Forging A Robust Middle Class: Lessons Learned From Comparisons Between Indonesia And China – Analysis

March 10, 2026 
 ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute
By Sherry Tao Kong and Maria Monica Wihardja


The expansion of the middle-class has long been viewed as an indicator of successful development.[1] In China, large-scale poverty reduction under an industrialisation-led growth model beginning in the late 1970s was accompanied by sustained wage growth and the gradual expansion of social insurance. This allowed income gains to translate into greater economic security and the emergence of a large middle-class that has since consolidated.[2] Indonesia’s experience, however, presents a more fragile trajectory. Despite significant progress in lifting people out of poverty, middle-class expansion has slowed and even reversed in recent times.

Indonesia’s secure middle-class share has declined since 2018, while nearly half of the population remains economically insecure despite being no longer poor or near poor. Many households that have moved beyond poverty and near poverty remain exposed to income volatility, informal employment, and limited social protection. Stagnant real wages, weak manufacturing and high-end service sector growth, and rising informality have constrained upward mobility, while recent episodes of social unrest point to growing anxiety among those who are not poor or near poor but who remain economically insecure.

This Perspective argues that the central challenge facing Indonesia—and many middle-income economies in Southeast Asia—is not only how to expand the middle-class, but how to ensure that its expansion is resilient and durable. It advances a conceptual framework for middle-class resilience, defined as the capacity of households to sustain their economic position over time, absorb shocks, and convert income gains into lasting welfare and political stability. By comparing Indonesia with the case of China, the analysis shows how labour market conditions, social protection systems, structural transformation, and the fiscal capacity–governance nexus shape middle-class outcomes.

DEFINING THE MIDDLE-CLASS

Globally, there is no consensus when it comes to identifying the middle-class. Commonly adopted approaches include absolute (fixed) income (or expenditure) cutoffs, relative positions within the income distribution, and subjective self-identification. In Indonesia, the National Statistics Agency uses an absolute measure to define the middle-class where the cutoff values are based on economic vulnerability, following the approach used in the World Bank’s middle-class report for Latin America.[3]


It groups individuals into five economic classes:[4]

Poor: Those who live below the poverty line.

Vulnerable (near poor): Those who live above the poverty line but face more than a ten-percent probability of becoming poor in the following year.

Aspiring middle-class: Those who are neither poor nor vulnerable but face more than a ten-percent probability of becoming vulnerable in the following year.

Middle-class: Those who face less than a ten-percent probability of falling into poverty or vulnerability but face greater than a ten-percent probability of falling into the aspiring middle-class during the following year.

Upper-class: Those who face less than a ten-percent probability of falling into aspiring middle class or below in the following year.

With this definition, the middle-class are those who are relatively free from economic insecurity. Using the calculation described in Appendix 1 to set the expenditure threshold for each class category, the middle-class threshold is set at 3.5 to 17 times the poverty line. In 2024, this translates into those who consume IDR2.04 million-IDR9.91 million per capita expenditure per month (approximately USD136-USD661 per capita expenditure per month or USD6.5K-32K per household per year).

Figure 1: Indonesia’s household expenditure distribution (2010-2024)


Source: Susenas, 2010-2024; authors’ calculations. Note: Horizontal lines are indicated in the graph as higher and lower bounds for identifying middle class in Indonesia: 3.5-17 x national poverty line per capita expenditure per month.

Figure 1 shows that Indonesia’s middle-class consolidation has proven fragile. Although the middle-class was the fastest-growing expenditure group during the 2010s, its share has declined since 2018, with many households slipping back into the aspiring middle-class and the vulnerable class. This reversal reflects income volatility and limited access to social protection, particularly among wage earners without stable contracts or adequate employment protections. More fundamentally, the types and quality of jobs created over the past two decades have not generated sufficient upward mobility to absorb a substantial share of the aspiring middle-class into secure middle-class status.

Using Indonesia’s national definition of the middle-class, in 2024, Indonesia’s middle-class was estimated to have reached 47.9 million or only 17.1 percent of total population. It peaked at 22.5 percent in 2018 before declining to a share similar to that of a decade ago (2014). The middle-class lies between the 82nd and 99th percentiles of the consumption distribution.[5] Note that when an absolute measure is used, the middle-class does not necessarily comprise those in the ‘middle’ of the income or expenditure distribution as seen in the case of Indonesia.

Figure 2: China’s household income distribution (2010-2024)


Source: CFPS data and authors’ calculation. Note: Horizontal lines are indicated in the graph as higher and lower bounds for identifying the middle class in China: 80K-400K in 2010, 2012; 90K-450K in 2014, 2016; 100K-500K in 2018 and after, per household per year. The 2024 data is still preliminary.


China’s middle-class consolidation contrasts sharply with that of Indonesia. Like Indonesia, China adopts the absolute measure approach for its national definition of the middle-class albeit using income instead of expenditure. China’s National Bureau of Statistics categorises households into three income groups: low-income, middle-income and high-income. It defines the middle-income-group, a loosely comparable notion to the middle-class, using an absolute measure, namely those who earn RMB100K-500K (approximately USD14K-71K) per household per year in 2018 and after.

Figure 2 shows that over the past decade, China’s income distribution has shifted from a steep pyramid toward a more ‘elongated vase’, reflecting a broad-based expansion of middle-income households.[6] While income dispersion remains and mobility across income groups is substantial, the middle of the distribution has thickened over time, reflecting a net expansion of middle-income households. This structural shift has been supported in part by sustained wage growth and rising formal employment; these have helped reduce the risk of large-scale backsliding even as income mobility remains high. In 2022, China’s middle-class is estimated to have reached 591 million people or close to 40 percent of total households​​, up from 14.4 percent in 2012, to lie neatly between the 53rd and 97th percentiles of the income distribution.

