Friday, January 16, 2026

How 1,000 Days Of War Pushed Sudan’s Health System to The Brink Of Collapse – Analysis

“Secondly, the best cure for Sudan’s health crisis is peace. We can’t allow children in Sudan to go through another 1,000 days of conflict to pass otherwise we risk the health of a whole generation growing up in this pointless war.”



Families arrive at a UNICEF-supported mobile clinic in Fatasha village in West Omdurman, Sudan. Photo Credit: UNICEF/Ahmed Mohamdeen Elfatih


January 15, 2026
Arab News
By Robert Edwards

After more than 1,000 days of war, Sudan’s health system is buckling under the combined weight of violence, displacement, disease and hunger, pushing millions of civilians toward a crisis with few historical parallels.

What began as a power struggle between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces has evolved into what UN agencies now describe as the world’s largest humanitarian and health emergency.

According to the World Health Organization, more than 20 million people in Sudan now require health assistance, while an estimated 33.7 million — roughly two-thirds of the population — are expected to need humanitarian aid this year.

At least 21 million people face acute food insecurity, with famine already confirmed in parts of North Darfur and South Kordofan.

“One thousand days of conflict in Sudan have driven the health system to the brink of collapse,” Dr. Shible Sahbani, WHO’s representative in Sudan, said in a statement. “Under the strain of disease, hunger and a lack of access to basic services, people face a devastating situation.”

The health system’s deterioration has been swift and severe. Since the war began in April 2023, WHO has verified 201 attacks on health care, resulting in 1,858 deaths and 490 injuries.

More than one third of health facilities nationwide — 37 percent — are now non-functional, depriving millions of people of essential and lifesaving care.

“Healthcare facilities are being attacked, there is a shortage of medicines and supplies, and a lack of financial and human resources to operate health services,” Sahbani said. “This means that the system is on the verge of collapse.”

In the hardest-hit regions, particularly Darfur and Kordofan, the picture is even bleaker.

Aid groups estimate that in some areas up to 80 percent of health facilities are no longer operational, leaving overstretched clinics struggling to cope with outbreaks of cholera, malaria, dengue and measles.

“The weather and conditions in Sudan are conducive to the spread of malaria and dengue fever by mosquitoes,” Sahbani said. “Outbreaks of vaccine-preventable diseases, such as measles and polio, are also being reported in many states right now.”

Sudan is now the world’s largest displacement crisis. An estimated 13.6 million people have been forced from their homes — around 9.3 million internally displaced and a further 4.3 million seeking refuge in neighboring countries.

Overcrowded displacement sites, poor sanitation and the collapse of routine health and water services have created ideal conditions for disease outbreaks. Cholera has now been reported in all 18 states, dengue in 14 states, and malaria in 16.

“As the relentless conflict renders some areas inaccessible, particularly in the Darfur and Kordofan regions, the population’s health needs continue to increase,” Sahbani said.

“To meet these mounting needs and prevent the crisis from spiraling out of hand, WHO and humanitarian partners require safe and unimpeded access to all areas of Sudan, and increased financial resources.”
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Children are bearing the heaviest burden of Sudan’s collapse. According to the UN children’s agency, UNICEF, roughly half of those expected to need humanitarian assistance in 2026 are children.

“For the children of Sudan, the world is 1,000 days late,” Edouard Beigbeder, UNICEF’s regional director for the Middle East and North Africa, said in a statement.

“Since fighting erupted in April 2023, Sudan has become one of the largest and most devastating humanitarian crises in the world, pushing millions of children to the brink of survival.”

More than 5 million children have been displaced — the equivalent of 5,000 children displaced every day — often repeatedly, as violence follows families from one location to another.

“Millions of children in Sudan are at risk of rape and other forms of sexual violence, which is being used as a tactic of war, with children as young as one reported among survivors,” Beigbeder said.

Malnutrition is compounding the crisis. In North Darfur alone, nearly 85,000 children suffering from severe acute malnutrition were treated between January and November 2025 — “equivalent to one child every six minutes.”

“The collapse of health systems, critical water shortages and the breakdown of basic services are compounding the crisis, fueling deadly disease outbreaks and placing an estimated 3.4 million children under five at risk,” Beigbeder said.

Hunger is worsening Sudan’s health crisis.

“Sudan was once considered to be the food basket of the entire region,” Sahbani said. “Today, it is facing one of the most serious food crises in the world: more than 21 million people face high levels of acute malnutrition and food insecurity.”

Children under five and pregnant or breastfeeding women are particularly vulnerable. “We estimate that nearly 800,000 children under the age of five will have suffered severe acute malnutrition in 2025,” Sahbani added.

UNICEF warns that the breakdown of maternal and child health services has turned childbirth into a life-threatening event, particularly in displacement camps where access to skilled care and surgical facilities is limited or nonexistent.

A Port Sudan-based doctor, who asked to remain anonymous, said the cumulative impact of the war had shattered the country’s health system, with facilities, staff and infrastructure systematically dismantled.

“After a thousand days of awful war, the health system in Sudan remains in a dire situation,” the doctor told Arab News.

“The health system and of course the infrastructure have seen direct attack, where 75 percent of the hospitals and health facilities sustained damage, either via direct shelling or looting of their equipment.”

The conflict has also hollowed out Sudan’s medical workforce. “Many of the health personnel and workforce had to flee, as they were targeted themselves,” the doctor said, warning that the loss of staff has sharply reduced the country’s ability to deliver even basic care.

The collapse of routine services has accelerated the spread of disease, particularly among children. “We started to see the emergence of outbreaks of vaccine-preventable diseases like diphtheria and measles — many outbreaks that we are seeing among children,” the doctor said.

