Did the US violate Doha accord by taking out Al Qaeda chief Zawahiri?
UMER BIN AJMAL
3 AUG 2022
In a first drone strike since the Taliban took over, the US targeted a key Al Qaeda leader in Afghanistan’s capital city Kabul, raising concerns about whether the attack was in violation of the Doha agreement between the two parties.
Al Qaeda chief Ayman al Zawahiri’s killing in Kabul has sparked a debate whether the Doha agreement, which paved the way for ending America's 20-year war in Afghanistan, will hold and ensure continuation of peace in the war-stricken country.
The United States Secretary of State Antony Blinken revealed on August 1 that Zawahiri was struck by an American drone that killed him instantly. Calling the world “a safer place following the death of Zawahiri”, Blinken also accused the Taliban of violating its peace accord with the US, signed in 2020 in the Qatari capital of Doha, by hosting and sheltering the Al Qaeda supremo.
Was the Doha pledge violated? Here's what experts say.
Obaidullah Baheer, lecturer at the American University of Afghanistan and visiting scholar at The New School in New York City, calls it a "chicken-and-egg problem".
“I think both sides violated the agreement. One in violating Afghanistan’s sovereignty with the attack, and the other by hosting Al Qaeda affiliates and leadership within Kabul,” he says. So, Baheer adds, “the Doha agreement is whatever both parties make it to be.”
The Doha agreement was signed as the US sought to end its 20-year war in Afghanistan, and a joint declaration, comprising four interrelated and interdependent parts, was made public. The declaration spoke about guarantees to prevent the use of Afghan soil by terrorists, timeline of the US withdrawal, intra-Afghan political settlement and a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire.
While the deal explicitly mentions a key commitment on part of Afghanistan to prevent any international terror groups or individuals from using its soil, in the overall context of the agreement, the US drone strike could also be seen as a violation of the ceasefire and in extension a violation of the agreement.
“I guess the Taliban's understanding was if they are not active militarily then it should be fine,” says Baheer, adding that it will have to be seen what the Taliban communicate to the American officials.
However, this isn’t the first occasion when an accusation has been levelled by one party against the other for not upholding the accord.
Consensual act?
Zawahiri’s killing comes at a time when Al Qaeda has lost much of its operational capabilities due to several factors ranging from the loss of much of its senior leadership to lack of funding.
Ashok Swain, professor of peace and conflict research at Uppsala University, thinks it’s unlikely the Taliban were unaware of the US strike.
“I think the Taliban had direct knowledge about the American operation, and also, it had given its consent either directly or indirectly for it,” he says. “Otherwise, it wouldn’t have waited for President Biden’s press conference to issue a formal and mild criticism of it.”
Baheer, too, thinks the messaging on part of the Taliban, which is not too aggressive and appears to be cautious, is worth reading into.
“The Taliban’s response really says a lot,” he says.
“The fact that it hasn’t been too aggressive shows that there is willingness to work towards some sort of understanding and I guess we’ll have to see if both sides can sit down and maybe discuss the appendices to the actual Doha agreement — that were never released (and) had some mechanisms to enforce the deal.”
However, he cautions and says it will have to be seen how both parties react moving forward, but doubts that this is the end of engagement between the US and the Taliban.
The reason Baheer says so is because of late the US and the Taliban have been quite satisfied with each other on the security front. “It’s just that this came very abruptly … so, if both sides do sit down and certain guarantees and mechanisms are provided, (then) maybe this is a one-off thing,” he says.
Swain, too, does not foresee the new-found peace between the two sides getting derailed. “I think it is business as usual,” he says. “Zawahiri was a big name but had been reduced to almost nothing. So, his killing is a win-win for everyone.”
3 AUG 2022
In a first drone strike since the Taliban took over, the US targeted a key Al Qaeda leader in Afghanistan’s capital city Kabul, raising concerns about whether the attack was in violation of the Doha agreement between the two parties.
Al Qaeda chief Ayman al Zawahiri’s killing in Kabul has sparked a debate whether the Doha agreement, which paved the way for ending America's 20-year war in Afghanistan, will hold and ensure continuation of peace in the war-stricken country.
