The Problem Is Not Palestinian Culture — Rebutting Modern Right-Wing Colonial Propaganda
The infamous XIX century idea of the “civilizing mission” is spread again in the XXI century. The portrayal of Palestinians as “unfit for self-government” is being used in an attempt to deprive them of their UN-guaranteed right to self-determination. In a grotesque distortion of reality, the colonization is portrayed as being “for their own good” by the Israel-aligned elements of the political right.
July 23, 2025
Promoters of the Modern Colonial Propaganda
No Scopus-listed scientific journal would ever publish the apparent pro-Israel propaganda advanced by journalists, pundits and politicians who promote such narratives. This forces them to swarm around the right-wing media, think tanks or publish their own books to advance their agenda.
One example is Caroline Glick. Born in Texas, she chose to relocate to the occupied Palestinian West Bank and later produced a racist video about Gaza. In 2014, she published a book The Israeli Solution: A One-State Plan for Peace in the Middle East, in which she suddenly pretended to care about Palestinians.
In Chapter 7 of the book, she wrote: “For the Palestinian Arabs in Jerusalem, Judea, and Samaria, Israel’s takeover of those areas was an economic and civil rights boon.” She also claimed that “Under Israeli rule, the Palestinians of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza exercised political freedoms that were nonexistent in the rest of the Arab world.”
And although her “care” about Palestinians emerged only when it served to justify the Israeli expansion, her book was endorsed by the prominent right-wing American politicians and she is regularly invited to brief policymakers and read lectures on the topic of Israel and Palestine, spreading her agenda to the influential public of numerous countries.
A more recent example of this Israeli apologia is a podcast episode titled Did Israel Steal Palestinian Land?, uploaded on October 27, 2023 on the Ayn Rand Institute’s official YouTube channel. Since then, the episode gained several million views, becoming the channel’s most-watched video. It featured Elan Journo, who authored What Justice Demands: America and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (2018), and was dedicated to explaining why “Israelis deserve to have a state” and Palestinians do not.
According to Journo, Israel enables people to live in freedom, prosper, build and produce, while he deemed Palestine a “hostile environment for people who want to be free and produce”. Whatever, in his own words, “quasi-sovereignty” Palestine has, he lamented it by saying that “no one wants to live there.” He did not hold Israel responsible for this state of affairs, however, but speculated that “Palestinian cause was not really interested in building a free prosperous society.”
He believed that Palestinians “can’t build a state when they’re given the opportunity and billions of dollars in international aid” because, in his view, “it’s not their goal.” Speculating about their goal, he proclaimed: “they want no one else living there who is not a faithful Muslim” and referenced the 1988 Hamas charter, thinking it would back-up his claim. However, in reality, the charter calls for a Muslim-led Palestine where Jews and Christians who do not challenge Muslim sovereignty are allowed to reside like in any other Muslim county (Article Thirty-One of the Charter). The Charter has other flaws, yet they are not a blank check to misinform people regarding its content.
It is, however, unsurprising that Ayn Rand’s followers would misinform people about Israel and Palestine. Ayn Rand herself described Israel as “the advanced technological civilized country amidst a group of almost totally primitive savages.” The Institute is not even the only organization that promotes both Rand’s ideas and pro-Israel colonial propaganda in the 21st century: the Atlas Society is another prominent example.
Dr. Edward Hudgins is a former affiliate of The Atlas Society and the right-wing think tank The Heritage Foundation. He has appeared on American TV channels, wrote for American news outlets, and performed advisory roles for the U.S. Congress. In his articles on The Atlas Society’s website, written in 2014–2016, he promoted a nationalist narrative that Israeli Jews “worked hard, and made the desert bloom, sharing many modern agricultural techniques with local Arab peasants, most living in conditions unchanged for a millennium.”
He also praised Israelis for valuing “life and productive achievement,” contrary to Palestinians, whom he characterized as valuing “ethnic solidarity, killing, and death.” To support this notion, he mentioned the 2005 disengagement from Gaza: “[w]hen [Israel] pulled out of Gaza, Palestinians did not turn to peaceful productive activities and trade relations with Israel,” he proclaimed. “Rather, they elected Hamas, an Islamist group bent on Israel’s destruction.” He did not, however, mention that it was Israel, and not Hamas, who blockaded Gaza in 2007, ending the mutual trade between them.
The examples above illustrate the colonial paternalist rhetoric that tried to argue that Palestinians are better off without self-determination and under Israeli rule. This rhetoric celebrates Israel’s achievements with nationalist vigor, calling them “miracles,” but depicts Palestinians as unproductive people bent on destruction.
Once the job of devaluing Palestinian achievements is done, it opens the door for even greater attacks on their dignity and human rights. One way to escalate this rhetoric is exemplified in the words of the infamous American diplomat John Bolton, who previously spread fakes to justify the war in Iraq.
Bolton rightfully described Gaza as “a decades-long refugee camp with no sustainable economic activity.” But his solution was not to urge Israel to lift the blockade of Gaza that hampered the economic activity in the first place. Rather, he promoted the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians from Gaza by claiming that “The best thing to do across the Middle East is to find ways to resettle them.”
He even framed this as some sort of aid: “If you can’t go back to your place of origin, the international community finds ways to resettle you and for the people to become part of a real functioning economy to give their families, their children, a vision of the future. I think that’s best for the Palestinian residents of Gaza.”
The rhetoric that paints indefinite occupation with land confiscations and expulsions as benevolent is only possible when Palestinians are depicted as irrational, unproductive, warmongering people, incapable of building a functioning state. This slander whitewashes the harm done to them by foreign powers and presents Palestinian problems as a result of their own cultural or innate deficiencies. As Dr. Hudgins put it in his 2012 article: “The fundamental problem is the values, priorities, assumptions, and expectations in the Arab-Muslim world.” It is therefore imperative to analyze the historical context to understand whether Palestinian problems were caused by internal or external reasons.
No Scopus-listed scientific journal would ever publish the apparent pro-Israel propaganda advanced by journalists, pundits and politicians who promote such narratives. This forces them to swarm around the right-wing media, think tanks or publish their own books to advance their agenda.
One example is Caroline Glick. Born in Texas, she chose to relocate to the occupied Palestinian West Bank and later produced a racist video about Gaza. In 2014, she published a book The Israeli Solution: A One-State Plan for Peace in the Middle East, in which she suddenly pretended to care about Palestinians.
In Chapter 7 of the book, she wrote: “For the Palestinian Arabs in Jerusalem, Judea, and Samaria, Israel’s takeover of those areas was an economic and civil rights boon.” She also claimed that “Under Israeli rule, the Palestinians of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza exercised political freedoms that were nonexistent in the rest of the Arab world.”
