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Sunday, April 13, 2025

Most Hezbollah military sites in south Lebanon under army control

Around 190 out of 265 Hezbollah sites located in southern Lebanon have been ceded to the Lebanese army.


The New Arab Staff & Agencies
13 April, 2025


The Lebanese army was requested to be deployed in south Lebanon as per the ceasefire's agreement between Hezbollah and Israel [Getty/file photo]

Most military sites belonging to Hezbollah in southern Lebanon have been placed under Lebanese army control, a source close to the group said on Saturday.

A 27 November ceasefire that ended more than a year of conflict between Hezbollah and Israel, including two months of full-blown war which killed over 4,000 Lebanese, stipulated that only United Nations peacekeepers and Lebanon's army should be deployed in the south.

The deal required the Iran-backed group to dismantle its remaining military infrastructure in the south and move its fighters north of the Litani River, which is about 30 kilometres (19 miles) from the Israeli border.

"Out of 265 Hezbollah military positions identified south of the Litani, the movement has ceded about 190 to the army," the source said on condition of anonymity.

Under the ceasefire, Israel was ordered to complete its troop withdrawal from Lebanon by 18 February after missing a January deadline, but it has insisted to keep troops in five places it deems strategic, despite requests from the Lebanese to leave.

Israel has continued to attack several sites in Lebanon killing scores, in violation of the ceasefire.

In a speech on Saturday marking the anniversary of the outbreak of Lebanon's 1975-1990 civil war, President Joseph Aoun renewed his appeal for Hezbollah to lay down its weapons.

"Because we all unanimously believe that any bearing of weapons outside of state authority... would jeopardise the interests of Lebanon... it is time for us all to say: 'Lebanon can only be protected by the state, the army and the security forces,'" he said.

The United States deputy special envoy for the Middle East, Morgan Ortagus, discussed disarming Hezbollah with senior Lebanese figures during a visit to Beirut last weekend, a Lebanese official said.

In an interview with Lebanese television channel LBCI, Ortagus said that "we continue to press on this government to fully fulfil the cessation of hostilities, and that includes disarming Hezbollah and all militias".

She said it should happen "as soon as possible".

The United States chairs a committee, which also includes France, tasked with overseeing the ceasefire.

Following the outbreak of Israel's war on Gaza in October 2023, cross-border fire flared between Israel and Hezbollah one day after.

Months of cross-border exchanges with Israeli forces escalated into full-blown war last September, with Israel bombing several parts of Lebanon, killing over 4,000. Several high-profile members of Hezbollah were killed in such strikes.

As Israel escalates strikes in Lebanon, residents say it ‘will not keep us from the path of resistance’

The failure of the Lebanese government to protect against Israeli attacks is leading Lebanon down two roads: either Hezbollah will re-enter the war in defense of the Lebanese people, or the government will prevail and content itself to sit back.

 April 11, 2025 
MONDOWEISS

Aftermath of Israel’s bombing of Beirut’s southern Dahiya suburb.
 (Photo: Roqaya Chamseddine)


On March 28, Beirut’s southern Dahiya suburb was targeted with four Israeli airstrikes on the neighborhood of Hadath — the first attack on Beirut since the truce in November 2024. A residential building, which housed a number of Lebanese families, was left completely flattened by the airstrikes.

“The entire building is gone. The only thing left is cement and glass,” a local business owner told Mondoweiss. “We were sitting with our grandchildren when we heard the airstrikes and saw people running and screaming.” Hours later, smoke still billowed from the ash and rubble as recovery efforts continued.

Residents of Hadath communicated a sense of unease that existed among residents of Dahiya, even before the airstrikes. One woman explained that Israel’s ongoing attacks against South Lebanon were never far from people’s minds. “Many of us felt as though this attack was inevitable, and that Israel wouldn’t spare Dahiya. The ceasefire doesn’t exist for South Lebanon, and it doesn’t exist for the people of the suburb. Where any of our people exist, Israel sees a target.”

