China weaponises port inspections to punish Panama over ports ruling

Strip the sovereignty rhetoric from Washington and Beijing, and what remains is a resource fight over who controls the infrastructure bookending the world's most valuable shortcut / bne IntelliNews

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By Alek Buttermann July 8, 2026

Panama's top maritime officials land in Beijing on July 16 with a mandate that looks technical and is anything but. Officially, Panama Maritime Authority (AMP) administrator Luis Roquebert leads a delegation to renew a bilateral shipping treaty and discuss inspection protocols. In reality, Panama is going to beg its way out of a blockade dressed up as bureaucracy, one that has already driven over 200 vessels off its flag.

The case

Strip away the geopolitics and the underlying dispute is simple. Since 1997, Panama Ports Company, a subsidiary of Hong Kong conglomerate CK Hutchison, has run Balboa and Cristóbal, the container terminals sitting at the Pacific and Atlantic mouths of the Canal. These are not the waterway itself, which Panama has operated independently since 1999, but they are the chokepoints on either side of it: whoever runs them controls the first and last mile for a large share of the roughly 14,000 vessels transiting the canal each year.

In 2021, that concession was quietly extended for another 25 years, to 2047, without competitive bidding. In January, following an audit which found Panama had collected barely a third of what it was owed under the contract, the Supreme Court ruled the 1997 concession law and its 2021 extension unconstitutional. The court's core finding: the deal was never put out to public tender, a breach of Article 266 of the constitution, and its terms caused direct harm to the public interest. Hutchison lost both ports. It has since filed an international arbitration seeking more than $2bn in damages.

Washington's fingerprints all over

The ruling did not land in a vacuum. A year earlier, after Trump accused China of "running the Panama Canal," Hutchison struck a $22.8bn deal to sell its non-Chinese port empire, Balboa and Cristóbal included, to a consortium led by BlackRock and MSC's Terminal Investment Limited. Beijing's antitrust regulator froze the sale as capitulation to American pressure, and Hutchison spent 2025 trying to appease both capitals by inviting Chinese state-owned COSCO Shipping in as a co-investor.

The court's ruling landed in the middle of that stalemate, and the White House did not hide its satisfaction, touting it as a decisive blow against Chinese-linked control of the canal's flanks. Panama then handed interim operations to Maersk and MSC's TiL, the exact consortium that Trump's pressure had assembled a year earlier. Panama's court may have ruled on solid procedural grounds. Yet coincidentally, it also delivered Washington the outcome it had spent a year manufacturing, which makes Panama's insistence on pure judicial independence a harder sell than officials in Panama City want to admit.

China's punishment campaign is real

None of that, however, legitimises what Beijing did next. China weaponised Port State Control (PSC) the way only a dominant port authority can: quietly, deniably, devastatingly. Tokyo MOU records show detentions of Panama-flagged vessels at Chinese ports climbing from 20 in February to 92 in March, 135 in April, and a peak of 140 in May, easing only to 64 in June as diplomatic heat rose. COSCO suspended its own Balboa service in solidarity. The message needed no press release: cross a Chinese state-linked firm, and Beijing makes your flag radioactive.

It has worked. Panama's open registry, its single greatest commercial asset at 8,638 vessels and 233.2mn tonnes representing the world's largest merchant fleet, is now its greatest vulnerability, and shipowners have already voted with their re-flagging.

Beijing then overplayed its hand in public. At the Organisation of American States (OAS) General Assembly in late June, China's permanent observer Xie Feng told Panama to "correct its errors," a demand for a democracy to overrule its own top court that foreign minister Javier Martínez-Acha threw back hard by revealing Chinese officials had asked him directly, more than once, to intervene in the ruling. US ambassador Kevin Cabrera called Beijing's denial of any link between the detentions and the ruling an outright lie. 

US counterweight is self-interest wearing a rule-of-law mask

Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) Chairman Laura DiBella's July 7 statement escalated things further, warning that China's "retaliatory and unjustified" inspections could trigger a US investigation and corrective measures against Chinese-controlled carriers. The legal hook is genuine. So is the self-interest: Washington spent a year engineering Hutchison's exit and will not now watch Beijing claw the outcome back through customs paperwork. Trump's claim that "China's trying to take over the Panama Canal" conflates commercial terminal operators with sovereignty over the waterway itself, a narrative his administration has found useful since it first floated retaking the canal outright.

Peel back the sovereignty rhetoric from both capitals, and what remains is a resource fight over who controls the infrastructure bookending the world's most valuable shortcut. China is punishing Panama for a ruling Washington did much to engineer. The White House is defending a rule-of-law outcome it spent a year manufacturing for its own strategic ends. Panama, caught in the middle, dispatches a technical delegation to Beijing and hopes Roquebert can squeeze out a renewal of the treaty, prolonging a ceasefire neither superpower has much incentive to make permanent.

 

Panama Ship Registry Returns to Paris MoU “White List”

The Panama Ship Registry has returned to the Paris MoU White List due to an effort to ensure quality of the ships in the registry (Panama Maritime Authority)

Published Jul 2, 2026 6:49 PM by The Maritime Executive

Officials in Panama are highlighting the successful return of its ship registry to the Paris MoU White List after having been on the Grey List for the past several years. They are highlighting it as a confirmation of their efforts to maintain the highest standards for Panama-registered vessels.

It is a critical development for the flag and registry, which is the largest by the number of ships. It has been under pressure from competitors and criticized for substandard vessels and harboring shadow fleet tankers. The administration has made a concerted effort with the support of the government to purge the registry and enhance its administration.

The annual listing setting the standards for flags is effective as of July 1 and is based on three years of data reviewed by the Paris MoU. Flag state performance is evaluated using a rolling three-year average based on inspections and detention conducted at ports within the organization.

Panama highlights that there were 5,7312 inspections of ships under its flag between 2023 and 2025. It reports the data shows a total of 338 detentions during that period, or a rate of 5.9 percent, well below the Paris MoU standard of 7 percent to be on the White List.