The United States Secretary of State Antony Blinken revealed on August 1 that Zawahiri was struck by an American drone that killed him instantly. Calling the world “a safer place following the death of Zawahiri”, Blinken also accused the Taliban of violating its peace accord with the US, signed in 2020 in the Qatari capital of Doha, by hosting and sheltering the Al Qaeda supremo.
Was the Doha pledge violated? Here's what experts say.
Obaidullah Baheer, lecturer at the American University of Afghanistan and visiting scholar at The New School in New York City, calls it a "chicken-and-egg problem".
“I think both sides violated the agreement. One in violating Afghanistan’s sovereignty with the attack, and the other by hosting Al Qaeda affiliates and leadership within Kabul,” he says. So, Baheer adds, “the Doha agreement is whatever both parties make it to be.”
The Doha agreement was signed as the US sought to end its 20-year war in Afghanistan, and a joint declaration, comprising four interrelated and interdependent parts, was made public. The declaration spoke about guarantees to prevent the use of Afghan soil by terrorists, timeline of the US withdrawal, intra-Afghan political settlement and a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire.
While the deal explicitly mentions a key commitment on part of Afghanistan to prevent any international terror groups or individuals from using its soil, in the overall context of the agreement, the US drone strike could also be seen as a violation of the ceasefire and in extension a violation of the agreement.
“I guess the Taliban's understanding was if they are not active militarily then it should be fine,” says Baheer, adding that it will have to be seen what the Taliban communicate to the American officials.
However, this isn’t the first occasion when an accusation has been levelled by one party against the other for not upholding the accord.
Consensual act?
Zawahiri’s killing comes at a time when Al Qaeda has lost much of its operational capabilities due to several factors ranging from the loss of much of its senior leadership to lack of funding.
Ashok Swain, professor of peace and conflict research at Uppsala University, thinks it’s unlikely the Taliban were unaware of the US strike.
“I think the Taliban had direct knowledge about the American operation, and also, it had given its consent either directly or indirectly for it,” he says. “Otherwise, it wouldn’t have waited for President Biden’s press conference to issue a formal and mild criticism of it.”
Baheer, too, thinks the messaging on part of the Taliban, which is not too aggressive and appears to be cautious, is worth reading into.
“The Taliban’s response really says a lot,” he says.
“The fact that it hasn’t been too aggressive shows that there is willingness to work towards some sort of understanding and I guess we’ll have to see if both sides can sit down and maybe discuss the appendices to the actual Doha agreement — that were never released (and) had some mechanisms to enforce the deal.”
However, he cautions and says it will have to be seen how both parties react moving forward, but doubts that this is the end of engagement between the US and the Taliban.
The reason Baheer says so is because of late the US and the Taliban have been quite satisfied with each other on the security front. “It’s just that this came very abruptly … so, if both sides do sit down and certain guarantees and mechanisms are provided, (then) maybe this is a one-off thing,” he says.
Swain, too, does not foresee the new-found peace between the two sides getting derailed. “I think it is business as usual,” he says. “Zawahiri was a big name but had been reduced to almost nothing. So, his killing is a win-win for everyone.”
What the Al-Qaeda Drone Strike Reveals About U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan
AARON DAVID MILLER
AUGUST 02, 2022
COMMENTARY
Summary: It was a victory for Biden, but the jihadi threat to United States is not nearly acute as the challenges that ail the nation internally.
Saturday’s U.S. drone strike that killed al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul, Afghanistan, carries important political and symbolic implications for President Joe Biden’s administration and substantive ramifications for U.S. counterterrorism strategy. Here are some key takeaways.
YES, THE UNITED STATES CAN OPERATE OVER THE HORIZON
In the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan last August, critics charged that the United States would not be able to operate effectively without on-the-ground intelligence, including the deployment of special forces, however limited, to act against terror assets. The U.S. intelligence community warned that a failing Afghan state shaped by the Taliban’s own relationships with terror groups would allow the groups’ presence to grow. And within a year, the number of operatives of both the self-proclaimed Islamic State in Khorasan (IS-K) and the smaller al-Qaeda organization had doubled.
