Crude calculations: How oil became a frontline in Sudan's war
As Sudan's economy collapses, rival military leaders have engineered a fragile truce to keep oil flowing. But how long will it last?
Analysis
Elfadil Ibrahim
17 December, 2025
NEW ARAB
As the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) swept into Heglig, the country’s oil hub, last week, soldiers from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) did not put up a fight.
Instead, thousands crossed the southern border, surrendering their weapons to the army of South Sudan, a nation that itself seceded from Khartoum just over a decade ago.
Against the background of these events, an interesting geopolitical arrangement has taken hold. A ‘tripartite agreement’ has been struck between the SAF, their mortal enemies the RSF, and the government of South Sudan.
"The agreement ensures that the Heglig area becomes a neutral zone, where no war takes place," Ateny Wek Ateny, South Sudan’s Minister of Information, told the media.
"The agreement ensures that the South Sudan People's Defence Forces (SSPDF)... will be responsible for the security of the oil areas,” he said. "All oil wells are operating and working in a normal manner.”
The deal, born of mutual financial desperation, allows South Sudanese troops to cross back into northern territory to guard the oil infrastructure, while the RSF withdraws from the production site and patrols the periphery.
The irony is hard to miss. Sudan’s rival generals can reach an agreement to protect the flow of crude oil, yet they cannot muster the political will to stop a war that has displaced millions and shattered the state.
A former business planning executive in Sudan’s oil industry, who requested anonymity to speak freely, cautioned that despite assurances that the site is functioning, its physical integrity is hanging by a thread.
“The infrastructure is highly vulnerable to strikes, and any attack could result in severe disruption with potentially catastrophic consequences," the source told The New Arab.
"Such incidents may ultimately lead to an indefinite, long-term shutdown,” he added.
Indeed, despite the activation of the tripartite agreement, violence has already punctured the deal. A recent drone strike in the vicinity reportedly killed South Sudanese soldiers, highlighting how volatile the situation is.
Nicholas Coghlan, Canada’s first resident diplomat in Khartoum, suggests this wasn't necessarily a calculated betrayal, but a symptom of the overarching chaos.
As Elbadawi explained, Sudan is no stranger to strife, but its past wars were fought in the hinterlands, far from the economic engines. Today, the map of the war is a map of the economy itself.
"In previous wars, such as the civil war in the South [South Sudan], the fighting happened only in peripheral regions that were also economically marginalised," Elbadawi explained. "Now, productive regions are under attack."
He pointed to specific commercial hubs that have become battlegrounds, listing cities that serve as crucial nodes in the national export market.
"El Obeid, the centre for Gum Arabic, is under siege. Nyala, which is the hub for cattle and livestock, is being hit by drones and airstrikes…Khartoum and the industrial area in Bahri [Khartoum North] were destroyed at the beginning of the war.”
While this route is effectively the junior partner to the larger Petrodar pipeline further east (flowing from South Sudan’s Upper Nile State into SAF-controlled White Nile State), the two pipelines generate the transit fees that have become the essential revenue stream for the SAF’s war chest.
For South Sudan, the stakes are existential. The nation relies on these pipelines to export nearly all its crude, the lifeblood of an economy teetering on collapse. As Coghlan, the former Canadian diplomat, points out, the rot was deep even before the latest disruption.
"Government ministries derive more than half of their revenue from international donors; notoriously, the government is often months behind in paying civil servants' salaries," he said, noting that international donors are "meanwhile bailing" on Juba, too.
With no financial cushion left, the diplomatic scramble to save this lifeline was immediate. On Sunday, a high-level South Sudanese delegation led by security advisor Tut Gatluak arrived in Port Sudan. Gatluak hand-delivered a letter from President Salva Kiir, prompting al-Burhan to order immediate technical talks on energy and trade.
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While the oil deal demonstrates that Sudan’s warring parties can communicate when cash is on the line, the broader peace process has effectively collapsed. The "Quad" - a diplomatic bloc containing the US, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates - recently attempted to broker a ceasefire, an effort that was spearheaded by President Trump’s Senior Advisor for African Affairs, Massad Boulos.
