Solar-powered streetlights wipe out AI climate impact


By Dr. Tim Sandle
SCIENCE EDITOR
DIGITAL JOURNAL
November 27, 2025


Street lighting. — Image by © Tim Sandle

The environmental impact of power-hungry AI data centres has been in the news, with governments scrabbling to generate more electricity. A British company, Conflow Power Group, has found a solution.

The firm has invented a solar-powered streetlight, iLamp, packed with Nvidia AI processors. No electricity supply is required and the owner actually makes a profit because AI providers such as OpenAI pay for the processing power. Hence, there is a near-zero carbon footprint and a profit for the customer.

The iLamps come with a 20-year warranty and the base model costs £7,500 but AI providers pay to use the Nvidia Jetson compute power for their services – meaning buyers can generate revenue instead of incurring running costs. They can also be fitted with almost any tech as required, including AI cameras, sensors, Wi-Fi and GPUs.

The technology provides a solution to a growing global AI power consumption crisis – reducing the carbon footprint to near-zero while supplying the world’s first autonomous AI distributed data centre.

Electricity consumption from AI data centres is estimated to be 415 terawatt-hours (TWh) and this is set to more than double by 2030 to around 945 TWh, according to the International Energy Agency, leading several nations to expand their nuclear power station programmes to cope.

A recent Cornell University study also found that by 2030, the current rate of AI growth in the US will add up to 44 million tons of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere – equivalent to adding 10 million petrol cars to the road. This underscores the urgency of accelerating the energy transition and point to the need for AI companies to harness clean energy potentials.

In addition, surging AI demand could also consume 1.7 trillion gallons of fresh water per year globally by 2027 to cool servers, according to an estimate from researchers at the University of California, Riverside.

The iLamp solves several of these problems, reducing the carbon footprint to near-zero since it is powered off-grid by low maintenance self-cleaning solar panels generating up to 200–600W of power, depending on configuration, while only consuming 80W. The surplus electricity can support a range of technology including Nvidia Jetson AI processors which only draw 15W per unit.

There are streetlights everywhere in our towns and cities. By replacing them with iLamps fitted with Nvidia Jetson processors, the firm suggests this will create a large distributed data centre which is clean, non-water-hungry and low latency because the servers are near to the users.

Nigeria Bets Big on Renewables as Oil Troubles Deepen

By Felicity Bradstock - Nov 29, 2025

• Nigeria’s oil industry continues to suffer massive losses from theft, sabotage, and chronic underinvestment, pushing the government to diversify its energy mix.
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• The country’s Energy Transition Plan aims for net-zero emissions by 2060, with major renewable investments, job creation targets, and gas positioned as a transition fuel.
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• New multi-hundred-million-dollar deals for solar manufacturing and renewable projects signal a decisive shift toward domestic clean energy production and industrial growth.
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For decades, Nigeria’s oil industry has faced a multitude of challenges. Despite having vast quantities of crude, the mismanagement of revenue, weak agreements with international oil companies, an underinvestment in infrastructure, and widespread oil theft have left many opposed to the ongoing production of crude. Now, Nigeria has high hopes for its renewable energy sector, as it looks to diversify its energy sources and boost energy security over the coming years.

Oil theft has long been a problem in Nigeria, affecting both the financial gain from oil projects and health and safety in the sector. A committee, established earlier this year, assessed some of the oil sector’s challenges in Nigeria, including oil theft, bunkering operations, illegal export networks, and alleged compromises within regulatory and security systems. The committee published a report on its findings, which suggested that the government could significantly mitigate the country’s oil losses.

Satellite and agency tracking revealed at least 589 oil leaks across Nigeria in 2024, most of which were due to theft and sabotage. The Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative estimated that, over 12 years, Nigeria lost 619.7 million barrels of oil, with a total value of $46.2 billion. In addition, Nigeria lost approximately $1.84 billion worth of petroleum products from its refineries over nine years.

While the government seeks to make its oil industry safer and more efficient, and, importantly, more profitable, many Nigerians are calling for the government to abandon its oil ambitions in favour of clean energy sources. While the government continues to back fossil fuels, it also sees a future for Nigeria in green energy, having set a target for net-zero carbon emissions by 2060 during the COP26 climate summit.

Nigeria’s Energy Transition Plan (ETP) led the way for the passing of the country’s Climate Change Act in 2021. The government then established the Energy Transition Office to oversee the implementation of the ETP, with a focus on six pillars – improved energy access, poverty reduction, modern energy access, job preservation, a sustainable transition, and legislation. The ETP aims to reduce emissions in several sectors, including power, transport, oil and gas, cooking, and industry. The ETP was revised and updated in 2024 to incorporate recent data and policy developments.

The government expects the ETP to support widespread job creation, with an estimated 340,000 jobs created by 2030 and up to 840,000 jobs by 2060. Nigeria views natural gas as a transition fuel and as key to its shift away from dirtier fossil fuels. However, to achieve its aims, the government will need to establish new green energy industries and attract investment for large-scale projects.

During the Nigeria Renewable Energy Innovation Forum 2025, the government signed contracts with a value of $435 million to expand the country’s renewable energy capacity. The agreements are expected to support the creation of 1,500 direct jobs across the country. Several state governments made deals with local and international renewable energy companies to develop solar, hybrid, and recycling projects to support power generation. Vice President Kashim Shettima said that $23 billion in funding was required in the short term to provide reliable power to millions of Nigerians without access to power.

To attract higher levels of investment to the sector, the government has committed to incentivising local production, streamlining regulations, and encouraging public-private partnerships.

Nigeria has significantly expanded its solar power industry in recent years, aiming to benefit from its abundant sunlight. In October, Nigeria’s Energy Commission signed a strategic partnership with the Chinese solar manufacturer LONGi to develop a solar panel plant with up to 1 GW of production capacity. This followed a visit to the Longi headquarters earlier in the month during which Longi “expressed strong interest in investing in Nigeria and demonstrated readiness to advance concrete plans for the construction of the factory.”

