Is Eastern Libya a viable strategic alternative to Russian retreat from Syria?
A view of damaged buildings and businesses after the attack by Russian warplanes, on November 28, 2024 in Aleppo, Syria. [Kasim Rammah – Anadolu Agency]
by Dr Mustafa Fetouri
MFetouri
MEMO
December 19, 2024
On 30 September, 2015, Russian military jets bombed targets in Syria for the first time in what was the start of a long Russian involvement in the Syrian civil war, in progress since 2011. Earlier in the day, the Russian Duma authorised President Putin to deploy Russian air forces to Syria. The military goal, was limited, “exclusively air support of the Syrian armed forces”, according to Sergei Ivanov, Putin’s Chief of Staff at the time. He also said the decision was made at the request of Syrian President, Bashar Al-Assad, which makes the Russian deployment official and legal because it was requested by a United Nations recognised government.
Russia’s intervention was also seeking to prevent the collapse of the Al-Assad regime, a long-time Moscow ally. At the time, the Damascus regime was on the verge of collapse as it battled myriad of armed groups, including foreign mercenaries, fighters supporting Daesh, as it established itself as the de facto state over swathes of land in Syria and Iraq. Iran and its ally, Hezbollah, in Lebanon were already fighting for Al-Assad and saw the Russian intervention as a timely move to keep Al-Assad in power.
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Nine years on, and the regime in which Moscow has heavily invested vanished in less than two weeks when fighters from the Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham – which was an Al-Qaeda affiliate when Moscow intervened back in 2015 – simply walked into Bashar Al-Assad’s presidential place in Damascus, virtually unopposed. The fall of Damascus is now history, but it has far reaching implications, particularly its impact on Russia’s regional policy and how strategic was the Russian gamble on Assad?
Russia maintains two military bases in Syria as an outpost for Moscow’s power projection and strategic military presence, not only to counter the United States’ military power in this vital region of the world, but also to help allies, like former ally, Al-Assad.
In 1971, when Hafiz Al-Assad came to power, he sought closer military and economic ties prompting him to sign the treaty establishing the Soviets’ first Tartous naval facility on Syria’s Mediterranean coast. His son, dictator Bashar in 2017, expanded that treaty. For the Soviets and, later, Russia, it was a strategic move. However, the facility was limited in capacity but still used for naval communications, logistics and refuelling of Soviet navy roaming the area. The airbase in Hmeimim, just south of Latakia, was established by Moscow in 2015 as it accelerated its bombardment of rebel targets in Syria.
Now, Moscow finds itself in an embarrassing situation and appears to be losing that strategic military advantage after the rebels took over the country and Al-Assad has been granted asylum by Moscow. Different news reports are confirming that Russia is evacuating Tartous. If Tartous is evacuated, then Hmeimim will follow, since Tartous is the important military asset. It is not yet clear if the future Syrian government will honour or cancel the former regime’s treaties with Russia or not. But having supported the deposed dictator for nine years, it is likely that the new authority in Damascus will ask Moscow to evacuate its military from Syria.
Russia has been using both air and naval bases in Syria as a transit point for its increasing military activities in Africa, which means Moscow is certainly keen to find an alternative to Syria and every indication says Libya is likely to be that option.
Russian military presence in Eastern and Southern Libya began in 2018, marking the first time the Russian mercenary group, Wagner Group, got involved in the country’s civil war. Wagner became a unit of Russia’s Defence Ministry and the military presence there became part of Russia’s forces.
The Russian state also inherited all former Wagner operations in half a dozen African countries in the southern vicinity of Libya, including in Niger, Mali and deeper in the central African region where Wagner first started operating in the Central African Republic in 2018.
Libya became more important to the long-term Russian ambitions on the African continent. Most Russian forces in Libya are now based in Al-Khadim airbase just east of Benghazi, in Al-Jufra airbase south of the capital Tripoli, Al-Qardabiya airbase near Sirte (central Libya) and Brak Al-Shati airbase (Southern Libya).
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These airbases, particularly near Sirte, are strategically located on the Southern Mediterranean bank and could play an important role should any confrontation, however unlikely, between NATO and Russia break out, given that the Western alliance has a major Naval Air Station (NAS) Sigonella, in Sicily—half hour flight from Libya.
