Tuesday, December 31, 2024

Senegal’s First Oil Exports Push Economic Growth to Record High

By Charles Kennedy - Dec 30, 2024




Senegal is seeing a record jump in economic growth after its first oil project and oil exports were launched in the middle of 2024.

Senegal’s gross domestic product surged by 8.9% in the third quarter compared to the second quarter and soared by 11.5% compared to the same quarter of 2023, data from the National Agency of Statistics and Demography, ANSD, showed on Monday.

Non-oil GDP rose by 2.1% in Q3 compared to the second quarter, according to the official data.

Senegal’s record-high growth rates follow the start-up of the Sangomar oil field offshore the West African country in June. Six months ago, Australia-based Woodside achieved first oil at the project, which is the country’s first offshore oil project.

The Sangomar Field Development Phase 1 is a deepwater project including a stand-alone floating production storage and offloading (FPSO) facility with a nameplate capacity of 100,000 barrels per day (bpd) and subsea infrastructure that is designed to allow subsequent development phases, Woodside says.

“First oil from the Sangomar field marks a new era not only for our country's industry and economy, but most importantly for our people,” Thierno Ly, general manager of Senegal's national oil company Petrosen said in June, commenting on the milestone.

Senegal’s economy is set to receive another shot in the arm in early 2025 when the first LNG shipment from a major gas and LNG project operated by BP is expected to take place.

The Greater Tortue Ahmeyim LNG export project offshore Mauritania and Senegal is being developed by UK-based supermajor BP and has seen several delays in recent years. The latest timeline says start-up will take place in early 2025, and the companies look confident they would meet that deadline.

BP and project partner Kosmos are developing the Greater Tortue Ahmeyim Phase 1 project, which will use a floating liquefied natural gas (FLNG) vessel to produce LNG from the massive natural gas find offshore Mauritania and Senegal in West Africa made in 2015.

By Charles Kennedy for Oilprice.com
Carlos Slim Invested $1B In American Oil & Gas Companies In 2024

By Alex Kimani - Dec 30, 2024



Carlos Slim, Latin America’s richest man, boosted his stakes in American energy companies in the current year as the world’s leading tycoons continue betting on fossil fuels. Slim invested $602 million in Parsippany, New Jersey-based refiner PBF Energy Inc. (NYSE:PBF), boosting his stake to 25%, and also bought $326 million worth of shares in Houston-based oil producer Talos Energy Inc. (NYSE:TALO).


Last year, the Mexican billionaire’s Grupo Carso SAB agreed to acquire PetroBal SAPI’s stake in two oil fields in Campeche in southern Mexico for $530 million, expanding its bet on energy production. Under the deal, Grupo Carso will take a 50% stake in the Ichalkil and Pokoch oil field. According to the company, the fields produce about 16,350 barrels of crude oil equivalent per day. Carso shares jumped to record highs after the deal was announced. Mexican President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador welcomed the deal despite earlier being critical of energy reforms that opened exploration to private investment, “Why do I celebrate this? Because it stays in the hands of Mexicans and I’m sure that they’re going to invest to extract crude. I consider that to be good news,” the president said at his daily news conference.

Obradors’ nationalist policies have seen the Mexican government become increasingly hostile to foreign companies. Last year, giant oil and commodities trading firm, Trafigura, was forced to scale back its oil trading business in Mexico thanks to shrinking margins. Trafigura has recorded margin compression due to fuel subsidies by the Mexican government.

Meanwhile, Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway (NYSE: BRK.A) (NYSE: BRK.B) has continued growing its oil and gas stakes. Two weeks ago, Berkshire Hathaway bought another 8.9 million shares of Occidental Petroleum (NYSE:OXY) with the company now owning 260 million shares of OXY. Berkshire Hathaway's OXY stake is currently worth $12 billion, making it the company’s sixth largest holding.

By Alex Kimani for Oilprice.com
Is The Iraqi Oil Export Embargo Set To Be Lifted After Landmark Legal Ruling?

By Simon Watkins - Dec 30, 2024, Oilprice.com

The Kurdistan region's efforts to achieve financial independence through oil exports have faced significant resistance from Iraq’s Federal Government.

The stand-off resulted in a years-long embargo on oil exports via the Iraq-Turkey Pipeline.

Despite a recent court ruling in favor of foreign oil contracts with the KRI, Baghdad isn't like to loosen the reins.




It is coming up to two years since oil exports from the semi-autonomous Kurdistan region of Iraq (KRI) through the Iraq-Turkey Pipeline (ITP) were halted by the Federal Government of Iraq (FGI). Billions of dollars in export revenues have been lost by both sides, in addition to the many foreign oil firms working in the region. However, according to local news sources, on 18 December the Karkh Court of Appeals in Baghdad reversed previous rulings favouring the FGI’s Oil Ministry. These had sought to permanently invalidate foreign firms’ oil exploration and development contracts directly with the KRI government based in Erbil. So does this mean that the costly, long-running embargo on oil exports is about to end?

