Masrour Barzani visits Turkey, to meet Recep Tayyip Erdogan
Posted on April 15, 2022
Masrour Barzani (L) Iraqi Kurdistan prime minister shakes hands with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Ankara, Turkey, November 28, 2019. Photo: Turkish presidency/KRG/Twitter
ISTANBUL,— The prime minister of the Kurdish administration in Iraqi Kurdistan Masrour Barzani arrived in Istanbul, Turkey on Friday and is scheduled to meet with Turkey’s president Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
During the visit, the premier of so-called Kurdistan Regional Government KRG, Masrour Barzani, is expected to discuss strengthening bilateral ties as well as the recent developments in Iraq and the region, according to a statement from Barzani office.
According to analysts the talks will be focused on the plans to export natural gas from Iraqi Kurdistan region to Europe.
On March 13, Iranian forces launched 12 ballistic missiles at the Iraqi Kurdish capital of Erbil, claiming the attack was in response for an Israeli military attack in Syria that killed Iranian military personnel. Most of the missiles were fired at a villa owned by Sheikh Baz Karim Barzanji, the CEO of a major domestic energy company called KAR Group which close to the Barzanis.
According to Iraqi, Turkish, and Western sources, the strike was launched in response to plans to export Kurdistan natural gas to Turkey and Europe.
The Iraqi Kurdistan-ruling Barzani family have close business, economic, and energy ties with the Turkish government, which is an important oil, economic and political partner of Kurdistan Democratic Party KDP. Turkey’s pipelines transport most of the crude oil produced in Iraqi Kurdistan.
Masrour Barzani said on March 29, 2022, that Kurdistan has the capacity to make up for at least some of the energy shortfall in Europe – and that oil and gas development in Kurdistan might not be in the interest of major regional energy producer Iran.
On February 22, Iraq’s Supreme court deemed an oil and gas law regulating the oil industry in Iraqi Kurdistan unconstitutional and demanded that Kurdish authorities hand over their crude supplies. Despite the court verdict, KRG premier Masrour Barzani, who seems to defy the ruling, stated his administration remains committed to its oil and gas contracts.
The Barzani-dominated KRG has no authority in areas which is controlled by Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, where the most gas fields are located. The KDP is not even sharing oil revenues with the PUK, according to critics.
In February 2022, Turkey’s president Recep Tayyip Erdogan met with the president of Iraqi Kurdistan Nechirvan Barzani in Ankara where they discussed a possible natural gas pipeline and gas supply agreement between Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan.
Masrour Barzani’s last official visit to Turkey was in November 28, 2019.
Iraqi Kurdistan is not a unified region; it is divided politically and geographically into the Yellow and Green zones, which are led by the KDP’s Massoud Barzani and the PUK’s Talabani family. The Barzanis govern Erbil and Duhok, while the Talabanis govern Sulaimani.
AND OCALAN'S PKK FIGHT TURKEY'S DOMINANCE OF KURDISTAN
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This is a developing story…
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The U.S. must stand up to Barzani blackmail in Iraq
Posted on April 14, 2022 by Editorial Staff
Tribal leader and the head of KDP party Massoud Barzani (R) along his son Masrour (L), Duhok, Iraqi Kurdistan, 2018.
Tribal leader and the head of KDP party Massoud Barzani (R) along his son Masrour (L), Duhok, Iraqi Kurdistan, 2018.
Photo Michael Rubin | The National Interest
For almost twenty years, the U.S. State Department has allowed its fear of Barzani’s intransigence to shape American policy in Iraq.
On May 12, 2018, Iraqis went to the polls to elect a new government. Then, as now, political maneuvering consumed months as Iraqis sought first to select a speaker, then a president, and finally a prime minister. Behind the scenes, individuals and party leaders engaged in political horse-trading and brinkmanship, while diplomats from Washington and Tehran sought to ensure that candidates more sympathetic to their interests, if not worldview, found their way into top positions.
During the struggle to form a new government in 2018, Brett McGurk was the U.S. special envoy to counter the Islamic State. But, by dint of his experience in Iraq and personal relationships with Iraqi politicians across the political spectrum, President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo relied on him to shape U.S. Iraq policy. While the Americans, Europeans, Arabs, and Iranians all largely agreed that Barham Salih was the most capable and politically moderate candidate, McGurk urged Iraqi politicians to choose Fuad Hussein, chief of staff to Kurdistan Democratic Party leader Massoud Barzani.