Before dawn on April 1, these words seemed almost prophetic as Dahiya was once again rocked by an Israeli airstrike, this time targeting the neighborhood of Moawad. The attack on Moawad leveled three floors of a residential building, killing four and wounding seven. Among the rubble were children’s toys, backpacks, clothing, and shoes.

“We want Israel to know one thing: that this will not keep us from the path of resistance,” a young man told Mondoweiss. “Do not think that we are afraid, no. We have put our faith in God and in our resistance.”

It is this sharpened confidence that has moved the people of Dahiya forward on what they describe as the “path of resistance” — one that has no shortcuts and has forced them to confront the brutality of the United States’ foremost vassal state in the region. To many, the battle is an unfinished one, and those loyal to Hezbollah remain posed in a state of preparedness for whatever comes next.
Frustration with government stance

As Lebanese citizens across South Lebanon and the Dahiya suburb continue to face targeted assassination campaigns, aerial bombardment, and the destruction of their historic villages, the Lebanese government has done little in the way of responding to Israel’s ongoing attacks — which also include clear violations of Lebanese sovereignty by way of drone surveillance — beyond weak condemnations. The local population considers some elements of the Lebanese government as being wholly complicit at worst and weak-willed at best, and instead have put their faith squarely in one another and the Lebanese resistance.

After the airstrikes in Hadath, a group of women standing next to a clothing store just feet from the airstrike expressed their anger and disgust with the Lebanese government, describing them as no better than the United States and Israel. “What is [the government’s] plan for us? To endure these attacks in the South and also here? Are we to feel comforted by their condemnations? Why doesn’t the puppet President Joseph Aoun come back from his trip to France and send his army to defend his people? Where is the Prime Minister? Is he still asleep?” one woman said. “All in all, we’re once again left to defend ourselves. We have no one but God and our Resistance, and that is enough for us.”

This steely conviction is not a rare, poetic expression conveyed by a handful of Lebanese residents but it is an undeniable cool-headedness that is part of the fabric of what comprises the culture of resistance found throughout the Dahiya and South Lebanon.
Hezbollah’s calculations

The Israeli attacks on Dahiya come as international political and economic pressure continues to mount on the Lebanese resistance group Hezbollah to disarm.

Despite enduring a campaign of devastating assassinations — which included the killing of Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah in September and the two waves of exploding electronics attacks — Hezbollah has shouldered a majority of the nation’s reconstruction and shelter costs amounting to $650 million, according to a report from Al-Akhbar, a pro-resistance outlet. To put this in context, the World Bank has only offered Lebanon a loan of $250 million for reconstruction, which many have described simply as a means to exert pressure on the Lebanese government in order to disarm Hezbollah.

The IMF and World Bank are conditioning reconstruction funds on Lebanon’s normalization with Israel and disarming Hezbollah. The people of Dahiya and Southern Lebanon remain opposed to this form of blackmail, as reported recently by Mondoweiss.

Lebanese writer and analyst Mohammad Hasan Sweidan characterized the current political atmosphere facing the resistance community as “the most violent cognitive war in the history of the conflict with Israel.” In this war, Sweidan argues, Israel is using the latest strategies “in the field of psychological and media warfare that target the awareness of anyone who believes in the option of resisting Israel’s arrogance.”

Among these tactics, arguably, are unconfirmed media reports that allege the Lebanese resistance has entertained the possibility of disarming in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon and ending its aggression on Lebanese villages.

There has been no official statement released by the party or from its new Secretary General, Sheikh Naim Qassim. In fact, in February, during the funeral of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, Qassim emphasized that “the resistance is not over” and that it is “present and ready” to face Israel. “We open fire when we see it appropriate, and we practice patience when we see it appropriate, and the resistance will continue.”

Hezbollah has not responded to the Israeli attacks, as they have left this up to the state.

This time has also given the Lebanese resistance the necessary ability to restore their capabilities, but the failure of the Lebanese government to do more than issue weak denunciations is leading Lebanon down two roads: either Hezbollah will have no choice but to re-enter the war in defense of the Lebanese people, or Lebanon will be left to endure further attacks while local politicians continue to sit back.

