New Project Aims To Improve Early Warning Of Sudden, Dangerous Volcanic Eruptions

One of the 32 explosive eruptions that occurred in April 2021 at Soufrière in the Caribbean island of St Vincent. Image credit: Richie Robertson.

 January 19, 2026  

By Eurasia Review

Hundreds of millions of people worldwide live within 100 kilometres of a volcano that has experienced at least one significant eruption. Yet the warning signs that signal a shift from relatively mild activity to a high-impact eruption remain unclear. A major new £3.7 million University of Bristol-led research project aims to change this.

The Ex-X: Expecting the Unexpected study will investigate what drives dangerous escalations in volcanic activity and how scientists can better detect them before they threaten lives.

Research shows that around 61% of eruptions initially affect only the immediate area around a volcano’s summit, before rapidly escalating into far more explosive and dangerous events capable of impacting much larger populations. Understanding why and how these transitions occur is one of the biggest challenges in volcanology.

Led by Professor Jenni Barclay from Bristol’s School of Earth Sciences, the NERC-funded project will build on recent advances in volcanology, seismology, and numerical modelling.

Initial research will focus on three volcanic systems in the Eastern Caribbean: Soufrière Volcano (St Vincent), Montagne Pelée (Martinique), and Soufrière Hills Volcano (Montserrat).

Recent advances in seismology will enable the team to deploy large numbers of seismic ‘nodes’ across the Soufrière Volcano in the Caribbean island of St Vincent. These instruments, with long battery lives, will allow researchers to gather crucial data even when the volcano is not erupting.

The resulting measurements, along with data from past eruptions, will be analysed using machine learning, helping the team to recognise subsurface activity before, during, and after these eruptive transitions.

These new insights will be incorporated into new mathematical models to simulate eruption processes. By tracking the development of eruptions in the simulations, the team will identify the key drivers and potential signals of escalations in eruptions.

In parallel, the research team will use advanced micro-analytical techniques, including Bristol’s X-ray computed tomography (XCT) and a state-of-the-art electron microprobe, to examine the small-scale changes in crystals formed during recent and historic eruptions. These crystals preserve records of changing conditions within magma systems, offering valuable clues to the processes that precede eruptions.

Professor Jenni Barclay, AXA Chair in Volcanology at Bristol’s School of Earth Sciences and the project lead, explains: “Unexpected shifts in volcanic eruptions have historically had significant impacts on people living around active volcanoes in the Eastern Caribbean and elsewhere, but there is still considerable uncertainty around when these will occur. Ex-X aims to deliver a step-change in our ability to anticipate these dangerous escalations.

“Recent analytical, theoretical, and instrumental advances in volcanology, alongside advances in numerical modelling capacities, may now make it possible for us to better recognise the subtle signs of a dangerous shift and provide early warning.

“Our aim is to combine highly detailed observations derived from real eruptions with our improved models to gain deeper theoretical understanding and identify a range of likely scenarios at Eastern Caribbean volcanoes that will help us monitor eruptions.

“By working with our observatory partners throughout the project, we are hoping this will particularly benefit those responsible for volcanic hazard monitoring and management, and through them, the exposed populations and managers of risk in volcanic countries.”

Dr Erouscilla Joseph, Director of The University of the West Indies Seismic Research Centre, which is responsible for monitoring the many volcanoes of the English-speaking Eastern Caribbean, and a key partner in the Ex-X study, added: “Many Caribbean communities live in the shadow of dangerous volcanoes. Rapid changes in activity can overwhelm evacuation efforts and devastate entire regions. Involvement in research like this is essential, because the advances we make will directly improve how we respond to the next eruption.”

Proposed Surcharge On Oil Would Help Pay For Responses To Climate-Related Disasters In Alaska

U.S. Coast Guard MH-60 Jayhawk helicopter aircrews conduct overflights of Kipnuk, Alaska, after coastal flooding impacted several western Alaska communities, Oct. 12, 2025. The Coast Guard continues to support the state of Alaska’s response efforts in impacted communities. (U.S. Coast Guard photo courtesy of Air Station Kodiak)

January 19, 2026 
Alaska Beacon
By Yereth Rosen

(Alaska Beacon) — Landslides, storm-driven floods, infrastructure-damaging permafrost thaw and intensifying wildfires are among the expensive disasters that scientists link to Alaska’s rapidly changing climate.

Now a state legislator is proposing to levy a 20-cent surcharge on every barrel of Alaska-produced oil to fund programs that respond to and prepare for disasters related to climate change.

Rep. Andy Josephson, D-Anchorage, introduced the measure, House Bill 247, in advance of the legislative session scheduled to start on Jan. 20.

To explain why the state needs such a fund, Josephson ticked off a list of recent disasters in Alaska that imposed heavy costs — and, in some cases, killed people. Those events, which include deadly landslides in Southeast Alaska, landslides that have blocked roads, severe flooding 
“It’s a true statement that a lot of the disaster dollars we need right now are related to climate change. That, in my opinion, is sort of inarguable,” he said.

Disasters like those that have occurred in recent years are expected to continue in the future, he said: “We’re in a new normal.”

The bill is logical from a fiscal standpoint, Josephson said.

As of now, the state’s disaster relief fund is “basically a sub-fund of the general fund,” and it gets whatever lawmakers are able to appropriate, he said. But if there is a new stream of money as proposed by his bill, “we would free up those dollars we’re otherwise spending in the disaster relief fund.”

At 20 cents per barrel, the proposed surcharge would raise about $30 million a year, he said.

In comparison, Gov. Mike Dunleavy in December proposed that lawmakers approve a $40 million appropriation for the state’s existing disaster relief fund. The need could increase from that total if the Trump administration fails to reimburse 100% of the costs for Typhoon Halong relief rather than the normal 75%. The Biden administration in 2022 approved 100% reimbursement for Merbok-related costs.

As introduced by Josephson, the bill would give the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation oversight over the money generated by the surcharge. It would distribute fund money in the form of grants to local governments and other entities for purposes like disaster response, disaster preparation and upgrades that make infrastructure better protected against climate change.

The surcharge idea has precedent in Alaska. The Department of Environmental Conservation already administers another fund with money coming from a per-barrel fee on oil produced in the state.

After the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill, the state began levying a 5-cent-per-barrel surcharge on oil that goes into the state’s Oil and Hazardous Substance Release Prevention and Response Fund. The fund itself was created by the legislature in 1986, with the surcharge established after the disastrous Prince William Sound spill.

That surcharge and rules concerning the fund’s operations have been modified over the years, broadening the purposes for which the fund can be used and boosting DEC’s reporting requirements, according to the department.

In its current configuration, each 5-cent-per-barrel surcharge sends 1 cent into a spill response account, to be used for spills that have been officially declared disasters. The other 4 cents goes into a spill prevention account, which can be used to address spills that have not been declared disasters, among other functions.