WHY THE MIDDLE-CLASS MATTERS

In Indonesia, the middle-class contributes significantly to national consumption. Indonesia’s middle-class accounted for 38 percent of total household consumption in 2024, which was disproportionately larger than the 17 percent share of the middle-class in the population.[7] Indonesia’s economy is largely driven by household consumption, which contributes a robust 53 percent of GDP. Robust domestic consumption, fueled by the middle-class, is therefore not just desirable; it is a strategic necessity for economic resilience and sustained growth. Moreover, a 2024 study in Indonesia shows that the middle-class contributed 51 percent of total tax revenues despite only receiving 9 percent of total government subsidies.[8]


Aside from its economic significance, a resilient middle-class is often correlated with greater political stability. Global experiences including Thailand,[9] Brazil,[10] and Indonesia[11] show that a fragile middle-class easily generates political instability. A recent study by Basri (2026) shows a strong correlation between social unrest intensity and middle-class shrinkage among emerging markets between 2019 and 2024.[12] This segment of the population is distinctly more educated than those in poorer sections of the population and typically make demands for better governance, transparency, and public services.[13] In Indonesia, more than one in four individuals aged 15 or older in the middle-class have a bachelor’s or equivalent degree, compared to only 9 percent or lower of those in the less economically secure class groups (Figure 3). Their political participation – whether through formal politics, civil society, or consumer activism – shapes national agendas and fosters more responsive institutions.

The middle-class is also distinct from other class groups in their consumption patterns and in quality of jobs. The middle-class spends more on non-food items than food items, unlike the more vulnerable class groups (Figure 4). They drive demand in key sectors such as automobiles, education, healthcare, entertainment, travel, and e-commerce, and they invest more in their children’s education and help break intergenerational poverty.[14] Moreover, Indonesia’s middle-class mostly work as wage employees in formal employment unlike those in lower-class groups who mostly work in the informal employment (Figure 5).

Figure 3: Highest Educational Attainment for Population Aged 15 and Above in 2024

 (Indonesia)

Figure 4: Average Share of Food and Non-Food Items by Income Class in 2022 (Indonesia)

Figure 5: Employment Status in 2024 (Indonesia)



Like Indonesia, China’s middle-class carries significant economic weight and exhibits stronger educational and occupational advantages compared to the low-income group. In 2022, it accounted for nearly half of total household consumption, exceeding its share of the population. Middle-income households in China have substantially higher educational attainment and spend more on non-food items compared to low-income households (Appendix Figure 1-2). They are more closely linked to formal employment in public and private enterprises compared to low-income households (Appendix Figure 3).

THE PILLARS OF MIDDLE-CLASS RESILIENCE: A COMPARATIVE ANALAYSIS

This section develops a framework organised around four pillars—quality jobs, structural transformation, social protection, and the fiscal capacity-governance nexus—to explain why poverty reduction has been more likely to translate into middle-class consolidation in China, while that class has remained more fragile in Indonesia. These pillars are inter-related. Structural transformation shapes the availability of productive jobs, which in turn determines labour market formality and wage dynamics, while social protection, fiscal capacity and governance provide the conditions in which income risks are managed over the life cycle. By using China as a benchmark for middle-class consolidation, the analysis of Indonesia’s case yields lessons for other middle-income economies across Southeast Asia.

Structural Transformation and Productivity

Structural transformation forms the foundation of middle-class resilience and shapes the economy’s capacity to generate productive, well-paying jobs. Middle-class expansion is more likely to be durable when labour moves into higher-productivity sectors and occupations that support sustained wage growth, rather than into low-productivity activities that limit earnings and job upgrading, and reinforce informality.

Indonesia’s structural transformation has been limited. Investment has increasingly been oriented towards resource-based activities and capital-intensive sectors, while labour-intensive manufacturing has failed to expand.[15] The high-end services sector has also been constrained by a limited supply of high-skill workers. While labour has transitioned away from the low-productivity agricultural sector, it has primarily been absorbed by the low-end services sector.[16] As a result, job creation has been concentrated in low-productivity services and informal activities, limiting wage growth and reinforcing employment precarity. This pattern helps explain why employment expansion has not translated into more substantial middle-class consolidation, despite rising consumption.


In contrast to Indonesia’s limited structural transformation, partly attributed to ‘premature deindustrialisation’ starting in the early 2000s, China’s middle-class expansion was underpinned by a sustained shift of labour into manufacturing and, more recently, to technology- and knowledge-intensive activities.[17] This transformation raised productivity and created large numbers of wage-paying jobs in the formal sector capable of supporting income growth over time. While not all employment has been high-quality, and regional disparities persist, the overall structure of growth has generated the productive jobs needed to sustain a broad middle-income group.

The contrast highlights a core vulnerability. In Indonesia, household consumption accounts for a large share of GDP—around 53 per cent—yet this consumption-led growth has not been matched by a productivity-driven employment base. Without deeper structural transformation into sectors that generate ‘good jobs’, middle-class expansion is likely to remain fragile.

Quality Jobs

Labour market conditions are central to middle-class resilience in Indonesia, since wages (labour incomes) are the primary income source for its middle-income households. Stable real-wage growth and access to formal employment reduce income volatility and help households sustain middle-class living standards, while stagnant wages and informality increase the risk of backsliding.

Indonesia’s trajectory is concerning in this regard. Real wages have stagnated since around 2017, a reversal of the pre-2017 trend when real wages grew by 4.2 percent annually between 2010 and 2017.[18] Job creation has increasingly occurred in the informal sector rather than in the formal sector, reversing the long-term trend of formalisation.[19] It is notable that the issue here is not in job creation but in job quality. Recent shifts have weakened earnings stability and reduced access to employment-linked protections; this contributes directly to the decline since 2018 of the secure middle-class. The pattern reflects a structural change in labour market dynamics rather than a temporary cyclical slowdown.

In contrast to Indonesia’s recent labour-market trajectory, middle-income households in China have a mix of relatively secure formal employment in the public sector and private enterprises, alongside owning private businesses and self-employment. Wages in China account for around 70 per cent of middle-class income. While income mobility remains high and some downward movement persists, sustained wage growth has ensured that upward mobility has, on balance, exceeded downward mobility.

Social Protection

While labour market conditions and structural transformation establish the foundation for middle-class incomes, access to essential services and social protection determines whether those gains can be sustained in the face of economic shocks. Social protection is however not a substitute for decent jobs.[20] The extent and effectiveness of the safety nets thus constitute a third pillar of middle-class resilience.