This is the latest of several solar manufacturing sites announced by the government. In September, Nigeria’s Rural Electrification Agency (REA) partnered with the Infrastructure Corporation of Nigeria and the Dutch solar manufacturer Solarge BV to establish a special purpose vehicle for the construction and operation of a 1 GW solar panel manufacturing plant in Nigeria.

Meanwhile, in March, the REA signed a deal with Lagos-based renewables developer Oando Clean Energy to develop a 1.2 GW solar assembly plant. The government has also discussed the possibility of introducing a ban on solar panel imports to help encourage local production. Technology Minister Uche Nnaji stated, “We have lithium in abundance here in Nigeria, so Mr President is already taking action… We are adding value to our raw materials.”

As Nigeria’s oil industry continues to face a multitude of challenges, the government is starting to drive investment in the country’s renewable energy sector. In addition to the expansion of its renewable energy capacity, the government is also looking at how to add value to its raw materials and ramp up manufacturing activities to drive economic growth.

By Felicity Bradstock for Oilprice.com

The EU’s Ukraine Strategy: The Worst Foreign Policy Blunder In European History Since WWII?

By Thomas E. Henökl 

November 25, 2025

Source: Originally published by Z. Feel free to share widely.

Image by European Commission (Dati Bendo), Creative Commons 4.0

For more than three and a half years now, Ukraine – and with it the so-called ‘West’ – have been paralyzed by a dreadful, protracted war of attrition against Russia, and Europe is collectively heading into a hurtful military, political and economic defeat. This article reveals a series of pitfalls of European diplomacy allowing the EU to be held hostage by U.S. great power politics. 

In a rather shortsighted move, Europe (with the sole exception of Switzerland) has aligned on a strategic path, designed by the U.S. to serve American interests and has jeopardized, if not completely relinquished, any residue of autonomous reasoning and decision-making. Of course, by building and stocking up their own arsenals, EU member states will achieve some degree of tactical leverage. However, what remains is the strategic alignment with (what used to be) US policy. In some form of collective cognitive dissonance, Europe, again, has permitted letting itself be dragged into yet another unnecessary and devastating war, causing tremendous human suffering and security risks as well as global political and economic havoc. By blindly falling in line with the Biden-administration’s provocation of this conflict, Europeans yielded their independent actorness and any remaining diplomatic clout. In conclusion, this chapter will try and point towards a potential exit strategy for the present quagmire.

Also in academic debates, we are witnessing a revival of wartime narratives, characterized by antagonistic, mutually exclusive and even hostile discussion, leaving no middle ground, no room for compromise; and that much rather displays a partisan logic, zero-sum game, and entrenched antagonism. Therefore, an underlying problem exposed by this article is the lack of debate about the scope and direction of EU foreign policy. Re-arming or militarizing Europe has become central to EU policy, with alternatives being almost instantly discounted. Accepted points of debate within the EU focus only on the most effective ways to “ReArm EU” rather than the meaning and consequences of such a strategy.

Literature on policy-making in times of crisis, connected to decision-making in EU foreign policy and “presidentialization” as a concentration of power at the top of the hierarchical level, explains the foreign policy choices by EU-leaders. The perception of crisis creates momentum for centralization of decision-making at the top of government hierarchies (Dahlström et al., 2011; Furness et al., 2019; Sperling, J., and M. Webber, 2019). The prospect of war has the effect of focussing policy debates on a narrow range of issues perceived to be at the heart of the crisis. A perceived security threat would clearly represent such a crisis, which favours the centralization of decision-making at the political helm, endowing leaders with exceptional powers – a classical feature of politics in the time of war. Leaders, on the other hand, know about and consciously use such narratives of crisis and emergencies to bestow special powers on themselves. Hence, there is a two-way centralization bias resulting from and framing political phenomena as a crisis, or a so-called “unprovoked war of aggression”.

The EU’s very own Stalingrad?

According to prominent voices, although marginalized in the dominant IR-discourse, such as John J. Mearsheimer (2014, 2022), Stephen M. Walt (2022), Jeffrey Sachs (2022, 2025), Glenn Diesen (2022, 2024), Jacques Baud, Daniele Ganser or Johannes Varwick (2023), the course of events was foreseeable, and the West has to assume its share of responsibility for Russia’s attack on Ukraine. In this perspective, the present situation is the logical consequence of path-dependent behaviour, resulting in a perfect lock-in of the actors involved. Already 2008, when NATO announced that Ukraine and Georgia would eventually join the alliance at their summit in Bucharest, Putin made it crystal clear that Russia was never going to accept this expansion of the Western military bloc right at its doorstep (Mearsheimer 2022). This unambiguous warning by Russia was simply – and shamelessly – ignored, with the catastrophic consequences the Ukrainian and the Russian people have to bear and are paying the price for with their blood. The EU got dragged into this cataclysm by US imperialist self-interest, with the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) becoming a fig-leave for transatlantic great-power ambitions. If not already sufficiently demonstrated in 2008 and 2011, today the ENP turns out to be a total and utter failure, leading to a series of distressed states and societies in the Southern neighbourhood producing terror and mass-migration and a devastating war in the Eastern neighbourhood, causing immense human suffering and a black hole for billions of Euros in military and monetary aid.

For the Biden administration and for the United Kingdom, Ukraine was merely a pawn in a much bigger geostrategic plot, along the tune of Lord Rothschild’s message to the UK government from 02 March 2012:

“The world order will not survive without Ukraine. We must bring Russia to its knees by any means necessary to send a clear and unambiguous signal to our enemies.”
“Ukraine is a necessary thing that we cannot afford to lose on the geopolitical chessboard. In essence, our current path of no hostilities means that our global project is dead.”
“I demand from you to send more forces against Russia and its satellites, step up the “information war” to correct public opinion and send weapons to our friends in Ukraine.”