Fuad’s achievements were negligible, and Iraqis perceived his capabilities as lackluster. According to Iraqis present in the meetings, McGurk’s reasoning was that picking anyone besides Barzani’s man would lead Barzani to undermine the broader Iraqi system. This was no idle concern; the year before, Barzani, his uncle, Hoshyar Zebari, and his son Masrour had held an independence referendum across both Iraqi Kurdistan and disputed territories claimed by both Baghdad and Erbil.
For almost twenty years, the U.S. State Department has allowed its fear of Barzani’s intransigence to shape American policy in Iraq.
On May 12, 2018, Iraqis went to the polls to elect a new government. Then, as now, political maneuvering consumed months as Iraqis sought first to select a speaker, then a president, and finally a prime minister. Behind the scenes, individuals and party leaders engaged in political horse-trading and brinkmanship, while diplomats from Washington and Tehran sought to ensure that candidates more sympathetic to their interests, if not worldview, found their way into top positions.
During the struggle to form a new government in 2018, Brett McGurk was the U.S. special envoy to counter the Islamic State. But, by dint of his experience in Iraq and personal relationships with Iraqi politicians across the political spectrum, President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo relied on him to shape U.S. Iraq policy. While the Americans, Europeans, Arabs, and Iranians all largely agreed that Barham Salih was the most capable and politically moderate candidate, McGurk urged Iraqi politicians to choose Fuad Hussein, chief of staff to Kurdistan Democratic Party leader Massoud Barzani.
Fuad’s achievements were negligible, and Iraqis perceived his capabilities as lackluster. According to Iraqis present in the meetings, McGurk’s reasoning was that picking anyone besides Barzani’s man would lead Barzani to undermine the broader Iraqi system. This was no idle concern; the year before, Barzani, his uncle, Hoshyar Zebari, and his son Masrour had held an independence referendum across both Iraqi Kurdistan and disputed territories claimed by both Baghdad and Erbil.
US Secretary of State Michael Pompeo (R) shakes hands with Massoud Barzani leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan, on January 9, 2019. Photo: Public Domain/US Secretary of State
For almost twenty years, the State Department has allowed its fear of Barzani’s intransigence to shape American policy in Iraq. In the era of the Coalition Provisional Authority, some current and former U.S. government officials used their contacts in the State Department or Pentagon to run interference for the Barzanis while simultaneously pursuing their own personal business interests. Many other diplomats and military officers—a notable exception being David Petraeus, the commander of the 101st Airborne at the time—would undermine or soft-pedal efforts to instill democracy or punish corruption for fear of upsetting Barzani.
While other Iraqi political leaders would meet high-profile American leaders in Baghdad, Barzani demanded they visit him at his cliff-top palace complex outside of Erbil. The fact that many did allowed Barzani to depict Americans as supplicants. Ironically, assuaging Barzani in this way only increased his ego and sense of entitlement.
This deference to Barzani did not serve U.S. interests. Russian firms benefited disproportionately from Kurdish oil, and both Massoud and Nechirvan Barzani leaked word of impending operations to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Masrour Barzani—the regional government’s current prime minister—is best known among U.S. intelligence authorities for pestering them on citizenship issues for family members and requests for other inappropriate personal favors.
Nor has this deference brought regional stability. Nearly two decades after Saddam’s fall, Iraq needs talent. Barzani’s nepotism—and U.S. deference to it—undercuts recognition of that talent by signaling that only the Barzanis are capable. This is one of the reasons why, in November 2021, so many Iraqi Kurds traveled to Belarus—many dying en route—in order to try to cross into Poland. Likewise, those who drowned in the English Channel last November were not refugees fleeing war, but rather Iraqi Kurds seeking to escape the Barzanis’ regime of corruption. It is quite telling when supporters of Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, whose followers often engage in corruption, criticize Sadr for the unseemliness of a political alliance with a family as corrupt as the Barzanis.
Brett McGurk, Baghdad, Iraq, June 7, 2017. Photo: Reuters
To look at the problem from the opposite perspective, it is clear that a willingness to stand up to the Barzanis at any point from 2003 to the present would have very likely bolstered Iraq’s stability. There are legitimate reasons to criticize Barham Salih—the people of Sulaimani, his hometown, are not shy about doing so—but the United States is lucky that McGurk’s maneuvering failed in 2018. There is simply no way Fuad Hussein could have navigated Iraq through the crisis of nationwide protests, the aftermath of Qassem Suleimani’s assassination, and the COVID-19 pandemic. Nor would he have been able to advance Iraq on the world stage in the way that Barham did. Moreover, Barzani proxies would have been unable to act and be accepted as an honest broker by Iraq’s various sectarian, ethnic, and political constituencies, let alone Washington, Tehran, Abu Dhabi, and Ankara.
