Tuaregs in Mali and Burkina file ICC complaint against armies, Russian allies
Tuareg associations in Mali and Burkina Faso have filed a complaint with the International Criminal Court against their nations' armies and the Russian paramilitary group, Africa Corps. (FORMERLY WAGNER GROUP)
Issued on: 16/06/2025 -
Several Tuareg community organisations filed a complaint with the office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague on Sunday, according to RFI's correspondent.
The complaint targets the Malian Armed Forces (FAMA), the Burkinabe Forces, and Russian mercenaries from the Africa Corps, which recently replaced the Wagner group in Africa.
The charities Imouhagh International, Kel Akal, Diaspora of the United States, and the Azawad Solidarity Association accuse them of crimes against humanity and war crimes.
Serious crimes
The groups say the crimes against humanity and war crimes reported to the prosecutor of the ICC have been committed in Mali and Burkina Faso since 2022.
They include murders, arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, looting, and torture, including the discovery in April in Kwala, Mali, of 60 bodies of civilians, visibly tortured, according to these organisations.
They point to the use of mercenaries from Africa Corps – the former Wagner – in the repressive operations carried out by the armies of both countries.
Mali's first case
The ICC had already opened an investigation into crimes committed in Mali, following the occupation of Timbuktu in 2012, at the time at the government's own request.
But the departure of French and UN forces - in 2022 and 2024 - has made the court's operations on the ground very difficult.
To investigate the crimes committed in Burkina Faso, the prosecutor would need to secure approval from the ICC judges, unless the Burkinabe government decides to refer the case itself.
With this complaint lodged in The Hague, the four plaintiff organisations say they intend to make "a major political and legal statement" to enable Sahelian victims to obtain "recognition, justice and reparation."
As mercenaries leave Mali, experts say that remaining Kremlin-controlled Africa Corps is more than just ‘Wagner rebranded’.
By Niko Vorobyov
Published 16 Jun 2025
AL JAZEERA
This month, the Russian mercenary outfit Wagner Group announced its total withdrawal from Mali, claiming it had completed its mission after three and a half years of operations in the West African country.
For years, Wagner had been battling rebels and armed groups on behalf of the Malian government, as well as asserting Russia’s interests in the Sahel.
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But as Wagner leaves, security advisers from the Africa Corps, a Kremlin-controlled paramilitary group, will remain in their place, ensuring a lingering presence of Russian forces.
So, what does this change mean for Mali, and is there a difference between the two Russian paramilitary groups and their mission in Africa?
An ‘anti-Western coalition’?
Mali’s government has, for decades, been embroiled in a conflict with ethnic Tuareg separatists in the Sahara Desert, as well as fighters affiliated with ISIL (ISIS) and al-Qaeda.
Previously, French forces assisted the Malian government, but they withdrew after a military coup in 2021. The latest round of fighting erupted in 2023 when Bamako’s military government mounted a new offensive against the rebels.
“The Malian junta invited Wagner and Russia to support them in Mali – this really stemmed from frustration with the [military] support provided by France and other Western partners,” Flore Berger, a senior analyst at the Global Initiative’s North Africa and Sahel Observatory, told Al Jazeera.
“They felt that, despite years of help, the security situation hadn’t improved, and Western countries kept pressuring them to return to civilian rule, organise elections, etc. Russia, through Wagner, on the other hand, offered support without those conditions. It was seen as a more respectful and reliable partner that wouldn’t interfere in Mali’s political choices.”
“Long story short, they break up, and Mali kicks out the French troops … The deployment in Mali was pretty opportunistic, upstaging the West; it was a big black eye for France.”
While Moscow maintained an active presence in Africa during the Cold War, its footprint diminished in the post-communist collapse of the 1990s as Russia dealt with its own problems. But it has been revived in recent years, as President Vladimir Putin has sought a more assertive role on the world stage.
“The original push into Africa largely came through Wagner,” said John Lechner, author of Death Is Our Business: Russian Mercenaries And The New Era Of Private Warfare.
“Over time, as the programme became successful … the interest within the Kremlin more broadly grew, especially after the full-scale war in Ukraine in 2022, when it was a useful narrative that not only is Russia not isolated, but there are African countries that continue to seek its assistance.”
Experts say mercenaries have been a tool of Russian interests in Africa, capitalising on discontent with the former colonial and neocolonial powers, as well as offering security in exchange for resources, especially in the Central African Republic. This was less so in Mali, however, where, despite some small-scale gold mining operations, some Wagnerites were so hard-pressed for cash they were purportedly pictured selling discount canned sardines at local markets. There, the priority was seemingly more about Russian influence over the Sahel.
“Now, it is exclusively a question of geopolitics, ousting the collective West from Africa, creating an anti-Western coalition,” explained Sergey Eledinov, a former Russian peacekeeper turned independent Africa specialist based in Dakar, Senegal.
The Ukraine factor
Last year saw another foreign player appear in the Malian conflict.
A contingent of Wagner and Malian troops was ambushed by Tuareg rebels in Tinzaouaten, near the Algerian border, in July, claiming the lives of 84 Russian mercenaries and 47 Malian soldiers, including Nikita Fedyanin, a blogger behind the Wagner-linked Telegram channel, Grey Zone.
Ukraine’s spy agency, the GUR, admitted it provided crucial intelligence to the rebels against Russia. There were also reports that Ukrainians taught the rebels how to operate drones.
In response, Mali broke off diplomatic relations with Ukraine.
“We’re not really sure if it’s still ongoing,” Nossiter said about Ukraine’s support.
“At the time, there were reports that other Ukrainian allies were pressuring Ukrainians not to do that,” he explained, noting that the perceived “close ties between the jihadist groups and some of the separatists” may have made Kyiv’s Western backers nervous.
Now, given recent upsetting defeats against Malian and Russian troops, and the intensifying violence in northern Mali, it’s questionable to many whether Wagner’s mission was a success.
“The biggest crowning victory of the Malian military in the last couple of years was retaking this town, Kidal [in 2023], which was a long-time separatist stronghold,” Nossiter said. “It’s the kind of victory people point to and say: without Wagner, it wouldn’t have been possible.”
But at the same time, insecurity continues to be a major challenge, the Sahel researcher emphasised.
“The jihadists, just in the last two weeks, have attacked three major Malian military camps. They also attacked the city of Timbuktu, and they put an IED [improvised explosive device] at a joint Malian-Wagner training camp just outside of the capital city of Bamako,” he said.
