Sunday, July 03, 2022

Hope and despair: Kathy Gannon on 35 years in Afghanistan

By KATHY GANNON

In this Saturday, Oct. 1, 2011 file photo, Associated Press Special Regional Correspondent for Afghanistan and Pakistan Kathy Gannon sits with girls at a school in Kandahar, Afghanistan. A Kabul court announced Wednesday, July 23, 2014 that the Afghan police officer charged with killing Associated Press photographer Anja Niedringhaus and wounding veteran AP correspondent Kathy Gannon has been convicted and sentenced to death.
(AP Photo/Anja Niedringhaus, File)

LONG READ

KABUL, Afghanistan (AP) — The Afghan policeman opened fire on us with his AK-47, emptying 26 bullets into the back of the car. Seven slammed into me, and at least as many into my colleague, Associated Press photographer Anja Niedringhaus. She died at my side.

Anja weighed heavy against my shoulder. I tried to look at her but I couldn’t move. I looked down; all I could see was what looked like a stump where my left hand had been. I could barely whisper, “Please help us.”

Our driver raced us to a small local hospital in Khost, siren on. I tried to stay calm, thinking over and over: “Don’t be afraid. Don’t die afraid. Just breathe.”

At the hospital, Dr. Abdul Majid Mangal said he would have to operate and tried to reassure me. His words are forever etched in my heart: “Please know your life is as important to me as it is to you.”

Much later, as I recovered in New York during a process that would turn out to eventually require 18 operations, an Afghan friend called from Kabul. He wanted to apologize for the shooting on behalf of all Afghans.

I said the shooter didn’t represent a nation, a people. My mind returned to Dr. Mangal – for me, it was him who represented Afghanistan and Afghans.

I have reported on Afghanistan for the AP for the past 35 years, during an extraordinary series of events and regime changes that have rocked the world. Through it all, the kindness and resilience of ordinary Afghans have shone through – which is also what has made it so painful to watch the slow erosion of their hope.

I have always been amazed at how Afghans stubbornly hung on to hope against all odds, greeting each of several new regimes with optimism. But by 2018, a Gallup poll showed that the fraction of people in Afghanistan with hope in the future was the lowest ever recorded anywhere.

It didn’t have to be this way.

___

I arrived in Afghanistan in 1986, in the middle of the Cold War. It seems a lifetime ago. It is.

Then, the enemy attacking Afghanistan was the communist former Soviet Union, dubbed godless by United States President Ronald Reagan. The defenders were the U.S.-backed religious mujahedeen, defined as those who engage in holy war, championed by Reagan as freedom fighters.

Reagan even welcomed some mujahedeen leaders to the White House. Among his guests was Jalaluddin Haqqani, the father of the current leader of the Haqqani network, who in today’s world is a declared terrorist.

At that time, the God versus communism message was strong. The University of Nebraska even crafted an anti-communist curriculum to teach English to the millions of Afghan refugees living in camps in neighboring Pakistan. The university made the alphabet simple: J was for Jihad or holy war against the communists; K was for the Kalashnikov guns used in jihad, and I was for Infidel, which described the communists themselves.

There was even a math program. The questions went something like: If there were 10 communists and you killed five, how many would you have left?

When I covered the mujahedeen, I spent a lot of time and effort on being stronger, walking longer, climbing harder and faster. At one point, I ran out of a dirty mud hut with them and hid under a nearby cluster of trees. Just minutes later, Russian helicopter gunships flew low, strafed the trees and all but destroyed the hut.

In this Oct. 9, 2014 photo, Associated Press reporter Kathy Gannon answers questions during an interview in New York. This was Gannon's first interview since she and AP photographer Anja Niedringhaus were attacked on April 4, by a gunman in Khost Province in eastern Afghanistan as they prepared to cover the presidential election the next day. Niedringhaus was killed in the attack and Gannon is recovering from multiple gunshot wounds. (AP Photo/Julie Jacobson, File)

The Russians withdrew in 1989 without a win. In 1992, the mujahedeen took power.

Ordinary Afghans hoped fervently that the victory of the mujahedeen would mean the end of war. They also to some degree welcomed a religious ideology that was more in line with their largely conservative country than communism.

But it wasn’t long before the mujahedeen turned their guns on each other.

The fighting was brutal, with the mujahedeen pounding the capital, Kabul, from the hills. Thrice the AP lost its equipment to thieving warlords, only to be returned after negotiations with the top warlord. One day I counted as many as 200 incoming and outgoing rockets inside of minutes.

The bloodletting of the mujahedeen-cum government ministers-cum warlords killed upward of 50,000 people. I saw a 5-year-old girl killed by a rocket as she stepped out of her house. Children by the scores lost limbs to booby traps placed by mujahedeen as they departed neighborhoods.

I stayed on the front line with a woman and her two small children in the Macroyan housing complex during the heaviest rocketing. Her husband, a former communist government employee, had fled, and she lived by making and selling bread each day with her children.

She opened her home to me even though she had so little. All night we stayed in the one room without windows. She asked me if I would take her son to Pakistan the next day, but in the end could not bear to see him go.

Only months after my visit, they were killed by warlords who wanted their apartment.

___

Despite the chaos of the time, Afghans still had hope.

In the waning days of the warring mujahedeen’s rule, I attended a wedding in Kabul where both the wedding party and guests were coiffed and downright glamorous. When asked how she managed to look so good with so little amid the relentless rocketing, one young woman replied brightly, “We’re not dead yet!”

The wedding was delayed twice because of rockets.

The Taliban had by then emerged. They were former mujahedeen and often Islamic clerics who had returned to their villages and their religious schools after 1992. They came together in response to the relentless killing and thieving of their former comrades-in-arms.