And although her “care” about Palestinians emerged only when it served to justify the Israeli expansion, her book was endorsed by the prominent right-wing American politicians and she is regularly invited to brief policymakers and read lectures on the topic of Israel and Palestine, spreading her agenda to the influential public of numerous countries.
A more recent example of this Israeli apologia is a podcast episode titled Did Israel Steal Palestinian Land?, uploaded on October 27, 2023 on the Ayn Rand Institute’s official YouTube channel. Since then, the episode gained several million views, becoming the channel’s most-watched video. It featured Elan Journo, who authored What Justice Demands: America and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (2018), and was dedicated to explaining why “Israelis deserve to have a state” and Palestinians do not.
According to Journo, Israel enables people to live in freedom, prosper, build and produce, while he deemed Palestine a “hostile environment for people who want to be free and produce”. Whatever, in his own words, “quasi-sovereignty” Palestine has, he lamented it by saying that “no one wants to live there.” He did not hold Israel responsible for this state of affairs, however, but speculated that “Palestinian cause was not really interested in building a free prosperous society.”
He believed that Palestinians “can’t build a state when they’re given the opportunity and billions of dollars in international aid” because, in his view, “it’s not their goal.” Speculating about their goal, he proclaimed: “they want no one else living there who is not a faithful Muslim” and referenced the 1988 Hamas charter, thinking it would back-up his claim. However, in reality, the charter calls for a Muslim-led Palestine where Jews and Christians who do not challenge Muslim sovereignty are allowed to reside like in any other Muslim county (Article Thirty-One of the Charter). The Charter has other flaws, yet they are not a blank check to misinform people regarding its content.
It is, however, unsurprising that Ayn Rand’s followers would misinform people about Israel and Palestine. Ayn Rand herself described Israel as “the advanced technological civilized country amidst a group of almost totally primitive savages.” The Institute is not even the only organization that promotes both Rand’s ideas and pro-Israel colonial propaganda in the 21st century: the Atlas Society is another prominent example.
Dr. Edward Hudgins is a former affiliate of The Atlas Society and the right-wing think tank The Heritage Foundation. He has appeared on American TV channels, wrote for American news outlets, and performed advisory roles for the U.S. Congress. In his articles on The Atlas Society’s website, written in 2014–2016, he promoted a nationalist narrative that Israeli Jews “worked hard, and made the desert bloom, sharing many modern agricultural techniques with local Arab peasants, most living in conditions unchanged for a millennium.”
He also praised Israelis for valuing “life and productive achievement,” contrary to Palestinians, whom he characterized as valuing “ethnic solidarity, killing, and death.” To support this notion, he mentioned the 2005 disengagement from Gaza: “[w]hen [Israel] pulled out of Gaza, Palestinians did not turn to peaceful productive activities and trade relations with Israel,” he proclaimed. “Rather, they elected Hamas, an Islamist group bent on Israel’s destruction.” He did not, however, mention that it was Israel, and not Hamas, who blockaded Gaza in 2007, ending the mutual trade between them.
The examples above illustrate the colonial paternalist rhetoric that tried to argue that Palestinians are better off without self-determination and under Israeli rule. This rhetoric celebrates Israel’s achievements with nationalist vigor, calling them “miracles,” but depicts Palestinians as unproductive people bent on destruction.
Once the job of devaluing Palestinian achievements is done, it opens the door for even greater attacks on their dignity and human rights. One way to escalate this rhetoric is exemplified in the words of the infamous American diplomat John Bolton, who previously spread fakes to justify the war in Iraq.
Bolton rightfully described Gaza as “a decades-long refugee camp with no sustainable economic activity.” But his solution was not to urge Israel to lift the blockade of Gaza that hampered the economic activity in the first place. Rather, he promoted the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians from Gaza by claiming that “The best thing to do across the Middle East is to find ways to resettle them.”
He even framed this as some sort of aid: “If you can’t go back to your place of origin, the international community finds ways to resettle you and for the people to become part of a real functioning economy to give their families, their children, a vision of the future. I think that’s best for the Palestinian residents of Gaza.”
The rhetoric that paints indefinite occupation with land confiscations and expulsions as benevolent is only possible when Palestinians are depicted as irrational, unproductive, warmongering people, incapable of building a functioning state. This slander whitewashes the harm done to them by foreign powers and presents Palestinian problems as a result of their own cultural or innate deficiencies. As Dr. Hudgins put it in his 2012 article: “The fundamental problem is the values, priorities, assumptions, and expectations in the Arab-Muslim world.” It is therefore imperative to analyze the historical context to understand whether Palestinian problems were caused by internal or external reasons.
The Butchered Palestinian Independence
After being ruled by the Ottoman Empire and later the British Empire, Palestine had a chance of becoming independent in 1947–1948, when the British troops left their county. Immediately, however, the young Palestine found itself in the midst of a major foreign-made crisis.
From 1917 to 1948, when the region was controlled by the British, the number of Jews in Mandatory Palestine grew tenfold from 60,000 to 630,000. Most of them immigrated from Eastern Europe. Among these Eastern European Jews, most immigrated from interwar Poland to escape the anti-Semitic discrimination and violence of the Second Polish Republic.
Most Jews were not Zionists. From 1899 to 1924, more than 1,800,000 Jews, who migrated also mostly from Eastern Europe, fled to the United States, and the majority of them settled in New York. When given the choice between Palestine and the United States, the majority of Jews opted for the second option. But everything changed when the U.S. representative Albert Johnson, a supporter of eugenics, introduced the “Emergency Quota Act of 1921,” which was followed by the “Immigration Act of 1924.” These laws severely restricted immigration from Eastern Europe to the USA.
According to Professor Gur Alroey from the University of Haifa, it was American immigration policy that forced Jews to choose Palestine for immigration. He also claims that even amongst Jews who immigrated to Palestine only a minority had “Zionist-pioneering ideology.”
The United States combined the abundance of cheap land, economic opportunities for educated migrants, and millions of Jews already lived there, which made it so attractive for prospective Jewish immigration. Palestine was the opposite. In 1937, the British Peel Commission produced a report on the situation in Palestine which stated that “under present conditions [there is] no cultivable land to spare” (page 389). The change of conditions to allow Palestinian land to feed more people was possible but required huge foreign investments and decades of time.
As King Abdullah I of Jordan wrote in The American Magazine in 1947: “The rich and empty portions of the earth belong, not to the Arabs, but to the Christian nations of the West.” To accept more Jewish refugees for other countries, in his opinion, would have been “hardly a drop in the bucket,” while for Palestine it would be a “national suicide.” Unlike the United States, which prevented Jewish and Eastern European immigration for racist reasons, as it previously did with Chinese, Arabs had legitimate concern that Jewish migration to Palestine would cause a mass-scale displacement of Arabs. But even in 1943, when the Holocaust was already confirmed by the Allies, the British-American Bermuda Conference failed to increase the immigration quotas for the Jews.