Ships on the White List are recognized for operating under the highest standards. It is also reflected in their inspection routines

The Panama authorities highlight a sustained strategy to strengthen safety standards, enhance compliance with international conventions, and reinforce oversight of the Panamanian merchant fleet. The return to the White list, they report, reflects a series of initiatives over the past several years to improve performance on inspections while also raising the overall quality of the registry.

Among the steps they highlight is a strengthening of its preventative inspection program and an introduction of more rigorous mechanisms to identify and monitor vessels with a history of deficiencies during inspections. It also adopted enhanced methodologies for flag state inspections.

Other efforts included reinforcing a precheck process to ensure that only vessels meeting international standards are admitted to the Panama Ship Registry. It has also enhanced the removal process for violators and increased the number of flag cancellations.

The Panama flag, however, has been under pressure in 2026 due to the political and commercial disputes between Panama and China. China recently denied it was targeting ships with the Panama flag as a retaliation for Panama’s cancelling CK Hutchison’s operations in the port of Balboa and Cristobal. The number of Panamanian-flagged ships detained in China jumped dramatically, while China says this was due to the ships being involved in fishing boat accidents.

 

Peru reasserts control over China's flagship South American port

Chancay was built to be Beijing's flagship gateway into South America. A Lima court ruling has just put it back under Peruvian state oversight, reopening the fault line between Washington and China over who controls Latin America's ports. / Presidencia PerúFacebook

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By Alek Buttermann July 2, 2026

A Lima court has just done what Washington has spent months demanding: it put China's flagship South American port back under state oversight. On July 1, the Second Constitutional Chamber of the Superior Court of Lima overturned a January ruling that had stripped Ositrán, Peru's transport infrastructure regulator, of its power to inspect and sanction the $1.3bn Megaport of Chancay. For a facility built to be China's main gateway into South America, this is a serious reversal.

The ruling landed days after a separate court blocked a parallel attempt by the port's operator, Chinese state-controlled Cosco Shipping, to halt an antitrust probe by Indecopi, Peru's competition authority. Together, the two rulings end Cosco's brief run of regulatory immunity. The court's reasoning was blunt: Chancay is a public-use facility, regardless of the private ownership structure behind it.

The regulators are back

Cosco has lost its shield. For months, the terminal sat in a regulatory grey zone after the January ruling ordered Ositrán to stay away, effectively creating a private enclave on the Pacific coast. Cosco argued that a fully privately financed port, built without a state concession contract, fell outside standard public oversight law. It wanted routine disputes handled through commercial channels, not state mandates.

The appellate judges rejected that argument outright. Routine information requests and baseline administrative checks, they found, do not amount to an "imminent threat" to a private company's constitutional rights. That closes a loophole Cosco had used to play one regulator off against another. Now it faces both Ositrán and Indecopi at once, with no immunity from either.

Cosco is not done, though. Its lawyer, Ramiro Portocarrero, has confirmed the company will escalate the matter to Peru's Constitutional Tribunal through a Constitutional Grievance Recourse, arguing the state promised legal stability for a $1.3bn investment and then changed the rules mid-operation.

Peru follows Panama's script

Washington has run this play before, just five months earlier and one country north. In late January and February, the Trump administration pushed Panama's Supreme Court to nullify long-standing concessions at the ports of Balboa and Cristóbal, sitting at the Pacific and Atlantic mouths of the Panama Canal. A subsidiary of the Hong Kong-based conglomerate CK Hutchison had held those terminals for decades.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio led the public pressure, arguing Chinese port control was unacceptable on strategic grounds. The dispute peaked on February 23, when Panama's government seized the terminals by executive decree and handed interim control to Western-allied shipping lines, prompting a multi-billion-dollar arbitration claim from Beijing.

Chancay is the sequel. Washington treats Chinese control of Latin American port infrastructure as a systemic risk to Western supply chains. The method is identical to the one used in Panama: lean on domestic courts to enforce local law, reassert host-country sovereignty, and strip the legal protections shielding Chinese state-linked capital.

Washington times its message to the ballot box

The US State Department set the tone early. Its Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs warned publicly that "cheap Chinese money costs sovereignty". US Ambassador Bernie Navarro reinforced the point in person, delivering US-donated cargo scanners directly to Chancay's customs checkpoint, establishing a physical, symbolic American presence inside China's main South American gateway.

The timing of the ruling is political as much as it is judicial. Following Peru's June 7 elections, Navarro and Rubio moved quickly to congratulate conservative candidate Keiko Fujimori on her presidential win. They framed US engagement as a defence of transparent institutions against Chinese state firms dodging local rules. Beijing pushed back hard, with foreign ministry spokesperson Lin Jian dismissing the American statements as defamation.

None of this is coincidental. It traces a direct line back to Washington's national security establishment. Fujimori's campaign advisor in the run-up to the vote was Carlos Díaz-Rosillo, who during the first Trump administration served as White House director of policy and interagency coordination and later as the Pentagon's acting principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, a brief that explicitly covered defence policy for the Western Hemisphere. His move from drafting Washington's regional security doctrine to endorsing Fujimori across major Peruvian media outlets shows how tightly US security interests and Peruvian electoral politics have become intertwined. Navarro mirrored that posture on the ground: his highly visible role during the election cycle drew local criticism for pushing the boundaries of diplomatic neutrality.

Pulling Peru back from Beijing

Since Trump assumed office, Washington's focus on Peru has intensified dramatically, driven by alarm over how deeply intertwined Lima has become with Beijing. China is Peru's uncontested top trading partner, absorbing nearly 30% of Peruvian exports worth over $22bn a year, the vast majority of it copper and other minerals. Chancay was supposed to be the crown jewel cementing that architecture.

To break the alignment, the White House has deployed an aggressive, multi-layered counter-offensive. In January 2026, the Trump administration designated Peru a "Major Non-Nato Ally" (MNNA), a rare status that unlocks privileged access to US military hardware, joint defence research, and security programmes.

