Living In A House Of Dynamite: The Dilemmas Of Nuclear Decision-Making – Analysis

January 8, 2026 
 IPCS
By Dr. Manpreet Sethi

Kathryn Bigelow, an Academy Award-winning filmmaker, describes the contemporary nuclear scenario as ‘a house of dynamite’. The nine nuclear-armed states are inmates in a house (Earth), with each accumulating more dynamite (nuclear warheads) and building capabilities that could blow up the tinderbox. Bigelow’s film, A House of Dynamite, raises several uncomfortable nuclear issues that states face but prefer to push into the background in their search for more or stronger deterrence. It stirred a conversation in the US but didn’t catch much attention in India. Available on Netflix, the film merits a watch for many reasons—with several that are relevant from an Indian perspective.

A House of Dynamite starts with the detection of a missile launch from somewhere in the Pacific. Initially believed to be a test, attitudes change as defence alert levels advance once the missile is ascertained to be heading for Chicago. The confusion, chaos, pressure, and helplessness that follow in the next 18 minutes is captured from three perspectives: the White House Situation Room, US Strategic Command, and the US President. The film wisely stays away from identifying a country as the origin of the missile launch, keeping the focus on nuclear decision-making dilemmas. Given that Washington currently has multiple nuclear-armed security challengers, the fog of information is well brought out. The attacker could be Russia, China, North Korea, or even Pakistan, or a rogue captain on a submarine, or an unintentional/accidental launch. The questions the film seeks to raise aren’t about the attacker but the decisions the US has to make.

One of the major issues that the movie throws up for discussion is the value of ballistic missile defence (BMD). The decision is to shoot the missile down with ground-based interceptors (GBI). Two attempts fail. The first GBI fails to detach and falls back to earth; the second reaches the missile but doesn’t hit the target.

The depiction of BMD failure was quick to elicit a response from the US Department of War, which dismissed it as unrealistic. There is however no denying the fact that ‘hitting a bullet with a bullet’ isn’t an easy proposition, and real-life situations could be quite different from sanitised test scenarios. The US has spent as much as USD 250 billion between 1985-2023 to build systems that protect the mainland and regional allies from missile threats from North Korea and Iran. These systems don’t protect from similar threats from China or Russia who have far more sophisticated missiles.

We shouldn’t assume that the US could have neutralised the missile simply by throwing more interceptors at it. This was the simplest possible scenario, with one solitary incoming missile. In real-life, missiles could be equipped with many countermeasures. Multiple missiles or the use of multiple independently targetable warheads on one missile could cause BMD saturation. Decoys accompanying the warhead or warheads disguised in different configurations of size, reflectivity, and dynamic motion could cause confusion. Radars or sensors could be jammed or attacked, or hypersonic missiles or fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) could further degrade it.

BMD therefore can’t automatically help execute a ‘safe’ nuclear war. The ambitious, multi-layered Golden Dome promised by President Trump at an anticipated cost of a trillion plus dollarsenvisions interceptors in space, which would likely exacerbate the arms race with China and Russia. The latter are already taking steps to offset BMD by expanding or diversifying their nuclear arsenals. China is increasing nuclear warheads and delivery platforms and has tested FOBS. Russia is engaged in building what President Putin calls “invincible weapons.” The nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered cruise missile, Burevestnik, and the underwater nuclear drone, Poseidon, were among those tested in 2025.

There is a lesson here for India. After Operation Sindoor, Prime Minister Modi announced the Sudarshan Chakra, a multi-layered defence system that would integrate advanced surveillance, cyber protection, and physical safeguards against enemy strikes. While assurances to protect the public from missiles may seem politically correct, in reality, technologically and materially, it is an extremely demanding effort. India’s missile threat environment is complex. China and Pakistan have robust missile arsenals, having spent the last decade enhancing their missile capabilities in terms of numbers, range, accuracy, reliability, and penetrability. Both have also deployed a growing number of dual-use cruise missiles.

In such a challenging missile threat environment, an Indian BMD will have to be of high sophistication to offer even a modicum of effectiveness. This would require spending liberally on the development of a widespread network of early warning systems, deploying the requisite numbers of interceptors, dedicated cruise missile defences, as well as dogged R&D to move towards boost phase interception given the need to intercept as far away from one’s own territory as possible. Meanwhile, adversaries can be expected to build countermeasures, putting the two sides in an offence-defence spiral.