By mid-1996, the Taliban were on Kabul’s doorstep, with their promise of burqas for women and beards for men. Yet Afghans welcomed them. They hoped the Taliban would at least bring peace.

 
In this Feb. 2012 photo, Kathy Gannon, front left, AP special correspondent for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and veteran AP photographer Anja Niedringhaus, third right, pose with Pakistani soldiers in the remote border area opposite Afghanistan's northeastern Kunar province. The AP team was documenting Pakistan's role in fighting Islamic militants in the region. Niedringhaus, 48, was killed and Gannon was wounded on Friday, April 4, 2014 when an Afghan policeman opened fire while they were sitting in their car in eastern Afghanistan. (AP Photo/File)


When asked about the repressive restrictions of the Taliban, one woman who had worked for an international charity said: “If I know there is peace and my child will be alive, I will wear the burqa.”

Peace did indeed come to Afghanistan, at least of sorts. Afghans could leave their doors unlocked without fear of being robbed. The country was disarmed, and travel anywhere in Afghanistan at any time of the day or night was safe.

But Afghans soon began to see their peace as a prison. The Taliban’s rule was repressive. Public punishments such as chopping off hands and rules that denied girls school and women work brought global sanctions and isolation. Afghans got poorer.

The Taliban leader at the time was the reclusive Mullah Mohammad Omar, rumored to have removed his own eye after being wounded in a battle against invading Soviet soldiers. As international sanctions crippled Afghanistan, Omar got closer to al-Qaida, until eventually the terrorist group became the Taliban’s only source of income.

By 2001, al-Qaida’s influence was complete. Despite a pledge from Omar to safeguard them, Afghanistan’s ancient statues of Buddha were destroyed, in an order reportedly from Osama bin Laden himself.

Then came the seismic shock of 9/11.


Many Afghans mourned the American deaths so far away. Few even knew who bin Laden was. But the country was now squarely a target in the eyes of the United States. Amir Shah, AP’s longtime correspondent, summed up what most Afghans were thinking at the time: “America will set Afghanistan on fire.”

And it did.

After 9/11, the Taliban threw all foreigners out of Afghanistan, including me. The U.S.-led coalition assault began on Oct. 7, 2001.

By Oct. 23, I was back in Kabul, the only Western journalist to see the last weeks of Taliban rule. The powerful B-52 bombers of the U.S. pounded the hills and even landed in the city.

On Nov. 12 that year, a 2,000-pound bomb landed on a house near the AP office. It threw me across the room and blew out window and door frames. Glass shattered and sprayed everywhere.

By sunrise the next day, the Taliban were gone from Kabul.

___

Afghanistan’s next set of rulers marched into the city, brought by the powerful military might of the U.S.-led coalition.

The mujahedeen were back.

The U.S. and U.N. returned them to power even though some among them had brought bin Laden from Sudan to Afghanistan in 1996, promising him a safe haven. The hope of Afghans went through the roof, because they believed the powerful U.S. would help them keep the mujahedeen in check.

With more than 40 countries involved in their homeland, they believed peace and prosperity this time was most certainly theirs. Foreigners were welcome everywhere.

Some Afghans worried about the returning mujahedeen, remembering the corruption and fighting when they last were in power. But America’s representative at the time, Zalmay Khalilzad, told me that the mujahedeen had been warned against returning to their old ways.

Yet worrying signs began to emerge. The revenge killings began, and the U.S.-led coalition sometimes participated without knowing the details. The mujahedeen would falsely identify enemies – even those who had worked with the U.S. before – as belonging to al-Qaida or to the Taliban.

One such mistake happened early in December 2001 when a convoy was on its way to meet the new President Hamid Karzai. The U.S.-led coalition bombed it because they were told the convoy bore fighters from the Taliban and al-Qaida. They turned out to be tribal elders.

Secret prisons emerged. Hundreds of Afghan men disappeared. Families became desperate.

Resentment soared especially among the ethnic Pashtuns, who had been the backbone of the Taliban. One former Taliban member proudly displayed his new Afghan identity card and wanted to start a water project in his village. But corrupt government officials extorted him for his money, and he returned to the Taliban.

A deputy police chief in southern Zabul province told me of 2,000 young Pashtun men, some former Taliban, who wanted to join the new government’s Afghan National Army. But they were mocked for their ethnicity, and eventually all but four went to the mountains and joined the Taliban.

In the meantime, corruption seemed to reach epic proportions, with suitcases of money, often from the CIA, handed off to Washington’s Afghan allies. Yet schools were built, roads were reconstructed and a new generation of Afghans, at least in the cities, grew up with freedoms their parents had not known and in many cases looked on with suspicion.

Then came the shooting in 2014 that would change my life.

It began as most days do in Afghanistan: Up before 6 a.m. This day we were waiting for a convoy of Afghan police and military to leave the eastern city of Khost for a remote region to distribute the last of the ballot boxes for Afghanistan’s 2014 presidential elections.

After 30 minutes navigating past blown-out bridges and craters that pockmarked the road, we arrived at a large police compound. For more than an hour, Anja and I talked with and photographed about a dozen police officials.

We finished our work just as a light drizzle began. We got into the car and waited to leave for a nearby village. That’s when the shooting happened.

It was two years before I was able to return to work and to Afghanistan.


 In this Dec. 2, 2014 file photo, Associated Press journalist Kathy Gannon poses for a photograph in Toronto. Afghanistan's highest court has ruled that the police officer convicted of murdering Associated Press photographer Anja Niedringhaus and wounding Gannon almost one year ago, should serve 20 years in prison, according to documents sent to the country's attorney general on Saturday, March 28, 2015. The final sentence for former Afghan police unit commander Naqibullah was reduced from the death penalty recommended by a primary court last year. Twenty years in prison is the maximum jail sentence in Afghanistan, said Zahid Safi, a lawyer for The Associated Press who had been briefed on the decision by the Supreme Court. (Darren Calabrese/The Canadian Press via AP, File)

By that point, the disappointment and disenchantment with America’s longest war had already set in. Despite the U.S. spending over $148 billion on development alone over 20 years, the percentage of Afghans barely surviving at the poverty level was increasing yearly.