Meanwhile, the mercenaries have been accused of the deliberate deaths and disappearances of civilians in their counter-rebellion campaign. In February, a Tuareg convoy returning from a wedding reportedly came under fire from Wagner and Malian forces, killing at least 20 civilians, including children and elderly people.
“Overall, the Russian presence has helped the junta stay in power and appear strong, but it hasn’t solved the deeper security problems, and it’s led to more isolation from the West and international aid,” added Berger.
The Russian position has also been weakened by developments elsewhere.
“Russia’s position has become more precarious following the collapse of key logistics hubs in Syria, specifically the Tartous port and Khmeimim airbase, after the downfall of its protege Bashar al-Assad,” noted Alessandro Arduino, author of Money for Mayhem: Mercenaries, Private Military Companies, Drones, and the Future of War.
More than just ‘Wagner rebranded’
In 2023, then-Wagner boss Yevgeny Prigozhin mutinied against the Russian military leadership before he subsequently perished in a suspicious plane crash in August that year. Fearing another uprising, the Kremlin reined in Wagner and other paramilitaries, which have since been more tightly integrated into the command structure and the Africa Corps rose to prominence.
According to Eledinov, this sparked some tension.
“Some of the Wagner fighters went over to the Africa Corps, but most of them stayed to serve in the assault squads,” he said.
“After the death of Prigozhin, the majority of fighters and commanders did not want to go over to the Africa Corps, as a result of which the Wagner assault squads remained in Mali to this day. I assume that now they had no choice [but to withdraw].”
While there’s substantial overlap between the two paramilitary groups, with some estimates claiming 70-80 percent of Africa Corps personnel being Wagner veterans, they are different organisations.
“A lot of reporting on this – especially in the early months after Africa Corps was first announced – assumed that Africa Corps and Wagner were the same thing, and that AC was just Wagner ‘rebranded’,” said Julia Stanyard, another analyst at the Global Initiative.
“In fact, they are separate entities. Africa Corps is more closely managed by the Russian Ministry of Defence and [Russia’s military intelligence agency], the GRU, than Wagner ever was. However, they do have similarities, and many of those recruited to Africa Corps, including many of their commanding officers, are former Wagner mercenaries.”
While Wagner actively engaged on the battlefield, the Africa Corps is set to serve in a more advisory capacity.
“Even after the death of Prigozhin and his mutiny, the Russian government is formalising its presence in the Sahel,” Lechner observed.
“It will be interesting to see how, now that Africa Corps is fully taking over the mission, to what extent Russia’s military presence will have a different character within Mali. The Wagner units were extremely aggressive, operationally very often independent, often going out in direct combat on their own without even being accompanied by [Malian soldiers]. Africa Corps has been designed as more of a training mission, a force that is supposed to protect fixed assets. And it will probably be more bureaucratic because it’s part of the MOD and risk-averse.”
Although Wagner served Russian interests, as mercenaries, they still allowed the Kremlin plausible deniability.
“If earlier, everyone understood that Wagner was Russia, but formally, it was a private company, now, it is entirely Russia. And accordingly, Russia bears much more responsibility [for] all the ensuing consequences, namely purges of civilians, looting and so on,” said Eledinov.
“There is no military resolution to this conflict by force. Without negotiations, it only escalates the degree of the conflict.”
Wagner Out, Africa Corps In: Africa File, June 12, 2025
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Authors: Liam Karr and Kathryn Tyson
Key Takeaways:
- Russia. The Russian Wagner Group formally withdrew from Mali, as the Kremlin continues to transition control of its military operations in Africa to the Ministry of Defense–backed Africa Corps. The shift to more overt Russian state military involvement in Africa creates myriad domestic and geopolitical risks for the Kremlin. Russia may accordingly adapt its engagement in Africa to the detriment of its current and prospective partnerships.
- Somalia. Al Shabaab seized more territory, as it continues its offensive to reconnect its support zones in central and southern Somalia. The offensive threatens to destabilize Mogadishu and undo gains made during the US-backed Somali counterterrorism offensive in 2022. The recent killing of a senior al Shabaab commander will likely disrupt the group’s operations temporarily but is unlikely to have a meaningful effect beyond the short term.
Assessments
Russia
Author: Liam Karr
The Wagner Group announced on June 6 that it had left Mali, signaling the formal transition of the Russian military presence in Mali to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD)–backed Africa Corps. Wagner announced on its official Telegram that its troops would return home and that its mission in Mali was accomplished.[1] Wagner’s claim of mission accomplished is at odds with the fact that the Malian junta has continued to lose control over its national territory since Wagner arrived in late 2021. Wagner did help the Malian junta make key gains against non-jihadist Tuareg separatist rebels in northern Mali, including the regional capital Kidal.[2] But al Qaeda- and IS-affiliated insurgents are stronger than ever, and Wagner failed to defeat the Tuareg rebels after it suffered massive losses near the Algerian border in July 2024.[3] The rebels have since rekindled their historic partnership with al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM), creating a more united front against the Malian government in northern Mali.[4] The Malian government has backed local agreements between JNIM and local communities in central Mali—one of the first places that Wagner deployed and regularly operated—and JNIM attacked the Malian capital for the first time in nearly a decade in 2024.[5]
Wagner’s withdrawal is part of the Kremlin’s plan to consolidate the Russian military presence in Mali—and Africa writ large—under the MOD-backed Africa Corps. Africa Corps announced on June 6 that it would remain in Mali despite Wagner’s withdrawal.[6] Africa Corps is itself part of an effort that the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) assesses aims to centralize Russian state control over informal volunteer-based units, such as the Wagner Group.[7]
The Russian MOD has worked to subsume Wagner’s operations in Mali and across the globe since the Wagner mutiny in June 2023 and the subsequent death of Wagner Group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin in August 2023. The Kremlin faced pushback from Malian authorities and the thousands of Wagner fighters in the country who were hesitant to subordinate themselves to the MOD.[8] The MOD reached an internal “power-sharing” compromise in early 2024, which gave the MOD a limited degree of control over the Wagner Group deployment in Mali but ultimately led to little tangible change.[9] French media and Kremlin-linked Russian milbloggers reported in early 2025 that Africa Corps would replace Wagner in Mali after the previous contract for Russian forces in Mali expired in February 2025.[10] The Kremlin has increased military equipment shipments to Mali intended for Africa Corps since December 2024 and Africa Corps recruitment in early 2025 as part of this effort.[11] Russian insider sources reported in mid-May that Wagner deployments would formally end in June-July 2025.[12]
Figure 1. Russian Military Positions in the Sahel
Source: Liam Karr; West Africa Maps.