As McGurk, newly-confirmed ambassador to Iraq Alina Rominowski, and others in the White House, State Department, Pentagon, and CIA work to help Iraq secure itself and set itself on a trajectory for economic stability, it is essential that they stop allowing fear of Barzani intransigence undermine U.S. interests and Iraq’s future. It is time to call Barzani’s bluff and allow him to retire into the dustbin of history where he belongs.
Michael Rubin is a former Pentagon official whose major research areas are the Middle East, Turkey, Iran and diplomacy. He is author of “Dancing with the Devil: The Perils of Engaging Rogue Regimes” (Encounter, 2014). He is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute AEI. His major research area is the Middle East, with special focus on Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Kurdish society. Read more by Michael Rubin.
The article first published at The National Interest.
Copyright © 2022, respective author or news agency, nationalinterest.org
For almost twenty years, the State Department has allowed its fear of Barzani’s intransigence to shape American policy in Iraq. In the era of the Coalition Provisional Authority, some current and former U.S. government officials used their contacts in the State Department or Pentagon to run interference for the Barzanis while simultaneously pursuing their own personal business interests. Many other diplomats and military officers—a notable exception being David Petraeus, the commander of the 101st Airborne at the time—would undermine or soft-pedal efforts to instill democracy or punish corruption for fear of upsetting Barzani.
While other Iraqi political leaders would meet high-profile American leaders in Baghdad, Barzani demanded they visit him at his cliff-top palace complex outside of Erbil. The fact that many did allowed Barzani to depict Americans as supplicants. Ironically, assuaging Barzani in this way only increased his ego and sense of entitlement.
This deference to Barzani did not serve U.S. interests. Russian firms benefited disproportionately from Kurdish oil, and both Massoud and Nechirvan Barzani leaked word of impending operations to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Masrour Barzani—the regional government’s current prime minister—is best known among U.S. intelligence authorities for pestering them on citizenship issues for family members and requests for other inappropriate personal favors.
Nor has this deference brought regional stability. Nearly two decades after Saddam’s fall, Iraq needs talent. Barzani’s nepotism—and U.S. deference to it—undercuts recognition of that talent by signaling that only the Barzanis are capable. This is one of the reasons why, in November 2021, so many Iraqi Kurds traveled to Belarus—many dying en route—in order to try to cross into Poland. Likewise, those who drowned in the English Channel last November were not refugees fleeing war, but rather Iraqi Kurds seeking to escape the Barzanis’ regime of corruption. It is quite telling when supporters of Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, whose followers often engage in corruption, criticize Sadr for the unseemliness of a political alliance with a family as corrupt as the Barzanis.
Brett McGurk, Baghdad, Iraq, June 7, 2017. Photo: Reuters
To look at the problem from the opposite perspective, it is clear that a willingness to stand up to the Barzanis at any point from 2003 to the present would have very likely bolstered Iraq’s stability. There are legitimate reasons to criticize Barham Salih—the people of Sulaimani, his hometown, are not shy about doing so—but the United States is lucky that McGurk’s maneuvering failed in 2018. There is simply no way Fuad Hussein could have navigated Iraq through the crisis of nationwide protests, the aftermath of Qassem Suleimani’s assassination, and the COVID-19 pandemic. Nor would he have been able to advance Iraq on the world stage in the way that Barham did. Moreover, Barzani proxies would have been unable to act and be accepted as an honest broker by Iraq’s various sectarian, ethnic, and political constituencies, let alone Washington, Tehran, Abu Dhabi, and Ankara.
As McGurk, newly-confirmed ambassador to Iraq Alina Rominowski, and others in the White House, State Department, Pentagon, and CIA work to help Iraq secure itself and set itself on a trajectory for economic stability, it is essential that they stop allowing fear of Barzani intransigence undermine U.S. interests and Iraq’s future. It is time to call Barzani’s bluff and allow him to retire into the dustbin of history where he belongs.
Michael Rubin is a former Pentagon official whose major research areas are the Middle East, Turkey, Iran and diplomacy. He is author of “Dancing with the Devil: The Perils of Engaging Rogue Regimes” (Encounter, 2014). He is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute AEI. His major research area is the Middle East, with special focus on Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Kurdish society. Read more by Michael Rubin.
The article first published at The National Interest.
Copyright © 2022, respective author or news agency, nationalinterest.org