General al-Burhan, however, shot this down, choosing instead to write an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal appealing directly to the US President Donald Trump, dangling the prospect of business deals for American companies in Sudan’s reconstruction.
While ceasefire efforts falter and Sudan’s descent continues, the tragic fragmentation of its political class has deprived the country of any domestically designed off-ramp. Civilian coalitions, instead of offering a unified alternative, are splintering into factions that mirror the military divide.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the implosion of the "Somoud" coalition (formerly Taqqadum). Led by former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, the group was intended to be the unified voice of the anti-war movement and the bridge back to civilian rule. Instead, it has collapsed inwards, victim to the same polarisation tearing the country apart.
High-profile defections have gutted its credibility. Its vice president, al-Hadi Idris, has openly aligned with the RSF, while other public faces of the movement have drifted toward the paramilitary’s self-styled "Government of Peace and Unity".
On paper, the world agrees that Sudan must be put back together by civilians. The stated goal of all major mediators - the “Quad”, the United Nations, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and the African Union - is to resurrect a unified, civilian-led Sudan.
Yet this diplomatic consensus collides with bleak political realities.
Abdulrahman Alghali, a political analyst and writer who was in the past a high-ranking member of the National Umma Party, notes that even stalwarts like the Umma Party (historically one of the nation's largest) are currently in a state of disintegration.
"The Umma Party now is almost four factions," Alghali explained to The New Arab.
He detailed how the party has splintered into irreconcilable camps: those backing the RSF, those staunchly behind the SAF, those remaining with Hamdok’s 'Somoud' coalition, and a fourth group attempting a precarious neutrality.
"So the party is divided, of course," Alghali noted, adding that the phenomenon is widespread. "This is the same thing happening in the Democratic Unionist Party,” another of Sudan’s political heavyweights.
Without a unified civilian voice to check the military actors, both the ceasefire and political tracks remain paralysed. This leaves the fate of Sudan in the hands of men with guns who view the state merely as a prize to be captured.
Elfadil Ibrahim is a writer and analyst focused on Sudanese politics
Edited by Charlie Hoyle
As Sudan's economy collapses, rival military leaders have engineered a fragile truce to keep oil flowing. But how long will it last?
Analysis
Elfadil Ibrahim
17 December, 2025
NEW ARAB
As the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) swept into Heglig, the country’s oil hub, last week, soldiers from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) did not put up a fight.
Instead, thousands crossed the southern border, surrendering their weapons to the army of South Sudan, a nation that itself seceded from Khartoum just over a decade ago.
Against the background of these events, an interesting geopolitical arrangement has taken hold. A ‘tripartite agreement’ has been struck between the SAF, their mortal enemies the RSF, and the government of South Sudan.
"The agreement ensures that the Heglig area becomes a neutral zone, where no war takes place," Ateny Wek Ateny, South Sudan’s Minister of Information, told the media.
"The agreement ensures that the South Sudan People's Defence Forces (SSPDF)... will be responsible for the security of the oil areas,” he said. "All oil wells are operating and working in a normal manner.”
The deal, born of mutual financial desperation, allows South Sudanese troops to cross back into northern territory to guard the oil infrastructure, while the RSF withdraws from the production site and patrols the periphery.
The irony is hard to miss. Sudan’s rival generals can reach an agreement to protect the flow of crude oil, yet they cannot muster the political will to stop a war that has displaced millions and shattered the state.
A former business planning executive in Sudan’s oil industry, who requested anonymity to speak freely, cautioned that despite assurances that the site is functioning, its physical integrity is hanging by a thread.
Jonathan Fenton-Harvey
“The infrastructure is highly vulnerable to strikes, and any attack could result in severe disruption with potentially catastrophic consequences," the source told The New Arab.
"Such incidents may ultimately lead to an indefinite, long-term shutdown,” he added.
Indeed, despite the activation of the tripartite agreement, violence has already punctured the deal. A recent drone strike in the vicinity reportedly killed South Sudanese soldiers, highlighting how volatile the situation is.