Another important issue was the assimilation of Jewish migrants. According to Alroey, “In immigration countries other than Palestine, newly landed Jews spared no effort to integrate into the surrounding society.” But in Palestine, Zionist organizations have created infrastructure that prevented Jewish assimilation into the Arab world. As witnessed by the aforementioned Peel Commission, “from [the point of view of the] facilitating a better understanding between the races, the Jewish educational system is making it more and more difficult as, year by year, its production of eager Jewish nationalists mounts up” (page 335).
Finally, in 1947, the British Empire decided to terminate its mandate over Palestine and forwarded the issue of resolving the Palestinian situation to the UN. By this time, however, the UN could’ve done little to prevent the conflict.
On November 29, 1947, the UN General Assembly recommended to partition Palestine into the Arab and the Jewish state (Resolution 181). According to Professor Jerome Slater’s Mythologies without End (Oxford University Press, pp. 62–63), the proposed Jewish state was to take up 57% of Palestine’s territory and include 500,000 Jews and 400,000 Arabs, while the Arab state would contain almost no Jews.
Behind this seemingly unfair deal stood the consideration that the Jewish state should be large enough to accommodate future Jewish migration from other countries. As the UN Special Committee on Palestine noted in its report: “the Jewish State is needed in order to assure a refuge for the Jewish immigrants” (page 30). In contrast, Arab countries suggested that Palestine should be a single country with 1/3 Jewish minority but limited future Jewish immigration.
After World War II, it would’ve been fair to seize part of Germany for the creation of a Jewish state that would’ve accommodated and protected Jewish refugees. Indeed, such proposals were discussed. But they were opposed both by Zionists in Palestine and by Western diplomats. For instance, a Canadian diplomat Jake H. Warren claimed that such a move would reignite German antisemitism.
Meanwhile, the Palestinian fears were not given much consideration. Instead, Western powers prioritized their own interest—to resist the settlement of Jewish refugees within their own borders. Rather than helping, Western powers pressed for a solution that granted Zionists a license to colonize the weaker state, turning the Jewish refugee crisis into a Palestinian refugee crisis. Predictably, Palestinian representatives rejected this arrangement, but Zionists—emboldened by the West for decades—had no intention of accepting anything less than statehood. As a result, on November 30, 1947, the Civil War in Palestine began.
After being ruled by the Ottoman Empire and later the British Empire, Palestine had a chance of becoming independent in 1947–1948, when the British troops left their county. Immediately, however, the young Palestine found itself in the midst of a major foreign-made crisis.
From 1917 to 1948, when the region was controlled by the British, the number of Jews in Mandatory Palestine grew tenfold from 60,000 to 630,000. Most of them immigrated from Eastern Europe. Among these Eastern European Jews, most immigrated from interwar Poland to escape the anti-Semitic discrimination and violence of the Second Polish Republic.
Most Jews were not Zionists. From 1899 to 1924, more than 1,800,000 Jews, who migrated also mostly from Eastern Europe, fled to the United States, and the majority of them settled in New York. When given the choice between Palestine and the United States, the majority of Jews opted for the second option. But everything changed when the U.S. representative Albert Johnson, a supporter of eugenics, introduced the “Emergency Quota Act of 1921,” which was followed by the “Immigration Act of 1924.” These laws severely restricted immigration from Eastern Europe to the USA.
According to Professor Gur Alroey from the University of Haifa, it was American immigration policy that forced Jews to choose Palestine for immigration. He also claims that even amongst Jews who immigrated to Palestine only a minority had “Zionist-pioneering ideology.”
The United States combined the abundance of cheap land, economic opportunities for educated migrants, and millions of Jews already lived there, which made it so attractive for prospective Jewish immigration. Palestine was the opposite. In 1937, the British Peel Commission produced a report on the situation in Palestine which stated that “under present conditions [there is] no cultivable land to spare” (page 389). The change of conditions to allow Palestinian land to feed more people was possible but required huge foreign investments and decades of time.
As King Abdullah I of Jordan wrote in The American Magazine in 1947: “The rich and empty portions of the earth belong, not to the Arabs, but to the Christian nations of the West.” To accept more Jewish refugees for other countries, in his opinion, would have been “hardly a drop in the bucket,” while for Palestine it would be a “national suicide.” Unlike the United States, which prevented Jewish and Eastern European immigration for racist reasons, as it previously did with Chinese, Arabs had legitimate concern that Jewish migration to Palestine would cause a mass-scale displacement of Arabs. But even in 1943, when the Holocaust was already confirmed by the Allies, the British-American Bermuda Conference failed to increase the immigration quotas for the Jews.
Another important issue was the assimilation of Jewish migrants. According to Alroey, “In immigration countries other than Palestine, newly landed Jews spared no effort to integrate into the surrounding society.” But in Palestine, Zionist organizations have created infrastructure that prevented Jewish assimilation into the Arab world. As witnessed by the aforementioned Peel Commission, “from [the point of view of the] facilitating a better understanding between the races, the Jewish educational system is making it more and more difficult as, year by year, its production of eager Jewish nationalists mounts up” (page 335).
Finally, in 1947, the British Empire decided to terminate its mandate over Palestine and forwarded the issue of resolving the Palestinian situation to the UN. By this time, however, the UN could’ve done little to prevent the conflict.
On November 29, 1947, the UN General Assembly recommended to partition Palestine into the Arab and the Jewish state (Resolution 181). According to Professor Jerome Slater’s Mythologies without End (Oxford University Press, pp. 62–63), the proposed Jewish state was to take up 57% of Palestine’s territory and include 500,000 Jews and 400,000 Arabs, while the Arab state would contain almost no Jews.
Behind this seemingly unfair deal stood the consideration that the Jewish state should be large enough to accommodate future Jewish migration from other countries. As the UN Special Committee on Palestine noted in its report: “the Jewish State is needed in order to assure a refuge for the Jewish immigrants” (page 30). In contrast, Arab countries suggested that Palestine should be a single country with 1/3 Jewish minority but limited future Jewish immigration.
After World War II, it would’ve been fair to seize part of Germany for the creation of a Jewish state that would’ve accommodated and protected Jewish refugees. Indeed, such proposals were discussed. But they were opposed both by Zionists in Palestine and by Western diplomats. For instance, a Canadian diplomat Jake H. Warren claimed that such a move would reignite German antisemitism.
