French MPs vote to nationalise ArcelorMittal as ministers warn of ‘illusion’

France’s National Assembly has thrown its weight behind a proposal to nationalise ArcelorMittal – France's biggest steelmaker – in a vote that has energised the left but sparked a pushback from the government, which argues the plan is more political theatre than practical solution.


Issued on: 28/11/2025 - RFI

Placards reading 'Steel without Mittal' and 'nationalisation of Arcelor Mittal' are seen during a May Day rally, marking International Workers' Day, in Dunkirk, northern France, on 1 May 2025. AFP - SAMEER AL-DOUMY

The bill, championed by the hard-left France Unbowed (LFI) and backed by a united left-wing bloc – Socialists, Greens and Communists included – was passed late on Thursday by 127 votes to 41.

The far-right’s National Rally chose to abstain, while parties backing President Emmanuel Macron’s minority government voted against.

The proposal now faces a more hostile reception in the Senate, dominated by centrists and the right, and is widely expected to stall.

Finance Minister Roland Lescure has criticised the move, describing it as “a populist response to a structural problem”.

Posting on social media this Friday, he took aim at what he called an “opportunistic and unnatural” alignment between LFI and the National Rally, insisting it would do nothing to tackle the unfair competition undermining the French steel industry.

For Lescure, the debate comes down to strategy rather than symbolism. “France needs a clear industrial roadmap – not some supposed magic formula like nationalisation,” he argued, adding that the government would continue opposing the bill while working on “structural answers” for ArcelorMittal and its workforce.

French government helps ArcelorMittal speed up shift to more green energy

'Illusion of protection'

Industry Minister Sébastien Martin echoed Lescure's message, warning that the text “creates the illusion of protection” but does little to address the real pressures on the sector – from falling European demand to distorted global competition and high production costs.

He stressed that the real battleground is in Brussels, where France is pushing for measures to shield European steel from a surge of cheap imports, particularly from Asia.

China produced 1 billion tonnes of steel last year – over half of global output – compared with 150 million for India and under 100 million each for Japan and the United States.

Europe, by contrast, lags far behind, with Germany producing 37 million tonnes, Italy 20 million, Spain 12 million and France just 11 million.

With supply so heavily skewed, French ministers argue that nationalising a single company won’t change the situation.

ArcelorMittal to invest €1.8 billion to decarbonise its northern France site

Chinese steel

Speaking on RTL radio, French Labour Minister Jean-Pierre Farandou stated: “The real issue isn’t nationalising Arcelor – it’s fighting massive imports of Chinese steel. That’s where we need to put our weight.”

For him, the priority is collective European action rather than a domestically focused takeover.

ArcelorMittal – the world’s second-largest steelmaker – employs more than 7,000 people across seven sites in northern France, forming part of a wider steel sector that supports around 15,000 direct jobs.

The company has announced plans to cut around 270 roles as part of Europe-wide cost-saving measures, prompting left-wing MPs to push for nationalisation as the only sure-fire way to safeguard employment.

The price tag, however, is an estimated €3 billion.

(with newswires)

TRUMP'S CIA FALSE FLAG

US halts asylum decisions as troop killing sparks migrant crackdown

"They are using a single violent individual as cover for a policy they have long planned" 

Washington (AFP) – The United States is freezing all asylum decisions, officials said Friday, as President Donald Trump hardens his anti-migrant stance after an Afghan national allegedly shot two National Guard members this week in Washington.


Issued on: 29/11/2025 -

Two National Guard soldiers were injured when an Afghan national allegedly opened fire on them near the White House © Brendan SMIALOWSKI / AFP/File

Wednesday's attack on the soldiers -- one of whom died from her injuries -- has ignited a fresh crackdown on foreigners in the United States, with Trump also pledging to suspend migration from "third world countries."

Joseph Edlow, director of the US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), said his agency has "halted all asylum decisions until we can ensure that every alien is vetted and screened to the maximum degree possible."

That followed Trump's announcement late Thursday of plans to "permanently pause migration from all Third World Countries to allow the US system to fully recover."

Asked which nationalities would be affected, the Department of Homeland Security pointed AFP to a list of 19 countries -- including Afghanistan, Cuba, Haiti, Iran and Myanmar -- already facing US travel restrictions since June.

Meanwhile, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Friday that the US had temporarily stopped issuing visas to all individuals traveling on Afghan passports.

"The United States has no higher priority than protecting our nation and our people," he said.

'Monster'

The shooting has brought together three politically explosive issues: Trump's controversial use of the military on American soil, immigration, and the lingering legacy of the 20-year conflict in Afghanistan.

Rahmanullah Lakanwal, 29, who allegedly opened fire on the guardsmen just a few blocks from the White House, had been part of a CIA-backed "partner force" fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan.

He entered the United States as part of a resettlement program following the American military withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021.

Sarah Beckstrom, a 20-year-old West Virginia National Guard member deployed in the US capital as part of what Trump called a crackdown on crime, died from her wounds © Brendan SMIALOWSKI / AFP

Jeanine Pirro, the US attorney for Washington DC, said Friday that Lakanwal would be charged with murder over the attack.

Sarah Beckstrom, a 20-year-old West Virginia National Guard member deployed in the US capital as part of what Trump called a crackdown on crime, died from her wounds.

The second injured soldier, 24-year-old Andrew Wolfe, was "fighting for his life," Pirro told the Fox News program Fox & Friends.

Attorney General Pam Bondi has pledged to seek the death penalty against Lakanwal, describing him as a "monster."

'Long planned'

In his social media post Thursday, Trump also threatened to reverse "millions" of admissions granted under his predecessor Joe Biden, in a new escalation of his anti-immigration stance.

Separately, the USCIS said it would reexamine the green cards -- permanent residency cards -- issued to individuals who had migrated to the US from the same 19 countries also cited by the Department of Homeland Security.

More than 1.6 million green card holders, roughly 12 percent of the total permanent resident population, were born in the countries listed, according to US immigration data analyzed by AFP.

Afghanistan has over 116,000 green card holders.

Shawn VanDiver, president of AfghanEvac, a group that helped resettle Afghans in the country after the military withdrawal, blasted Rubio's move to halt all visa issuances.

"They are using a single violent individual as cover for a policy they have long planned," he said in a statement.

Lakanwal had been living in the western state of Washington with his family and drove across the country to the capital before Wednesday's shooting, officials said.

Trump has insisted that Lakanwal had been granted unvetted access to the United States because of lax asylum policies after the chaotic US withdrawal from Afghanistan under former president Biden.

