Ukraine Plans to Ship Grain to Syria, Replacing Russian Supplies
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced Sunday that his government is working to facilitate shipments of agricultural goods to Syria, which is now governed by Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Until HTS took Damascus last week, Syria was a top recipient of Russian-supplied grain stolen from occupied Ukrainian territories; with the ouster of Russian-backed president Bashar al-Assad, Russia's grain-theft bulkers have halted mid-voyage and are not expected to deliver their cargoes.
During HTS' short and decisive offensive against the Assad regime, Ukraine weighed in on the militant group's behalf, aiming to deal Russia a strategic failure in the eastern Mediterranean. Russian intelligence official Alexander Lavrentyev complained about the presence of Ukrainian operatives on the ground; Ukraine's secret service, the GUR, reportedly provided drone surveillance assistance to HTS units during the push to the capital.
With Assad gone, and with his Russian backers all but ejected, HTS must now govern on its own - with few resources, and with a terrorist-group designation clouding its ability to cooperate with the West. In this context, bulkers of corn and wheat from the "Grain from Ukraine" program could help alleviate potential food shortages in Syria's devastated economy.
"This humanitarian initiative has already made a significant impact in stabilizing the food situation in some of the world’s most challenging regions," said Zelensky. "Now, we have the opportunity to support Syrians with Ukrainian wheat, flour, and oil—our products that contribute globally to ensuring food security."
Zelensky said that his administration is already coordinating with its partners and with "the Syrian side" to make delivery arrangements. "We will certainly support this region so that stability there can become a foundation for our movement toward real peace," he said.
What Next After Syria?
A Middle Eastern regional review for 2025, starting with the Levant
The rapid and unexpected revolution in Syria has caught many by surprise, the shock of it re-igniting worldwide interest in the region. How things develop in Syria is going to be important. But the revolution in Syria is just one consequence of Hamas launching its attack on Israel on October 7, hastening Hamas’ own defeat and the collapse of Iran’s Axis of Resistance.
Looking ahead to 2025, it is the destruction of Iran’s Axis of Resistance that will continue to be the dominant catalytic spark. But from January onwards, change is likely to be accelerated by the new US administration. Except for a blip during the first Trump presidency, American policy towards the Middle East since the Obama era has had continuity; this is likely to change significantly after the presidential inauguration. The demise of the Axis of Resistance and the arrival of a second term President Trump is going to make 2025 a particularly turbulent year in the Middle East.
Beyond generalities, predicting the future in the Middle East is a very imprecise art. In this first part, the focus is on the Levant. Subsequently, potential happenings in the rest of the Region will be considered.
In Syria, a period of instability beckons, as the new government struggles to consolidate its control. There was clearly sovereign money behind the HTS offensive; no rebel army otherwise appeared in identical uniforms carrying the same type of weapons, and HTS’ rapid progress was in part due to generous bribes paid to commanders and factions to secure new loyalties. This is how things have been done in Syria for the past 50 years.
The usual paymasters - the Emiratis and Saudis - were backing the other horse on this occasion, the Americans in the dark as to what was going on. The Israelis have traditionally not taken sides in Syria, unless there is an immediate threat to Israel. That leaves the Turks across a shared border as the prime suspects, working closely as ever with the Qataris, and both of them sharing the same Muslim Brotherhood inclination. Predictably, both Turkey and Qatar have denied underwriting HTS.
But while the Turks and Qataris will seek to keep HTS aligned with their own playbook and to represent its interests on the world stage, the HTS leadership will now have other suitors. The Saudis and Emiratis will be anxious to win influence, and to exploit economic opportunities arising from the need to renovate the whole country. At the same time, radical Islamists - already deeply embedded in Syrian society as a product of a long civil war - will be pushing to recover the sway that they previously enjoyed over HTS.