Damage to water infrastructure has further compounded the crisis. “Attacks on water stations led to outbreaks like cholera and hepatitis E with high fatalities among pregnant women,” the doctor added.

Reversing the damage will require far more than short-term emergency aid, the doctor said.

“Sudan’s health system requires huge rehabilitation and rebuilding,” they said, stressing that the consequences of inaction extend well beyond Sudan’s borders. “Health is now global health — whenever there is an outbreak somewhere, there is a risk of it spreading all over.”

The doctor called for urgent international support to stabilize services and rebuild infrastructure.

“There is a need for urgent donations to fill the huge gap in life-saving health services to the people and also to rebuild the health infrastructure,” they said, adding that support must focus on areas of greatest need, “especially conflict areas as well as areas that have been freed of the RSF where now people are returning.”

As international access remains constrained and funding dwindles, much of the burden of care has fallen on Sudanese communities themselves — including diaspora-funded initiatives and volunteer-run clinics and the Emergency Response Rooms

“The conflict has exacerbated all the vulnerabilities Sudan’s health system faced before the war,” Dr. Majdi Osman, a University of Cambridge scientist and founder of Nubia Health, a diaspora-funded clinic in Wadi Halfa in Sudan’s Northern State, told Arab News.

“Decades of under-investment, especially outside of Khartoum, left the health system fragile, but the current violence has pushed it into a state of collapse.”
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Supply chains have fragmented, driving up costs and limiting access to essential medicines. “Getting basic medicines has become a challenge but somehow health workers in Sudan are adapting and have been able to get medicines to communities in need,” Osman said.

“For patients with chronic diseases, the war has forced an impossible choice. Stay in a collapsing system or flee across dangerous routes to reach Egypt just to access life-saving treatment that should be a basic right.

“We are seeing families separated and lives risked on these journeys because the local medical infrastructure can no longer sustain the continuous care required for conditions like kidney disease or cancer.”

Despite the devastation, Sudan’s medical workforce has not disappeared. “Sudan does not lack medical expertise; it lacks the infrastructure and stability,” Osman said.

In Wadi Halfa, displaced doctors have arrived from Khartoum, Blue Nile and other conflict-affected regions. “At Nubia Health we are trying to provide them with the resources they need to support health in their communities,” Osman added.

Some organizations are attempting to restore fragments of the national health system. The Sudanese American Physicians Association, a leading humanitarian medical group, has sent a large delegation to Sudan to assess conditions and reopen facilities.

“Our delegation is on the ground to help reopen and restore essential hospital services disrupted by war — starting with the most critical hospitals across the health system’s resiliency, not only in Khartoum but also across the country,” Dr. Anmar Homeida, SAPA’s strategic adviser, told Arab News.

On Wednesday, SAPA announced the reopening of Bahri Teaching Hospital, one of the state’s largest referral facilities, “which represents a lifeline for children, mothers, and people with chronic and hard-to-treat conditions,” said Homeida.

“The impact we’re aiming for is simple: reduce preventable deaths, help local medical providers and humanitarian personnel deliver quality care to people in need, and support families returning home and those still displaced across the country, especially from Darfur and Kordofan, to have quality access to healthcare.

“With Sudan’s health system severely damaged and outbreaks spreading, reopening functional referral hospitals in Khartoum and supporting frontline services across other states is a practical step toward stabilizing communities and enabling recovery.”

Despite insecurity and access constraints, WHO says it continues to deliver lifesaving assistance wherever possible.

Since April 2023, the agency has delivered more than 3,300 metric tons of medicines and medical supplies worth around $40 million, including treatments for cholera, malaria, dengue and severe malnutrition.

About 24 million people have received cholera vaccinations, while more than 3.3 million have accessed care at WHO-supported hospitals, primary health facilities and mobile clinics.

More than 112,400 children with severe acute malnutrition have received treatment at WHO-supported stabilization centers.

“WHO is doing what we can, where we can, and we know we are saving lives and rebuilding the health system,” Sahbani said. “Despite the challenges, we are also working on recovery of the health system.”

Aid agencies are clear that humanitarian action alone cannot resolve Sudan’s crisis. “Humanitarian action can save lives, but it cannot replace the protection that only peace can provide,” Beigbeder said.

WHO, UNICEF and Sudanese doctors are united in their call for an end to the fighting and unimpeded humanitarian access.

“All parties must uphold their obligations under international humanitarian law: protect civilians, stop attacks on infrastructure, and allow safe, sustained and unimpeded humanitarian access across Sudan,” Beigbeder said.For Osman, the message to donors is equally stark.

“Firstly, the international community needs to move quickly and support Sudanese, community-led efforts that are delivering care today,” he said.

“When I recently visited Sudan, I was expecting to see a global response to the world’s largest humanitarian crisis. I found almost nothing.

“Secondly, the best cure for Sudan’s health crisis is peace. We can’t allow children in Sudan to go through another 1,000 days of conflict to pass otherwise we risk the health of a whole generation growing up in this pointless war.”


Arab News

Arab News is Saudi Arabia's first English-language newspaper. It was founded in 1975 by Hisham and Mohammed Ali Hafiz. Today, it is one of 29 publications produced by Saudi Research & Publishing Company (SRPC), a subsidiary of Saudi Research & Marketing Group (SRMG).
Pacific Power Must Show Progress Towards Oregon Emission Reduction Targets, Judge Finds

January 16, 2026 
Oregon Capital Chronicle
By Alex Baumhardt

(Oregon Capital Chronicle) — Oregon’s largest electric utilities will need to show continual progress towards the state’s greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets or face enforcement from the Oregon Public Utility Commission, a judge ruled.