In 2015, refined petroleum products were added to the program. The state added a small surcharge, 0.95 cents per gallon, on refined fuel projects sold, transferred or used at the wholesale level, according to the DEC.

The idea of a similar levy to raise money for climate change preparedness and response is not new.

Rick Steiner, a retired University of Alaska marine conservation professor who founded and leads an environmental organization called Oasis Earth, has been advocating for the approach for several years.

“The legislature has so far seemed unable or unwilling to connect the dots between the many climate-related disasters we are experiencing — typhoon Merbok, wildfires, landslides, floods, coastal erosion, permafrost thaw, storm damage, infrastructure damage, subsistence impacts, commercial fishing impacts, etc..– to see the larger picture of the threat and costs these interrelated climate disasters pose,” he said in a letter to lawmakers sent last September. “The money to address these issues will have to come from government.”

In advocating for what he called an Alaska Climate Resilience Fund, Steiner said funding issues have become more pressing because of federal cutbacks.

The climate-response surcharge idea is not unique to Alaska, either.

Hawaii has put its version of a climate surcharge into law, a measure that seeks to raise money for responses to future disasters like the deadly 2023 Lahaina wildfire on the island of Maui.

In May, Hawaii Gov. Josh Green, a Democrat, signed a bill that increases the state’s hotel and lodging tax by less than a percentage point. The increase is applied to the state’s Transient Accommodations Tax, known at TAT. The governor said the increase would amount to an additional charge of about $3 on a $400-a-night hotel room fee. It is expected to generate about $100 million a year, according to state officials.

Alaska Beacon is an independent, nonpartisan news organization focused on connecting Alaskans to their state government. Alaska, like many states, has seen a decline in the coverage of state news. We aim to reverse that.

World On Track To Breach 1.5C Target By 2030

January 19, 2026 
By Ben Deighton

Global average temperature increases could pass the 1.5 degrees Celsius threshold outlined in the Paris Agreement by the end of the decade, according to the EU’s Copernicus Climate Change Service, putting the world at greater risk of never-seen-before extreme weather events.

Data released today (Wednesday) by the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts, which operates Copernicus on behalf of the EU, shows the average global surface air temperature in 2025 was 1.47 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial times.

As 2024 was the hottest year ever recorded, it means the average temperature increase over the past three years exceeded 1.5 degrees Celsius, according to the Copernicus analysis. In 2024, temperatures reached 1.6 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, compared to 1.48 degrees in 2023, the European data shows.

“These three years stand apart from those that came before,” Samantha Burgess, climate lead at the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts and deputy director of Copernicus, told a press briefing.

The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) also confirmed today that 2025 was one of the three warmest years on record, releasing its consolidated analysis of eight datasets, including the one from Copernicus.



However, the WMO analysis put the 2025 global average surface temperature at 1.44 degrees Celsius above the 1850-1900 average, with a margin of uncertainty of 0.13 degrees. The consolidated three-year average for 2023 to 2025 was 1.48 degrees Celsius above the pre-industrial era, with the same margin of uncertainty.

The Copernicus data combines past observations, including satellite data, with computer models, while some of the other datasets are based on measurements made by weather stations, ships and buoys.

“The year 2025 started and ended with a cooling La Niña and yet it was still one of the warmest years on record globally because of the accumulation of heat-trapping greenhouse gases in our atmosphere,” said WMO secretary-general Celeste Saulo.

She said extreme weather such as heatwaves, heavy rainfall and intense tropical cyclones, underlined a “vital need for early warning systems”.
2030 forecast

Under the terms of the Paris Agreement, countries agreed to pursue efforts to limit global average temperatures to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels.

At the time of the agreement, the Copernicus service predicted that the world would pass 1.5 degrees Celsius by March 2045. However, accelerating global warming means it is now forecasting that temperatures could pass this threshold as early as 2030, based on the current rate of warming.

“Overall, the globe has warmed by about 1.4 degrees Celsius above the pre-industrial level, and if warming continues at the same average rate experienced over the last 15 years, then we will reach [the] 1.5 degree level by the end this decade,” said Burgess.

“Every fraction of a degree matters, particularly for worsening extreme weather events.”

Carlo Buontempo, director of the Copernicus Climate Change Service, said it was now “inevitable” that the world would pass the 1.5 degree Celsius threshold.

“Now we are effectively entering a phase where … [it] is basically inevitable that we will pass that threshold and it is up to us to decide how we want to deal with the enhanced and increased … risk that we face as a consequence of this,” he told the press briefing.
Unprecedented

Passing the 1.5 degrees Celsius threshold will increase the chance of weather events that are “unprecedented in the observed record”, according to an assessment by the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.

“There are people in the Pacific that may not see this report, but they will definitely live its catastrophic reality,” said Fenton Lutunatabua, program manager for the Pacific and Caribbean region at the climate change group 350.org.

“This data proves that now, more than ever, we need to move beyond fossil fuels.”

Patrick Verkooijen, chief executive of the Netherlands-based Global Center on Adaptation, said: “Passing the 1.5-degree threshold is not a symbolic failure—for people in low- and middle-income countries, it would represent a material shift in daily life.

“It means more days of extreme heat that endanger outdoor workers, more volatile rainfall that undermines smallholder farmers, and more frequent floods and droughts that push vulnerable communities into poverty.”

Last year was marked by extreme weather events such as Hurricane Melissa in the Caribbean, drought in Brazil, and flooding in Colombia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, according to a report by the UK-based charity Christian Aid.

During the year, SciDev.Net reported on the destruction caused by cyclone Ditwah in Sri Lanka, deadly landslides in Sudan, and tidal flooding in India, as well as ongoing impacts of climate change on agriculture and health.

Harjeet Singh, of the Satat Sampada Climate Foundation, said the latest data was “an existential warning” for low- and middle-income countries.

“We are moving from the era of mitigation and adaptation into the era of unavoidable loss and damage,” he said.

“For the Global South, passing 1.5 degrees Celsius means that heatwaves in South Asia and floods in Southeast Asia will no longer be ‘extreme events’ but structural realities that dismantle decades of development progress overnight.”

This piece was produced by SciDev.Net’s Global desk.

Ben Deighton

Ben Deighton is the Managing Editor of SciDev.Net.He is responsible for ensuring our editorial independence and the quality of our articles and multimedia products. Ben joined SciDev.Net in July 2017 after four years as editor of Horizon magazine.

Adani’s Mannar Wind Project In Sri Lanka: Is The Opposition Unmasked At Last? – Analysis

January 19, 2026 
By A. Jathindra


Development-related environmental debates in Sri Lanka rarely stay rooted in ecology—they are almost always colored by politics. The abandoned Adani wind power project in Mannar is a striking example.

