital disinformation may unfold. In the USA every second item on Twitter is already such a manipulative, incorrect news item – in Germany, as yet, it is “only” every fifth tweet. But the creation of opinion in this country is facing the onset of such development3, for which we are unprepared – either as voters or media users, citizens, journalists or artists. A Threat to Democratic Debate: The Echo Chamber Effect A fundamental change in the public sphere of information and the creation of opinion is underway. It entails great opportunities, as knowledge is now available to all via the Net, independent of place and time. But the creation of opinion online also entails great risks, for facts here are being manipulated, challenges we face politically. And so, for example, the parties represented in the Bundestag attempted to keep provocative themes to a minimum in election campaigning. Like the demand for more direct participation by citizens, or the urgent question discussed with such controversy by many people, of whether and how we can achieve the integration of refugees. Complex decisions, which touch upon the framework of values in our society – like “marriage for all” or the “online search regulations” – were enforced in a hurried procedure before the end of the legislation period, without much parliamentary or social discussion. But if there is no discussion in parliament and the media, others will take over – and they do so primarily online. For two years now, I have exposed myself daily to the self-styled “alternative media”, have been a member of public and restricted Facebook groups relating to the AfD and Pegida, following the sources of this digital counterpublic on Twitter, receiving newsletters, and watching – on the “hidden” servers of rightwing extremist and potentially violent nerds – how they produce radically right-wing tweets and memes or construct pro-AfD campaigns for social media. I have conducted research in the echo chambers of media true to Erdogan, and trolls, and I have perused disinformation disseminated by the Russians. Extremist populists find opportunity online to spread their information entirely without filters and without troublesome questioners or presenters. In many places, they use the possibilities of the Net far more purposefully than the classic people’s parties or media. They successfully address the growing number of people in our country who are turning away from the traditional parties and media, and have long been operating in their own informational sphere, which they call “alternative”, “uncensored” and “democratic”. Over the period of my research it has been possible to see clearly: all these actors and sources have increased their scope of influence online. And they make no secret of their digital information strategy; their strategies for digital propaganda and disinformation are published online and are easy to find. Stories from a Country Poised on the Edge The heart of this communication is stories arousing fear and outrage, using artificial and martial concepts. A communication that discredits – using its own language and narratives – our democratic institutions, our model of an open society and diversity of opinion, and also sows doubt in the functioning of our polity as a whole.


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Anti-migrant-demonstration of rightist extremists and critical citizens organised by the activist group “Pro Chemnitz” and some AfD groups – campaigning for the demonstration was mainly distributed on social media

The overall framework, the stage for all these narratives, is the downfall of Germany. Censorship, limitations of citizens’ rights and persecution of those who think differently are, following the current of reports in my right-wing newsfeed, on the order of the day in Germany. It seems that little value is placed on human rights, freedom of the press, or democracy in our country. For they are being wantonly and deliberately restricted – and not by just anyone, but by the government and the liberal establishment. Dramas happen on this stage: there are brutal dictators and an oppressed people. Perpetrators and victims. Foreign hordes. And upstanding saviours of the freedom of opinion. Conspiracies and plotting are on the daily agenda. The roles are attributed quite clearly. This creates excitement and people enjoy sharing it. They are stories that report on catastrophes, so underlining the sense among users that they are being disadvantaged, overrun by foreigners, robbed by the political elite, in short: they have been degraded to second-class citizens. Thereby, these narratives are all about decisive themes: about our daily existence, peace in our country, and identity. “The state is failing, imposing a state of emergency on Germany.” “Martial law rules.” The stories are concerned with the “chancellor dictatorship”, “state terror”, or the “state of emergency”. There is talk of a failing, weak state, in which the “enemies of the people”, “traitors” or “system parties” govern the people in a dictatorial manner. Another badgering narrative is that of civil war being brought to the country by a foreign horde: the story of the “great invasion”, whereby the “rapefugees” and “asylum demanders” are swamping Germany in violence and terror and bringing the “sex-jihad” to the country. Disinformation as a Constitutive Means for Extremists and Populists The narratives of the extremists and populists are all about moods and emotions rather than facts. Fake is a constitutive means for populists and extremists, for they aim at emotional stories to win over and keep their supporters: with victims and perpetrators, obvious enemies and of course with heroes. For some, that is the election victor Trump, who is acclaimed on the media platforms of right-wing populists all over Europe. For others, the jihadist terrorists of Paris, who roamed the French capital murdering people for several hours in November 2015. The violent members of the three teams of IS terrorists armed with Kalashnikovs and explosive belts ignited bombs and fired at street bars. 130 people died, 89 of them in Bataclan concert hall. But the violent participants and murderers are lauded in videos made by the IS and disseminated online. These are stories to share, like, comment on. Stories inviting us to join in. By means of the Net, I can be there “live”, in real time. The result is the development of a space of participation and experience, in which every user can become involved with little effort, in which everyone is important!