The genesis of the current dispute does not begin in March 2023 when the ban was imposed by the FGI in Baghdad or in February 2022 when the Baghdad-based Federal Supreme Court of Iraq deemed such contracts unconstitutional -- it began instead on 23 April 2013. On that date, the regional parliament of the semi-autonomous Kurdistan region of Iraq – the KRG – passed a bill that would allow it to independently export crude oil from fields located in the region if the FGI failed to pay the KRI its share of oil revenues and exploration costs. A corollary bill to create an oil exploration and production company separate from the FGI and a sovereign wealth fund to take in all energy revenue was approved at the same time by the KRG’s cabinet under then-Prime Minister (and now President) Nechirvan Barzani. At that point, the KRI was producing around 350,000 barrels of oil per day (bpd) – with the rest of Iraq’s output standing at around 3.3 million bpd – and planned to increase this to 1 million bpd by the end of 2015. In short, it was intended by the KRG in Erbil to give the KRI complete financial independence from the FGI in Baghdad as a precursor to total political independence shortly thereafter, as analysed in my latest book on the new global oil market order. The next phase after independent oil sales were assured by the KRI was a planned referendum on independence. The FGI saw this existential threat to its future extremely seriously as this is what the U.S. and its allies had quietly promised the KRG in exchange for its providing the boots on the ground in the fight against Islamic State at that point, in the shape of the fearsome Kurdish Peshmerga army.

The FGI’s initial reaction was to bring legal action against independent oil exports from the KRG as and when the opportunities arose. July 2014 saw FGI government lawyers file a suit to impound the US$100 million cargo of Kurdish oil aboard the United Kalavryta tanker anchored in the Gulf of Mexico off the U.S. coast. The lawyers insisted that the KRI had sold the oil without the permission of the central government, and that only the FGI had the legal right to export oil from anywhere in Iraq, including the Kurdish region. The U.S. Federal magistrate said that because the tanker was outside U.S. territorial waters, she was unable to order the enforcement order against the tanker or its cargo by U.S. Marshals and that the matter should be settled in Iraq. The FGI took this, and similar rulings on similar cargoes, as evidence that the U.S. was still supportive of the idea of full independence for the KRI and allowing it the financial autonomy through oil exports that this would require. Following these legal setbacks, the FGI concluded a deal in November of that year with the KRI. This would see the central government pay the KRI 17% of the FGI’s budget after sovereign expenses (around US$500 million at that time) per month in exchange for the KRG organising the export up to 550,000 bpd of oil from the Iraqi Kurdistan oil fields and Kirkuk to the FGI’s State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO).

Despite the agreement, neither side had shifted from their core positions relating to oil exports. The KRI wanted all the revenues from oil produced in their territory to lay the financial basis for independence, and the FGI wanted to give it neither. The legal position relating to the Iraqi oil indus­try and the distribution of its revenue sharing between the KRG area and the FGI did not help to clarify the impasse, with both sides claiming a right to the revenues from the disputed oil flows. According to the KRG, it has authority under Articles 112 and 115 of the Iraq Constitution to man­age oil and gas in the Kurdistan Region extracted from fields that were not in production in 2005 - the year that the Constitution was adopted by referendum. In addition, the KRG maintains that Article 115 states: “All powers not stipulated in the exclusive powers of the federal government belong to the authorities of the regions and governorates that are not organised in a region.” As such, the KRG maintains that, as relevant powers are not otherwise stipulated in the Constitution, it has the authority to sell and receive revenue from its oil and gas exports. Additionally, it argues the Con­stitution provides that, should a dispute arise, priority shall be given to the law of the regions and governorates. However, the FGI maintains that under Article 111 of the Constitution oil and gas are under the ownership of all the people of Iraq in all the regions and governorates.


It was little surprise, then, that the agreement had failed to function effectively within three months of its signing. The KRG accused the FGI of not paying the full amount promised, and the FGI accused the KRG of not supplying the full amount of oil agreed. Matters became even worse in 2017 in the wake of two major developments, detailed in full in my latest book on the new global oil market order. First, there was a huge vote in favour of Kurdish independence in September, following which FGI and Iranian forces took back control of the oilfields in Kurdistan, including the major oil sites around Kirkuk. Second, Russia effectively took over Iraqi Kurdistan’s oil sector due to three key deals also analysed in full in the book. Moscow sought to leverage this presence in the KRI into a similarly powerful position in the south of the country by casting itself as an intermediary in the ongoing budget disbursements-for-oil deal. Russia’s mischief-making in the country diminished in 2018, after an understanding was reached between it and China that Moscow would focus more on its interests in Iran and Syria, while Beijing would concentrate more fully on developing its assets in Iraq, in line with its ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ plan. The agreement between the two powers occurred as China was in the process of formulating its September 2019 ‘Oil for Reconstruction and Investment’ agreement signed with the FGI in Baghdad, which would be expanded in 2021 to the all-encompassing economic, political, and military ‘Iraq-China Framework Agreement’.