Tuesday’s written ruling from Marion County Circuit Court Judge Channing Bennett follows a spoken directive Bennett gave in November and clears up any uncertainty over the commission’s authority to ensure progress is met on House Bill 2021.

That law requires Pacific Power and Portland General Electric — the state’s two largest investor-owned monopoly electric utilities collectively serving nearly 75% of the state’s electricity users — to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions 80% by 2030, 90% by 2035 and 100% by 2040.

Bennett rejected an appeal from lawyers for PacifiCorp, Pacific Power’s parent company, who argued the commission lacked the power to hold the company accountable for showing “continual progress” in meeting the targets established by the state Legislature five years ago. That’s because commissioners had not defined what “continual progress” meant, the lawyers said.

The case stemmed from a 2023 clean energy plan the company submitted to the Public Utility Commission as required by state law, meant to outline steps the company would take to reduce emissions and ensure reliable service and affordability.

Commissioners determined Pacific Power’s plan was insufficient as it did not include contracting with new clean energy producers to buy more power from them and cancelled a procurement process the company had begun in 2022 for purchasing more clean energy from producers. Instead, the plan outlined several strategies the company might undertake to reduce emissions, but did not commit to them.

“We simply cannot find that backsliding on emissions reductions without committing to a plan for improvement is continual progress, even if it represents a company’s best efforts under challenging circumstances and even though PacifiCorp has continued to advance its analysis and planning,” commissioners wrote.

In 2024, they proposed requiring the company to buy more clean energy from producers on the open market, which PacifiCorp appealed.

Bennett’s ruling affirmed that the commission has the power to ensure companies are making continual progress and that it does not need to define what that means.

“Absent a definition by the Legislature or the Commission, the phrase ‘continual progress’ is to be interpreted in accordance with the plain meaning of those two words,” Bennett wrote. “Backsliding on emission reductions without committing to a plan for improvement does not meet the plain meaning of ‘continual progress.’”

The watchdog Oregon Citizens’ Utility Board, the Green Energy Institute at Lewis and Clark University Law School, and the nonprofits Sierra Club and Renewable Northwest intervened on behalf of the Public Utility Commission in the case. They argued that Pacific Power was attempting to delay implementation of the state law and its legally mandated emission reduction targets, and to delay adding more clean energy resources to its power mix.

“The legislature didn’t anticipate that the utilities would do nothing and then all of a sudden in 2030 reduce their emissions, but that every year they would be taking steps to reach that target,” said Rose Monahan, senior attorney for the Sierra Club. “We were very vindicated to see that a judge who isn’t steeped in the weeds here also just sort of got it.”

Monahan said advocates suspected PacifiCorp’s 2023 Clean Energy Plan did not include more plans to buy clean energy on the open market or to build it themselves due to financial insecurity over the company’s liability in several 2020 powerline-ignited wildfires.

Simon Gutierrez, a spokesperson for PacifiCorp, said in an email that Pacific Power has improved upon its 2023 clean energy plan, and that its most recent clean energy plan presented to the commission in 2025 shows it will exceed the state’s timeline for decreasing emissions by creating and buying clean energy.

By 2030, he said, the company will reach an 85% reduction of emissions in Oregon, and reach a more than 90% reduction by 2035.

But, he added, “the current plan for clean energy deployment in Oregon will impact the cost of living for Oregonians and is becoming increasingly risky for utilities. PacifiCorp urges state leaders to consider these affordability challenges and also work to streamline the approval process for major infrastructure projects.”

The Public Utility Commission “remains committed to ensuring all regulated utilities make continual progress toward the state’s emissions‑reduction goals,” said Kandi Young, a commission spokesperson. “These standards were established by the Legislature to protect Oregon customers, support grid reliability, and advance the state’s transition to a cleaner energy future.”


Oregon Capital Chronicle

The Oregon Capital Chronicle, founded in 2021, is a professional, nonprofit news organization. We focus on deep and useful reporting on Oregon state government, politics and policy. Staffed by experienced journalists, the Capital Chronicle helps readers understand how those in government are using — or abusing — their power, what’s happening to taxpayer dollars, and how citizens can stake a bigger role in big decisions.

Spanish PM Pedro Sánchez’s Dilemma Over Western Sahara


File photo of Western Sahara protests in Madrid, Spain. 
Photo Credit: Cristianrodenas, Wikipedia Commons

Spain’s calls to respect sovereignty in Venezuela and Gaza have drawn attention to alleged hypocrisy vis-a-vis its own colonial past


January 16, 2026 
EurActiv
By Inés Fernández-Pontes

(Euractiv) — Spain’s strong defence of international law in response to a US military operation in Venezuela and Washington’s threats to take over Greenland has reignited scrutiny of Madrid’s own position on Western Sahara, where Spain retains a key and politically sensitive role.

Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez condemned what he described as a violation of Venezuelan sovereignty following the US capture of the country’s leader, Nicolás Maduro, and urged the EU not to “remain silent” in the face of US interventionism.

“Atlanticism does not mean vassalage,” the socialist leader said last week in his address to ambassadors, adding that respect for the sovereignty of Ukraine, Gaza, Venezuela or Greenland is “non-negotiable.”

The remarks, however, have drawn attention to Spain’s alleged hypocrisy toward Western Sahara, a former Spanish colony, and a long-running territorial dispute with direct legal and strategic implications for Madrid.

Controversies over airspace control

Spain withdrew from Western Sahara in 1975 after decades of colonial rule, opening the way for what international law considers the illegal occupation of the territory by Morocco and Mauritania. Nouakchott eventually withdrew from the conflict, but Rabat continues to lay claim to Western Sahara.

The situation triggered a protracted conflict between Rabat and the pro-independence armed group the Polisario Front, which claims to represent the local population.