Discussion with the german artists Monika Huber and Wiebke Elzel about the effect and impact of Echochambers and digital Desinformation in the Nurnberg Exhibititon in Oktober 2018
This is true of the information and disinformation campaigns of state-directed foreign media, financed by many millions of euros, in Russia and Turkey, as well as the extremists of the IS. Different though their aims may be individually – what they have in common is a declaration of “information war” on the democratic order in our country, on liberal political ideas, a willingness for integration and
the openness of our society, and the fact that they are waging this war primarily digitally in order to assert their interests in Germany or to win over new supporters. And that they ingeniously exploit the functions of the Net – a vast range of influence and frequency – to deliberately address specific users. Radicalization through the Net What does the 17-year-old Islamist terrorist who attacked people on a regional train near
Würzburg4 have in common with the extreme rightwing demonstrators in Bautzen?5 What unites the demonstrating Russian-Germans as they protest about the disappearance of 13-year-old Lisa with
supporters of the extreme right Identitarian Movement, who climbed up the Brandenburg Gate and rolled out a banner there in protest against immigration? Not a lot, at first glance.

But they all source their information on the Net. They plan their actions and form their political attitudes online, even though their political positions and interests are totally different. They have been radicalized via the Net, where they are also connected to operators who are disseminating radical misanthropic messages: extremists – like the terrorist organization Islamic State –, who propagate violence and recruit young men prepared to use violence for acts of terrorism like the one in Würzburg or the attack on the Christmas market in Berlin. Extreme right-wing actors – from the NPD to the “Reichsbürger” to the Identitarian Movement – and right-wing populists in the sphere of Pegida and the AfD, who reject people for their religion or race and do not wish to see human rights being applied equally to all – that is, independent of race, skin colour, and national or social origins. What concerns our society is reflected on and spread online. And there are obvious links between what is being spread in the way of information and disinformation – and what happens, politically and socially, in our country. This explains why so many people with Turkish roots in our country affirm the undemocratic changes to the constitution being made by Erdogan. It explains why young men in the midst of our society are becoming Islamist terrorists. It answers the question why refugee hostels are being set on fire in the very regions where there are only a few refugees.
What begins as a tweet or post online often leads to practical violence: murder threats against MPs in the German Bundestag after the resolution on Armenia, for example. The deliberate cases of aggression in Dresden during the celebrations of the Day of German Unity on 3rd October 2016, Police protection for MPs due to their critical attitude towards Turkey. Massive threats against the liberal Islamic academic Lamya
Kaddor, which led to her withdrawal from active teaching. There is a measurable growth in politically motivated crimes: a fivefold increase in predominantly right-wing motivated attacks on asylum-seekers’ accommodation6 when many refugees came to Germany.

How Language Changes Reality
Does language create reality? Not directly.But language changes our view of reality – and thus our opinions and attitudes.7 “We ought to be allowed to say that,” as we hear regularly from the ranks of the AfD. Provocations and breaches of taboo are an essential part of its communication, key aggressive concepts such as “lying press”, “mob of migrants”, “traitors to the people” are constructed online and then
transferred to political discussion. “Mainstream media”, “Rautenfrau”, “migrant disaster”, “old parties” – all terms that are used with great matter-of-factness when one keeps one’s ears open in the supermarket around the corner or on the underground train, terms that may be used in conversations with neighbours or acquaintances – and they all originate from discourses online. Such terms are representative
of the agenda of the New Right and its groups. They question the functioning and stability of the democratic system, and on Twitter these attitudes turn into hashtags like #stopinvasion, #remigration, #refugeesNotwelcome, #MerkelhatBlutandenHaenden, #KanzlerinderSchande. Successful agenda setting means getting key aggressive terms into people’s heads so that they stick and can be activated easily.