Due to lack of access to social protection programmes, Indonesia’s middle-class has been described by some as ‘consuming like the middle-class but living with the anxiety of the poor’, reflecting limited insurance coverage and high exposure to health and economic shocks. Indonesia’s situation is characterised by a heavy reliance on private services (for those who can afford them) that have emerged in lieu of public alternatives that remain underdeveloped. For example, while 49 percent of government employees have a pension fund, this is true only for 12 percent of private-sector employees.[21] The share of workers in household enterprises with a pension fund is only 0.18 per cent. Moreover, while 75 percent of government employees have health insurance, only 69 percent of private-sector employees and less than 3 percent of workers in household enterprises do.[22] This qualitative dimension of fragility is evident in expenditure patterns, where middle-class households allocate a significant share of their spending to private health and education—a defensive strategy that drains resources which could otherwise be saved or invested for upward mobility.[23] The under-provision of public social protection also shifts risk management onto households, leaving them financially exposed. Without a functional safety net, the economic security of the middle-class remains provisional.

In contrast, the expansion of social insurance in China has proceeded in tandem with middle-class growth, providing a measurable degree of security. Coverage for medical insurance and old-age pensions exceeds 57 per cent of the relevant population, reflecting a systematic effort to build a broad-based safety net.[24] Although the social protection system, while extensive, remains incomplete, institutional backing has helped to cushion middle-income households against health emergencies and retirement insecurity, reducing the risk that a single shock could push them back into poverty.

The contrast between China’s institutionalised, albeit incomplete, system, and Indonesia’s fragmented, individually financed model, underscores the fact that the durability of the middle- class depends not only on the ability to earn a stable income but also on the collective capacity to pool risks and ensure general access to essential services.

Fiscal Capacity and Governance

The state’s capacity to mobilise resources, deliver services, and maintain public trust plays an important role in determining whether the economic foundations of middle-class resilience can be fully realised. Labour markets, structural transformation, and social protection do not operate in an institutional vacuum; their effectiveness is mediated by fiscal capacity and the governance pact between the state and its citizens.

Revenue mobilisation​ is the bedrock of state capacity, enabling investments in public goods that support middle-class stability. However, Indonesia struggles with low tax revenues relative to its economy, constraining the government’s ability to fund essential services.[25] This fiscal gap undermines the very public investments needed to consolidate the gains made from poverty reduction, leaving the middle-class exposed to underfunded systems.

State capacity and service delivery​ determine whether revenue translates into tangible benefits for households. When the state provides quality education, healthcare and infrastructure efficiently, it reinforces middle-class trust and reduces the need for costly private alternatives. In Indonesia, however, perceived inefficiency or corruption in public service delivery erodes confidence; this prompts households to opt for private services as a rational choice that, in turn, weakens the tax base and perpetuates underinvestment in public services. This vicious cycle highlights the fact that effective governance is not merely about collecting taxes but about demonstrating credible delivery to secure citizen buy-in.


In contrast, in China, rapid economic growth has expanded the tax base, allowing for substantial public spending on infrastructure, education and healthcare. These are key drivers of productivity and household security. Access to quality education, healthcare and infrastructure has also reduced the need for costly private services.

The dynamics of the above four pillars produce a critical political economy feedback loop. A resilient middle-class tends to support long-term investment and fiscal capacity, and thus becomes a stabilising force, while a large, fragile ‘aspirational’ class—no longer poor or near poor but lacking economic security—can fuel grievances and populism, undermining the very policies that can foster long-term resilience.[26] While a state that delivers on its promises nurtures a resilient, tax-compliant middle-class, a mismatch between rising expectations for public services and limited fiscal capacity fuels political anxiety. Thus, in Indonesia, rebuilding the governance pact—where credible service delivery meets tax morale—is essential to prevent middle-class fragility from undermining long-term resilience.

Furthermore, the large share of Indonesian households clustered near the threshold of middle-class status (the aspiring middle-class) has translated into rising expectations for public services and protection, without a commensurate expansion of the stable tax base or fiscal space. By contrast, where income growth and employment are closely anchored in productivity gains, as in the case of China, governments have been better able to mobilise resources and expand social protection alongside middle-class growth. More broadly, the experience of Indonesia suggests that middle-class fragility can generate political pressures that, if not managed, risk reinforcing economic vulnerability and making reforms more difficult to implement.[27] This is an issue that holds growing relevance for middle-income countries across Southeast Asia.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

For Indonesia, the transition from poverty reduction to a resilient middle-class is not an automatic process. By using China as a benchmark case, the analysis in this paper shows that middle-class consolidation requires a deliberate and integrated policy approach that addresses the interconnected pillars of labour markets, social protection, and structural transformation, which are at the same time underpinned by sound fiscal capacity and governance and adapted to the country’s developmental context.[28] For Indonesia, there is an urgent need for middle-class consolidation​ in order to prevent backsliding.

Indonesia’s policy agenda needs to aim at stabilising its vast aspirational class and halting the erosion of its secure middle-class. This requires a coordinated strategy across the following three areas. First, policies must reverse the trend of de-formalisation. This involves labour market deregulation to incentivise formal hiring, coupled with targeted skills training aligned with the needs of higher-value sectors.

Second, to address the profound vulnerability highlighted by the social protection​ pillar, the government must prioritise expanding the social safety net. Enhancing the coverage and adequacy of health insurance and pension fund, and introducing a credible unemployment benefits system, are critical to reducing households’ exposure to shocks and building trust in state institutions.


Third, these efforts will be futile without a shift in structural transformation. Policy must consciously steer away from capital-intensive, resource-extractive FDI towards job-creating, competitive manufacturing and knowledge-intensive modern services, supported by improved regulatory certainty. Ultimately, these economic measures must be framed within a broader new social contract that demonstrates tangible improvements in public service delivery through the broadening of the tax base; this will break the vicious cycle of low tax morale and underfunded public goods.

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Basri, Chatib. 2025. ‘Indonesia’s Fragile Middle Class’. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 

https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/10/indonesias-fragile-middle-class?

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Basri, Chatib. 2026. ‘Why Development Becomes Harder: The Policy Economy of the Possible’. CID Speakers Series. Harvard Kennedy School. https://youtu.be/vZvAEvTw7gg?si=P98eNoizjw0Mltnf

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Nagara, Khaerul Budhy, & Rusma Rizal. 2025. ‘The Burden of Education Costs for the Middle Class in Indonesia: An Analysis of Challenges and Implications’. Jurnal Serambi Ilmu, 26(2), 153–164. https://doi.org/10.32672/jsi.v26i2.3766

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For appendices and endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.

About the authors:

 Sherry Tao Kong is Head of Research at the Institute of Social Science Survey, and Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Digital Finance, Peking University. She also teaches at the Institute of Area Studies, Peking University. 