The MOD is also trying to transition from Wagner to Africa Corps in the Central African Republic (CAR)—the last bastion of Wagner operations in Africa. Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov visited the CAR and Mali during a regional tour in March. Jeune Afrique reported in March that Yevkurov had already been negotiating with Central African authorities to replace Wagner with Africa Corps for “several months.”[13] Central African President Faustin-Archange Touadéra maintained demands to retain key Wagner advisers and keep Wagner’s role as his personal bodyguard service, however, during talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow in January 2025.[14] The Kremlin has struggled equally to directly co-opt Wagner personnel. Wagner members in the CAR were not required to sign new contracts with the MOD after the creation of Africa Corps in 2024 as they were in every other African country.[15] Veteran Wagner Group personnel still maintain the most influential contact with Touadéra and control Russia’s lucrative wood and gold trade operations in the CAR.[16]
The transition from Wagner to Africa Corps may uproot elite connections that Wagner personnel had developed with their African counterparts. The Russian government viewed Wagner’s handling of proxy forces and partnerships as a major asset.[17] African partners, especially elites, in the CAR and Mali developed close relationships with Wagner commanders and pushed against discarding Wagner due to these personal ties.[18] These ties helped Wagner gain entry to both countries and cultivate business and political influence. Wagner’s ties have been crucial at the local level as well; the group operates alongside local militias in some areas. Wagner-linked Telegram chats claim that 70-80 percent of Africa Corps is comprised of former Wagner members, signaling that the Kremlin has sought to retain these ties and experience among the more rank-and-file.[19]
More direct MOD involvement allows the Kremlin to better align its military presence in Africa with its strategic priorities. Russia has long been interested in increasing its influence in Chad to supplant France in the region and to exploit Chad’s strategic location in the central Sahel. The Wagner Group had previously sought to do so by supporting Chadian rebels.[20] The Kremlin reset relations with former junta leader and now President Mahamat Déby in 2024, however, and is seeking to increase ties with the regime directly.[21] Chad asked France and the United States to withdraw their forces later in 2024 and has shown an openness to the Russian-backed Sahelian juntas.[22]
Russia has sought a Red Sea naval base in Sudan for more than a decade.[23] The Wagner Group initially sought to support this goal, as well as its own business aims, through ties to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).[24] Wagner continued supporting the RSF in the early stages of the Sudanese civil war in 2023.[25] The Kremlin, however, began supporting the opposing Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in 2024—who control Sudan’s coastline and have since captured Khartoum—in exchange for promises of a Russian naval base.[26] There has been no indication that Wagner has continued supporting the RSF since the beginning of 2024.
Figure 2. Africa Corps Logistics Network in Africa
Source: Liam Karr.
Russia is considering building a military base in the CAR, which would bolster its strategic depth in Africa and serve as a rear hub for its operations across Africa. CAR officials have sought a permanent Russian base capable of housing up to 10,000 soldiers since at least 2019 as a security guarantee against any potential rebel resurgence.[27] The CAR is not strategically located, which has led the Kremlin to ignore this ask and even consider withdrawing forces from the CAR altogether.[28] Russian officials throughout 2025 have signaled an openness to this base and increasing the number of forces in the CAR, however, as part of ongoing negotiations with the Central African government to allow a greater Africa Corps presence in the country.[29] French magazine Jeune Afrique reported that Russia has accelerated talks for a base in the CAR since the fall of the Bashar al Assad regime in Syria to strengthen the self-sufficiency of its Africa network alongside other logistic hubs such as Libya or Russian plans for Sudan.[30]
More public MOD involvement in Africa means that the Kremlin can no longer use Wagner’s ambiguous status to distance itself from Russian operations in Africa, making the Kremlin more vulnerable to domestic and geopolitical blowback for its activities. The Kremlin used Wagner’s status as a private military company to gloss over military setbacks suffered in Africa despite directly funding and supporting the group’s operations. Wagner’s legal gray status as a private military company helped the Kremlin obscure contractor deaths as opposed to Russian servicemember deaths.[31] The Kremlin regularly used Wagner as a scapegoat when things went wrong. For example, debacles such as the Tinzaouten ambush in northern Mali that killed up to 84 Russian soldiers in 2024 and the failed deployment into Mozambique in 2019-20 were passed as Wagner failures—not Russian failures.[32]
The transition from Wagner to Africa Corps will likely drive the Kremlin to more openly acknowledge Russian casualties and setbacks suffered in Africa, which would be domestically unpopular. Russian recruitment officials have told Russian media that Africa Corps recruits are entitled to some state benefits, such as additional one-time payments for having children and compensation for being wounded or killed.[33] Casualty compensation means that the Kremlin cannot obscure casualties suffered in Africa because it will have to report casualties to the affected families. Such casualties are widely unpopular among the Russian public, with affected families often questioning what their family members are fighting and dying for.[34]
The responsibility for Russian operations in Africa will now land squarely with the Kremlin, which will become a direct referendum on the Russian state as a security partner. This shift is an opportunity for the Kremlin to achieve one of its long-term strategic goals to position itself as a revitalized great power and global military force. This opportunity also carries clear risk, however. Failures and setbacks will be a public humiliation for the Kremlin, opening Russia to many of the same risks that the United States has faced in its counterinsurgency partnerships. Such setbacks can range from tactical defeats to more strategic defeats, such as the US experience with the fall of Kabul.