Now that the US under President Donald Trump is oscillating between pulling out from and a somehow limited engagement in the war effort in Ukraine, the EU risks to stand alone with its support to Kiev. Trump, while struggling with US hawks, deep state and neocon war profiteers, wants to look like a “deal maker” while avoiding the impression of appearing as a weak leader, giving in to Vladimir Putin.

To explain why and how Europe (read: the EU and Norway) has got trapped in a proxy-war against Russia, one needs to adopt a realist’s perspective and soberly look at the historic context of the EU’s external policy and its relations with its wider neighbourhood over the last two decades. This lens will help understanding how dramatically the EU has changed as an actor in response to the Ukraine war. Without questioning the US premises and logics behind the war against Russia, Germany (echoed by the rest of the EU) announced “Zeitenwende”, and Europe went straight into fueling this catastrophic conflict – yielding parts of its sovereignty and acting contrary to its own best interest.

Siding with the US and UK doctrine of dealing a decisive blow to Russia can hardly be qualified “strategic autonomy”. What the EU has achieved is a subaltern autonomy, as main funder (and thereby fueller) of the war. It can now send more weapons from US manufacturers to Ukraine. What “Zeitenwende” actually meant for Europe, was some sort of silent merger between EU and NATO and acting against its own political and economic interest. The UK had been on board from the beginning, but one may merely second-guess, why Germany was so wilfully promoting war; possibly, because Germany has no room for independent foreign policy-making, at least not where it matters.

Since then, life in Europe itself is no longer as self-evident as it seemed decades ago. European values and way of life, and especially democracy as a political system, with its checks and balances, have come under attack. Shamefully, the better part of this attack on European values comes from within and from the top of the political leadership. Prosperity and a decent standard of living is becoming a fairy from the past for more and more EU citizens. In part this may be due to a decade of austerity, but this loss in standard of living has been drastically accelerated by the unconditional (financial) support of Ukraine and the sanctions against Russia. According to the “Ukraine Aid Tracker” by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy of June 1st 2025, Ukraine received a flabbergasting 156.1 bn Euro from the EU and its member states (compared to 114.6 bn from the US), as of 1 June 2025. (Another 335 bn Euro, left over from the Covid-recovery fund, are yet to be channeled into the conflict by the Von-der-Leyen Commission.) And the (so far) 19 packages of economic sanctions-imposed on Russia hit, first and foremost, the Europeans themselves, with energy prices soaring and entire sectors of industries tanking.

Whatever happened to the EU as a peace project?

Worst of all, the nightmare of war, which seemed unthinkable for 21^st century Europe, turned into a real possibility with all the rhetoric and even preparation in a number of EU member states. It is unforgivable that the EU did not take the security concerns repeatedly raised by Vladimir Putin serious enough – nor did it honor its own commitment vis-à-vis Russia, the Minsk agreements. Europe’s dependence on Russian oil and gas, caused in part by the economic interests of big heavily industrialized countries such as Germany, but also based on the assumption that trade with Russia could foster the development of peaceful relations in the long term, was suddenly radically aborted. At the same time, also the weakness of the EU’s own defence capacities, its vulnerability and security dependence on the US are on display. There has been presidentializaton (to put it mildly) of, amongst other, foreign policy, with Ursula von der Leyen (even though facing her second no-confidence vote by the European Parliament) exercising nearly unchecked power from the upper-most level of the executive. One might speak of anti-democratic tendencies or even an autocratic turn in the EU under Von der Leyen, that at the latest began or took a clear shape in the COVID pandemic. From this onwards, we witness an authoritarian slide of the EU.

Other actors, like the European External Action Service and its unfortunate former High Representative Josep Borrell had been largely marginalized. This changed under the leadership of Kaja Kallas, excelling in Russophobia and escalation. Among the most arduous war mongers, beside the EU Commission figure the UK, France and Germany, Poland (depending who is governing)  and the Baltic states. And they completely cancelled any record of the origins of the conflict, dating back at least to 2014. Over time, the European Union turned into a branch of NATO, and foreign policy-wise put under direct control by the United States. Democracy and accountability in the EU have been set on stand-by. Nowadays, the EU stands for limiting freedom of expression, and oppression of dissenting opinions. Today’s EU is a clear threat to democracy, and peace and prosperity. Politically, the state of the Union transpires the total absence of strategic thinking – and moral standards.

There is a gloomy scenario on the horizon, where democracy and civil liberties could succumb to the pressures of an increasingly authoritarian EU. And citizens would in large numbers begin to accept repressive structures and a clamp-down on democracy and free speech justified on the grounds of wartime priorities and prerogatives. The use of the Digital Service Act and the European Democracy Shield by the EU-Commission for the purpose of surveillance and silencing citizens is a case in point. But also, the space for academic debate has been considerably narrowed. As the war between Russia and Ukraine is framed by the ruling elites, so-called experts and commentators as part of struggle between democracy and autocracy (good vs. evil), the quality of discourse in the West has taken a hit. Respected academics throughout the West have been smeared and ignored. If we look at the reality, democracy is not doing so well in Ukraine either – not to mention the colossal problem of corruption in the country – as Kremlin mouthpieces, subjected to harassment, marginalization and defamation.