In 2019, Pakistan began accepting visa applications at its consulate in eastern Afghanistan. People were so desperate to leave that nine died in a stampede.

In 2020, the U.S. and the Taliban signed a deal for troops to withdraw within 18 months. The U.S. and NATO began to evacuate their staff, closing down embassies and offering those who worked for them asylum.

The mass closure of embassies was baffling to me because the Taliban had made no threats, and it sparked panic in Kabul. It was the sudden and secret departure of President Ashraf Ghani that finally brought the Taliban back into the city on Aug. 15, 2021.

Their swift entry came as a surprise, along with the thorough collapse of the neglected Afghan army, beset by deep corruption. The Taliban’s rapid march toward Kabul fed a rush toward the airport.

For many in the Afghan capital, the only hope left lay in getting out.

Fida Mohammad, a 24-year-old dentist, was desperate to leave for the U.S. so he could earn enough money to repay his father’s debt of $13,000 for his elaborate marriage. He clung to the wheels of the departing US C-17 aircraft on Aug. 16 and died.

Zaki Anwari, a 17-year-old footballer, ran to get on the plane. He dreamed only of football, and believed his dream could not come true in Afghanistan. He was run over by the C-17.

Now the future in Afghanistan is even more uncertain. Scores of people line up outside the banks to try to get their money out. Hospitals are short of medicine. The Taliban hardliners seem to have the upper hand, at least in the short term.

Afghans are left to face the fact that the entire world came to their country in 2001 and spent billions, and still couldn’t bring them prosperity or even the beginnings of prosperity. That alone has deeply eroded hope for the future.

I leave Afghanistan with mixed feelings, sad to see how its hope has been destroyed but still deeply moved by its 38 million people. The Afghans I met sincerely loved their country, even if it is now led by elderly men driven by tribal traditions offensive to a world that I am not sure ever really understood Afghanistan.

Most certainly, though, I will be back.
What to Know About WNBA Star Brittney Griner's Detention in Russia

WAS IT CBD OIL? SHE IS A LESBIAN IN AN ANTI GAY COUNTRY

Anisha Kohli
Fri, July 1, 2022

2021 WNBA Semifinals - Las Vegas Aces v Phoenix Mercury

Brittney Griner #42 of the Phoenix Mercury looks on during the game against the Las Vegas Aces during Game Three of the 2021 WNBA Semifinals at Desert Financial Arena in Tempe, Arizona on October 3, 2021. Credit - Michael Gonzales—NBAE/ Getty Images)

The criminal trial of 31-year-old WNBA champion and Olympic gold medalist Brittney Griner, who has been detained for more than four months, began in Russia on July 1. She faces up to 10 years in prison for the alleged transportation and smuggling of cannabis products. Experts say that she is unlikely to receive a fair trial, and that Russian authorities are using her as a diplomatic bargaining chip amid the ongoing invasion of Ukraine.

Here’s what you need to know.

Griner was arrested and detained in February


On Feb. 17, Griner, who plays for the Phoenix Mercury, was taken into custody at Sheremetyevo International Airport near Moscow after her arrival to play in the off-season with UMMC Ekaterinburg, a Russian women’s basketball team where Griner has been a star for the past seven years. Airport authorities allegedly found four vape cartridges containing hash oil, a concentrated form of cannabis that is illegal in Russia, in Griner’s luggage. Russian Federal Customs Service said an airport security dog prompted customs officials to search her possessions. Griner was charged with violating Article 229.1 of the Criminal Code of Russia, a law criminalizing illegal drug trafficking and smuggling.

Griner’s detention occurred one week before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and it wasn’t until March 5 that news outlets began reporting about the detention of an unnamed American basketball player.

Footage from the airport released by Russian customs officials shortly after, which shows officials conducting a customs search, revealed that Griner was the detained player, a source in law enforcement told TASS, the Russian news agency, later that day.

On March 17, TASS reported that Griner’s detainment would be extended for more than two months, until May 19, after a court petition to investigate the charges had been approved. That day, a State Department representative said that American consular representatives had still not been able to meet with Griner.

However, on March 23, U.S. officials confirmed that an American embassy representative had been granted access to meet with Griner. During a press conference, spokesman Ned Price said Griner was “doing as well as can be expected under these very difficult circumstances.”

On April 11 WNBA Commissioner Cathy Englebert said that the league was working with Griner’s legal team, her agent, and the U.S. government to get Griner home as quickly as possible.

“This is an unimaginable situation for BG to be in. She continues to have our full support,” Englebert said, referencing Griner by her initials. “We know she’s safe, but we want to get her home so it’s a really complex situation.”

About three weeks later on May 3, the WNBA released a statement that Griner’s initials and jersey number would be featured on each court this season and that the league granted both roster and salary cap relief for Phoenix Mercury to hire a temporary replacement player to fill Griner’s spot.

On the same day, the State Department said in a statement that Griner had been “wrongfully detained” by the Russian government, adding that “the welfare and safety of U.S. citizens abroad is among the highest priorities of the U.S government.” The agency said that a new team within the agency would begin overseeing her case. On May 13, Griner was denied a request for house arrest and her detention was extended by another 30 days. The U.S. Embassy said that throughout the month, their requests to see Griner were repeatedly denied.