Maria Monica Wihardja is Visiting Fellow and Co-coordinator of the Media, Technology and Society Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, and also Adjunct Assistant Professor at the National University of Singapore.

Source: This article was published by ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute

ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute

The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), an autonomous organization established by an Act of Parliament in 1968, was renamed ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute in August 2015. Its aims are: To be a leading research centre and think tank dedicated to the study of socio-political, security, and economic trends and developments in Southeast Asia and its wider geostrategic and economic environment. To stimulate research and debate within scholarly circles, enhance public awareness of the region, and facilitate the search for viable solutions to the varied problems confronting the region. To serve as a centre for international, regional and local scholars and other researchers to do research on the region and publish and publicize their findings. To achieve these aims, the Institute conducts a range of research programmes; holds conferences, workshops, lectures and seminars; publishes briefs, research journals and books; and generally provides a range of research support facilities, including a large library collection.

Trump’s Incompetent War

Why did the US attack Iran? How long will the war last? What will the implications be? Don’t ask President Donald Trump!


Demonstrators trample on a portrait of US President Donald Trump during a protest against the attacks by Israel and the US on Iran, as they march towards the US embassy in Baghdad on March 5, 2026.
(Photo by Ahmad Al-Rubaye / AFP via Getty Images)

Steven Harper
Mar 09, 2026

Common Dreams

Minimally competent leaders would have considered at least five obvious questions before launching the nation into war. President Donald Trump considered none of them.
No. 1: What’s the Objective?

It’s not surprising that more than half of all Americans oppose Trump’s War. From the outset, his administration has offered numerous and contradictory justifications for it.




Experts Pillory Trump Case for War on Iran: ‘Flimsiest Excuse for Initiating a Major Attack’ in Decades



Call Grows to Impeach Trump, ‘The Most Dangerous Man on the Planet’

February 28:

Trump cited 47 years of grievances, a desire to destroy Iran’s missiles, and a message that the Iranian people should “seize the moment” because now was their chance to “be brave, be bold, be heroic, and take back your country.”

But he also said that the attack was a campaign to “eliminate the imminent nuclear threat,” although Trump had boasted in June that the United States had already accomplished that goal.

The next day, Pentagon officials told congressional staff members that no intelligence supported the notion that Iran was planning to attack the US first.

The same day, Trump told the Washington Post, “All I want is freedom for the people.”

United Nations Ambassador Mike Walz claimed to the UN Security Council that the US was invoking the right of self-defense in response to Iran’s imminent threat.

But the next day, Pentagon officials told congressional staff members that no intelligence supported the notion that Iran was planning to attack the US first.

March 2:

Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth told the press that the objective was retaliation for decades of Iranian behavior, destruction of their missiles, and providing an opportunity for Iranians to “take advantage of this incredible opportunity.”

But only hours later, Secretary of State Marco Rubio offered a new justification for the war: Israel was going to attack Iran and, if that happened, Iran would then attack US interests in the region. He made it sound as if Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had maneuvered Trump into a corner.

The next day, Trump contradicted Rubio, saying: “It was my opinion that they [Iran] were going to attack first. They were going to attack if we didn’t do it.” Rebutting any impression that Netanyahu had manipulated him, Trump added, “If anything, I might have forced Israel’s hand.”

Rubio complained that his earlier remarks had been taken out of context and the operation “had to happen anyway.”

March 6:

Trump posted on social media that only “unconditional surrender” would end the war.
No. 2: How Long Will It Last?

March 1: Trump told the New York Times that the operation could take “four to five weeks.” He didn’t mention the Pentagon’s concerns that the war could further deplete reserves that military strategists have said are critical for scenarios such as a conflict over Taiwan or Russian incursions into Europe.

March 2: Trump said that the war could go on longer than four to five weeks.

March 4: Hegseth said that the Iran war is “far from over” and has “only just begun.”

March 6: Trump told the New York Post that he hadn’t ruled out putting “boots on the ground, if necessary.”
No. 3: Who Will Lead Iran After US Strikes Kill Its Supreme Leader?

March 1: Trump told the New York Times that he had “three very good choices” for who could lead Iran.

March 3: Trump admitted: “Most of the people we had in mind are dead… Now we have another group. They may be dead also, based on reports. So I guess you have a third wave coming. Pretty soon we’re not going to know anybody.” Asked about the worst-case scenario for the war, Trump said, “I guess the worst case would be we do this and somebody takes over who’s as bad as the previous person.”

More than a dozen Mideast countries are now embroiled in Trump’s war, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen.

March 5: Trump told Axios, “I have to be involved in the appointment [of Iran Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei’s successor], like with Delcy in Venezuela”—referring to Vice President Delcy Rodriguez, who remained in charge of President Nicolás Maduro’s corrupt and repressive regime after the US abducted him. Trump said that Khamenei’s son—rumored to be a leading candidate as successor—is “unacceptable to me” and “a light weight.”

The same day, he told NBC News, “We have some people who I think would do a good job.”

March 7: The Washington Post reported that a classified National Intelligence Committee study issued prior to the war found that even if the US launched a large-scale assault on Iran, it likely would not oust the Islamic republic’s entrenched military and clerical establishment.

March 9: Iran chose Khamenei’s son, a cleric expected to continue his father’s hard-line policies, as the country’s Supreme Leader.
No. 4: How Would a US-Iran War Affect the Mideast?

Before US bombs began to fall, thousands of American citizens were in the war zone. But ahead of the strikes, the State Department didn’t issue official alerts advising Americans that the risk of travel in the region had increased.

Yael Lempert, who helped organize the evacuation of Americans in Libya in 2011 observed, “It is stunning there were no orders for authorized departure for nonessential US government employees and family members in almost all the affected diplomatic missions in the region—nor public recommendations to American citizens to depart—until days into the war.”

After attacks and counterattacks closed airspace and airports throughout the region, on Wednesday, March 4—four days into the war—the State Department finally began evacuations by charter flight. The following day, the New York Times reported:
Until midweek, the State Department had mainly provided stranded travelers with basic information about security conditions and commercial travel options via a telephone hotline and text messages. Before Wednesday, desperate people calling the hotline got an automated message that said the US government could not help get them out of the region.
No. 5: Could the War Lead to Humanitarian, Economic, or Geopolitical Crises?

Only a week into the war, the UN humanitarian chief warned, “This is a moment of grave, grave peril.”