Meanwhile, the Palestinian fears were not given much consideration. Instead, Western powers prioritized their own interest—to resist the settlement of Jewish refugees within their own borders. Rather than helping, Western powers pressed for a solution that granted Zionists a license to colonize the weaker state, turning the Jewish refugee crisis into a Palestinian refugee crisis. Predictably, Palestinian representatives rejected this arrangement, but Zionists—emboldened by the West for decades—had no intention of accepting anything less than statehood. As a result, on November 30, 1947, the Civil War in Palestine began.
The First Arab-Israel War
Famous Israeli historian Benny Morris, in his authoritative history Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict (page 197), depicted its first month as marked by massacres and collective punishments committed by both sides. However, as the Israeli historian Professor David Tal reported, according to Hagana intelligence, “the majority of the Palestinians had not joined in the fighting.” He further claims that “In various places, Palestinian notables negotiated ceasefire agreements with their Jewish neighbours on a local basis, and several villages signed peace agreements with Jewish leaders at the local and national level.”
American professor emeritus of political science Jerome Slater concurs, citing Israeli historian Simha Flapan who drew attention to “the many Palestinian villages that sought non-intervention agreements with their Jewish neighbors, with hundreds of non-aggression pacts signed all over the country” (page 74) and cites Ben-Gurion as saying “it is now clear, without the slightest doubt, that were we to face the Palestinians alone, everything would be all right. They, the decisive majority of them, do not want to fight us” (pages 74–75).
Dr. Moshe Naor from the University of Haifa writes that Palestinian Jews began “Mobilization of personnel for military service and essential labor […] on 9 December 1947” and “In mid-April 1948 21,000 persons were mobilized.” On March 10, 1948, Ben-Gurion formulated Plan D (also known as Plan Dalet), which called for the occupation of lands far beyond even what the UN allocated to a Jewish state.
Israeli historian Ilan Pappé, in his Cambridge University Press book A History of Modern Palestine (3rd ed., 2022, p. 187), wrote about Plan Dalet:
“The second, and far more important, objective of the plan was to cleanse the future Jewish state of as many Palestinians as possible. The main military force was the Hagana, which had several brigades. Each brigade received a list of villages it was to occupy. Most of the villages were destined to be destroyed, and only in very exceptional cases were the soldiers ordered to leave them intact. In addition, some of the brigades were to engage in the take-over of the mixed Arab–Jewish towns of Palestine and their environs. This meant occupation and the expulsion of the Palestinian population. This was the fate of Jaffa, Haifa, Safad and Tiberias.”
On 14 May 1948, Israel officially declared independence. By this time, “300,000 to 400,000 Palestinians […] were either forcibly expelled—sometimes by forced marches with only the clothes on their backs—or fled as a result of Israeli psychological warfare, economic pressures, and violence, designed to empty the area that would become Israel of most of its Arab inhabitants” (Slater, page 81).
On 15 May 1948, the armies of five Arab countries invaded Israel. Professor Slater wrote about the motivation behind this invasion: “there is no reason to doubt what they said at the time, namely, that they were furious at Zionist massacres and forced expulsion of the Palestinians, which began well before the invasion” and quotes Israeli historian Tom Segev as saying: “The possibility arises that . . . the Arab states attacked Israel—among other reasons—because it had chased out and expelled 400,000 Palestinians” (page 77).
Additional motivations of the Arab countries were summarized by Fried, based on the works of prominent scholars such as Mordechai Bar-On, Fawaz Gerges and Joshua Landis. Far from being genocidal against the Jews, as the Israeli propaganda claimed, the Arab counties had limited, self-serving goals, such as counteracting each other’s regional influence—especially in light of Jordan’s ambition to annex the West Bank.
Famous Israeli historian Benny Morris, in his authoritative history Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict (page 197), depicted its first month as marked by massacres and collective punishments committed by both sides. However, as the Israeli historian Professor David Tal reported, according to Hagana intelligence, “the majority of the Palestinians had not joined in the fighting.” He further claims that “In various places, Palestinian notables negotiated ceasefire agreements with their Jewish neighbours on a local basis, and several villages signed peace agreements with Jewish leaders at the local and national level.”
American professor emeritus of political science Jerome Slater concurs, citing Israeli historian Simha Flapan who drew attention to “the many Palestinian villages that sought non-intervention agreements with their Jewish neighbors, with hundreds of non-aggression pacts signed all over the country” (page 74) and cites Ben-Gurion as saying “it is now clear, without the slightest doubt, that were we to face the Palestinians alone, everything would be all right. They, the decisive majority of them, do not want to fight us” (pages 74–75).
Dr. Moshe Naor from the University of Haifa writes that Palestinian Jews began “Mobilization of personnel for military service and essential labor […] on 9 December 1947” and “In mid-April 1948 21,000 persons were mobilized.” On March 10, 1948, Ben-Gurion formulated Plan D (also known as Plan Dalet), which called for the occupation of lands far beyond even what the UN allocated to a Jewish state.
Israeli historian Ilan Pappé, in his Cambridge University Press book A History of Modern Palestine (3rd ed., 2022, p. 187), wrote about Plan Dalet:
“The second, and far more important, objective of the plan was to cleanse the future Jewish state of as many Palestinians as possible. The main military force was the Hagana, which had several brigades. Each brigade received a list of villages it was to occupy. Most of the villages were destined to be destroyed, and only in very exceptional cases were the soldiers ordered to leave them intact. In addition, some of the brigades were to engage in the take-over of the mixed Arab–Jewish towns of Palestine and their environs. This meant occupation and the expulsion of the Palestinian population. This was the fate of Jaffa, Haifa, Safad and Tiberias.”
On 14 May 1948, Israel officially declared independence. By this time, “300,000 to 400,000 Palestinians […] were either forcibly expelled—sometimes by forced marches with only the clothes on their backs—or fled as a result of Israeli psychological warfare, economic pressures, and violence, designed to empty the area that would become Israel of most of its Arab inhabitants” (Slater, page 81).
On 15 May 1948, the armies of five Arab countries invaded Israel. Professor Slater wrote about the motivation behind this invasion: “there is no reason to doubt what they said at the time, namely, that they were furious at Zionist massacres and forced expulsion of the Palestinians, which began well before the invasion” and quotes Israeli historian Tom Segev as saying: “The possibility arises that . . . the Arab states attacked Israel—among other reasons—because it had chased out and expelled 400,000 Palestinians” (page 77).
Additional motivations of the Arab countries were summarized by Fried, based on the works of prominent scholars such as Mordechai Bar-On, Fawaz Gerges and Joshua Landis. Far from being genocidal against the Jews, as the Israeli propaganda claimed, the Arab counties had limited, self-serving goals, such as counteracting each other’s regional influence—especially in light of Jordan’s ambition to annex the West Bank.
