The EU’s Ukraine Strategy: The Worst Foreign Policy Blunder In European History Since WWII?
Image by European Commission (Dati Bendo), Creative Commons 4.0For more than three and a half years now, Ukraine – and with it the so-called ‘West’ – have been paralyzed by a dreadful, protracted war of attrition against Russia, and Europe is collectively heading into a hurtful military, political and economic defeat. This article reveals a series of pitfalls of European diplomacy allowing the EU to be held hostage by U.S. great power politics.
In a rather shortsighted move, Europe (with the sole exception of Switzerland) has aligned on a strategic path, designed by the U.S. to serve American interests and has jeopardized, if not completely relinquished, any residue of autonomous reasoning and decision-making. Of course, by building and stocking up their own arsenals, EU member states will achieve some degree of tactical leverage. However, what remains is the strategic alignment with (what used to be) US policy. In some form of collective cognitive dissonance, Europe, again, has permitted letting itself be dragged into yet another unnecessary and devastating war, causing tremendous human suffering and security risks as well as global political and economic havoc. By blindly falling in line with the Biden-administration’s provocation of this conflict, Europeans yielded their independent actorness and any remaining diplomatic clout. In conclusion, this chapter will try and point towards a potential exit strategy for the present quagmire.
Also in academic debates, we are witnessing a revival of wartime narratives, characterized by antagonistic, mutually exclusive and even hostile discussion, leaving no middle ground, no room for compromise; and that much rather displays a partisan logic, zero-sum game, and entrenched antagonism. Therefore, an underlying problem exposed by this article is the lack of debate about the scope and direction of EU foreign policy. Re-arming or militarizing Europe has become central to EU policy, with alternatives being almost instantly discounted. Accepted points of debate within the EU focus only on the most effective ways to “ReArm EU” rather than the meaning and consequences of such a strategy.
Literature on policy-making in times of crisis, connected to decision-making in EU foreign policy and “presidentialization” as a concentration of power at the top of the hierarchical level, explains the foreign policy choices by EU-leaders. The perception of crisis creates momentum for centralization of decision-making at the top of government hierarchies (Dahlström et al., 2011; Furness et al., 2019; Sperling, J., and M. Webber, 2019). The prospect of war has the effect of focussing policy debates on a narrow range of issues perceived to be at the heart of the crisis. A perceived security threat would clearly represent such a crisis, which favours the centralization of decision-making at the political helm, endowing leaders with exceptional powers – a classical feature of politics in the time of war. Leaders, on the other hand, know about and consciously use such narratives of crisis and emergencies to bestow special powers on themselves. Hence, there is a two-way centralization bias resulting from and framing political phenomena as a crisis, or a so-called “unprovoked war of aggression”.
For more than three and a half years now, Ukraine – and with it the so-called ‘West’ – have been paralyzed by a dreadful, protracted war of attrition against Russia, and Europe is collectively heading into a hurtful military, political and economic defeat. This article reveals a series of pitfalls of European diplomacy allowing the EU to be held hostage by U.S. great power politics.
In a rather shortsighted move, Europe (with the sole exception of Switzerland) has aligned on a strategic path, designed by the U.S. to serve American interests and has jeopardized, if not completely relinquished, any residue of autonomous reasoning and decision-making. Of course, by building and stocking up their own arsenals, EU member states will achieve some degree of tactical leverage. However, what remains is the strategic alignment with (what used to be) US policy. In some form of collective cognitive dissonance, Europe, again, has permitted letting itself be dragged into yet another unnecessary and devastating war, causing tremendous human suffering and security risks as well as global political and economic havoc. By blindly falling in line with the Biden-administration’s provocation of this conflict, Europeans yielded their independent actorness and any remaining diplomatic clout. In conclusion, this chapter will try and point towards a potential exit strategy for the present quagmire.
Also in academic debates, we are witnessing a revival of wartime narratives, characterized by antagonistic, mutually exclusive and even hostile discussion, leaving no middle ground, no room for compromise; and that much rather displays a partisan logic, zero-sum game, and entrenched antagonism. Therefore, an underlying problem exposed by this article is the lack of debate about the scope and direction of EU foreign policy. Re-arming or militarizing Europe has become central to EU policy, with alternatives being almost instantly discounted. Accepted points of debate within the EU focus only on the most effective ways to “ReArm EU” rather than the meaning and consequences of such a strategy.
Literature on policy-making in times of crisis, connected to decision-making in EU foreign policy and “presidentialization” as a concentration of power at the top of the hierarchical level, explains the foreign policy choices by EU-leaders. The perception of crisis creates momentum for centralization of decision-making at the top of government hierarchies (Dahlström et al., 2011; Furness et al., 2019; Sperling, J., and M. Webber, 2019). The prospect of war has the effect of focussing policy debates on a narrow range of issues perceived to be at the heart of the crisis. A perceived security threat would clearly represent such a crisis, which favours the centralization of decision-making at the political helm, endowing leaders with exceptional powers – a classical feature of politics in the time of war. Leaders, on the other hand, know about and consciously use such narratives of crisis and emergencies to bestow special powers on themselves. Hence, there is a two-way centralization bias resulting from and framing political phenomena as a crisis, or a so-called “unprovoked war of aggression”.