However, AfghanEvac said the Afghans had undergone "some of the most extensive security vetting" of any migrants. It added that Lakanwal applied for asylum under Biden but received it later, under Trump.

© 2025 AFP

Arctic Tensions Rise As Superpowers Race For Strategic Control – OpEd


November 28, 2025 
By M A Hossain

For most of the modern era, the Arctic barely registered in the strategic imagination of the great powers. It was too cold, too distant, and too inhospitable to matter. Policymakers treated it as a scientific sanctuary, a zone of environmental research and indigenous rights, an arena where global rivalries were politely suspended. That era is over. The Arctic today is becoming what the Mediterranean was for Rome or the Indian Ocean for the British Empire: a frontier where strategic ambition, economic necessity, and military power converge.

Three forces are redefining the region: Russia’s militarized resurgence, China’s economic encroachment, and the West’s scramble to respond. None of this resembles the old story of melting glaciers and endangered species. The logic now is harder, colder, and far more familiar: Who controls resources, choke points, and the rules of navigation?

A Return to Great Power Logic

History rarely repeats itself, but it rhymes loudly in the Arctic. During the Cold War, Soviet and American submarines shadowed each other beneath polar ice sheets, an underwater chess match for nuclear advantage. When the Soviet Union collapsed, the tension dissipated and environmental cooperation flourished. That cooperative spirit survived for two decades. Today, it is fading fast.

The shift began with Russia’s decision, starting around 2014, to treat the Arctic as a core national project. Moscow upgraded or reopened more than fifty military installations, deployed a lattice of radars and air-defense systems, and modernized its Northern Fleet—central to its second-strike nuclear capability. These are not symbolic gestures. They reflect a conviction, articulated repeatedly by Vladimir Putin, that national survival requires dominance over the Northern Sea Route and the resources buried beneath the Arctic seabed.

Climate change accelerated this conviction. Melting ice has opened new lanes that shorten shipping times between Europe and Asia by nearly half. The region also hosts vast hydrocarbon deposits, rare earth minerals, and future fisheries. In geopolitics, opportunities invite competition, and competition invites militarization.

China Arrives as the “Near-Arctic State”

Enter China, a power with no Arctic coastline but an increasingly Arctic ambition. Beijing calls itself a “near-Arctic state,” a term unrecognized in international law but revealing of its strategic thinking. Its motivations are not subtle: access to shipping routes, seabed minerals, rare earths, and long-term energy partnerships—much of them facilitated by Russia.

China’s method is slow, methodical, and familiar. Build scientific research stations. Invest in infrastructure. Sign joint ventures. Deploy icebreakers under the banner of scientific cooperation while collecting data with dual-use potential. In Antarctica, such tactics have raised quiet alarms. In the Arctic, they raise louder ones.

The key development is not merely China’s presence but China’s partnership with Russia, a relationship Western governments increasingly treat as a single strategic challenge. One has geography and military infrastructure; the other has capital and global reach. Together, they alter the balance of power in a region once dominated by Western institutions.

The West Wakes Up Late—but Fast

The United States and its allies spent years treating the Arctic as an environmental side project. That complacency is ending.

Canada has undergone the sharpest strategic shift. Ottawa is negotiating participation in U.S. regional missile defense systems and has joined the Ice Pact with the U.S. and Finland to pool resources for future icebreakers. It has announced nearly half a billion dollars for Arctic initiatives and published a more assertive foreign policy doctrine for the region in 2024.

For Washington, the turning point is the growing sense that Russia and China could set the rules of Arctic governance without meaningful American input. The response has been rapid: development of a deepwater port in Nome, fast-tracking Arctic-capable vessels, and a surge in maritime domain awareness investments. Even bureaucratic shifts tell a story—responsibility for Arctic shipbuilding has moved from the National Security Council to the Office of Management and Budget, a sign that the issue is now tied to long-term national planning.

Across the Nordic world, the transformation is even more striking. Finland, NATO’s newest member, has emerged as one of the West’s most proactive Arctic actors. Sweden and Norway are expanding their own strategies. Denmark, through its control of Greenland, is increasing military spending to ensure no geopolitical vacuum emerges there. The U.S. has signaled it will never allow Greenland—strategically positioned between North America and Europe—to fall under Chinese influence. In other words, the Arctic is now fully embedded in the logic of NATO’s northern expansion.

A Region Once Governed by Cooperation Now Defined by Rivalry

For years, the Arctic Council symbolized what responsible multilateralism could look like. Environmental monitoring, Indigenous rights, scientific collaboration—the agenda was wide, and tensions low. But the war in Ukraine fractured that consensus. Meetings have grown more contentious, cooperation more limited, and suspicion more entrenched.

Climate concerns still shape the discourse, but now they sit behind debates over sovereignty, security, and economic advantage. This is how most geopolitical transitions begin: quietly, gradually, but unmistakably.

The New Flashpoints

Two areas deserve particular attention:

1. The Northern Sea Route: Russia regards the route not as an international waterway but as a national asset. Moscow wants control over transit, security, and fee structures. Washington and its allies argue for open navigation. Such disagreements have historically sparked conflict—from the Strait of Hormuz to the South China Sea.

2. Territorial claims and governance gaps. The Arctic seabed is subject to overlapping claims under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The most contentious zones lie between Russia, Denmark (via Greenland), and Canada. Meanwhile, increased naval activity raises the risk of accidental encounters and miscalculations—conditions that historically precede crises.

The Cold War Echo

It is tempting to frame the Arctic buildup as a return to Cold War logic. The analogy is imperfect but useful. Then, the contest was ideological. Now, it is material. Then, the confrontation was global. Now, it is concentrated in a rapidly changing environment where the nations most affected must adapt in real time. Yet the one constant is clear: strategic vacuum invites strategic competition.
Where This Leads

The most likely future is not open conflict but a hardened geopolitical frontier. Russia will keep militarizing. China will keep expanding. NATO will keep responding. Cooperation will not vanish altogether, but it will be increasingly filtered through a security lens.

The real question is whether the world can manage this rivalry without triggering an avoidable crisis. History suggests both optimism and caution. The Antarctic has remained demilitarized for decades. The South China Sea, by contrast, shows what happens when rival claims mix with military buildup and national pride.

The Arctic could follow either path. The decisions made now—about transparency, governance, and military restraint—will shape which one it becomes.