Nicholas Coghlan, Canada’s first resident diplomat in Khartoum, suggests this wasn't necessarily a calculated betrayal, but a symptom of the overarching chaos.
Sudan's rival generals have reached an agreement to protect the flow of crude oil, but have not found the political will to stop a war that has displaced millions and shattered the state. [Getty]
"I'd guess there is very poor communication and discipline on all sides here - SAF, RSF and SSPDF [South Sudan’s army]," Coghlan told The New Arab.
"It's quite possible that the regional SAF commander was ignorant of any supposed tripartite agreement... and/or didn't know whom his drone was going to hit."
While the generals barter over oil fields, Sudan's economy lies in ruins. The government, currently based in the wartime capital of Port Sudan, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, continues to speak of reconstruction and recovery, a narrative that stands in stark contrast to the data.
Ibrahim Elbadawi, the finance minister who steered Sudan’s economy during the fragile transition following the 2019 revolution, offers a chilling assessment.
Now managing director of the Development Studies & Research Forum, Elbadawi told The New Arab that "we found that approximately in the first three years - or a little over two years, and we are heading into the third year of course - that Sudan lost around 50% of its GDP".
Elbadawi also dismisses the government’s current rhetoric regarding reconstruction as "deception,” noting that the intensity of the conflict makes the environment far too volatile for foreign capital.
Related
"I'd guess there is very poor communication and discipline on all sides here - SAF, RSF and SSPDF [South Sudan’s army]," Coghlan told The New Arab.
"It's quite possible that the regional SAF commander was ignorant of any supposed tripartite agreement... and/or didn't know whom his drone was going to hit."
While the generals barter over oil fields, Sudan's economy lies in ruins. The government, currently based in the wartime capital of Port Sudan, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, continues to speak of reconstruction and recovery, a narrative that stands in stark contrast to the data.
Ibrahim Elbadawi, the finance minister who steered Sudan’s economy during the fragile transition following the 2019 revolution, offers a chilling assessment.
Now managing director of the Development Studies & Research Forum, Elbadawi told The New Arab that "we found that approximately in the first three years - or a little over two years, and we are heading into the third year of course - that Sudan lost around 50% of its GDP".
Elbadawi also dismisses the government’s current rhetoric regarding reconstruction as "deception,” noting that the intensity of the conflict makes the environment far too volatile for foreign capital.
Related
Elfadil Ibrahim
As Elbadawi explained, Sudan is no stranger to strife, but its past wars were fought in the hinterlands, far from the economic engines. Today, the map of the war is a map of the economy itself.
"In previous wars, such as the civil war in the South [South Sudan], the fighting happened only in peripheral regions that were also economically marginalised," Elbadawi explained. "Now, productive regions are under attack."
He pointed to specific commercial hubs that have become battlegrounds, listing cities that serve as crucial nodes in the national export market.
"El Obeid, the centre for Gum Arabic, is under siege. Nyala, which is the hub for cattle and livestock, is being hit by drones and airstrikes…Khartoum and the industrial area in Bahri [Khartoum North] were destroyed at the beginning of the war.”
Sudan's war has created the largest humanitarian crisis since records began. [Getty]
Sudan's oil sector is also evaporating, even as Sudan and South Sudan scramble to keep production alive and hydrocarbon infrastructure out of harm's way.
The Khartoum Refinery - the country’s largest - has been rendered inoperable, and nationwide infrastructure has been devastated by the fighting. Sudan’s energy ministry estimated reconstruction costs for the oil sector alone at nearly $20 billion.
Moreover, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), a steadfast partner to Khartoum through decades of sanctions and civil wars, has formally requested to terminate contracts in the Balila oil field, another significant field near Heglig.
The anonymous former oil executive noted that while this departure is technically specific to Balila, "it nonetheless has implications for the field" in Heglig because the sites rely on the same logistics network.
The exit endangers the presence of "Chinese subcontractors who continue to provide services to the CPF [Central Processing Facility]," the source explained.
These subcontractors, he added, are the lifeline for "critical spare parts required to sustain the ageing infrastructure," meaning that as the Chinese giant exits Balila, the technical backbone supporting Heglig’s operations also threatens to snap.