Time will tell what the future holds for Lebanon, but one thing is clear: those with the Lebanese resistance remain steadfast on this path, and no amount of Israeli violence will deter them from the battle that lies ahead.

‘Beyrouth Ya Beyrouth’: Mapping Beirut through comics




A Lebanese flag hung on a car is seen among the destroyed roads and collapsed buildings in Tyre, Lebanon on November 29, 2024. [Murat Şengül – Anadolu Agency]


OPINION
April 3, 2025 

by Naima Morelli
naimamorelli
MEMO

There are some cities that are impossible to grasp fully. No matter how much you try to explore them, to understand them, it’s impossible to make sense of it all. Beirut is one of these cities, continually morphing, changing and rising from the ashes despite the hardships, wars and seemingly endless other crises.

We find all of these aspects and more in “Beyrouth Ya Beyrouth”, a comic book collection in the form of a newspaper created last year by the comic book festival “Rencontres du 9e Art, Festival BD d’Aix” at Aix-en-Provence in the South of France. The collection sees a group of Lebanese artists sharing different sides of Beirut that are less known to the media. Rather than focusing on the crises and turmoil, they aim to capture the city’s everyday life, emotions and experiences through the medium of comics.

Michelle Standjovski, a comic book author, illustrator and professor at the Lebanese Academy of Fine Arts (ALBA), played a central role in the creation of the collaborative project based on capturing Beirut’s different districts and their residents. The idea for this came after Standjovski was contacted by Serge Darpex, director of the Festival BD d’Aix, in which she had participated before. “Serge contacted me and suggested the idea of creating a newspaper to be distributed,” she told me.

The festival, managed by the tourism office of Aix-en-Provence, has a unique structure that offers distinct advantages. Maxime Arnaud, the spokesperson for the festival, explained that having access to the city’s communication resources is what helped boost the festival’s reach and open it up to a wider audience, rather than comic book lovers only. The idea for the journal format was also intended to let the French public get to know Beirut through the popular medium of comics.

Initially, the proposal was for a more general focus on Lebanon, but Standjovski immediately saw an opportunity to focus on Beirut. “I visualised something around the capital, rather than Lebanon in general,” she said. “I thought that it could be a choral project with several voices, several participants, resembling the kind of mosaic that is Beirut.”

Her vision was to capture Beirut as a living, breathing city through the eyes of the people who know it best and are sensitive to the changes and small details: resident artists. She reached out to a group of colleagues and students at ALBA, inviting them to participate in the project.


“We wanted to map out the city, visually and emotionally.”

The contributors were tasked with depicting different neighbourhoods, each one presenting their own personal view of the area chosen. Standjovski emphasised that the goal was not to provide a comprehensive, factual account of Beirut, but to capture emotions and lived experiences. “We haven’t tried to be exhaustive at all. We didn’t really try to tell the whole story. It’s more about emotions, sensations, personal experiences.”

READ: Lebanese artist Nadia Saikali and Beirut as the centre of abstract art

The overarching goal of the newspaper project was to avoid the stereotypical representations of Beirut often seen in foreign media. When international journalists cover Lebanon, they usually focus on the same well-worn narratives and locations. Standjovski wanted this project to break away from this and present the city in its diversity. “Our main objective was to avoid clichés. Foreign journalists often highlight the same neighbourhoods and the same narratives. We wanted to showcase Beirut in ways that aren’t typically seen.”

Each contributor focused on a neighbourhood or aspect of Beirut that had personal significance to them. Standjovski herself depicted the path of protestors during the 2019-2020 revolution, capturing the routes they took through the city and the significance of mobile phones in documenting the events. “I wanted to show the diversity of people, their different lifestyles, different mentalities,” she said.

The project allowed each artist to share a piece of Beirut that resonated with their own experiences.

The final form of “Beyrouth Ya Beyrouth” is a 24-page journal to be distributed for free during the Festival des Rencontres du 9e Art in April and May, and will continue to be available to be distributed upon request by the Festival.

A significant aspect of the project was the involvement of Standjovski’s students from ALBA. As part of the Master’s programme in Illustration and Comics, several second-year students were invited to contribute to the newspaper and attend the festival in France.