“Airspace is part of Sahrawi territory, along with land and maritime space,” Abdulah Arabi, the Polisario Front representative in Spain, told Euractiv.

Arabi recalled the 2024 ruling of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), settling that Western Sahara is a distinct territory from Morocco.” Any action regarding the territory taken “without the consent of the people of Western Sahara and its legitimate representative is illegal under international law,” he noted.

But while Morocco claims sovereignty over Western Sahara, Spain continues to control the territory’s airspace. Since 1976, Spain’s air navigation authority, AENA, has managed air traffic from Gran Canaria’s Gandó airport.

For Rabat, control of the airspace is crucial for asserting control over the disputed territory, explained Isaías Barreñada, professor of international relations at Madrid’s Complutense University. But in Spain, where strong support for the Sahrawi cause persists across the political spectrum, any concession would be highly contentious.

In 2024, amid mounting pressure from political allies, Spanish Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares denied that the government was considering concessions to Morocco over airspace, calling such claims “strange theories.”

Barreñada also noted that Spain doesn’t have the legal authority to transfer control of airspace to Morocco.

There’s also the question of symbolism. Former Spanish army colonel Alfredo Rodríguez told Euractiv that changing who manages the airspace would signal “who is consolidating power in Western Sahara.”

“The debate over air traffic control is not merely technical – it is fundamentally political,” Rodríguez said.


Morocco’s leverage


Spain’s room for manoeuvre is also constrained by its relationship with Morocco.

In 2021, ties between the two countries deteriorated after Madrid allowed the Polisario leader Brahim Ghali to receive medical treatment in Spain without notifying Rabat. Morocco responded by easing border controls, allowing thousands of migrants to storm the Spanish northern African exclave of Ceuta in what Spain’s Defence Minister Margarita Robles described as “blackmail.”

Madrid eventually capitulated, and relations were later “normalised” after Spain broke with decades of neutrality by backing Morocco’s autonomy plan for Western Sahara in 2022, a position the US and France also took.

A joint declaration later opened the door to future “discussions on airspace management.”

Serving as a crucial buffer against the Sahel’s instability, Morocco remains a key partner for Spain in fighting terrorism and criminal trafficking networks. Spain’s Interior Minister Fernando Grande-Marlaska recently hailed this cooperation as “extraordinary,” highlighting Morocco’s role as a vital security shield for the EU.

According to Rodríguez, cooperation on migration, border control and policing gives Morocco significant leverage to “politically and economically influence” Spain.

Sánchez’s silence


Despite the many incentives for the Spanish government to acquiesce to Morocco, its silence leaves the socialists open to criticism.

Roberto Cantoni, an investigator for the organisation Western Sahara Resource Watch (WSRW), said Madrid’s staunch support for international law is, in fact, rather inconsistent.

“It is very striking and controversial given Sánchez’s support for other international rights violations and the self-determination of the Palestinians and Greenland,” Cantoni said.

Sánchez’s silence over the Sahara implies that “the problem does not exist,” he added, “as if there were no international judgments affirming that Morocco does not have sovereignty over this territory.”

The Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not respond to Euractiv’s requests for comment at the time of publication.

EurActiv publishes free, independent policy news and facilitates open policy debates in 12 languages.
U.S. Wild Horse And Burro Management: Overview Of Costs – Analysis





Background

The Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act of 1971 (1971 Act, 16 U.S.C. §§1331 et seq.) provides for management and protection of wild horses and burros by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), within the Department of the Interior, and the Forest Service (FS), within the Department of Agriculture. For decades, federal management of wild horses and burros in western states has generated controversy, study, proposals, and lawsuits on occasion. BLM and FS use several approaches to achieve the appropriate management level (AML) of animals on the range, including placement into private care (primarily adoption and sale), off-range holding, and fertility control, among others. Management costs have increased over time (Figure 1). Issues for Congress include the adequacy and use of funding to achieve AML, primarily on BLM lands.
 
Overview of Authority

Under the 1971 Act, BLM and FS inventory horse and burro populations periodically to determine AML for each herd. When the pertinent Secretary determines that an overpopulation exists and that it is necessary to remove excess animals, the law requires specific actions (16 U.S.C. §1333(b)(2)). First, the Secretary “shall order old, sick, or lame animals to be destroyed in the most humane manner possible.” Second, the Secretary “shall cause … excess … horses and burros to be humanely captured” for private adoption. Third, where there is no adoption demand, the Secretary shall cause excess animals “to be destroyed in the most humane and cost efficient manner possible.”

Congress has enacted additional authorities to reduce excess animals. For instance, P.L. 108-447, Division E, Section 142, authorized excess animal sales, with provisions to (1) direct the agencies to sell, “without limitation,” excess animals (or remains) that are more than 10 years old or offered for adoption unsuccessfully at least three times; (2) remove a ban on sale of wild horses and burros (and remains) for processing into commercial products; and (3) remove criminal penalties for processing the remains of a sold animal into commercial products.

Since 1982, BLM and FS have not used their authority to destroy healthy animals. Further, most (but not all) annual Interior appropriations laws over the past few decades have prohibited BLM from using funds therein for destruction of healthy animals or for sales of animals that result in processing into commercial products. Since FY2020, Interior appropriations laws typically contained a similar FS provision (e.g., P.L. 118-42, Division E, §417(e)).


Population

Achieving and maintaining the number of wild horses and burros at the national AML has challenged BLM for decades. As of March 1, 2025, BLM had set the AML upper limit for all wild horse and burro herds on its lands at 25,556 animals, but the on-range estimate was 73,130 animals. However, this level is 23% less than the 2020 recent high of 95,114 animals, due to factors including increased removals, adoptions/sales, and fertility control.