Washington backed that diplomatic upgrade with hard cash. The US State Department pushed through an estimated $3.42bn deal to sell F-16 fighter jets to the Peruvian Air Force, a sum roughly equivalent to Peru's entire annual defence budget, to anchor Lima's long-term military reliance on the West. The deal triggered fierce local political gridlock and internal ministerial clashes over funding timelines in April, but Peru ultimately secured its first payments to keep the purchase alive.

Simultaneously, to neutralise China's commercial maritime leverage at Chancay, Washington has shifted focus just north to Callao. The US has cleared equipment packages to modernise the naval base there and is pushing a deal for the US Army Corps of Engineers to build a brand-new main naval headquarters at Callao. Elite military access, fighter jets, and naval infrastructure: Washington is building a military firewall where it lost the economic argument.

A domestic corruption trail

While the geopolitics dominate the headlines, Peru's own state auditor has uncovered something arguably more damaging at home. An audit by the Comptroller General (Contraloría) found that officials at the National Port Authority and the Ministry of Transport and Communications possessed blueprints as early as 2021 showing the port's access tunnel was being built along an unapproved route, yet sat on that information for years while construction continued. The Contraloría has since referred several officials for criminal prosecution.

The bigger blow is a civil liability claim tied to ProInversión, the state investment agency. Auditors found officials fast-tracked a general sales tax (IGV) early-recovery scheme worth PEN527.8mn to Cosco representatives who allegedly lacked the legal authority to sign the contract. That sum, roughly $154mn, is more than a tenth of the port's entire $1.3bn construction cost.

The Contraloría has recommended the case go to Peru's Public Prosecutor's Office for Corruption Offences, naming Cosco itself as civilly responsible. Combined with a prior environmental fine and a failed beach-erosion system, the pattern points to a state regulatory system that repeatedly looked away.

The sovereignty play nobody quite believes

Peru's Constitutional Tribunal will have the final word, and Chancay's regulatory status stays provisional until it rules. Officially, this is a story about sovereignty restored: a turbulent Andean state standing up to a Chinese state giant, backed by a superpower patron cheering from the sidelines.

Read the fine print and the story gets murkier. The same officials now empowered to police Cosco are drawn from the same ministries that sat on tunnel blueprints for years and fast-tracked a $154mn tax break to representatives who, on paper, had no authority to ask for it. Sovereignty, in this telling, was for sale well before Washington decided it needed defending.

Cosco knows the routine. It has watched CK Hutchison run the same play in Panama: fight in the courts, absorb the political theatre, wait for the news cycle to move on. An appeal to the Constitutional Tribunal buys time, and time is the one resource a $1.3bn sunk investment can still spend freely.

What is being restored at Chancay is not so much sovereignty as leverage, and it now sits with whichever government official Cosco, Ositrán or Washington decides to call next. Peru did not choose sides in the US-China contest so much as it discovered, again, that its ports are worth more as chips than as ports.

China’s Global Strategy: Using Port Infrastructure As A Tool Of Power – Analysis

July 3, 2026 
Diálogo Américas
By Julieta Pelcastre

Key Takeaways

Strategic Global Expansion — China has invested ~$24 billion (2000–2025) in 168 ports across nearly 90 countries, creating a network that links trade routes, mining operations, and logistics hubs. In Latin America, ports like Chancay (Peru) are strategically placed near Chinese-backed mining projects, enhancing supply chain control.

Dual-Use Concerns — Beyond commerce, 31% of Chinese-funded ports saw naval activity, rising to 41% at operator-owned facilities. Examples like Nicaragua’s Corinto port (financed then visited by Chinese naval hospital ship) raise questions about intelligence, crisis leverage, and military access.

Sovereignty & Dependence Risks — Heavy reliance on Chinese financing/operation risks ceding control over critical infrastructure. Analysts warn of long-term constraints on national decision-making and recommend diversification, stronger oversight, and regional cooperation to protect sovereignty.

Analysis

China’s global expansion of port infrastructure is widely regarded as part of a broader strategy to expand geopolitical influence, secure access to strategic supply chains, and strengthen its long-term positioning. According to the report, Anchoring Global Ambitions, published by AidData in partnership with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Beijing has spent the last two decades building an extensive network of ports and logistics corridors that increasingly intersect with strategic resources, critical maritime routes, and key infrastructure hubs around the world. Within this network, Latin America is becoming an increasingly important node.

Beyond facilitating trade, these investments may also provide China with greater access to strategic logistics data, increased influence over maritime chokepoints, and expanded operational leverage during periods of crisis or geopolitical tension. Analysts warn that the integration of Chinese companies into the operation, financing, and modernization of critical port infrastructure could increase regional dependence on external actors for the management of key supply chains and trade corridors.


Between 2000 and 2025, China invested some $24 billion in the development and modernization of port infrastructure across 168 ports in nearly 90 countries, according to the AidData report published in March 2026. The initiative includes not only the construction and expansion of terminals, but also more than 360 related projects involving logistics systems, cranes, scanners, and other port technologies supplied by Chinese companies, deepening Beijing’s role in the operation of strategic maritime infrastructure.

Juan Belikow, a political scientist and specialist in security and organized crime at the University of Buenos Aires, Argentina, told Diálogothat China’s port expansion reflects a long-term strategy aimed at establishing interconnected global logistics hubs.

“They are setting up a series of nodes around the world through which international trade will have to pass,” Belikow said, highlighting the concentration of trade flows in these corridors.

Latin America: A strategic hub in China’s logistics network

Latin America has become an area of growing strategic importance with China’s port expansion strategy. According to data from AidData’s CPORTS 2.0 and CFTM 2.0, at least seven ports in the region are located within 500 kilometers of Chinese-financed mining operations. These include ports in Chancay, Peru; Guayaquil, Posorja, and Bolívar in Ecuador; Buenaventura in Colombia; and a port in Guyana.