In addition to being Sudan’s most productive field, Heglig houses a Central Processing Facility (CPF) capable of processing over 100,000 barrels per day of South Sudanese crude, acting as a critical valve connecting the basin to the Red Sea.
Related
Sudan's oil sector is also evaporating, even as Sudan and South Sudan scramble to keep production alive and hydrocarbon infrastructure out of harm's way.
The Khartoum Refinery - the country’s largest - has been rendered inoperable, and nationwide infrastructure has been devastated by the fighting. Sudan’s energy ministry estimated reconstruction costs for the oil sector alone at nearly $20 billion.
Moreover, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), a steadfast partner to Khartoum through decades of sanctions and civil wars, has formally requested to terminate contracts in the Balila oil field, another significant field near Heglig.
The anonymous former oil executive noted that while this departure is technically specific to Balila, "it nonetheless has implications for the field" in Heglig because the sites rely on the same logistics network.
The exit endangers the presence of "Chinese subcontractors who continue to provide services to the CPF [Central Processing Facility]," the source explained.
These subcontractors, he added, are the lifeline for "critical spare parts required to sustain the ageing infrastructure," meaning that as the Chinese giant exits Balila, the technical backbone supporting Heglig’s operations also threatens to snap.
In addition to being Sudan’s most productive field, Heglig houses a Central Processing Facility (CPF) capable of processing over 100,000 barrels per day of South Sudanese crude, acting as a critical valve connecting the basin to the Red Sea.
Related
Elfadil Ibrahim
While this route is effectively the junior partner to the larger Petrodar pipeline further east (flowing from South Sudan’s Upper Nile State into SAF-controlled White Nile State), the two pipelines generate the transit fees that have become the essential revenue stream for the SAF’s war chest.
For South Sudan, the stakes are existential. The nation relies on these pipelines to export nearly all its crude, the lifeblood of an economy teetering on collapse. As Coghlan, the former Canadian diplomat, points out, the rot was deep even before the latest disruption.
"Government ministries derive more than half of their revenue from international donors; notoriously, the government is often months behind in paying civil servants' salaries," he said, noting that international donors are "meanwhile bailing" on Juba, too.
With no financial cushion left, the diplomatic scramble to save this lifeline was immediate. On Sunday, a high-level South Sudanese delegation led by security advisor Tut Gatluak arrived in Port Sudan. Gatluak hand-delivered a letter from President Salva Kiir, prompting al-Burhan to order immediate technical talks on energy and trade.
Subscribe now to Inside MENA
While the oil deal demonstrates that Sudan’s warring parties can communicate when cash is on the line, the broader peace process has effectively collapsed. The "Quad" - a diplomatic bloc containing the US, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates - recently attempted to broker a ceasefire, an effort that was spearheaded by President Trump’s Senior Advisor for African Affairs, Massad Boulos.
General al-Burhan, however, shot this down, choosing instead to write an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal appealing directly to the US President Donald Trump, dangling the prospect of business deals for American companies in Sudan’s reconstruction.
While ceasefire efforts falter and Sudan’s descent continues, the tragic fragmentation of its political class has deprived the country of any domestically designed off-ramp. Civilian coalitions, instead of offering a unified alternative, are splintering into factions that mirror the military divide.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the implosion of the "Somoud" coalition (formerly Taqqadum). Led by former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, the group was intended to be the unified voice of the anti-war movement and the bridge back to civilian rule. Instead, it has collapsed inwards, victim to the same polarisation tearing the country apart.
High-profile defections have gutted its credibility. Its vice president, al-Hadi Idris, has openly aligned with the RSF, while other public faces of the movement have drifted toward the paramilitary’s self-styled "Government of Peace and Unity".
On paper, the world agrees that Sudan must be put back together by civilians. The stated goal of all major mediators - the “Quad”, the United Nations, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and the African Union - is to resurrect a unified, civilian-led Sudan.
Yet this diplomatic consensus collides with bleak political realities.