It remains the case that it is not in China’s or Russia’s interest to have a fractious breakaway region with previously strong ties to the U.S. Not only does it make the administration of Iraq’s massive oil and gas sector more difficult but also the granting of independence to the Iraqi Kurds might well make the sizeable Kurdish populations in the Middle East restless for the same. The endgame for China, Russia (and Iran) in Iraq is clearly delineated in the 3 August statement last year from Iraq Prime Minister, Mohammed Al-Sudani. He highlighted that the new unified oil law – run, in every way that matters, out of Baghdad - will govern all oil and gas production and investments in both Iraq and its autonomous Kurdistan region and will constitute “a strong factor for Iraq’s unity”. Destroying all financial independence for the region, which is reliant on ongoing independent oil supplies, is the key mechanism for achieving this aim. Once this has been done, then the region can simply be rolled back into one unified Iraq. Consequently, it would be extremely unwise to believe that the 18 December decision by the Karkh Court of Appeals against Iraq’s Oil Ministry marks a new dawn for the KRI. It might just be the twilight before the sun sets for good on its hopes for independence.
OOPS

Trump’s Oil Plans Meet Market Glut in 2025
- Dec 29, 2024

At the current state of affairs, supply is expected to exceed demand by around 1 million barrels per day next year.

Non-OPEC+ supply, including from the United States, will continue to grow, analysts say.

Trump's promised deregulation in the oil and gas industry with faster permitting could hit a wall of continuously growing global supply.


President-elect Donald Trump’s friendly oil policies could boost U.S. crude production beyond the currently estimated growth.

However, Trump’s vow to “drill, baby, drill” and the promised deregulation in the oil and gas industry with faster permitting could hit a wall of continuously growing global supply. This higher production from non-OPEC+ producers is set to tilt the market into a large surplus in 2025, even if OPEC+ keeps its current commitment to begin bringing back supply from April, analysts and forecasters say.


At the current state of affairs, supply is expected to exceed demand by around 1 million barrels per day (bpd) next year. But market observers know that geopolitics will surely play a role in oil prices going forward. And they concur that the biggest wildcard is Trump’s policy toward Iran, Venezuela, and Russia, as well as potential tariff impacts on energy prices in America, its economy, and global economic growth.

On the supply side, expectations are bearish.

Non-OPEC+ supply, including from the United States, will continue to grow, analysts say. The expected increase is set to offset a large part of the ongoing OPEC+ production cuts. With more than 2 million bpd of OPEC+ cuts, the global oil market has a comfortable spare capacity of well over 5 million bpd, concentrated in some of OPEC’s biggest producers – Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the UAE, and Kuwait.


As a result, “The oil market is not particularly concerned about supply over the next few years, especially in an environment where Chinese oil demand growth has disappointed, especially in 2024,” Andy Lipow, president at Lipow Oil Associates, told Yahoo Finance this week.

Estimates of China’s oil demand growth have been constantly downgraded throughout the year— from 700,000 bpd growth for 2024 expected in January to just 180,000 bpd growth seen in December, Lipow noted.

Related: U.S. Oil Production Shattered Records Again in 2024

Modest demand growth in 2025 and a strong supply increase from non-OPEC+ producers led by the U.S., Brazil, Guyana, and Argentina are expected to keep oil prices next year at around the current levels of Brent Crude in the low $70s and WTI Crude prices hovering around the $70 per barrel mark, most analysts and investment banks say at the end of 2024.

The oil market will see a surplus next year even if OPEC+ begins to unwind its production cuts in April 2025 as currently planned, they reckon.


In early December, the OPEC+ group decided to delay the start of the easing of the 2.2 million bpd cuts to April 2025, from January 2025. The group also extended the period in which it would unwind all these cuts into the following year through September 2026.

Due to the OPEC+ decision, next year’s surplus may not be as large as previously feared, but a surplus we will see, banks say.

Even if OPEC+ keeps its oil production as-is for the whole of 2025, there would still be a surplus in supply of 950,000 bpd next year, the International Energy Agency (IEA) said in its monthly report for December.

If OPEC+ does begin unwinding the voluntary cuts from the end of March 2025, this glut will swell to 1.4 million bpd, according to the agency.

All these forecasts could be quickly upended by President Trump’s tariff policies and geopolitical choices.


Stricter U.S. sanctions against Iran under Donald Trump and geopolitical tensions would be bullish catalysts for oil prices. But fundamentals currently point to supply outstripping demand, which is a downside risk for oil prices in 2025.

“Going short now you have to be brave,” Frederic Lasserre, Global Head of Research & Analysis at commodity trader Gunvor, told Bloomberg last week.

“Yes, fundamentals are not so great, but market participants know that geopolitics will play a role next year for sure.”

By Tsvetana Paraskova for Oilprice.com

Trump's Tariff Threats Cast Shadow Over European Auto Industry

By RFE/RL staff - Dec 27, 2024

Trump's proposed tariffs on Chinese, Canadian, and Mexican goods could trigger trade wars and severely impact European automakers.

Central and Eastern European countries that rely heavily on car manufacturing would be particularly hard hit by these tariffs.

The German auto industry, Europe's largest exporter of passenger cars to the United States, is also highly vulnerable to Trump's tariff threats.



As Donald Trump prepares to take office on January 20, Europe’s already battered car industry is bracing for additional headwinds amid the threat of new tariffs from the incoming U.S. president.

Trump has pledged to impose steep new tariffs on goods coming from China, Canada, and Mexico in one of his first acts in office, a promise that could ignite trade wars.