Not long ago, selective Colombo-based “environmentalists” thundered against the Indian conglomerate, branding its plans as ecological disasters. Yet today, as a near-identical project advances under a local company, those same voices have fallen conspicuously silent. Was their outrage truly about protecting the environment—or was it stirred by a hidden geopolitical hand?

Recent reports indicate that 28 Pakistani nationals and two Chinese nationals engaged in Mannar’s wind project have departed following the completion of turbine installation. It has also been noted that two Pakistani workers, while venturing into the sea, were subsequently intercepted by Sri Lankan security forces. One might reasonably reflect—had the Adani project proceeded as originally envisioned, such circumstances may well have been avoided.

Viewed in this light, the opposition to Adani’s initiative appears less an expression of ecological concern and more a matter shaped by broader political considerations.

On January 15, 2025, President Anura Kumara Dissanayake inaugurated the construction of a 50megawatt wind farm in Mannar, developed by Hayleys Fentons Limited. Scheduled for completion in March 2027, the project is part of the government’s pledge to achieve netzero carbon emissions by 2050.

Mannar has long been recognized as one of Sri Lanka’s most promising renewable energy hubs. It was this very potential that drew Adani Green Energy, which proposed a 250 MW wind power project in the region. Yet, shortsighted local opposition forced the plan’s abandonment.

The Adani Group and India suffered no loss. But for Sri Lanka, it was the loss of a significant opportunity to harness clean energy and strengthen its power grid. The episode underscores a troubling pattern: environmental concerns seem to erupt most fiercely only when the projects carry an Indian nameplate.

At the time, Adani’s investment represented the first major foreign capital inflow since Sri Lanka’s bankruptcy during its historic economic crisis. Had it gone ahead, the project would have spurred development in the Northern Province. In January 2023, the Board of Investment approved a $422 million plan for Mannar and Pooneryn, expected to generate 484 MW of electricity—one of the largest green energy projects in the country.

However, the Mannar project faced a fundamental rights petition filed by Bishop Emmanuel Fernando and three environmentalists, who questioned the credibility of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and warned of potential financial losses. Yet the EIA—covering bird and bat studies—was conducted by the Sri Lanka Sustainable Energy Authority under the leadership of Professor Devaka Weerakoon of the University of Colombo. Despite this, the environmentalists sought to discredit the findings, claiming the wind farm would become a “death trap” for migratory birds.

Globally, however, countries have adopted mitigation strategies. India’s 1,500 MW Muppandal Wind Farm—close to Sri Lanka—operates despite similar concerns. In Norway, researchers found that painting one rotor blade black reduced bird mortality by 70 percent. Studies in the U.S. estimate wind turbines kill between 140,000 and 679,000 birds annually—a tiny fraction compared to the billions killed by buildings or domestic cats. Fossil fuel projects are far deadlier, with 5.18 birds killed per gigawatthour of electricity compared to just 0.269 for wind.

Yet Colombobased environmental groups opposing Adani never highlighted these facts or proposed alternatives. Instead, they misled local communities, with religious leaders echoing flawed guidance. This begs the question: will the 50 MW projects now underway not harm birds? Will migratory species be spared?

The silence following Adani’s withdrawal suggests the protests were less about ecology and more about politics—specifically, blocking Indian investment. Meanwhile, far more environmentally damaging projects, such as the Chineseowned power plant in Nurisolai, escape scrutiny. This selective activism illustrates how environmental concerns in Sri Lanka have been politicized.

Wind power projects worldwide have not been abandoned because of bird deaths. Instead, governments and companies have introduced strategies to mitigate harm. Norway’s experiments with rotor blade painting, UV lighting, and micrositing of turbines show that innovation can reduce risks. Tamil Nadu, with its forwardlooking approach, is positioned to attract €72 billion in offshore wind investment by 2030. Sri Lanka could have shared in this momentum, but the Mannar opportunity was lost to politicized environmental activism.

The broader truth is that every development project carries an environmental cost. Countries that have successfully implemented wind farms have accepted this reality, balancing ecological concerns with the urgent need for clean energy. Sri Lanka’s activists, however, seem to apply their scrutiny selectively. When Indian projects are proposed, opposition is fierce; when Chinese projects advance, silence prevails.

This inconsistency undermines the credibility of environmental advocacy. If the true goal is sustainability, then all projects—regardless of origin—should be judged by the same standards. Otherwise, Sri Lanka risks allowing political agendas to derail its path to renewable energy.

The Mannar case is a cautionary tale. By blocking Adani’s project, Sri Lanka lost not only foreign investment but also a chance to accelerate its transition to clean energy. The government’s target of 70 percent renewable energy by 2030 and netzero emissions by 2050 will remain a distant dream if antidevelopment narratives dominate.

The question remains: was the opposition to Adani’s project truly about protecting birds, or was it about preventing Indian investment in Mannar? The disappearance of protesters after the project’s cancellation suggests the latter. Meanwhile, the new 50 MW project will inevitably face similar ecological challenges. Will migratory birds be spared this time, or will silence prevail because the developer is local?

The Mannar wind farm controversy is not merely about turbines and birds. It is about Sri Lanka’s future—whether the nation will embrace renewable energy with pragmatism, or remain entangled in politicized debates that stall progress. If selective activism continues to dominate, the aspiration of achieving net zero carbon emissions by 2050 risks becoming symbolic rather than substantive.

A. Jathindra is the head of the think tank Trinco Centre for Strategic Studies (TSST) and a Sri Lankan-based independent political analyst.

Greenland Between Denmark And The USA: What Is The Price For The Largest Island In The World? – Analysis

January 19, 2026 
By Dr. Vladislav B. Sotirovic

The largest island in the world, Greenland (that is not green at all but rather covered by white ice), has in recent months and even several years become one of the hottest geopolitical spots and disputes in world politics and international relations. The island, which has been administratively part of the Kingdom of Denmark for two centuries, has seriously caught the eye of the USA, namely its Trump administration, which firmly claims that the island simply must be under direct control and administration of the USA for its national security, otherwise it will be “swallowed up” by Russia and China (whose [Russian] submarines already operate around the island). The latest statements by NATO leaders support the idea of “Russian occupation of Greenland” as the reason for the increased presence of (small and meager) NATO soldiers on the island, but in essence, this position advocates the transfer of the island under American administration.

Greenland politically belongs to Denmark, i.e., the European Union, and in a military-political sense to the NATO pact. Geographically, it belongs to the North American continent and is closest to Canada, not the USA, and far away from Denmark. However, in a purely military sense, Greenland has been under the “occupation” of the USA since the summer of 1940 (after Nazi Germany’s overrun of Denmark), and in that context, the island is much more tied to the American, rather than the Danish, i.e., European administration. If, and this is in fact more or less a fait accompli, Greenland does indeed belong to the USA in one form or another, it will only be a formal recognition of the real state of affairs since the time of World War II up to today.