The proximity between these Chinese-backed ports and extractive projects highlight the growing integration between logistics infrastructure and natural resource supply chains. In Peru, for example, the port of Chancay is located near major mining operations such as Toromocho and Raura, strengthening China’s access to strategic minerals and export corridors critical to global supply chains.

Brazil has also emerged as an important hub within this network. Between 2009 and 2023, the country received some $505 million in Chinese investment related to port infrastructure projects. Analysts warn that this growing footprint has implications that extend beyond commerce, particularly regarding strategic logistic access, supply chain influence, and long-term dependence on infrastructure operated or financed by Chinese entities.

Naval activity and dual-use concerns

Concerns surrounding China’s global port investments are not limited to commercial activity. According to the AidData report, 31.2 percent of Chinese funded port projects worldwide recorded some form of Chinese naval activity between 2000 and 2025, including military ship visits, exercises, and official engagements. The percentage rises to 41.5 percent at port facilities where Chinese operators hold direct ownership stakes, reinforcing concerns among analysts about the dual-use nature of these projects.

One recent example is the Port of Corinto in Nicaragua. In July 2025, Nicaragua approved some $128 million in Chinese financing to modernize the port. Four months later, the Chinese naval hospital Silk Road Ark docked at Corinto, marking the first known visit by a Chinese military vessel to the country.


For analysts, cases like Corinto illustrates how commercial infrastructure projects may also support broader strategic objectives by expanding China’s access, presence, and influence in critical maritime regions.

CSIS warned in its report No Safe Harbor that China’s growing involvement in strategic ports could provide Beijing with access to sensitive logistics information and increase its ability to influence operations at key maritime hubs, particularly during crisis scenarios. The report also notes that Chinese companies operating ports abroad may create opportunities for intelligence collection, logistical support, and expanded strategic access.
Sovereignty and challenges for the region

China’s growing presence in strategic infrastructure is also raising concerns about sovereignty and operational dependence throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.

Investigative outlet Expediente Público warned that increasing reliance on Chinese-operated or Chinese-financed infrastructure could gradually limit countries’ ability to independently manage strategic logistics systems and supply chains. Analysts note that as Chinese companies become more deeply integrated into port operations, governments may face increasing difficulty maintaining full control over critical maritime infrastructure.

Belikow emphasized that ports are not merely commercial facilities, but strategic nodes capable of shaping trade flows and influencing national decision-making. “Ports are bottlenecks of international trade, allowing China not only to expand its presence but also to observe the behavior of other actors at these key points,” Belikow said.

According to Belikow, China’s financing model also reflects a long-term strategic approach that differs significantly from the shorter political and economic cycles often seen in the region. “Our leaders think from now until the next election,” he said. “China does not.”

A strategic response

As China expands its global infrastructure footprint, analysts argue that countries in Latin America will increasingly need to evaluate the long-term strategic implications associated with foreign control or influence over critical logistics infrastructure.

The report Anchoring Global Ambitions recommends that governments strengthen long-term infrastructure planning, diversify financing options through partnerships with trusted allies, and improve coordination mechanism for evaluating strategic investments.

The report also highlights the importance of strengthening regional cooperation to ensure greater oversight and resilience across critical logistics networks.

“Managing these hubs not only allows for influencing trade but also for anticipating trends and guiding decisions,” concluded Belikow, warning that, although these investments may seem attractive in the short term, “they are ceding control.” This process, according to the expert, “becomes entrenched over time and constrains states’ ability to ensure their sovereignty over key infrastructure.”

This article was published by Diálogo Américas

About Diálogo Américas
Diálogo Américas is a professional magazine published by U.S. Southern Command as an international forum for security issues in Latin America.
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MSC Acquires Majority Stake in Ukrainian Terminal Operator

MSC is reported to have acquired a majority position in TIS, the operator Ukraine's Pivdennyi port near Odesa (TIS)

Published Jun 2, 2026 4:10 PM by The Maritime Executive

 

Media reports from Ukraine indicate that MSC Mediterranean Shipping Company has acquired a controlling stake (51 percent) in Ukrainian terminal operator TIS Group. Local industry executives are excited by the prospect of MSC’s investment, noting it would be the first time a major carrier has invested in Ukraine and that it will help to raise the operating standards in the country.

MSC Group is reported to have purchased the shares of TIS Group, replacing an earlier 51 percent investment by DP World. The Dubai-based company had, in March, sold its shares to the founders of TIS Group and exited Ukraine. The speculation was that the move was prompted by a deal between DP World and Russia’s Rosatom to develop shipping along Russia’s Northern Sea Route with FESCO. As part of the deal, TIS also regained control of the towing business, which had been operated as P&O Maritime Ukraine.

TIS (Transinvetservice) is reported to be the largest private terminal operator in Ukraine. It was founded in 1994, and before the war, the TIS terminal operation at Pivdennyi, the southern port in the Greater Odesa complex, handled over 30 million tons of cargo annually. It is reported to have accounted for 20 percent of the total cargo volume in Ukraine and to be the second-largest terminal in the Black Sea.

The port was purpose-built and is reported to have the deepest container terminal in Ukraine. It has specialized facilities for grain, bulk, and project cargo alongside containers and direct road and rail connections linking it to inland centers.

The acquisition of the shares by MSC would be subject to regulatory approval, as MSC also holds a large position in Germany’s HHLA, which owns a container terminal in Odesa. Experts note that, in addition to linking the two terminals, the deal also provides access to MSC’s network, including terminals in Treiste and Tallinn.

The move is the latest by MSC as it works to build out its terminal and logistics operations. Last year, it acquired a 50 percent interest in an intermodal logistics operator in Ukraine and a 25 percent interest in a cross-border terminal. Elsewhere in Europe, it has also been making terminal acquisitions, and it, of course, is the bidder behind the stalled deal to acquire CK Hutchison’s global network of terminals.