They have an effect on how we think about a subject. They are not neutral terms – they all evaluate. They may add value to something (resistance fighter = member of the AfD or Identitarian Movement) – or reduce the value of something (system parties, synchronized press). By means of this valuation they connect a subject to an interpretation. It is easy to check what images are linked to which terms. It is enough to insert them into Google image search, where “asylum demanders”, “sexjihad”, “refugee invasion” trigger a flood of images of violent migrants. The phrase “Schlepperkönigin” (queen of trafficking)
leads directly and almost exclusively to images of the Chancellor. The term “traitors to the people” leads to images of government members, ranging from the Chancellor to the Minister of Justice, from the Foreign
Secretary to the Minister of Defence. It even leads to an image in which the heads of the aforementioned individuals are depicted in front of a scaffold. The heading reads: “Please don’t push. Everyone will get a turn.” The search reveals which online images are shared frequently. In this way, we can get an indication of which images have become fixed in the minds of the users.

Catalyser Themes
There are two topics with the effect of fire accelerants in the newsfeeds of my research: acts of terror and migrants. The fatal attack at the Christmas market on Breitscheidplatz in Berlin on 19.12.2016 is exploited by many media platforms of the New Right, and the Epoch Times concludes: “And again, they are all involved in the murders. Politics, media, judicial system, police, do-gooders – all those who have caused and approved such conditions.” The extreme right Identitarian Movement tweeted: “It must be said quite clearly: #Breitscheidplatz happened because Merkel and her cronies allowed the perpetrators into the country.”8 In the comment columns one can read, among other things: “[…] The problem and the reason for this is the ruling clique, high treason against the German people […].”9 The “Patriotic Platform”10,a Facebook group close to the AfD, posted a photomontage picturing Angela Merkel sitting beside the Berlin terrorist Amri in the truck. The headline: “Asylum policy was in the cab with him!” A tasteless satire? After
all, it referred to a fatal terror attack in Germany that cost 12 people their lives. Here, expressions of opinion and false assertions are being merged deliberately to the extent that we can scarcely determine what is
still the reporting of facts and where disinformation begins.


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Migrants are a “trigger-issue” for many speculations, sterotypes and fake information distributed in the echochambers of the rightist mobements all over Europe

Analogue Mass Propaganda also Champions Fake

Of course, post-factual narratives and propaganda are not merely a 21st-century phenomenon. And although post-factual was not word of the year until 201611, the phenomenon has
existed across all eras. Hannah Arendt wrote impressively on the subject – in very analogue times. She wrote about German society after the collapse of the National Socialist regime, after travelling to
Germany in 1949 and 195012, and noted in regard to the National Socialist dictatorship that every totalitarian regime is dependent on disinformation as a constitutive means:
“Before they seize power and establish a world according to their doctrines, totalitarian movements conjure up a lying world of consistency which is more adequate to the needs of the human mind than reality
itself”. The ideal subjects of totalitarian rule, according to Arendt, are not ideologically convinced National Socialists or Communists but “people for whom the distinctions between fact and fiction […] true and
false no longer exist.” The flight from reality into interpretation, exaggeration, agitation have always been preconditions to all mass propaganda. And so the National Socialists quite intentionally developed
post-factual narratives in the Weimar Republic in order to respond to the deepseated disappointment of many Germans and the sense of damage to their own identity after defeat in World War 1. In 1931, Adolf
Hitler rejected the simple assertion that the modern political and social world was compicated “as wicked propaganda from democrats.”

Instead, National Socialist propaganda offered simple explanations and denied the facts: Parliamentary system? A deceptive façade by which people were deceived and MPs made themselves rich! Democratic
parties? A corrupt crowd! Liberal press? Among National Socialists, it became the “asphalt press” or “Jewish press”. And the term “system parties” had been used during the economic crisis since 1930, referring
to those parties who were waging “a campaign of destruction against their own people”. It cannot be overlooked that the rightwing populists of today are readopting the linguistic phrases and narratives of that
time. This is true in particular of those narratives regarding the community of the people, cultural superiority through race or religion, discrimination of cetain groups across the board, immense inhumanity, and
of the elitist criticism shaping their narratives. In terms of content and language, these are the old keywords and recipes – which is not to say that all AfD voters represent such exteme attitudes.
But there is a fundamental difference between analogue propaganda and digital disinformation: the mass character and frequency with which manipulated information is disseminated online. Disinformation and propaganda today achieve a much greater scope of influence through the Net than at a time when the post-factual was spread via radio, newsreels or the daily press. The number of actors sowing doubts in our democratic system through disinformation, poisoning democratic debate with their language and narratives – and the number of media platforms, groups and forums they use – have multiplied in number. And as a result, so have propaganda and false information.