Nevertheless, what is Greenland, and what are its basic characteristics?

Geographical and military-technical characteristics of the island

Greenland (Grønland) is an Arctic island, the largest in the world, located off the northeastern part of the North American continent, next to Canada. It has an area of ​​2,130,800 sq km, with coastal islands of 2,175,600 sq km, and a population of almost 55,000 (the area of ​​Europe is about 10,180,000 sq km). Greenland is politically part of the territory of the Kingdom of Denmark with a certain degree of local autonomy. The island is mostly in the Arctic Circle, with its northernmost point 708 km from the North Pole. It is about 2,650 km long from north to south, and about 1,300 km wide from east to west. The island generally rises steeply from the surrounding seas, bays, and straits into highland terrain and over 3,000 m. altitude.

The island has a very rugged coastline with a large number of fjords. The eastern coast, despite its great ruggedness, is practically inaccessible for the most part due to icebergs. The interior of Greenland, together with the ice sheet, forms a plateau between 2000 and 3000 meters above sea level. It is estimated that about 1,860,900 sq. km. of the island’s territory is permanently covered with ice, with a thickness of between 500 and 1500 m., and only about 13% of Greenland’s surface is free of ice, and in the coastal zone it is up to 150 m. wide. The highest peak is located on Mount Forel, 3440 m.

The Greenland Sea is the main link between the Arctic and the western Atlantic. It is of great importance for Arctic fishing and whaling. Its northern part is mostly covered with ice, and its southern part is covered with icebergs or floes.

Probably the greatest geopolitical value of the island of Greenland is that whoever holds it in their hands essentially controls access to the North Atlantic.

The climate in Greenland is of the Arctic type. The southern part of the west coast is the most favorable for life because it is reached by the warmer Atlantic current, and where the average January temperature is about minus 14 degrees C, and July about plus 8 degrees C. In the interior of the island, the temperature can reach minus 50 degrees C.

It is important to note, at least from a military-economic point of view, that the seas, bays, and straits around Greenland freeze over except in its southwestern part, i.e., these waters are covered with icebergs as well as mountains broken off from glaciers, which descend from the interior of the mainland into the sea. Along the northern coast, the sea is constantly under ice. There are no land communications on the island. The ports in the south of the island are of insignificant capacity, at least in military terms. In Greenland, dog sledding on land and boats at sea are the only means of transport. However, in terms of air traffic, Greenland is in a very important position because the shortest flight routes from North America to the northern parts of Europe and Western Siberia pass through it.

The economy of Greenland

The current economy of the island is very poor, i.e., insignificant, because the main economic activity of the islanders is limited to fishing, which is not as profitable as in the cases of Iceland or Norway. It is mainly about catching cod, whale, seal, walrus, and, on the mainland, bear hunting for fur. A small number of sheep and goats are raised on the island, while vegetables and potatoes are grown sparingly in the southern coastal belt.

However, the island is rich in certain natural minerals. There are deposits of cryolite, copper, lead, graphite, and uranium. Greenland has the largest mines of cryolite in the world, which is used in the aluminum industry. Cryolite ore is mined in the southwestern part of the island and exported. Graphite and coal are mined in smaller quantities, while lead and zinc ores have been exploited since 1956. It is claimed that there are large quantities of oil and especially natural gas in the depths of the island. In this context, Greenland can be considered a part of the Arctic that has been proven to lie on huge reserves of natural gas and probably other energy sources, which would be the main reason for the international race for the largest island in the world.

Population and Constitution

The indigenous population of Greenland is of Inuit origin, who have settled mainly in its southern (more domesticated) part along the coast. There are a small number of ethnic Danes as well as US citizens who are stationed at US military bases, especially at the large Tula naval and air base on the northwestern coast of the island. The capital of Greenland is Gothop/Nuuk, which in 1965 had a population of almost 4,000 but today has almost 20,000. It is also the northernmost capital city in the world.

Greenland is, according to the Constitution of the Kingdom of Denmark of June 5th, 1953, an integral province of the Kingdom of Denmark with special autonomy (the same as the Faroe Islands) since 2009. Greenland has its own separate (autonomous) flag and local administration. The island sends two representatives to the Parliament of the Kingdom of Denmark. The executive power on the island is exercised by the Landsråt (Country Council), which consists of 13 members elected from among the inhabitants of Greenland. The President of the Landsråt is appointed by the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Denmark.

Short history of the island

The island was discovered in 982 by the Vikings, and after that, the southwestern coast of Greenland was settled by the Normans (Vikings), but their settlements later disappeared. New settlements from Europe began at the end of the 18th century. The settlements in southern Greenland came under the rule of the Kingdom of Denmark in 1814, and the entire island was annexed to it in 1921. When the Germans occupied Denmark on April 9th, 1940, by decision of US President F. D. Roosevelt, military units of the US Army landed on Greenland, where they remained throughout World War II, and to this day.

Denmark is one of the 12 founding members of the NATO pact in 1949, as is the US. The United States has built the Thule air and naval base in the northwestern part of the island and the Narssarssuaq air base in the southern part. By a mutual defense agreement with the Kingdom of Denmark of April 27th, 1951, the United States was granted the right to use these two military bases, which also serve as air traffic. East of Thule, a nuclear power plant was built by the United States in an agreement with Denmark, and a long-range air intelligence radar system was also built, which is linked to the northern parts of Canada. In other words, the capital military-economic infrastructure of the island is built up by the USA, not by Denmark.

The Future of the “Greenland Question“

Realistically, the US will certainly take over Greenland from Denmark, the only question is whether by July 4th or by the November 3rd, 2026, US elections. There are two practical scenarios for this takeover:

1) Either by using soft power, i.e., bribery, purchases, political blackmail, and/or economic sanctions;

2) Or by using hard power, i.e., direct military intervention or occupation and annexation of the island under the excuse of security or whatever geopolitical reasons.

The first option involves pro-American propaganda among the inhabitants of Greenland, who number as many as the inhabitants of one major street in New York. They will be promised a better future and life within the United States, and especially a higher standard of living. The Americans will promise large investments in the exploitation of mineral and other natural resources on the island, from which the inhabitants of Greenland will directly benefit, which was by no means the case while Greenland was under Danish rule, because it is well known that the Danish authorities did not invest much in the economy of Greenland.

The island is, by the way, one of the poorest regions of the European Union in terms of infrastructure, economy, and living standards. Therefore, it will not be very difficult for the Trump administration to indoctrinate the majority of the island’s inhabitants and bribe them with economic propaganda, especially if we know that there is already a solid pro-American core in Greenland. After its propaganda work, the soft power would end with a general vote on the island for its independence, which would be declared with all possible electoral manipulations under the supervision of the “international (pro-American) community”. Therefore, the transition of Greenland from Denmark to the US administration would take place according to formally “democratic” principles. The amount of money that Denmark would receive from the US for this “democratic” transition from Denmark to the US will probably never be known.