The precision strike against Zawahiri, ensconced in a safe house in Kabul, was a master class in intelligence and operational capacity and an affirmation that U.S. intelligence could still be effective in Afghanistan. The intelligence community had been tracking Zawahiri for months, establishing a pattern of his routine and activity much like the period leading up to the strike on Osama bin Laden in May 2011. And it managed to carry out an operation that reportedly caused no civilian deaths or injuries. The strike was a counter-argument to those who believed a permanent presence on the ground was essential to what President Joe Biden had declared in August 2021 was the only U.S. vital interest in Afghanistan: preventing a terror attack on the homeland. Indeed, Saturday’s strike was a much needed corrective to the failed U.S. drone strike a year earlier against IS-K that killed ten Afghan civilians.
WHAT HAPPENS TO AL-QAEDA
Zawahiri never had the charisma and leadership skills of bin Laden. Reportedly in ill health and in hiding for more than a decade, Zawahiri clearly was not the day-to-day tactician and manager of al-Qaeda operations. More likely, his real significance lay in his ability to keep al-Qaeda’s brand and image intact after bin Laden’s death. Bin Laden might well be satisfied in what al-Qaeda has accomplished in the past decade: while it may not have regained its operational effectiveness after September 11, 2001, it has spread far and wide into local affiliates throughout the Middle East and Africa. Groups such as Hurras al-Din in Syria, al-Shabab in Somalia, and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen are far more capable of carrying out operations against U.S. interests in the areas in which they operate, and they’re perhaps a longer-term threat to planning operations against the United States than al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Indeed, the most likely threat against U.S. interests emanate from ISIS-K in Afghanistan.
As for successors to Zawahiri, it’s not entirely clear. A number of established al-Qaeda senior leaders in Africa and Iran could serve in the role, though it’s possible a struggle might ensue and a new, younger face could emerge. To keep itself viable and demonstrate continuity, al-Qaeda will likely announce the new leader soon.
THE IMPACT ON BIDEN’S POLITICAL FORTUNES
Presidential fortunes ebb and flow, and lately, Biden has had some good news. His alliance management of the war in Ukraine has been as adept as any since the administration of President George H.W. Bush’s handling of the first Gulf War. At home, legislation on gun safety, drug prices, and climate change has improved his image. While Americans more often than not want as little to do with foreign policy as possible, the announcement of the Zawahiri strike will help somewhat counter the chaotic images of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Much of the president’s remarks announcing the strike on Monday centered on fostering the image of a strong president determined to protect Americans and deliver justice to those who have harmed them. Biden’s moving words sought to mark the 9/11 attacks, remember the lost, grieve with the living, honor the troops, and never give up or abandon the effort to protect Americans. It was one of the few moments of the Biden presidency, aside from statements issued in the wake of mass shootings, that the president could speak to the nation as commander in chief seemingly above the political fray. If the past is any guide, Biden is likely to get scant credit in the November midterms.
A NEW DEFINITION OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Killing Zawahiri won’t eliminate the threat from jihadi groups, but it does strengthen the argument that the presence of U.S. forces and bases on the ground, which comes at a severe cost, may well be the best way to guarantee maximum protection of the United States but not necessarily the only way. Since September 11, with one potential exception, there has not been a successful attack organized, directed, and carried out by a foreign terror organization. And while the threat from these jihadi groups demands a robust counterterrorism strategy, the United States can’t allow itself to be guided by a one-dimensional approach to homeland security. The core threats to the United States, including the coronavirus pandemic and climate change, have taken a far greater toll on U.S. security, prosperity, and human suffering than jihadi threats.
And none of this even begins to address an increasingly polarized nation, a dysfunctional political system, and the rise of white nationalist extremist groups and militias—all of which pose a much greater danger to America’s stability, democracy, security, and prosperity than any threat from al-Qaeda or other groups. As vigilant as Washington must be to confront the threats and challenges from abroad, we need to look inward to see where the far greater danger lies.
End of document
Aaron David Miller is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, focusing on U.S. foreign policy.
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
AARON DAVID MILLER
AUGUST 02, 2022
COMMENTARY
Summary: It was a victory for Biden, but the jihadi threat to United States is not nearly acute as the challenges that ail the nation internally.