It is a mistake to ignore this antidemocratic,hate-filled white noise on the Net along with the disinformation circulating online. For it will remain and grow in Germany as well – and this will have practical
consequences for our lives together, our politics,our political and democratic undersstanding. Our handling of it can change, however. The precondition to finding some orientation in this web of fake and fact, truth
and lies, is that we know how to distinguish one from the other. This also involves knowing who is spreading disinformation online and with what interests – and through what narratives, images and linguistic terms it is happening. It is important to take an energetic stand against the misanthropic phrases and group-related inhumanity on the Net, and to reject hate and violence. And we should not give way to pressure to shift the boundaries of the unspeakable. We must not stop comparing and be aware of the boundaries of our own echo chambers, and continue to break through them – to get the full picture, to know the arguments and fears of others. For democracy and the question of what kind of society we wish to live in is also being negotiated on the Net!

This essay is the outcome of two years of investigative research into the spread of disinformation online. The book Fake statt Fakt. Wie Populisten, Bots und Trolle
unsere Demokratie angreifen was published by dtv in summer 2018: 

Fake statt Fakt – how Populists, Bots and Trolls are offending our democracy”

POLITICAL EXTREMISM OF THE YOUTH AS AN ETHNO-SOCIAL DEVIATION
IN THE POST-SOVIET ELECTRONIC INFORMATION SOCIETY

Volume 17 Issue 4 2016 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS
https://www.ca-c.org/online/2016/journal_eng/cac-04/ca-cE-4-2016.pdf
BY IRINA MKRTUMOVA
D.Sc. (Sociol.), Professor, Deputy Director for Scientific-Analytical Work,
Institute of Supplementary Professional Education
(Moscow, Russian Federation)

Irina KARABULATOVA
D.Sc. (Philol.), Professor,
Member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences,
Chief Research Associate, Head of the Sector of Ethnopolitical and
Sociocultural Security and Communication Technologies,
Institute of Socio-Political Research, Russian Academy of Sciences
(Moscow, Russian Federation)

Anastasiya ZINCHENKO
Ph.D. (Econ.), Lecturer at the Tyumen Military Engineering Officer Academy
(Tyumen, Russian Federation)

ABSTRACT
 We belong to an electronic information society and live in a global  space of information and communication technologies with the following intertwining parameters: (1) the individual and the collective; (2) the objective and the subjective; (3) the material and the ideal. This is
a new type of global integrity that has already challenged those who are learning to
distinguish between the external and the internal and between “mine” and “yours,” while
remaining within the information space. 

This adds special importance to the conditions within which these two spaces can be outlined; the absence of outlines or inability of any country to defend its own lines gives rise
to a new type of danger created by information flows. This is extremely obvious among
young people as the most mobile group susceptible to all sorts of factors that change
stereotypes and create ethnosocial deviations.1

 The religious factor as part of the political process is becoming a catalyst of sta
bilization and/or destabilization of the political space. We need to identify the mechanisms and technologies that draw religion into politics and arrive at methods through
which social and state security can be ensured. This doubles the importance of the
subject of our study. The information threat per se can crop up in a variety of forms: virtual worlds that replace reality in the minds of people; manipulation of human minds and
human behavior, replacement of goals, values, and lifestyle with standards imposed
from the outside, distorted information, etc.2

This means that the problem of interaction between consciousness and being has
been revived in the information society: today, they coexist in the common space of
information flows (knowledge, technologies,2 and programs). They are practically indistinguishable, which creates a negative trend, viz. the replacement of the subjective with a technological milieu, in which the difference between “moral” and “amoral” can hardly be
distinguished. To arrive at a strategy for preventing and opposing the discussed phenomenon, we must undertake as thorough an analysis as possible of the ontogenesis
and phylogenesis of political extremism among young people, as well as its specifics
and non-lineal dynamics in Russia’s sociopolitical conditions, and generalize the results thus obtained. The time has come to admit that today the state is opposing extremism merely to neutralize its most dangerous repercussions. So far nothing has been done to eliminate the fundamental causes of extremism in the younger generation: its social vulnerability, lack of opportunity to move up the social ladder, and glaring property inequality.

See: I.S. Karabulatova, “Sovremenny elektronnoinformatsionny diskurs kak indikator etnopoliticheskoy
bezopasnosti: mezhetnicheskaya tolerantnost v XXI veke,”
Nauchnoe obozrenie. Seria 2: Gumanitarnye nauki, No. 2,
2016, pp. 3-14.

This study has been carried out with the financial support of the Russian Federal Property Fund within the framework of research project No. 16-06-00476.80

THE MOLOTOV-RIBBENTROP PACT MYTHS (PT.I)
WRITTEN BY 

ALAFFCREATOR22.06.2019

With this translation, ALAFF opens the series of publications that make up the chapters of the book «“Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact” in questions and answers» by Alexander Dyukov (ISBN 978-5-9990-0005-7). The book was released in 2009 by the “Historical Memory” Foundation. The book was released in edition of only 1000 copies.