BLM manages wild horses and burros in 175 herd management areas (HMAs) in 10 western states. Nearly half (83) of the HMAs are in Nevada. Wyoming, Oregon, Utah, and California each have between 14 and 21 HMAs. BLM also manages thousands of these animals—64,205 as of August 2025—off range. During periodic gathers and removals, these additional animals were removed from rangelands exceeding AML. Most (61%) are being cared for in long-term (pasture) facilities, typically for the remainder of their lives. Others (39%) are in short-term (corral) facilities, usually to be readied for adoption or sale. For FS lands, AML is roughly 3,500 (January 2025). The number on range—about 9,000-9,500—is more than double the AML. The animals are on 34 active territories in several states, with about two dozen managed jointly with BLM.
Wild Horse and Burro Program Funding

It is unclear whether funding levels have been appropriate to care for wild horses and burros. Program costs would vary based on the overall management strategy adopted and the particular programs emphasized (e.g., off-range holding, adoption, or population control). For instance, 2018 and 2020 BLM reports (and a 2020 fact sheet) presented management options with varying associated costs.

BLM Historical Appropriations: FY2000-FY2025

The FY2025 appropriation for BLM management of wild horses and burros was $142.0 million. Relative to FY2000 ($20.4 million), this was nearly a 600% increase in nominal dollars and about a 270% increase in 2025 dollars. The FY2025 appropriation also was about 4% less than the FY2023 peak of $147.9 million in nominal dollars and about 9% less in 2025 dollars (Figure 1). FS wild horse and burro appropriations are not separately identifiable.

Since FY2000, appropriations laws periodically have provided BLM funding to reduce animals on the range. For example, in FY2010, BLM received $64.0 million,compared with $40.6 million in FY2009. The increase was for activities (e.g., removal and adoption of animals, population control) to achieve AML by 2013 (which did not occur) and for the escalating cost of long-term holding. As another example, the FY2022 appropriation was $137.1 million, compared with $115.7 million in FY2021, to support “an aggressive, non-lethal population control strategy” as set out in BLM’s 2020 report, according to the explanatory statement. This strategy was to include increased removals, long-term holding, and fertility control.
FY2024 Obligations by Activity

Figure 2 shows FY2024 BLM obligations of wild horse and burro funding of $153.3 million, by activity. Off-range holding accounted for $101.4 million (66%), composed of $70.9 million (46%) for short-term care and $30.5 million (20%) for long-term care. Program support and adoptions and sales were each 10%. Other portions were 5% for gathering (animals on the range), 4% for growth suppression, and 5% for other activities.


Issues and Proposals Related to Costs

Concerns over increasing wild horse and burro populations and program costs have prompted studies and proposals for years. In response to congressional direction, BLM issued a report in 2020 proposing actions to achieve AML over 15-18 years. The emphasis was on animal removals, off-range holding, placement into private care, and fertility control and included related costs. Some Appropriations Committee reports have expressed an intent to fund options in BLM’s 2020 report.

Some questions pertain to how to increase the number, and reduce the average cost, of animals placed in private care. BLM has sought to increase adoptions and sales by partnering with organizations (including new partnerships). BLM typically charges a minimum of $25 to adopt or purchase an untrained animal and $125 per trained animal, but BLM estimated the average cost to the agency at about $1,700 in 2025. This cost includes making the animals more marketable (e.g., by training, advertising, and transporting) but excludes a $1,000 adoption incentive that ended in March 2025. The cost of placement in private care is considerably less than BLM’s average lifetime cost of caring for an animal—about $15,000 in 2025. This was a decrease from $27,500 in 2023, according to BLM, due to the acquisition of additional long-term pasture facilities, which are lower cost than short-term corral facilities.

However, the number of animals in short-term facilities has increased (e.g., by 54% from 16,325 in 2021 to 25,110 in 2025). Another question is whether animals can be moved more quickly from short-term corral facilities into long-term pasture facilities to achieve program savings. Long-term holding typically is used for older and other animals with less potential for adoption or sale, with an average cost in 2025 at about $2.35 per animal per day, according to BLM. The cost of short-term corral facilities was about $6 per animal per day in 2025. Short-term facilities are more expensive due in part to hay costs, veterinary services, and farrier services to prepare the animals for adoption or sale and, in some cases, to the costs of BLM salaried employees.

A third question—how to improve fertility control to reduce herd sizes and costs—has been a focus of BLM research and was recommended by BLM’s Wild Horse and Burro Advisory Board. BLM estimated the cost of the most common method—Porcine Zona Pellucida (PZP) vaccines—at $2,100 per mare in 2025, including gathering, treating with PZP, holding for a short time, and then releasing back to the range. PZP generally is most effective for one year only. To lower costs, areas of research have included longer-lasting fertility control. Since 2018, BLM has increased use of the GonaCon-Equine vaccine, which can produce four or more years of infertility in mares receiving a booster dose. The cost of this treatment was about $2,500 per mare in 2025, including the vaccine; application by dart or gather/treat/hold/release; and staff travel and labor.

A fourth question is how to increase nonfederal funding for management of wild horses and burros. Recent initiatives include BLM establishment of a “micro-donations website.” Also, the BLM Wild Horse and Burro Advisory Board has recommended that the Foundation for America’s Public Lands, BLM’s official charitable partner, serve as a funding source/mechanism for off-range holding.

A fifth question is whether BLM should sell excess animals without limitations and/or destroy excess healthy animals to reduce program costs, as some observers have proposed. President Trump’s FY2026 budget did not prohibit use of funds for destruction of animals. Also, the FY2020 BLM budget justification had called for availability of all authorities under the 1971 Act by removing sale limitations (intended as safeguards against slaughter) and prohibitions on using funds to destroy healthy animals. The FY2020 appropriations law retained these provisions.