African countries will equally understand that their decisions directly affect the Kremlin’s international image and can use this factor to their advantage. The situation may incentivize current or prospective partners to more openly “shop the market” and play Russia off potential competitors, as African leaders frequently do with the West.[35] For example, the Central African government contacted US security contractors in late 2023, which helped revive the Kremlin’s waning interest in the country.[36]
Russia may change its strategic and operational behavior in Africa to mitigate the possible dangers of more visible Kremlin involvement in Africa operations. Such shifts would likely create another set of risks, however, which could limit Russian defense partnerships and their value for the Kremlin and African partners. The risk to Russian prestige may lead Russia to get more deeply entrenched in long-term conflicts to “save face,” which would ensnare the Kremlin in its own series of “forever wars.” Wagner was more immune to such long-term entanglements and even abruptly withdrew from places, such as Mozambique, when the benefits outweighed the costs.[37] Africa Corps cannot abandon the Sahelian regimes or let the security situation seriously deteriorate without making the Kremlin look like a bad partner, however. There is no clear end to this commitment, given the lack of signs that the Sahelian regimes and their Russian partners can defeat the continually strengthening Sahelian Salafi-jihadi insurgency. The CAR has lobbied Russia to establish a base in the CAR partly due to the belief that a base would ensure Russia’s long-term engagement in the country. These missions will be domestically unpopular and a resource drain for the Kremlin. Such resources include weapons systems, such as small numbers of T-72 tanks and electronic warfare systems deployed in Mali, that are needed at scale in Ukraine.[38]
Russian forces may become more conflict- and casualty-averse, which would change how Russia engages with current or prospective African partners. High casualties would be both domestically unpopular and possibly damage Russian prestige, although some partner states view Russian casualties as a positive signal that Russian forces are willing to take risks. Other Russian private military companies that are part of Africa Corps additionally have much less practical experience with combat operations than Wagner and have focused instead on more casualty-averse functions, such as training.[39] Russia becoming more casualty-averse would influence Russian strategic behavior, as it more carefully chooses its partners and avoids large-scale counterinsurgency missions like those that Wagner undertook in the CAR and Mali. Russian forces could also become more casualty-averse in already-existing deployments, which would change how or whether Russian forces participate in some campaigns and operations in places like the CAR, Libya, and Mali.
The Kremlin may also become more risk-averse in Libya and Mali to support Russian objectives to maintain a strong partnership with Algeria. Algeria has maintained a close relationship with Russia that includes significant defense ties and cooperation in international institutions that dates back to the Soviet Union and has persisted after Russia invaded Ukraine in March 2022.[40] Algeria has signaled increasingly, however, that it views Russia’s activity in the neighboring Sahel and Libya as a threat to Algerian and regional stability.[41] Algeria has sought greater cooperation with Europe and the United States directly and indirectly in reaction to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and destabilizing activity around Algeria in Africa. Algerian and US military engagement reached a new peak in early 2025 after the two countries signed a wide-reaching memorandum of understanding and elevated discussions between top military leaders.[42]
African partners, in turn, may be less interested in working with Russia if it becomes more casualty- and risk-averse. Wagner’s willingness to sustain casualties and engage in geopolitically risky campaigns was a key comparative advantage for African partners.[43] Wagner’s foray into northern Mali was one of its only major achievements in Mali, and its support for the Libyan National Army in Libya enabled one of the biggest offensives in the Libyan civil war in the past decade.[44] Russian forces will be a lesser-equipped, lesser-trained, and worse-behaved version of Western partner forces if they shift to more non-combat roles and are less willing to support risky campaigns. These shortcomings limit Russia’s appeal to prospective partners and could lead current partners to explore additional options. Russia will continue to be a popular tool for African countries seeking to balance against perceived Western neocolonialism, authoritarians who want to consolidate political control, and militaries who are unable to get weapons from the West due to democracy and human rights concerns. The People’s Republic of China, the Gulf states, Iran, and Turkey, however, can all fill these needs to varying degrees, however, meaning Russia still lacks a clear comparative advantage.[45]
The Kremlin may have given final control of Africa Corps to a Russian oligarch instead of the MOD, but the ownership situation is unlikely to significantly alter the various risks that the Kremlin faces. ISW assessed on June 11 that the Kremlin may have given control of Africa Corps to Russian billionaire Gennady Timchenko.[46] ISW cited Russian insider sources who claimed that the Russian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GRU), which is the part of the MOD tasked with overseeing Africa Corps, failed to meet the Kremlin’s deadlines to develop Africa Corps.[47] CTP and ISW reported throughout 2024 that Africa Corps faced significant recruiting shortages, which impacted its ability to expand operations in partner countries like Burkina Faso and Niger.[48] The struggle to secure buy-in from former Wagner members and African partner countries impacted its ability to consolidate Wagner operations in the CAR and Mali. The insider source claimed that Timchenko and his designated commander—former convict Konstantin Mirzayants—used these failures to supplant the GRU.[49] Africa Corps recruiting has notably surged in early 2025, which aligns with the general timeline of this internal power struggle.[50]
The Kremlin will still face many of the same risks with Africa Corps replacing Wagner, regardless of who controls the group. The MOD has at the very least retained administrative control over Africa Corps, clearly linking the Russian state to the project. Timchenko is also reportedly trying to regain Putin's favor.[51] This internal political dynamic makes Timchenko more likely to clearly align with the Kremlin’s strategic priorities and avoid humiliating blunders that would damage Russian prestige. Prigozhin’s demise also serves as a stark warning against running afoul of the Kremlin. Timchenko’s ownership of Africa Corps would likely keep Russian engagement more personality-dominated, however, as it was during the Wagner Group era. This feature will keep Russian engagement fluid and responsive and allow Africa Corps to more quickly capitalize on opportunities as they arise.
Somalia
Author: Kathryn Tyson
Contributor: Liam Karr
Al Shabaab captured two key areas in central Somalia as it continues its 2025 offensive to reestablish support zones there and connect them to its center of gravity in southern Somalia. Al Shabaab captured El Hareeri, Hiraan region, on June 11 following a six-day battle between Somali security forces and al Shabaab for the town.[52] El Hareeri sits on a network of roads that connects to key areas in central Somalia, including Moqokori and Mahas--the last Somali-controlled towns in the southeastern Hiraan region. Al Shabaab forces advanced within 45 miles of both towns from the east, west, and south by mid-April, and unspecified local security officials told Somali media in June that al Shabaab aimed to capture the towns.[53]
Al Shabaab also captured Hawadley, which lies approximately 39 miles north of Mogadishu, on June 3.[54] Hawadley is located in the Shabelle River valley along a major north-south road between the district capital Bal’ad and Jowhar--the regional capital of Middle Shabelle and capital of Hirshabelle state. Al Shabaab already infiltrated parts of the Shabelle River valley north and south of Jowhar to relink its support zones in central and southern Somalia in March.[55] The valley is also a possible staging ground for al Shabaab attacks on the main highway connecting Mogadishu and central Somalia or Mogadishu directly. Al Shabaab’s capture of Hawadley threatens to entrench an al Shabaab support zone in the valley. Seasonal rains reportedly flooded Hawadley in early June, howver, which may prevent al Shabaab from moving effectively in and out of the town in the short term.[56]
Figure 3. Al Shabaab’s Area of Operations in Central Somalia
Source: Kathryn Tyson; Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.