Annotation:

The book that you hold in your hands is a popular science work, which gives reasoned answers to key questions related to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and perceptions in Russia and abroad of its consequences.

Is it true that the Soviet-German non-aggression pact was illegal from the point of view of international law? Is it true that the Kremlin deliberately pushed the beginning of the Second World War? Is it true that the Baltic countries lost their independence as a result of the Soviet-German pact? Which countries today enjoy the “fruits of the pact”? The perception of the past and understanding of the reasons for its active politicization in our days depends on the the answers to these and other questions.

The entire book is available for free download. Source (*.pdf file)

IN RUSSIAN





It is argued that the conclusion of the “Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact” was predetermined by the totalitarian essence of the Nazi and Stalinist regimes. How consistently did Moscow and Berlin come to the conclusion of such a pact since the establishment of the Nazi regime in Germany and the strengthening of Stalin’s in the USSR?

The thesis that “the totalitarian regimes of Germany and the USSR inevitably had to agree [among themselves], since both were totalitarian” is quite popular today, first of all in Europe. However, this thesis has absolutely nothing in common with reality. In fact, it was the Soviet Union that in the 1930s was the most consistent opponent of the expansionist and revanchist plans of Nazi Germany.

As early as February 3, 1933, a few days after Adolf Hitler was appointed as German Reich Chancellor, the leader of the Nazi party declared “conquering the new living space in the east and its merciless Germanization” as the goal of its policy [1]. A few weeks later, the Nazis organized the arson attack on the Reichstag building, which the Communists were accused of. The subsequent persecution of the Communists, anti-Jewish actions and bonfires from books in the squares of German cities could not cause sympathy in Moscow; already in June 1933, the USSR declared Germany about the termination of military cooperation. Subsequently, Soviet-German relations continued to deteriorate. When a year and a half later, in December 1934, the Soviet ambassador to London, Ivan Maisky, was asked about the USSR’s attitude towards Germany and Japan, the answer was lapidary. “Our relations with these two countries are characterized… by the presence of strong suspicions that they have aggressive aspirations towards our territory,” — answered the Soviet ambassador [2].





(left) Ivan Mikhailovich Maisky, Soviet diplomat, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the USSR to the United Kingdom in 1932 — 1943

(right) USSR People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinov in October 1934

The threat of German expansion to the east forced the Soviet leadership to persistently oppose the Nazi plans (of course, diplomatic contacts with Germany were not broken). This course is strongly associated with the name of the USSR Commissar of Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinov.

Initially, the potential German expansion was supposed to be blocked by concluding bilateral agreements with the countries of Eastern Europe. In December 1933, the USSR proposed to Poland to sign a joint declaration of interest in the inviolability of the Baltic states, but this proposal was rejected by Warsaw, which was increasingly oriented towards Berlin. At the same time, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) decided on the readiness of the USSR “to join the League of Nations on certain conditions” and “to conclude a regional agreement on mutual aggression on the part of Germany” [3].

In May 1934, French Foreign Minister Louis Barthou proposed to conclude an agreement on mutual assistance between France and the Soviet Union. In addition, it was supposed to conclude the “Eastern Pact” — a multilateral agreement on the mutual non-aggression of all the countries of Eastern Europe, as well as the USSR and Germany. The Kremlin generally supported these projects because they contributed to the security of the Soviet borders.

However, the “Eastern Pact” was not destined to take place: its signing was blocked by the diplomatic efforts of Berlin and Warsaw, and its initiator, Louis Barthou, together with Alexander, the king of Yugoslavia, was killed by Croatian terrorists (with the assistance of the Nazis) in October 1934. But the Soviet-French mutual aid pact was signed on May 2, 1935; its ratification, however, took place only in February 1936. Following France, Czechoslovakia signed an agreement on mutual assistance with the Soviet Union.

During the Spanish civil war, in which Germany and Italy actively intervened, the Soviet Union openly supported the legitimate republican government. The USSR supplied military equipment to Spain; Soviet military experts fought against the Frankists, their German and Italian allies. Soviet aid to Republican Spain was especially important in the conditions of “non-intervention” of England and France, which turned a blind eye to the active participation of Germany and Italy in the Spanish war.

On March 17, 1938, the Soviet government made another attempt to create a system of “collective security”, proposing to convene an international conference to consider “practical measures against the development of aggression and the danger of a new world war”. However, this proposal was rejected by London as “undermining the prospects for peace in Europe”.



