November 29, 2025
Observer Research Foundation
By Aleksei Zakharov
Russian President Vladimir Putin is scheduled to visit New Delhi on 4-5 December for the 23rd India-Russia Annual Summit. This will be his first visit to India since December 2021. The agenda of the upcoming summit is extensive, covering an array of topics from energy and defence to trade and investment, as well as rising grassroots engagement. Beyond pushing forward a number of joint projects, the talks will also seek to tackle the pressing challenges that are holding back trade and economic cooperation between the two countries.
Energy Cooperation
Since 2022, energy has developed into the main driver of the bilateral partnership, with Russia becoming the largest source of crude for India. Despite several rounds of sanctions, Russian companies have continued to ship oil to Indian refineries. The latest US restrictions against the largest Russian oil companies — Rosneft and Lukoil — have complicated Russian supplies, necessitating a recalibration of existing supply chains. These measures will, however, be unlikely to cast a death spell over the India-Russia oil connection.
First, Moscow is convinced that oil flows will find their way, betting on India’s ability to proceed with indirect purchases through a series of intermediaries and workaround mechanisms. Second, New Delhi has shown little zeal to bow to US pressure in areas that correspond to national interests, with public companies reiterating their intention to move ahead with the import of Russian oil from non-sanctioned entities. Therefore, India and Russia will seek to stick to their mutually beneficial engagement even if the process becomes more complicated.
That said, with the latest US sanctions having taken effect on 21 November, the upcoming trend is likely to be New Delhi cutting down oil-related transactions with Moscow. This is not something the Indian government would be willing to announce when Putin lands in New Delhi, but it is the most likely scenario for 2026. Russian decision-makers would definitely want to see India remain a long-term oil customer, which helps stabilise budget projections and offset the looming dependency on China as the biggest export destination. Therefore, Russia is preparing a set of measures on how to move ahead with oil shipments — from considerably higher discounts to dealings through newly formed companies and intermediaries — in the hope that after the hiatus, it will be possible to return to ‘business as usual.’
Beyond oil, Russia is eager to expand civil nuclear cooperation with India, with Rosatom offeringlocalisation of large- and small-scale nuclear power plant projects. Apart from completing Phases II and III of the Kudankulam NPP in Tamil Nadu, the Russian company has long proposed that India start a new one, though the approval of a site has been protracted. Another proposal from Rosatom is to build small modular reactors (SMRs) in Indian regions with limited grid infrastructure or phased-out coal plants. While the company struck an MoU with the Government of Maharashtra in April 2025 for thorium-based SMRs, its implementation remains to be seen as New Delhi is considering procuring similar technologies from other partners, such as the US and France. Russia and India also continue to collaborate on the construction of the Rooppur NPP in Bangladesh, where Rosatom has sourced some necessary equipment for the project from Indian contractors.
The Defence Partnership
The India-Russia defence partnership has clearly bounced back after a period of uncertainty between 2022 and 2024. The summit may prove instrumental in finalising new deals, though these will likely be kept under wraps. Potential agreements include India’s procurement of a new batch of S-400 air defence systems, which performed well during Operation Sindoor in May 2025. In a sign that New Delhi is making a firm bet on these systems to bolster air defence capabilities, the Indian defence ministry has recently given preliminary approval for the purchase of “a large number of surface-to-air missiles” for the S-400, with ranges of 120, 200, 250, and 380 kilometres. However, even if a new contract for the S-400 is signed, India may still encounter delayed deliveries of these systems, as evidenced by the postponed supply of the remaining two units under the 2018 agreement.
Other items on the agenda are the joint production of S-500 air defence systems and the Su-57 fighter jet deal. Both appear to be in the early stages of negotiation, and it will be some time before they materialise. Russia has been marketing the S-500 to India since 2021, when Yury Borisov, the then Deputy Prime Minister, said that India would “potentially” be the first foreign recipient of this system. The serial production of the missiles for the S-500 system commenced in mid-2021, while the mass production of these air defence systems was announced in April 2022. However, there has been no official information since then on the number of S-500s Russia has deployed for its air defence. As meeting the needs of its own armed forces is a priority for Moscow, exports of the S-500 currently look like a far-fetched prospect.