The HTS is keen to honor debts of loyalty to some of these Islamist organizations, such as the East Turkistan Islamic Party, which helped with the recent offensive and may now seek assistance with their struggle against China in Xinjiang. So the next year could well be chaotic, and the outcome uncertain. Hence Israel has taken the precaution of destroying what remains of the Syrian armed forces, just in case it is not possible to maintain the unofficial non-aggression pact on the Syrian-Israeli border that was in place with the Assad regime. The overwhelming need to secure redevelopment funds to rebuild a devastated nation, which can only come on the scale required from the Gulf monarchies and the West, will be a strong incentive for HTS-dominated leaders to keep the radical Islamists under control, and so far HTS seems set on restoring Syria’s rich tradition of pluralism.
Most certainly, the Iranians will have no further foothold in Syria. HTS leader Ahmed Al Sharaa, speaking in the Ummayad Mosque on his arrival in Damascus, specifically blamed the Iranians for introducing sectarian divisions to Syria.
The Russians may be suggesting they are in discussions to retain their bases in Tartus and Khmeimim. If indeed the Russians have managed to find the right people to talk to, it would be fanciful to think that such a dialogue could be fruitful. Within the last week, Russian aircraft were bombing the advancing HTS forces - with the Russians at one point claiming to have killed the HTS leader in an airstrike. Accusing Ahmad al Sharaa of being a CIA agent and offering sanctuary to Bashar Al Assad and his family will not have helped either.
With their potential for continuing interference, the new Syrian administration will be wondering what benefit a continued Russian presence might have to offer a new Syria. Anti-Russian sentiment will have been bolstered by the presence alongside HTS in the advance on Damascus of a Ukrainian GUR military intelligence drone unit.
Over the border in Lebanon, the end of Assad rule closes down residual Syrian influence in Lebanon, still strong since Syrian occupation forces withdrew from the country in 2005. Moreover, with the IRGC evicted, the overland arms supply route through Syria into Lebanon is no more, with the Israelis - just to make sure - destroying the logistics routes that underpinned the network, including the remarkable two-mile truck tunnel under the border, which entered northern Lebanon at Mrah al-Makbeh.
With its leadership and fighters decimated, its border infrastructure in southern Lebanon and the Beqaa destroyed, and with arsenals whittled down, Hezbollah is a shadow of its former self. The coming months will see whether this demise is reflected in Lebanese domestic politics, and if there will be a realignment of political parties and switching of allegiances such that Hezbollah no longer is the dominant force in Lebanese politics.
Without such a realignment and a new political consensus, nobody will come to the desperately needed rescue of the Lebanese economy. On balance it seems likely that over 2025, a new president will be elected and a new parliamentary majority constructed with support from Western and moderate Arab states, and that the economy will rebound. The Lebanese will find a way somehow to do business.
Finally to Israel and Palestine. Driven by the shock of October 7, and the horrific heritage of the Holocaust conjured up, Israel has determinedly pursued its national security interests, doing what it previously had hesitated to do for fear of upsetting allies. Self-assuredness strengthened by its successful exercise of resolve, Israel will not compromise on securing satisfactory security solutions for its borders with Lebanon and Syria.
The shape of a settlement in Gaza is as yet unclear. Hamas is destroyed militarily (although still capable of low-level insurgency) and Israel appears able to dictate its own terms. So the situation will settle. But with the political character of the Knesset as it is, Israel is not going to sign up to a Two State Solution, and on the contrary a further erosion of Palestinian statehood and autonomy on the West Bank can be expected.
This is something that the Gulf monarchies will be unable to accept, given the strength of hostile public opinion, which would need to be defied if a compromise with Israel left the Palestinian situation unresolved. So an extension of the Abraham Accords to include Saudi Arabia - and perhaps other states - is unlikely.
Without such an extension, a joining up of the Gulf with the Mediterranean, engendering a potentially huge economic revolution, will be forfeit. This could have been transformational for both Israel and the Gulf states. Israel and the Arab states will continue to glower at each other, and the potential dividends of peaceful co-existence and economic cooperation will be lost for the time being.
The opinions expressed herein are the author's and not necessarily those of The Maritime Executive.
No comments:
Post a Comment