Britain’s refusal to hold an international conference on countering aggression was not accidental. London has consistently taken the path of “appeasing” Germany, pushing Nazi aggression eastward. Western countries loyally reacted to the remilitarization of the Rhineland, to the intervention of Germany in the Spanish civil war, to the Anschluss of Austria. On December 2, 1937, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden informed Berlin that London was not against a border revision in Eastern Europe — provided that this happened without a war [4].

“Germany and England are the two pillars of the European world and the main pillars against communism, and therefore it is necessary to overcome our present difficulties peacefully,” said British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain on September 12, 1938. “Probably, it will be possible to find a solution acceptable to everyone except Russia” [5]. A few weeks later, on September 30, a meeting of the heads of government of Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy was held in Munich, at which was approved tearing off of a number of areas from Czechoslovakia. The “Munich collusion” took place behind the backs of the Soviet Union and was perceived in the Kremlin as clear evidence of a rapprochement between Hitler, on the one hand, and Great Britain and France, on the other.



USSR People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Maxim Maksimovich Litvinov in 1937



It was a catastrophic failure of the “collective security” strategy. The prospect of remaining alone in front of Germany, which had effectively established dominance over all of Central Europe, was clearly marked before the USSR. The situation was complicated by an acute confrontation with the Japanese Empire on the country’s Far Eastern borders, which in the summer of 1938 resulted in bloody hostilities on Lake Hassan.

Nevertheless, Soviet diplomats continued their attempts to form an anti-Hitler system of “collective security” and clearly draw its contours. On April 17, 1939, the Soviet Union proposed Great Britain and France to conclude an agreement on mutual assistance, which also provides for the provision of support to the countries of Eastern Europe in the event of aggression against them. And It was only after the failure of the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations that a decision was made in the Kremlin to ensure the security of the Soviet borders at the expense of the treaty with Germany.


“I closely followed the Russians in the League of Nations and in the Committee on Non-intervention and without hesitation I would say that Litvinov is the only foreign minister who speaks the language of elementary honesty”

US Ambassador to Spain C. Bowers, November 3, 1938 [6]

As one can see, to say that the Soviet Union consistently went to the conclusion of a pact with Nazi Germany, is impossible. On the contrary, the USSR’s foreign policy was consistently aimed at countering German aggression and revanchism. It was precisely this that made Soviet foreign policy different from the foreign policy of other European states.

If one ask about a state that really worked closely with Germany and for a long time supported the Nazi foreign political actions, then we should pay attention to Poland.

When, in October 1933, Berlin announced the withdrawal of its representatives from the conference on disarmament, there was a threat that the League of Nations would apply sanctions against Germany. Warsaw assured Berlin that it would not join any sanctions against it [7]. In December of the same year, Poland proposed Germany to conclude an anti-Soviet alliance; at that time, such a proposal turned out to be too radical even for the Nazi leadership [8]. Instead, on January 26, 1934, the Polish-German Declaration on the peaceful settlement of disputes and the non-use of force was signed.

In accordance with the wishes of Berlin and because of territorial contradictions with Lithuania, Warsaw refused to sign the declaration on interest in the inviolability of the Baltic States proposed by the Soviet Union, blocked attempts to create an “Eastern Bloc”. Rejecting the “Eastern Pact” project on September 28, 1934, Warsaw notified Paris of its readiness “to link its fate with the fate of Germany” [9].



When Germany began an audit of European borders, Poland took similar actions. In March 1938, Warsaw organized provocations on the demarcation line with Lithuania, presented it with an ultimatum, demanding to officially recognize the Vilna region occupied by Polish troops in 1920 and annexed in 1922 as Polish territory. Otherwise, Poland threatened Lithuania with war. This initiative was supported by Berlin [10].


“The Germans were not the only predators who tormented the corpse of Czechoslovakia. Immediately after the conclusion of the Munich Agreement on September 30, the Polish government sent an ultimatum to the Czech government, which was to be answered after 24 hours. The Polish government demanded the immediate transfer of the border region of Těšín… While the glow of Germany’s power fell on them, they hurried to seize their share when plundering and ruining Czechoslovakia”

W. Churchill,
“Second World War” [11]

A little later, together with Germany, Poland took part in the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, capturing Těšín region. In fact, Poland acted as a co-aggressor; in a conversation with Hitler on September 20, 1938, the Polish ambassador in Berlin pointed out that it was his country’s position that made it possible to paralyze “the possibility of the Soviets intervening in the Czech issue” [12]. In March 1939, Poland again found itself on the same side of the barricades with Germany, actively supporting the idea of occupation Transcarpathian Ukraine by Hungary.





