The conflict over Western Sahara is just one layer of the deep-rooted geopolitical battle for regional leadership between Morocco and Algeria.
February 12, 2025
Source: Africa Is a Country
2008 protest calling for the independence of the Western Sahara. Image credit Natalia de la Rubia via Shutterstock.
Too often, the Western Sahara conflict is viewed as the root cause of tensions between Algiers and Rabat. Analyzing Algeria-Morocco relations through the lens of this conflict is, however, not only incomplete but, more importantly, largely incorrect. As academic Yahia Zoubir underlines in his piece The Algerian-Moroccan Rivalry: Constructing the Imagined Enemy, “Algeria and Morocco’s strained relations are not solely the result of the Western Sahara conflict; they derive from a historical evolution of which the Western Sahara is only one aspect.” The dispute over the Western Sahara isn’t just about ownership of the land, rather, the conflict serves as a vessel for Morocco to gain regional hegemony at the cost of Algeria’s influence.
The nearly five-decades-long Western Sahara conflict between Morocco and the Polisario Front has contributed to the complicated relationship between Algiers and Rabat. However, this conflict is only the tip of the iceberg. In 1963, when the countries were then young independent states, the War of the Sands armed conflict resulted from Rabat’s claim that large portions of land, including Tindouf and Béchar regions in Western Algeria, belong to Morocco. In October of that year, with the backup of the United States, Morocco invaded Algeria over its irredentist territorial claims. For Morocco, borders inherited from the colonial era were artificial and had to be reviewed, while for Algeria, these borders must remain unchanged. This Moroccan attack, which took place just 12 years before the dispute over Western Sahara, has undeniably created an environment of profound mistrust between Rabat and Algiers, still tangible today. Since then, animosity from both Moroccan authorities and the Moroccan people towards Algeria’s authorities and Algerians has intensified.
These challenging relations didn’t stop Algeria and Morocco from reopening their borders to one another in 1988. However, the 1994 Marrakech bombing changed this. At the time, Moroccan authorities accused Algerian elements and intelligence services of being the masterminds of the attack. Morocco unilaterally imposed a visa for all Algerians who sought to enter Moroccan territory. In response, Algiers closed off the land border with Morocco, which hasn’t reopened since 1994.
More recently, in August 2021, Algeria ended its diplomatic relations with Morocco. Officials cited an array of reasons for this move, including accusations that Rabat spied on Algerian diplomats and politicians using Pegasus spyware, and a July push by the Moroccan ambassador to the United Nations for member states of the Non-Aligned Movement to recognize the independence of the Kabylie region of Algeria—a red line for Algiers. While such crises have popped up between the two neighbors, it has never led to direct conflict.
Indeed, contrary to popular belief, the difficult relations between Algiers and Rabat is mainly the result of unbridled ambition for regional leadership. As the pivotal state, Algeria is the natural regional leader par excellence, given its geostrategic position, economic weight, and military power. Therefore, Morocco understands that it can’t achieve its hegemonic goal without the annexation of Western Sahara. This dynamic, accompanied by a history of mistrust, has heightened tensions between the two countries.
Opposing political ideologies have also nurtured the rivalry between Morocco and Algeria. After gaining its independence in 1962, Algeria joined the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), while Morocco, despite also being a member of NAM, embraced the West. While these two neighbors have much in common—such as language, religion, and even family ties (via thousands of intermarriages)—relations have been complicated since their respective independences.
Besides being a close geostrategic ally of France and the United States, and thus benefiting from their unconditional support since its independence in 1956, Morocco enjoys a very positive reputation internationally due to a well-applied communication strategy and its strategic use of diplomatic and political maneuvers, especially on the Western Sahara dossier. In 2018 alone, Morocco reportedly spent $1.38 million in lobbying against Algeria in the United States. Rabat also hired a consulting firm for US$75,000 per month to lobby in favor of Morocco.
The worldwide scandal involving Morocco’s attempts to spy on foreign journalists, politicians, and members of civil society using the spying software system Pegasus, which was developed by the Israeli company NSO Group, further emphasizes the obsessive surveillance and regional ambition of the Moroccan regime, which has been dubbed a North Korea–like dictatorship. For the United Nations, such spying on politicians is illegal and undermines their rights.
As I clearly underline in my work “Morocco’s Intelligence Services and the Makhzen Surveillance System,” Morocco is often presented as a modernist and progressive country. Such an idealistic portrayal is, however, erroneous. Indeed, as Yom argues, the Moroccan Makhzen looks like a democratic reformer when compared to some other states of the MENA region and the Gulf monarchies—which include some of the world’s most closed and coercive dictatorships. When plucked from this context and analyzed on its own terms, however, the trajectory of Morocco’s Alawite Dynasty does not look nearly so promising.
Moroccan media regularly portrays Algeria in a negative light on behalf of the Moroccan elite, and a large number of academics simply mimic the negative representation of Algeria that the media and decision-makers put forward. Moreover, in the event of a dispute, it is often the case that “Algeria ends up paying the cost diplomatically as all the [international] sympathy tends to be concentrated on Morocco.”