Let us not forget that Trump has already threatened European countries that oppose his policy of annexing Greenland with the introduction of tariffs of 10% to begin with, and if the countries in question do not collaborate, successively higher and higher tariffs on the export of their goods to the US market. This moment is extremely important because the governments of European countries will have a strong argument before their citizens as to why they are not more resolutely defending the territorial integrity of Denmark. Such blackmail is an extreme variant of the application of soft power.

The second scenario involves the direct use of military force in Greenland, which would be formally justified by security reasons. For the US to “occupy” the island, they would need one destroyer and one battalion of Marines, just in case. There are already two US military bases on the island anyway. In the event of an American landing on the island, the “international community” would not take any concrete action, and the protests would be reduced to a boring repetition of the story about the violation of “international law”.

Let us recall that the USA has a long tradition of military aggression against other states that violate this right, totaling around 22 or 33 since 1945, including directly instigating coups d’état and military coups. A classic example is the military occupation of the independent island state in the Caribbean Sea – Grenada, in October 1983, under the administration of President Ronald Reagan, under whose administration the President of Panama, General Manuel Noriega, was kidnapped in 1989 (anyway, a long-time CIA collaborator).

The “international community” has not taken any concrete action against the Israeli genocide in Gaza or the kidnapping of Venezuelan President Maduro, and it will not do so in the case of the military occupation of Greenland. Only Denmark will protest for a while, but it will soon calm down. Great Britain, Poland, and the Baltic states will probably give direct support to the occupation, while the EU and NATO bureaucracy will try to cover up the whole matter as soon as possible in order to consolidate their members against their main enemy – “aggressor” Russia.

The current deployment of bizarre EU/NATO military troops to Greenland is primarily an unproductive demonstration of “force” against the “Russian and Chinese occupation” of the island, not a “force” to contain the US real occupation of Greenland. The threats by Washington and Paris to leave NATO are of the nature of diplomatic bickering, i.e., moving the ball from one court to another. It is clear to anyone who understands even a little about international relations that these are primarily empty phrases and empty rhetoric aimed at scoring political points on both sides, primarily against Russia.

The price of transfer (?) and possible consequences in international relations

According to estimates by some Western experts, and as reported by the American television NBC TV Network, the value of Greenland today is up to $ 700 billion, including its geopolitical position. The interest of the United States to simply buy the island for cash dates back to 1946, when US President Harry Truman offered $ 100 million in gold for it. However, this information was not learned until 1991. For comparison, in 1999, the American CIA estimated the total value of the southern province of Serbia, Kosovo, at $ 500 billion.

In essence, at least from a military and geopolitical perspective, the transfer of Greenland to the US will not fundamentally change anything, as the island has been de facto under US control since June 1940, and the complete transfer of the island from Danish to US hands would be an insignificant operation within the framework of the NATO pact.

The only question is, who is next in line to be occupied for the sake of US national security?

 There are many candidates: Colombia, Mexico, Iran, etc. For now, the Trump administration is promoting the implementation of the “Monroe Doctrine” from 1823 – “America, for the Americans”, i.e., that the entire Western (American) Hemisphere falls under US rule. It is clear that if this regional project of American imperialism is realized, it is only a matter of days in the context of the implementation of the global MAGA project, when American imperialism will move to the Eastern Hemisphere, where it also has a larger number of solid military-political strongholds (especially around Iran).

Finally, in this whole policy of transferring Greenland to the US, the biggest real winners will be China and Russia, and the only loser, along with Denmark, will be the European Union. The diplomatic moves of Beijing and Moscow on this issue clearly indicate that they are de facto staying on the sidelines, with the US award to Russia likely being a solution to the “Ukrainian Question” according to the Russian will, while the award to China remains a secret, as in many other similar cases so far.Personal disclaimer: The author writes for this publication in a private capacity, which is unrepresentative of anyone or any organization except for his own personal views. Nothing written by the author should ever be conflated with the editorial views or official positions of any other media outlet or institution. The author of the text does not have any moral, political, scientific, material, or legal responsibility for the views expressed in the article.

Dr. Vladislav B. Sotirovic is an ex-university professor and a Research Fellow at the Center for Geostrategic Studies in Belgrade, Serbia.

Day 22 Of Iran Uprising: Regime Relies On Foreign Proxies And Chemical Attacks – OpEd

January 19, 2026 
By Mahmoud Hakamian


The nationwide uprising against the mullahs’ dictatorship in Iran has reached its twenty-second day on Sunday, January 18, 2026. The regime is now resorting to its most desperate measures yet.

Reports emerging on Sunday indicate that the regime, unable to quell the spirit of the rebellious youth with domestic forces alone, is importing foreign mercenaries and potentially deploying toxic chemical agents. Meanwhile, the Resistance has identified dozens more martyrs who sacrificed their lives for freedom.

Day 22 Roundup: Chemical weapons reports, 5,000 foreign mercenaries, and 58 new martyrs identified

On Sunday, January 18, 2026, the twenty-second day of the uprising revealed the depth of the regime’s desperation. As international isolation grows, the mullahs are turning to proxy militias and prohibited weapons to survive.

Key highlights from today include:Potential Chemical Attacks: A report by Newsweek cites credible sources indicating the regime may have used “toxic chemical substances” against protesters, a major escalation and violation of international law.
Foreign Mercenaries Deployed: German outlet Der Spiegel reports that 5,000 foreign militia members, including Iraqi PMU and Lebanese Hezbollah, have entered Iran to assist in the crackdown.
New Martyrs Announced: The PMOI has released the names of 58 additional martyrs of the uprising, including 11 women and several teenagers.
Regime Threats of “Compensation”: In a bid to intimidate families, Expediency Council member Abbas Ali Kadkhodaei demanded that protesters be forced to pay financial “compensation” for damages.
Airspace Warning: The European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has warned airlines to avoid Iranian airspace due to the high alert status of the regime’s air defense systems.
PMOI releases names of 58 more martyrs

The People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK) has announced the names of 58 more martyrs of the nationwide uprising following rigorous verification. Among these newly identified heroes are 11 women and several youths, highlighting the widespread participation of all sectors of Iranian society in the revolution.



The martyrs gave their lives in cities across the country, including Tehran, Isfahan, Karaj, Shiraz, Mashhad, and Rasht. Among them are 17-year-olds Borna Dehghani and Sam Afshari from Karaj, and 18-year-old Arshia Ahmad Pour from Baharestan, Isfahan.
Reports of toxic chemical substances used against protesters

In a shocking development, reports suggest the regime may be resorting to chemical warfare against its own citizens. According to Newsweek, former UK lawmaker Bill Rammell has cited a “credible report” from Iranian-Kurdish sources stating that “toxic chemical substances” have been used to suppress the protests.