That is bad news for European automakers who have already seen sales and manufacturing decline in top markets like the United States and China.

The potential tariffs would be felt hard not only by leading European car brands like Volkswagen, Volvo, and Stellantis -- the conglomerate that produces Fiat, Chrysler, and Citroen -- but also for the Central and Eastern European countries whose economies rely heavily on making them.

Toma Savic, a former director at Zastava, a Serbian international car manufacturer that was shuttered in 2008, said the tariffs would be a particularly hard blow for operations in the Balkan country.


"This inevitably would lead to the shrinking of production in Europe and mass layoffs," he said.

Zastava later became Fiat Chrysler Automobiles Serbia, which is owned by Stellantis.

Based in Kragujevac in central Serbia, Fiat Chrysler Automobiles Serbia has already been struggling to recuperate its foothold in the European auto industry prior to the breakup of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s when it assembled 200,000 cars annually and exported them to 26 countries.

Germany’s auto industry is also likely to be highly vulnerable to Trump’s promised tariffs, especially given that Europe’s biggest economy is by far the region’s largest exporter of passenger cars to the United States.

European and American carmakers could lose up to 17 percent of their combined annual core profits if the United States imposes import tariffs on Europe, Mexico, and Canada, according to some estimates.


Trump’s Tariff Vision

While Europe was not specifically mentioned in Trump’s first tariff announcement in late November, he took aim at the European Union while on the campaign trail earlier this year and accused European partners of unfair trade practices and stealing American manufacturing jobs.

"They don’t take our cars, they don’t take our farm products, don’t take anything,” Trump said on the campaign trail in October. “They are going to have to pay a big price.”

The U.S. market is the main destination for European passenger cars. Exports amounted to 42.5 billion dollars in 2023, according to Statista, a German online platform that specializes in data gathering and visualization.

In comparison, the value of U.S. vehicles imported to the EU was around 7.8 billion dollars during the same period.


Trump said on the campaign trail in September that he wants German automakers to become "American car companies” and “build their plants here.”

He added that he was prepared to offer low taxes and energy costs to draw more companies to set up manufacturing inside the United States.

In 2016, German carmakers avoided 35 percent tariffs floated by Trump by investing in more production in the United States.

But Trump's new proposed tariffs could make it more costly for European automakers to set up U.S.-based factories.

A Make Or Break Moment


The threat of new tariffs will add to already growing pressures facing the European auto industry as it looks to compete for the future electric vehicle (EV) market that is dominated by Chinese manufacturers.

Earlier this year, the EU imposed duties of up to 35 percent for EVs from China saying that the “unfairly subsidized” cars have given them a market foothold.

Added to this, car sales for EVs across the EU have dipped downward and some governments have repealed subsidies meant to incentivize consumers to buy the cars.

The rise of Chinese companies, such as EV-leader BYD, has also seen Western car brands lose market share inside China at a steady rate, with Volkswagen in particular grappling with declining sales.

Between tougher competition from China, declining sales at home, and new pressure from Trump, many European automakers are facing a bleak outlook.


Back in Kragujevac, Fiat Chrysler Automobiles Serbia is grappling with weak demand, including several fully electric products delayed entirely or produced at tumbling rates.

Jugoslav Ristic, a long-time union official in the car industry in Serbia, said the setbacks are a result of “customs wars and unfavorable business conditions.”

There is also concern that the industry could be further hit by a trade spat if Brussels responds to possible U.S. tariffs. Such an event could increase costs for consumers in both the United States and Europe and particularly hit Germany, the continent’s car behemoth.

The German Economic Institute predicts that if Trump imposes 20 percent tariffs on the EU it could cost the German economy up to 192.5 billion over four years.

Those costs would also have ripple effects in the parts of Central and Eastern Europe that are dependent on car manufacturing.

By RFE/RL
Why Mozambique Is Gripped by Its Worst Turmoil Since the 1990s

By Matthew Hill
December 31, 2024

(Bloomberg) -- Waves of unrest have swept through Mozambique since a disputed Oct. 9 election, with security forces accused of killing dozens of protesters. The government was already grappling with an Islamic State-linked insurgency in the north of the country. One of the world’s poorest nations, Mozambique hasn’t been this unstable since a 1977-1992 civil war in which more than 1 million people died. The violence has disrupted the economy and risks further delaying the start of natural gas exports seen as key to the country’s future.

Why was the October election controversial?

Election-rigging claims are nothing new in the southeast African nation, where the ruling Mozambique Liberation Front, known by its Portuguese acronym Frelimo, has been in power since independence from Portugal 49 years ago. But the backlash from the population this time around has been unprecedented.

Even before voting day, there were concerns that the electoral authorities had registered more voters than the number of people old enough to cast ballots, and had made registration difficult for opposition supporters. European Union observers flagged signs of ballot-box stuffing and manipulation of results.

There were large discrepancies in the number of ballots cast in the three simultaneous elections — for the presidency, the national legislature and provincial assemblies. And when the Constitutional Council validated the result showing a win for the ruling party, it reduced the size of the victory without explaining its methodology, adding to doubts about the vote.


What triggered the unrest?