Iran is a country of 90 million people. US-Israel bombing has already displaced more than 100,000 of them.

Israel’s companion attack on Lebanon has displaced more than 300,000 residents.

Asked to rate his Iran war performance on a scale of one to 10, Trump gave himself a “15.”

More than a dozen Mideast countries are now embroiled in Trump’s war, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen.

The ripple effects span the globe as oil prices spike and Iran disrupts tanker traffic in the Strait of Hormuz—through which one-fifth of the world’s oil flows. During his state of the union message, Trump boasted that the price of gasoline was down to $2,00 per gallon in some states. Last week, the national average price in the US was $3.41 per gallon.

Ominously, on March 6 the Washington Post reported that Russia is providing intelligence assistance to the Iranian military attacking US targets. But Hegseth is “not concerned about that.”

Asked to rate his Iran war performance on a scale of one to 10, Trump gave himself a “15.”

Introspection rarely accompanies incompetence.


Our work is licensed under Creative Commons (CC BY-NC-ND 3.0). Feel free to republish and share widely.


Steven Harper
Steven J. Harper is an attorney, adjunct professor at Northwestern University Law School, and author of several books, including Crossing Hoffa -- A Teamster's Story and The Lawyer Bubble -- A Profession in Crisis. He has been a regular columnist for Moyers on Democracy, Dan Rather's News and Guts, and The American Lawyer. Follow him at https://thelawyerbubble.com.
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The Cost of War: Iran’s Strategy to Make Trump Pay

Iran’s actions suggest a strategic framework designed to raise the cost of the conflict beyond what its adversaries may be willing to bear. Whether the strategy ultimately succeeds remains uncertain.


A US Army carry team moves a flag-draped transfer case containing the remains of Chief Warrant Officer 3 Robert M. Marzan at Dover Air Force Base March 7, 2026 in Dover, Delaware. Six soldiers from the 103rd Sustainment Command were killed in action by an Iranian drone strike March 1 in Port Shuaiba, Kuwait during Operation Epic Fury.
(Photo by Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images)

Ramzy Baroud
Mar 09, 2026

Common Dreams

Iran is pursuing a multi-layered strategy—military, economic, political, and diplomatic—to raise the cost of war and prevent regime change.

Iran’s Strategy in the Current War

As the war on Iran continues to expand across multiple fronts, Tehran appears to be pursuing a complex strategy that combines military escalation, economic leverage, domestic mobilization, and diplomatic signaling.

Rather than relying on what Iranian officials once described as “strategic patience,” the current approach suggests that Iran is attempting to fundamentally reshape the battlefield by increasing the costs of the war for the United States, Israel, and any regional actors that choose to participate.

The strategy appears to rest on several interconnected pillars designed not only to respond to military attacks but also to prevent the broader objective that Iranian leaders believe lies behind the war: regime change.

Overwhelming the Battlefield

The most visible element of Iran’s strategy has been its attempt to expand the battlefield geographically and operationally.

Rather than focusing solely on Israeli territory, Iran has targeted a wide range of US and allied assets across the region. These include military bases, intelligence facilities, radar systems, and logistical infrastructure that support American operations.

The aim appears to be twofold.

First, Iranian strikes are intended to impose a form of “strategic blindness” on opposing forces by degrading radar systems, surveillance networks, and early-warning capabilities. Such attacks reduce the ability of the United States and Israel to monitor Iranian movements and respond effectively to missile launches or other military operations.

Second, by targeting US bases in multiple countries across the region, Iran is sending a clear message that the conflict will not remain geographically contained.

In practical terms, this means that any country hosting American military facilities risks becoming part of the battlefield.

Iranian officials have repeatedly emphasized that these strikes are directed at US military infrastructure rather than the sovereignty of host nations. Nevertheless, the message is unmistakable: if regional territory is used to launch attacks on Iran, that territory may also become a site of retaliation.

This approach reflects a major shift away from Iran’s previous policy of measured responses and limited escalation.

Instead, Tehran appears to be pursuing a strategy designed to overwhelm the enemy on multiple fronts simultaneously, raising the political and military cost of continuing the war.

Economic Warfare

Alongside its military operations, Iran is also leveraging one of the most powerful tools at its disposal: the geography of global energy supply.

The Strait of Hormuz—through which roughly a fifth of the world’s oil supply passes—has effectively become a war zone. Although Iran has not formally declared a blockade, the conditions created by the conflict have produced a functional shutdown of the waterway.

Missile exchanges, naval deployments, maritime attacks, and the growing threat environment have drastically reduced the willingness of commercial shipping companies to operate in the area. Insurance costs for tankers have surged, while several shipping operators have suspended or rerouted voyages altogether.

In practice, this means that the strait is not closed by decree but by the realities of war.

This distinction is important. Iran does not need to announce a blockade to achieve the strategic effects of one. The instability itself disrupts energy flows, drives oil prices upward, and injects uncertainty into global markets.

The consequences are felt far beyond the Gulf.

European economies—already weakened by energy shocks following the war in Ukraine—are particularly vulnerable to renewed volatility in oil and gas markets. Rising shipping costs, supply disruptions, and market speculation all compound the economic pressure.

For Tehran, this dynamic serves as a powerful form of indirect leverage.

The longer the war continues, the greater the economic consequences for the global system that underpins Western power. In this sense, the Strait of Hormuz functions not merely as a geographic chokepoint but as a strategic pressure valve capable of transmitting the costs of the conflict far beyond the battlefield.

Domestic Cohesion

Another key pillar of Iran’s strategy lies within the country itself.

Western analysts had widely speculated that sustained military pressure—or a leadership decapitation strategy—could produce internal instability or even trigger a political crisis within Iran.

The killing of senior political and military figures, including high-ranking officials, appeared to be designed in part to create such a vacuum.

Yet the anticipated fragmentation has not materialized.

Instead, Iranian authorities have focused on projecting unity and political cohesion. Mass rallies and public demonstrations have taken place across multiple cities, with large crowds gathering in public squares to express support for the government and condemnation of the attacks.

These displays serve an important political function.

By filling public spaces with supporters, the government is attempting to pre-empt the emergence of alternative movements that might claim to represent a popular response to the war.

In effect, the strategy denies external actors the ability to argue that military intervention is intended to support domestic opposition or restore democratic governance.

For Washington and Tel Aviv, the assumption that internal unrest could become a decisive factor appears to have been a significant miscalculation.