Al Shabaab has captured several operationally critical areas of central Somalia since it launched an offensive in the region in early 2025. These gains have enabled the group to reconnect its support zones in southern and central Somalia for the first time since 2022 and create a buffer for the group‘s key control zones in the neighboring Galgadud region. Al Shabaab’s gains include the recapture of Adan Yabal, which was al Shabaab’s administrative headquarters in central Somalia for over a decade before Somali forces captured the town in December 2022.[57]
The Somali National Army (SNA) killed a regional al Shabaab commander in central Somalia region, which may temporarily disrupt al Shabaab planning and logistics for its ongoing offensive in central Somalia.[58]The SNA launched airstrikes in El Hareeri, Hiraan region, that killed al Shabaab commander Nur Abdi Roble, also known as Nuunuule, on June 6.[59] The airstrike also killed a logistics head for al Shabaab’s combat units and a senior field commander.[60] Roble had been a member of al Shabaab for 17 years and served as the regional commander for al Shabaab operations in Mudug, Galgaduud, Hiraan, and Middle Shabelle regions, according to the Somali government.[61] Roble reportedly organized a complex attack targeting the SNA in Cowsweyne in August 2023 that killed dozens of soldiers.[62] The attack led Somali forces to retreat from several towns in previously captured areas and resulted in the collapse of the government’s frontline in southern Galmudug.[63]
The killing of Roble is highly unlikely to disrupt al Shabaab’s operations in central Somalia in the long term, however. Al Shabaab’s hierarchical but decentralized command structure gives the group flexibility to replace even senior leaders within days or weeks.[64] Al Shabaab named a new leader for the group five days after a US airstrike killed al Shabaab’s late leader Ahmed Godane in September 2014, for example.[65]
Figure 4. Al Shabaab’s Area of Operations
Source: Kathryn Tyson.
The al Shabaab offensive in central Somalia threatens to inflict a strategic setback on the Somali Federal Government (SFG) by undoing gains made during the US-backed Somali counterterrorism offensive in 2022. These losses would undermine the SFG’s domestic and international credibility in its ability to eventually retake its national territory from al Shabaab. Many of Somalia’s international partners praised the 2022 offensive as the first Somali-led counterterrorism offensive to retake significant territory from al Shabaab.[66] The offensive stalled in 2023, however, and the SFG’s clan-based coalition began to collapse in 2024 due to domestic and regional political issues.[67] The offensive benefited from al Shabaab’s missteps that alienated locals in the area, the Somali president’s clan ties in the area, and the prevalence of strong clan militias in the area.[68] The SFG was unable to consolidate its gains despite these favorable conditions, which are not present in al Shabaab’s center of gravity in southern Somalia.
Africa File Data Cutoff: June 12, 2025, at 10 a.m.
The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.
[1] https://apnews.com/article/mali-wagner-russia-withdraws-b29349be737cbc14dfc435b3536711eb
[2] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67418482
[3] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cq5xvl1111yo; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-june-5-2025-jnim-offensive-sahel-islamic-state-somalia-is-central-africa-uganda-is-mozambique-threatens-us-and-western-lng#Sahel; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-areas-of-operation-in-the-sahel;
[4] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1690778/politique/mali-les-jihadistes-du-jnim-et-les-rebelles-du-fla-vont-ils-sallier; https://www.france24.com/fr/vid%C3%A9o/20250303-mali-des-n%C3%A9gociations-en-cours-entre-touaregs-et-jnim
[5] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20250403-mali-les-dessous-de-la-lev%C3%A9e-du-blocus-jihadiste-de-boni; https://www.dw.com/fr/au-mali-le-blocus-l%C3%A9r%C3%A9-lev%C3%A9/a-71290420; https://x.com/Walid_Leberbere/status/1909546669269541124; https://x.com/Walid_Leberbere/status/1909554161298841719
[6] https://apnews.com/article/mali-wagner-russia-withdraws-b29349be737cbc14dfc435b3536711eb
[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-21-2025
[8] https://therussiaprogram.org/wagners_future; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1649876/politique/de-wagner-a-africa-corps-au-mali-les-putschistes-jouent-a-la-roulette-russe
[9] https://therussiaprogram.org/wagners_future; https://www.pism.pl/webroot/upload/files/Raport/PISM%20Report%20Africa%20Corps_.pdf; https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/02/07/africa-corps-wagner-group-russia-africa-burkina-faso; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1649876/politique/de-wagner-a-africa-corps-au-mali-les-putschistes-jouent-a-la-roulette-russe
[10] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1649876/politique/de-wagner-a-africa-corps-au-mali-les-putschistes-jouent-a-la-roulette-russe; https://t.me/rybar/67262
[11] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-21-2025
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[14] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1651488/politique/comment-touadera-et-poutine-negocient-le-passage-de-wagner-a-africa-corps
[15] https://www.pism.pl/webroot/upload/files/Raport/PISM%20Report%20Africa%20Corps_.pdf
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[17] https://therussiaprogram.org/wagner_1209
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[19] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-says-plan-boost-role-africa-includes-sensitive-security-ties-2025-06-09
[20] https://www.newarab.com/analysis/how-russia-could-capitalise-chads-instability; https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210923-chad-fm-warns-against-russian-interference; https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-intelligence-points-to-wagner-plot-against-key-western-ally-in-africa-29867547
[21] https://www.barrons.com/news/leader-of-france-allied-chad-hails-ties-with-putin-in-moscow-adf49145; https://www.france24.com/en/tv-shows/eye-on-africa/20240606-russia-s-lavrov-wraps-up-africa-tour-in-chad
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[23] https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russias-port-sudan-naval-base-power-play-red-sea; https://gulfif.org/slow-but-persistent-russias-overseas-basing-strategy-in-the-red-sea-and-the-gulf-of-aden; https://www.institute.global/insights/geopolitics-and-security/security-soft-power-and-regime-support-spheres-russian-influence-africa#conclusion-and-recommendations
[24] https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/feb/10/militia-strike-gold-to-cast-a-shadow-over-sudans-hopes-of-prosperity; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48987901; https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-does-conflict-sudan-affect-russia-and-wagner-group; https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/05/world/africa/wagner-russia-sudan-gold-putin.html;
[25] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/09/14/uae-wagner-group-fighters-weapons-sudanese-civil-war