Gone are the days of the EU being a credible broker in international conflicts. Instead, the EU has gotten itself involved in a devastating war, explicitly siding with and materially supporting Ukraine, more precisely its extreme right leadership. While enormous costs are inflicted on civilian populations by western-financed hostilities (at the expense of the European taxpayers), and to the benefit of the military-industrial complex, EU leaders fail to make an effort to push for immediate peace talks in both Ukraine and Israel. Is it not the first task of diplomacy to work for the non-violent resolution of conflicts? In contrast, European statesmen are piling up arsenals of deadly weapons, ultimately prolonging and intensifying the dreadful bloodshed. For those who seem to have forgotten that the EU is not NATO, and should not be instrumentalized to adopt, implement and finance US and NATO policies, they need to be reminded of the ruins of WWII from which the European idea emerged. War is not the spirit of the EU treaties, but peace, even though the EU today seems to be transitioning from being a “normative power” (Manners 2002) to a military power. In the case of Ukraine, the EU could (and should) make it a condition for any kind of further support to Kiev to engage in negotiations to end the war.

There is no doubt that the process of European integration made an important contribution to the long-lasting period of peace in Europe. To many, it seemed that the process of enlargement would take place gradually and orderly and that the sphere of peace and prosperity would continue to expand. However, the situation has changed significantly in this millennium with several crucial internal and external challenges. For the EU it has been a decade of crisis, and the war as well is taking its toll. The consequences of the sanctions packages are having a high price for Europe.  At the same time a new cluster of power centers emerges, in the shape of ascending geopolitical players (BRICS+, notably Russia, China, India, Turkey) – as well as the erratic behaviour of the EU’s transatlantic ally, the USA, e.g. President Trump’s erratic tariff policy. Even before the Russia’s arguably retaliative special military operation against Ukraine, Russia has made a systematic effort to champion a multipolar world order, which disrupts the agency of the EU and its allies. While Russia does not have the capabilities to directly oppose NATO expansion nor any interest in preventing EU expansion, it has been suspected of undermining the democratic ideals of the EU through hybrid warfare, promotion of post-truth narratives and support for reform-oriented political forces, most of which has turned out as being Western (US and EU/NATO) deception. There is no “realism à la carte”, not even for Europe.

European delusion

Russia’s leadership cannot afford losing the war it was forced into – and Russia will not lose, and literally cannot lose it, not least since it is a nuclear power. Time is on its side, and the contestation of the international liberal order by the BRICS+ countries plays in Russia’s favour. US military and financial support to Ukraine may come at a high price or even to a full stop under the presidency of Donald Trump, and the EU/NATO-alliance is facing a crushing defeat in its proxy-war. The EU and (European) NATO have virtually merged, and both of them seem to have tied their destiny entirely to Ukraine. This is a zero-sum game that is not only very harmful – but also extremely dangerous. There is the risk of a wider war with devastating consequences, and also institutionally for the EU (and NATO), since if they fail in helping Ukraine prevail, they will face an existential threat and maybe their decomposition. This connects to realist thinking in that the prime objective of states – and entities like the EU – is self-preservation, securing their own survival. EU, more so than NATO seem to have put their carriage before the horses. It clearly turns out to be rather backfiring premise to say: Putin attacks our European values in Ukraine (which he does not), and if Ukraine loses, we will be berobbed of our values.

And Russia is by no means isolated, it is actively engaging with the BRICS+ group countries, notably with powerful players such as China, India or Brazil. China, in turn, has long sought to reshape the primary and secondary institutions of the current international system via the promotion of a new narrative about the ideal future of a multipolar global international society. Most recently the Eastern giant became more assertive in contesting the status-quo of international relations and in proposing an alternative world order, openly challenging the ILO dominated by the Western (NATO-)powers, namely the US and its allies, most notably the UK, Norway, and the EU. It may rather be, that the US needs the Russia-threat to keep its alliance together, because an economic or political cooperation between Russia and European countries, especially Germany is not in the American interest. The destruction of the NordStream pipelines by the US (and/or its proxies) is a clear example for this neocon calculus. Russia, in close coordination with China, is also pushing for a multipolar international order and works actively towards a de-dollarization of the global economy, trading with China and others in local currencies. This could have far reaching consequences weakening the standing of the US in external trade and finance, as it would no longer be in a position to offset its fiscal deficit by limitless emission of treasury bonds, hitherto bought by economies all over the world. China alone has been selling off its dollar holdings at a value of 400 bn US$ over the last couple of months.   

However, the US are still the word’s superpower and able to impose its will economically, e.g through sanctions, tariffs and militarily, potentially projecting protection and deterrence. Europe, on the other hand, has for decades presumably benefitted from (some even say, it has been free-riding on) US military capacity and capitalized an economic peace dividend. Now, at this perceived or pretended point of “Zeitenwende” this passive approach to security and defence is said to backfire, and Europe has to move out of its comfort-zone, taking responsibility for protecting and guaranteeing the viability of its model of liberal democratic governance and economic prosperity. And in this reasoning, Europe forever vows its allegiance to the US, come hell or high water. Even if this means to wreck its own industrial base and national economies.

Concomitantly, we observe the rise of some sort of imperial attitude among EU-elites, pretending to fight what Brussels perceives as ideological extremism or anti-liberal populism that questions some elements of “European values”. This phenomenon is even more problematic since Eastern European countries frequently are still unconsolidated or ‘unsettled’ democracies as well as economically vulnerable countries, unable to defend themselves against EU feudalism and arrogance. The EU’s autocratic turn under von der Leyen disqualifies it to act as model for democracy and the rule of law. Brussels has been unmasked as a hotbed of anti-democratic rule, corruption and mismanagement, as well as meddling in national elections and circumcising national sovereignty (e.g. the Romanian presidential election of 2024/25). The feeling of institutional ineffectiveness is particularly strong in the candidate countries, where the bureaucratic burden of EU “criteria” is experienced as particularly pressing. The so-called ‘enlargement momentum’ has abated considerably, and the EU is no longer perceived as a credible crisis manager or even moderator. While measures relevant to consolidating the functioning of democratic institutions is crucial for the enlargement process, interference with democratic processes is of little help in this endeavor. The genuine political efforts to silence critical voices have fueled the resentment of Brussels and its agenda. This is why we are witnessing the decreasing power of attraction of the European model of democracy over the last decade or so. And this erosion of democracy is manifest not just within candidate countries but also in the Union itself, especially with von der Leyen’s second term. The consequence of these problematic developments is the weakening of the European Union as a global promoter of freedom and democracy, which opens room of maneuver for geopolitical actors, such as the BRICS+, to expand their influence and implement their agenda more easily.