Calibrated Diplomacy

Despite the widening military confrontation, Iran has also sought to maintain a careful diplomatic balance with Arab governments.

Iranian officials have repeatedly emphasized that their strikes are directed at US military installations rather than the countries that host them.

This distinction is important.

Tehran’s broader objective appears to be preventing Arab states from becoming full participants in the conflict. While warning that any government enabling US military operations could face retaliation, Iran has simultaneously signaled that it does not seek confrontation with the region as a whole.

The message to Arab governments has therefore been dual-layered: do not allow your territory to be used for attacks on Iran, but if you avoid direct involvement, Iran does not consider you an enemy.

Such messaging reflects Tehran’s understanding that regional alignment could dramatically reshape the war’s dynamics.

Strategic Weaknesses

Despite the coherence of Iran’s overall approach, several weaknesses remain.

One of the most significant challenges lies in the realm of communication.

Iranian media outlets, operating under heavy pressure and frequent targeting, have struggled to project their narrative effectively to global audiences. Compared with the sophisticated international media infrastructure available to Western governments and Israel, Iran’s messaging often fails to reach wider international publics.

This limits Tehran’s ability to frame the conflict on its own terms.

A second challenge concerns the global anti-war movement.

While protests against the war have emerged in various cities around the world, they have not yet reached a scale capable of exerting decisive political pressure on governments supporting the conflict.

For Iran, the expansion of such protests could become a critical factor in constraining the military options available to Washington and its allies.

A War of Strategy

Taken together, Iran’s actions suggest a leadership attempting to wage war according to a clearly defined strategic framework.

Military escalation, economic disruption, domestic mobilization, and diplomatic signaling all appear to function as parts of a single integrated approach designed to raise the cost of the conflict beyond what its adversaries may be willing to bear.

Whether the strategy ultimately succeeds remains uncertain.

What is increasingly evident, however, is that the war is evolving into a contest not only of military capabilities but also of strategic coherence.

For now, Iran appears to be operating according to a calculated plan, while its adversaries continue to search for a sustainable path forward in a rapidly expanding conflict.



Our work is licensed under Creative Commons (CC BY-NC-ND 3.0). Feel free to republish and share widely.


Ramzy Baroud
Ramzy Baroud is a journalist and the Editor of the Palestine Chronicle. He is the author of five books including: "These Chains Will Be Broken: Palestinian Stories of Struggle and Defiance in Israeli Prisons" (2019), "My Father Was a Freedom Fighter: Gaza's Untold Story" (2010) and "The Second Palestinian Intifada: A Chronicle of a People's Struggle" (2006). Dr. Baroud is a Non-resident Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Islam and Global Affairs (CIGA), Istanbul Zaim University (IZU). His website is www.ramzybaroud.net.
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UK Migrant charities and refugees slam Labour for throwing ‘human rights under the bus’ with temporary refugee status

Olivia Barber

6 March, 2026 
Left Foot Forward

Refugee groups have said the policy is "divisive and scapegoating" and will trap people fleeing war in "a state of insecurity and fear"

Refugees and charities that support refugees have slammed the government’s decision to make refugee status temporary, saying that the policy throws “human rights under the bus”.

On Monday, the government announced that refugee status will now be temporary and subject to review every 30 months for all adults claiming asylum.

This means that if a person is granted refugee status, their designation as a refugee will be reassessed every two and a half years. If their home country is then deemed to be “safe”, they would be asked to return home or deported.

Yavuz (not his real name), who came to the UK as an asylum seeker but now has settled status and works for migrant charity Praxis, told Left Foot Forward: “People are fleeing from war and conflict, persecution and ill-treatment, these are not things that can change in 30 months.”

Yavuz added: “I don’t think the Home Office will have the capacity to understand if things are safe or not in different countries, which may actually result in misjudgements and people may be sent back prematurely and to the fear and horror of what’s happening in their home country.”

Highlighting the backlog of over 64,000 cases at the Home Office, Yavuz added: “they are creating something that they don’t have capacity to review every 30 months”.

He also criticised Labour’s decision to require refugees to wait 20 years to apply for Indefinite Leave to Remain.

He said that people fleeing war and persecution are “looking for stability and safety”, and that by requiring refugees to wait 20 years to settle “this is literally telling people you don’t deserve to live here, you don’t deserve to live a good life”.

Yavuz said that this will also negatively affect refugees’ ability to integrate and feel a sense of belonging in the UK.

Minnie Rahman, CEO of Praxis, said: “Scrapping permanent status will trap refugees in a state of insecurity and fear. Doing so says some people deserve fewer rights – and that inequality is lawful. This is inhumane cruelty.

“If the Government wants to foster cohesion and cut poverty, people need to be able to settle here simply, quickly and affordably. Allowing people to have secure futures enables them to reach their full potential, benefitting everyone – not just refugees.”

In a statement, Women for Refugee Women said they were “deeply alarmed” by the government’s decision. A spokesperson for the charity said: “For the women we support – many of whom have survived war, rape and trafficking – repeated reviews create a climate of permanent fear and insecurity.”

They added: “Already we know from Denmark – where this policy is borrowed from – women will be disproportionately harmed, particularly single mothers, trapping them and their children in cycles of poverty and harm. This is a shameful approach for a Government committed to tackling violence against women and girls.”

The charity said: “This divisive and scapegoating policy is designed to make the Government look ‘tough’ on immigration, but it is real people’s lives at stake. We urge the Government to uphold a system that provides genuine protection for those seeking safety in the UK – not institutionalise insecurity for those who have already endured profound harm.”

Yazan Miri, a spokesperson for the Joint Council of the Welfare of Immigrants (JCWI), said: “As many countries around the world make amendments to their asylum legislations to provide protection to more people at risk including those fleeing climate violence and environmental disasters, this government decides to throw human rights under the bus and make the UK a backward-moving country.

Miri added that “The government’s designation of a “safe country” is inadequate and lacks the comprehensive assessment of the risks for people seeking safety”.

Olivia Barber is a reporter at Left Foot Forward

UK Government attacks on migrant rights intensify

HubMP2012

Shabana Mahmood’s attack on migrant rights continues. Following her announcement to double – and in some cases, triple – the length of time that migrants have to wait before getting settled status, the Home Secretary has now opened several new fronts.