The EU’s very own Stalingrad?
According to prominent voices, although marginalized in the dominant IR-discourse, such as John J. Mearsheimer (2014, 2022), Stephen M. Walt (2022), Jeffrey Sachs (2022, 2025), Glenn Diesen (2022, 2024), Jacques Baud, Daniele Ganser or Johannes Varwick (2023), the course of events was foreseeable, and the West has to assume its share of responsibility for Russia’s attack on Ukraine. In this perspective, the present situation is the logical consequence of path-dependent behaviour, resulting in a perfect lock-in of the actors involved. Already 2008, when NATO announced that Ukraine and Georgia would eventually join the alliance at their summit in Bucharest, Putin made it crystal clear that Russia was never going to accept this expansion of the Western military bloc right at its doorstep (Mearsheimer 2022). This unambiguous warning by Russia was simply – and shamelessly – ignored, with the catastrophic consequences the Ukrainian and the Russian people have to bear and are paying the price for with their blood. The EU got dragged into this cataclysm by US imperialist self-interest, with the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) becoming a fig-leave for transatlantic great-power ambitions. If not already sufficiently demonstrated in 2008 and 2011, today the ENP turns out to be a total and utter failure, leading to a series of distressed states and societies in the Southern neighbourhood producing terror and mass-migration and a devastating war in the Eastern neighbourhood, causing immense human suffering and a black hole for billions of Euros in military and monetary aid.
For the Biden administration and for the United Kingdom, Ukraine was merely a pawn in a much bigger geostrategic plot, along the tune of Lord Rothschild’s message to the UK government from 02 March 2012:
“The world order will not survive without Ukraine. We must bring Russia to its knees by any means necessary to send a clear and unambiguous signal to our enemies.”
“Ukraine is a necessary thing that we cannot afford to lose on the geopolitical chessboard. In essence, our current path of no hostilities means that our global project is dead.”
“I demand from you to send more forces against Russia and its satellites, step up the “information war” to correct public opinion and send weapons to our friends in Ukraine.”
Now that the US under President Donald Trump is oscillating between pulling out from and a somehow limited engagement in the war effort in Ukraine, the EU risks to stand alone with its support to Kiev. Trump, while struggling with US hawks, deep state and neocon war profiteers, wants to look like a “deal maker” while avoiding the impression of appearing as a weak leader, giving in to Vladimir Putin.
To explain why and how Europe (read: the EU and Norway) has got trapped in a proxy-war against Russia, one needs to adopt a realist’s perspective and soberly look at the historic context of the EU’s external policy and its relations with its wider neighbourhood over the last two decades. This lens will help understanding how dramatically the EU has changed as an actor in response to the Ukraine war. Without questioning the US premises and logics behind the war against Russia, Germany (echoed by the rest of the EU) announced “Zeitenwende”, and Europe went straight into fueling this catastrophic conflict – yielding parts of its sovereignty and acting contrary to its own best interest.
Siding with the US and UK doctrine of dealing a decisive blow to Russia can hardly be qualified “strategic autonomy”. What the EU has achieved is a subaltern autonomy, as main funder (and thereby fueller) of the war. It can now send more weapons from US manufacturers to Ukraine. What “Zeitenwende” actually meant for Europe, was some sort of silent merger between EU and NATO and acting against its own political and economic interest. The UK had been on board from the beginning, but one may merely second-guess, why Germany was so wilfully promoting war; possibly, because Germany has no room for independent foreign policy-making, at least not where it matters.
Since then, life in Europe itself is no longer as self-evident as it seemed decades ago. European values and way of life, and especially democracy as a political system, with its checks and balances, have come under attack. Shamefully, the better part of this attack on European values comes from within and from the top of the political leadership. Prosperity and a decent standard of living is becoming a fairy from the past for more and more EU citizens. In part this may be due to a decade of austerity, but this loss in standard of living has been drastically accelerated by the unconditional (financial) support of Ukraine and the sanctions against Russia. According to the “Ukraine Aid Tracker” by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy of June 1st 2025, Ukraine received a flabbergasting 156.1 bn Euro from the EU and its member states (compared to 114.6 bn from the US), as of 1 June 2025. (Another 335 bn Euro, left over from the Covid-recovery fund, are yet to be channeled into the conflict by the Von-der-Leyen Commission.) And the (so far) 19 packages of economic sanctions-imposed on Russia hit, first and foremost, the Europeans themselves, with energy prices soaring and entire sectors of industries tanking.