Realism à la carte

For the past three years EU/NATO countries sent hundreds of billions’ worth of arms to Ukraine, a quantity of weapons so enormous it depleted their own reserves, and a vast undisclosed number of mercenary soldiers was deployed; and they applied the whole arsenal in terms of sanctions to cripple Russia economically. The result? It simply didn’t work. Without the US, NATO countries will now have to work on a peace deal, and Ukraine will probably end up having lost at least a fifth of its territory, half the size of the UK. All this after having been told during almost the entire duration of the war that Ukraine was winning. Of course, people will be told that it’s not a defeat, merely a “stalemate”, that NATO comes out of it reinforced with additional members, that it’s Ukraine or Zelensky’s fault anyhow. But the crux of the matter is NATO defined an extremely clear objective – which was to “drive Russians back to pre-invasion lines” to directly quote Anthony Blinken – and that failed miserably despite their unprecedented efforts. Which means that the West is much weaker than they thought they were, they just couldn’t collectively defeat Russia. This has immense implications. First of which being: if they can’t defeat Russia, what hope do they have against China which is likely – just looking at metrics (number of people, production capacity, military budget, etc.) – at least 5 times more powerful than Russia? The answer is obvious. Another one is that all those places around the world who thought they were protected by the US will start (in fact, they are already starting) to ask themselves difficult and serious questions: “Can we rely on that promise of military protection?” We will witness very significant shifts of alliances and defence arrangements. Lastly, people in Western countries will at some point wake up from their propaganda haze and ask very simple questions like: why did we ruin ourselves for Ukraine with virtually nothing to show for? Wouldn’t we and the Ukrainians have been better off if we had respected Minsk 2 and if we hadn’t tried to convert Ukraine into a Western bulwark against Russia? And so, this will likely serve as a hard lesson domestically that we should rather be much humbler about our geopolitical ambitions (assuming the West still is capable of learning lessons, which is far from certain). All in all, this will undoubtedly be seen by history as the defining event that signified that we moved from Western hegemony into a multipolar world. A very long chapter of our collective world history book has just been closed, 500 years of Western hegemony is about to end.

Mainstream ideas that influence EU foreign policy have always sidelined the importance of realism. With the von der Leyen Commission, the EU, at least declaratively, emphasized the importance of geopolitics. However, this implied a certain understanding of geopolitics which is somewhat patronizing and ignores the way power is distributed in the world order, as well as the claims and perspectives of other important actors, such as Russia or China. One could say the EU pretended to accept that geopolitics and realism play a key role but has not yet come to terms with the way realism shapes international relations. Rather, it ignores parts of reality that are uncomfortable and brands alternative ideas as evil, wrong, or as “misinformation”. This refers to both more intellectual voices as well as the views of other international actors. Even though the Von der Leyen Commission conceives itself as a “geopolitical Commission” and presumably adopted a realist approach to external policies, the way the EU-leadership is applying the notion of realism to its version of geopolitics, very much looks like “realism à la carte”, a menu to pick and choose from to one’s own liking, as is the case in the ENP or in the EU’s approach to the BRICS+. The consequence is a behavioural pattern that EU policy is not based on realist assessments of the distribution of power in the world but on misguided hope, arrogance, and virtue signaling. In practice, this results in a chaotic strategy, where any alternative view, both from inside the EU and more importantly outside, is seen as a threat. Hasty militarization or re-arming is a key example of this chaotic response.

Instead, the EU should accept Ukraine’s imminent defeat and demand general elections in the country. A new and legitimate leadership in Kiev could be trustworthy to enter serious peace-negotiations with Russia. Otherwise, Europe should stay out of this conflict; no more arms shipments, no more threateningRussia, no more meddling with Ukrainian politics, and no more arms race.Email

Thomas E. Henökl

Thomas E. Henökl is an Associate Professor of Public Policy and Administration at the University of Agder (Norway) and a Senior Research Associate at the German Development Institute (Bonn). He works in research and teaching in the fields of European politics, public administration, EU foreign and security policy, international cooperation and development, and more widely on comparative politics and organization theory. Previously, Thomas Henökl worked as Security Policy Officer for the European Commission, External Relations DG (from 2011 the European External Action Service) and at the European Institute of Public Administration (EIPA). He holds PhD in Political Science from the University of Agder (Norway).

 BACKGROUND

A draft of the 28-point plan reviewed by AFP:

1. Ukraine's sovereignty will be confirmed.

2. A comprehensive non-aggression agreement will be concluded between Russia, Ukraine and Europe. All ambiguities of the last 30 years will be considered settled.

3. It is expected that Russia will not invade neighbouring countries and NATO will not expand further.


4. A dialogue will be held between Russia and NATO, mediated by the United States, to resolve all security issues and create conditions for de-escalation.

5. Ukraine will receive reliable security guarantees.

6. The size of the Ukrainian Armed Forces will be limited to 600,000 personnel.

7. Ukraine agrees to enshrine in its constitution that it will not join NATO, and NATO agrees to include in its statutes a provision that Ukraine will not be admitted in the future.

8. NATO agrees not to station troops in Ukraine.

9. European fighter jets will be stationed in Poland.

10. The US will receive compensation for the security guarantees it provides. If Ukraine invades Russia, it will lose the guarantee. If Russia invades Ukraine, in addition to a decisive coordinated military response, all global sanctions will be reinstated and recognition of its new territories and all other benefits of this deal will be revoked. If Ukraine launches a missile at Moscow or St. Petersburg without cause, the security guarantee will also be deemed invalid.