Protests broke out on Oct. 21 after unknown killers gunned down the lawyer of the leading opposition candidate. They intensified three days later after the National Electoral Commission announced that the governing party’s presidential candidate, Daniel Chapo, had secured 71% of the vote.

Opposition presidential candidate Venâncio Mondlane, an evangelical pastor and former lawmaker, rejected as fraudulent the official results that ultimately gave him 24% of the vote, and said a parallel vote count showed he had won. Mondlane fled the country on the first day of the demonstrations and began using internet livestreams to encourage and organize the protests.

Claims of police brutality — including the use of live bullets to disperse protesters — further inflamed tensions.

What are the protesters demanding?

Their main goal has been to get the authorities to formally recognize Mondlane as the election winner. The protesters are also driven by dislike of Frelimo, and some of the party’s offices have been torched. Police stations and government offices have also been targeted.

The demonstrations come against a backdrop of worsening poverty over the past decade that’s widened the gap between rich and poor. Mozambique is now one of the world’s most unequal societies, and around one in three school leavers can’t find a job or some form of training. The median age is less than 18, and millions of people are unemployed.

Mondlane has also demanded that citizens be given a bigger share of the nation’s abundant natural resources. The country’s mines have been another target for the protesters.

What could turn things around?

A negotiated solution could be one way to solve the crisis. But as incumbent President Filipe Nyusi prepares to hand over power to Chapo in mid-January, neither has shown much enthusiasm for starting a dialogue.

Mondlane has signaled an openness to international mediation, which could come under the auspices of a regional bloc of which Mozambique is a member: the Southern African Development Community. For now, he’s in an undisclosed location outside the country and fears arrest — or worse — if he returns.


Electoral reform would be high on the list of opposition demands in any talks. The ruling party controls the authorities that oversee elections in Mozambique, which damages their credibility. There is little transparency in how the Constitutional Council validates the final results, which are not subject to appeal.

What does it all mean for the region’s economy?

The unrest has interrupted electricity supplies to Zambia and blocked one of the world’s most important trade corridors for chrome that’s used to make stainless steel. Thousands of citizens have fled to neighboring Eswatini and Malawi.

The turmoil has stretched the capacity of Mozambican security forces who were already fighting the Islamic State-linked insurgency in the northeastern Cabo Delgado province that’s home to some of Africa’s biggest natural gas deposits.

That conflict led to the suspension in early 2021 of a project led by France’s TotalEnergies SE to export liquefied natural gas from Mozambique. The latest protests could make the start of LNG exports an even more distant prospect.

©2024 Bloomberg L.P.

London-listed miner pauses Mozambique operation amid political unrest


Gemfields makes decision over ruby mining after groups ‘took advantage’ of situation to try to invade its site



Mark Sweney
THE GUARDIAN
Fri 27 Dec 2024

The London-listed mining company Gemfields said it had temporarily halted its ruby mining operation in Mozambique after groups “took advantage” of political unrest to set fire and attempt to invade its site, resulting in two deaths.

Gemfields, one of the world’s largest miners of coloured gemstones, said more than 200 people associated with illegal ruby mining attempted to invade the residential village built by the company next to its Montepuez Ruby Mining (MRM) operation in northern Mozambique on Christmas Eve.

The company, which is incorporated in Guernsey and listed on the London and Johannesburg stock exchanges, said the groups were trying to take advantage of the widespread civil unrest after the controversial and disputed national election.

Gemfields said on Friday that looters set fire to community buildings built by MRM and that security forces, made up of the Mozambican police and the military, protected the residential village in a “staged escalation of force” that resulted in two individuals being shot and killed.

On the same day, a vocational training centre built by MRM, and operated by Mozambique’s Institute for Vocational Training and Labor Studies, in the nearby village of Wikupuri was looted and damaged.

The unrest resulted in Gemfields temporarily relocating some of its more than 500 employees, halting its operation since Christmas Eve. It began a phased return of staff on Thursday.

“Given the company’s priority remains the safety and security of its personnel, a number of people were temporarily relocated to off-site locations given the increased risk profile,” Gemfields said.

“MRM maintained a sizeable presence on site of more than 500 persons across employees, contractors and security components. While MRM’s operations were halted from 24 December, MRM intends to return to normal operations before the end of the year. The company continues to closely monitor the evolving situation and will provide further updates as necessary.”

On Monday, Mozambique’s top court confirmed the victory of the ruling party, Frelimo, in the October election, which caused widespread protests by groups claiming the vote was rigged.

The Constitutional Council has the final say over the electoral process.

At least 130 people have been killed in clashes with police, according to the civil society monitoring group Plataforma Decide.

The Frelimo party has governed the southern African country since 1975.

Kenmare Resources, which operates a titanium mine in northern Mozambique, has said there have been no material incidents at its operations and no damage to its facilities.

Gemfields owns expansive mining operations including Kagem in Zambia, which produces almost a quarter of the world’s emeralds, as well as the luxury jeweller Fabergé, known for its lavish eggs. In the past, Gemfields has used stars such as the Hollywood actor Mila Kunis as the face of the company.


Australia’s Cassius Mining Takes Ghana to Court for $277M


By Paul Ploumis
ScrapMonster Author

Since 2013, it is alleged that more than 60 miners have been killed in Shaanxi’s mines
.