According to prominent voices, although marginalized in the dominant IR-discourse, such as John J. Mearsheimer (2014, 2022), Stephen M. Walt (2022), Jeffrey Sachs (2022, 2025), Glenn Diesen (2022, 2024), Jacques Baud, Daniele Ganser or Johannes Varwick (2023), the course of events was foreseeable, and the West has to assume its share of responsibility for Russia’s attack on Ukraine. In this perspective, the present situation is the logical consequence of path-dependent behaviour, resulting in a perfect lock-in of the actors involved. Already 2008, when NATO announced that Ukraine and Georgia would eventually join the alliance at their summit in Bucharest, Putin made it crystal clear that Russia was never going to accept this expansion of the Western military bloc right at its doorstep (Mearsheimer 2022). This unambiguous warning by Russia was simply – and shamelessly – ignored, with the catastrophic consequences the Ukrainian and the Russian people have to bear and are paying the price for with their blood. The EU got dragged into this cataclysm by US imperialist self-interest, with the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) becoming a fig-leave for transatlantic great-power ambitions. If not already sufficiently demonstrated in 2008 and 2011, today the ENP turns out to be a total and utter failure, leading to a series of distressed states and societies in the Southern neighbourhood producing terror and mass-migration and a devastating war in the Eastern neighbourhood, causing immense human suffering and a black hole for billions of Euros in military and monetary aid.
For the Biden administration and for the United Kingdom, Ukraine was merely a pawn in a much bigger geostrategic plot, along the tune of Lord Rothschild’s message to the UK government from 02 March 2012:
“The world order will not survive without Ukraine. We must bring Russia to its knees by any means necessary to send a clear and unambiguous signal to our enemies.”
“Ukraine is a necessary thing that we cannot afford to lose on the geopolitical chessboard. In essence, our current path of no hostilities means that our global project is dead.”
“I demand from you to send more forces against Russia and its satellites, step up the “information war” to correct public opinion and send weapons to our friends in Ukraine.”
Now that the US under President Donald Trump is oscillating between pulling out from and a somehow limited engagement in the war effort in Ukraine, the EU risks to stand alone with its support to Kiev. Trump, while struggling with US hawks, deep state and neocon war profiteers, wants to look like a “deal maker” while avoiding the impression of appearing as a weak leader, giving in to Vladimir Putin.
To explain why and how Europe (read: the EU and Norway) has got trapped in a proxy-war against Russia, one needs to adopt a realist’s perspective and soberly look at the historic context of the EU’s external policy and its relations with its wider neighbourhood over the last two decades. This lens will help understanding how dramatically the EU has changed as an actor in response to the Ukraine war. Without questioning the US premises and logics behind the war against Russia, Germany (echoed by the rest of the EU) announced “Zeitenwende”, and Europe went straight into fueling this catastrophic conflict – yielding parts of its sovereignty and acting contrary to its own best interest.
Siding with the US and UK doctrine of dealing a decisive blow to Russia can hardly be qualified “strategic autonomy”. What the EU has achieved is a subaltern autonomy, as main funder (and thereby fueller) of the war. It can now send more weapons from US manufacturers to Ukraine. What “Zeitenwende” actually meant for Europe, was some sort of silent merger between EU and NATO and acting against its own political and economic interest. The UK had been on board from the beginning, but one may merely second-guess, why Germany was so wilfully promoting war; possibly, because Germany has no room for independent foreign policy-making, at least not where it matters.
Since then, life in Europe itself is no longer as self-evident as it seemed decades ago. European values and way of life, and especially democracy as a political system, with its checks and balances, have come under attack. Shamefully, the better part of this attack on European values comes from within and from the top of the political leadership. Prosperity and a decent standard of living is becoming a fairy from the past for more and more EU citizens. In part this may be due to a decade of austerity, but this loss in standard of living has been drastically accelerated by the unconditional (financial) support of Ukraine and the sanctions against Russia. According to the “Ukraine Aid Tracker” by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy of June 1st 2025, Ukraine received a flabbergasting 156.1 bn Euro from the EU and its member states (compared to 114.6 bn from the US), as of 1 June 2025. (Another 335 bn Euro, left over from the Covid-recovery fund, are yet to be channeled into the conflict by the Von-der-Leyen Commission.) And the (so far) 19 packages of economic sanctions-imposed on Russia hit, first and foremost, the Europeans themselves, with energy prices soaring and entire sectors of industries tanking.
Whatever happened to the EU as a peace project?
Worst of all, the nightmare of war, which seemed unthinkable for 21st century Europe, turned into a real possibility with all the rhetoric and even preparation in a number of EU member states. It is unforgivable that the EU did not take the security concerns repeatedly raised by Vladimir Putin serious enough – nor did it honor its own commitment vis-à-vis Russia, the Minsk agreements. Europe’s dependence on Russian oil and gas, caused in part by the economic interests of big heavily industrialized countries such as Germany, but also based on the assumption that trade with Russia could foster the development of peaceful relations in the long term, was suddenly radically aborted. At the same time, also the weakness of the EU’s own defence capacities, its vulnerability and security dependence on the US are on display. There has been presidentializaton (to put it mildly) of, amongst other, foreign policy, with Ursula von der Leyen (even though facing her second no-confidence vote by the European Parliament) exercising nearly unchecked power from the upper-most level of the executive. One might speak of anti-democratic tendencies or even an autocratic turn in the EU under Von der Leyen, that at the latest began or took a clear shape in the COVID pandemic. From this onwards, we witness an authoritarian slide of the EU.