Saturday’s U.S. drone strike that killed al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul, Afghanistan, carries important political and symbolic implications for President Joe Biden’s administration and substantive ramifications for U.S. counterterrorism strategy. Here are some key takeaways.
YES, THE UNITED STATES CAN OPERATE OVER THE HORIZON
In the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan last August, critics charged that the United States would not be able to operate effectively without on-the-ground intelligence, including the deployment of special forces, however limited, to act against terror assets. The U.S. intelligence community warned that a failing Afghan state shaped by the Taliban’s own relationships with terror groups would allow the groups’ presence to grow. And within a year, the number of operatives of both the self-proclaimed Islamic State in Khorasan (IS-K) and the smaller al-Qaeda organization had doubled.
The precision strike against Zawahiri, ensconced in a safe house in Kabul, was a master class in intelligence and operational capacity and an affirmation that U.S. intelligence could still be effective in Afghanistan. The intelligence community had been tracking Zawahiri for months, establishing a pattern of his routine and activity much like the period leading up to the strike on Osama bin Laden in May 2011. And it managed to carry out an operation that reportedly caused no civilian deaths or injuries. The strike was a counter-argument to those who believed a permanent presence on the ground was essential to what President Joe Biden had declared in August 2021 was the only U.S. vital interest in Afghanistan: preventing a terror attack on the homeland. Indeed, Saturday’s strike was a much needed corrective to the failed U.S. drone strike a year earlier against IS-K that killed ten Afghan civilians.
NO, THE TERROR PROBLEM IN AFGHANISTAN HAS NOT BEEN SOLVED
Whether the strike against Zawahiri is part of a trend line of stepped-up U.S. counter-terrorism activity remains to be seen. After all, Saturday’s strike was the first significant operation in Afghanistan since the U.S. withdrawal. And the Zawahiri’s presence in Afghanistan—in a Kabul neighborhood where Taliban officials also resided—reflected the challenge of al-Qaeda’s presence in the country. It’s one thing to plan an operation to eliminate a high-profile target and another to track, infiltrate, and destroy an active cell involved in carrying out specific terrorist operations without an on-the-ground presence and an intelligence network.
It should have come as little surprise that ties between the Taliban and al-Qaeda remain strong. Historical connections run deep, and senior Taliban officials—especially Sirajuddin Haqqani, Afghanistan’s acting interior minister and a U.S.-designated terrorist—have close ties with al-Qaeda leaders. The 2020 Doha agreement commits the Taliban leadership to preventing terrorist activity against the United States from its soil, but attacks by the Pakistani Taliban in Pakistan have increased. And IS-K—a key Taliban adversary with as many as 4,000 members—continues to operate.
The strike against Zawahiri seems all the more impressive in view of the fact that the withdrawal had reportedly weakened U.S. cooperation with partners on the ground, undermined a sustainable foundation to collect intelligence, and eliminated in-country bases of operation. There’s much that we don’t know about how the CIA pulled off this operation, and perhaps its assets in Afghanistan are stronger than believed. In any event, the Taliban is already reeling from international pressure and isolation, and it will face greater pressure to act against remaining al-Qaeda assts. It’s doubtful that it will. Still, the threat to the United States from al-Qaeda in Afghanistan—or even IS-K—is not nearly acute as the challenges that ail the nation internally.
Whether the strike against Zawahiri is part of a trend line of stepped-up U.S. counter-terrorism activity remains to be seen. After all, Saturday’s strike was the first significant operation in Afghanistan since the U.S. withdrawal. And the Zawahiri’s presence in Afghanistan—in a Kabul neighborhood where Taliban officials also resided—reflected the challenge of al-Qaeda’s presence in the country. It’s one thing to plan an operation to eliminate a high-profile target and another to track, infiltrate, and destroy an active cell involved in carrying out specific terrorist operations without an on-the-ground presence and an intelligence network.
It should have come as little surprise that ties between the Taliban and al-Qaeda remain strong. Historical connections run deep, and senior Taliban officials—especially Sirajuddin Haqqani, Afghanistan’s acting interior minister and a U.S.-designated terrorist—have close ties with al-Qaeda leaders. The 2020 Doha agreement commits the Taliban leadership to preventing terrorist activity against the United States from its soil, but attacks by the Pakistani Taliban in Pakistan have increased. And IS-K—a key Taliban adversary with as many as 4,000 members—continues to operate.