The report indicates that these substances cause severe injuries leading to death days later. If confirmed, this would constitute a grave violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and represents an “extraordinary” escalation by the regime.
Regime imports 5,000 foreign mercenaries to quell uprising

With its domestic forces exhausted and demoralized, the regime is bringing in foreign proxies to hold onto power. Der Spiegel and CNN report that approximately 5,000 fighters from the regime’s proxy forces in Iraq and Lebanon have entered Iran to aid in the suppression.

These forces, primarily from the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) and Lebanese Hezbollah, reportedly entered the country under the guise of pilgrims visiting religious sites. This move underscores the regime’s lack of trust in its own security forces and its reliance on the terrorist network it has cultivated across the region.
Regime official demands “compensation” to bankrupt protesters

As the crackdown continues physically, regime officials are also attempting to exert financial pressure on the population. Abbas Ali Kadkhodaei, a member of the regime’s Expediency Discernment Council, has threatened protesters with financial ruin.

Using threatening language, Kadkhodaei stated that imprisonment is not enough and that protesters must be forced to pay “financial damages.” This tactic is viewed by observers as a means to intimidate families and impose further economic hardship on a populace already suffering from the regime’s corruption and mismanagement.


Mahmoud Hakamian writes for The People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), also known as Mujahedin-e-Khalgh (MEK)

The British North American Colonies Were Not Homogeneous Political Units – OpEd

January 19, 2026 
MISES
By Larsen Plyler

Through the 1600s, the English established colonies along the North American coast. Of course, these colonies shared much in common: shared language, shared appreciation for English citizenship and rights, and a shared commitment to Protestant Christianity (though, with different denominational and traditional commitments). But, it is worth considering just how different these colonies were.

One work that is absolutely worth considering is David Hackett Fischer’s Albion’s Seed. Fischer explains that, from 1629 to 1775, the territory that would become the present-day United States was settled by four major waves of English immigrants.

The first was that of the Puritans from 1629-1640. They came from the east of England to Massachusetts and broader New England.

The second major wave was that of the Cavaliers and their indentured servants from 1642 to 1675. They came from the south of England to settle in Virginia and the Chesapeake.

Then, from 1675-1725, a wave of Quakers came from the North Midlands of England and Wales to the Delaware Valley, including Pennsylvania.

From 1718-1775, a wave of “Scots-Irish” or “Ulster Scots” from the borders of North Britain and North Ireland came to the Appalachian mountains and the backcountry.

Now, Fischer’s book is a massive work with far more than I can convey, but he considers these four major waves and describes their unique characteristics. Of course, he explains that they were similar: English, Protestant, and committed to British liberties and laws, but they were distinct in the denominations, society, history, culture, daily habits, and, most significantly, their considerations of power, order, and freedom. These realities are significant because they will shape the United States for generations, and, arguably, to this day.

Now, of course, we could focus on the environments, religious commitments, and other characteristics that set the colonial regions apart from each other. The environments, including the climate and the soil of the places where the colonists landed, and agendas of the colonists who came shaped the colonies to look very differently from the ways that their towns were organized to the way that they shaped their economy. Fischer goes further than that describing the difference in the ways that the people in certain regions prepared their food, raised their children, built their houses, and used their time. However, I want to consider a particular difference between the colonial regions that Fischer points out was unique between the colonial regions. That is, their visions of liberty.

David Hackett Fischer emphasizes the vision of liberty held by the New England colonies. Rather than fierce independence in the southern colonies, New England held to what Fischer calls “ordered liberty.” New Englanders believed that in order to be a “free” community, the group could place limits on individual freedom in order to ensure the good of the whole. They also believed that liberty meant that the community should provide for those who were on the margins and that a provision of necessities was essential for everyone to experience liberty.

Let us note that the Puritans did not believe in what we think of as “religious freedom” or “tolerance.” They came to the New World to exercise what they believed was right and imposed that on the people in their communities.

Now, this takes us a long way down the road, but it is vital to see. It is no coincidence that ideas like Progressivism, as Murray Rothbard has shown, have their roots in New England and the areas where descendants of those colonists spread. New England had long been the center of support for those who wanted stronger centralization in the government.

Indeed, they lost their religious zeal, but they did not lose their zeal for placing limitations on others for what they viewed as the general good. In the late 1800s and early 1900s, brought to theological liberalism by Darwinism, they were all the more committed to their willingness to force others into their mold, moved by the “Social Gospel” and “Social Darwinism.” Now they are ready to tell you what size soft drinks you can buy at the convenience store and whether or not you’re allowed to use a straw.

Fischer described the Virginian visions as the desire to rule, but not to be ruled. In other words, they had a local vision of rule. This was, in their view, pictured in the paternalistic plantation system. A man’s manor was his domain and they were opposed to outside interference.

It is easy for us to look back at these men and conclude that they were hierarchical and patriarchal. I think they would wonder what the issue was. They would have agreed with those characterizations, believing that they could bring out the best in the people for whom they were responsible. Of course, many of the Cavaliers in Virginia abused their place and their power. But that was not the case across the board as we can see demonstrated in many of those in the Southern colonies.

Pennsylvania, because of the Quaker leadership which led to religious liberty and economic opportunity, was characterized by diverse settlement. Because of that, Fischer explains that the Quaker colonies developed a vision of liberty he called the “reciprocal” or the “golden rule” vision. Because the Quakers wanted and needed toleration of their own beliefs and practices, they granted that to others.

I grew up on the edges of Appalachia in Walker County, Alabama. My people were Borderlanders. Because of their long and troubled history on the border between England and Scotland, they distrusted authority, including the state and established churches, though many of them were connected to the Presbyterian church in some way. They were always willing to move farther west in order to avoid the exertion of authority on them. One historian described them as “always on guard, fiercely protective of family, loyal toward friends, and ruthless toward enemies.” Fischer called their vision of liberty as “natural freedom” which he described as heavy on individual autonomy and fiercely resistant to outside authority.

Now, here is one reason why this matters. When Thomas Jefferson wrote the Declaration of Independence, he was not “bringing forth a new nation conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal,” at least not in the sense that Lincoln meant it at Gettysburg.

This was not one nation; it was multiple. With different agendas, priorities, aims, and especially, as we have seen, different visions for what it meant to be free. Regional tensions did not arise because of slavery, did not develop simply because of westward expansion, nor did they appear in the 1850s. Rather, the colonies were different from the go. This shaped the colonies as they became states. Southerners did not want the New England vision imposed on them. The same was true in the other direction. The same was true for the Middle Colonies and those who settled in the backcountry. This kind of arrangement necessitated a federal approach. No central power could fully satisfy all of the regions.