Other actors, like the European External Action Service and its unfortunate former High Representative Josep Borrell had been largely marginalized. This changed under the leadership of Kaja Kallas, excelling in Russophobia and escalation. Among the most arduous war mongers, beside the EU Commission figure the UK, France and Germany, Poland (depending who is governing) and the Baltic states. And they completely cancelled any record of the origins of the conflict, dating back at least to 2014. Over time, the European Union turned into a branch of NATO, and foreign policy-wise put under direct control by the United States. Democracy and accountability in the EU have been set on stand-by. Nowadays, the EU stands for limiting freedom of expression, and oppression of dissenting opinions. Today’s EU is a clear threat to democracy, and peace and prosperity. Politically, the state of the Union transpires the total absence of strategic thinking – and moral standards.
There is a gloomy scenario on the horizon, where democracy and civil liberties could succumb to the pressures of an increasingly authoritarian EU. And citizens would in large numbers begin to accept repressive structures and a clamp-down on democracy and free speech justified on the grounds of wartime priorities and prerogatives. The use of the Digital Service Act and the European Democracy Shield by the EU-Commission for the purpose of surveillance and silencing citizens is a case in point. But also, the space for academic debate has been considerably narrowed. As the war between Russia and Ukraine is framed by the ruling elites, so-called experts and commentators as part of struggle between democracy and autocracy (good vs. evil), the quality of discourse in the West has taken a hit. Respected academics throughout the West have been smeared and ignored. If we look at the reality, democracy is not doing so well in Ukraine either – not to mention the colossal problem of corruption in the country – as Kremlin mouthpieces, subjected to harassment, marginalization and defamation.
Gone are the days of the EU being a credible broker in international conflicts. Instead, the EU has gotten itself involved in a devastating war, explicitly siding with and materially supporting Ukraine, more precisely its extreme right leadership. While enormous costs are inflicted on civilian populations by western-financed hostilities (at the expense of the European taxpayers), and to the benefit of the military-industrial complex, EU leaders fail to make an effort to push for immediate peace talks in both Ukraine and Israel. Is it not the first task of diplomacy to work for the non-violent resolution of conflicts? In contrast, European statesmen are piling up arsenals of deadly weapons, ultimately prolonging and intensifying the dreadful bloodshed. For those who seem to have forgotten that the EU is not NATO, and should not be instrumentalized to adopt, implement and finance US and NATO policies, they need to be reminded of the ruins of WWII from which the European idea emerged. War is not the spirit of the EU treaties, but peace, even though the EU today seems to be transitioning from being a “normative power” (Manners 2002) to a military power. In the case of Ukraine, the EU could (and should) make it a condition for any kind of further support to Kiev to engage in negotiations to end the war.
There is no doubt that the process of European integration made an important contribution to the long-lasting period of peace in Europe. To many, it seemed that the process of enlargement would take place gradually and orderly and that the sphere of peace and prosperity would continue to expand. However, the situation has changed significantly in this millennium with several crucial internal and external challenges. For the EU it has been a decade of crisis, and the war as well is taking its toll. The consequences of the sanctions packages are having a high price for Europe. At the same time a new cluster of power centers emerges, in the shape of ascending geopolitical players (BRICS+, notably Russia, China, India, Turkey) – as well as the erratic behaviour of the EU’s transatlantic ally, the USA, e.g. President Trump’s erratic tariff policy. Even before the Russia’s arguably retaliative special military operation against Ukraine, Russia has made a systematic effort to champion a multipolar world order, which disrupts the agency of the EU and its allies. While Russia does not have the capabilities to directly oppose NATO expansion nor any interest in preventing EU expansion, it has been suspected of undermining the democratic ideals of the EU through hybrid warfare, promotion of post-truth narratives and support for reform-oriented political forces, most of which has turned out as being Western (US and EU/NATO) deception. There is no “realism à la carte”, not even for Europe.
Worst of all, the nightmare of war, which seemed unthinkable for 21st century Europe, turned into a real possibility with all the rhetoric and even preparation in a number of EU member states. It is unforgivable that the EU did not take the security concerns repeatedly raised by Vladimir Putin serious enough – nor did it honor its own commitment vis-à-vis Russia, the Minsk agreements. Europe’s dependence on Russian oil and gas, caused in part by the economic interests of big heavily industrialized countries such as Germany, but also based on the assumption that trade with Russia could foster the development of peaceful relations in the long term, was suddenly radically aborted. At the same time, also the weakness of the EU’s own defence capacities, its vulnerability and security dependence on the US are on display. There has been presidentializaton (to put it mildly) of, amongst other, foreign policy, with Ursula von der Leyen (even though facing her second no-confidence vote by the European Parliament) exercising nearly unchecked power from the upper-most level of the executive. One might speak of anti-democratic tendencies or even an autocratic turn in the EU under Von der Leyen, that at the latest began or took a clear shape in the COVID pandemic. From this onwards, we witness an authoritarian slide of the EU.