The strike against Zawahiri seems all the more impressive in view of the fact that the withdrawal had reportedly weakened U.S. cooperation with partners on the ground, undermined a sustainable foundation to collect intelligence, and eliminated in-country bases of operation. There’s much that we don’t know about how the CIA pulled off this operation, and perhaps its assets in Afghanistan are stronger than believed. In any event, the Taliban is already reeling from international pressure and isolation, and it will face greater pressure to act against remaining al-Qaeda assts. It’s doubtful that it will. Still, the threat to the United States from al-Qaeda in Afghanistan—or even IS-K—is not nearly acute as the challenges that ail the nation internally.
WHAT HAPPENS TO AL-QAEDA
Zawahiri never had the charisma and leadership skills of bin Laden. Reportedly in ill health and in hiding for more than a decade, Zawahiri clearly was not the day-to-day tactician and manager of al-Qaeda operations. More likely, his real significance lay in his ability to keep al-Qaeda’s brand and image intact after bin Laden’s death. Bin Laden might well be satisfied in what al-Qaeda has accomplished in the past decade: while it may not have regained its operational effectiveness after September 11, 2001, it has spread far and wide into local affiliates throughout the Middle East and Africa. Groups such as Hurras al-Din in Syria, al-Shabab in Somalia, and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen are far more capable of carrying out operations against U.S. interests in the areas in which they operate, and they’re perhaps a longer-term threat to planning operations against the United States than al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Indeed, the most likely threat against U.S. interests emanate from ISIS-K in Afghanistan.
As for successors to Zawahiri, it’s not entirely clear. A number of established al-Qaeda senior leaders in Africa and Iran could serve in the role, though it’s possible a struggle might ensue and a new, younger face could emerge. To keep itself viable and demonstrate continuity, al-Qaeda will likely announce the new leader soon.
THE IMPACT ON BIDEN’S POLITICAL FORTUNES
Presidential fortunes ebb and flow, and lately, Biden has had some good news. His alliance management of the war in Ukraine has been as adept as any since the administration of President George H.W. Bush’s handling of the first Gulf War. At home, legislation on gun safety, drug prices, and climate change has improved his image. While Americans more often than not want as little to do with foreign policy as possible, the announcement of the Zawahiri strike will help somewhat counter the chaotic images of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Much of the president’s remarks announcing the strike on Monday centered on fostering the image of a strong president determined to protect Americans and deliver justice to those who have harmed them. Biden’s moving words sought to mark the 9/11 attacks, remember the lost, grieve with the living, honor the troops, and never give up or abandon the effort to protect Americans. It was one of the few moments of the Biden presidency, aside from statements issued in the wake of mass shootings, that the president could speak to the nation as commander in chief seemingly above the political fray. If the past is any guide, Biden is likely to get scant credit in the November midterms.
A NEW DEFINITION OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Killing Zawahiri won’t eliminate the threat from jihadi groups, but it does strengthen the argument that the presence of U.S. forces and bases on the ground, which comes at a severe cost, may well be the best way to guarantee maximum protection of the United States but not necessarily the only way. Since September 11, with one potential exception, there has not been a successful attack organized, directed, and carried out by a foreign terror organization. And while the threat from these jihadi groups demands a robust counterterrorism strategy, the United States can’t allow itself to be guided by a one-dimensional approach to homeland security. The core threats to the United States, including the coronavirus pandemic and climate change, have taken a far greater toll on U.S. security, prosperity, and human suffering than jihadi threats.
And none of this even begins to address an increasingly polarized nation, a dysfunctional political system, and the rise of white nationalist extremist groups and militias—all of which pose a much greater danger to America’s stability, democracy, security, and prosperity than any threat from al-Qaeda or other groups. As vigilant as Washington must be to confront the threats and challenges from abroad, we need to look inward to see where the far greater danger lies.
End of document
Aaron David Miller is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, focusing on U.S. foreign policy.
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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