Going back in time
Published November 24, 2025
DAWN
DAWN
The writer teaches politics and sociology at Lums.
WITH a series of significant constitutional amendments as well as de facto changes in governance, a distinctive political system is taking shape in Pakistan. The fact that it is authoritarian goes without saying. The exact form of this authoritarianism is worth thinking through.
The bare standard definition of democracy, i.e., a political system where election results generally decide who sits in office, was effectively done away with after the 2024 poll. The existence of significant question marks over the electoral validity of the civilian government marked a clear shift in the ‘hybrid regime’ dynamic in place since 2018.
With time in office dependent on decree rather than election outcomes, parliament itself now operates within the limitations set by an establishment-controlled executive. The legislative agenda, in whatever form it exists, is now centrally ordained rather than deliberated and discussed. The PTI, despite its ballot box performance, stands disenfranchised and marginalised in this process.
The concluding phase of the system’s transformation comes via the passage of the 26th and 27th amendments. Through these changes, the judiciary in nominal terms is now subject to parliamentary authority. But as laid out above, if parliament is de facto subservient to the executive, that means the judiciary now too is an implementation branch of executive power.
The current configuration of governance is not too dissimilar to what the British envisioned in the early 20th century.
Countries the world over conjure up a variety of different political systems enshrined in their constitutions — presidential, semi-presidential, parliamentary, consociational etc — but all of them have one thing in common: judicial review of the executive. With the latest developments in judiciary-executive relations, thanks to amendment nos. 26 and 27, the last remaining vestiges (mostly a fig-leaf) of constitutionalism stand discarded.
So what are we left with? It’s tempting to think of this as personalised autocracy, or even some 21st-century variant of absolutism. A strongman at the top ruling through a set of vassals, drawing on the power of an inordinately well-funded and organised security apparatus. The historical parallels evoke Bismarck, but the closest contemporary parallels are Middle Eastern dictatorships, especially in Egypt.
But there is a historical instance that resembles the current situation in somewhat similar ways. This instance is in fact from this very region, which makes the comparison more apt. And it won’t be remiss to suggest that the patterns of authority taking root in Pakistan today actually go all the way back to the roots established during an earlier era.
I’m primarily referring to the political system that evolved in the late colonial period, especially through its two main legislative instruments — the Government of India Acts of 1919 and 1935. Conventionally taught in the local curricula as ‘dyarchy’, the system first devolved several aspects of governance to provincial governments, though with varying scope for elected versus non-elected representatives. At the central level, some aspects were handed over to the legislative council, while others (finance, defence, administration) remained under executive authority.
The Government of India Act, 1935, enlarged the role of elected provincial legislatures in governance, but maintained executive control on central subjects. The graduation of the legislative assembly to a truly representative governing authority never took place. Self-government was thus only made possible with the end of colonial authority.
Allowing for some liberty in the analogy, Pakistan’s current configuration of governance is not too dissimilar to what the British envisioned in the early 20th century. The provinces have become concessionary arenas for popular politics. Party activity operates somewhat unencumbered, to the extent that even the main opposition to the regime is allowed to retain its government in KP.
NFC transfers help lubricate this politics, with party support being shored up (as in PPP in Sindh and PTI in KP) or being rebuilt from its obliteration (PML-N in Punjab) through patronage and mega projects. Much like in colonial India, elites from the propertied classes use this arena for a variety of political and self-serving objectives. Effectiveness of spending and impact on welfare are secondary concerns.
At the centre, though, the story is entirely different. Here we see the exercise of viceregal authority in full bloom. Parliament serves the same function (with the same degree of potency) that the legislative council historically did. The judiciary’s primary task is to provide exceptions to bypass any fundamental rights. Key decisions on finance, defence, and administration are taken by civilian and military bureaucrats, and the current cabinet resembles the appointed officials of a past era in all but name.
Such authoritarian control coexisting with political federalism, at least for now, seems like an odd combination. Past episodes of dictatorial control tried to centralise authority by undercutting the provinces through steps like the One-Unit scheme or via the curtailment of provincial resources). But in many ways, events of the past few years are a reversion of the Pakistani state to its foundational DNA from the early 20th century.
The tragedy here is the direction of change. Each successive Government of India Act enlarged the space for representative politics, under strong pressure from mass movements of self-rule and independence. The political sphere of that time carried a variety of ideological currents, all of which sought an emancipated future — one in which viceregal authority would give way to the exercise of sovereignty by the people themselves.
Our direction is the opposite. Having enshrined the principles of democratic government and federalism in 1973 (reaffirmed in 2008), the state has now moved in the opposite direction. It has closed off key domains of governance from representative authority, shut off judicial review for its actions, and made parliament largely redundant in form, if not in appearance. Barring any resistance, the next step on this trajectory would take us further back into the late-19th century, when even provincial politics is deemed surplus to requirement. Let’s see what the 28th amendment has in store.
X: @Umairjav
Published in Dawn, November 24th, 2025
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