Other actors, like the European External Action Service and its unfortunate former High Representative Josep Borrell had been largely marginalized. This changed under the leadership of Kaja Kallas, excelling in Russophobia and escalation. Among the most arduous war mongers, beside the EU Commission figure the UK, France and Germany, Poland (depending who is governing) and the Baltic states. And they completely cancelled any record of the origins of the conflict, dating back at least to 2014. Over time, the European Union turned into a branch of NATO, and foreign policy-wise put under direct control by the United States. Democracy and accountability in the EU have been set on stand-by. Nowadays, the EU stands for limiting freedom of expression, and oppression of dissenting opinions. Today’s EU is a clear threat to democracy, and peace and prosperity. Politically, the state of the Union transpires the total absence of strategic thinking – and moral standards.
There is a gloomy scenario on the horizon, where democracy and civil liberties could succumb to the pressures of an increasingly authoritarian EU. And citizens would in large numbers begin to accept repressive structures and a clamp-down on democracy and free speech justified on the grounds of wartime priorities and prerogatives. The use of the Digital Service Act and the European Democracy Shield by the EU-Commission for the purpose of surveillance and silencing citizens is a case in point. But also, the space for academic debate has been considerably narrowed. As the war between Russia and Ukraine is framed by the ruling elites, so-called experts and commentators as part of struggle between democracy and autocracy (good vs. evil), the quality of discourse in the West has taken a hit. Respected academics throughout the West have been smeared and ignored. If we look at the reality, democracy is not doing so well in Ukraine either – not to mention the colossal problem of corruption in the country – as Kremlin mouthpieces, subjected to harassment, marginalization and defamation.
Gone are the days of the EU being a credible broker in international conflicts. Instead, the EU has gotten itself involved in a devastating war, explicitly siding with and materially supporting Ukraine, more precisely its extreme right leadership. While enormous costs are inflicted on civilian populations by western-financed hostilities (at the expense of the European taxpayers), and to the benefit of the military-industrial complex, EU leaders fail to make an effort to push for immediate peace talks in both Ukraine and Israel. Is it not the first task of diplomacy to work for the non-violent resolution of conflicts? In contrast, European statesmen are piling up arsenals of deadly weapons, ultimately prolonging and intensifying the dreadful bloodshed. For those who seem to have forgotten that the EU is not NATO, and should not be instrumentalized to adopt, implement and finance US and NATO policies, they need to be reminded of the ruins of WWII from which the European idea emerged. War is not the spirit of the EU treaties, but peace, even though the EU today seems to be transitioning from being a “normative power” (Manners 2002) to a military power. In the case of Ukraine, the EU could (and should) make it a condition for any kind of further support to Kiev to engage in negotiations to end the war.
There is no doubt that the process of European integration made an important contribution to the long-lasting period of peace in Europe. To many, it seemed that the process of enlargement would take place gradually and orderly and that the sphere of peace and prosperity would continue to expand. However, the situation has changed significantly in this millennium with several crucial internal and external challenges. For the EU it has been a decade of crisis, and the war as well is taking its toll. The consequences of the sanctions packages are having a high price for Europe. At the same time a new cluster of power centers emerges, in the shape of ascending geopolitical players (BRICS+, notably Russia, China, India, Turkey) – as well as the erratic behaviour of the EU’s transatlantic ally, the USA, e.g. President Trump’s erratic tariff policy. Even before the Russia’s arguably retaliative special military operation against Ukraine, Russia has made a systematic effort to champion a multipolar world order, which disrupts the agency of the EU and its allies. While Russia does not have the capabilities to directly oppose NATO expansion nor any interest in preventing EU expansion, it has been suspected of undermining the democratic ideals of the EU through hybrid warfare, promotion of post-truth narratives and support for reform-oriented political forces, most of which has turned out as being Western (US and EU/NATO) deception. There is no “realism à la carte”, not even for Europe.
European delusion
Russia’s leadership cannot afford losing the war it was forced into – and Russia will not lose, and literally cannot lose it, not least since it is a nuclear power. Time is on its side, and the contestation of the international liberal order by the BRICS+ countries plays in Russia’s favour. US military and financial support to Ukraine may come at a high price or even to a full stop under the presidency of Donald Trump, and the EU/NATO-alliance is facing a crushing defeat in its proxy-war. The EU and (European) NATO have virtually merged, and both of them seem to have tied their destiny entirely to Ukraine. This is a zero-sum game that is not only very harmful – but also extremely dangerous. There is the risk of a wider war with devastating consequences, and also institutionally for the EU (and NATO), since if they fail in helping Ukraine prevail, they will face an existential threat and maybe their decomposition. This connects to realist thinking in that the prime objective of states – and entities like the EU – is self-preservation, securing their own survival. EU, more so than NATO seem to have put their carriage before the horses. It clearly turns out to be rather backfiring premise to say: Putin attacks our European values in Ukraine (which he does not), and if Ukraine loses, we will be berobbed of our values.