 

China’s COSCO JV with PTP Approved to Redevelop Spain’s Tarragona Port

The approved plan calls for a 50-year concession for the development of a large new multipurpose terminal (Port Authority of Tarragona)

Published Jun 1, 2026 8:05 PM by The Maritime Executive

 

A newly formed joint venture between divisions of China COSCO and a Spanish company, PTP, was approved for a new concession and redevelopment of the Spanish Port of Tarragona. The deal, which includes a 50-year concession for port operations, comes as there is increasing scrutiny on Chinese efforts to expand global port operations.

Under the terms that were approved by the board of the Port Authority of Tarragona, the new JV will invest €116 million ($135 million) to redevelop the port, including a massive new terminal. The port authority justifies the 50-year concession, highlighting that the financial investment is far larger than envisioned in the plans for the port. 

COSCO Shipping Ports and COSCO Bulk will form a company to hold 51 percent of the JV. The remaining 49 percent will be held by PTP Iberica, a Spanish subsidiary of the Argentine PTP Group. The awarding of the concession still requires the formation of the new operating company and the formalization of contracts following Spanish legislation.

The Port Authority says the plan will help the Port of Tarragona, which is located on the Mediterranean in northern Spain near Barcelona, to consolidate its strategic position. They predict that the port will develop as a regional logistics center in the Mediterranean, connected to both main international maritime routes, the Iberian Peninsula, and Europe’s inland centers.

“Not only are we recovering the container and expanding the general cargo and the movement of vehicles, but we will become one of the reference gateways in the Mediterranean for both traffic coming from China and the Far East and Latin America,” predicted the president of Port Tarragona, Santiago J. Castellà. He called the agreement “a historic moment for the Port.”

The concession includes over 510,000 square meters of area, which is the entire space available for the concession plus another 58,000 square meters belonging to the La Boella railway terminal. The plan calls for the development of a multipurpose terminal to handle containers, general merchandise, vehicles, and cold chain logistics, as well as auxiliary facilities and a maneuvering area.

The maximum capacity is estimated at 680,000 TEU equivalents, including both containers and general cargo. According to the business plan, they will grow traffic between 2027 and 2033 with a commitment to a minimum of 360,000 TEU equivalents starting in 2031. The majority must be containers with a minimum of 200,000 TEU annually, and the additional volume will come from general cargo. 

Some political questions have been raised in Spain about awarding a long-term concession to a Chinese state company, but so far, it has not faced major opposition. This, however, comes as the sale of CK Hutchison’s global port terminal operations remains in question and political challenges continue in Panama. China’s development of the large Port of Chancay in Peru. COSCO is reported to have invested $1.3 billion in the port’s development, which was seen as a foothold in South America. It has created legal and political controversy in Peru, while the Trump administration continues to challenge China’s growing influence in global ports and port infrastructure, such as its dominance in large cargo cranes.

D.E.I.

Panama Canal Names First Female Administrator as Challenges Grow

Panama Canal is seeing a surge in volumes as tankers rush to the wateway after leaving the Middle East (ACP)

Published May 21, 2026 7:36 PM by The Maritime Executive

The President of Panama, Jose Mulino, announced on Thursday the decision of the Board of Directors of the Panama Canal Authority to appoint its first-ever female administrator for the vital waterway. An engineer and the current deputy administrator, Ilya Espino de Marotta, will officially assume the leadership position on October 1, taking the reins at a critical time as the operation is seeing increased traffic and potential impacts from a brewing El Niño weather pattern and the lingering pressure from the United States after Donald Trump asserted that China was controlling the operations.

A marine engineer, a graduate of Texas A&M University, with a master's degree in Economic Engineering from Santa María La Antigua University and executive training from INCAE and the Kellogg School of Management, Espino de Marotta, the authority highlights, was selected after a national international search, consultation, and evaluation process. It notes she has over 40 years of experience and is a 35-year veteran at the Panama Canal, having overseen major projects, including the expansion programs.

Espino de Marotta takes over as volume at the Panama Canal is increasing. The industry trade group BIMCO highlights that the disruptions in the Middle East and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz are contributing to the Panama Canal’s volumes. With oil and gas prices increasing, U.S. exports are growing, and Asia is seeking to make up the shortfall through U.S. imports.

BIMCO highlights an eight percent year over year increase in daily transits at the Panama Canal, with a current daily average of 38 vessels driven by the tanker sector. In the past five weeks, BIMCO reports there has been a 16 percent year-over-year increase in traffic at the Panama Canal.

 

(BIMCO - Clarksons data)

 

“The daily maximum capacity of the Panama Canal is around 36 to 40 transits, meaning it is currently operating close to maximum capacity,” says Filipe Gouveia, Shipping Analysis Manager at BIMCO. “The recent spike in demand has inflated auction prices and caused a 50 percent year-over-year increase in waiting times, now sitting at a 47-hour average.”

The Panama Canal Authority’s online dashboard shows a total of 83 booked vessels and 10 non-booked vessels waiting as of May 21. It says the average wait for non-booked vessels is 3.9 days northbound and 8 days southbound.

The surge in volume has also sent prices skyrocketing for the slots the AMP auctions off to vessels without bookings. Earlier in the month, brokers reported a record $4 million price paid at auction for a slot, while the average is running around $400,000, up nearly three times from the average before the war started in the Middle East.
 
BIMCO highlights that container vessels, LPG, oil tankers, and bulkers make up approximately three-quarters of the transits. The rise in energy shipments, it notes, adds to the strain as many of these vessels operate in the spot market without schedules that permit advance reservations. 

“Looking ahead, demand for Panama Canal transits could stay high for as long as disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz persist and U.S. energy exports stay strong. In the short term, congestion and waiting times could remain high and increase further in the medium term,” reports BIMCO. 