About the author: Carol Hardy Vincent, Specialist in Natural Resources Policy

Source: This article was published by the Congressional Research Service (CRS).
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) works exclusively for the United States Congress, providing policy and legal analysis to committees and Members of both the House and Senate, regardless of party affiliation. As a legislative branch agency within the Library of Congress, CRS has been a valued and respected resource on Capitol Hill for nearly a century.

Thursday, January 15, 2026

No Country’s Safe in Imperialism’s Gangster Phase


Prabhat Patnaik 



The difference between Trump and earlier US Presidents lies only in the fact that the others had camouflaged their gangster acts under a patina of “civilised” verbiage.


When the Soviet Union collapsed, liberal bourgeois writers had proclaimed the arrival of an era marked by the universal triumph of democracy and stability; they had considered the socialist challenge unnecessary and counterproductive, and believed that capitalism, which had already given political independence to its colonies, and introduced universal adult franchise and welfare state measures at its core, would, in the absence of this challenge, secure for mankind peace, economic security and individual freedom.

Several Left writers, on the other hand, had seen decolonisation, and the introduction of universal adult franchise and welfare state measures, as concessions wrung out of capitalism at a time when it faced an existential threat because of the socialist challenge, and had anticipated that the abatement of this challenge would make the system assume its usual predatory character and roll back these concessions. They have been proved right, and imperialism, with which alone we shall be concerned here, has shown its blatantly aggressive nature, exhibiting what can only be called a “gangster phase”.

To abduct, as US imperialism has done, a duly elected President of another country, Nicolas Maduro of Venezuela, and his wife, from their residence through a military operation, and bring them to the US in handcuffs to face trial on trumped up charges for which no credible evidence has ever been provided, and to run their country directly as a US colony until a suitable puppet government has been put in place, is an act of incredible audacity which violates all legal and moral norms of international behaviour and typifies this “gangster phase” of imperialism.

This, however, constitutes the latest act of the gangster phase of imperialism. The forcible removal of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and his execution, again on totally false charges, the brutal killing of Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi, the occupation of Syria, the genocide perpetrated on the Palestinian people whose only “fault” lies in their desire not to be evicted from their homes by an imperialist-backed settler colonial project, the taking over of Gaza as a US colony to be ruled by a “Viceroy” selected by US President Donald Trump and to be converted into a piece of prime real estate, are all episodes in the unfolding of the gangster phase of imperialism.

Liberal opinion, again, holds Trump as a maverick responsible for behaving like a gangster and puts the entire onus of recent predatory acts on him alone. But most of the episodes mentioned above predate Trump’s ascendancy to power; the difference between Trump and earlier US Presidents lies only in the fact that the others had camouflaged their gangster acts under a patina of “civilised” verbiage, while Trump makes no bones about his administration’s intentions.

Besides, every one of the episodes mentioned above, including even the genocide directed against the Palestinians, has the full support of other imperialist countries who never cease to advertise their so-called “liberal” principles. Even the abduction of Maduro, while it has drawn condemnation from all over the world, except a few in the Global South wishing to curry favour with Trump (among whom alas India is included), has enjoyed the active or tacit backing of Germany, France and Britain.

An argument is being put forward, in particular by the European allies of the US, to the effect that Maduro was an authoritarian ruler, so that no tears need be shed over his removal. The utter absurdity of this argument is palpable. International law does not allow the US, or any other country for that matter, to intervene militarily in the affairs of another country to establish democracy there; it is for the people of that country to determine who the ruler should be. Whether Maduro was authoritarian or not is thus completely irrelevant to the issue of US intervention.

Read Also: What Really Does ‘Western Civilisation’ Denote?

Besides, Trump himself has openly admitted that Maduro’s principal opponent in Venezuela, Maria Corina Machado, did not enjoy sufficient popular support to take over the reins of administration after Maduro had been arrested.

In a country with two main political platforms, if one does not enjoy sufficient popular support, then it stands to reason that the other must have greater support. In such a case, to claim, as Trump himself and many European leaders have done, that Maduro lacks political legitimacy, is utterly absurd. If Machado lacks political legitimacy and so does Maduro, then Trump must specify who in Venezuela does enjoy political legitimacy.

The real reason for removing Maduro was revealed by Trump with his characteristic bluntness, when he stated at his press conference on Saturday, January 3: “We are going to be taking out a tremendous amount of wealth out of the ground”. The money made, according to him, would not only go to the people of Venezuela but also to American oil companies and to the “United States of America in the form of reimbursement for damages caused us by that country”.

The “damages” Trump was referring to were caused apparently by Venezuela’s nationalising its oil resources. Venezuela has more oil reserves than any other country in the world, reserves amounting to as much as 17% of total world reserves. And Trump’s proposal to loot Venezuela’s oil is a brazen admission of his motive for taking over and “running” that country. This is nothing else but open gangsterism: you have oil and we shall take it from you by abducting your President if he stands in the way, and either by running your country directly as a colony or by putting in place some puppet government that would allow us to loot your country.

To be sure, looting the resources of other countries, including land or products of land, is what imperialism has always done; it is central to imperialism. After decolonisation, it attempted to carry on the process of looting by toppling governments that stood in the way and putting in place pliant governments.

The CIA-sponsored coups against Arbenz in Guatemala, Mossadegh in Iran, Lumumba in Congo (as it was then called), and Allende in Chile, come to mind as obvious examples. More recently, the various colour revolutions in Eastern Europe and former Soviet republics, and the American assault on West Asia, belong to the same genre. 