The Palestinian Situation
By the end of the First Arab-Israel War, 700,000 Palestinians in total were ethnically cleansed from their land. This event became known as the “Nakba” (Arabic for “catastrophe”). The tiny Gaza Strip — home to 90,000 people before the Nakba — suddenly came to host an additional refugee population of 200,000 (numbers from Ilan Pappé, The ethnic cleansing of Palestine, page 214). This led to unlivable conditions. As Benny Morris wrote in 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War (Yale University Press, p. 309): “They were temporarily housed in public buildings in towns and under trees on the outskirts of villages or in abandoned British army camps in the countryside.”
Ilan Pappé provided additional context in A History of Modern Palestine (3rd ed., p. 206): “The winter of 1948–49 was particularly cold and bitter, and the 750,000 persons who qualified as refugees would hardly have survived were it not for American welfare organizations and international aid agencies.”
Some 150,000 Palestinians—mostly from the western Galilee—were allowed to stay in Israel, but unlike Jewish citizens, they were placed under a separate military rule that restricted their basic civil liberties until 1966. Israeli historian Dr. Arnon Degani highlights that one of the reasons for this measure was that “the Military Government, so claimed its defenders, was a necessity in the face of Israel’s porous borders.” He is referring to what Benny Morris called the “Israel’s Border Wars”—years when Israelis massacred Nakba victims who tried to return to their homes and their property while calling them “infiltrators.”
As Benny Morris wrote in Israel’s Border Wars, 1949–1956: Arab Infiltration, Israeli Retaliation, and the Countdown to the Suez War, “upward of 2,700 Arab infiltrators, and perhaps as many as 5,000, were killed by the IDF, police, and civilians along Israel’s borders between 1949 and 1956. To judge from the available documentation, the vast majority of those killed were unarmed ‘economic’ and social infiltrators” (page 137). He then commented on the motives of these “infiltrators,” claiming that “refugees’ fear of hunger was far greater than their fear of Israeli bullets and mines” (page 138).
This was not what the UN envisioned when it adopted its Resolution 181 that suggested the division of Palestine. Israel was supposed to be allocated 57% of the land—but seized 77.4%. The resolution required Israel to adopt a constitution that would guarantee equality. It also required that Israel consult the ICJ in case of disputes. Israel did neither. Although constitutional debates took place in the Knesset (see The unJewish State, pp. 19 and onward), no constitution was ever adopted. Instead, Israel almost immediately became one of the biggest violators of international laws. Despite all that, the great powers of the day recognized Israel without first demanding it respect Palestinian rights and sovereignty.
By the end of the First Arab-Israel War, 700,000 Palestinians in total were ethnically cleansed from their land. This event became known as the “Nakba” (Arabic for “catastrophe”). The tiny Gaza Strip — home to 90,000 people before the Nakba — suddenly came to host an additional refugee population of 200,000 (numbers from Ilan Pappé, The ethnic cleansing of Palestine, page 214). This led to unlivable conditions. As Benny Morris wrote in 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War (Yale University Press, p. 309): “They were temporarily housed in public buildings in towns and under trees on the outskirts of villages or in abandoned British army camps in the countryside.”
Ilan Pappé provided additional context in A History of Modern Palestine (3rd ed., p. 206): “The winter of 1948–49 was particularly cold and bitter, and the 750,000 persons who qualified as refugees would hardly have survived were it not for American welfare organizations and international aid agencies.”
Some 150,000 Palestinians—mostly from the western Galilee—were allowed to stay in Israel, but unlike Jewish citizens, they were placed under a separate military rule that restricted their basic civil liberties until 1966. Israeli historian Dr. Arnon Degani highlights that one of the reasons for this measure was that “the Military Government, so claimed its defenders, was a necessity in the face of Israel’s porous borders.” He is referring to what Benny Morris called the “Israel’s Border Wars”—years when Israelis massacred Nakba victims who tried to return to their homes and their property while calling them “infiltrators.”
As Benny Morris wrote in Israel’s Border Wars, 1949–1956: Arab Infiltration, Israeli Retaliation, and the Countdown to the Suez War, “upward of 2,700 Arab infiltrators, and perhaps as many as 5,000, were killed by the IDF, police, and civilians along Israel’s borders between 1949 and 1956. To judge from the available documentation, the vast majority of those killed were unarmed ‘economic’ and social infiltrators” (page 137). He then commented on the motives of these “infiltrators,” claiming that “refugees’ fear of hunger was far greater than their fear of Israeli bullets and mines” (page 138).
This was not what the UN envisioned when it adopted its Resolution 181 that suggested the division of Palestine. Israel was supposed to be allocated 57% of the land—but seized 77.4%. The resolution required Israel to adopt a constitution that would guarantee equality. It also required that Israel consult the ICJ in case of disputes. Israel did neither. Although constitutional debates took place in the Knesset (see The unJewish State, pp. 19 and onward), no constitution was ever adopted. Instead, Israel almost immediately became one of the biggest violators of international laws. Despite all that, the great powers of the day recognized Israel without first demanding it respect Palestinian rights and sovereignty.
The Economic Dimension
In 1967, after the war with Egypt—for which Palestinians bore no responsibility—Israel occupied the remaining Palestinian territories: the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem. After this, all Palestinian economic activity came under total Israeli control—far beyond what is typical for the conventional military occupation—and was subjected to the unfair colonial practices that were recognized as violating international laws by the international legal bodies.
Roy wrote in her Scopus-listed article: “Immediately after the June 1967 war, all Western markets were banned to Gazan exporters in order to preclude competition with Israeli agricultural producers.” In addition to this, Israel imposed restrictions on the export of goods from the occupied Palestinian territories into Israel, while removing any restrictions on its exports into the occupied territories.
The International Monetary Fund report supported these claims in a vague bureaucratic language: “Opportunities to invest in domestic production of goods were restricted by an extensive framework of regulations that limited investment in activities competing with Israeli producers.”
In the article dedicated to 50 years of occupation, written in 2017, Amnesty International wrote: “Israel has […] unlawfully seized control of Palestinian natural resources, such as water, fertile land, stone quarries and minerals, and diverted these to benefit [Jewish] settlement industries.”
The IMF report tells the same story in a more detached language: “Domestic development was further constrained by the under-provision of public goods (water, sanitation, roads, and electric power) that were held by fiscal and institutional constraints” and “land and water resource bases have stagnated or declined—in part due to land confiscation by Israel,” declining to specify in how large of a part—to soften the blow.