The first challenge will come in June. Beginning at midnight on June 9, the canal will begin a dry maintenance process for the east lane at Gatun Lock, and it is scheduled to run through June 17. During that time, booking slots will be cut to just 16 vessels, with the authority warning that lockage will take additional time as the vessels share the westbound lane. It will be offering 10 fewer slots than normal during the maintenance period.

Also looming and expected to start this month or next is the weather phenomenon known as El Niño, which is likely to reduce rainfall on the isthmus. The authority highlights that it is better prepared than in the 2023-2024 season, when the lack of water forced it to cut transits to 22 vessels and reduce the maximum draught.

It reports monitoring began in late 2025 and that it has kept water levels at historically high levels in Gatun Lake, which serves as the main reservoir of the operations. They also point to an unusually wet season, which helped strengthen water reserves in the lakes, while they have also maintained water-saving measures at the locks. Currently, they do not anticipate being forced to renew restrictions in 2026, but the situation requires careful monitoring and management.

Longer-term, Espino de Marotta is likely to face renewed pressures from the Trump administration, which has also demanded free passage for U.S. government ships. The authority is also planning the development of two new port terminals, one at each end of the canal, with the tender expected in the coming months. It was announced to address U.S. concerns before Panama’s courts canceled the concession of CK Hutchison. The country remains locked in a brewing legal battle or arbitration with the Hong Kong company, while it also plans to tender for new concessions to operate the two existing terminals.

The Panama Canal Authority has announced other expansion plans, including a natural gas pipeline and improvements to the logistics corridor. It also has a long-term program to improve its reservoir system and water management.

 

China Fines MSC, CMA CGM, and Hapag, and Warns on Freight Rate Violations

China says it found violations during inspections at three container ports (Qingdao file photo)

Published May 14, 2026 3:50 PM by The Maritime Executive

China’s Ministry of Transport announced it has issued fines against a total of nine international container shipping lines, as well as seven of its domestic non-vessel operation common carriers (NVOCC) for what it terms freight rate violations. The Ministry said carriers and NVOCCs should see this as a warning to improve their systems.

Among the carriers being targeted as industry leaders are MSC Mediterranean Shipping Company, CMA CGM Group, Hapag-Lloyd, Ocean Network Express, and Evergreen Karine. Also listed for the violations were smaller carriers, including Wan Hai Lines, SM Line, Emirates Shipping, and TS Lines, and the seven NVOCCs.

The Ministry reported that it conducted inspections at the ports of Guangzhou, Qingdao, and Ningbo in August, September, and November 2025. It reports it was focusing on the implementation of freight rate filings by the companies.

“It said the companies cited were found to "have violated regulations, including failing to complete freight rate filing procedures or having discrepancies between the actual freight rates and the filed prices.”

It reported that the companies were penalized. The Ministry conducted “serious talks” while imposing administrative penalties. 

The Ministry is also demanding that the companies “improve their freight rate filing systems, ensure accountability, and earnestly fulfill their freight rate filing obligations.”

Calling this a warning, the Ministry said it will intensify its inspections. It said it would be reviewing compliance with freight rate filing regulations and correcting any violations in accordance with the law.

This latest effort came after the Ministry in March reported it had summoned both Maserk and MSC Mediterranean Shipping Company to talks.  It was widely believed it was a dressing down of the companies after each agreed to have the terminal operators assume one of the port operations at the Panama Canal. The Financial Times reported that Chinese officials privately demanded that the companies relinquish the operations of the terminals that had been seized from CK Hutchison by Panama’s government. CK Hutchison had also said it would invoke an arbitration against Maersk’s APM Terminals.

China Fines MSC, CMA CGM, and Hapag, and Warns on Freight Rate Violations

China says it found violations during inspections at three container ports (Qingdao file photo)

Published May 14, 2026 3:50 PM by The Maritime Executive

China’s Ministry of Transport announced it has issued fines against a total of nine international container shipping lines, as well as seven of its domestic non-vessel operation common carriers (NVOCC) for what it terms freight rate violations. The Ministry said carriers and NVOCCs should see this as a warning to improve their systems.

Among the carriers being targeted as industry leaders are MSC Mediterranean Shipping Company, CMA CGM Group, Hapag-Lloyd, Ocean Network Express, and Evergreen Karine. Also listed for the violations were smaller carriers, including Wan Hai Lines, SM Line, Emirates Shipping, and TS Lines, and the seven NVOCCs.

The Ministry reported that it conducted inspections at the ports of Guangzhou, Qingdao, and Ningbo in August, September, and November 2025. It reports it was focusing on the implementation of freight rate filings by the companies.

“It said the companies cited were found to "have violated regulations, including failing to complete freight rate filing procedures or having discrepancies between the actual freight rates and the filed prices.”

It reported that the companies were penalized. The Ministry conducted “serious talks” while imposing administrative penalties. 

The Ministry is also demanding that the companies “improve their freight rate filing systems, ensure accountability, and earnestly fulfill their freight rate filing obligations.”

Calling this a warning, the Ministry said it will intensify its inspections. It said it would be reviewing compliance with freight rate filing regulations and correcting any violations in accordance with the law.

This latest effort came after the Ministry in March reported it had summoned both Maserk and MSC Mediterranean Shipping Company to talks.  It was widely believed it was a dressing down of the companies after each agreed to have the terminal operators assume one of the port operations at the Panama Canal. The Financial Times reported that Chinese officials privately demanded that the companies relinquish the operations of the terminals that had been seized from CK Hutchison by Panama’s government. CK Hutchison had also said it would invoke an arbitration against Maersk’s APM Terminals.

 

Iran war shows dramatic decline of US imperialism

By Dave Holmes

Published 12 May, 2026

First published at Arguing for Socialism.

Notwithstanding all the death and destruction meted out by the US-Israeli aggressors, they have failed to achieve any sort of victory over Iran. On the contrary, Iran seems to be in a stronger overall position.

Despite the unpopularity of the regime, public support for defending their country against the US has grown stronger within Iran. This is shown by the large and repeated public demonstrations within the country and the willingness of large numbers of people to turn out to protect vital infrastructure with their bodies.