About the author: Larsen Plyler received his PhD in history from Mississippi State in 2019. He has taught at the high school, college, and graduate school level. He also serves as a Bible teacher in Franklin County, Alabama. He is married to Lydia and together they have four children.

Source: This article was published by the Mises Institute


MISES
The Mises Institute, founded in 1982, teaches the scholarship of Austrian economics, freedom, and peace. The liberal intellectual tradition of Ludwig von Mises (1881-1973) and Murray N. Rothbard (1926-1995) guides us. Accordingly, the Mises Institute seeks a profound and radical shift in the intellectual climate: away from statism and toward a private property order. The Mises Institute encourages critical historical research, and stands against political correctness.

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India Between Power Blocs – Analysis

THE COMING MULTIPOLAR WORLD

Image generated by ChatGPT (OpenAI).

January 19, 2026 

By Ramesh Jaura



For close to eight decades since World War II, world trade has been based, though imperfectly, on the premise that rules matter. This was from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Though rules were occasionally bent, states had to justify their conduct within the rules.

This world has come to an end—not in a single disruption but through a gradual erosion.

The WTO’s dispute settlement system has been paralysed for years. “National security” exceptions, which were once narrowly construed and rarely used, have become flexible tools. Export restrictions, sanctions, technology bans, and industrial subsidies have become openly used in strategic competition. The realm of trade has been subsumed into geopolitics; markets have ceased to be neutral spaces and have become battlefields.

The US, the architect and guarantor of the post-war trade system, has de facto abandoned its role of steward. Tariffs and extraterritorial sanctions apply not only to enemies but also to partners. The EU, long a normative cornerstone of the system, has now adopted carbon border tariffs, strategic industrial subsidies, and trade screens that shatter the notion of a level playing field. China continues to pursue selective opening alongside state intervention.

For India, the implications are direct and tangible. With an ever-closer strategic partnership with Washington, New Delhi is now facing penalty tariffs on its oil purchases from Russia, which are not adjudicated by any multilateral body. This is also true for Brazil.

It is in the light of such a collapse of rules and increased leverage that the two foreign policy gestures of India—its increased involvement in Europe in the spirit of the new ‘concept of Indo-Europe’, as well as its plans to assume the BRICS 2026 presidency—need to be understood.

From Bandung to BRICS: autonomy in a fractured order

The Indian government’s tendency to hedge during times of systemic stress is not new. Since the Bandung Conference of 1955 and the Non-Aligned Movement, the Indian government has been advocating self-reliance in an internationally polarised environment shaped by the rivalry of two power blocs. During that time, the focus was not on economic integration but rather on political independence. Non-alignment was a policy of sovereignty within the Cold War order, characterised by ideological inflexibility and military alliances.

The BRICS grouping, established in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, represented a different moment. This was more of a reformist movement—a desire of the major emerging powers to reform the global economy from the inside out. The implication was that institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO should be reformed.

This assumption no longer holds true.

The institutions are no longer able to impose their rules on the most powerful players. The reform has been overtaken by fragmentation. What BRICS faces today is not a problematic system requiring adjustment, but a void in which power has fewer limits and fewer common premises.

This is also true of the Indian strategy for BRICS. Instead of viewing BRICS as a challenge to Western hegemony, the Indian government has increasingly focused on BRICS as an instrument for managing vulnerability—economic, technological, and geopolitical—in a world where the universality of norms no longer carries the force of compliance.

BRICS 2026: Managing Disorder, Not Remaking the World

When India takes over the presidency of BRICS this year, it will be leading a body that has grown to encompass much more than the founding five, which are Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, to now include Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Indonesia.

The expansion has increased the geopolitical importance and demographic weight of the BRICS. However, it has reduced cohesion. The present-day BRICS is neither a bloc, nor an alliance, nor a counter-system. The current BRICS is a loose coalition of states with different interests, threat perceptions, and alignments.

In launching India’s BRICS presidency, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar encapsulated India’s agenda as resilience, innovation, cooperation, and sustainability. Note the words themselves. There is no sense of ideology or reformist passion, but a realisation that the challenge is to order the chaos rather than re-establish a previous balance.

This implies that the BRICS are focusing on issues such as resilient value chains, development financing, adaptation to climate change, health collaboration, and resilience. The trade among BRICS nations has surpassed $160 billion but is limited to commodities and energy. The financial talks, ranging from local currency trading to an enhanced BRICS Development Bank, indicate a concern with the weaponisation of finance. However, India has been cautious in approaching these to avoid disturbing its domestic economy.

Perhaps the most obvious contradiction within the BRICS group is the economic dynamic between India and China. Bilateral trade levels have broken the $100 billion mark, but mutual trust in each other’s strategic intentions continues to deteriorate.

During the Indian presidency, the BRICS group is not likely to become an institutionalised or ideologically homogeneous entity. Instead, it will continue to remain a functional group. This instrument will allow its members to better weather the challenges of a world where the safeguarding power of multilateral institutions is waning.

Indo-Europe: why Delhi and Berlin are important today

Whereas BRICS might be seen to embody India’s relations with the Global South within a fractured system, this new concept of Indo-Europe could be said to embody India’s hedge towards Europe and is grounded mainly within its relationship with Germany.

The January 12-13 visit by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz to New Delhi and his meetings with Narendra Modi were widely viewed by the Indian media as more than ceremonial. Indeed, as former Ambassador Gurjit Singh has noted, there are 27 tangible outcomes, including 19 Memoranda of Understanding, which reflect a relationship that has transcended symbolism.

The bilateral trade has already surpassed $51 billion, constituting nearly a quarter of total trade between India and the EU, Modi stated. Both leaders acknowledged that to maintain such momentum, a forward-looking vision was needed. Speaking at the CEOs’ Forum in front of Modi, Merz warned against “dangerous one-sided dependencies.”

Technology cooperation became one of the key elements. Both sides acknowledged the increasing weaponisation of essential technologies and the need for reliable partners to address this challenge. Defence cooperation, long hampered by German export restrictions, also evolved. The export approvals now proceed more swiftly, and an agreement was reached to establish a defence industrial cooperation roadmap, including talks on submarines.

Crucially, differences have been handled in a pragmatic, not ideological, fashion. India has made it clear that its national interest is the overriding consideration in its defence sourcing. Germany has signalled that it is flexible and realises that public pressure on India to move away from Russia is not helpful.

Energy transition has also become another anchor. A long-term off-take agreement between AM Green and Uniper Global Commodities on green ammonia has showcased how climate ambitions are being turned into partnerships.