British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and British diplomat Anthony Ideen

Modern Polish historians are trying to convince us that in fact Poland in the 30s only pursued a policy of “balance” between Germany and the USSR. However, this is not true; following the Russian historian Mikhail Meltyukhov, it should be recognized that at that time “the position of Poland was, as a rule, closer to the position of Germany and sharply diverged from the position of the USSR” [13].

It is not difficult to notice the significant difference between the “German” policy of Moscow and Warsaw in 1933-1938, between the opposition of Nazi aggression and its support. Unfortunately, today for some reason people prefer not to recall this difference.

[1] Top secret! Only for command!: The strategy of fascist Germany in the war against the USSR: Documents and materials. M., 1967. P. 42 — 43.

[2] Maisky I.M. Diplomat diary: London, 1934 — 1943 / Ed. A.O. Chubaryan. M., 2006. Book 1. P. 45.

[3] Ken O., Rupasov A. Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and the relations of the USSR with the western neighboring states. M., 2000. Book 1. P. 104, 406-411.

[4] Meltyukhov M.I. September 17, 1939: Soviet-Polish conflicts, 1918 — 1939. M., 2009. P. 182

[5] The Year of the Crisis, 1938 — 1939. M., 1990. Volume 1. P. 6

[6] World Wars of the twentieth century. M., 2005. Book. 4. P. 29

[7] Meltyukhov M.I. September 17, 1939. P. 168.

[8] ibid. P. 170.

[9] ibid. P. 174.

[10] ibid. P. 179.

[11] Churchill W. World War II. M., 1997. Volume 1. P. 151 — 152.

[12] Meltyukhov M.I. September 17, 1939. P. 195.

[13] ibid. P. 176.

THE MOLOTOV-RIBBENTROP PACT MYTHS (PT.II)
WRITTEN BY ALAFFCREATOR10.02.2020

ALAFF continues to publish a translation of the chapters of the book «“Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact” in questions and answers» by Alexander Dyukov (ISBN 978-5-9990-0005-7). The first chapter is here.

The entire book is available for free download. Source (*.pdf file)



Is it true that back in November 1938 the “General Agreement between the NKVD and the Gestapo” was signed, testifying to the close cooperation of the Soviet and Nazi regimes?

The so-called “General Agreement on cooperation, mutual assistance, joint activity between the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR and the Main Directorate of Security of the National Socialist Workers Party of Germany (Gestapo)” is a fake well known to historians. It was first published in the anti-Semitic newspaper “Pamyat” (“Memory” — ALAFF), published in Moscow in 1999 [14]. This “document”, which tells about the joint struggle of the NKVD and the Gestapo against the “Jewish threat”, was widely used in Russian ultranationalist circles and after some time was partially reproduced in the book of the writer Vladimir Karpov “Generalissimo”. The “General Agreement” is also presented on numerous resources of the Russian segment of the Internet.


The head of the anti-Semitic movement “Pamyat” Dmitry Vasiliev demonstrates the fake “General Agreement”. Moscow, February 1999.

The content of the “General Agreement” indisputably indicates the falsity of this “document”. According to the notes on the folder in which the “General Agreement” was allegedly “found”, this folder is stored in the fund 13 of the archive of the CPSU Central Committee [15]. However, the fund 13 of this archive (now the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History) stored the documents of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU for the RSFSR, which operated in 1956-1966, and had nothing to do with the bodies of the NKVD. No “General Agreement” is stored in the fund and has not been stored [previously].

The “document” was signed by “the head of the Fourth Directorate (Gestapo) of the Main Security Directorate of the National Socialist Workers Party of Germany, SS brigadeführer G. Müller” on November 11, 1938. However, the Gestapo became the Fourth Directorate only on September 27, 1939, when the RSHA, the General Directorate of Imperial Security, was created. Thus, the “General Agreement” was signed on behalf of the department that did not exist at that time.



“General agreement between the NKVD and the Gestapo” — a document falsified in the 90s of the XX century.

The strangeness of the “document” is not limited to this. G. Müller by November 1938 was the rank of SS standartenführer, not the SS brigadeführer, as indicated in the “General Agreement”. And he did not head the Gestapo, but was the head of the referent of the Main Directorate of the Security Police and the SD. Moreover, on November 11, 1938, Müller was not in Moscow, as is clear from the “Agreement”, but in Berlin, summing up the famous Kristallnacht. It turns out that the “General Agreement” on behalf of a non-existent organization was signed by a representative of another organization, who was thousands of kilometers from the place of signing. And besides, he confused his own rank.