[26] https://sudantribune.com/article285164; https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-sudan-agree-red-sea-naval-base-sudanese-foreign-minister-says-2025-02-12; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-special-edition-external-meddling-for-the-red-sea-exacerbates-conflicts-in-the-horn-of-africa#Sudan
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[28] https://therussiaprogram.org/wagner_1209
[29] https://t.me/MID_Russia/59916; https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1664812/politique/comment-la-russie-veut-imposer-africa-corps-a-touadera
[30] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1651488/politique/comment-touadera-et-poutine-negocient-le-passage-de-wagner-a-africa-corps
[31] https://therussiaprogram.org/wagner_1209
[32] https://www.pism.pl/webroot/upload/files/Raport/PISM%20Report%20Africa%20Corps_.pdf; https://apnews.com/article/mali-wagner-russia-sahel-tuareg-extremism-conflict-949c217b99f4f2cbf07805345f399273; https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/01/world/africa/russia-wagner-mercenaries-mali.html
[33] https://www dot tatar-inform.ru/news/elitnoe-podrazdelenie-na-straze-interesov-rodiny-kogo-vozmut-v-afrikanskii-korpus-5977066
[34] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/01/world/africa/russia-wagner-mercenaries-mali.html
[35] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx2kr40nlkpo; https://apnews.com/article/new-cold-war-africa-2835929157959a9ef276290c8c9ecfa1; https://apnews.com/article/central-african-republic-russia-africa-wagner-bancroft-f0b9e7705713768f4676c2588c0e0200
[36] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1531224/politique/touadera-wagner-et-bancroft-nouvelle-guerre-froide-a-bangui; https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20231230-car-in-talks-with-us-security-firm-as-west-eyes-wagner-s-ground-in-africa; https://www.dw.com/en/us-firm-bancroft-eyes-wagner-groups-influence-in-car/a-67886088; https://jamestown.org/program/wagners-influence-in-central-african-republic-wanes-as-american-pmc-enters-the-scene
[37] https://oxfordpoliticalreview.com/2023/03/06/when-private-military-operations-fail-the-case-of-mozambique
[38] https://apnews.com/article/russia-africa-weaponry-ships-mali-ukraine-f3383b5bbc8120b445d3df9062bf7f14
[39] https://therussiaprogram.org/wagner_1209
[40] https://mecouncil.org/publication/algerian-russian-relations-military-cooperation; https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/algeria-russia-relations-after-ukraine-invasion
[41] https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/mercenary-politics-algerias-response-wagner-mali; https://www.newarab.com/news/algeria-and-russia-seek-mend-ties-after-wagner-attacks; https://www.lefigaro.fr/international/abdelmadjid-tebboune-il-est-urgent-d-ouvrir-une-nouvelle-ere-des-relations-franco-algeriennes-20221229; https://www.slate.fr/story/267038/presence-groupe-paramilitaire-wagner-afrique-algerie-menace-diplomatie-russie-niger-mali-libye-soudan-geopolitique; https://www.dzair-tube dot dz/en/algeria-demands-justice-for-civilian-casualties-in-mali-urges-international-accountability; https://www.newarab.com/news/algeria-calls-unsc-halt-mercenary-activities-mali
[42] https://dz.usembassy.gov/africom-commander-signs-memorandum-of-understanding-with-algerian-ministry-of-national-defense; https://defensescoop.com/2025/01/29/us-algeria-defense-cooperation-mou-agreement-to-expand-military-cooperation; https://www.jcs.mil/Media/News/News-Display/Article/4051976/readout-of-chairman-of-the-joint-chiefs-of-staff-gen-cq-brown-jrs-phone-call-wi
[43] https://therussiaprogram.org/wagner_1209
[44] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/podcasts/le-grand-invit%C3%A9-afrique/20250611-mali-quand-on-fait-la-balance-l-action-de-wagner-est-mitig%C3%A9e-voire-n%C3%A9gative; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58009514
[45] https://adf-magazine.com/2024/07/china-becomes-africas-top-weapons-supplier-but-motive-and-quality-stir-debate; https://africacenter.org/spotlight/militarization-china-africa-policy; https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/chinas-expanding-security-footprint-in-africa-from-arms-transfers-to-military-cooperation-184841; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-may-8-2025-rsf-drone-strikes-port-sudan-iran-exports-regime-security-burkina-faso#Iran; https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/the-uaes-rising-military-role-in-africa-defending-interests-advancing-influence-172825; https://www.military dot africa/2025/04/beyond-weapons-turkeys-expanding-defence-industry-footprint-in-africa
[46] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-june-11-2025
[47] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-15-2024; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-june-11-2025
[48] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-special-edition-russias-africa-corps-arrives-in-niger-whats-next; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-august-2-2024-russian-blunder-in-mali-is-and-jnim-wreak-havoc-in-niger-jnims-border-havens-threaten-togo#Mali; https://t.me/rybar/59081; https://static.rusi.org/SR-Russian-Unconventional-Weapons-final-web.pdf; https://x.com/ChrisO_wiki/status/1780140057124364713
[49] https://t.me/rucriminalinfo/1906
[50] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-14-2025; https://t.me/rucriminalinfo/1183
[51] https://t.me/rucriminalinfo/1906
[52] https://garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/al-shabaab-pushes-to-regain-foothold-in-central-somalia-amid-fierce-clashes; https://x.com/AAGA_CAWLAN101/status/1931159006095036471; https://x.com/AAGA_CAWLAN101/status/1932872346702074023
[53] https://garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/al-shabaab-pushes-to-regain-foothold-in-central-somalia-amid-fierce-clashes
[54] https://hornobserver.com/articles/3351/Chaos-and-Looting-Follow-AU-Burundian-Forces-Withdrawal-in-Somalias-Xawaadley-Allowing-Al-Shabaab-Takeover; https://somaliguardian.com/news/somalia-news/al-shabaab-seizes-strategic-somali-town-after-au-troops-withdraw/
[55] https://x.com/HarunMaruf/status/1904879820661547107
[56] https://hornobserver.com/articles/3351/Chaos-and-Looting-Follow-AU-Burundian-Forces-Withdrawal-in-Somalias-Xawaadley-Allowing-Al-Shabaab-Takeover
[57] https://www.voanews.com/a/somali-army-dislodges-al-shabab-from-key-stronghold-/6864706.html; https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/january-alerts-and-december-trends-2022
[58] https://www.bbc.com/somali/articles/c8e6nnern52o; https://x.com/SONNALIVE/status/1931372667241709712
[59] https://www.bbc.com/somali/articles/c8e6nnern52o; https://x.com/HarunMaruf/status/1931377733189116141
[60] https://shabellemedia.com/over-40-al-shabaab-leaders-and-militants-killed-in-targeted-operation-nisa/;
[61] https://x.com/SONNALIVE/status/1931372667241709712
[62] https://www.voanews.com/a/somali-soldiers-killed-as-au-forces-start-second-round-of-troop-drawdown-/7275141.html; https://x.com/HarunMaruf/status/1931377733189116141
[63] https://www.voanews.com/a/7245333.html; https://ctc.westpoint.edu/somalias-stalled-offensive-against-al-shabaab-taking-stock-of-obstacles/