M A Hossain, a political and defense analyst based in Bangladesh. He can be reached at: writetomahossain@gmail.com

MAKE WORK PROJECT

Moscow Institute Calls Tor Diverting Portions of Flow Of Two Rivers in Northwestern Russia To Occupied Portions Of Ukraine – OpEd


The Northern Dvina river in Russia. Photo Credit: Ipaat, Wikipedia Commons

November 29, 2025 
By Paul Goble


As tensions rise over the possibility that Russia will divert part of the flow of Siberian rivers southward to Central Asia, the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Water Problems is calling for the diversion of part of the flow of the Northern Dvina and Pechora to drought-ravaged portions of Russian-occupied sections of Ukraine.

The proposal, to be made formally next week (thebarentsobserver.com/news/former-environmental-minister-vows-to-divert-water-from-northern-rivers-to-occupied-donbas/441400, will certainly spark controversy both for all the reasons that Siberian river diversion projects have and because the Pechora flows through the Komi Republic, the site of massive environmental protests in the past .

But the idea may pick up more support because it would allow Moscow to address several other serious problems: Water from the two north Russian rivers will be routed through the Kama and Volga rivers and then via the Volga-Don Canal to the Azov highlands and the Donbas.

If this river diversion scheme were carried through, it might thus help Moscow solve the problems of falling water levels that it now faces on the Volga and especially on the Volga-Don Canal (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/10/caspians-falling-water-level-hitting.html,windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/06/falling-water-levels-forcing-moscow-to.html and windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2025/03/siltification-of-caspian-and-volga-don.html).

Moreover, if diverting water from these two northern rivers happens, Moscow and Russians are likely to be more disposed to support the other and larger Siberian river diversion project. And for that reason in addition to the prospect of new environmental protests in Komi, the fate of this proposal deserves careful attention

Yermak Resigns After Ukrainian Anti-Graft Investigators Launch Surprise Search Of His Office

Andriy Yermak, was the influential chief of staff of Ukraine’s President

Ukraine's Andriy Yermak. Photo Credit: Vinnytsia Governor, Wikimedia Commons

November 29, 2025 
By RFE RL


Andriy Yermak, the influential chief of staff of Ukraine’s President, has resigned hours after the country’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) conducted searches in his office.

The resignation was confirmed by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in his regular video address to the Ukrainian people on November 28.

Zelenskyy said that he was “grateful” to Yermak, who had been leading the Ukrainian delegation for talks with the United States in Geneva last week about a potential settlement of the war in Ukraine.

“The Ukrainian position in the negotiation track has always been presented as it should be,” Zelenskyy said. “It has always been a patriotic position. But I want there to be no rumors and speculation.”

He added that he would hold consultations on November 29 with the chief of the General Staff, the secretary of the National Security and Defense Council and other officials on finding a replacement for Yermak.

“One hundred percent of our strength will be focused on the defense of Ukraine,” Zelenskyy said. “Everyone must now act exactly like this, in the interests of our state, and defend our state. This is an unchanging principle. Meetings with the American side will take place in the near future.”

Earlier in the day NABU said in a statement that it was searching the Yermak’s office and added that the “investigative actions are authorized and are being carried out as part of the investigation. Details to follow.”

A correspondent for Ukrainian media outlet Ukrayinska Pravda reporting from the scene shared images of anti-corruption agency employees entering the government district in Kyiv, but did not provide further details.

Shortly afterward, Yermak’s office confirmed that they were fully cooperating with the investigators.

“Today, NABU and SAPO are indeed conducting procedural actions at my home. The investigators are not encountering any obstacles. They have been given full access to the apartment, and my lawyers are on site, interacting with law enforcement officials. For my part, I am providing full cooperation,” Yermak wrote on Telegram.

Yermak is considered to be one of the most powerful officials in Ukraine, but his position had become the subject of much speculation after Ukraine was rocked by a corruption scandal in recent weeks when it was revealed that funds meant for the country’s vulnerable energy infrastructure have been siphoned off.

Several influential individuals with links to Zelenskyy have been implicated in the scheme. Ever since the corruption scandal broke, several Ukrainian lawmakers, including from Zelenskyy’s own “Servant of the People” political faction had called for Yermak to step down.

Speaking ahead of the resignation, Volodymyr Fesenko, head of the Penta Center for Political Studies in Kyiv, told RFE/RL that Zelenskyy faces “a difficult choice. Especially since Yermak is also the head of the delegation in negotiations with the United States regarding ending the war,”.

“In my view, temporary removal would be the most balanced compromise option — at least for the duration of the investigation,” Fesenko concluded.

Answering a question from RFE/RL on the issue, European Commission spokesperson Guillaume Mercier said “any investigations show that the anti-corruption bodies are in place and are allowed to function in Ukraine. The fight against corruption has been a central element of our enlargement package, which provides our general position on the matter. Let me stress that the fight against corruption is key for a country to join the European Union.”

Ukraine applied to join the EU shortly after Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 and is an official candidate country but is yet to start formal accession negotiations.

Meanwhile, in a recent interview with The Atlantic, Yermak, said that ceding sovereign territory is off the table in Ukraine peace talks.

In the interview published on November 27, he stated that as long as Zelenskyy remains president, no one should expect Ukraine to give up any territory.

“Not a single sane person today would agree to a document that involves giving up territory,” Yermak said, according to The Atlantic.


RFE RL

RFE/RL journalists report the news in 21 countries where a free press is banned by the government or not fully established.

ARYAN NATIONALISTS

Key Policy Outcomes Expected At The India-Russia Summit – Analysis

November 29, 2025
Observer Research Foundation
By Aleksei Zakharov


Russian President Vladimir Putin is scheduled to visit New Delhi on 4-5 December for the 23rd India-Russia Annual Summit. This will be his first visit to India since December 2021. The agenda of the upcoming summit is extensive, covering an array of topics from energy and defence to trade and investment, as well as rising grassroots engagement. Beyond pushing forward a number of joint projects, the talks will also seek to tackle the pressing challenges that are holding back trade and economic cooperation between the two countries.

Energy Cooperation

Since 2022, energy has developed into the main driver of the bilateral partnership, with Russia becoming the largest source of crude for India. Despite several rounds of sanctions, Russian companies have continued to ship oil to Indian refineries. The latest US restrictions against the largest Russian oil companies — Rosneft and Lukoil — have complicated Russian supplies, necessitating a recalibration of existing supply chains. These measures will, however, be unlikely to cast a death spell over the India-Russia oil connection.

First, Moscow is convinced that oil flows will find their way, betting on India’s ability to proceed with indirect purchases through a series of intermediaries and workaround mechanisms. Second, New Delhi has shown little zeal to bow to US pressure in areas that correspond to national interests, with public companies reiterating their intention to move ahead with the import of Russian oil from non-sanctioned entities. Therefore, India and Russia will seek to stick to their mutually beneficial engagement even if the process becomes more complicated.