And Russia is by no means isolated, it is actively engaging with the BRICS+ group countries, notably with powerful players such as China, India or Brazil. China, in turn, has long sought to reshape the primary and secondary institutions of the current international system via the promotion of a new narrative about the ideal future of a multipolar global international society. Most recently the Eastern giant became more assertive in contesting the status-quo of international relations and in proposing an alternative world order, openly challenging the ILO dominated by the Western (NATO-)powers, namely the US and its allies, most notably the UK, Norway, and the EU. It may rather be, that the US needs the Russia-threat to keep its alliance together, because an economic or political cooperation between Russia and European countries, especially Germany is not in the American interest. The destruction of the NordStream pipelines by the US (and/or its proxies) is a clear example for this neocon calculus. Russia, in close coordination with China, is also pushing for a multipolar international order and works actively towards a de-dollarization of the global economy, trading with China and others in local currencies. This could have far reaching consequences weakening the standing of the US in external trade and finance, as it would no longer be in a position to offset its fiscal deficit by limitless emission of treasury bonds, hitherto bought by economies all over the world. China alone has been selling off its dollar holdings at a value of 400 bn US$ over the last couple of months.
However, the US are still the word’s superpower and able to impose its will economically, e.g through sanctions, tariffs and militarily, potentially projecting protection and deterrence. Europe, on the other hand, has for decades presumably benefitted from (some even say, it has been free-riding on) US military capacity and capitalized an economic peace dividend. Now, at this perceived or pretended point of “Zeitenwende” this passive approach to security and defence is said to backfire, and Europe has to move out of its comfort-zone, taking responsibility for protecting and guaranteeing the viability of its model of liberal democratic governance and economic prosperity. And in this reasoning, Europe forever vows its allegiance to the US, come hell or high water. Even if this means to wreck its own industrial base and national economies.
Concomitantly, we observe the rise of some sort of imperial attitude among EU-elites, pretending to fight what Brussels perceives as ideological extremism or anti-liberal populism that questions some elements of “European values”. This phenomenon is even more problematic since Eastern European countries frequently are still unconsolidated or ‘unsettled’ democracies as well as economically vulnerable countries, unable to defend themselves against EU feudalism and arrogance. The EU’s autocratic turn under von der Leyen disqualifies it to act as model for democracy and the rule of law. Brussels has been unmasked as a hotbed of anti-democratic rule, corruption and mismanagement, as well as meddling in national elections and circumcising national sovereignty (e.g. the Romanian presidential election of 2024/25). The feeling of institutional ineffectiveness is particularly strong in the candidate countries, where the bureaucratic burden of EU “criteria” is experienced as particularly pressing. The so-called ‘enlargement momentum’ has abated considerably, and the EU is no longer perceived as a credible crisis manager or even moderator. While measures relevant to consolidating the functioning of democratic institutions is crucial for the enlargement process, interference with democratic processes is of little help in this endeavor. The genuine political efforts to silence critical voices have fueled the resentment of Brussels and its agenda. This is why we are witnessing the decreasing power of attraction of the European model of democracy over the last decade or so. And this erosion of democracy is manifest not just within candidate countries but also in the Union itself, especially with von der Leyen’s second term. The consequence of these problematic developments is the weakening of the European Union as a global promoter of freedom and democracy, which opens room of maneuver for geopolitical actors, such as the BRICS+, to expand their influence and implement their agenda more easily.
Russia’s leadership cannot afford losing the war it was forced into – and Russia will not lose, and literally cannot lose it, not least since it is a nuclear power. Time is on its side, and the contestation of the international liberal order by the BRICS+ countries plays in Russia’s favour. US military and financial support to Ukraine may come at a high price or even to a full stop under the presidency of Donald Trump, and the EU/NATO-alliance is facing a crushing defeat in its proxy-war. The EU and (European) NATO have virtually merged, and both of them seem to have tied their destiny entirely to Ukraine. This is a zero-sum game that is not only very harmful – but also extremely dangerous. There is the risk of a wider war with devastating consequences, and also institutionally for the EU (and NATO), since if they fail in helping Ukraine prevail, they will face an existential threat and maybe their decomposition. This connects to realist thinking in that the prime objective of states – and entities like the EU – is self-preservation, securing their own survival. EU, more so than NATO seem to have put their carriage before the horses. It clearly turns out to be rather backfiring premise to say: Putin attacks our European values in Ukraine (which he does not), and if Ukraine loses, we will be berobbed of our values.
And Russia is by no means isolated, it is actively engaging with the BRICS+ group countries, notably with powerful players such as China, India or Brazil. China, in turn, has long sought to reshape the primary and secondary institutions of the current international system via the promotion of a new narrative about the ideal future of a multipolar global international society. Most recently the Eastern giant became more assertive in contesting the status-quo of international relations and in proposing an alternative world order, openly challenging the ILO dominated by the Western (NATO-)powers, namely the US and its allies, most notably the UK, Norway, and the EU. It may rather be, that the US needs the Russia-threat to keep its alliance together, because an economic or political cooperation between Russia and European countries, especially Germany is not in the American interest. The destruction of the NordStream pipelines by the US (and/or its proxies) is a clear example for this neocon calculus. Russia, in close coordination with China, is also pushing for a multipolar international order and works actively towards a de-dollarization of the global economy, trading with China and others in local currencies. This could have far reaching consequences weakening the standing of the US in external trade and finance, as it would no longer be in a position to offset its fiscal deficit by limitless emission of treasury bonds, hitherto bought by economies all over the world. China alone has been selling off its dollar holdings at a value of 400 bn US$ over the last couple of months.