Refugees targeted

The first is the decision that all new refugees entering the UK will be told that their right to stay is only temporary, to be reviewed every thirty months. The copying of Denmark’s draconian system has been widely criticised, not least by the Law Society of England and Wales’s President, Mark Evans. He said: “The changes stand in tension with Article 34 of the refugee convention, under which the UK has agreed to facilitate as far as possible the assimilation and naturalisation of refugees.”

Sophie McCann, of Médecins Sans Frontières UK, called the decision “cruel”, adding: “Embedding prolonged uncertainty and fear within the asylum system will create further psychological harm and inhibit refugees’ – including our patients’ – ability to heal from their experiences and rebuild their lives with dignity.”

Daniel Sohege, Director of the human rights advocacy and support organisation Stand For All, commented: “Leaving people in limbo, without any guarantee of security, creates the additional issue of placing them in more precarious positions. It is already shown that this increases the risks of both people becoming undocumented and of people being exploited, particularly by human traffickers. This would create a result from this policy which is entirely at odds with this government’s claim that they are focused on reducing the number of undocumented migrants and tackling exploitation and human trafficking.”

The policy is also at odds with the government’s claim to be focused on reducing division and increasing integration. Many Labour local authorities, particularly in urban areas with a high proportion of residents born overseas, are keen to tell a positive story about inclusivity and integration. Sheila Chapman, who is Islington Council’s Executive Member for Equalities, Communities and Inclusion called the announcement “really unwelcome.”

She added: “Making refugee protection temporary will make our work harder. It creates divides in our community as refugees are presented with yet another barrier to integration. For those who are not able to move on to work or study visas, the threat of deportation will loom over their lives and the lives of their dependents.

“We know firsthand the benefit that refugees have brought for generations. They become our neighbours, our classmates, our friends and family, and we do not agree that they should be made to leave.”

She has written to Shabana Mahmood, urging her to reconsider. Backbench Labour MP are also unhappy.

Bell Ribeiro-Addy MP said: “Those fleeing disaster and conflict deserve certainty and dignity, not repeated questioning of their right to feel safe. Progressive, humane policies strengthen communities.  Division does not. We can choose compassion, and we should.”

Imran Hussain MP tweeted: “Making refugee status temporary and subject to review every 30 months is deeply misguided. It undermines the post war refugee protections Britain helped build and will fuel more insecurity and hostility towards people seeking safety.  These changes must stop before we slide further down a dangerous path.”

And former Shadow Home Secretary Diane Abbott MP questioned: “After Labour’s drubbing in Gorton, this is the response??? My party implementing policies that used to get you thrown out of the Tory party.” Many others are also asking why Labour is aping the policies of Reform UK – particularly after the latter’s comprehensive drubbing in the Gorton and Denton byelection last week.

Study visas restricted

Midweek, the Home Secretary announced a new crackdown on issuing study visas, saying they would no longer be made available to people from Afghanistan, Cameroon, Myanmar and Sudan from this month. Skilled work visas to Afghans will also be stopped. All the countries targeted are in the midst of civil wars, with very high levels of civilian casualties and human rights abuses.

The University and College Union responded: “This attack on international students isn’t really about reducing asylum claims, it’s about aping Reform to try and win back votes. The Greens’ destruction of Labour in the Gorton and Denton by-election should have been a wakeup call – these tactics aren’t just immoral; they’re political suicide.”

National Union of Students president Amira Campbell said the move was “deeply immoral”. She said: “The ambition of the next generation is not paused during conflict. Which is why it is even more important that students from countries facing conflict or humanitarian disasters can come to the UK, access our world-leading education system and share their experiences with other students on campus.”

New restrictions

Then on Thursday, the Home Secretary, in a flagship speech, announced new measures, including a requirement that to be granted permanent settlement, immigrants must attain a higher standard of English language.

Echoing Reform UK, she said the current system was “out of control”.  But Sile Reynolds, Head of Asylum Advocacy at Freedom from Torture, warned that Shabana Mahmood’s plans to remove accommodation and financial support from some asylum seekers will leave people homeless.

The Refugee Council agreed, saying the plans could lead to an uptick in rough sleeping, shifting costs to local councils and the NHS. Imran Hussain, its director of external affairs, said speeding up slow decision-making was a “far more effective” way to reduce costs.

The plans triggered an immediate backlash from Labour MPs. Tony Vaughan, the Labour MP for Folkestone and Hythe, organised a letter that he said had been signed by 100 of his party colleagues, saying the proposals undermined the government’s commitment to integration and social cohesion.

Stella Creasy, MP for Walthamstow, who said: “There’s no ‘fairness’ in repeatedly spending money on asking victims of trafficking and civil war if they are still in that category.” Sarah Owen, a leader of the Tribune group of centre-left Labour MPs, said: “The idea of deporting children mimics Trump’s ICE detention of children.”

These latest attacks follow last month’s proposal to make migrants wait longer before being allowed Indefinite Leave to Remain, which large numbers of Labour backbenchers outspokenly criticised in Parliament.

Corbyn broadside

Islington North Independent MP Jeremy Corbyn told the Home Secretary: “The premise of the proposals is fundamentally unfair and unjust, and it is deeply disturbing that these rules are being pushed through via secondary legislation without Parliamentary scrutiny. It is therefore no surprise that little attention has been paid to safeguarding those most vulnerable to exploitative employees, people with caring responsibilities, individuals trapped in abusive relationships, and children.”

He called the proposals “fundamentally unjust. They are set to apply retroactively, affecting many already living and working in the country, some of whom are mere months away from qualifying for settlement.” He added: “The criteria for reducing and increasing the qualifying period favour one group of people only: those on high income. In practice this means that following a decade of austerity, wage stagnation and a cost-of-living crisis, the vast majority of applicants will face a harder life and at worst, be susceptible to exploitation.”

He said the proposals were inconsistent with the government’s own rhetoric: “In 2024, the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care emphasised the need for carers to be ‘respected as professionals’. Yet it is carers who are having their minimum qualifying period extended from 5 to 15 years, leaving them vulnerable to predatory relationships as they rely entirely on individual company sponsorships. This callous treatment of migrants will likely achieve the goal of a decrease in legal migration. However, at a time when 111,000 posts remain unfilled in the care sector, it would be a hollow victory with devastating consequences for the vulnerable and elderly.”,

He said the prolonged temporary status migrants would now face would hit children particularly and could prevent them from feeling truly integrated as they continually are forced to rely on visa extensions. This would put vulnerable children at risk of social and cultural alienation.