That said, with the latest US sanctions having taken effect on 21 November, the upcoming trend is likely to be New Delhi cutting down oil-related transactions with Moscow. This is not something the Indian government would be willing to announce when Putin lands in New Delhi, but it is the most likely scenario for 2026. Russian decision-makers would definitely want to see India remain a long-term oil customer, which helps stabilise budget projections and offset the looming dependency on China as the biggest export destination. Therefore, Russia is preparing a set of measures on how to move ahead with oil shipments — from considerably higher discounts to dealings through newly formed companies and intermediaries — in the hope that after the hiatus, it will be possible to return to ‘business as usual.’

Beyond oil, Russia is eager to expand civil nuclear cooperation with India, with Rosatom offeringlocalisation of large- and small-scale nuclear power plant projects. Apart from completing Phases II and III of the Kudankulam NPP in Tamil Nadu, the Russian company has long proposed that India start a new one, though the approval of a site has been protracted. Another proposal from Rosatom is to build small modular reactors (SMRs) in Indian regions with limited grid infrastructure or phased-out coal plants. While the company struck an MoU with the Government of Maharashtra in April 2025 for thorium-based SMRs, its implementation remains to be seen as New Delhi is considering procuring similar technologies from other partners, such as the US and France. Russia and India also continue to collaborate on the construction of the Rooppur NPP in Bangladesh, where Rosatom has sourced some necessary equipment for the project from Indian contractors.


The Defence Partnership

The India-Russia defence partnership has clearly bounced back after a period of uncertainty between 2022 and 2024. The summit may prove instrumental in finalising new deals, though these will likely be kept under wraps. Potential agreements include India’s procurement of a new batch of S-400 air defence systems, which performed well during Operation Sindoor in May 2025. In a sign that New Delhi is making a firm bet on these systems to bolster air defence capabilities, the Indian defence ministry has recently given preliminary approval for the purchase of “a large number of surface-to-air missiles” for the S-400, with ranges of 120, 200, 250, and 380 kilometres. However, even if a new contract for the S-400 is signed, India may still encounter delayed deliveries of these systems, as evidenced by the postponed supply of the remaining two units under the 2018 agreement.

Other items on the agenda are the joint production of S-500 air defence systems and the Su-57 fighter jet deal. Both appear to be in the early stages of negotiation, and it will be some time before they materialise. Russia has been marketing the S-500 to India since 2021, when Yury Borisov, the then Deputy Prime Minister, said that India would “potentially” be the first foreign recipient of this system. The serial production of the missiles for the S-500 system commenced in mid-2021, while the mass production of these air defence systems was announced in April 2022. However, there has been no official information since then on the number of S-500s Russia has deployed for its air defence. As meeting the needs of its own armed forces is a priority for Moscow, exports of the S-500 currently look like a far-fetched prospect.

There is a slightly higher chance of an agreement on the Su-57E, an export version of the Su-57 fighter jet. The paradox is that India pulled out of the joint Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) programme with Russia in 2018, citing inadequate stealth and supercruise capabilities of the jet and limited technology transfer. However, the Indian Air Force (IAF) is currently considering the Su-57 purchase as a potential “stopgap” solution, bearing in mind the need to address capability gaps and a squadron-strength shortfall. Sensing the right moment, Russia is showing a willingness to accommodate Indian demands, including unrestricted technology transfer and production of the jets on Indian soil. The Su-57s are already being supplied to foreign partners, with Algeria having received the first two out of 12 jets under the 2019 deal. Despite these marketing efforts, there are still multiple doubts among Indian experts about the Su-57’s reliability, given that Russia itself has employed the aircraft only to a limited extent. Even if India decides to move forward with a deal, coordinating technical details and responding to the IAF’s specific requirements will likely prove a lengthy process.

Further Engagements

Discussions on how to expand trade and industrial cooperation will likely be a major focus of the upcoming summit. A few weeks ago, Putin tasked Denis Manturov, the First Deputy Prime Minister and a co-chair of the India-Russia intergovernmental commission, with examining bilateral trade issues, including trade imbalances, and proposing remedies. Russia is expected to introduce a range of measures to grant Indian companies greater access to its market, with the aim of ramping up Indian exports of machinery, telecom equipment, chemicals, food, and pharmaceutical products.

The acceleration of India’s trade talks with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is seemingly an extension of bilateral measures. The 18-month work plan, adopted as part of the Terms of Reference signed in August 2025, entails opening new EAEU markets to Indian micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs), farmers, and fishermen.

Banking integration is expanding, with several of the largest Russian banks stepping up their presence and operations in India, and direct settlements in “national currencies” dominating bilateral trade. In a move to deepen financial engagement, the Russian Central Bank is planning to open a representative office in India. The main objective is to spur the integration of payment and financial messaging systems, which, according to official sources, is “gradually developing.”

Investment projects, joint ventures, and co-production initiatives are expected to be among the summit’s outcomes. For instance, India is expected to announce the establishment of a urea manufacturing plant in Russia to ensure a stable supply of fertilisers. In the civil aviation sector, Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) has signed an agreement with Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) to produce SJ-100 aircraft, a two-engine narrow-body passenger aircraft intended for short-haul flights.

Russia is also pitching several proposals to deepen maritime cooperation. Nikolay Patrushev, Chairman of the Russian Maritime Board, during his recent India trip, suggested establishing shipbuilding and ship-repairing clusters with Russian participation in the ports of Mumbai and Chennai. Among other initiatives in this domain are the joint construction of non-nuclear icebreakers, collaboration in crew training and scientific activities in ocean exploration, as well as Russia’s assistance with the development of “green shipping”.

With the two countries navigating geopolitical headwinds and confronting external obstacles to their engagement, the summit is expected to be full of symbolism. Translating intentions into working agreements will remain a priority for New Delhi and Moscow. Some of the projects in the pipeline are designed to underscore the resilience of bilateral ties, while others will be intentionally kept low-profile to bypass sanctions radars. With US tariffs and a Sino-American G2 reshaping regional equations, this may be an ideal time for a revitalised India-Russia partnership.

About the author: Aleksei Zakharov is a Fellow – Russia & Eurasia with the Strategic Studies Programme at Observer Research Foundation.

Source: This article was published at the Observer Research Foundation.

ORF was established on 5 September 1990 as a private, not for profit, ’think tank’ to influence public policy formulation. The Foundation brought together, for the first time, leading Indian economists and policymakers to present An Agenda for Economic Reforms in India. The idea was to help develop a consensus in favour of economic reforms.