However, the US are still the word’s superpower and able to impose its will economically, e.g through sanctions, tariffs and militarily, potentially projecting protection and deterrence. Europe, on the other hand, has for decades presumably benefitted from (some even say, it has been free-riding on) US military capacity and capitalized an economic peace dividend. Now, at this perceived or pretended point of “Zeitenwende” this passive approach to security and defence is said to backfire, and Europe has to move out of its comfort-zone, taking responsibility for protecting and guaranteeing the viability of its model of liberal democratic governance and economic prosperity. And in this reasoning, Europe forever vows its allegiance to the US, come hell or high water. Even if this means to wreck its own industrial base and national economies.
Concomitantly, we observe the rise of some sort of imperial attitude among EU-elites, pretending to fight what Brussels perceives as ideological extremism or anti-liberal populism that questions some elements of “European values”. This phenomenon is even more problematic since Eastern European countries frequently are still unconsolidated or ‘unsettled’ democracies as well as economically vulnerable countries, unable to defend themselves against EU feudalism and arrogance. The EU’s autocratic turn under von der Leyen disqualifies it to act as model for democracy and the rule of law. Brussels has been unmasked as a hotbed of anti-democratic rule, corruption and mismanagement, as well as meddling in national elections and circumcising national sovereignty (e.g. the Romanian presidential election of 2024/25). The feeling of institutional ineffectiveness is particularly strong in the candidate countries, where the bureaucratic burden of EU “criteria” is experienced as particularly pressing. The so-called ‘enlargement momentum’ has abated considerably, and the EU is no longer perceived as a credible crisis manager or even moderator. While measures relevant to consolidating the functioning of democratic institutions is crucial for the enlargement process, interference with democratic processes is of little help in this endeavor. The genuine political efforts to silence critical voices have fueled the resentment of Brussels and its agenda. This is why we are witnessing the decreasing power of attraction of the European model of democracy over the last decade or so. And this erosion of democracy is manifest not just within candidate countries but also in the Union itself, especially with von der Leyen’s second term. The consequence of these problematic developments is the weakening of the European Union as a global promoter of freedom and democracy, which opens room of maneuver for geopolitical actors, such as the BRICS+, to expand their influence and implement their agenda more easily.
Realism à la carte
For the past three years EU/NATO countries sent hundreds of billions’ worth of arms to Ukraine, a quantity of weapons so enormous it depleted their own reserves, and a vast undisclosed number of mercenary soldiers was deployed; and they applied the whole arsenal in terms of sanctions to cripple Russia economically. The result? It simply didn’t work. Without the US, NATO countries will now have to work on a peace deal, and Ukraine will probably end up having lost at least a fifth of its territory, half the size of the UK. All this after having been told during almost the entire duration of the war that Ukraine was winning. Of course, people will be told that it’s not a defeat, merely a “stalemate”, that NATO comes out of it reinforced with additional members, that it’s Ukraine or Zelensky’s fault anyhow. But the crux of the matter is NATO defined an extremely clear objective – which was to “drive Russians back to pre-invasion lines” to directly quote Anthony Blinken – and that failed miserably despite their unprecedented efforts. Which means that the West is much weaker than they thought they were, they just couldn’t collectively defeat Russia. This has immense implications. First of which being: if they can’t defeat Russia, what hope do they have against China which is likely – just looking at metrics (number of people, production capacity, military budget, etc.) – at least 5 times more powerful than Russia? The answer is obvious. Another one is that all those places around the world who thought they were protected by the US will start (in fact, they are already starting) to ask themselves difficult and serious questions: “Can we rely on that promise of military protection?” We will witness very significant shifts of alliances and defence arrangements. Lastly, people in Western countries will at some point wake up from their propaganda haze and ask very simple questions like: why did we ruin ourselves for Ukraine with virtually nothing to show for? Wouldn’t we and the Ukrainians have been better off if we had respected Minsk 2 and if we hadn’t tried to convert Ukraine into a Western bulwark against Russia? And so, this will likely serve as a hard lesson domestically that we should rather be much humbler about our geopolitical ambitions (assuming the West still is capable of learning lessons, which is far from certain). All in all, this will undoubtedly be seen by history as the defining event that signified that we moved from Western hegemony into a multipolar world. A very long chapter of our collective world history book has just been closed, 500 years of Western hegemony is about to end.