On June 14, Griner’s pretrial detention was extended once more until July 2. Then, at Griner’s June 27 closed-door preliminary hearing, the court set a trial start date for July 1 and extended her detention until Dec. 20 to accommodate the length of the trial.
Public outcry over Griner’s detention




Advocacy groups, Griner’s teammates and basketball fans alike have spent the last several months writing petitions, organizing protests and pleading with legislators to negotiate with Russian officials for Griner’s safe return home. Protests ensued in Phoenix, where Griner’s WNBA team is based. Members of the WNBA team met with the State Department in early June to discuss what could be done about Griner’s case.

“There is a lot involved in getting her back home and safe, they’re working relentlessly,” Mercury star Diana Taurasi said in a statement after the meeting. “We’re here to do whatever we can to amplify and keep BG at the forefront, which is more important than any basketball game and anything else that’s going on in our lives. We want BG to come home as soon as possible, it’s number one on our list.”

Tim Bradley, a former FBI agent, told TIME in March that people of color and LGBTQ+ people face a different level of risk in Russia. “The Russian government has a very closed view towards the LGBTQ community. That could have made her a more obvious target for them,” Bradley said.

On May 17, Griner’s agent, Lindsay Kagawa Colas, expressed on Twitter that Griner’s detention is a human rights violation and that she was being used by Russia for diplomatic leverage.

“International law requires that Russia provide consular access to #BrittneyGriner and that access has now been denied three times. This proves Brittney is being used as a political bargaining chip,” Colas wrote.

Griner’s wife, Cherelle Griner, has also said Griner is a “political pawn.” Cherelle has made public requests for President Biden to intervene in Griner’s release, and she’s shared scorn over the American government’s handling of the case. As of Friday, a petition to free Griner on change.org had nearly 290,000 signatures.
How Russia is responding

On March 5, the U.S. State Department issued a “do not travel” advisory for Russia in light of the invasion of Ukraine, warning that Americans faced potential harassment from Russian security officials and that the U.S. Embassy in Moscow could only offer limited assistance to Americans there.

Despite public outcry over Griner’s case, relatively few political figures have weighed in. According to government and legal analysts and experts interviewed by The New York Times, limiting statements and attention on the case could be helpful for Griner’s freedom because of the widely-held belief that Russian President Vladimir Putin is staunchly against caving to Western demands, especially since global outrage ensued over the invasion of Ukraine.

Political commentators have largely said that ongoing geopolitical tension between Russia and the West—including sanctions and military support for Ukraine—have weakened Griner’s possibility of release.

Bradley also told TIME that Griner’s arrest was “right out of the Russian playbook.” “I have to believe that she was targeted, based on the pending invasion of Ukraine. The Russian government has a long history of wrongfully detaining U.S. citizens,” he said. “It just doesn’t pass the smell test… It’s not shocking that the Russian government would do this.”

Russian news outlets and political pundits have circulated the idea of a prisoner swap as a possible solution for Griner’s release, after a successful swap earlier this year that brought a detained former U.S. Marine home from Russia. Russian news outlets have brought up Viktor Bout, an international arms dealer imprisoned in the United States, as a strong potential match to exchange for Griner. However, criticism has emerged over the stark differences in the two prisoners’ alleged crimes. Security experts are also worried that such a swap could encourage future hostage-taking.
The trial

Griner’s trial began July 1, but there’s no information about what type of evidence Russian prosecutors will bring against Griner.

Legal analysts told The New York Times that a conviction is very likely because “there’s no real idea or expectation that the defendant could be innocent” when they go to trial in Russia, all of the evidence used in a case comes from the prosecution, and there is no right to trial by jury. Cases that make it to trial are also far more likely to end in convictions. Kimberly St. Julian-Varnon, a Ph.D. student in the history department at the University of Pennsylvania, told The Times that there is a chance that Griner might win her freedom, after all, perhaps through a prisoner exchange, a lesser conviction, a fine or some other twist in her lengthy pursuit of justice.

As Griner’s trial began, U.S. Charge d’Affaires in Moscow Elizabeth Rood said that Griner told her she was “keeping the faith.”





MEET THE NEW BOSS
John Lee: the former Hong Kong cop Beijing trusts is sworn in



Xinqi SU
Thu, June 30, 2022


John Lee, a former beat cop who became Hong Kong's security chief and played a key role in suppressing democracy protests, became the business hub's new leader on Friday in a ceremony overseen by Chinese President Xi Jinping.

"It is the greatest honour for me today to shoulder this historic mission given to me by the central authorities and the people of Hong Kong," Lee said in his inauguration speech, thanking Beijing for its support.

Lee, 64, was anointed as Hong Kong's next chief executive by a small committee in May, winning 99 percent of the votes in a choreographed, Beijing-blessed race in which no other candidates stood.

Xi later said Lee's government would deliver a "new chapter" for Hong Kong.

Lee's elevation caps a remarkable rise for a man whose police career lifted him from a working-class family to the upper echelons of Hong Kong's political establishment.

It also places a security official in the city's top job for the first time, a man who was pivotal in the quashing of huge democracy protests in 2019 and Beijing's subsequent political crackdown.

Insiders say Lee's unwavering commitment to that role won China's confidence at a time when other Hong Kong elite were seen as insufficiently loyal or competent.

"John Lee is the one that the central government knows the best, because he was in constant contact and interaction with the mainland," pro-establishment lawmaker and prominent business figure Michael Tien told AFP earlier this year.

Lee, who is under US sanctions, spent 35 years in the police before jumping to the government in 2012, followed by a swift rise to the top.

Law and order remained his portfolio, with him serving in the Security Bureau and then leading it before becoming the city's number two official last year.
- Flares and long hair -

Lee, a Catholic, grew up poor in Sham Shui Po -- one of wealthy Hong Kong's working-class districts -- but made his way to an elite boys' school run by Jesuits.

Peter Lai, a former banker and classmate, described him as a clever and fashionable teenager who grew long hair and wore flared trousers.