A Lucrative Hypothetical: Mauritania And The Nigeria–Morocco Pipeline – Analysis

November 29, 2025 
Geopolitical Monitor
By Arthur Michelino





The Nigeria–Morocco Gas Pipeline (NMGP) is a diplomatic leverage with an engineering blueprint attached. Announced in 2016, the project would run about 5,600 kilometers along the West African coast through more than a dozen states, connecting Nigerian reserves to European markets via Morocco’s pipeline network into Spain. Construction is priced at around $25 billion. European gas demand is projected to contract through the 2030s. Commissioning before 2040 looks implausible. Morocco and Nigeria continue enrolling states into memoranda of understanding, feasibility studies move slowly, and political capital accumulates around a corridor that may never carry molecules. The NMGP functions as a framework for positioning, where countries stake claims to future optionality regardless of whether pipe ever touches seabed.

Mauritania entered West African hydrocarbon politics late. Greater Tortue Ahmeyim reached first gas in late 2024. The BirAllah field adds more than 50 trillion cubic feet of reserves, placing the country among Africa’s largest future producers. Aligning with NMGP makes little sense for near-term exports. Project economics rule out northward flows before the mid-2030s. But Nouakchott gains strategic room. It diversifies its options beyond a single joint development. It keeps routing pathways open beyond LNG. It inserts itself between Nigeria’s resource base and Morocco’s gateway role into European markets, where Algeria delivers gas in the tens of billions of cubic meters annually. For a state straddling the Sahel and the Maghreb, NMGP participation converts marginal geography into diplomatic weight.

Mauritania’s position in the project is defined by a clear imbalance between what it contributes and what it stands to gain. Mauritania pays almost nothing to participate. The returns arrive immediately: greater strategic autonomy within the GTA partnership, visibility in Maghrebi energy politics, a seat in West African integration narratives, and diversification away from exclusive LNG pathways. Infrastructure remains hypothetical. A country that became a gas producer less than a year ago has bought influence by joining a project that today exists mainly in conference rooms and communiqués. The pipeline’s materialization matters less than the alignments it generates. For Mauritania, the NMGP delivers option value through minimal cost, maximum flexibility, and leverage that compounds whether or not gas ever flows north.
Nigeria–Morocco Gas Pipeline in Context

The NMGP emerged in December 2016 as a joint initiative between the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation and Morocco’s Office National des Hydrocarbures et des Mines. The project envisages an approximately 5,600-kilometer offshore route parallel to the West African coast, linking via Morocco into the existing Maghreb–Europe Gas Pipeline to Spain. The anticipated route passes through thirteen countries including Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, The Gambia, Senegal, Mauritania, and Morocco. It is framed as an ambitious corridor of coastal integration. Stated objectives are threefold: monetise Nigeria’s substantial gas reserves, provide regional access to gas along the West African seaboard, and offer European markets a new supply corridor away from Russian hydrocarbons.

Progress has been irregular despite repeated declarations of political will. Memoranda of understanding have been signed with multiple states. Feasibility and front-end engineering studies have been launched. Preparatory financing from institutions such as the OPEC Fund and, in some reports, the Islamic Development Bank has been discussed. Construction remains distant. The estimated cost of $25 billion places NMGP among the most capital-intensive energy infrastructure projects in Africa. Investment risk is heightened by uncertainty over long-term European gas demand, the advance of renewable energy, and competition from lower-cost LNG supply chains. Under low-carbon pathways, European gas imports could fall significantly by the 2040s. Whether NMGP would arrive in time to anchor meaningful offtake remains an open question.



Pipeline economics are structured in phases as a hedge against this uncertainty. Early segments would targetregional consumption in West Africa, where demand for electricity generation and industrial supply remains strong. Later stages would extend the system along the Atlantic coast through Morocco toward Europe. This sequencing reflects recognition that European demand alone cannot secure financing at present. Regional consumption provides a more credible foundation. Even under this model, most observers situate commissioning well into the 2030s or 2040s, placing the project within a period of accelerating global decarbonization pressures. By the time gas could flow north, the market it was designed to serve may have contracted sharply.

These structural realities explain why NMGP functions better as a geopolitical framework than as a near-term supply route. By enrolling multiple states through memoranda and political agreements, Morocco and Nigeria build a shared narrative of integration and strategic solidarity. The project’s material delivery remains uncertain, but the political capital it generates is immediate. For Europe, NMGP offers both opportunity and contradiction. It presents a diversification instrument after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine that may nonetheless arrive too late to anchor a reshaping energy mix. For the coastal states along the route, participation signals alignment and opens the door to bargaining long before a meter of pipe is laid. Infrastructure may be hypothetical, but the positioning is real.
Mauritania’s Option Value

Mauritania’s integration into the NMGP framework has taken place through successive memoranda signed since 2022, alongside Senegal, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, and other coastal states. These agreements do not commit Mauritania to construction or financing. They bring the country into the political architecture that Morocco and Nigeria are constructing around the pipeline. This matters because Mauritania sits at the northern hinge of the West African coastline, where the offshore route begins to turn toward Morocco and the Mediterranean.

Mauritania also entered the regional hydrocarbon landscape late. Greater Tortue Ahmeyim, a joint development with Senegal, reached first gas at the turn of 2024–2025. The BirAllah field, estimated at more than 50 trillion cubic feet of reserves, ranks among the largest undeveloped gas accumulations in Africa. This combination places Mauritania in a position to influence export decisions in the decade ahead, a shift that elevates its role in both West African and Atlantic energy politics.

Participation in the Nigeria–Morocco Gas Pipeline is not about immediate offtake. Project economics and sequencing rule out northward transit before the 2030s. What NMGP offers Mauritania is strategic diversification. The shared governance of GTA binds Mauritania and Senegal through a common upstream architecture and shared offshore infrastructure. This is cooperation, not rivalry, but it does create a concentration of dependence. Mauritania’s first LNG exports will be channeled through a project in which Senegal is a large stakeholder. By joining NMGP, Nouakchott avoids relying exclusively on a single monetization model or a single axis of export.

This diversification is only one part of the picture, because NMGP also links Mauritania to a wider regional geometry. Mauritania positions itself between Nigeria’s resource base and Morocco’s established pipeline interface with Europe. Algeria already delivers gas in the tens of billions of cubic meters annually through Trans-Med and Medgaz, giving it structural influence in Mediterranean energy politics. NMGP offers Mauritania an avenue to diversify its strategic relationships within this landscape. By inserting itself into the Nigeria–Morocco–Europe geometry, Mauritania gains access to diplomatic channels, negotiations, and energy dialogues that would otherwise unfold without it.