SEATTLE (Scrap Monster): Cassius Mining (ASX: CMD) has taken the Ghanaian government to court for “breach of contracts” that resulted in the company losing its gold project. In its claim, Cassius is seeking $277 million (A$443 million) in damages from the African nation.

In a press release dated Dec. 23, the Australian miner said the claim, witness statements and independent expert reports have all been filed at the International Tribunal in London. The claim amount, it added, represents the “lost profits and damages for the loss of opportunity to develop, establish and benefit from a producing gold mine in its licensed area.”

The company’s Gbane project in northeastern Ghana comprises a large-scale prospecting licence covering a total area of 13.8 km2. It is situated within the Talensi district of the Upper East region, next to the currently producing Shaanxi gold mine.

Cassius also had a long-running dispute with Shaanxi, alleging that the Chinese mining company operating the mine had dug hundreds of metres underground into its concession and plundered tens of millions of dollars in gold from its veins, according to investigations by the Sydney Morning Herald and a local journalist.

Shaanxi had also been accused of taking extreme measures to keep small-scale miners off their mine site in northern Ghana, including the release of toxic gas that once killed 16 people. Since 2013, it is alleged that more than 60 miners have been killed in Shaanxi’s mines.


Despite these allegations, which Shaanxi denied, Ghana elected to turn a blind eye. Instead, it shut down Cassius’ nearby project in 2019 for what it calls “constitutional non-compliance” because it was not properly ratified under the new Ghanaian law.

“Ghana’s actions, including its failure to renew Cassius’s prospecting licence, has resulted in Cassius being deprived of the entire value and profits of its gold project in Ghana,” Cassius stated in its press release.

To support its claim, the company relied on leading quantum experts AMC Consultants in Perth, Western Australia, and Secretariat in Washington DC.

The claim is being prosecuted through the legal framework of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2010 (Ghana), which is largely based on the provisions of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Rules (UNCITRAL).

Supply-demand imbalance looms for critical battery raw materials by 2030: McKinsey



Toward security in sustainable battery raw material supply

 |McKinsey

The net-zero transition will require vast amounts of raw materials to support the development and rollout of low-carbon technologies. Battery electric vehicles (BEVs) will play a central role in the pathway to net zero; McKinsey estimates that worldwide demand for passenger cars in the BEV segment will grow sixfold from 2021 through 2030, with annual unit sales increasing to roughly 28.0 million, from 4.5 million, in that period.1 For producers of battery cells and raw materials, ensuring a reliable and ample supply of sustainable and affordable materials will be crucial to their competitiveness, the ongoing rollout of BEVs, and the net-zero transition overall.2

The industry is likely to confront persistent long-term challenges; it will need to address them to keep up with demand in 2030. This article explores those challenges—namely, reducing carbon emissions across the value chain and related adverse effects on nature and communities—and the actions that battery materials producers can consider to overcome them.

Supply and demand imbalances in battery raw materials occur at the regional level

The shift from internal-combustion engines to battery electric vehicles is greatly affecting the materials industry. The rise in battery electric vehicles will lead to an increase in demand for battery materials. For example, battery electric vehicles are typically 15 to 20 percent heavier than comparable internal combustion engine vehicles,3 with a large share of the additional weight coming from battery applications. Despite this forecasted rise in battery materials demand, 2024 has been a challenging year for the industry, due to the slowdown of economic growth and pressure on price levels, especially for battery materials such as nickel and lithium.

However, to meet net-zero transition goals, companies that produce and consume battery materials will need to balance the three dimensions of the “materials trilemma”4 by ensuring availability (meeting growing demand needs and ensuring regional security of supply), affordability (maintaining competitive prices to ensure affordability of materials and the products and applications that are built from those materials), and sustainability (complying with or exceeding the environmental, social, and governance (ESG) standards and requirements set out by governments, customers, and industry associations alike) of materials.

After a focus on tailpipe emissions, automotive OEMs are now starting to move toward reducing their Scope 3 emissions from material usage, which contribute a large portion of what batteries emit.

Within the battery market itself, the choice of battery chemistries determines demand for materials, driven by the need to balance battery performance and cost. There are currently two broad families of battery chemistries—lithium nickel manganese cobalt oxide (Li-NMC) and lithium iron phosphate (LFP). More manganese-rich battery technologies are also emerging.5 These chemistries vary with respect to material content and offer manufacturers the option of adjusting performance or cost based on the actual composition of the chemistry. With the attention given to Scope 3 reduction and sustainability at large, battery materials sourcing is an important decision for battery producers and automotive OEMs.

At a broader level, the fast-growing demand for batteries6—from the automotive and energy sectors, for example—has caused unprecedented levels of investment by raw materials producers and battery manufacturers.7

Although there is some uncertainty about the magnitude of the adoption of various battery chemistries, there is a clear trend toward LFP, as evidenced by OEMs adding it to their portfolios for entry level models or even transitioning to the chemistry entirely.8

Based on the latest estimates, McKinsey analysis projects that demand will outpace base-case supply for certain materials,9 requiring additional investment and leading to fear of shortages and price volatility, among other challenges.