Iran prepared in advance for the expected US-Israeli onslaught. There was a big decentralisation of the military command and military assets across the vast country. Missiles, drones and attack boats are kept in deep underground facilities under granite mountains, impervious to Washington’s vaunted bunker-buster bombs.

Before the war Iran placed a large order with China for decoys — high quality inflatable replicas of missiles, tanks etc., some even with their own heat sources to register on US-Israeli surveillance. We can assume that a lot of the devastation fell on these fakes. In the cities, government buildings were emptied of personnel.

Early in the conflict Iran wiped out all the critical US radars in the Gulf region and Jordan. Iran has also destroyed several US AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) aircraft which play the same role. These radars were also a key part Israel’s early warning system. They will probably never be replaced. (Apart from their cost and complexity they use large amounts of rare earth elements for which China will be highly unlikely to grant export licences.)

Iran has also wiped out US bases in the Gulf states, rendering them literally uninhabitable. (The barracks were not even hardened; they had no bunkers for the troops to flee to.)

Iran has also attacked data centres established by the big US tech companies in the Gulf states.

The Gulf state rulers must surely be wondering just what their “alliance” with the US is worth. It couldn’t defend them and has actually made them a target of Iran.

Iranian missiles and drones have also pounded Israel, targeting military and security centres, industrial facilities and infrastructure. For instance, Ben Gurion airport, the country’s main link with the world, is effectively closed due to repeated attacks. There has been widespread damage across the country but there is complete censorship in Israel and the pro-Israel western corporate media has imposed its own blackout on the topic.

Hezbollah resurgent

In late 2024 the militant Lebanese Shia organisation Hezbollah was dealt some very heavy blows by Israel. The attack by exploding pagers killed and maimed a large layer of its military and political leadership. Then its charismatic leader Hassan Nasrallah was killed in a targeted assassination. A very pro-US government was installed with the avowed aim of disarming Hezbollah.

But the organisation has clearly successfully reorganised and rebuilt itself. It has re-established tight internal security. It has stopped using electronic communications and has gone back to couriered messages. Going dark in this way means Israel’s vaunted surveillance technology is largely neutralised.

Hezbollah has clearly preserved and/or rebuilt its drone and missile arsenal and is dealing lethal blows to Israeli forces, both in Lebanon and in Israel itself. Despite deploying five divisions and up to 100,000 troops, the IDF has made only very modest progress in Lebanon and suffered high casualties. Over 100 of its vaunted Merkava main battle tanks have been damaged or destroyed by Hezbollah IEDs, anti-tank missiles and drones. (I was astonished to see images of columns of IDF tanks wending their way along narrow roads in the hills of southern Lebanon — no anti-drone cages, sitting ducks for ATGMs and drones which duly took them out in large numbers.)

Revolution in military technique

The wars in Iran and Lebanon are a very clear demonstration of the revolution in military technique that has taken place over the last few years, driven by the war in Ukraine. Drones and hypersonic missiles now dominate the battlefield. Moreover, the development of cheap precision guidance coupled with satellite intelligence gives missile strikes stunning accuracy.

Both Iran and Hezbollah have obviously intensely studied the lessons of Ukraine. There drones have revolutionised the battlefield. They dominate a zone 10-30 kilometres on either side of the line of contact. Within this zone any vehicle (truck, tank, artillery piece) or individual soldier is at risk of being hit by a drone. Attacks are now made by small groups of soldiers infiltrating or moving rapidly on motorcycles. Drones are also deployed in swarms to overwhelm defences.

What this means is that big expensive hardware items like tanks, artillery units, aircraft carriers and other naval ships which once dominated the battlefield are now extremely vulnerable. Iranian missile attacks have forced US carriers to retreat well out of range. That means their aircraft can’t attack Iran without refueling support, which is itself very vulnerable.

Not only does Iran have an arsenal of thousands (possibly tens of thousands) of drones but it has a vast and varied stockpile of missiles, especially hypersonic manoeuverable ones. Against Israel it has also deployed missiles with cluster warheads, that is, high up in its trajectory the missile releases dozens of smaller bombs which cannot be intercepted and cause damage over a wide area.

Rise of US imperialism

US imperialism erupted onto the world stage with the 1898 Spanish-American war; its easy victory over Spain gave the United States a number of first-class strategic assets.

In the Caribbean, it annexed Puerto Rico; and, pushing aside the indigenous liberation forces, it established a harsh protectorate over Cuba. In the Pacific, Washington grabbed the Philippines — again pushing aside and then brutally crushing the native independence movement — and annexed Guam giving it a vital staging post on the way to the Far East.

Some years before this, US adventurers had overthrown the Hawaiian monarchy; in 1898 the US formally annexed the islands, thus completing its strategic corridor to China and the Far East.

In 1903, Washington engineered a revolt in Panama, separating the country from Colombia, and embarked on the construction of the strategically and economically vital Panama Canal (completed in 1914).

Long US decline

The high point for US imperialism was 1946. Washington was the big victor in World War II. Its territory and economy had not been devastated and it had a monopoly of nuclear weapons. However, since then, despite the appearance of omnipotence, there has actually been a long slow decline in its relative position.

The Soviet Union broke the US atomic monopoly in 1949 with its first atomic test; in 1955 it tested its first hydrogen bomb.

For some time the US not only had nuclear weapons but also had a monopoly on the means of delivering them. But possession of nuclear weapons doesn’t automatically solve anything: They can only be used in certain political conditions.

Even in 1950-53, the Korean War showed the limits of US power. The US was fought to a stalemate by China and North Korea. Macarthur, the US commander, wanted to drive north into China, which would probably have touched off World War III. Truman sacked him in 1951. Washington also considered but rejected using nuclear weapons. Several million died in the war and the North was utterly devastated but US imperialism had been fought to a standstill.