Most of his contemporaries went to university, but Lee turned down an offer to study engineering to join the police.

He later told a pro-Beijing newspaper he was motivated by being bullied by neighbourhood hooligans.

Two former classmates gave a more practical reason -- the police force offered a stable career for Lee and his pregnant wife Janet.

Lee has not spoken much about his family and has dodged questions about whether his wife and two sons still hold British nationality, something he renounced when he joined the government.

As events began on Friday morning, Lee's new social media accounts posted a picture of his wife fixing his tie, thanking her for "silently supporting me and taking care of the family over the years".

- Business acumen? -

Given his security background, it seems unlikely Lee will reverse Beijing's campaign against dissent.

Where he will enter less familiar territory is the world of business.

Hong Kong, once a vibrant, multicultural business hub, has been cut off internationally during the pandemic as it shadows Beijing's strict zero-Covid strategy.

Its economy is struggling and there has been an exodus of talent.

Danny Lau, a small business association leader, said Lee was not an ideal candidate but that he would reserve judgement.

"I hope he can consider Hong Kong's international competitiveness and does not waste time on making laws unhelpful for the city's economy," Lau told AFP.

But others say Lee's appointment confirms that China now puts Hong Kong's political security ahead of business and livelihood issues.

"In the past, China might compromise for some economic benefits," Charles Mok, a former pro-democracy lawmaker now living overseas, told AFP.

"But now it seems Beijing wants its people to feel that the world is full of threats and it's only safe to stick closely to the (Communist) Party."


Who is winning Myanmar's civil war?

Since the coup in February 2021, Myanmar has descended into a bitter fight between the military and resistance groups. However, there are many competing assessments of the current situation on the ground.

Myanmar People's Defence Force (PDF) fighters are still loosely organized

Who has the upper hand in Myanmar's civil war? Is it the military, which has been trying to control the country with brutal force since the coup, or the resistance movement, which is using guerrilla tactics against the military?

The question is being asked not only by people who are suffering, but also by leaders in neighboring countries and observers around the world.

Over the past six weeks, several reports, commentaries and interviews have appeared in English-language media and think tanks attempting an answer.

What are experts saying?

In an analysis published in the the Asia Times, "Is Myanmar's military starting to lose the war?" military and security expert Anthony Davis said that he believes the resistance movement is consolidating gains, after he initially thought directly after the coup that the situation would be hopeless.

Davis made similar comments in a subsequent interview with the Irrawaddy magazine. 

Michael Martin, an analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, recently wrote an analysis titled, "Is Myanmar's Military on Its Last Legs?"

Ye Myo Hein and Lucas Meyer published a commentary on the website "War on the Rocks," calling for a "more united, better-armed opposition" to bring "democracy to Myanmar."

Junta chief Min Aung Hlaing during a military parade in March 2022

However, assessments of the conflict in Myanmar can differ widely, depending on what you read.

For example, The Economist reported in a recent article titled, "Myanmar's resistence is at risk of believing its own propaganda," that social media in Myanmar is spreading the "narrative of imminent victory" for the resistance movement.

However, according to the article, the facts on the ground speak a different language.

"Peer past the virtual fog, and a far bleaker picture emerges … Armed anti-regime groups are fragmented, with up to a dozen in a single district. A paucity of weapons has left them unable to go beyond guerrilla ambushes and assassinations," it reads.

At the other end of the spectrum is Michael Martin's commentary for CSIS. He writes: "There are growing signs that Myanmar's military is in a serious struggle to survive."

Most analyses fall somewhere in between these poles. However, except for the Economist, many of the reports assume that the situation has shifted in favor of the resistance in recent months. The question is, by how far?

Different numbers

Looking at the details, it becomes clear that the assessment of the overall situation is not the only place where there are divergences.

Data on the number of fighters and weapons also changes from analysis to analysis. It also depends on how "weapons" are defined. 

For example, the article by "War on the Rocks" states that the armed resistance groups known as "People's Defense Forces" (PDF) have recruited about 100,000 fighters, 40% of whom are armed in some way with conventional and non-conventional arms, including homemade, or improvised weapons. 

However, Davis, in his interview with The Irrawaddy, speaks of 50,000 to 100,000 fighters, and cites the National Unity Government's (NUG) ministry of defense as his source. Davis' analysis has less than 20% PDFs being armed, albeit limiting his scope to more conventional arms.

It's worth remembering that the NUG comprises the largely exiled government countering the military that claims to represent Myanmar politically. The NUG is also party to the conflict and its statements cannot be independently verified.

The NUG cannot quantify exactly how many members the resistance has, in part because there is no established chain of command from NUG to the PDFs, which operate more or less autonomously.

Min Zaw Oo from the Myanmar Institute for Peace and Security (MIPS) told DW he estimates that only 10% of PDFs are armed with automatic weapons.

He said these figures are based on reports of weapons seized or found after battles.

More serious than a lack of weapons, however, is the evident lack of ammunition among PDFs, which can be deduced from the fact that skirmishes with the military generally do not last longer than an hour.

There are varying assessments on how well equipped PDF fighters are

Biased reporting?

Most articles covering the conflict in Myanmar specifically address the problems of unreliable data.

Davis said in the Asia Times that "coherent analysis is complicated by the sheer frequency and spread of small-unit clashes and attacks across a vast swath of the country, and by a striking lack of impartial news reporting from the frontlines of a civil war largely shielded from the outside world."

Local journalist Cape Diamond said that the media in Myanmar do not "deliver the entire picture" and often "understate defeats" of the PDFs.

A village on fire in Myanmar's northwestern Chin state after government shelling

Breaking through the fog of war

The uncertainty in covering the civil war in Myanmar cannot be overemphasized. There is a lack of reliable information collected nationwide about the current situation in the country. There are individual reports, mostly of localized events, that are difficult to verify independently.