According to the IMF, Israel took control of “granting licenses and permits, regulating trade, collecting taxes [and] organizing public infrastructure,” and used these powers, amongst other things, to deny permits to Palestinians. As a result of this strangulation of Palestinian economy, by 1987, “35 percent of the employed population in the West Bank [and] 45 percent in Gaza” worked in Israel and “a significant but unknown” number of Palestinians worked in the Persian Gulf states. The IMF notes that in the 1970s, “economic growth in the West Bank and Gaza was driven by demand for Palestinian labor in outside centers of activity, in Israel and the Gulf.”
It was that economic growth of the 1970s that Caroline Glick praised, framing it as the beneficial effect of Israeli occupation. However, Israel’s economic policies in the occupied territories were harmful already since 1967. And it manifested in that “the bulk of capital investment went into housing, and very little into industry,” the IMF reported, meaning that even Palestinians were not ready to invest in Palestinian enterprises under such conditions. Instead, they had no real choice but to exchange their labor for Israeli products rather than developing their own economy.
Eventually, this caused “a large trade deficit of some 26 percent of GDP in the late 1980s—financed almost entirely by the substantial flow of labor income from abroad,” according to the IMF. Thus, “Incomes and wages boomed in the 1970s, stalled in the early 1980s, and declined later in the decade,” which demonstrates the long-term devastating effect of Israel’s policies, which began in 1967, but was fully revealed only in the 1980s and thereafter.
According to Figure 1 in the World Bank’s report, per capita GDP in the West Bank and Gaza declined continuously from 1997 to 2008 in constant US dollars. This same report claims that if the restrictions on Palestinian economy were eased, real GDP growth could have increased from 2% in 2008 to 7.5% in a few years.
Instead, Israel made sure that any growth in this Israel-engineered environment would only boost imports of Israeli goods rather than strengthen the Palestinian economy. Furthermore, this manufactured dependence on Israeli jobs can be used to collectively punish Palestinians by annulling their work visas to Israel whenever Israel wants and depriving a sizable share of the Palestinian population of any income—an opportunity Israel has abused many times since.
In 1967, after the war with Egypt—for which Palestinians bore no responsibility—Israel occupied the remaining Palestinian territories: the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem. After this, all Palestinian economic activity came under total Israeli control—far beyond what is typical for the conventional military occupation—and was subjected to the unfair colonial practices that were recognized as violating international laws by the international legal bodies.
Roy wrote in her Scopus-listed article: “Immediately after the June 1967 war, all Western markets were banned to Gazan exporters in order to preclude competition with Israeli agricultural producers.” In addition to this, Israel imposed restrictions on the export of goods from the occupied Palestinian territories into Israel, while removing any restrictions on its exports into the occupied territories.
The International Monetary Fund report supported these claims in a vague bureaucratic language: “Opportunities to invest in domestic production of goods were restricted by an extensive framework of regulations that limited investment in activities competing with Israeli producers.”
In the article dedicated to 50 years of occupation, written in 2017, Amnesty International wrote: “Israel has […] unlawfully seized control of Palestinian natural resources, such as water, fertile land, stone quarries and minerals, and diverted these to benefit [Jewish] settlement industries.”
The IMF report tells the same story in a more detached language: “Domestic development was further constrained by the under-provision of public goods (water, sanitation, roads, and electric power) that were held by fiscal and institutional constraints” and “land and water resource bases have stagnated or declined—in part due to land confiscation by Israel,” declining to specify in how large of a part—to soften the blow.
According to the IMF, Israel took control of “granting licenses and permits, regulating trade, collecting taxes [and] organizing public infrastructure,” and used these powers, amongst other things, to deny permits to Palestinians. As a result of this strangulation of Palestinian economy, by 1987, “35 percent of the employed population in the West Bank [and] 45 percent in Gaza” worked in Israel and “a significant but unknown” number of Palestinians worked in the Persian Gulf states. The IMF notes that in the 1970s, “economic growth in the West Bank and Gaza was driven by demand for Palestinian labor in outside centers of activity, in Israel and the Gulf.”
It was that economic growth of the 1970s that Caroline Glick praised, framing it as the beneficial effect of Israeli occupation. However, Israel’s economic policies in the occupied territories were harmful already since 1967. And it manifested in that “the bulk of capital investment went into housing, and very little into industry,” the IMF reported, meaning that even Palestinians were not ready to invest in Palestinian enterprises under such conditions. Instead, they had no real choice but to exchange their labor for Israeli products rather than developing their own economy.
Eventually, this caused “a large trade deficit of some 26 percent of GDP in the late 1980s—financed almost entirely by the substantial flow of labor income from abroad,” according to the IMF. Thus, “Incomes and wages boomed in the 1970s, stalled in the early 1980s, and declined later in the decade,” which demonstrates the long-term devastating effect of Israel’s policies, which began in 1967, but was fully revealed only in the 1980s and thereafter.
According to Figure 1 in the World Bank’s report, per capita GDP in the West Bank and Gaza declined continuously from 1997 to 2008 in constant US dollars. This same report claims that if the restrictions on Palestinian economy were eased, real GDP growth could have increased from 2% in 2008 to 7.5% in a few years.
Instead, Israel made sure that any growth in this Israel-engineered environment would only boost imports of Israeli goods rather than strengthen the Palestinian economy. Furthermore, this manufactured dependence on Israeli jobs can be used to collectively punish Palestinians by annulling their work visas to Israel whenever Israel wants and depriving a sizable share of the Palestinian population of any income—an opportunity Israel has abused many times since.
The Israeli Exceptionalism
Despite the fact that XIX century colonial rhetoric is still being used today, its uses are largely confined to the margins of society. However, the pro-Israel brand of colonial rhetoric attempts to influence even those who are overall opposed to colonialism. For this, they either paint Arabs as especially regressive or Jews as uniquely moral and progressive.
Thus, they essentially claim that the typical colonial propaganda is wrong overall but perfectly matches the specific case of Palestine and Israel, where Israel is bringing civilization or economic success to the “ungrateful” Arabs. This necessitates the examination of reasons behind Israel’s economic success and whether Palestinians require Jewish governance to repeat it.
The World Bank database contains econometric data on different countries from 1960 to present which may be a good starting point for our examination. According to the World Bank, nominal Israeli GDP has risen from $3 billion in 1960 to $513.6 billion in 2023. Adjusting for inflation, this translates to a growth from $18.5 billion to $418 billion in 2015 US dollars. An impressive rise of 22.5 times.
However, in that same time period, Israel’s population also grew, from 2.1 million in 1960 to 9.8 million people in 2023. This means that real (adjusted for inflation) GDP per capita in Israel rose from $8,800 to $43,000 in 2015 US dollars or fivefold in 63 years. For comparison, in the same period from 1960 to 2013, France’s GDP per capita in 2015 US dollars grew 3.6 times from $10,700 to $39,100, Spain’s grew 4.5 times, and Portugal’s by 5.5 times. Ireland managed to outpace them all by growing from $8,500 to $91,600—more than tenfold. This makes Israel’s growth comparable to that of Western European counties.