Even so, no BMD can guarantee 100 per cent success. India can’t afford astrodome protection over its entire landmass. The effort should therefore be to protect the assets most needed for buttressing credible nuclear deterrence. Such a BMD could be for limited, area-specific deployment to provide insurance against pre-meditated, mistaken, or unauthorised launches. Taking a leaf from the film, India must think deeply about its missile defence requirements.

A second issue that the film surfaces are nuclear decision-making dilemmas. As the president is loaded with information—which is nevertheless incomplete despite the US early warning network—he is faced with the critical choice of whether to ‘surrender’ by not responding immediately, or commit ‘suicide’ by approving a retaliation and then bracing for nuclear retaliation. His military commanders recommend a quick, near immediate response. With the US’ launch on warning (LOW) posture, STRATCOM warns that “if we don’t take steps to neutralise our enemies now, we will lose our window to do so. We can strike pre-emptively or risk 100 ICBMs launching our way, at which time this war will have already been lost.” The military advice is to strike at the adversary’s command centres, silos, and bombers while they’re still on the ground, eliminating their ability to take further action.

Despite the military logic, in the absence of any clarity about the attacker and intention, but the certainty of nuclear retaliation that would follow irrespective of whom the US targets, the president’s dilemma is existential. He wonders whether the attack on Chicago could be a one-off—or even an accidental launch—and if his response might lead to the loss of not just one but several American cities. He mulls whether the possibility of a “harsh public backlash” to a non-response “would still not be better than a possible counteract that could put even more US residents at risk.” So, even with a first use nuclear doctrine, the president appears inclined to wait it out—following a de facto no first use (NFU).

India has already eased this burden for the Indian prime minister through its NFU that signals response only after a nuclear attack. For those who view NFU as a passive strategy, it is worth considering whether a country with a declared first use doctrine might also find it prudent to lean towards NFU in case of uncertainty and ambiguity. The strength of the NFU is in the availability of a robust and secure second-strike capability.

Meanwhile, in contrast to LOW, an NFU also reduces the pressure of time on decision-making. In the film, the president feels overwhelmed. Indeed, one is left wondering whether nuclear command and control needs to be structured for speed in decision-making. This question will become even more critical with the integration of AI into military applications. On the one hand, this is being touted as an advantage since speedier assimilation is expected to give decision-makers more time to take a call. On the other, it would increase pressure on decision-making in order to pre-empt the adversary’s move. In having to take as momentous a decision as nuclear use, time can be more debilitating than empowering. Surprise, fear, limited information, and a self-imposed lack of time can cause tremendous strain on leadership.

A third dimension that stands out in the film is the need for channels of communication during crises. In the film, Washington is able to reach out only to Moscow thanks to the hotlines and a nuclear risk reduction centre that followed the Cuban Missile Crisis. In moments of crisis, these mechanisms help dissipate tension. The US has no such channels with China or North Korea, making it difficult to find the right avenue for communication or clarification.

In the India-China and India-Pakistan cases, military hotlines exist. They haven’t however been optimally used in all circumstances. Countries must invest in crisis communication that is technically robust, always available, and politically reliable, given that the missile flight time is far shorter in this regional context and accidents could always happen.

Finally, the film also refers, though tangentially, to the consequences of a nuclear attack. It acknowledges that the missile would result in as many as 10 million casualties in Chicago. One of the officers advises her family to “drive upwind away from any big city.” A nuclear detonation would degrade the internet, power, global financial systems, and transportation. In fact, no disaster planning can hope to cope with the consequences. And, depending on the level of the ensuing nuclear exchange, the long-term environmental, health, and food security impacts would be life-threatening.

While the film ends without showing the detonation and its aftermath, it leaves behind a deep sense of dread about what could have been. It leaves the watcher with questions that continue to preoccupy the mind much after it ends. A House of Dynamite and other films of the kind remind states of the dangers they live with in the presence of nuclear weapons. One person or a handful of people would have only a few minutes to make a decision as momentous as nuclear use. Its consequences, however, will be borne by millions for decades and over generations. To avert such a possibility, uncomfortable questions will have to be posed to and answered by our political leaders and publics. 

 About the author: Dr Manpreet Sethi is Distinguished Fellow with the Centre for Aerospace Power ans Strategic Studies (CAPSS) in New Delhi and Senior Research Advisor with the Asia Pacific Leadership Network (APLN).

Source: This article was published by IPCS
IPCS

IPCS (Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies) conducts independent research on conventional and non-conventional security issues in the region and shares its findings with policy makers and the public. It provides a forum for discussion with the strategic community on strategic issues and strives to explore alternatives. Moreover, it works towards building capacity among young scholars for greater refinement of their analyses of South Asian security.