KCK Executive Council Member Mustafa Karasu told ANF about one year of the process that proceeded with Leader Apo's Peace and Democratic Society perspective, the responsibilities of the state and society, and how to fight against anti-solution groups.

ANF
NEWS CENTER
Friday, January 2, 2026
Leader Apo's "Call for Peace and Democratic Society" published on February 27, 2025, created a historical threshold in the course of the Kurdish problem. In the intervening 10 months, the Kurdistan Freedom Movement has taken steps with extraordinary speed and high risk compared to world examples: A ceasefire was declared on March 1, the PKK took the 12th Parliamentary Assembly on May 5-7. It dissolved itself at the Congress, ended the method of armed struggle, on July 11, a guerrilla group of 30 people led by KCK Executive Council Co-Chair Besê Hozat burned their weapons, and on October 26, it was announced that the armed forces had begun to withdraw from Northern Kurdistan and Turkey.
KCK Executive Council Member Mustafa Karasu emphasized the historical, political and social dimensions of this process; From the level of ownership of the Kurdish society to the political climate in Turkey, from the resistance of the war rentier groups to the responsibilities of the state, from the visit of the commission established in the Parliament to İmralı and the interlocutor debates to the attitude of the opposition, from the struggle for Leader Apo's right to hope and physical freedom within the scope of the "second stage" to the role of women and youth, from the increasing interest in Leader Apo's thoughts in the international arena to the steps to be taken for the permanence of peace He answered ANF's questions.
The first part of our interview with KCK Executive Council Member Mustafa Karasu in three parts is as follows:
As a movement, you fit this historical process, which takes years in the examples of other countries, into a few months. What gives you the strength and determination to take these steps? How did you achieve this? How should it be understood to take these steps in an environment where there are many uncertainties and concerns?
First of all, on behalf of our Movement, we congratulate Rêber Apo and all our comrades in prison on the New Year, wish the new year to bring freedom and democracy for our peoples, celebrate the new year of our people, the peoples of Turkey, the Middle East and the world and all the forces of democracy, and wish the new year to bring peace and democracy. 2025 has been a year of hope in this respect. The Peace and Democratic Society Process, which proceeded with the initiative of Rêber Apo, created excitement among the Kurdish people and the forces of democracy. We believe that this process will deepen in 2026 and create a situation in which the physical freedom of Rêber Apo is ensured, the solution of the Kurdish problem is realized, Turkey is democratized, and wars in the Middle East and the world come to an end, and we wish 2026 to be a good year for everyone.
ÖNDER APO HAS BEEN ADVOCATING A POLITICAL SOLUTION, NOT A WAR, FOR 52 YEARS
Rêber Apo's search for a democratic political solution goes back to his interview with Mehmet Ali Birand in 1988. In this interview, Rêber Apo said, "The state should send an official, let's discuss the problems." In 1993, as a response to Özal's soft approaches, he declared a unilateral ceasefire in March. In the second period of this ceasefire, Özal was poisoned and eliminated. Rêber Apo also showed a positive approach to the Erbakan government in 1995. In 1998, it declared a unilateral ceasefire on September 1, after some forces within the army sent a message. Rêber Apo sought dialogue and solutions with the Turkish state throughout the 1990s. In his assessment on August 15, 1998, he emphasized that the time had come for other methods other than seeking to solve problems through war; expressed its preference for a democratic political solution on the anniversary of August 15.
When he was taken into captivity in İmralı on February 15, 1999 by an international conspiracy, he demonstrated his will for a democratic solution. He wanted to evaluate his being in captivity in the direction of a democratic solution. It has created an environment of non-conflict for years by taking the guerrilla forces out of Turkey's borders. With the evaluations he made in this process, he tried to create the theoretical and political basis of a democratic political solution. However, the state did not respond to these radical decisions and steps and insisted on its policy of denial. Rêber made the mistake that the PKK was defeated with Apo's captivity, which led to the continuation of the conflicts.