“More than others I felt that my students need to breathe, to get out of this war in which we were not yet directly involved, but we were still affected,” said Standjovski. When the students asked if all five of them could attend, she reached out to Darpex for support. “The next day, I sent a message to Serge. He called me on the phone and said, ‘Listen, Michelle, I don’t have any money, but we’re going to find some. The five of them are going to come.’”

The students’ excitement was evident when their teacher shared the news. “They were so happy. Beside the publication of the journal, we had an exhibition and a concert dessiné, a live drawing performance set to music.” This unique format allowed artists to bring their work to life in real time, creating a dynamic and engaging experience for the audience.

“The concert dessiné is a way to make the artwork come alive, to give it movement and voice,” added Arnaud.

Lebanon’s comic book scene has faced numerous challenges, particularly in terms of language and market limitations. While many Lebanese people speak Arabic, French and English, literary Arabic, the language typically used in literature, doesn’t adapt well in a comic book format. “In Lebanon, there aren’t really any comic book publishers for adults, the market is more focused on illustrated books for children,” noted Standjovski.


Despite these difficulties, ALBA has been a significant force in supporting comic artists.

Until the financial crisis of 2019, the academy regularly published students’ work as part of their academic projects. “The good thing about ALBA publications is that they are distributed in bookshops, but they are not for profit. They’re academic. So, in a way, they are published to encourage publication, to encourage students, to serve as a springboard.”

Several of her former students have used ALBA’s publications to launch their careers abroad. “It’s easier to get published in Europe or the United States,” she said. “Most of our former students either work in illustration or not in comics.” Standjovski herself has been published in France and for years she created a weekly comic strip for L’Orient-Le Jour.

Working as an artist in Lebanon is never easy, and that was especially so last year when the journal came out in the context of the country’s political and economic instability. With frequent power outages, internet disruptions and unreliable infrastructure, the logistics of creating art can be challenging. Yet, as Michelle Standjovski pointed out, these technical difficulties pale in comparison to the psychological toll that the crises take on people. “People are exhausted. Sometimes contributors would promise work and never deliver, not out of neglect, but sheer burnout,” she explained. The country’s ongoing crises make it difficult to maintain momentum in creative projects.

Despite these obstacles, Standjovski and her students found strength in their collaboration. “We weren’t doing well. But working on this, collaborating, creating; it gave us a sense of purpose. It was our compass, our flotation device. We don’t sink when we do things that interest us.”

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

PHOTO  ESSAY

50 years since the Lebanese Civil War, Palestinian refugees cling to renewed hope for liberation and return

The same reality that compelled Palestinian refugees in Lebanon to take up arms in the 1970s persist to this day. Today, the Palestinians of the camps view the resistance movement in Gaza with renewed hope for liberation.

By Sabah Haider 
 April 13, 2025 
MONDOWEISS

Fedayeen from Fatah at a rally in Beirut, Lebanon, January 1, 1979. (Photo: Wikimedia Commons)

On April 13, 1975, a busload of Palestinian civilians was ambushed in Ain al-Rummaneh, a predominantly Maronite Christian neighborhood in East Beirut, by Phalangist militiamen who committed a massacre. That moment, often cited as the spark of the Lebanese Civil War, did not emerge from a vacuum — it followed years of tension between the Lebanese state, sectarian militias, and the growing Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon, which started in 1971 when the PLO arrived after being forcibly expelled by the Jordanian state following the events of Black September.

Fifty years have passed, and the debate over the role of Palestinians — specifically Palestinian factions under the PLO — in the Lebanese Civil War remains mired in a murky combination of emotions, facts, myths, scapegoating, and to some extent, political erasure. Yet the story of the Palestinian fedayeen, the armed guerillas of the PLO and its associated factions, is integral to understanding their presence in the Lebanese Civil War itself. Their story of resistance, exile, and survival is essential to appreciating the systemic marginalization that Palestinians have faced in Lebanon from that period to the present day.