Abdulrahman Alghali, a political analyst and writer who was in the past a high-ranking member of the National Umma Party, notes that even stalwarts like the Umma Party (historically one of the nation's largest) are currently in a state of disintegration.
"The Umma Party now is almost four factions," Alghali explained to The New Arab.
He detailed how the party has splintered into irreconcilable camps: those backing the RSF, those staunchly behind the SAF, those remaining with Hamdok’s 'Somoud' coalition, and a fourth group attempting a precarious neutrality.
"So the party is divided, of course," Alghali noted, adding that the phenomenon is widespread. "This is the same thing happening in the Democratic Unionist Party,” another of Sudan’s political heavyweights.
Without a unified civilian voice to check the military actors, both the ceasefire and political tracks remain paralysed. This leaves the fate of Sudan in the hands of men with guns who view the state merely as a prize to be captured.
Elfadil Ibrahim is a writer and analyst focused on Sudanese politics
Edited by Charlie Hoyle
Why Britain must designate the RSF a terrorist entity
December 21, 2025
Displaced Sudanese who fled El-Fasher after the city fell to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), arrive in the town of Tawila war-torn Sudan’s western Darfur region on October 28, 2025.
[Photo by -/AFP via Getty Images]
by Mohamed Suliman
Last November, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia overran El-Fashir—the largest refuge for displaced families in Darfur—with chilling speed. Within days, thousands were slaughtered for no reason other than their ethnic identity. Women were raped in the open, their bodies turned into battlegrounds. Those who managed to flee found no safety beyond the city’s borders; they were hunted on the road, or stopped and forced to give blood to the very men who had destroyed their homes. The brutality did not end with the killing. In a desperate attempt to erase evidence, RSF fighters dug mass graves—an atrocity later exposed by independent experts analyzing satellite imagery.
But El-Fashir’s final collapse was only the end of a far longer ordeal. Long before the city fell, it had been choked by an 18-month siege. Its residents, already clinging to survival, were deliberately starved as food supplies dwindled and humanitarian and water access were blocked.
In other parts of the country, the militia conducted drone strikes on civilian targets such as hospitals, airports, and oil refineries, aiming at advancing its political interests. These actions qualify as terrorist activities and should lead the UK government to designate the militia as a terrorist organization.
In April 2023, a conflict erupted in Sudan between the Sudanese National Army and the Rapid Support Forces militia, which is mainly sponsored by the UAE. The consequences have been catastrophic, with published figures indicating thousands of deaths and millions of people forced from their homes. The UN considers Sudan to be the worst humanitarian crisis.
READ: UN says Sudan’s RSF killed over 1,000 civilians in Zamzam camp in April
The Rapid Support Forces originated mainly from the 2013 reorganisation of the infamous Janjaweed militia. They were established to assist government counterinsurgency efforts in Darfur and South Kordofan. The Sudanese parliament formally legitimized its operations through legislation in 2017. Throughout the conflict, the RSF has been responsible for numerous atrocities, including village devastation, protester killings, sexual assaults, mass murders, illegal imprisonments, attacks on medical facilities and religious buildings, aggression toward media personnel and organizations, ethnically-motivated violence, and the use of child soldiers.
Thus far, the UK has relied on its sanctions policy to deal with the RSF militia. For instance, in July 2023, the UK imposed sanctions on several entities associated with the militia, resulting in the freezing of their assets. But still afterwards, the militia continued its attacks and violations against civilians.
The Terrorism Act 2000 defines terrorism as the use of a threat to intimidate the public ot influence the government and to advance a political, religious or ideological cause. The actions of the RSF militia during the war fall precisely within this definition. In recent weeks, the RSF militia has conducted drone strikes against various civilian Infrastructure throughout the country, such as power plants, civilian airports, oil facilities, Telecom and internet networks, as well as water dams that serve the whole country. The impact of these attacks has been devastating on the lives of citizens.
Over 200 medical staff killed in Sudan since 2023: Medics
The impact of proscription will be significant, as it limits the power of the militia by making it unlawful to belong to, profess support for, or invite material support to it. In addition to assets and bank accounts freezing. Moreover, the delegitimization of the militia will cause severe damage to the public image of the militia.