Min Zaw Oo is therefore skeptical about assessments of the overall situation or even an outcome of the conflict. "Different regions need to be assessed differently," he said.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies, which has created an interactive map of the current conflict, makes a similar argument.

"Rather than seeking to determine whether SAC or anti-SAC forces are 'winning,' the map emphasizes that the coup has altered long-standing power struggles by introducing new actors and alliances, with uneven effects across the country."

The only thing that can be said with certainty is that the violence has only spread and intensified since the coup.

However, the question of which side will win the civil war in the future remains open.

 

A MORE UNITED, BETTER-ARMED OPPOSITION CAN BRING DEMOCRACY TO MYANMAR

YE MYO HEIN AND LUCAS MYERS
JUNE 23, 2022
COMMENTARY



Myanmar’s rocky democratic transition ended abruptly in a military coup on February 1, 2021. Yet, the generals have kicked a hornet’s nest. The country’s Bamar majority has long dominated Myanmar, but an assortment of over 20 ethnic armed organizations have contested this situation for decades, and some have taken up arms once more to oppose the coup. Most crucially, faced with junta gunfire, the largely Bamar-dominated pro-democracy movement also made the grim decision to arm itself and fight the military.

The story of post-coup Myanmar is now one of a dedicated popular democratic resistance gaining momentum against a powerful military machine armed with Chinese and Russian equipment. This resistance is largely led by the predominantly Bamar National Unity Government in a loose coalition with some ethnic armed groups, ousted parliamentarians, and activists. They have shaken the junta to its core, successfully seized rural areas across the country, and enjoined several of the country’s ethnic armed groups to directly support them in the fight.

Yet, the odds against them remain steep. The National Unity Government lacks significant Western support — most notably in the form of arms — and still struggles to bring distrustful ethnic armed groups into a consolidated resistance movement. Currently operating as a diffuse and underequipped insurgency fighting what amounts to at least seven discrete conflicts, anti-junta forces lack strategic-level unity as well. While remarkably effective in numerous tactical skirmishes, the poorly equipped National Unity Government’s long-term prospects are, therefore, less than ideal. The junta’s military, known as the Sit-Tat, is suffering from overstretch and low morale, but still holds key cities and strategic locations with its superior airpower, armor, and artillery.

Nonetheless, the revolution can achieve victory. Resolving the fundamental distrust between the National Unity Government and ethnic armed organizations may be enough to overcome political and military roadblocks. This will require developing a shared political objective and an effective “coalitional” military strategy. It will also require persuading non-aligned ethnic armies as well as the Chinese government to increase the flow of arms, so anti-junta forces can launch coordinated offensives to take and hold territory. These steps could prompt the Sit-Tat’s collapse, or at least compel the junta to allow a return to democratic rule.

The Current Situation


Over the past few months, the National Unity Government’s military momentum has slowed as the junta deployed its air power and heavy weapons, locking down cities and preventing the rebels from consolidating their gains. In places like Mindat, Chin State, and Lay Kay Kaw, Karen State, the junta’s troops ousted poorly equipped People’s Defense Forces. In classic “authoritarian counterinsurgency” fashion, the junta continues to use unanswered firepower to displace lightly equipped units with little concern for escalating civilian casualties.

People’s Defense Forces and newly founded autonomous defense forces were successful in recruiting roughly 100,000 personnel, but only about 40 percent of them have any small arms whatsoever. Many of these weapons are rudimentary, either locally produced, cast off by the junta, or obtained on the black market from China and Thailand. Stealing weapons is not viable at scale. And while Chinese-supported ethnic armed groups have weapons like FN-6 man-portable air-defense systems that could dent the junta’s air and armor, they are reluctant to share them.

Politically, the incredibly diverse ethnic landscape in Myanmar has provided the National Unity Government with a number of potential armed allies, but it has also hampered anti-junta unity. Many ethnic groups have historical grievances and legitimate concerns with a Bamar-dominated pro-democracy movement, which results in limited cooperation beyond the tactical and operational levels. Some groups, such as the powerful United Wa State Army, seek to preserve their own interests regardless of the wider movement’s fate — especially if the National Unity Government’s odds of victory remain low.

Yet despite its problems, the National Unity Government and the wider pro-democracy movement cannot easily be crushed and show little intention of surrender. The junta has failed to cow the populace into submission, retake rural areas, or persuade the ethnic armies to join its side. While Myanmar has experienced numerous unsuccessful anti-government conflicts, and the Sit-Tat is often described as a formidable force, this time is different. As shown most recently during its 2019-20 fighting with the Arakan Army, the junta has struggled to defeat popular insurgencies. In the current round of conflict, the Sit-Tat has not only failed to prevail, in several places it cannot venture out into rural areas without suffering serious losses due to small-unit tactical failures. Moreover, the Bamar majority is now actively challenging the junta in a manner unseen since the 1980s, and fighting has spread throughout the country.

This leaves the Sit-Tat overstretched, overburdened, and short on morale. A total military victory for the pro-democracy forces led by the National Unity Government will still be difficult to achieve, but it is likelier now than it has been in decades. To date, the junta has made clear that it will not negotiate with the National Unity Government. Thus, while military victory is a long shot, the pro-democracy movement has no other option but to ramp up military pressure to either overthrow the junta or compel it to hand power to a civilian government.

The Need for Unity

Despite conducting a series of negotiations, the Bamar-dominated National Unity Government is struggling to find common ground with the ethnic armed organizations to build a mutually acceptable democratic federal state. Some dominant pro-democracy political entities still hold the dismissive views of ethnic actors that marked the National League for Democracy’s rule after 2015. Meanwhile, many ethnic armed groups pursue their own parochial interests. In addition to a few smaller outfits, the most powerful ethnic armed organizations on the National Unity Government’s side are the Kachin Independence Army in the north and the Karen National Union to the east. Both have supported the resistance movement since its inception and frequently launch offensives within their own territories, but they are hesitant to invest scarce resources in battlefields beyond their control.