11. Ukraine is eligible for EU membership and will receive short-term preferential access to the European market while this issue is being considered.

12. A powerful global package of measures to rebuild Ukraine will be established, including the creation of a Ukraine Development Fund, the rebuilding of Ukraine's gas infrastructure, the rehabilitation of war-affected areas, the development of new infrastructure and a resumption of the extraction of minerals and natural resources, all with a special finance package developed by the World Bank.

13. Russia will be reintegrated into the global economy, with discussions on lifting sanctions, rejoining the G8 group and entering a long-term economic cooperation agreement with the United States.

14. Some $100 billion in frozen Russian assets will be invested in US-led efforts to rebuild and invest in Ukraine, with the US receiving 50 percent of the profits from the venture. Europe will add $100 billion to increase the amount of investment available for Ukraine's reconstruction. Frozen European funds will be unfrozen, and the remainder of the frozen Russian funds will be invested in a separate US-Russian investment vehicle.

15. A joint American-Russian working group on security issues will be established to promote and ensure compliance with all provisions of this agreement.

16. Russia will enshrine in law its policy of non-aggression towards Europe and Ukraine.

17. The United States and Russia will agree to extend the validity of treaties on the non-proliferation and control of nuclear weapons, including the START I Treaty.

18. Ukraine agrees to be a non-nuclear state in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

19. The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant will be launched under the supervision of the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the electricity produced will be distributed equally between Russia and Ukraine.

20. Both countries undertake to implement educational programmes in schools and society aimed at promoting understanding and tolerance.

21. Crimea, Luhansk and Donetsk will be recognised as de facto Russian, including by the United States. Kherson and Zaporizhzhia will be frozen along the line of contact, which will mean de-facto recognition along the line of contact. Russia will relinquish other agreed territories it controls outside the five regions. Ukrainian forces will withdraw from the part of Donetsk Oblast that they currently control, which will then be used to create a buffer zone.

22. After agreeing on future territorial arrangements, both the Russian Federation and Ukraine undertake not to change these arrangements by force. Any security guarantees will not apply in the event of a breach of this commitment.

23. Russia will not prevent Ukraine from using the Dnieper River for commercial activities, and agreements will be reached on the free transport of grain across the Black Sea.

24. A humanitarian committee will be established to resolve prisoner exchanges and the return of remains, hostages and civilian detainees, and a family reunification programme will be implemented.

25. Ukraine will hold elections in 100 days.

26. All parties involved in this conflict will receive full amnesty for their actions during the war and agree not to make any claims or consider any complaints in the future.

27. This agreement will be legally binding. Its implementation will be monitored and guaranteed by the Peace Council, headed by US President Donald Trump. Sanctions will be imposed for violations.

28. Once all parties agree to this memorandum, the ceasefire will take effect immediately after both sides retreat to the agreed points to begin implementation of the agreement.

(FRANCE 24 with AFP)

SEE

Inside the Chaos of Trump’s Ukraine Peace Plan

Ukraine Solidarity Network (US): Oppose Trump’s surrender plan for Ukraine

'For a very long time, Ukrainians have suspected that Steve Witkoff was working for the Russians'

Trump admin crafted Russia-friendly peace plan with help from Kremlin in 'secret meetings'

Trump’s ‘Munich’ agreement is nothing but Russian demands. The world must reject it.

UKRAINE CAPITULATION PLAN

The Nestor Makhno Archive - index

 

Video: Ukraine Claims Responsibility for Attacks on Two Sanctioned Tankers

Ukraine took responsibility for the tanker attacks and released a video showing the strike

Published Nov 29, 2025 8:52 AM by The Maritime Executive

 

Multiple media sources are quoting Ukrainian officials saying they attacked the two sanctioned shadow fleet tankers off Turkey on Friday. Turkey had earlier reported that the fires were controlled on the two vessels, but one of the tankers was again attacked in the morning hours. Speculation had been growing over a possible attack by Ukraine using drones or mines.

Reports by CNN and Agence France-Presse are quoting Ukrainian security sources confirming that Ukraine orchestrated the attacks. They are saying a new form of the “Sea Baby” drone was used in the attacks and that it was done to further impact Russia’s oil trade. A video was posted online showing the strike on one of the tankers.

 

 

The tanker Virat reportedly suffered “minor damage,” with Turkey’s Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure saying “an attack was carried out again on the Virat vessel in the morning hours.” Friday night, they reported that there was no fire or emergency on the tanker, which had been anchored north of Turkey in the Black Sea awaiting orders. Saturday, they are reporting minor damage on the starboard side of the Virat.

Turkey had dispatched a rescue boat to stand by the Virat. The Ministry reports, “Rescue teams are waiting at a safe distance from the vessel for security reasons.” The tanker is stable and has not requested an evacuation.

Teams worked through the night at the Kairos, the first tanker that was attacked, to control a massive fire on the vessel that resulted from an explosion. The Turkish Coast Guard said the 25 crewmembers were evacuated and handed over to medical teams. There was no mention of injuries.

A tugboat and an emergency response boat were fighting the fire. As of Saturday, the Transport Ministry reports the fire on the open decks has been completely extinguished. Firefighting and cooling continue for the enclosed spaces.

 

 

Turkish Transport Minister Abdulkadir Uraloglu had earlier told the media that they did not have any definitive information, but he suggested a mine, missile, marine vessel, or drone could have been involved. He acknowledged explosions on both tankers “caused by external interference.”

“Conflicting reports suggest USV or UAV, although sea mine and limpet mine cannot be ruled out,” wrote Martin Kelly, Head of Advisory at EOS Risk Group. “The Virat incident suggests that the earlier incident involving Kairos was unlikely accidental, and is part of the broader effort to choke Russian revenue from maritime trade via its Dark Fleet.”