Mainstream ideas that influence EU foreign policy have always sidelined the importance of realism. With the von der Leyen Commission, the EU, at least declaratively, emphasized the importance of geopolitics. However, this implied a certain understanding of geopolitics which is somewhat patronizing and ignores the way power is distributed in the world order, as well as the claims and perspectives of other important actors, such as Russia or China. One could say the EU pretended to accept that geopolitics and realism play a key role but has not yet come to terms with the way realism shapes international relations. Rather, it ignores parts of reality that are uncomfortable and brands alternative ideas as evil, wrong, or as “misinformation”. This refers to both more intellectual voices as well as the views of other international actors. Even though the Von der Leyen Commission conceives itself as a “geopolitical Commission” and presumably adopted a realist approach to external policies, the way the EU-leadership is applying the notion of realism to its version of geopolitics, very much looks like “realism à la carte”, a menu to pick and choose from to one’s own liking, as is the case in the ENP or in the EU’s approach to the BRICS+. The consequence is a behavioural pattern that EU policy is not based on realist assessments of the distribution of power in the world but on misguided hope, arrogance, and virtue signaling. In practice, this results in a chaotic strategy, where any alternative view, both from inside the EU and more importantly outside, is seen as a threat. Hasty militarization or re-arming is a key example of this chaotic response.
Instead, the EU should accept Ukraine’s imminent defeat and demand general elections in the country. A new and legitimate leadership in Kiev could be trustworthy to enter serious peace-negotiations with Russia. Otherwise, Europe should stay out of this conflict; no more arms shipments, no more threateningRussia, no more meddling with Ukrainian politics, and no more arms race.
For the past three years EU/NATO countries sent hundreds of billions’ worth of arms to Ukraine, a quantity of weapons so enormous it depleted their own reserves, and a vast undisclosed number of mercenary soldiers was deployed; and they applied the whole arsenal in terms of sanctions to cripple Russia economically. The result? It simply didn’t work. Without the US, NATO countries will now have to work on a peace deal, and Ukraine will probably end up having lost at least a fifth of its territory, half the size of the UK. All this after having been told during almost the entire duration of the war that Ukraine was winning. Of course, people will be told that it’s not a defeat, merely a “stalemate”, that NATO comes out of it reinforced with additional members, that it’s Ukraine or Zelensky’s fault anyhow. But the crux of the matter is NATO defined an extremely clear objective – which was to “drive Russians back to pre-invasion lines” to directly quote Anthony Blinken – and that failed miserably despite their unprecedented efforts. Which means that the West is much weaker than they thought they were, they just couldn’t collectively defeat Russia. This has immense implications. First of which being: if they can’t defeat Russia, what hope do they have against China which is likely – just looking at metrics (number of people, production capacity, military budget, etc.) – at least 5 times more powerful than Russia? The answer is obvious. Another one is that all those places around the world who thought they were protected by the US will start (in fact, they are already starting) to ask themselves difficult and serious questions: “Can we rely on that promise of military protection?” We will witness very significant shifts of alliances and defence arrangements. Lastly, people in Western countries will at some point wake up from their propaganda haze and ask very simple questions like: why did we ruin ourselves for Ukraine with virtually nothing to show for? Wouldn’t we and the Ukrainians have been better off if we had respected Minsk 2 and if we hadn’t tried to convert Ukraine into a Western bulwark against Russia? And so, this will likely serve as a hard lesson domestically that we should rather be much humbler about our geopolitical ambitions (assuming the West still is capable of learning lessons, which is far from certain). All in all, this will undoubtedly be seen by history as the defining event that signified that we moved from Western hegemony into a multipolar world. A very long chapter of our collective world history book has just been closed, 500 years of Western hegemony is about to end.
Mainstream ideas that influence EU foreign policy have always sidelined the importance of realism. With the von der Leyen Commission, the EU, at least declaratively, emphasized the importance of geopolitics. However, this implied a certain understanding of geopolitics which is somewhat patronizing and ignores the way power is distributed in the world order, as well as the claims and perspectives of other important actors, such as Russia or China. One could say the EU pretended to accept that geopolitics and realism play a key role but has not yet come to terms with the way realism shapes international relations. Rather, it ignores parts of reality that are uncomfortable and brands alternative ideas as evil, wrong, or as “misinformation”. This refers to both more intellectual voices as well as the views of other international actors. Even though the Von der Leyen Commission conceives itself as a “geopolitical Commission” and presumably adopted a realist approach to external policies, the way the EU-leadership is applying the notion of realism to its version of geopolitics, very much looks like “realism à la carte”, a menu to pick and choose from to one’s own liking, as is the case in the ENP or in the EU’s approach to the BRICS+. The consequence is a behavioural pattern that EU policy is not based on realist assessments of the distribution of power in the world but on misguided hope, arrogance, and virtue signaling. In practice, this results in a chaotic strategy, where any alternative view, both from inside the EU and more importantly outside, is seen as a threat. Hasty militarization or re-arming is a key example of this chaotic response.
Instead, the EU should accept Ukraine’s imminent defeat and demand general elections in the country. A new and legitimate leadership in Kiev could be trustworthy to enter serious peace-negotiations with Russia. Otherwise, Europe should stay out of this conflict; no more arms shipments, no more threateningRussia, no more meddling with Ukrainian politics, and no more arms race.
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