He concluded: “People who migrate and make this country their home make enormous social and economic contributions to society. In the current climate of rising anti-immigrant sentiment pushed by far-right-racism, it is alarming to see this government amplify, through these changes, the false assumption that migrants are a burden to society.”

Rogue employers

The latest targeting of migrants comes at a time when Home Office action against rogue employers has hit an all-time high. The Government has revoked a record 1,516 sponsor licences from businesses in October to December 2025, with new data revealing exploitation of sponsored workers goes far beyond the care sector. Penalising exploitative employers is no bad thing – but the current approach also hits those who work for them, who lose their jobs and visas and end up destitute.

Work Rights Centre analysis of official immigration statistics finds that the Home Office revoked a record number of licences from businesses in 2025, totalling 3,100 revocations. This is the highest number of revocations in any year since records began in 2012. 

Chief executive of the Work Rights Centre, Dr Dora-Olivia Vicol said: “We welcome increased action to hold exploitative employers accountable, but this should not come at the cost of migrant workers being left out in the cold. Every licence revocation means all migrant workers sponsored by that employer will lose their income and risk losing their immigration status. 

“Migrant workers must not be punished for the crimes of their employers. This is not only unjust, but creates a disincentive for all workers to report exploitation, giving unscrupulous employers free rein to exploit as they please. 

“Ministers have not done enough to support migrant workers who have fallen victim to unscrupulous employers and the UK’s broken immigration system. They were abandoned as collateral damage in the Home Office’s crackdown on rogue employers, many of which should never have been given a licence to sponsor migrant workers in the first place. 

More analysis of Work Rights Centre’s Freedom of Information Request data can be found in its new publication: Home Office enforcement against exploitative sponsors hits all-time high, but fails to protect victims. Work Rights Centre is a charity dedicated to ending in-work poverty.

Image: c/o Labour Hub.

‘Labour’s lesson from Denmark: immigration alone won’t save you’

Sofie Pultz  6th March, 2026

Photo: Nick N A/Shutterstock

Labour has its eyes on Denmark. The story told by the Home Office is that the Danish Social Democrats owe their success to getting tough on migration. While that was part of the story when Mette Frederiksen first took office in 2019, it was never the full story. 

As a Dane, the current political situation in the UK feels like slight deja-vu. While Denmark is, of course, very different, there are still lessons from the Danish Social Democrats that Labour might want to take note of – and oversimplifications of the Danish story that they should avoid.

Frederiksen is credited for writing the playbook for how left-wing parties can adopt right-wing immigration policies and combine them with social democratic welfare policies to fight off the populist right. Her 2019 election win was seen as proof; the populist right party, the Danish People’s Party, that had won more than 21 percent of the vote in the 2015 election, was halved. 

However, the Social Democrats got more votes in 2015 than they did in 2019, and only ten percent of the Danish People’s Party’s voters went to the Social Democrats – most of the voters the Danish People’s Party lost went to other right-wing parties. Instead, Frederiksen was able to get a majority behind her because the smaller left-wing parties did significantly better in 2019 than 2015.

‘Trying to stop the drift to the right by focusing too much on one voter group can result in a stronger drift to the left’

Similar to Labour, the Danish Social Democrats have relied on a ‘hero-voter’ approach. In a multi-party system, they knew they could not be a party for everyone, so they made intentional choices of who they are for, who they are not for, and who they are against.

They identified their base voter as primarily pensioners and working-class people in provincial towns. They built everything around that group, combining tough immigration policies with retirement age reform and increased minimum wage for care workers, nurses and prison guards as flagship political wins. In doing so, they were prepared to sacrifice the young, university-educated metropolitan vote, knowing it would flow to other parties.

The consequences of this strategy, however, have been significant.  In last year’s council election, they lost the mayoral seat in Copenhagen for the first time in more than 100 years. The current polls also predict that they will lose 19 percent of their 2022 voters to other left-wing parties.

The Social Democrats learned the hard way that trying to stop the drift of voters to the right by focusing too much on one voter group, might result in a stronger drift to the left.

‘The grocery cheque’

Realising this, Frederiksen’s 2026 campaign is bearing signs of ‘course correcting’; her priorities and announcement are clear returns to ‘traditional’ social democratic policies with broad appeal.

While Denmark has a strong economy, the cost of living is still the primary concern of voters in this election. Frederiksen therefore called the election right after the Danish Parliament passed what has been dubbed “the grocery cheque”: a one-off cash transfer of between £117 and £586 for more than a third of the population.

As a policy, it is easy to explain, easy to feel, and easy to remember. It shows that the Government takes voters’ concerns seriously and it is immediately felt in people’s pockets. 

Recent IPPR research has argued that cost-of-living interventions should be a priority for this government in the UK. These interventions do not need to be large to be effective; but the longer the list, the more convincing the case becomes that the Government is doing everything within its power to ease the pressure on working people.

‘Danish wealth tax communicated whose side the government is on’

The clearest example of Frederiksen’s ‘course correction’, however, came in her election announcement speech: Frederiksen wants to introduce a wealth tax on the wealthiest 0.5 percent of the population, with the money ringfenced for reducing class sizes in primary schools. 

This is a near perfect Social Democratic policy; it raises money on the principle that those with the broadest shoulders should bear the heaviest load, spends it on something universally valued, and communicates something clear about whose side the government is on: the 99.5 percent.

Labour might consider introducing similar broad-appeal policies to address voters’ concern with the growing inequality in the UK. Polling by IPPR and Persuasion UK from November 2025 shows that there would be public support for a ‘narrow’ wealth tax if it was clear that it would benefit the wider public.

‘Adopting a simplified Danish playbook is unlikely to be a silver bullet’

Frederiksen has been an impressive Prime Minister. But her story is about more than ‘getting tough on migration’. It is also a story about the consequences of getting too caught up in the ‘hero voter’ strategy. Denmark’s multiparty system kept her in power, but she has realised that she cannot afford to overlook her wider voter base.

Adopting a simplified idea of the Danish Social Democratic playbook is therefore also unlikely to be a silver bullet for Labour, especially if it largely just focuses on ‘getting tough on immigration’.

Sofie Pultz

Sofie Pultz is a researcher in IPPR’s international policy programme, specialising in the global south. Before joining IPPR, she worked with a major international NGO on development and climate finance projects.

View all articles by Sofie Pultz