Based on current market observations, battery manufacturers can expect challenges securing supply of several essential battery raw materials by 2030 (Exhibit 1a).10 Beyond these materials, other minerals are also expected to play critical roles (see sidebar “Other necessary battery raw materials”).

Exhibit 1a
Battery manufacturers may have challenges securing some essential raw materials through 2030.
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Lithium. Battery producers use more than 80 percent of all lithium mined today; that share could grow to 95 percent by 2030.11 Some of the announced supply growth is supported by the adoption of direct lithium extraction technology, a cost-efficient source of lithium that unlocks large, previously inaccessible deposits. With technological advancements shifting in favor of lithium-heavy batteries, lithium mining will need to increase substantially to meet 2030 demand under our latest demand estimates.

Nickel. Fears of a nickel shortage prompted by the shift to BEVs have already triggered significant investments in new mines, particularly in Southeast Asia, but even more supply will need to be brought online as demand for Li-NMC batteries for EVs continues to increase over time. Although most demand for class 1 nickel today still originates from the stainless steel sector (about 65 percent),12 the battery sector is expected to increasingly vie with steel and other sectors for this nickel, raising the possibility of a slight shortage in 2030.

Cobalt. About 64 percent of cobalt, which is largely a by-product of copper and nickel production, originates in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).13 While the share of cobalt in battery chemistry mix is expected to decrease, the absolute demand for cobalt for all applications could rise by 7.5 percent a year from 2023 and 2030.14 Supply, mainly from DRC copper mines and Indonesian nickel mines, is expected to increase. Shortages of cobalt are unlikely, but supply is driven by the performance of nickel and copper. Additionally, cobalt price dynamics and more-transparent value chains could lead to a resurgence of cobalt demand.

High-purity manganese. The supply of manganese is projected to grow moderately through 2030. However, increasing demand for battery-grade manganese is likely to outpace supply, requiring the development of new refineries. Although manganese ore is plentiful, battery applications require ore conversion into high-purity manganese sulfate monohydrate (HPMSM). And while bringing a refinery online may have a shorter lead time than building a mine, HPMSM production requires very good process control to separate manganese from some common impurities (such as magnesium, calcium, potassium, and iron), particularly with the direct precipitation purification process. When using the electrowinning route for purification, manganese does not plate as readily as other metals such as copper, therefore requiring tighter process control and operational experience to plate the metal and then to strip it.

To account for a rapid adoption of LFP technology, we have modeled supply and demand balances with two scenarios.

In the base case, using the latest demand estimates, McKinsey analysis projects that in 2030, only about 20 percent of the HPMSM supply will meet the requirements of battery applications (30 percent if all announced projects are realized), which themselves will account for only about 5 percent of total demand for manganese.

In a world where the rapid adoption of LFP technology is coupled with a lower growth in EV production, the demand of battery materials could look different (Exhibit 1b).

Exhibit 1b
Battery manufacturers may have challenges securing some essential raw materials through 2030.
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Meanwhile, although overall demand for batteries and raw materials is increasing rapidly, supply is—and will remain—largely concentrated in a few naturally endowed countries, including Indonesia for nickel; Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile for lithium; and the DRC for cobalt. Refining typically takes place elsewhere, often in China (for cobalt and lithium), Indonesia (nickel), and Brazil (niobium).15

This value chain setup poses additional considerations for regions such as the European Union and the United States, both of which have high demand for imported materials and often rely heavily on single-country sources. For example, the European Union imports 68 percent of its cobalt from the DRC, 24 percent of its nickel from Canada, and 79 percent of its refined lithium from Chile.16

ESG standards and supply chain transparency are part of the transition

Moreover, although supply concentration for materials such as refined nickel, cobalt, and lithium are knowable, complete visibility into the origin of raw materials is sometimes unattainable. This is the case with high-purity manganese, of which more than 95 percent is produced in China17 and minor volumes come from Belgium and Japan; graphite, of which almost all is refined in China; and anode production, on which China has a near monopoly (anodes are a key component of lithium-ion batteries).18 Limited transparency into the origins of battery raw materials supply also poses broader ESG concerns and attention. For instance, the EU Batteries Regulation aims to make batteries sustainable throughout their entire life cycle, from material sourcing to battery collection, recycling, and repurposing. Pressure to address ESG concerns will likely increase moving forward.

Recent supply chain disruptions, such as those affecting magnesium, silicon, and semiconductors in from 2021 to 2023,19 have increased buyers’ needs to boost supply chain resilience for critical battery raw materials. Buyers’ risks of import dependency are further heightened by recent trade restrictions introduced by exporters, including China’s export controls on some materials (such as synthetic graphite and natural flake graphite products used in BEVs)20 and Indonesia’s ban on nickel ore exports.21

As part of efforts to mitigate these risks and ensure security of supply, economic diversification, and employment creation, the European Union and the United States are enacting a range of policy and regulatory measures to produce critical raw materials domestically and ramp up local battery production. They are also using a range of incentives to attract domestic stakeholders, including tax credits and limitations on foreign entities of concern, to entice suppliers to shift activities from other regions to their own.

What is the emissions profile of battery raw materials today?