Earlier this year, there was a rash of unexplained incidents involving shadow fleet tankers. Several tankers were struck with what appeared to have been limpet mines attached to their hulls in Russia and in Italy. In June, a Greek-managed crude oil tanker suffered an explosion while it was anchored off the coast of Libya. No blame was placed for any of the incidents, but the speculation linked all the tankers to the Russian oil trade.

The two tankers struck on Friday are both reported to be owned by Chinese interests, and each has been sanctioned for its activity in the Russian oil trade. Both vessels report registry in Gambia, but the Equasis database lists their flags as “unknown” after the vessels were sold in 2025.

Ukraine Clams Hit on Key Rosneft Refinery in Volga Region

By Charles Kennedy - Nov 28, 2025

Ukraine hit the Saratov refinery of Russian oil giant Rosneft in the Volga region on Friday, Ukraine’s General Staff said, in what was the second attack on the refinery in recent months as the Trump Administration continues with its efforts to broker a peace deal.

“As part of efforts to reduce the military and economic potential of the Russian aggressor, during the night of 28 November, units of the Defence Forces of Ukraine struck the Saratov Oil Refinery in Russia’s Saratov region,” Ukraine’s General Staff said on their Telegram channel.

“The facility produces more than 20 types of petroleum products, including gasoline, fuel oil, diesel fuel and technical sulphur, and is involved in supporting the needs of the Russian occupation army.”

Ukraine said that “a series of explosions was recorded, followed by a fire in the target area. The results of the strikes are being clarified.”

A similar attack on the Saratov refinery in August prompted the facility to halt the intake of crude oil.

Last week, Rosneft’s refinery at Ryazan, Russia’s fourth-largest, was said to have suspended crude processing after a Ukrainian drone attack over the November 15-16 weekend.

In recent weeks, Ukraine has intensified attacks on Russia’s oil refineries, depots, and export terminals in an escalation of the war on energy infrastructure, which has also seen Russia targeting Ukraine’s gas producing facilities and gas and power distribution networks as temperatures drop.

The targeting of energy infrastructure continues from both sides as the Trump Administration intensified in the past week efforts to broker a peace agreement.

Earlier this week, reports emerged that Ukraine had mostly agreed to a peace deal, with “minor details” to discuss and settle.

White House envoy Steve Witkoff will travel to Moscow next week to discuss the peace plan with the Kremlin.

On Thursday, Russian President Vladimir Putin doubled down on Moscow’s demand that it would stop the war only if Ukraine withdraws from territories Russia has already seized.

By Charles Kennedy for Oilprice.com

Ukraine’s Oil Strikes Are Hurting Russia’s War Economy

By RFE/RL staff - Nov 29, 2025

• Ukraine’s deep-strike drones have hit half of Russia’s major oil and gas facilities, reducing refining capacity and fueling domestic fuel shortages.
• 
  
• New long-range systems like the Lyutiy drone and mass FPV swarms let Kyiv strike targets daily and repeatedly, complicating Russia’s repairs.
• 
  
• While Russia’s vast refining system prevents collapse, sustained attacks and sanctions are lowering export revenues and tightening its war financing.
• 
  

Ukraine's deep-strike drone campaign targeting Russia's oil and gas production facilities has already cost its enemy 10 percent of its refining capacity, according to industry experts -- and Kyiv is committed to stepping things up.

"Ten percent, it's not an astonishing number," says Tatiana Mitrova of Columbia University's Center on Global Energy Policy. "But it is still something that starts to be felt with the Russian domestic fuel crisis, with reduced oil refined products exports, and general tension inside the Russian oil sector."

Ukraine has invested heavily in new long-distance drone technology, putting out weapons such as the Lyutiy drone, which is capable of delivering explosives up to 2,000 kilometers from its secret launch site.

But Ukrainian drone units have also gained expertise at swarming targets with dozens of cheaper first-person-view (FPV) drones.

The technology advances are currently allowing Kyiv to hit key Russian oil and gas resources on an almost daily basis.

It has also committed to hitting the same refineries repeatedly, an essential strategy, says Mitrova, as Russia scrambles to rebuild and repair damage.

Kyiv has also struck at least half of Russia's 38 major production complexes and has forced Russia to reduce oil processing from 5.4 million barrels per day in July to just 5 million two months later.

Still, Mitrova points out, Russia operates the world's third-largest refining system and has substantial built in surplus capacity.

"It might take years before the result becomes really visible," she says, "so we are not talking about Russian refining collapsing anytime soon -- but exhausting its potential, it really started already."

Russian consumers have felt the pain of gasoline shortages and rationing, while gasoline exports have been banned. In addition, says Mitrova, Russia is now exporting more crude oil and less refined product, which substantially lessens its export revenues.

The importance of fossil fuels to Russia's economy can hardly be overstated, bringing in $100 billion annually. However, that number is roughly 20 percent lower than it was a year ago, say industry analysts at organizations such as the Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air.

The nearly four-year full-scale invasion of Ukraine is funded heavily by Russian gas and oil sales abroad, which have made this sector the subject of growing waves of US and EU sanctions.

But it would be naive to assume that targeting Russian oil and gas, both economically and militarily, is likely to cause noticeable battlefield effects, says Mitrova, who points out the Russian Army is generally first in line when resources are limited.

Nevertheless, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said he's a firm believer that hits on Russia's refineries are "the most effective sanctions -- the ones that work the fastest."

By RFE/RL

Is the Arctic Sea the Key to Ending the Ukraine War?