However, this is not all. The “General Agreement” states that Müller signed it “on the basis of power of attorney No. I 448 / 12-1 of November 3, 1938, issued by the chief of the General Security Directorate of the SS Reichsführer Reichard Heydrich”. Certified by the “head of the secretariat of the NKVD of the USSR [Stepan Solomonovich] Mamulov”, the translation into Russian of this “power of attorney” was published in the same issue of the “Pamyat” newspaper as the “General Agreement”. However, Mamulov was appointed head of the Secretariat of the NKVD of the USSR only on January 3, 1939 — two months after he allegedly assured the translation of the “power of attorney”.



“General agreement between the NKVD and the Gestapo” — a document falsified in the 90s of the XX century.

As one can see, the fake turned out to be extremely rude. It is not surprising that it was subjected to devastating criticism in the Russian media immediately after a partial reprint in V. Karpov’s book “Generalissimo” [16]. This criticism was conscientiously taken into account by falsifiers in the preparation of the second, revised version of the “General Agreement”.

The second version of the “General Agreement” was put into circulation through the journalist of NTV broadcaster Sergey Kanev, who specialized in criminal chronicle. According to Kanev himself, “the person who brought this folder said that the document was genuine from the personal archive of L. Beria” [17]. The new version of the “General Agreement” differed significantly from the one published in the newspaper “Pamyat”. Müller’s rank was changed — this time it sounded like “a representative of the head of the German Main Security Directorate”. The title of “SS brigadeführer” turned out to be amended to a more adequate “SS standartenführer”. The text of the “General Agreement” has been amended; in addition, wax seals and “personal notes of Beria” appeared. However, some evidence of falsehood remained; for example, in the new version of the “General Agreement” Mamulov was still listed as “the head of the secretariat of the NKVD of the USSR”. The question of how Müller, who was in Berlin on November 11, 1938, was able to sign the “General Agreement” in Moscow on the same day, also remained open.

Sergey Kanev accepted the “General Agreement” as an authentic document; his film “The NKVD and the Gestapo: Marriage of convenience” in 2004 was shown on NTV. Four years later, the shots taken by Kanev of the second version of the “General Agreement” along with a number of other fakes were used by the authors of the Latvian pseudo-documentary film “The Soviet Story” [18]. Objections from official Latvian historians to this film did not follow; moreover, this movie, overflowing with fakes and false statements, was approved by them. This fact, as well as the use of the “Agreement” as a genuine document in the book of Lithuanian historian Petras Stankeras “Lithuanian Police Battalions” [19], testifies to the progressive degradation of Baltic historical science.

[14] Secret conspiracy of the NKVD and the Gestapo // Pamyat. 1999. No. 1 (26). Electronic publication: http://www.pamyat.ru/gestapo.html

[15] It should be noted that a reference to the fund 13 of the Archive of the CPSU Central Committee is contained in other false documents related to the “General Agreement”. For more details see: Kostyrchenko G. “Racial Instructions of Beria”: Regarding the publication of one fake // Lekhaym. 2002. No. 5.

[16] See, for example: Deych M. Stalin, Beria and dad Müller // Moskovsky Komsomolets. 07/31/2002 (Source — ALAFF); Dashevsky V. Lies for a wide circle // Novoe Vremya. 2002. No. 48.

[17] NKVD — Gestapo (1938): In the wake of the sources. Gennady Mesh — Vladimir Fedko // Russian Globe. 2004. No 6. Electronic publication: http://www.russianglobe.com/N28/NKVD_GESTAPO.About.htm

[18] For a detailed analysis of fakes and false statements used in this pseudo-documentary film, see: A.R. Dyukov “The Soviet Story”: The mechanism of lies; Dyukov A. “The Soviet Story”: Forgery Tissue. M., 2008. According to the conclusion of specialists from the Department of Psychology at Moscow State University, the film is directly aimed at inciting ethnic hatred.

[19] Stankeras P. Lithuanian police battalions, 1941-1945. M., 2009. Pp. 23 — 24.

Leviathan Killed Boris Nemtsov
LUKE HARDING
At 11:30 PM on Friday February 27th 2015, Boris
Nemtsov, an outspoken Russian opposition leader,
was shot in the back. The assassin fired off six shots;
four of the bullets struck him, one in the heart; and he
died instantly. The only explanation not being given
in Moscow for Nemtsov’s is the blindingly obvious
one: that Nemtsov was murdered for his opposition
activities and, specifically, for his very public
criticism of Vladimir Putin’s secret war in Ukraine.

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