Rêber Apo again secured a unilateral ceasefire in 2006. Since 2008, negotiations have been held in Oslo for the continuation of the de-escalation and the democratic solution of the Kurdish problem. These meetings continued with state officials both in Oslo and İmralı. In this process, Rêber Apo tried to pave the way for a democratic solution to the Kurdish problem with reasonable proposals. He made calls and announced declarations in this direction.
The result of all these efforts was announced to the public on February 28, 2015 at the Dolmabahçe Palace in Istanbul.
All these facts show that Rêber Apo is looking for a democratic solution at every opportunity; It clearly shows that it aims to end the armed struggle on this basis. However, since there was no change in mentality in the Turkish state and seeing the political conjuncture in its favor, it increased its attacks as of July 24, 2015. However, we resisted all these attacks as a people and as a movement, and we left these attacks inconclusive.
On the other hand, economic, social and political problems in Turkey have worsened. The escalating war in the Middle East and the uncertainties in the political situation it created led the Turkish state to seek a way out of this impasse. Devlet Bahçeli made a call to Rêber Apo in this environment. Since Rêber Apo has been in the understanding that "negotiations, not war, solve problems" for decades, he replied, "I have the power to end the armed conflict process and bring the Kurdish problem to the political and legal ground."
A very righteous struggle is being waged and the realities of the Kurdish problem have been revealed. In fact, our Movement has abandoned the real socialist understanding and the approach of a state for every nation. These facts formed the basis of a democratic political solution. For this reason, we are trying to provide the ground and enable this solution by taking steps in line with Rêber Apo's perspectives. There is a 100-year-old Kurdish problem, we have a 50-year struggle. All these steps should be seen as the result of the effects of 50 years of struggle in Kurdistan, Turkey, the Middle East and the world. We are not talking about a one-year, two-year struggle and the effect it creates. In these 50 years, such values have been created and reality has been revealed that it has become possible to achieve a democratic political solution based on this.
How did these steps affect the political and social climate in Turkey? What kind of developments and changes did it create? How do you evaluate the level of ownership of the Kurdish community in particular?
Undoubtedly, getting out of the conflict environment for more than a year has given the society and the forces of democracy some respite. Because in the war environment, the forces of democracy were constantly kept under pressure. The government was showing every political force it targeted to be related to the PKK and going after it. Attacks and oppressions were legitimized based on the conflict environment. In this process, the CHP and some circles were attacked for other reasons, not by showing them as collaborating with terrorism this time; The CHP's presidential candidate and many mayors have been arrested. These pressures and the practices against Tele1 and Merdan Yanardağ are seen as a policy of limiting the social support for the solution of the Kurdish problem and the non-conflict. This is how some circles evaluate it. A CHP deputy also cited this situation as the reason why social support for the process did not increase. Undoubtedly, such explanations do not express a principled policy, but a political situation influenced by the outside.
STRUGGLE AND ORGANIZATION ELIMINATE ALL CONCERNS
Despite these negativities, an environment has emerged in which the political climate has softened to a certain extent and the pressures on the grounds of terrorism have declined. A ground has been created for the struggle for democracy. Although some circles incite Kurdish hostility, since the AKP-MHP is a part of this process, there has been an objective softening in the society's view of the Kurdish problem and the Kurds. No matter how much they try to hide the truth by saying 'Turkey without terrorism', the society learns that there is a Kurdish problem and that the Kurds have demands. Undoubtedly, the cessation of the war has created relief not only in the economic field but also in the social field.
Although the Kurdish community is bitter with the dissolution of the PKK, it sees that the development and success of the process will bring great benefits to the Kurds and supports the efforts of Rêber Apo and our Movement. Kurdish society has experienced an intense politicization process for a year. Not only the DEM Party base, but all Kurds have been sensitive to the Kurdish problem and democratization. The Kurds have entered into a common agreement for the democratic solution of the Kurdish problem. The Kurds who voted for the AKP also have an approach that wants a democratic solution to the Kurdish problem. Even though they take care of the government, the fact that they are in such a state of mind is a factor that will have a positive effect on the Kurdish society's ownership of the process and its struggle.