There is a slightly higher chance of an agreement on the Su-57E, an export version of the Su-57 fighter jet. The paradox is that India pulled out of the joint Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) programme with Russia in 2018, citing inadequate stealth and supercruise capabilities of the jet and limited technology transfer. However, the Indian Air Force (IAF) is currently considering the Su-57 purchase as a potential “stopgap” solution, bearing in mind the need to address capability gaps and a squadron-strength shortfall. Sensing the right moment, Russia is showing a willingness to accommodate Indian demands, including unrestricted technology transfer and production of the jets on Indian soil. The Su-57s are already being supplied to foreign partners, with Algeria having received the first two out of 12 jets under the 2019 deal. Despite these marketing efforts, there are still multiple doubts among Indian experts about the Su-57’s reliability, given that Russia itself has employed the aircraft only to a limited extent. Even if India decides to move forward with a deal, coordinating technical details and responding to the IAF’s specific requirements will likely prove a lengthy process.
Further Engagements
Discussions on how to expand trade and industrial cooperation will likely be a major focus of the upcoming summit. A few weeks ago, Putin tasked Denis Manturov, the First Deputy Prime Minister and a co-chair of the India-Russia intergovernmental commission, with examining bilateral trade issues, including trade imbalances, and proposing remedies. Russia is expected to introduce a range of measures to grant Indian companies greater access to its market, with the aim of ramping up Indian exports of machinery, telecom equipment, chemicals, food, and pharmaceutical products.
The acceleration of India’s trade talks with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is seemingly an extension of bilateral measures. The 18-month work plan, adopted as part of the Terms of Reference signed in August 2025, entails opening new EAEU markets to Indian micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs), farmers, and fishermen.
Banking integration is expanding, with several of the largest Russian banks stepping up their presence and operations in India, and direct settlements in “national currencies” dominating bilateral trade. In a move to deepen financial engagement, the Russian Central Bank is planning to open a representative office in India. The main objective is to spur the integration of payment and financial messaging systems, which, according to official sources, is “gradually developing.”
Investment projects, joint ventures, and co-production initiatives are expected to be among the summit’s outcomes. For instance, India is expected to announce the establishment of a urea manufacturing plant in Russia to ensure a stable supply of fertilisers. In the civil aviation sector, Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) has signed an agreement with Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) to produce SJ-100 aircraft, a two-engine narrow-body passenger aircraft intended for short-haul flights.
Russia is also pitching several proposals to deepen maritime cooperation. Nikolay Patrushev, Chairman of the Russian Maritime Board, during his recent India trip, suggested establishing shipbuilding and ship-repairing clusters with Russian participation in the ports of Mumbai and Chennai. Among other initiatives in this domain are the joint construction of non-nuclear icebreakers, collaboration in crew training and scientific activities in ocean exploration, as well as Russia’s assistance with the development of “green shipping”.
With the two countries navigating geopolitical headwinds and confronting external obstacles to their engagement, the summit is expected to be full of symbolism. Translating intentions into working agreements will remain a priority for New Delhi and Moscow. Some of the projects in the pipeline are designed to underscore the resilience of bilateral ties, while others will be intentionally kept low-profile to bypass sanctions radars. With US tariffs and a Sino-American G2 reshaping regional equations, this may be an ideal time for a revitalised India-Russia partnership.
About the author: Aleksei Zakharov is a Fellow – Russia & Eurasia with the Strategic Studies Programme at Observer Research Foundation.
Source: This article was published at the Observer Research Foundation.
ORF was established on 5 September 1990 as a private, not for profit, ’think tank’ to influence public policy formulation. The Foundation brought together, for the first time, leading Indian economists and policymakers to present An Agenda for Economic Reforms in India. The idea was to help develop a consensus in favour of economic reforms.
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