By Robert Berke - Nov 29, 2025

• A Naval Academy professor proposed an Arctic-centered peace plan, arguing Trump could end the Ukraine war by lifting sanctions on Russia’s Northern Sea Route projects and promoting Western investment in Arctic development.
• 
  
• Trump reportedly embraced the idea, offering to drop Arctic-related sanctions in exchange for peace, potentially reopening massive oil and gas ventures once pursued by Exxon, Chevron, and Conoco before sanctions forced their exit.
• 
  
• Critics warn the plan mirrors Moscow’s demands, effectively granting Russia territorial and strategic concessions while dividing the West—raising doubts that it’s a viable or fair peace solution.

In a recent article, a professor at the Naval Academy argues that “Trump can leverage the Arctic to end the Ukraine war.”

It’s clear that Trump was excited by the possibilities the article raised in ending the war.  Written by Lyle J. Goldstein, a research professor at the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) at the US Naval War College.

The author makes the case that the key to ending the war lies in the Arctic. Goldstein argues that Trump’s announced plan to end the war swiftly “seemed increasingly out of reach.” The author went on to say that “it’s hard to imagine that… more arms for Ukraine and…more sanctions on Russia will be successful at achieving peace.”

The author said that Trump still has a chance “to break from the status quo and entice Russia to end the war” by making the situation in the Arctic - where a struggle for dominance between world powers has been intensifying in recent years – part of the negotiations, he wrote.

As the analyst stated, the issue is “guaranteed to capture… Putin’s attention” because Moscow is interested in the effective functioning of the Northern Sea Route (NSR), which runs from the Barents Sea near Russia’s border with Norway to the Bering Strait between Chukotka and Alaska, and “holds the key to unlocking major development in the country’s vast, resource-rich interior and more broadly for Siberia.”

“The Arctic region may contain an estimated 90 billion barrels of oil and 46 trillion cubic meters of natural gas, approximately 13 percent and 30 percent of undiscovered global reserves, respectively.”

To see Russia make concessions, “the US would need to lift sanctions that have been applied against NSR projects… [and] facilitate major European shipping companies like Hapag Lloyd and Maersk to green light the route.”

Another step to “sweeten the pot” for Moscow could be “the encouragement and even incentives for Western investment along the NSR” by Washington and Brussels, Goldstein stressed.

"By appending peace proposals with a carrot guaranteed to catch Putin’s attention, negotiations having a substantial Arctic component could gain Trump’s favor and find success,” he insisted.

Russia is by far the region’s largest geographical stakeholder, with its northern border encompassing some 53% of the Arctic Ocean coastline, and will likely continue to be a prime player in the High North.

And there is abundant evidence that Russia is militarizing the region, with many of the European northern tier countries and Canada following suit.

That Trump was captivated by the proposed plan was made clear by his sudden attempt to take over northern territories owned by his closest NATO allies, including annexing Canada, a prime member of England’s Commonwealth of Nations, and Greenland, governed by Denmark.

It’s also clear that Trump is following the Naval Officer’s plan to the letter. He is currently offering to drop sanctions on major Russian Arctic development projects in exchange for ending the Ukraine War.

That could be a bonanza for Russia to develop its Arctic and Siberian regions, said to hold some 25% of the world's primary industrial commodities, including giant gas and oil reserves, industrial and rare metals. 

Dropping US/EU war sanctions on Russia would also enable the country to leverage Western finance and technology in its Arctic development projects.

Another important factor in the deal is that before the onset of war in Ukraine, the world’s largest energy companies, led by US oil giants Exxon, Chevron, and Conoco, were working on developing some of Russia’s largest Arctic energy reserves, but were forced to leave because of US war sanctions, leaving billions in investments on the table.

Most Western energy companies want to return, while Putin has made it abundantly clear that if the war ends, he would be glad to welcome them back.

The access of US corporations to Arctic development could also increase commercial trade shipping efficiency across the top of the world, offering the shortest commercial route to circumnavigate the globe, along with the prospects for enormous mineral wealth.

Ironically, Trump, a confirmed climate change denier, is eager to invest billions of federal funds in the obvious fact of glaciers melting and reduced ice that underlies the opening of the Arctic Sea to commercial traffic and exploration.

Although Goldstein’s plan is full of rich prospects for both the US and Russia, there are strong obstacles to this scenario.

One of the most important is that Europe feels itself far more threatened by the war on its doorstep than does its US ally, and because of that, continues to be Ukraine’s strongest supporter, while Putin has made it plain that although he’s ready to end the war, that will only occur on his terms.

Russia wants peace; the US desperately seeks a ceasefire. For Russia, peace means that the US dismantle its missile bases in Poland and Romania, no NATO membership or western weapons in Ukraine, a large reduction of Ukraine’s army and long-range weapons, acceptance of Russia’s territorial gains, including Crimea, ending of US/EU sanctions, and eventually negotiations between Russia and the US towards new treaties on strategic arms.

The US peace proposal also calls for ‘a long-term economic cooperation agreement aimed at mutual development in the fields of energy, natural resources, infrastructure, artificial intelligence, data-processing centers, rare-earth mining projects in the Arctic, and other mutually beneficial corporate opportunities.’

Trump badly needs a resolution of the war that he boastfully promised to end on his first day in office. Many ‘American Firsters’ supported him on that promise, while his MAGA base fiercely opposes US involvement in foreign wars.

With a bi-election only a few months off, Trump is fully aware that he is vulnerable to attacks from the Democrats and some of his own supporters on his failure to deliver on his promise to end the war.

So it comes as no surprise that the Trump Administration is currently placing enormous pressure on Ukraine, its government weakened by a corruption scandal, to accept a 28-point plan that closely follows the naval officers' plans.

The plan also clearly echoes most of the Russian core demands. Some Republican Senators claim that Secretary of State Rubio described the plan as ‘a Russian wish list,’ although Rubio now denies he said that.

In a word, the plan calls for Ukraine’s complete surrender.

The big question now is, can an obscure naval officer’s plan change the course of war or is this just another quick answer to what might be a very long problem?

By Robert Berke for Oilprice.com