The ownership of the Kurdish people is positive. Politics is not done with concerns. Every political goal can be achieved through struggle. Struggle is already a factor that relieves anxiety. The concerns of those who do not embrace the process and do not struggle are empty and meaningless. In this respect, the main task is to struggle, to organize. Only in this way can all kinds of anxiety be eliminated.
We can say that the steps you have taken in this process have unmasked the war rentiers and those who benefit from the war, especially in politics, the media and the academic field. What is the intention of these segments who take an anti-process position? How should these segments be fought?
These segments both benefit from the conflict between the Kurds and the state and are enemies of the Kurds. Undoubtedly, Kurdish hostility has been created by a hundred years of education, culture, press policies and the policies and discourses of political powers. Those who want this war to continue are actually collaborators of foreign powers who want the Kurds and the Turkish state to clash. Don't look at them saying "Homeland-nation-Sakarya"; They are the internal extensions of foreign powers weakening Turkey in constant war and making it a collaborator of their own policies.
They should be exposed as opponents of peace and those who want war. They are those who do not want Turkey's stability. These are war rentiers. In the 1990s, it was stated that they lived with the PKK and Apo rent. The louder they shouted, the more rent they would get. It has not been forgotten how those who were called artists in the 1990s attacked when Ahmet Kaya said, "I will make a Kurdish song". By doing so, they will get the well done of the governments and their bosses; they will achieve a social status in the art world.
Since at least one-third of Turkey's population is Kurdish, opposition to the process means "I will not make peace with my neighbor". These are the segments that have become diseased in decades of education. No matter how they define themselves, they are the fifth column of foreign powers in Turkey.
AS LONG AS THE KURDISH PROBLEM IS NOT RESOLVED, THE COUP HABIT WILL ALWAYS EXIST
In this process, the issue of coup mechanics, which Leader Apo drew attention to and warned many times, was discussed a lot. There have been important steps you have taken to prevent such provocative attempts and to prevent them. Well, do you think that the state has fought enough against these segments? What should the state and the government do about this for the sake of the process?
Rêber Apo expressed the coup mechanics decades ago. As a matter of fact, what Rêber Apo said came true. The July 15 coup is also a situation created by the insolubility of the Kurdish problem. If it is remembered, the so-called Gülenists were very reckless in their hostility to the PKK and Apo. By doing so, they wanted to strengthen themselves and come to power. As long as the Kurdish problem is not resolved, some segments will always try to find a ground for a coup by showing themselves as more anti-Kurdish people. There are always reasons for coups. The main reason for the September 12 coup was that the Kurds raised their demands for freedom and organized in this direction. Now some are uncomfortable with the Kurdish issue being on the agenda. For this reason, these segments may show themselves as those who will not "divide this country" and want to gather strength and stage a coup. As long as the Kurdish problem is not resolved, there will always be a coup habitus, that is, a ground that will lead to a coup in Turkey.
The right struggle with these segments is the socialization of the process. In this respect, the government should be in a position to ensure the socialization of the process with its attitudes and discourses. The fact that the press and other circles under the influence of the press and other circles play a role in the socialization of the process by leaving the old language will also narrow the coup aspirants.
Some of those who are disturbed by the process are Kurds. When the PKK fought, this mob used to say "it harms us by fighting, why is it fighting", and now it carries out counter-propaganda activities by saying "why did it end the war". What is the purpose of these circles? Why does the effort to reconcile, the effort to solve the Kurdish problem bother them so much? What should be the approach of the Kurdish people towards these circles? How should these circles be fought?
There have always been enemies of the sworn Rêber Apo and the PKK. Some people and circles have not been able to digest the fact that Rêber Apo and the PKK have left their mark on Kurdish politics for 50 years and have been influential in all four parts of Kurdistan. Those you call Kurds who are against the process have not contributed anything to the struggle of this people. They have not fought for this people, neither militarily nor politically.
Let us emphasize this: The PKK appeared on the stage of history as a Kurdish poor movement, that is, the Kurmanj movement. Contrary to approaches that see capitalism as a nationalizing force, the PKK has assessed that capitalism has accelerated the Kurdish genocide and has become an apparatus used in the Kurdish genocide. As a matter of fact, practice has shown that capitalism is used by genocidal colonialism to disperse Kurdish sociality. For this reason, opposition to the comprador class, which is the pillar of capitalism, has been a basic attitude in the emergence of the PKK.