This attitude is even more pronounced in France, where the profound and visceral hostility of a large fringe of the political elite who have yet to accept Algeria’s independence—left and right alike—towards Algeria contributes to this negative image of Algeria and Algerians. Moreover, as the former French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin underlines, Algeria is too often the scapegoat of France’s internal political illness. It is, therefore, through this Hegelian strategy, whereby a constantly repeated lie becomes the truth, that observers analyze the relations between Morocco and Algeria.
However, every communication strategy has its limits. In May 2021, following the Pegasus scandal, Morocco’s reputation was shaken by editorials from the Spanish El Mundo and the French Le Monde, characterizing Moroccan authorities as cynical and asserting that “it was time for Western chancelleries to review their naivety vis à vis Morocco.” As early as 2001, José Bono, the former defense minister of Spain, declared that Morocco was not a democracy but a covert dictatorship, a country dominated by a mafia.
The French recognition of Rabat’s sovereignty over the occupied Western Sahara territory may give more impetus to Rabat. But it will clearly not alter its rivalry (and animosity) towards Algeria. Indeed, due to the opposing nature of the two countries, compounded by a profound mistrust of each other and, more importantly, their regional leadership ambition, whatever the outcome of the Western Sahara conflict will eventually be, the battle for regional leadership will remain as fierce as ever.
Regarding the occupied Western Sahara, and regardless of Rabat’s external support, it is paramount to remember that Morocco’s illegal occupation of Western Sahara—the last colonized territory in Africa—is in direct violation of international law. In 1963, the UN included Western Sahara in a list of territories that sought self-determination. The notion of self-determination was enshrined in the UN Charter and is supported by UN Resolution 1514, which stipulates that “all people have the right to self-determination.” This was further supported by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in a ruling on October 16, 1975, declaring that Western Sahara was not “land belonging to no-one” (terra nullius) at the time of its colonization by Spain. The ICJ judgment, therefore, declared that Morocco had no valid claim on Western Sahara based on any historic title and that, even if it had, contemporary international law accorded priority to the Sahrawi right to self-determination.
Meanwhile, the security situation in the Maghreb remains worrying, and Morocco’s fait accompli annexation of Western Sahara will only fuel deeper instability. Without a fair and honest solution for the Sahrawis through a referendum, instability will only grow in North Africa, further destabilizing the neighboring Sahel region. If a dreadful scenario results from this instability, French authorities—and all their blind—would surely be ill-advised to intervene in any way.
Abdelkader Abderrahmane is a policy adviser on peace and security in North Africa and the Sahel. He is the author of “Morocco's Intelligence Services and the Makhzen Surveillance System.”
2008 protest calling for the independence of the Western Sahara. Image credit Natalia de la Rubia via Shutterstock.
Too often, the Western Sahara conflict is viewed as the root cause of tensions between Algiers and Rabat. Analyzing Algeria-Morocco relations through the lens of this conflict is, however, not only incomplete but, more importantly, largely incorrect. As academic Yahia Zoubir underlines in his piece The Algerian-Moroccan Rivalry: Constructing the Imagined Enemy, “Algeria and Morocco’s strained relations are not solely the result of the Western Sahara conflict; they derive from a historical evolution of which the Western Sahara is only one aspect.” The dispute over the Western Sahara isn’t just about ownership of the land, rather, the conflict serves as a vessel for Morocco to gain regional hegemony at the cost of Algeria’s influence.
The nearly five-decades-long Western Sahara conflict between Morocco and the Polisario Front has contributed to the complicated relationship between Algiers and Rabat. However, this conflict is only the tip of the iceberg. In 1963, when the countries were then young independent states, the War of the Sands armed conflict resulted from Rabat’s claim that large portions of land, including Tindouf and Béchar regions in Western Algeria, belong to Morocco. In October of that year, with the backup of the United States, Morocco invaded Algeria over its irredentist territorial claims. For Morocco, borders inherited from the colonial era were artificial and had to be reviewed, while for Algeria, these borders must remain unchanged. This Moroccan attack, which took place just 12 years before the dispute over Western Sahara, has undeniably created an environment of profound mistrust between Rabat and Algiers, still tangible today. Since then, animosity from both Moroccan authorities and the Moroccan people towards Algeria’s authorities and Algerians has intensified.
These challenging relations didn’t stop Algeria and Morocco from reopening their borders to one another in 1988. However, the 1994 Marrakech bombing changed this. At the time, Moroccan authorities accused Algerian elements and intelligence services of being the masterminds of the attack. Morocco unilaterally imposed a visa for all Algerians who sought to enter Moroccan territory. In response, Algiers closed off the land border with Morocco, which hasn’t reopened since 1994.
More recently, in August 2021, Algeria ended its diplomatic relations with Morocco. Officials cited an array of reasons for this move, including accusations that Rabat spied on Algerian diplomats and politicians using Pegasus spyware, and a July push by the Moroccan ambassador to the United Nations for member states of the Non-Aligned Movement to recognize the independence of the Kabylie region of Algeria—a red line for Algiers. While such crises have popped up between the two neighbors, it has never led to direct conflict.