[64] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-general-directorate-of-provinces-managing-the-islamic-states-global-network
[65] https://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/06/world/africa/somalia-godane-high-alert; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-29093200
[66] https://www.voanews.com/a/pentagon-chief-on-africa-tour-focusing-on-defense-issues/7281765.html; https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3435055/somali-president-austin-discuss-future-partnership-during-pentagon-meeting
[67] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/somalias-stalled-offensive-against-al-shabaab-taking-stock-of-obstacles
[68] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/b187-sustaining-gains-somalias-offensive-against-al-shabaab; https://ctc.westpoint.edu/can-somalias-new-offensive-defeat-al-shabaab
Posted on September 11, 2024 by Jacob Zenn
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Russian Deputy Defence Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov (left) is heading the newly formed Africa Corps, which under his leadership is set to become a key entity through which the Russian state will project power in West Africa.
“The Africa Corps represents the new incarnation of Russian military influence in Africa.”
Following the death of Russian Wagner Group founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in a suspicious airplane crash near Moscow in 2023, reports have emerged that his successor is Russian Deputy Defense Minister, General Yunus-Bek Evkurov.[i] However, in Africa, the mercenary company’s operation is rebranding as “Africa Corps” whereas the company’s operations elsewhere in the world seem to be retaining the Wagner brand. This new branding may help the company avoid the stigma of its Wagner predecessors for war crimes and smuggling and reduce international pressure against the company in Africa.
The excerpted French-language article in the Chadian publication, alwihdainfo.com, is an African perspective of the differences between Russia’s Africa Corps[ii] and its predecessor Wagner Group. The article acknowledges that Africa Corps is the successor to Wagner Group with important differences. First, it notes that Africa Corps is intended to legitimize the Russian military influence on the African continent while competing with the diminishing presence of the U.S. and European powers. Second, Africa Corps may have a smaller footprint than Wagner in Africa. For example, the article mentions it operates only in Libya, inheriting Wagner’s main bases and most of Wagner’s fighters; Burkina Faso; Mali; Central African Republic and Niger. According to the article, Libya’s position on the Mediterranean Sea facilitates military supply lines and the movement of Africa Corps personnel into Africa. The previous iteration of Wagner had also operated extensively in Sudan and, to a lesser extent, elsewhere in Eastern Africa, including Mozambique and Madagascar.[iii]
Another difference highlighted in the article relates to the way that Africa Corps will operate. Africa Corps is now focusing on providing military support to African countries through instructors, weapons, and developing counter-terrorism strategies with host nations in cooperation with the Russian Ministry of Defense. In contrast, Wagner soldiers directly participated in missions against terrorist or insurgent groups and functioned separate from, albeit in support of, the Russian government. The article indicates that the new Africa Corps will be more sustainable than the previous Wagner Group because of Africa Corps’ formal integration with the Russian state, and the ministry of defense. Further the ministry’s commitment to Africa Corps indicates that Russia is serious about its geopolitical ambitions in West Africa and Africa Corps’ impact on the region will not be fleeting. At a time when Western influence and partnerships with West African states are waning, Africa Corps is becoming the entity through which Russia will reassert itself.
Sources:
Source: “De ‘Wagner’ à ‘Africa Corps’: la Russie toujours présente au Sahel (From ‘Wagner’ to ‘Africa Corps’: Russia always is present in the Sahel),” alwihdainfo.com (French-language Chadian publication with a reputation for independent reporting and being critical of the government), 3 May 2024. https://www.alwihdainfo.com/De-Wagner-a-Africa-Corps-la-Russie-toujours-presente-au-Sahel_a132053.html
Recently, many people have been curious about the difference between the Russian paramilitary group “Wagner” and the “Africa Corps”, which newly appeared on the African scene and which was also founded in Russia to be deployed in African countries. In this analysis, we will seek to explain the difference between the two organizations, how and where they operate, and what their ambitions are in Africa.
Africa Corps is a Russian military company that was created in early 2024 as a replacement for the Wagner Group. This organization reflects Russia’s desire to extend its military influence on the African continent and to provide legitimacy to its official and public presence in the face of the European and American presence. Africa Corps is deployed in 5 countries: Libya, Burkina Faso, Mali, Central African Republic and Niger. Libya represents the core of the corps due to the previous activity of Wagner elements in the city of Tripoli…. Another factor in the choice of Libya as the headquarters of this corps is its strategic geographical location due to its connection with the Mediterranean coast, which ensures military supply lines and movement of corps members to other countries The Africa Corps’ modus operandi is entirely dependent on providing military support to African countries such as instructors and weapons. The company also is concerns with the development of strategies in cooperation with the Ministry of Defense, such as is the case in Mali and Niger… In short, the Africa Corps represents the new incarnation of Russian military influence in Africa.
Notes:
[ii] Since the death of Russian Wagner Group founder and CEO, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in a suspicious airplane crash near Moscow in 2023, reports have emerged that his successor is Russian Deputy Defense Minister, General Yunus-Bek Evkurov. For a profile of Evkurov, which argues that he “has the full backing of Russia’s military establishment and will not have to beg for ammunition or restrict himself to the use of contractors and mercenaries,” see: Andrew McGregor, “Yunus-Bek Yevkurov: A Profile of Russia’s New Ingush African Corps Leader,” Militant Leadership Monitor, Volume: 15 Issue: 3, 18 April 2024. (URL?) The article notes that under Yevkurov “the Africa Corps will have greater access to resources, but will be expected to be self-sufficient in many ways. This means Wagner-style associations with business interests will likely continue, although disentangling these interests from the Wagner network will be challenging.” In addition, it asserts that “Improving battlefield performance will be a priority for Yevkurov. Thus far, Russian fighters have not proven any more effective in eliminating Sahelian terrorist formations than their French predecessors.”