It lags far behind Asian Tigers like South Korea, which grew 33 times from $1,020 to $34,100 and China that outpaced all by growing more than 50 times over. Many Muslim counties also demonstrated substantial economic growth. Turkey grew from $2,400 to $14,700 (6 times), Malaysia from $1,300 to $11,400 (9 times) and Egypt from $750 to $4,100 (5.4 times). The list does not include OPEC members.
Neither oil, nor European culture is required for economic development. Most of the listed countries also had military coups, political purges and other social and political problems, which negatively affected the economy, but did not prevent their economic growth on the bigger time scale.
The data supplied by the World Bank, however, represents one problem: in 1960, where the data starts, Israeli Jews already had a European standard of living that far exceeded that of their neighbors. This warrants us to get even deeper in scientific literature on the matter to see a broader time scale than 1960-2023.
In the review of a 2023 Hebrew-language book by Prof. Jacob Metzer (the Alexander Brody Emeritus Professor at Hebrew University), Prof. Reuben Gronau provided a translated table from the original book, according to which in 1922 Palestinian Jews had an NDP Per Capita of 19.3 £P while Palestinian Arabs had 10.1 £P. This data was adjusted for 1936 prices.
As we can see, in 1922, Palestinian Jews already were wealthier than the Arabs. But the reason for their success was not some innate or cultural superiority. The reason was foreign donations. Arabs from all over the world did not donate money to Palestinian Arabs while many Jews from wealthy industrialized countries provided aid to the Yishuv (Jewish settlements in Palestine).
The biggest single donor Baron Edmond de Rothschild alone contributed some 5 million British pounds. In 1922, when Palestine’s Jewish population was 83,794, this amounted to roughly £59.7 per settler—enough to sustain each individual for several years at an annual expenditure of £19.3, or to invest in improvements that would elevate their standard of living above that of the Arab population. Moreover, Jewish settlers colonized mostly coastal cities where Arabs too had a higher standard of living than on average in Palestine.
By 1947, the discrepancy between the Arabs and the Jews in Palestine had increased. Citing Merzer, Gronau reports the NDP Per Capita of 62.4 £P for Jews and 24.7 £P for Arabs in 1936 prices. This means that in 1922–1947, the annual growth rate for Jews was 4.8% and for Arabs 3.6%. The Arab result was by no means small, but the Jewish result was even higher.
Another interesting number that Gronau provided was the tripling of the domestic product per capita in Palestine/Israel between 1947 and 1950. The domestic product of Israel alone in 1950 was double that of the entire Mandatory Palestine in 1947. Furthermore, based on Gronau’s numbers, we can calculate that relative to Jewish sector of the Mandatory Palestine economy in 1947 (£38.5 million out of £70.8 million, or 54%), the Jewish sector of Israel’s economy in 1950 (taken as 88% based on population) grew a staggering 3.4 times total or 2 times per person.
Jewish domestic product per capita already was 2.5 times that of an Arab in 1947. Also, Jewish population almost doubled between 1947 and 1950 due to migration. But it would’ve been strange to expect even the doubling of Jewish sector of the economy because these migrants were destitute refugees, who required housing, food assistance, and Hebrew classes. However, they were swiftly housed in the expropriated Arab property and the economic disruption caused by the war was outweighed by the massive influx of foreign donations to Israel.
Based on 13 data points from 1948 through 1960, we can calculate that average aid to Israel from the American Jewish diaspora was $77.5 million per year. Plus, from the US government to Israel it was $59 million per year. Professor Eytan Sheshinski, an emeritus lecturer at the Hebrew University, claimed that “[the Israeli] government provided jobs and set up infrastructure projects using money from overseas, mainly from Jews abroad but also from German reparations given as compensation for Nazi crimes.” He also claimed that “[they] were critical to the economy” and “helped build roads, ports and trains.” West German reparations did not begin until 1953, when they brought an additional $65 million per year.
Another important source of income for the Israeli government was the selling of bonds, which brought $52 million when it began in 1951 and only grew since then. The bonds provided only 3.5% yearly income which is not what geopolitically unstable countries usually pay. It was again mostly the American Jewish diaspora that bought Israeli bonds and invested in the Israeli economy at that time. All in all, the U.S. Department of State reported in 1953 that “Israel is not a viable state and requires outside financial assistance.”
Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics reported that in 1950–1972 Israel’s GDP per capita grew by 5.5% per year, after which it slowed down to a yearly growth of 2% in 1970–2016. This confirms the hypothesis that Israel’s fast growth was dependent on foreign aid. Although external contributions tripled in 1967 and amount to billions today, they shrank relative to Israel’s expanding GDP as the gap in living standards between American Jews and Israelis narrowed. As foreign aid lost its relative weight, no domestic source of growth emerged to maintain the momentum of earlier decades.
Despite the fact that XIX century colonial rhetoric is still being used today, its uses are largely confined to the margins of society. However, the pro-Israel brand of colonial rhetoric attempts to influence even those who are overall opposed to colonialism. For this, they either paint Arabs as especially regressive or Jews as uniquely moral and progressive.
Thus, they essentially claim that the typical colonial propaganda is wrong overall but perfectly matches the specific case of Palestine and Israel, where Israel is bringing civilization or economic success to the “ungrateful” Arabs. This necessitates the examination of reasons behind Israel’s economic success and whether Palestinians require Jewish governance to repeat it.
The World Bank database contains econometric data on different countries from 1960 to present which may be a good starting point for our examination. According to the World Bank, nominal Israeli GDP has risen from $3 billion in 1960 to $513.6 billion in 2023. Adjusting for inflation, this translates to a growth from $18.5 billion to $418 billion in 2015 US dollars. An impressive rise of 22.5 times.
However, in that same time period, Israel’s population also grew, from 2.1 million in 1960 to 9.8 million people in 2023. This means that real (adjusted for inflation) GDP per capita in Israel rose from $8,800 to $43,000 in 2015 US dollars or fivefold in 63 years. For comparison, in the same period from 1960 to 2013, France’s GDP per capita in 2015 US dollars grew 3.6 times from $10,700 to $39,100, Spain’s grew 4.5 times, and Portugal’s by 5.5 times. Ireland managed to outpace them all by growing from $8,500 to $91,600—more than tenfold. This makes Israel’s growth comparable to that of Western European counties.
It lags far behind Asian Tigers like South Korea, which grew 33 times from $1,020 to $34,100 and China that outpaced all by growing more than 50 times over. Many Muslim counties also demonstrated substantial economic growth. Turkey grew from $2,400 to $14,700 (6 times), Malaysia from $1,300 to $11,400 (9 times) and Egypt from $750 to $4,100 (5.4 times). The list does not include OPEC members.