Mauritania’s location between the Sahel and the Maghreb strengthens this strategic flexibility. Straddling the Sahel and the Maghreb, Mauritania functions as a hinge state. Its presence in NMGP extends the corridor’s political reach northward and strengthens Mauritania’s visibility in regional integration debates. Participation requires little financial investment but opens a platform that connects West African producers with a Mediterranean gateway. It multiplies Mauritania’s symbolic weight across both ECOWAS and Maghreb-oriented forums.

For Mauritania, the balance between cost and potential advantage tilts strongly in its favor. If the pipeline materializes, Mauritania gains diversified export routes and future revenue opportunities. If it does not, Nouakchott still benefits from diplomatic dividends, visibility, and leverage gained simply by being in the room where regional energy strategy is shaped. Minimal cost, potentially significant return. Mauritania pays almost nothing upfront, commits to no binding infrastructure obligations, and secures a strategic position that compounds regardless of whether gas ever flows north.
Risks and Strategic Dividends

Assessing the Nigeria–Morocco Gas Pipeline requires weighing a dense set of risks alongside the potential dividends, particularly for secondary countries such as Mauritania whose involvement is indirect. Financing remains the most immediate challenge. With cost estimates exceeding $25 billion, investors will demand credible offtake guarantees, which are difficult to provide while European demand declines under decarbonization trajectories. Technical uncertainties add a second layer, since the planned route crosses deep-water sections and politically fragile coastal and Sahelian environments where delays are likely. A further degree of unpredictability stems from regional geopolitics. Several ECOWAS states have been suspended following recent coups. Rivalries between Morocco and Algeria over regional influence persist. Instability along any portion of the thirteen-country corridor could delay or derail the entire system.

Mauritania bears only a fraction of these risks. Nigeria must anchor supply and mobilize reserves. Morocco must underwrite diplomatic credibility as the project’s sponsor. Mauritania’s exposure is marginal by comparison. Its main vulnerability lies in over-committing its long-term strategy to a project that may be delayed for decades. Treating NMGP as a supplementary option rather than the backbone of national planning mitigates that risk. Nouakchott’s public statements reflect this approach: participation without exclusivity, alignment without dependence.

The dividends, however, arrive immediately. By joining the NMGP framework, Mauritania signals alignment with Nigeria and Morocco, increasing its visibility in both West African and Maghreb diplomatic arenas. The association reduces the concentration of reliance on Senegal by broadening Mauritania’s negotiation space. It strengthens the perception of Mauritania as a hinge state capable of participating in multiple regional configurations. Participation allows Nouakchott to reference NMGP in ECOWAS energy discussions, positioning itself within a continental project rather than a bilateral partnership. Even if no gas flows northward, being present within NMGP’s diplomatic architecture enhances Mauritania’s ability to shape future decisions, alliances, and negotiations.

The paradox of NMGP is that strategic returns emerge long before physical construction. For Mauritania, the asymmetry is favorable. Risks are diluted, while diplomatic capital accumulates rapidly. Whether or not steel is ever laid on the seabed, the alignments fostered by NMGP are already reshaping Mauritania’s regional role.

This article was published by Geopolitical Monitor.com

Geopoliticalmonitor.com is an open-source intelligence collection and forecasting service, providing research, analysis and up to date coverage on situations and events that have a substantive impact on political, military and economic affairs.

The G20 Without The US: Multilateralism After Hegemony? – Analysis

November 29, 2025 
 Elcano Royal Institute
By Miguel Otero Iglesias

The 2025 G20 Summit in Johannesburg marks a turning point in the history of global economic governance. For the first time since the forum’s inaugural meeting of leaders in 2008, the US not only failed to shape the agenda but chose to boycott the entire process. President Donald Trump refused to attend, justifying his absence with the fabricated claim that ‘Afrikaners are being killed’ in South Africa, and attempted to downgrade the summit by insisting that the host country hold a handover ceremony with a junior US diplomat. President Cyril Ramaphosa –encouraged by the other members of the G20– declined to bow to US pressure. Rather than yielding, he even ‘dared’ to issue a G20 Leaders’ Declarationwithout the consent of the White House. Was this an unprecedented move towards a world ‘after hegemony’, as Robert Keohane would have it?

Of course, this moment does not signal the arrival of a new world order. Far from it. But it does show –tentatively, imperfectly, symbolically– that multilateralism can survive without the US. The G20 produced a final declaration, climate commitments were restated and major economies coordinated their diplomatic positions. These are not trivial achievements. They hint at a world that is beginning to function ‘after hegemony’: a world in which cooperation persists because states, and their civil societies, see value in collective action, not because a hegemon orchestrates the process. This has been palpable in the Think Tank 20 (T20) discussions I have attended over recent years, where the US has been increasingly noticeable by its absence.

Yet this is only the beginning. The outcome of the Johannesburg summit raises more questions than answers about what a post-hegemonic multilateral system might look like.

The US boycott

The political context of the US boycott set the tone for this G20 summit. And this was clearly observable in my conversations at the T20. South African officials and think tankers, as well as many other African voices, interpreted Trump’s absence as an insult to the host and the continent. His emphasis on a fabricated narrative about the killing of Afrikaners added racial and ideological undertones. More broadly, the boycott exemplifies the broader transformation of the US from a stabilising presence in global governance to a more unpredictable, selective and at times openly confrontational actor.

The shift was reinforced by the timing of the US 28-point plan to end the war in Ukraine, released a few hours before the G20 Summit, despite Washington’s absence. The plan was widely perceived by European capitals as skewed in favour of Russia, offering concessions that undermined core principles of Ukraine’s sovereignty. What troubled European delegations most was not only the content but the method: the US sought to impose a peace framework unilaterally, without consultation, and by not even being present in the most important multilateral gathering.

This combination of boycott and unilateralism constitutes a clear break with the historical role the US once played. Instead of providing the leadership that sustains cooperation, Washington now acts openly as a ‘predatory’ hegemon, using its power to shape outcomes in its interest while disregarding institutional processes and, most importantly, the reaction that these measures might trigger, even among its closest allies. The implications for the G20 are existential. Can it survive without the engagement of the US?

Europe and the Plural South

One of the central dynamics at Johannesburg was the emerging –albeit fragile and situational– convergence between Europe and parts of the Global South. This is not a new political axis, nor a coherent coalition, nor a unified worldview. It is a provisional alignment born of necessity, driven by a shared interest in preventing the G20 from collapsing into irrelevance.