The Vietnam War (1955-75) again showed the limits of US power. Despite killing millions of Vietnamese and devastating large parts of the country and its ecology, Washington was defeated. The indomitable Vietnamese resistance combined with the growth of a powerful antiwar movement in the United States itself saw off the aggressors. (Estimates of all military and non-military deaths range from 1.35 million to over 3.8 million. 58,000 US soldiers died plus many thousands more died by suicide afterwards.)

The 2003 Iraq War is yet another case in point. The US had a nominal victory but overall the conflict was a political disaster. Today, Iran has great influence in the country and the government has long been calling for US forces to leave.

The 2001-21 Afghanistan War was also a political disaster. The US invasion overthrew the Taliban regime and installed a puppet government; 20 years later the US fled the scene and the Taliban were back in power.

Trump’s plan

Despite the madness of Trump, he actually does have a plan to deal with the US decline. His tariffs are supposed to induce businesses to transfer operations to the US and reverse decades of offshoring of production. But it’s not that simple. The US doesn’t have the workers and labour costs are too high. And so many of the production inputs are themselves imported.

Furthermore, key elements of his broader program cut across re-shoring US production. Trump’s attacks on the universities, science and migrants are driving away much-needed talent. US industry has been restructured for so long: offshoring, just-in-time inventory, etc. can’t be reversed.

Then there is the obvious weakness of the vaunted US military machine, for all its undoubted lethality. As we have mentioned, the mighty but extremely expensive US aircraft carriers are also hugely vulnerable to missile and drone attacks. The Ukraine war has shown that US military equipment is hugely costly and often too complicated to maintain in battlefield conditions. (A prime example is the M1 Abrams tank. Costing in excess of $10 million USD, with its gas turbine engine it is prone to mechanical breakdown plus it is vulnerable to cheap drones. It has not fared well on the rough and often muddy Ukrainian battlefield.)

Competition with China

Right from the start, Trumpism has been dominated by the drive to reassert US primacy against China. Trump hit China with extremely punitive tariffs but he has been forced to back off.

China has one tremendously powerful counter to Trump’s attempt to attack its economy, namely its current near monopoly of the production of rare earth elements (REE). These 17 elements are actually not rare at all but, as Wikipedia explains, are in fact “relatively plentiful in the entire Earth's crust ... but in practice they are spread thinly as trace impurities, so to obtain rare earths at usable purity requires processing enormous amounts of raw ore which is costly and energy intensive.” REE are also often associated with thorium, so refining them can involve radioactive contamination, further complicating the whole process.

Rare earth elements are vital in electronics, lasers, advanced magnets and various industrial processes. They are thus vital to US production of radars, missiles and other essential military equipment.

China controls some 90% of global demand for rare earth minerals. And it has placed severe restrictions on what is exported and to which countries. The US and its allies are furiously trying to develop alternative sources of REE but, at the very least, this will take some time. Meanwhile, the US military may well take a big hit, being simply unable to produce some key items.

Battle over ports

Washington is trying to push China out of Latin America and the Caribbean. The Panama Canal has emerged as the latest site of this intense economic war. According to one report:

In January 2026 the Panama Supreme Court effectively ended Chinese-linked control over critical ports at both ends of the Panama Canal. While the canal itself is operated by the Panama Canal Authority (an agency of the Panamanian government), the court ruling annulled 25-year contracts held by CK Hutchison Holdings, a Hong Kong-based company that had operated the key container terminals of Balboa and Cristóbal since the 1990s.

China’s response was not long in coming. CK Hutchison has taken Panama to international arbitration. And China has sharply increased its detention of Panama-flagged ships in Chinese ports. Chinese state-owned shipping giant Cosco announced in early March that it was suspending all services at the Port of Balboa, at the Pacific end of the Panama Canal.

Now Peru is emerging as another key site of the struggle over maritime trade. As CNBC reports:

China has ramped up investment in strategic infrastructure across Latin America, including a major deep-water port in Peru. The Port of Chancay, operated and majority owned by state-owned Cosco, is expected to cut shipping times by about half …

China dominates the world’s shipbuilding orderbooks with nearly two-thirds of global orders flowing to Chinese yards in 2025 …

Meanwhile, around 40% of U.S. container traffic travels through the Panama Canal every year, which in all, moves roughly $270 billion in cargo annually.

Any expansion of Beijing’s maritime dominance, therefore, could put the U.S. and its allies at risk of the same dependency they face with critical minerals and rare earths …

Chancay is designed to link by rail with a Brazilian port on the Atlantic coast, dramatically shortening transit times for goods shipping to China.

Is the US heading toward a shooting war with China? On a purely military level this would be a very bad idea. For many years the US has been wargaming an all-out non-nuclear conflict with China and invariably loses or takes crippling losses.

China is undoubtedly a very keen observer of the US military’s difficulties in the Iran war. If the US has failed in a war against Iran it would seem to have absolutely no hope in a non-nuclear contest with vastly more powerful China.

Where is it all heading?

US imperialism and its power-mad ruling class will never be reconciled to its decline. It will continue to attempt to use its military muscle and standover tactics to compensate for its declining economic power.

Many commentators are hailing the development of a “multipolar” world. Factually, the US is no longer the sole superpower; its writ is no longer unchallenged. So there are already multiple centres (poles) of power. But the idea of a stable multipolar capitalist world, let alone as an objective to be striven for, is ridiculous. Ferocious competition is inherent in capitalism — both between the giant monopolies and between the states which protect them. Is a multipolar capitalist world better than a unipolar one? It will be different, that is all.

Whatever the geopolitical system, capitalism everywhere is based on the exploitation of wage labour and the siphoning of wealth from the Third World (the Global South).

All the things that have maintained a relative social and political stability in the world in the post-World War II period are fast eroding or being destroyed. Capitalism can offer nothing to the mass of the world’s people. Climate change is rushing toward us at breakneck speed and very little is being done to either avert or prepare for it. The only hope for humanity is a socialist world. Can we get there? This is the challenge of our time.