December 29, 2025
Arab News
By Andrew Hammond
The coming year will surely have some significant surprises in store, both politically and economically. However, one relatively predictable feature of the global landscape will be the launch of China’s new five-year plan, the 15th such iteration.
Beijing’s five-year plans have long been defining characteristics of not just the Chinese but also the wider international calendar. So, it is not only China, but much of the rest of the world, including the Middle East, which will be watching the blueprint for the nascent superpower’s development in the period to 2030.
This time frame may be a tumultuous period. This is not least with the second Trump presidency, which runs through to January 2029, potentially providing a historic context for the plan’s activation.
While the full details of the new plan will not be known until release, significant clues were provided at the Chinese Communist Party’s so-called fourth plenum last October. At the big event, the party leadership published a plan framework which will be formally approved in March during the National People’s Congress.
Several key elements are likely to be dialed up, including artificial intelligence. In the context of continued tensions with the US in areas such as computer chips, advanced software, rare earths, and magnets, the party decided at the plenum to focus the new plan on “substantial improvements in scientific and technological self-reliance … and steer the development of new quality productive forces.”
The reference to “new quality productive forces” means the need for greater homegrown, advanced technology, including in the defense area, so that Beijing can increasingly export this intellectual property. A growing number of these Chinese homegrown firms are proving to be internationally competitive earning a significant share of their revenue abroad, with the potential to become growth drivers.
On the face of it, this long-term, relatively predictable approach embodied in China’s five-year planning could not be more different from the short-termist, US policy-by-social media experience of Trump. Chinese President Xi Jinping recently asserted that, when it comes to China’s “revitalization,” long-term planning creates “a vital political advantage” vis a vis other world powers.
This core point has been echoed by Jiang Jinquan, a key party official. He declared that “scientifically formulating and continuously implementing the five-year plan is … a key political advantage … gaining strategic initiative in the midst of intense international competition.”
To be sure, China’s approach is far from perfect. A number of its five-year plans have backfired, such as under Mao Zedong in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Critics are also far from sure that this is the best way now to tackle the many domestic challenges that Beijing faces, for instance, in the property sector, uneven consumer demand, and deflation, let alone the international ones, as well.
Nevertheless, this emphasis on the long term continues to be a defining feature of Beijing’s grand strategy. This remains founded on a gradualist transition to power, allowing the nation to try to grow stronger over an extended horizon.
Since Xi became Chinese Communist Party secretary-general, more than a decade ago, when Barack Obama was still US president, he has sought to project Beijing as a responsible global stakeholder. Yet, much has changed in that long period, including international perceptions of the balance of power and Beijing’s place in it.
Many countries now increasingly perceive China as a significantly stronger global player. In recent years, the country has become a major force in areas such as electric cars, wind and solar industries, plus robotics. At the macro level, moreover, the International Monetary Fund asserts that the Chinese economy is now larger than its US counterpart on a purchasing power parity basis which adjusts for the fact that goods are cheaper in China and other countries relative to the US.
The consequences of this, especially when matched with the extended economic weakness in some of the West, have been more than economic. In terms of perceptions, the fact that many internationally believe the global balance of power has swung significantly has sometimes created tensions, and not only in Beijing’s relations with Washington.
While many in China welcome recognition of the country’s growing power, this shift is not without headaches for Beijing. It has exposed the country to greater foreign scrutiny and fed into perceptions, sometimes fuelled by Trump and some anti-establishment politicians, to try to tap into growing angst about China’s rise.
This may only become a bigger challenge in the future if the new plan seeks to give Beijing “markedly stronger” international influence, as was advocated in the plenum. Potentially, this jars with China’s longstanding grand strategy which has so far been premised on keeping a relatively low profile and avoiding major controversy.
When a bright spotlight has been shone on Beijing in recent years, it has sometimes exposed a soft-power deficit. Soft power is recognized by China as a valuable political commodity, but one it has had limited success in cultivating, so far. As international perceptions of the country’s power change, its global favorability has become more of a challenge to try to manage.
If China wants to develop markedly stronger international influence, Beijing will need to find better ways to tackle this. This includes doubling down on a process of addressing foreign concern about its intentions as a rising power.
For instance, China’s reputation might benefit significantly from greater public diplomacy to win more foreign hearts and minds. Example measures could include utilizing the country’s growing capabilities in space travel for high-profile international cooperation projects for the potential good of mankind as a whole.
This agenda may not be easy to address. However, China’s soft-power deficit will only persist, unless it is tackled, as part of its broader grand strategy and long-term planning.
• Andrew Hammond is an associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics.