For Europe, the stakes are existential too. This is why the Europeans were reportedly among the forefront of those who were in favour of issuing the G20 leaders’ declaration. Not issuing a final declaration simply because the US objected to it would mean ‘ceding sovereignty to Washington’ at a crucial moment when Europe’s security is at stake. In this regard, it was significant that European countries –together with Japan and Canada– took an even bolder stand in Johannesburg when they collectively resisted the US-Russian proposal on Ukraine, calling for ‘additional work’ and refusing to endorse a process that circumvented multilateral norms altogether.

For the Global South (which would be better termed the Plural South, given that it is not a coherent bloc but rather dozens of countries with their idiosyncrasies and interests), the priority here is to increase its influence on world affairs. South Africa, Brazil, India and Indonesia share an interest in demonstrating that the G20 cannot be held hostage by US political cycles or used as an instrument in the rivalry between great powers. Ramaphosa’s decision to issue a full summit declaration, despite US complaints, was a deliberate affirmation that emerging powers can act as responsible stewards overseeing global processes.

This Europe-Global South convergence is thus better understood as a coalition of the willing for institutional continuity. It is not ideological, and it is not directed against the US per se. It stems from the recognition that in a fragmented world, the cost of letting institutions fail is higher for everyone, including for the US, even though Trump, and some of his aides, might not be able to see it.

Symbolic multilateralism

Although it might be characterised as a list of good intentions unlikely to be fulfilled, the Johannesburg G20 declaration carries real symbolic weight. Climate change is mentioned 13 times, sustainability 66, equality 44 and gender five. These numbers matter politically. They signal priorities that a broad range of countries –from Europe, Africa, Asia and Latin America (this is the case for Brazil at least, not so for Argentina)– are willing to articulate collectively, even when the US chooses not to participate.

But symbolism is not substance. It is true that the declaration is ultimately a catalogue of aspirations rather than a roadmap of action. The G20 has rarely produced binding commitments, and without the US, the gap between rhetoric and implementation grows even larger. The success or failure of multilateral cooperation cannot be measured by the number of times climate appears in a communiqué, but by whether emissions fall, financial flows change and development goals are met.

In this regard, the 2025 summit reveals the possibility, not yet the reality, of multilateralism after hegemony. The system has proved resilient enough to operate in the absence of the US but is not yet effective enough to deliver collective outcomes.

The EU’s strategic role

If the US retreats from multilateral leadership and China remains unwilling to assume that role, the EU becomes the only major actor with both the normative identity and institutional commitment to defend the principles of the liberal order. But doing so requires a strategic shift.

First, the EU must understand that the Global South is a Plural South, diverse in interests, political systems and strategic cultures. Engagement must therefore be bilateral, respectful and devoid of moral superiority. A single EU narrative will not resonate in Brasília, Jakarta, Riyadh or Pretoria. Tailored partnerships are essential.

Secondly, the EU should not fear that by deepening cooperation with the Plural South it is betraying Washington. The US itself is moving outside multilateral structures and attempting to shape outcomes extraneously. Preserving global governance is not disloyalty; it is strategic autonomy through diplomatic action.

Thirdly, Europe must recognise that neither the US nor China will lead the new multilateralism ‘after hegemony’. They are the two superpowers, and they think multilateralism constrains more than it facilitates their power. This is why the EU needs to work with its partners from both the plural north and south in the creation of a new multilateralism.

Finally, today it is the EU –not Trump’s America– that most consistently defends the core values of openness, rules-based cooperation, democracy and human rights. This is not Eurocentrism. It is a reflection of geopolitical reality. If these values are to remain part of the international system, it will fall to Europeans and their partners in the Plural North and South to uphold them.

Next stop: Miami

The Johannesburg G20 Summit offers a fragile and preliminary glimpse of what global governance might look like without US leadership. The world has not entered a full ‘after hegemony’ system, but it has experienced its first mini rehearsal. Cooperation proved possible, a declaration was adopted and Europe and the Global South collaborated pragmatically.

But the limits are clear. Symbolism cannot replace implementation. The absence of the US creates political space but also institutional weakness. Whether this emerging multilateralism can deliver real results –on climate, development or macroeconomic and financial stability– remains an open question.

The South African presidency of the G20 marks the end of a cycle. All the countries that belong to this club have now hosted the forum. It is thus rather unfortunate that the US boycotted this last summit, and more worrying still is the fact that the 2026 G20 meeting in Miami risks becoming an exercise in presidential showmanship, with Trump planning a summit calibrated around personal prestige, bling and political theatrics rather than collective problem-solving.

After all this bling, perhaps in 2027 the EU should consider hosting the G20 for the first time. If there is a world capital where multilateralism can be saved it is surely Brussels.

About the author: Miguel Otero-Iglesias is Senior Fellow at the Elcano Royal Institute Professor at the IE School of Global and Public Affairs and Research Director at the Center for the Governance of Change at IE University. He is also Research Associate at the EU-Asia Institute at ESSCA School of Management in France. Previously he was Assistant Professor in International Political Economy (IPE) at ESSCA in Paris, Adjunct Lecturer at Queen Elisabeth House at the University of Oxford, postdoctoral Research Fellow at LSE and Associate Lecturer at Oxford Brookes University, where he obtained his PhD in IPE. He also holds a MA in IPE from the University of Manchester. He has been a Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute of International Relations (Pontificia Universidade Catolica – PUC of Rio de Janeiro), the Institute of World Economics and Politics (IWEP) at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) in Berlin and the College of Business at Alfaisal University in Riyadh. He is the co-founder and coordinator of the European Think Tank Network of China (ETNC).
Source: This article was published by Elcano Royal Institute

Elcano Royal Institute

The Elcano Royal Institute (Real Instituto Elcano) is a private entity, independent of both the Public Administration and the companies that provide most of its funding. It was established, under the honorary presidency of HRH the Prince of Asturias, on 2 December 2001 as a forum for analysis and debate on international affairs and particularly on Spain’s international relations. Its output aims to be of use to Spain’s decision-makers, both public and private, active on the international scene. Its work should similarly promote the knowledge of Spain in the strategic scenarios in which the country’s interests are at stake.

Iran boycotts World Cup draw after US denies visas to delegation

Iran boycotts World Cup draw after US denies visas to delegation. / CC: IRNA

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By bnm Tehran bureau November 28, 2025

Iran's football federation has confirmed that no representatives will attend the 2026 World Cup draw in Washington after US authorities denied visas to key delegation members, Tabnak reported on November 28.

Amir Mehdi Alavi, the federation's spokesman, said the decision was made following consultations with the Ministry of Sport and Youth and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and has been communicated to FIFA.