BLACK PROPAGANDA MAKERS ARE IN THE CALCULATION OF 'CAN WE FILL THE GAPS LEFT BY THE PKK'
When the de-escalation was achieved in 1999, those who told us that "we are giving up the struggle" made propaganda that "this war is harmful" when the guerrilla war resumed after 2004. Now, when the PKK is dissolved and decides to lay down its arms, these circles are in the impertinence of accusing Rêber Apo and the PKK, which have been fighting for 52 years, of giving up the struggle. Rêber Apo wants to crown the 52-year struggle with a democratic solution. He says that a democratic solution, not a statist solution, will bring a lot of benefits to the Kurds. Won by the classical paradigm and war is won. Insisting on the old paradigm will no longer yield results other than making the Kurds lose; Or no matter how much it is fought, such a solution will be sought in the end. This is Leader Apo's approach.
These circles are trying to portray themselves as those who supposedly want more rights for the Kurds. These segments, who give strength to the Kurdish people's struggle for freedom and do not pay the price, are in the calculation of "I wonder if we can fill the void left by the PKK". So much so that those who do not fight for the Kurds and do not contribute to the Kurds gaining anything are making demagogic statements such as "why don't we have a state?" This is a very simple thought. Even the KDP says "I support this process"; the false statements of these segments such as "why the PKK does not want a state" have no value other than black propaganda and demagoguery. Even such people and circles speak thanks to the results of the great struggle created by Rêber Apo. Undoubtedly, some well-intentioned and honest patriots also show such approaches in response to the denialist policies of the Turkish state.
We are the ones who have been fighting against the Turkish state for 52 years. We are the ones who know this state best. The state also knows us well. Those who fight in the world negotiate and make peace. Today, we are the most experienced and political power in the Middle East. We know the rights and wrongs. Of course, it is our responsibility towards the Kurdish people to create a democratic political solution to the Kurdish problem.
These circles see this; if Rêber Apo succeeds in solving the Kurdish problem, all the black propaganda they have carried out against Rêber Apo so far will collapse. They will no longer have any political value in the face of Rêber Apo's paradigm. Undoubtedly, some collaborators do not want a solution to the Kurdish problem. Because when the Kurdish problem is solved, their cooperation will not pay off.
The Kurdish people know very well what the place of the PKK is in the Kurdish people's struggle for freedom. Rêber Apo is a leadership whose leadership has been tested for 52 years and has always won it over to the Kurds. He is neither deceived nor deceived! The Kurdish people should approach them in the same way as the rentiers and anti-Kurds who do not want a solution to the Kurdish problem in Turkey. They are the natural allies of the anti-Kurdish and anti-process groups in Turkey.
This process is also a process of struggle. They weaken the position of the Kurds by opposing Rêber Apo and the process. These should be seen as groups that weaken the position of Kurds in the name of Kurdishness in this process. The most effective struggle against these circles is to embrace this process, which is carried out under the initiative of Rêber Apo, and thus to play a role in the success of the process by increasing social support for it.
AKP AND MHP'S CONCERNS OVERLAP
At the beginning of the process, it was commented that MHP leader Bahçeli and AKP President Erdoğan acted with different motives and thought differently about the process. Do you think that the People's Alliance has a common approach and policy at this stage?
There are differences in the ideological and political approaches of the AKP and MHP. In this respect, it is understandable that there are differences in their approach to the Kurdish problem. However, the AKP and MHP are in a very close alliance. If their views had not converged on a very important issue such as the Kurdish issue, Devlet Bahçeli would not have made these statements. In this respect, they discussed this process with Tayyip Erdoğan beforehand. Maybe the motives of both may not be the same. However, it should be considered that they are politically united in the start of such a process. Otherwise, a difference that does not create a common agreement on such an important issue would lead to the breakdown of the alliance.