Arab News
By Andrew Hammond
The coming year will surely have some significant surprises in store, both politically and economically. However, one relatively predictable feature of the global landscape will be the launch of China’s new five-year plan, the 15th such iteration.
Beijing’s five-year plans have long been defining characteristics of not just the Chinese but also the wider international calendar. So, it is not only China, but much of the rest of the world, including the Middle East, which will be watching the blueprint for the nascent superpower’s development in the period to 2030.
This time frame may be a tumultuous period. This is not least with the second Trump presidency, which runs through to January 2029, potentially providing a historic context for the plan’s activation.
While the full details of the new plan will not be known until release, significant clues were provided at the Chinese Communist Party’s so-called fourth plenum last October. At the big event, the party leadership published a plan framework which will be formally approved in March during the National People’s Congress.
Several key elements are likely to be dialed up, including artificial intelligence. In the context of continued tensions with the US in areas such as computer chips, advanced software, rare earths, and magnets, the party decided at the plenum to focus the new plan on “substantial improvements in scientific and technological self-reliance … and steer the development of new quality productive forces.”
The reference to “new quality productive forces” means the need for greater homegrown, advanced technology, including in the defense area, so that Beijing can increasingly export this intellectual property. A growing number of these Chinese homegrown firms are proving to be internationally competitive earning a significant share of their revenue abroad, with the potential to become growth drivers.
On the face of it, this long-term, relatively predictable approach embodied in China’s five-year planning could not be more different from the short-termist, US policy-by-social media experience of Trump. Chinese President Xi Jinping recently asserted that, when it comes to China’s “revitalization,” long-term planning creates “a vital political advantage” vis a vis other world powers.
This core point has been echoed by Jiang Jinquan, a key party official. He declared that “scientifically formulating and continuously implementing the five-year plan is … a key political advantage … gaining strategic initiative in the midst of intense international competition.”
To be sure, China’s approach is far from perfect. A number of its five-year plans have backfired, such as under Mao Zedong in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Critics are also far from sure that this is the best way now to tackle the many domestic challenges that Beijing faces, for instance, in the property sector, uneven consumer demand, and deflation, let alone the international ones, as well.
Nevertheless, this emphasis on the long term continues to be a defining feature of Beijing’s grand strategy. This remains founded on a gradualist transition to power, allowing the nation to try to grow stronger over an extended horizon.
Since Xi became Chinese Communist Party secretary-general, more than a decade ago, when Barack Obama was still US president, he has sought to project Beijing as a responsible global stakeholder. Yet, much has changed in that long period, including international perceptions of the balance of power and Beijing’s place in it.
Many countries now increasingly perceive China as a significantly stronger global player. In recent years, the country has become a major force in areas such as electric cars, wind and solar industries, plus robotics. At the macro level, moreover, the International Monetary Fund asserts that the Chinese economy is now larger than its US counterpart on a purchasing power parity basis which adjusts for the fact that goods are cheaper in China and other countries relative to the US.
The consequences of this, especially when matched with the extended economic weakness in some of the West, have been more than economic. In terms of perceptions, the fact that many internationally believe the global balance of power has swung significantly has sometimes created tensions, and not only in Beijing’s relations with Washington.
While many in China welcome recognition of the country’s growing power, this shift is not without headaches for Beijing. It has exposed the country to greater foreign scrutiny and fed into perceptions, sometimes fuelled by Trump and some anti-establishment politicians, to try to tap into growing angst about China’s rise.
This may only become a bigger challenge in the future if the new plan seeks to give Beijing “markedly stronger” international influence, as was advocated in the plenum. Potentially, this jars with China’s longstanding grand strategy which has so far been premised on keeping a relatively low profile and avoiding major controversy.
When a bright spotlight has been shone on Beijing in recent years, it has sometimes exposed a soft-power deficit. Soft power is recognized by China as a valuable political commodity, but one it has had limited success in cultivating, so far. As international perceptions of the country’s power change, its global favorability has become more of a challenge to try to manage.
If China wants to develop markedly stronger international influence, Beijing will need to find better ways to tackle this. This includes doubling down on a process of addressing foreign concern about its intentions as a rising power.
For instance, China’s reputation might benefit significantly from greater public diplomacy to win more foreign hearts and minds. Example measures could include utilizing the country’s growing capabilities in space travel for high-profile international cooperation projects for the potential good of mankind as a whole.
This agenda may not be easy to address. However, China’s soft-power deficit will only persist, unless it is tackled, as part of its broader grand strategy and long-term planning.
• Andrew Hammond is an associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics.
No comments:
Post a Comment