The difference between all these earlier cases and Venezuela lies in the fact that in earlier cases the US gave the appearance of supporting one side in an internal conflict, while working on coups behind the scenes; but in Venezuela it has simply carried out a military intervention without this fig-leaf of supporting one side in an internal conflict.

Of course, it also targets those countries which have anti-imperialist governments even when they may not be minerally rich, and Trump has already announced his plans of targeting Cuba, Mexico and Colombia as part of his attempted revival of the infamous Monroe Doctrine. But it is not just Latin America and the Caribbean that constitute the domain of his empire. No country in the world is safe from US intervention today.

The Soviet Union had come to the defence of Cuba during the so-called Cuban missile crisis when the US had threatened to attack that island, even at the risk of provoking a nuclear conflict with the US, just as it had earlier come to the defence of Egypt against an Anglo-French invasion following Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal; in both cases, imperialism had to beat a retreat. The absence of the Soviet Union today will be sorely missed by all countries of the world that are threatened by imperialism led by the US.

This gangster phase of imperialism, which constitutes the highest stage of imperialism to date, cannot obviously last for long. The people of the world, especially of the Third World who have been victims of imperialism, will not allow themselves once again to remain in thraldom to imperialist domination. In fact, even in earlier cases of imperialist gangsterism in the Arab world, the outcome of its interference has been quite different from what was intended.

It is significant in this context that Trump’s bland assumption that, with Maduro out of the way, the Vice-President of Venezuela, Delcy Rodriguez, who has taken his place, will obey American diktat has already proved hollow: she has condemned the US action and demanded the release of Maduro because of which Trump has started threatening her with “a fate worse than Maduro”. And indeed, the entire country has stood up against this act of US gangsterism. While the absence of the Soviet Union has emboldened imperialism in its quest for world domination, this domination will remain a pipe-dream.

Prabhat Patnaik is Professor Emeritus, Centre for Economic Studies and Planning, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. The views are personal. 

THE NEW IMPERIALISM IS FASCISM


'To remain free, one must be feared': Macron says of France’s defence priorities


By Sophia Khatsenkova
Published on 

On Thursday, the French president offered his New Year's address to the armed forces. The eagerly awaited annual event comes amid multiple geopolitical crises.

2026 will be “a year of challenges” for national defence, French President Emmanuel Macron told armed forces on Thursday at the Istres Air Base in southern France, against a backdrop of escalating international tensions.

Russia's war in Ukraine continues, tensions are escalating amid violent protests in Iran, and a new source of concern has emerged with US President Donald Trump’s expressed interest in taking over Greenland, an autonomous territory of the Kingdom of Denmark.

Paris has viewed this development as strategically sensitive, given the Arctic region’s growing geopolitical importance.

“We are ready,” Macron declared. “This decade of French rearmament is bearing fruit.”

'To remain free, one must be feared'


Macron reaffirmed his “determination to give our armed forces the means to ensure our defence” in a world he described as increasingly unstable.

“To remain free, one must be feared, and to be feared, one must be powerful. To be powerful in this brutal world, we must act faster and stronger,” he said.

Macron outlined three strategic priorities: increasing ammunition stockpiles, strengthening operational readiness, and safeguarding France’s sovereignty.

On the financial front, Macron confirmed his intention to significantly increase military funding, calling for a €36bn rise over the 2026-2030 period, including €3.5bn as early as 2026.

He had previously pledged in 2017 to raise France’s defence spending to 2% of GDP, a target that has been reached.

French President Emmanuel Macron delivers a speech as he visits the Istres military air force base, southern France, Thursday, Jan. 15, 2026.
French President Emmanuel Macron delivers a speech as he visits the Istres military air force base, southern France, Thursday, Jan. 15, 2026. Philippe Magoni/Copyright 2026 The AP. All rights reserved.

Acknowledging drone capability gaps

The French president also recognised gaps in certain areas, particularly in drone capabilities, which have been heavily used in the war in Ukraine.

“We are behind,” he admitted, calling for a rapid and forceful response. Highlighting the Russian threat, he warned: “We are within firing range of Russia.”

Macron announced that France would strengthen its military presence in Greenland.

Around 15 French soldiers are already deployed in Nuuk for exercises, and the contingent will be “reinforced in the coming days with land, air, and naval assets.” He emphasised that “Europeans have a particular responsibility” in the area.

Earlier on Thursday, Macron convened an emergency defence council to assess the strategic implications, while several allied countries, including Germany, Norway, and Sweden, have begun deploying troops to the Arctic in a show of support.

Another key initiative for the coming years is the reintroduction of a voluntary, paid national service for young people.

Announced last November, the program is designed to bolster military personnel numbers and meet growing staffing needs.

The government and the French armed forces launched a recruitment campaign this week for the new 10-month program.

The army aims to enlist 3,000 young people this year, 4,000 in 2027, and 10,000 by 2030, with the long-term goal of reaching 42,500 volunteers by 2035.

Lithuania on the frontline: How a small EU country is preparing for a possible war

Lithuanian Military parade
Copyright Copyright 2025 The Associated Press. All rights reserved.
By Evi Kiorri
Published o 

For Lithuania, a NATO and EU member bordering Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave and Belarus, the war in Ukraine has not been a distant conflict. It is a warning. How is Vilnius preparing for a possible war with Russia?

In Vilnius, daily life continues as usual, but beneath this normality, Lithuania focuses on reinforcing its security in response to new uncertainty in Europe’s security order.

For Lithuania, a NATO and EU member bordering Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave and Belarus, the war in Ukraine has not been a distant conflict. It has been a warning.

A rising threat perception

Lithuania sees a rising threat from Russia in the next three to five years, according to Vice-minister of National Defence Karolis Aleksa. He cites Russia's military buildup, readiness to use force, and ambition to reshape Europe's security as key drivers.