There are evaluations that the AKP is considering maintaining its power longer, while the MHP prioritizes the 'survival of the state and the nation'. Since there has been no contradiction so far, the concerns of the AKP and MHP coincide. A year of practice reveals that they are carrying out this process together. In terms of the progress of the process, the fact that the AKP and MHP, which are one side of the process, are close to each other should be seen as positive in another aspect.
In the context of the steps taken by the state, a commission was formed within the parliament in this process. This commission carried out some activities and finally held a meeting with Leader Apo in İmralı on November 24. How should we generally read the meeting of a delegation of parties in the parliament with Leader Apo? What is the importance of the process turning into a state policy and in terms of interlocutorship?
The establishment of the National Solidarity, Brotherhood and Democracy Commission in the Parliament has been an important step. Although Kurdish is not mentioned in its name, everyone knows that this commission is related to the Kurdish problem. As a matter of fact, the commission met with many institutions and individuals, and speeches were made about the Kurdish problem and its solution in these meetings. The speakers of the parliament were also summoned because it was a very important problem, and they expressed their thoughts on the silence of the guns and the Kurdish problem. The speeches of the speakers of the parliament on the Kurdish question were generally positive. In short, the establishment of such a commission by the parliament on the Kurdish question is an issue of political value. The existence of the Kurdish problem has also been registered by the parliament. Even the fact that they do not allow Kurdish mothers to speak Kurdish has added a dimension to the agenda of the problem. The speaker of the parliament went to Amed and spoke Kurdish to cover up the situation.
IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THERE IS AN INTERVENTION IN CHP AND YENI YOL
The fact that only three representatives of the parties in the commission went to İmralı revealed that the problem was not approached seriously. It is understood that there is an intervention in the CHP and the Yeni Yol group. However, it is still very important to go to İmralı and meet with Rêber Apo. This process went beyond meeting with some state officials and evolved into meeting with the parliamentary commission, which is a political will. Thus, the parliament and politics came into play. This is actually a new stage in the process. The ball is in the political field. Will the parliament and the political field have the right attitude on such an important issue? Turkish politics is in a test. The process started as a state policy; now politics has become a part of this policy. Because if there is to be a solution eventually, the parliament will decide on it and enact the necessary laws. If the peace process is to have a legal framework, it will be the Parliament that will ensure it. Without this process being included in the law and law, there will be neither peace nor a legal and political solution.
The state has known for decades who the interlocutor is in the Kurdish question. Negotiations were already being held with Rêber Apo and the PKK. Now, the parliament has taken the interlocutor and the Turkish society has been told that the interlocutor in the Kurdish problem is Rêber Apo. In this respect, as a result of going to İmralı and meeting with Rêber Apo, the second stage of the Peace and Democratic Society process was passed.
The commission's decision to go to İmralı was conflicting. MHP leader Bahçeli insisted. Then the decision-making session was postponed several times. CHP and Yeni Yol group withdrew. The summary text presented to the Parliamentary commission and the public after the meeting was also widely discussed. The commission members of the DEM Party announced that they did not take part in the preparation of this text and demanded that the entire meeting be reflected in a transparent manner. Likewise, the opposition parties made the same demand. How do you read this whole process? Why was it so crisis-ridden? What kind of misguided approaches were taken in this regard?
The summary text presented to the commission was reflected to the public. In fact, Gülistan Koçyiğit conveyed the essence of what was discussed in İmralı to the press. In this respect, we learned the important issues discussed. The commission consisted of three people. I guess each member had different things to consider important in the meeting. We do not know whether the minutes are published in their entirety in such conflict resolutions. The important thing is that the commission members know. If the representatives of other parties had also left, there would have been no secrets about what was discussed and discussed. It seems that the AKP and MHP reacted in such a way to the fact that other parties did not give members.
There were also reflections other than the summary presented to the commission and what Gülistan Koçyiğit stated. However, it was seen that it was deliberately distorted and reflected. For example, there was no coup debate about the MHP in İmralı, and Rêber Apo made some warnings that the lack of a solution to the Kurdish problem would create a ground for a coup. However, Rêber Apo's evaluations in this direction have been deliberately distorted. It seems that what was said in İmralı was reflected in their relations by some. There were those who expressed doubts about this issue in AKP circles.
TO BE CONTINUED...
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