Because the adoption of BEVs is central to decarbonization of the transportation segment of the economy, it is vital to reduce greenhouse gas emissions along the full value chain. On average, about 40 percent of battery emissions stem from upstream raw materials mining and refining processes (Exhibit 2).

Exhibit 2
Batteries' carbon footprint varies significantly, with 20 to 70 percent of emissions coming from mining and refining raw materials.
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Furthermore, the 40 percent of upstream emissions can be further defined by the core components of a typical EV battery cell.22 Different battery types have different emission profiles. For example, by nature of their design, cathodes in Li-NMC batteries are more emissive than those in LFP batteries (Exhibit 3). However, to calculate total emissions of both battery types, the extraction and refining practices of the miner and the sourcing strategy of the battery producers must be considered.23

Exhibit 3
Battery material composition highlights significant decarbonization opportunities, with some materials contributing outsize emissions.
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The raw materials needed to make cathodes account for about 50 to 70 percent of total emissions from battery raw materials (excluding electrode foils), with nickel and lithium contributing the most to Li-NMC emissions (about 40 percent and 20 percent, respectively) and phosphate to LFP emissions (about 30 percent).

Meanwhile, the raw materials needed to make anode electrodes account for an additional 10 to 15 percent of total emissions from battery raw materials. Looking solely at raw material emissions (not including emissions related to material transformation) for materials used to produce an anode electrode, graphite precursors such as graphite flake and petroleum coke are the most emissive materials, contributing about 7 to 8 percent of total emissions from battery raw materials. Importantly, emissions from graphite vary based on whether they are natural or synthetic. Typically, production of synthetic graphite is more emissive than natural because of much higher transformation emissions.

Over time, as the industry reduces emissions from the most emission-intensive materials, the relative emissions intensity of smaller materials will increase. For example, manganese currently accounts for 4 percent of emissions an Li-NMC battery; however, decarbonization efforts already under way are estimated to substantially reduce emissions from lithium (by 50 percent), nickel (50 percent), and aluminum (70 percent),24 thereby earning them a “low carbon” classification. If these reductions are achieved, then manganese’s contribution to total remaining emissions could nearly double. The upshot is that targeted abatement strategies, based on a solid understanding of emissions sources and decarbonization levers, will be required across all materials used.

Likewise, the emissions profile varies based on phases of production and production methods, with processing and refining being the most emissive phase for all materials used in batteries (Exhibit 4). For example, for a highly emission-intensive material such as nickel, a substantial amount of energy is needed during the smelting and refining process, particularly when processing laterites using high-pressure acid leach or rotary kiln–electric furnace processes, with emissions typically derived from fossil fuel usage.

Exhibit 4
Due to high energy intensity, processing and refining constitute major parts of the emissions for all materials production.
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What does a sustainable battery look like?

We see opportunities for best-in-class battery producers to substantially reduce emissions over two horizons by taking actions to decarbonize in each step of the value chain (Exhibit 5). By 2030 (horizon one) they could potentially reduce emissions by more than 70 percent, to less than 24 kilograms of CO2 equivalent per kilowatt-hour (kg CO2e/kWh); by 2040 (horizon two) they could further reduce emissions to less than 12 kg CO2e/kWh. Most ambitious battery makers have set goals to reach ten kg CO2e/kWh as early as 2030.25

Exhibit 5
Best-in-class battery producers can reduce materials emissions by nearly 90 percent by 2030 via known, available technologies.
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Horizon one actions. Battery producers could theoretically limit their emissions from materials mining and refining by up to 80 percent if they source materials from the most sustainable producers, such as those that have already transitioned to lower-emissions fuels and power sources (see sidebar “What constitutes ‘green’ battery materials?”). There are now a number of reduced-carbon primary materials and recycled materials providers on the market, and ongoing innovation is continually increasing those numbers.

Horizon two actions. Horizon two actions extend horizon one actions and add new ones, including recycling battery materials and reducing Scope 3 emissions by using green chemicals to produce raw and active materials and other components.26 By 2040, emissions from the production of primary battery materials—Scope 2 emissions (power) and Scopes 1 and 3 emissions (process reagents)—will also be substantially reduced. For example, by 2040, ultralow-carbon primary aluminum (based on inert anode or carbochlorination technologies) is likely to be processed at scale, resulting in lower emissions (comparable to the lower emissions of secondary aluminum).

With increasing feedstock supplies and regulatory support for recycling, recycled-materials supply for battery manufacturing is expected to reach, depending on the material, up to almost 50 percent of total demand by 2040 (Exhibit 6).

Exhibit 6
Recycled materials will increasingly propel battery sustainability as availability of feedstock increases.
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Short- to midterm challenges, such as price volatility and materials shortages at a regional level, will likely continue. In addition, serious sustainability challenges concerning emissions and other environmental and social effects of battery materials and battery disposal are emerging. All these challenges create opportunities for battery cell and automotive OEMs producers in terms of sourcing of battery materials and collaborating with materials producers in this highly dynamic sector. Collaboration will be critical to ensure the attainment of low-carbon battery consumption and traceable production and to contributing to the reduction of emissions in electric vehicles to reach corporate and country net-zero targets.