Lithuania’s preparations are a direct response to these developments.

“Russia has demonstrated both the will and the readiness to employ military force to pursue its goals,” Aleksa told Euronews, pointing to Ukraine as the clearest example. This is not only about Ukraine. "The Russian regime will employ military force as a tool to change the European security architecture.”

The war’s outcome, whether a ceasefire or peace agreement, will affect Russia’s posture. Still, Aleksa said Vilnius expects Moscow to keep strengthening its forces along NATO’s eastern borders, including in Kaliningrad. All indicators show an “increase of the conflict and of the Russian aggression” if deterrence is not strong enough, he added.

Allies on the ground

Deterrence, in Lithuania’s view, begins with a visible allied presence. Since 2022, NATO activity in the country has intensified significantly, with the United States and Germany playing a central role.

A key milestone is Germany’s decision to permanently deploy a brigade to Lithuania by 2027. Aleksa described it as “a huge political and military signal”, demonstrating that the defence of Lithuania is a collective NATO responsibility, not just a national one.

“This is about defending from the first inch of our territory,” he said. “We really have to demonstrate collectively that this is not only a national business of each NATO member state, but it's really a collective effort.”

German forces are already present, while Lithuania is rapidly upgrading its infrastructure to facilitate the missions and host the full brigade. US troops also maintain a constant presence, and other allies, including the Netherlands and Norway, contribute across land, air, and maritime domains.

Air defence now plays an important role. Lithuania is building its own systems, while NATO allies rotate surface-based air defence units and fighter aircraft through the Baltic region. At sea, NATO continues its Baltic mission, complemented by European Union efforts to strengthen critical infrastructure protection.

Building national military power

Beyond allied presence, Lithuania’s top priority is an ambitious national defence build-up to ensure the country is ready and resilient to current threats.

The government has committed to establishing a fully operational national division by 2030, capable of fighting alongside NATO forces. Aleksa identifies this as the central pillar of Lithuania’s military modernisation.

“This means not only combat brigades, but also all the enabling support capabilities in order to fight shoulder to shoulder with our allied forces here in Lithuania.” Logistics, engineering, medical support, command and control are equally important, he explained.

To achieve this, Lithuania is investing billions of euros in modern equipment. Major procurement projects include tanks, infantry fighting vehicles such as the CV90, German and French artillery systems, and US-made HIMARS rocket artillery. These investments are on a compressed timeline, creating pressure to acquire equipment, integrate it, and make units combat-ready by the end of the decade.

“We are not just buying platforms,” Aleksa said. Lithuania is building “interoperable, ready to fight by the end of 2030 units.”

Total defence and society’s role

Preparedness in Lithuania goes beyond the military: the total defence concept centres on strengthening national resilience and readiness at every level of society.

A key element is the Lithuanian Riflemen’s Union, a volunteer force like a national guard. Its membership has grown from around 10,000 in 2021 to more than 18,000 today.

“This shows the energy and commitment of our society,” Aleksa said. “We understand that we are a small nation, but we have to have a resilient and to-the-point defence industry.”

Defence spending reflects this sentiment. This year, Lithuania will spend about 5% of its GDP on defence. Public support for allies and military investment is high. A defence ministry poll found that nearly 80% of Lithuanians support the stationing of allies and NATO forces in the country.

There is also growing acceptance that preparedness must go beyond professional soldiers. While debates continue around the future of conscription, including whether it should be universal and how women should be included, Aleksa said the direction is clear: “A much, much bigger part of the society understands that they need to do more.”

Education is part of these efforts. Lithuania is expanding national security and civil resistance lessons in schools and supporting informal initiatives such as civilian drone training centres. “It is not preparation for war in this brutal sense, but providing possibilities for our kids to use drones,” Aleksa stressed. “It is about building civilian skills and resilience in a modern security environment.

Hybrid threats and grey-zone warfare

Lithuania’s defence planning increasingly focuses on threats that fall short of open conflict. Cyberattacks, disinformation, sabotage, and other forms of hybrid warfare are seen as persistent risks, not only from Russia but also from its partners, like Belarus.

“We already see these methods being used,” Aleksa said. “Future conflicts may begin without tanks crossing borders.”

As a result, Lithuania is investing in cyber defence, information resilience, and counter-disinformation to enable society to resist manipulation and disruption.

The EU’s role: money, mobility and regulation

Lithuania closely links its defence build-up to European and transatlantic support. The EU will provide a significant share of funding through "safe loans," allowing Lithuania to access up to €6.3 billion by 2030 for around 50 defence projects. Lithuania also expects additional support through EU defence programmes and the bloc’s next multiannual budget.

Equally important, Aleksa said, are regulatory reforms aimed at boosting Europe’s defence industry. Cutting bureaucratic hurdles and accelerating production is essential if Europe is serious about deterrence.

Military mobility remains another priority. Faster movement of troops and equipment across borders, often called a "military Schengen", would directly support NATO’s defence plans on the eastern flank.

Ukraine as the first line of defence

Lithuania remains one of Ukraine’s strongest supporters, committing at least 0.25% of its GDP to military assistance. Beyond donations, Vilnius is working on joint defence production projects with Ukraine and European partners.

“Supporting Ukraine is supporting our own security,” Aleksa said. “Ukraine’s resistance is the first line of defence for Europe.”

Lithuanian officials stress that Europe cannot afford complacency. The main challenge is maintaining deterrence momentum, even as others are tempted by complacency or a false sense of peace.

“We don't want war,” he said. “What we want is deterrence.”

His message to Europe is clear: real security demands constant preparedness and investment in collective defence. Europe must be ready and act together, as revisionist powers are already preparing for action.