Neither oil, nor European culture is required for economic development. Most of the listed countries also had military coups, political purges and other social and political problems, which negatively affected the economy, but did not prevent their economic growth on the bigger time scale.
The data supplied by the World Bank, however, represents one problem: in 1960, where the data starts, Israeli Jews already had a European standard of living that far exceeded that of their neighbors. This warrants us to get even deeper in scientific literature on the matter to see a broader time scale than 1960-2023.
In the review of a 2023 Hebrew-language book by Prof. Jacob Metzer (the Alexander Brody Emeritus Professor at Hebrew University), Prof. Reuben Gronau provided a translated table from the original book, according to which in 1922 Palestinian Jews had an NDP Per Capita of 19.3 £P while Palestinian Arabs had 10.1 £P. This data was adjusted for 1936 prices.
As we can see, in 1922, Palestinian Jews already were wealthier than the Arabs. But the reason for their success was not some innate or cultural superiority. The reason was foreign donations. Arabs from all over the world did not donate money to Palestinian Arabs while many Jews from wealthy industrialized countries provided aid to the Yishuv (Jewish settlements in Palestine).
The biggest single donor Baron Edmond de Rothschild alone contributed some 5 million British pounds. In 1922, when Palestine’s Jewish population was 83,794, this amounted to roughly £59.7 per settler—enough to sustain each individual for several years at an annual expenditure of £19.3, or to invest in improvements that would elevate their standard of living above that of the Arab population. Moreover, Jewish settlers colonized mostly coastal cities where Arabs too had a higher standard of living than on average in Palestine.
By 1947, the discrepancy between the Arabs and the Jews in Palestine had increased. Citing Merzer, Gronau reports the NDP Per Capita of 62.4 £P for Jews and 24.7 £P for Arabs in 1936 prices. This means that in 1922–1947, the annual growth rate for Jews was 4.8% and for Arabs 3.6%. The Arab result was by no means small, but the Jewish result was even higher.
Another interesting number that Gronau provided was the tripling of the domestic product per capita in Palestine/Israel between 1947 and 1950. The domestic product of Israel alone in 1950 was double that of the entire Mandatory Palestine in 1947. Furthermore, based on Gronau’s numbers, we can calculate that relative to Jewish sector of the Mandatory Palestine economy in 1947 (£38.5 million out of £70.8 million, or 54%), the Jewish sector of Israel’s economy in 1950 (taken as 88% based on population) grew a staggering 3.4 times total or 2 times per person.
Jewish domestic product per capita already was 2.5 times that of an Arab in 1947. Also, Jewish population almost doubled between 1947 and 1950 due to migration. But it would’ve been strange to expect even the doubling of Jewish sector of the economy because these migrants were destitute refugees, who required housing, food assistance, and Hebrew classes. However, they were swiftly housed in the expropriated Arab property and the economic disruption caused by the war was outweighed by the massive influx of foreign donations to Israel.
Based on 13 data points from 1948 through 1960, we can calculate that average aid to Israel from the American Jewish diaspora was $77.5 million per year. Plus, from the US government to Israel it was $59 million per year. Professor Eytan Sheshinski, an emeritus lecturer at the Hebrew University, claimed that “[the Israeli] government provided jobs and set up infrastructure projects using money from overseas, mainly from Jews abroad but also from German reparations given as compensation for Nazi crimes.” He also claimed that “[they] were critical to the economy” and “helped build roads, ports and trains.” West German reparations did not begin until 1953, when they brought an additional $65 million per year.
Another important source of income for the Israeli government was the selling of bonds, which brought $52 million when it began in 1951 and only grew since then. The bonds provided only 3.5% yearly income which is not what geopolitically unstable countries usually pay. It was again mostly the American Jewish diaspora that bought Israeli bonds and invested in the Israeli economy at that time. All in all, the U.S. Department of State reported in 1953 that “Israel is not a viable state and requires outside financial assistance.”
Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics reported that in 1950–1972 Israel’s GDP per capita grew by 5.5% per year, after which it slowed down to a yearly growth of 2% in 1970–2016. This confirms the hypothesis that Israel’s fast growth was dependent on foreign aid. Although external contributions tripled in 1967 and amount to billions today, they shrank relative to Israel’s expanding GDP as the gap in living standards between American Jews and Israelis narrowed. As foreign aid lost its relative weight, no domestic source of growth emerged to maintain the momentum of earlier decades.
Conclusions
Pro-Israel propagandists want to control the narrative about the Arab-Muslim world and we hear their narratives more often than academic consensus on the matter. Palestinians are accused of low economic productivity to justify their colonization and to whitewash its adverse effects on them. Arab-Muslim values are slandered to present them as the cause of Palestinian problems. However, Palestinians—and other Arabs—were developing their economies rapidly throughout numerous periods of growth and their values guided and inspired them.
The likes of Caroline Glick paint Israeli occupation as bringing economic growth to the occupied territories, but these claims became outdated in the 1980s, whereupon short-lived West Bank economic growth—brought by Palestinians working abroad—changed to the decades of struggling, caused by Israel’s strangling economic policies. Now that international aid no longer constitutes such a large share of Israel’s GDP, Israel’s economic growth slowed down to less than half its former pace. Meanwhile, the World Bank estimated that the depressed West Bank economy might’ve grown 7.5% per year, if only Israel ceased its damaging policies.Email
Pro-Israel propagandists want to control the narrative about the Arab-Muslim world and we hear their narratives more often than academic consensus on the matter. Palestinians are accused of low economic productivity to justify their colonization and to whitewash its adverse effects on them. Arab-Muslim values are slandered to present them as the cause of Palestinian problems. However, Palestinians—and other Arabs—were developing their economies rapidly throughout numerous periods of growth and their values guided and inspired them.
The likes of Caroline Glick paint Israeli occupation as bringing economic growth to the occupied territories, but these claims became outdated in the 1980s, whereupon short-lived West Bank economic growth—brought by Palestinians working abroad—changed to the decades of struggling, caused by Israel’s strangling economic policies. Now that international aid no longer constitutes such a large share of Israel’s GDP, Israel’s economic growth slowed down to less than half its former pace. Meanwhile, the World Bank estimated that the depressed West Bank economy might’ve grown 7.5% per year, if only Israel ceased its damaging policies.Email
Roman Kozhevnikov
Roman Kozhevnikov is a writer and analyst living in Ukraine. He holds a degree in economics and has written about science, economics, colonialism, history, and apartheid.
Roman Kozhevnikov is a writer and analyst living in Ukraine. He holds a degree in economics and has written about science, economics, colonialism, history, and apartheid.

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