Importantly, UK- based RSF mercenaries recruiting and propaganda networks will be disrupted and blocked from being turned into a financial and military arm to the militia, which, indeed, will pose a serious risk to the safety of the UK itself.
To minimize harm to civilians living under RSF control, any proscription must be carefully paired with clear safeguards that protect the delivery of humanitarian aid, independent journalism, human rights work, and the flow of personal remittances.
It’s time for the UK to move on with this crucial step that would protect the lives of Sudanese and prevent the next genocide from taking place.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.
by Mohamed Suliman
Last November, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia overran El-Fashir—the largest refuge for displaced families in Darfur—with chilling speed. Within days, thousands were slaughtered for no reason other than their ethnic identity. Women were raped in the open, their bodies turned into battlegrounds. Those who managed to flee found no safety beyond the city’s borders; they were hunted on the road, or stopped and forced to give blood to the very men who had destroyed their homes. The brutality did not end with the killing. In a desperate attempt to erase evidence, RSF fighters dug mass graves—an atrocity later exposed by independent experts analyzing satellite imagery.
But El-Fashir’s final collapse was only the end of a far longer ordeal. Long before the city fell, it had been choked by an 18-month siege. Its residents, already clinging to survival, were deliberately starved as food supplies dwindled and humanitarian and water access were blocked.
In other parts of the country, the militia conducted drone strikes on civilian targets such as hospitals, airports, and oil refineries, aiming at advancing its political interests. These actions qualify as terrorist activities and should lead the UK government to designate the militia as a terrorist organization.
In April 2023, a conflict erupted in Sudan between the Sudanese National Army and the Rapid Support Forces militia, which is mainly sponsored by the UAE. The consequences have been catastrophic, with published figures indicating thousands of deaths and millions of people forced from their homes. The UN considers Sudan to be the worst humanitarian crisis.
READ: UN says Sudan’s RSF killed over 1,000 civilians in Zamzam camp in April
The Rapid Support Forces originated mainly from the 2013 reorganisation of the infamous Janjaweed militia. They were established to assist government counterinsurgency efforts in Darfur and South Kordofan. The Sudanese parliament formally legitimized its operations through legislation in 2017. Throughout the conflict, the RSF has been responsible for numerous atrocities, including village devastation, protester killings, sexual assaults, mass murders, illegal imprisonments, attacks on medical facilities and religious buildings, aggression toward media personnel and organizations, ethnically-motivated violence, and the use of child soldiers.
Thus far, the UK has relied on its sanctions policy to deal with the RSF militia. For instance, in July 2023, the UK imposed sanctions on several entities associated with the militia, resulting in the freezing of their assets. But still afterwards, the militia continued its attacks and violations against civilians.
The Terrorism Act 2000 defines terrorism as the use of a threat to intimidate the public ot influence the government and to advance a political, religious or ideological cause. The actions of the RSF militia during the war fall precisely within this definition. In recent weeks, the RSF militia has conducted drone strikes against various civilian Infrastructure throughout the country, such as power plants, civilian airports, oil facilities, Telecom and internet networks, as well as water dams that serve the whole country. The impact of these attacks has been devastating on the lives of citizens.
Over 200 medical staff killed in Sudan since 2023: Medics
The impact of proscription will be significant, as it limits the power of the militia by making it unlawful to belong to, profess support for, or invite material support to it. In addition to assets and bank accounts freezing. Moreover, the delegitimization of the militia will cause severe damage to the public image of the militia.
Importantly, UK- based RSF mercenaries recruiting and propaganda networks will be disrupted and blocked from being turned into a financial and military arm to the militia, which, indeed, will pose a serious risk to the safety of the UK itself.
To minimize harm to civilians living under RSF control, any proscription must be carefully paired with clear safeguards that protect the delivery of humanitarian aid, independent journalism, human rights work, and the flow of personal remittances.
It’s time for the UK to move on with this crucial step that would protect the lives of Sudanese and prevent the next genocide from taking place.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.
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