Beyond the ethnic armed groups, only about 60 percent of the People’s Defense Forces and smaller Local Defense Forces are actually under the National Unity Government’s direct operational command. Moreover, the long hoped-for “federal army” capable of uniting the disparate ethnic armies and the People’s Defense Forces remains out of reach. While many of the ethnic armed groups reject peace talks with the military, they appear reluctant to wholeheartedly back the pro-democracy forces and some are open to junta outreach. This essentially splits the conflict into seven separate theaters with little overlap. It also allows the junta to “divide and conquer” and concentrate mass against isolated resistance pockets, as they have successfully done throughout their history.

The National Unity Government’s People’s Defense Forces have rapidly and effectively established themselves in the form of a cellular, horizontally networked guerilla force. Now the groups aiming to overthrow the junta need to undergo a sequential transition from a loosely organized movement to a more structured and centralized force. Martin C. Libicki and Ben Connable claim that networked armed movements “have lost significantly more often than they have won,” while hierarchically organized insurgencies have a better record. As Régis Debray, an associate of Che Guevara, claimed: “The lack of a single command puts the revolutionary forces in the situation of an artillery gunner who has not been told in which direction to fire.” Centralized command and control is necessary to field a force capable of taking urban settlements and strategic hard points.

Thus, the National Unity Government needs to consolidate its own chain of command and convince the fiercely independent ethnic armed organizations to accept a shared military strategy. It has attempted to do so through the establishment of a Central Command and Coordination Committee, but the ethnic armed groups have been loath to subordinate themselves to National Unity Government control. To overcome this, the National Unity Government will need to form a coalition around mutual goals in order to reach a consensus on an overarching strategy. This means forging a shared political objective before effective strategic military cooperation can occur.

Currently, the National Unity Government’s goal is to seize the central state apparatus, while the ethnic armed groups largely aim to consolidate their own autonomy. Persuading the ethnic armed organizations that it is in their interest to overthrow the Sit-Tat will require real inclusion and commitments to giving up some central authority in a federal democratic future. It would also be a real departure from Aung San Suu Kyi’s practices and likely would require moving beyond her legacy to build a more inclusive one. Any political arrangement must be conducive to genuine cooperation between the pro-democratic political forces and the ethnic armed groups. Most importantly, the National Unity Government must make the case to the ethnic armed organizations that the autonomy they seek can only happen under a democratic federal structure.

To be sure, the pro-democracy resistance movement has taken the right steps to advance this unity. It has created a National Unity Consultative Council, which could be a genuine political platform bringing together the country’s diverse stakeholders. Likewise, the Central Command and Coordinating Committee could create a military command structure that would improve collaboration. If the National Unity Government can demonstrate its practical cooperation with the ethnic armed groups, and the National Unity Consultative Council forges a strong alliance around a federal democratic future, they would be a strong magnet for uncommitted ethnic armies. This would also undermine the junta’s own efforts to co-opt ethnic armed groups. Just recently, the National Unity Government met with the currently uncommitted Arakan Army of Rakhine State in a move that is sure to turn heads in Naypyidaw.

If and once the National Unity Government persuades the ethnic armies to buy into a shared political objective, it can formulate a more effective military strategy and launch operations to take further territory. Based on her study of recent U.S. coalitions, Patricia A. Weitsman argues that “even in the absence of a unified chain of command, effective staff integration” is possible. Considering the reluctance of ethnic armed groups to embrace a “federal army” or fully cooperate with the National Unity Government, pro-democracy forces should at least work on shoring up the Central Command and Coordinating Committee and integrating high-level officers from its constituent coalition members within both itself and aligned ethnic armed organizations to formulate strategy and conduct operations across all seven theaters in Myanmar. This does not necessarily require subordination, but rather compromises and a shared understanding of national-level strategy. Without this, the movement will remain susceptible to the junta’s efforts to divide and conquer it.

Tackling the Military Problem

The other problem facing the National Unity Government is its ongoing lack of arms and equipment. The problem is particularly acute for People’s Defense Forces located outside territory held by ethnic armed organizations, or in regions such as Sagaing and Magway that are distant from Myanmar’s porous borders. In the early days of the conflict, homemade rifles and ancestral hunting weapons were enough to drive back the junta’s demoralized troops. But now, with the Sit-Tat’s forces supported by air power, modern small arms, light armored vehicles, and artillery, the sheer firepower brought to bear on the People’s Defense Forces is causing them to scatter to avoid direct confrontations. Thus, while they have no lack of enthusiastic recruits, they have been unable to move beyond rural guerilla tactics. The ethnic armies, with their better equipment and more reliable access to arms have performed somewhat better against junta offensives. For example, the Kachin Independence Army took the strategic Alaw Bum hill soon after widespread fighting broke out in early 2021, and has held the area against ferocious efforts to retake it with air power and artillery.

Once greater political unity is established, the People’s Defense Forces’ lack of equipment can be mitigated somewhat through cooperation with ethnic armed groups. Many of the ethnic armies, especially those along the Chinese border or aligned with the United Wa State Army, receive Chinese weapons and equipment, including anti-air systems. Other ethnic armies take advantage of longstanding ties to smugglers in Thailand and China to obtain black market weapons or have significant arms-making industrial capacity of their own. However, persuading the China-backed ethnic armies to sell more weapons directly to the pro-democracy resistance likely means getting Beijing on board as well. Given China’s growing support of the junta, this is no easy task. Yet, China is not the completely unitary actor that it is sometimes assumed to be, and Beijing also has a history of hedging in Myanmar. If the National Unity Government can win over the ethnic armed groups, demonstrate its capacity to govern territory, and, crucially, avoid angering China, then a pragmatic Beijing or local officials in China’s bordering Yunnan Province could acquiesce to a livelier arms trade. Given Western reticence towards arming the People’s Defense Forces, this may be their only option.