What Libya lacks in terms of potential military facilities that could be used by the Russians is deep water naval bases. Indeed, there is a naval base in Tobruk, in eastern Libya, but it requires major work to accommodate Moscow’s huge military assets currently in Tartous, Syria. While that is not an issue, a critical question arises from the recent geopolitical turmoil following the collapse of the Assad regime.
Is Moscow willing to invest as big as it did in Syria while it broadens its Pan-African scope of activities both militarily and economically? While Libya has been serving as a stepping stone for the so called Russian-African Legion, active in Africa beyond the Sahara, unstable Libya is a risky place. Russia’s military ties with Eastern Libya are directly connected to General Khalifa Haftar, de facto power in area, but he is not part of the United Nations government based in Tripoli. All agreements and arrangements he has been making with Moscow, widening Russian military presence in the country, are not sanctioned by the Libyan State nor approved by the Tobruk- based parliament, despite being ally to Haftar—unlike the case with Bashar.
The whole Russia-Haftar dealings have been a kind of Haftar family private business. Should Haftar end up like Assad, then whatever Moscow has invested in him would be gone—repeating the Assad experience.
Russia’s strategic mistake in not securing its bases in Syria beyond the Assad regime could also be repeated in Libya. It also indicates the lack of creative insightful strategic thinking. It could also be that Moscow gave up on Assad because of its war in Ukraine, which means its initial geopolitical considerations were not part of any long-term strategy of maintaining a foothold in the Mediterranean.
If that is the case, then Moscow is not being strategic in its relations with Africa, including Libya. Over the last decade or so, Moscow has been courting African countries, offering incentives like debt relief and free grain shipments, during the 2020 pandemic, and a couple of Russian-African summits with the hope of building long-term relations with the whole of Africa. However, judging by what is transpiring in Syria and the Russian military retreat from that valuable strategic spot could also mean that Moscow is more tactical in Africa than being long-term strategic.
Finally, any long term Russian military presence in Libya, vital base for Russia’s African hopes, is likely to negatively impact the political process the UN is re-launching to end the Libya crisis, making Moscow more of a hurdle than facilitator in stabilising Libya.
OPINION: Moscow is Bashar’s ally, but …
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.
December 19, 2024
On 30 September, 2015, Russian military jets bombed targets in Syria for the first time in what was the start of a long Russian involvement in the Syrian civil war, in progress since 2011. Earlier in the day, the Russian Duma authorised President Putin to deploy Russian air forces to Syria. The military goal, was limited, “exclusively air support of the Syrian armed forces”, according to Sergei Ivanov, Putin’s Chief of Staff at the time. He also said the decision was made at the request of Syrian President, Bashar Al-Assad, which makes the Russian deployment official and legal because it was requested by a United Nations recognised government.
Russia’s intervention was also seeking to prevent the collapse of the Al-Assad regime, a long-time Moscow ally. At the time, the Damascus regime was on the verge of collapse as it battled myriad of armed groups, including foreign mercenaries, fighters supporting Daesh, as it established itself as the de facto state over swathes of land in Syria and Iraq. Iran and its ally, Hezbollah, in Lebanon were already fighting for Al-Assad and saw the Russian intervention as a timely move to keep Al-Assad in power.
OPINION: Haaretz tells Israelis, ‘It’s time to choose life over death’
Nine years on, and the regime in which Moscow has heavily invested vanished in less than two weeks when fighters from the Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham – which was an Al-Qaeda affiliate when Moscow intervened back in 2015 – simply walked into Bashar Al-Assad’s presidential place in Damascus, virtually unopposed. The fall of Damascus is now history, but it has far reaching implications, particularly its impact on Russia’s regional policy and how strategic was the Russian gamble on Assad?
Russia maintains two military bases in Syria as an outpost for Moscow’s power projection and strategic military presence, not only to counter the United States’ military power in this vital region of the world, but also to help allies, like former ally, Al-Assad.
In 1971, when Hafiz Al-Assad came to power, he sought closer military and economic ties prompting him to sign the treaty establishing the Soviets’ first Tartous naval facility on Syria’s Mediterranean coast. His son, dictator Bashar in 2017, expanded that treaty. For the Soviets and, later, Russia, it was a strategic move. However, the facility was limited in capacity but still used for naval communications, logistics and refuelling of Soviet navy roaming the area. The airbase in Hmeimim, just south of Latakia, was established by Moscow in 2015 as it accelerated its bombardment of rebel targets in Syria.