Indeed, contrary to popular belief, the difficult relations between Algiers and Rabat is mainly the result of unbridled ambition for regional leadership. As the pivotal state, Algeria is the natural regional leader par excellence, given its geostrategic position, economic weight, and military power. Therefore, Morocco understands that it can’t achieve its hegemonic goal without the annexation of Western Sahara. This dynamic, accompanied by a history of mistrust, has heightened tensions between the two countries.
Opposing political ideologies have also nurtured the rivalry between Morocco and Algeria. After gaining its independence in 1962, Algeria joined the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), while Morocco, despite also being a member of NAM, embraced the West. While these two neighbors have much in common—such as language, religion, and even family ties (via thousands of intermarriages)—relations have been complicated since their respective independences.
Besides being a close geostrategic ally of France and the United States, and thus benefiting from their unconditional support since its independence in 1956, Morocco enjoys a very positive reputation internationally due to a well-applied communication strategy and its strategic use of diplomatic and political maneuvers, especially on the Western Sahara dossier. In 2018 alone, Morocco reportedly spent $1.38 million in lobbying against Algeria in the United States. Rabat also hired a consulting firm for US$75,000 per month to lobby in favor of Morocco.
The worldwide scandal involving Morocco’s attempts to spy on foreign journalists, politicians, and members of civil society using the spying software system Pegasus, which was developed by the Israeli company NSO Group, further emphasizes the obsessive surveillance and regional ambition of the Moroccan regime, which has been dubbed a North Korea–like dictatorship. For the United Nations, such spying on politicians is illegal and undermines their rights.
As I clearly underline in my work “Morocco’s Intelligence Services and the Makhzen Surveillance System,” Morocco is often presented as a modernist and progressive country. Such an idealistic portrayal is, however, erroneous. Indeed, as Yom argues, the Moroccan Makhzen looks like a democratic reformer when compared to some other states of the MENA region and the Gulf monarchies—which include some of the world’s most closed and coercive dictatorships. When plucked from this context and analyzed on its own terms, however, the trajectory of Morocco’s Alawite Dynasty does not look nearly so promising.
Moroccan media regularly portrays Algeria in a negative light on behalf of the Moroccan elite, and a large number of academics simply mimic the negative representation of Algeria that the media and decision-makers put forward. Moreover, in the event of a dispute, it is often the case that “Algeria ends up paying the cost diplomatically as all the [international] sympathy tends to be concentrated on Morocco.”
This attitude is even more pronounced in France, where the profound and visceral hostility of a large fringe of the political elite who have yet to accept Algeria’s independence—left and right alike—towards Algeria contributes to this negative image of Algeria and Algerians. Moreover, as the former French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin underlines, Algeria is too often the scapegoat of France’s internal political illness. It is, therefore, through this Hegelian strategy, whereby a constantly repeated lie becomes the truth, that observers analyze the relations between Morocco and Algeria.
However, every communication strategy has its limits. In May 2021, following the Pegasus scandal, Morocco’s reputation was shaken by editorials from the Spanish El Mundo and the French Le Monde, characterizing Moroccan authorities as cynical and asserting that “it was time for Western chancelleries to review their naivety vis à vis Morocco.” As early as 2001, José Bono, the former defense minister of Spain, declared that Morocco was not a democracy but a covert dictatorship, a country dominated by a mafia.
The French recognition of Rabat’s sovereignty over the occupied Western Sahara territory may give more impetus to Rabat. But it will clearly not alter its rivalry (and animosity) towards Algeria. Indeed, due to the opposing nature of the two countries, compounded by a profound mistrust of each other and, more importantly, their regional leadership ambition, whatever the outcome of the Western Sahara conflict will eventually be, the battle for regional leadership will remain as fierce as ever.
Regarding the occupied Western Sahara, and regardless of Rabat’s external support, it is paramount to remember that Morocco’s illegal occupation of Western Sahara—the last colonized territory in Africa—is in direct violation of international law. In 1963, the UN included Western Sahara in a list of territories that sought self-determination. The notion of self-determination was enshrined in the UN Charter and is supported by UN Resolution 1514, which stipulates that “all people have the right to self-determination.” This was further supported by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in a ruling on October 16, 1975, declaring that Western Sahara was not “land belonging to no-one” (terra nullius) at the time of its colonization by Spain. The ICJ judgment, therefore, declared that Morocco had no valid claim on Western Sahara based on any historic title and that, even if it had, contemporary international law accorded priority to the Sahrawi right to self-determination.
Meanwhile, the security situation in the Maghreb remains worrying, and Morocco’s fait accompli annexation of Western Sahara will only fuel deeper instability. Without a fair and honest solution for the Sahrawis through a referendum, instability will only grow in North Africa, further destabilizing the neighboring Sahel region. If a dreadful scenario results from this instability, French authorities—and all their blind—would surely be ill-advised to intervene in any way.
Abdelkader Abderrahmane is a policy adviser on peace and security in North Africa and the Sahel. He is the author of “Morocco's Intelligence Services and the Makhzen Surveillance System.”