"Given that the decisions taken are non-sporting and the path has deviated from the sporting process, it was decided that the Iranian delegation would not attend the draw ceremony," Alavi said.

The federation has corresponded with FIFA over the past two days, informing President Gianni Infantino and Secretary-General of the situation.

"FIFA has stated that it will pursue the matter seriously," Alavi said.

Alavi noted that Infantino had previously visited the Iranian national team's dressing room after the CAFA 2025 final against Uzbekistan, where he pledged to ensure Iran's participation from the draw ceremony through to the final day of the World Cup, including workshops.

Visas were denied for the federation's security director and executive director, who were required to attend mandatory workshops, even though federation president Mehdi Taj, who holds positions at both the Asian Football Confederation and FIFA, received his ticket, Alavi said.

"There is no guarantee that the five people scheduled to go to the draw will not face problems for the tournament itself," he added.

The draw is scheduled for December 5. The tournament will take place from June 11 to July 19, 2026, across the United States, Canada and Mexico.

Iran secured qualification for the 2026 World Cup on 25 March 2025 with a 2–2 home draw against Uzbekistan in Asian qualifying, ESPN previously reported.

Is Artificial Intelligence becoming conscious? Kurzweil's allegations are on the agenda

The rapid advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) have reignited a profound debate in the world of philosophy: Can advanced machines possess phenomenal consciousness, i.e., have a subjective experience?

HÊVÎ BAKUR
ANF NEWS CENTER
Friday, November 28, 2025 

This issue, which philosopher David Chalmers calls the "Hard Problem," is further complicated by the claims of AI prediction experts like Ray Kurzweil. Kurzweil argues that AI will reach The Singularity in the near future and the gap between human and machine consciousness will close.

PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS CONCERN

The rapid progress in AI raises not only technical but also fundamental philosophical questions. The most important of these is phenomenal consciousness.

Phenomenal consciousness means "how something feels"; that is, it refers to the quality of human subjective experiences: feeling heat, feeling pain, or perceiving the color blue.

In this discussion, AI expert Ray Kurzweil makes some pretty radical claims based on his vision of the singularity.

PHILOSOPHICAL DEADLOCK

In philosophy, phenomenal consciousness is still considered the "Hard Problem". While today's AI excels in functional tasks such as computation, image recognition, and language generation, it does not involve subjective experience or qualitative sensations.

Critics argue that no matter how advanced a machine is, it will only produce a functional imitation of intelligence, but not truly conscious.

AI AND UNIQUENESS

Ray Kurzweil, whose technological predictions are often correct, creates a wide area of discussion around the world. According to him, the singularity will occur in 2045: Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) will exceed all human cognitive capacity.

According to Kurzweil, AI will not only surpass human cognitive functions, but will also be able to form the basis of subjective experience; that is, he will be able to have phenomenal consciousness.

Kurzweil suggests that when machines reach a level of integration similar to the human brain, the distinction between function and experience will disappear.

BIOLOGICAL-ARTIFICIAL INTEGRATION

Kurzweil also describes the 'singularity' as a period in which man and machine will integrate. Through nanobots to be implanted in the brain, the human mind will be directly connected to AI. In such a scenario, the distinction between human and AI consciousness would blur.

In this case, the question of whether AI has a phenomenal consciousness becomes even more urgent.

SERIOUS QUESTIONS RAISED BY SINGLENESS

If Kurzweil's claims materialize and AI achieves phenomenal consciousness, crucial questions will arise:

- Should a machine with truly subjective experience have individual rights, such as the right not to suffer or the right to life?

- If a machine becomes truly capable of feeling and thinking, what would be the position of man in the universe?

The debate on AI and phenomenal consciousness is not only an academic issue but also pivotal for the ethical and political design of future AI systems.

If technology moves in the direction Kurzweil envisions, we will have to answer these questions much sooner. Or perhaps the technology Kurzweil envisions will give birth to just this kind of AI.

'Digital brain' breaks new ground in science, challenges ethical framework

The Blue Brain Project, launched in Switzerland, revolutionized neurological disease research by creating a digital replica of the human brain, while raising important ethical questions.

HÊVÎ BAKUR
ANF NEWS CENTER
Friday, November 21, 2025 

The Blue Brain Project (BBP) was implemented in 2005 by the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (EPFL) in Lausanne under the leadership of Prof. Henry Markram. The strategic goal of the project was to build from scratch a biologically highly detailed and realistic digital simulation of the brain, especially the cortex, using supercomputers.

In line with this goal, the team aimed not only to replicate the living brain, but also to unravel the mechanisms of consciousness, memory and movement arising from the interaction of millions of neurons. Over the years of work, extensive electrical and anatomical data have been collected; This data was processed with the power of supercomputers and advanced algorithms and transformed into detailed brain models. Each neuron was individually simulated to give realistic electrical responses, and then a neural network structure was created that mimicked the rules of connectivity in the living brain.

The most important turning point of the project came in 2015. BBP researchers announced that a completely digital copy of the neocortical column, one of the basic building blocks of the brain, has been successfully produced. The model included approximately 31 thousand neurons and 37 million synapses.

Although the BBP announced the completion of its first phase at the end of 2024, its impact on the scientific world is permanent. The simulations developed within the scope of the project are used today to test the effects of neurological diseases such as Alzheimer's, Parkinson's and epilepsy on neural networks without the need for animal experiments. In this respect, BBP started a new era in neurological disease research ethically and scientifically.

NEW SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERIES

The project showed that the human brain works based on multidimensional and transformational combined structures. This finding, made using Algebraic Topology, is considered one of the most revolutionary discoveries ever made regarding the holistic organization of neural activity.

Today, BBP data creates a Scientific Brain Atlas accessible to global researchers and contributes to the rapid advancement of neuroscience studies. The project also proved that holistic brain modeling is technically possible, laying a solid foundation in the field of computational neuroscience.

ETHICAL DEBATES AND AI CONCERNS

In addition to its scientific innovation, the Blue Brain Project has also raised important ethical questions. Criticisms are focused on the fact that digital reproduction of all functions of the human brain may open the door to controversial areas such as consciousness simulation in the long term. Some experts say that such detailed imitation of biological processes could create new ethical dilemmas over the rights of "digital consciousness," "artificial systems capable of feeling," or human-like cognitive models. Additionally, concerns about the privacy of neurological data, potential misuse risks by governments or corporations, and the potential use of advanced brain simulations for military purposes are among the international discussions. For this reason, the project is seen as a scientific revolution and at the same time a field that forces to redefine the ethical framework of the future.