The people-to-people links are also valuable. There are almost 300,000 people of Indian origin in Germany and 60,000 Indian students. Merz’s open invitation to Indian professionals has both economic and political undertones. However, certain sensitive aspects of the diaspora community, such as cases of custody of children and deportation of students, need to be treated differently.

On matters of geopolitics, opinions differ. Regarding Ukraine, West Asia, and the Indo-Pacific, India and Germany have differing opinions. However, the focus of the visit was on dialogue, principles, and coordination. An invitation extended to Modi for subsequent intergovernmental consultations in Berlin later this year indicated an intention to maintain this momentum.

Indo-Europe, in C. Raja Mohan’s formulation, “is not an alliance, nor a substitute for NATO or the Quad.” Instead, it represents a “supplementary geometry” that seeks to leverage “the demographic scale and market of India with the industrial power and technology of Europe, and to encourage greater burden sharing in Eurasia.”

India’s “multi-alignment” is a system-bridging power blocs

Together, BRICS 2026 and the Indo-Europe initiative represent not so much parallel tracks as intertwined ones. The first fixes India in the politico-economic space of the Global South, while the second seeks to integrate India into the industrial and tech centre of Europe. In either case, the enabling structural condition is the same: an international order in which rules do not effectively govern the behaviour of great powers.

This reflects a more profound transformation in Indian strategic thinking. India is no longer seeking to restore the old order or dismantle it. Instead, it aims to learn how to function in a bipolar world by serving as a bridge rather than a hegemon.

This makes India distinct from other significant players. The United States is increasingly likely to be seen as a rule-breaker; China is trying to use its power and size to shape the rules; the European Union is still a rule-preserver, but one with weaker enforcement capabilities. India does not fit into any of these roles. It cannot impose by force, nor does it want to create dependency. Thus, there is a tendency to create an overlapping network to mitigate risks rather than to require conformity.

The Indian experience in the G20 is a precursor to this strategy, with a focus on mediation rather than mobilisation and an agenda to deliver rather than issue declarations. This thinking is now being taken forward in the context of BRICS and Indo-Europe as well.

This approach does not remove risk. The challenge of dealing with the US, China, Russia, and Europe simultaneously will remain high-risk. However, in a world with no rules, risk management may be the best kind of statecraft that is possible.

A historical coda: Europe and India in the strategic imagination

The emerging Indo-European moment does not occur in a historical vacuum. The idea of Europe and India has appeared in each other’s strategic thinking long before the current concerns in Europe with supply chains, strategic autonomy, or the aftermath of an America in turmoil.

A European perception of India characterises the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries through the lens of empire. India was the pivot of the empire for Britain, while for the rest of continental Europe, it was a symbol of empire and a possible fault line in British primacy.

Germany’s interest in India during the First World War, evident in the activities of the Berlin Committee and the ill-fated plan to support Indian revolutionaries, was not based on any cultural or value-systemic similarities. India was important because it was a source of leverage in the larger global struggle between European nations.

For nationalists in India, Europe’s position in the strategic imagination was more complex. Europe was, at one level, the source of imperial domination, but also the site on which the rivalries of empires might be turned to advantage. The engagement of Indian nationalists with Europe was not to join Europe but to gain strategic space—a pattern that would continue through the twentieth century.

This ambivalence hardened into a doctrine after independence. The Non-Aligned Movement, among other things, represented a deliberate attempt to avoid India’s assimilation into a bipolar Cold War order led by NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Europe, divided and dependent on the United States’ security umbrella, held a small strategic place in Indian thinking. While contacts with European states were maintained, the continent as a whole was not regarded as a significant actor in international relations.

However, this view was to change only gradually after the end of the Cold War. The European Union became a regulatory and economic power, though not a strategic one. The axes of international politics for India lie through Washington, Moscow and then Beijing. Europe was significant as a market and source of technology, but hardly as a partner for balancing international politics.

The difference in the current decade, the 2020s, is not just in policy, but in mutual perception.

Europe, buffeted by the re-emergence of war on its own continent and the question of long-term American engagement, is returning to the language of strength, resilience, and self-reliance. India, faced with an increasingly bold China and an unpredictable US, is rethinking the parameters of its own bilateral dependence. Here, in this moment of simultaneous reassessments, Europe and India are beginning to view each other less as satellite entities of other power poles and more as autonomous actors facing the same systemic collapse.

This is a subtle but significant shift. The issue of Indo-Europe is not about shared nostalgia for a common past, but about a common present vulnerability. While the previous European engagement in India focused more on development assistance, normative dialogue, and trade, the current engagement is increasingly concentrated on defence industrial cooperation, critical technologies, the transition to a clean energy future, and the resilience of networked systems.

This is a subtle but significant shift in India’s calculations. Europe is not just a market or a moral counterpart; it is being recognised as a partner in its effort to hedge against chaos. For Europe, India is not just a rapidly growing economy or a strategic foil to China; it is now a significant, sovereign power that has experience in dealing with chaos without the protection of formal security arrangements.

Yet this joint process of reframing in no way abolishes the differences. The memory of history continues to count. India remains sensitive to moralising by Europeans, especially when European practices lack consistency. Europe, for its part, remains uncomfortable with India’s failure to align with the West on Russia or global sanctions.

Yet it is the capacity to retain interest in the face of all these differences that makes the Indo-European concept relevant to the current era. Unlike the era of the empire and the Cold War, the current era is not based on notions of superiority or the assimilation of ideals. It is based on the need for pragmatic coexistence in a world where no power can ensure that order is maintained.

Thus, in a way, the course of history stretches not towards alignment but towards a kind of convergence. The rediscovery of each other is not an affair of the heart but a necessity. Each is learning—that is a belated lesson in one case and an intuitive one in the other—that in the twenty-first century no one can gain autonomy alone.
Correcting an old misunderstanding

The Indo-European moment, therefore, is more about correcting an old misunderstanding than building a new partnership. For several decades, Europe has underestimated India’s strategic patience, and vice versa. The current turmoil has compelled both to rethink these views.

Whether this shift will hold will depend not on words but on action: on completing trade agreements, establishing defence collaboration, and transitioning from plans for tech collaboration to action. There is no reason to believe that history will repeat itself. But there is also no need to remind us that, when the world is going through turbulent times, the Indian and European worlds have always found a reason to look at each other differently.

The fall of the world trade order has not been replaced by anything but uncertainty. This is what India’s pursuit of Indo-Europe and its BRICS 2026 chairmanship represents.

Instead of waiting for rules to be re-established, India is learning to live without rules—through diversification, resilience, and strategic cooperation. In a world characterised by leverage rather than law, this ability—to straddle blocs without being tied down by any of them—could well be India’s most significant strategic strength.


Ramesh Jaura is a journalist with 60 years of experience as a freelancer, head of Inter Press Service, and founder-editor of IDN-InDepthNews. His work draws on field reporting and coverage of international conferences and events.