[iii] See, for example, Brian Katz, Seth G. Jones, Catrina Doxsee, Nicholas Harrington, “Moscow’s Mercenary Wars: The Expansion of Russian Private Military Companies, CSIS, September 2020, https://russianpmcs.csis.org/
Image Information:
Image: Russian Deputy Defence Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov (left) is heading the newly formed Africa Corps, which under his leadership is set to become a key entity through which the Russian state will project power in West Africa.
Published on 07 March 2024 in ISS Today
By Nicodemus Minde
Researcher, East Africa Peace and Security Governance, ISS Nairobi
The Russian military company Wagner appears to have been renamed the Africa Corps by Moscow, and brought under the control of Russia’s Defence Ministry. What does the government takeover of the company mean for security in Africa?
Russia’s economic, diplomatic and military interests in Africa have been increasing in the past few years. And while Russia-Africa summits enable the country to wield diplomatic support, Moscow understands this charm offensive isn’t enough to compete with its big power rivals – the United States (US) and China.
Since 2017, Russia has used Wagner as a low-cost strategy to increase its foothold in Africa. One focus for Wagner operations was the Sahel – a mineral-rich region rife with violent extremism, localised conflicts and military coups; and more recently, a battleground between global powers.
Recent military coups in the Sahel belt soured relations between some Sahelian states and the West. Taking advantage of the situation, the Kremlin has endeared itself to Mali and Burkina Faso’s military juntas.
Wagner’s former leader Yevgeny Prigozhin was Russia’s main man in Africa. A month before he died in a plane crash on 23 August 2023, Prigozhin was spotted at the Russia-Africa summit in St Petersburg – indicating Moscow’s use of the mercenary group for its military influence in Africa.
Moscow understands that a charm offensive isn’t enough to compete with its big power rivals
After his death, there were questions about Wagner’s future and its presence in Africa. Wagner had morphed into a unique entity under the leadership of Prigozhin and Dmitry Utkin (who died in the same plane crash). It had spread its operations to the Middle East (Syria), Latin America (Venezuela), and Africa (Central African Republic, Mali, Sudan, Libya, Mozambique, and Madagascar).
The Kremlin maintained a policy of deliberate ambiguity, refusing to admit its association with Wagner. But after Prigozhin’s death, President Vladimir Putin admitted his government had funded the paramilitary group.
Russia’s move to create the Africa Corps can be analysed from two possibly overlapping perspectives. First, by controlling Africa Corps, Moscow could be trying to avoid past mistakes. Wagner’s autonomy and power led to a supremacy battle between Prigozhin and senior Russian defence officials, which boiled over in an unsuccessful insurrection that saw Wagner soldiers marching on Moscow in June 2023.
Second, aligning Africa Corps’ operations with Russia’s foreign policy, security interests and international commitments could be part of the country’s long-term military strategy in Africa. As a unit reporting to the Defence Ministry, Africa Corps could theoretically be held accountable by Russia for violations committed during military operations. Recurring allegations of atrocities in Central and Northern Mali have tarnished Russia’s reputation over the years.
The Kremlin has shown interest in filling the vacuum left by France and its Western allies in the Sahel following the recent military coups. Antipathy towards France and the West has seemingly been among the drivers of the military coups, so Russia sees the Sahel as a region ripe to expert its foothold using the Africa Corps.
Using Africa Corps, Russia could present itself as a security ally and guarantor for Sahelian states
Meanwhile, Sahelian states that have experienced coups in the past few years have all shown great admiration for Moscow. Putin met and held talks with Burkina Faso’s interim leader Ibrahim Traoré during the July 2023 Russia-Africa summit. Russia’s Deputy Defence Minister Yunus-bek Yevkurov visited Libya in August and Niger in December, before travelling to Mali. On 24 January 2024, Putin met Mahamat Idriss Déby, Chad’s military leader who took power in a 2021 soft coup.
On the same day, Africa Corps’ operations first appeared on a Telegram channel covering the arrival of a 100-strong Russian contingent in Ouagadougou, capital of Burkina Faso. The troops were there to protect Traoré from apparent terrorist threats.
Even before this public report, Africa Corps had apparently begun to subsume Wagner’s operations in the Sahel and beyond, re-engaging with countries where Wagner had contracts. Mali, Libya and Burkina Faso have already signed agreements with the Russian Defence Ministry, and CAR is currently negotiating with Russia’s government to build a military base.
In September 2023, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger announced they had formed the Alliance of Sahel States. This was in response to the threat of an Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) intervention following Niger’s 26 July military coup. In late January this year, the three states announced their withdrawal from ECOWAS.
Russia may try to expand its influence by bringing Chad closer to the Burkina Faso-Mali-Niger triad
Although Russia’s role in their withdrawal is unclear, European Union foreign policy chief Josep Borrell hinted at Russia’s involvement: ‘It is very significant that these three states, all of them with military dictatorships, decided to leave the regional body ... at the same time that we see the Russian influence increase.’ Borrell said these developments created a ‘new geopolitical configuration’ in the Sahel.
Now that Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have exited ECOWAS and formed the Alliance of Sahel States, Russia – through the Africa Corps – will likely present itself as a security ally and guarantor for the three states. How this plays out for each of the countries may differ. Niger’s continued commitment to security cooperation with the US, notably through its drone base in Agadez, makes this prospect unlikely in the short term.
Nevertheless, following Déby’s January trip to meet Putin in Moscow, Russia may try to expand its influence in the region by bringing Chad – which still has close relations with France – closer to the Burkina Faso-Mali-Niger triad.
The rebranded Africa Corps allows Russia to expand its influence on the continent through direct state means. With continued instability in the Sahel and the ECOWAS exits, Russia will likely be an attractive security ally. While Africa Corps appears to be the sharp end of Russia’s security strategy in the turbulent Sahel region, its long-term goal will undoubtedly be to expand its influence across Africa.
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