Now, Moscow finds itself in an embarrassing situation and appears to be losing that strategic military advantage after the rebels took over the country and Al-Assad has been granted asylum by Moscow. Different news reports are confirming that Russia is evacuating Tartous. If Tartous is evacuated, then Hmeimim will follow, since Tartous is the important military asset. It is not yet clear if the future Syrian government will honour or cancel the former regime’s treaties with Russia or not. But having supported the deposed dictator for nine years, it is likely that the new authority in Damascus will ask Moscow to evacuate its military from Syria.
Russia has been using both air and naval bases in Syria as a transit point for its increasing military activities in Africa, which means Moscow is certainly keen to find an alternative to Syria and every indication says Libya is likely to be that option.
Russian military presence in Eastern and Southern Libya began in 2018, marking the first time the Russian mercenary group, Wagner Group, got involved in the country’s civil war. Wagner became a unit of Russia’s Defence Ministry and the military presence there became part of Russia’s forces.
The Russian state also inherited all former Wagner operations in half a dozen African countries in the southern vicinity of Libya, including in Niger, Mali and deeper in the central African region where Wagner first started operating in the Central African Republic in 2018.
Libya became more important to the long-term Russian ambitions on the African continent. Most Russian forces in Libya are now based in Al-Khadim airbase just east of Benghazi, in Al-Jufra airbase south of the capital Tripoli, Al-Qardabiya airbase near Sirte (central Libya) and Brak Al-Shati airbase (Southern Libya).
OPINION: Bombing Syria is never likely to do anything except feed the chaos
These airbases, particularly near Sirte, are strategically located on the Southern Mediterranean bank and could play an important role should any confrontation, however unlikely, between NATO and Russia break out, given that the Western alliance has a major Naval Air Station (NAS) Sigonella, in Sicily—half hour flight from Libya.
What Libya lacks in terms of potential military facilities that could be used by the Russians is deep water naval bases. Indeed, there is a naval base in Tobruk, in eastern Libya, but it requires major work to accommodate Moscow’s huge military assets currently in Tartous, Syria. While that is not an issue, a critical question arises from the recent geopolitical turmoil following the collapse of the Assad regime.
Is Moscow willing to invest as big as it did in Syria while it broadens its Pan-African scope of activities both militarily and economically? While Libya has been serving as a stepping stone for the so called Russian-African Legion, active in Africa beyond the Sahara, unstable Libya is a risky place. Russia’s military ties with Eastern Libya are directly connected to General Khalifa Haftar, de facto power in area, but he is not part of the United Nations government based in Tripoli. All agreements and arrangements he has been making with Moscow, widening Russian military presence in the country, are not sanctioned by the Libyan State nor approved by the Tobruk- based parliament, despite being ally to Haftar—unlike the case with Bashar.
The whole Russia-Haftar dealings have been a kind of Haftar family private business. Should Haftar end up like Assad, then whatever Moscow has invested in him would be gone—repeating the Assad experience.
Russia’s strategic mistake in not securing its bases in Syria beyond the Assad regime could also be repeated in Libya. It also indicates the lack of creative insightful strategic thinking. It could also be that Moscow gave up on Assad because of its war in Ukraine, which means its initial geopolitical considerations were not part of any long-term strategy of maintaining a foothold in the Mediterranean.
If that is the case, then Moscow is not being strategic in its relations with Africa, including Libya. Over the last decade or so, Moscow has been courting African countries, offering incentives like debt relief and free grain shipments, during the 2020 pandemic, and a couple of Russian-African summits with the hope of building long-term relations with the whole of Africa. However, judging by what is transpiring in Syria and the Russian military retreat from that valuable strategic spot could also mean that Moscow is more tactical in Africa than being long-term strategic.
Finally, any long term Russian military presence in Libya, vital base for Russia’s African hopes, is likely to negatively impact the political process the UN is re-launching to end the Libya crisis, making Moscow more of a hurdle than facilitator in stabilising Libya.
OPINION: Moscow is Bashar’s ally, but …
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.
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