The End of the War?

The pro-democracy movement’s political and military problems may be pressing, but they are not insurmountable. The National Unity Government can rest assured of its main strengths: public support, strong commitment from allied ethnic armies, and quiet cooperation from the unaligned ethnic armed organizations. From this base, it should first unite the collective efforts of all anti-junta forces in pursuit of a genuine federal democracy, then craft a joint military strategy. In newly liberated regions, the National Unity Government and ethnic armed organizations should collaborate to establish effective parallel governance mechanisms to raise funds, ensure humanitarian aid and deliver stability. This will demonstrate to the international community that the pro-democracy movement is the people’s government that it claims to be. From there, military victory or the return of civilian rule may be possible.

Ye Myo Hein is the executive director of the Tagaung Institute of Political Studies and a public policy fellow with the Wilson Center. His research interests include civil-military relations in Myanmar, the country’s armed conflict, and its politics. The views expressed are the author’s alone, and do not represent the views of the U.S. Government or the Wilson Center.

Lucas Myers is a program coordinator and associate for Southeast Asia at the Wilson Center. His work focuses on Southeast Asian geopolitics, Chinese foreign policy, and Indo-Pacific security issues. The views expressed are the author’s alone, and do not represent the views of the U.S. Government or the Wilson Center.

Image: Karen National Union


LET CAPITALI$M BE
Bezos slams Biden appeal for lower gasoline prices

Sun, July 3, 2022 

Amazon founder Jeff Bezos has criticized President Joe Biden for calling on oil companies to lower sky-high gasoline prices, prompting the White House to come to the US leader's defense on Sunday.


"My message to the companies running gas stations and setting prices at the pump is simple: this is a time of war and global peril," Biden tweeted Saturday.

"Bring down the price you are charging at the pump to reflect the cost you're paying for the product. And do it now," Biden added.

Bezos said Biden's remarks amounted to "either straight ahead misdirection or a deep misunderstanding of basic market dynamics."

"Ouch. Inflation is far too important a problem for the White House to keep making statements like this," the US billionaire tweeted Saturday.

Gasoline prices at the pump have become a symbol of broader price rises in the United States, and they are sapping Biden's approval rating ahead of legislative elections in November.

Biden has regularly attacked oil companies, saying they only care about profits and not the well-being of the average consumer.

The companies say in turn they have increased production to try to tame prices but that these are set on the world market and are subject to dynamics that are not under the control of US oil giants.

White House Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre said on Twitter Sunday that oil prices have dropped about $15 a barrel over the past month.

"But prices at the pump have barely come down. That's not 'basic market dynamics.' It's a market that is failing the American consumer," she wrote.

Gasoline prices have been above $5 a gallon since early June, which is unprecedented in the car-crazy nation. Prices have fallen slightly since, but remain far from the $3 a gallon level of a year ago.

John Kirby, White House spokesman on national security issues, also defended the president Sunday in an appearance on Fox News.

"The president is working very, very hard across many fronts... to try to bring that price down," Kirby said.

He cited Biden's proposal to suspend the federal gas tax this summer -- this would need congressional approval -- and his decision to tap the US strategic oil reserves to put more product on the market.

"He knows that it is not going to solve all the problems, but it will help if everybody cooperates on this. We could bring the price down at least by about one dollar a gallon," Kirby said.

Jeff Bezos Chastises Joe Biden For Telling Oil Companies To Stop Price Gouging At Gas Pumps

Champion of the ultra-wealthy Amazon founder Jeff Bezos has attacked President Joe Biden for calling out oil companies for price-gouging American consumers at the gas pump.

And the White House came back with some burn.

Biden in a tweet on Saturday called out executives of oil companies running gas stations: “This is a time of war and global peril. Bring down the price you are charging at the pump to reflect the cost you’re paying for the product. And do it now.”

Bezos was miffed.

“Ouch. Inflation is far too important a problem for the White House to keep making statements like this,” he tweeted in response. “It’s either straight ahead misdirection or a deep misunderstanding of basic market dynamics.”

Actually it’s neither, the White House slapped back.

White House Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre schooled Bezos in a responding tweet that gas prices are still high even while oil prices are falling — giving the lie to his claim of inevitable “market dynamics” (unless those “dynamics” must include price gouging).

“I guess it’s not surprising that you think oil and gas companies using market power to reap record profits at the expense of the American people is the way our economy is supposed to work,” Jean-Pierre slayed.

Twitter wags loved the Bezos shade.

The last time Bezos was this upset with the president was in May when Biden said corporations should pay their fair share of taxes (their taxes were slashed 40% during the Trump administration) to help battle inflation.

Bezos griped that underpaying taxes would have no effect on the nation’s current high rate of inflation. He called for Twitter’s “Disinformation Board” to probe Biden’s message because he claimed the president inaccurately linked higher corporate taxes to lowering inflation.

Higher corporate taxes can in fact lower inflation, according to economists, by tamping down an overheated economy, which causes inflation.

More money in the Treasury from corporations could also help provide aid to people suffering in a post-inflation, cooling economy, by expanding or increasing the amount of unemployment benefits, for example.

Amazon, incidentally, has paid extremely low taxes in relation to its enormous income and wealth. It paid zero federal taxes for 2018 by claiming a $129 million rebate on $11 billion in profits. It was one of 60 of some of the largest publicly traded corporations that paid no taxes that year.

This article originally appeared on HuffPost and has been updated.