Revolutionaries-in-exile

After 1967, the PLO — and especially its largest party, Fatah, under the leadership of Yasser Arafat — gained significant influence across the Arab world, including within Jordan, where a large number of Palestinian refugees lived. Many of these refugees were housed in camps around the country, where the PLO operated with increasing autonomy, building parallel institutions and maintaining armed factions of fedayeen. It was this increasingly uncomfortable reality for the Jordanian monarchy that led to what Palestinians refer to as the Black September War.

The arrival of the Palestinian fedayeen in Lebanon in 1971 reshaped the country’s internal dynamics. With the Lebanese state unable or unwilling to absorb the Palestinian refugee population into its social and political fabric, the camps became self-sufficient, heavily policed, and politically radicalized. The PLO, especially Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the PFLP-GC (General Command), and other leftist factions turned southern Lebanon and parts of West Beirut into what was often described by Western journalists as “Fatahland” — a semi-autonomous zone from which operations against Israel could be launched. These journalists today are the ones who love to call any area where the Shia in Lebanon reside as a “Hezbollah stronghold.” The Fakhani neighborhood in West Beirut housing the PLO’s headquarters was commonly known as the “Fakhani Republic,” where the PLO functioned as a state-within-a-state.

Palestinian fighters in Southern Lebanon, 1976. (Photo: Palestinian Museum Digital Archive, Yusef al-Qutob Collection).

For many Palestinian refugees living decades in exile in Lebanon, joining the Palestinian armed struggle in Lebanon was both a political necessity and a personal one. Stateless and under siege, they saw their fight not only as a battle against Israel but also as part of a broader anticolonial movement spanning the Arab world and beyond.

I interviewed countless former Palestinian fedayeen during my PhD fieldwork over many years, and I would always ask them what had motivated them to join. The most common answer was always, “With Fatah, we had hope that we could free our country.”

I recall one particular interview with a Palestinian fedayi originally from Nablus who led a battalion of fedayeen in South Lebanon for several years. He told me, “Fatah was organized and we trusted they had a plan. Of course, we wanted to free our country. There was dignity in that. There was no dignity in being a refugee.”

During the PLO’s heyday in Lebanon, its military and symbolic presence in the country, especially in Beirut, is now recalled as legendary by the elders in the camps. Posters of strength, of slogans, of images depicting victory, were seen not only all over West Beirut but across leftist spaces in the global south. When Fatah was strong, elders recount how it offered Palestinians in Lebanon a semblance of dignity in an otherwise precarious existence. However, to many Lebanese factions, particularly the Kataeb — the Phalangist party of the Christian far right — the Palestinian presence in Lebanon was perceived as a threat to national sovereignty and demographic balance.

Scapegoats


From the start of the Lebanese Civil War, Palestinian factions were framed by many groups as instigators and outsiders who had brought foreign wars into Lebanese soil — in reference to the PLO’s battle with Israel along South Lebanon’s borders. But this portrayal of the Palestinians in Lebanon also ignored the complex sectarian tensions and systemic inequities that had long plagued the Lebanese political order. Yet it was politically convenient.

Fawwaz Traboulsi, author of the widely cited A History of Modern Lebanon, said the Ain al-Rumman massacre was not the cause of the war, “but its pretext.” Traboulsi argues that the confrontation was long in the making, “rooted in unresolved class contradictions, sectarian anxiety, and the failure of the Lebanese state to adapt to changing regional and domestic realities.”

The Kataeb militiamen’s massacre was framed as retaliation for an earlier attack on Pierre Gemayel, their Maronite leader. Whether or not Palestinians were responsible remains disputed, but what followed was a devastating spiral: Christian militias targeted Palestinian civilians, PLO fighters responded, and within weeks, Beirut was split into a patchwork of armed zones.

A PLO poster titled “Look…these are the 3000 Martyrs of the Tal al-Zaatar Massacre,” issued by the Unified Information of the PLO in 1976
(Photo: Palestinian Museum Digital Archive, The Ali Kazak Collection)

The late Lebanese historian and journalist Samir Kassir said that the Civil War did not begin because of the Palestinians, but “because of what Lebanon had refused to address for decades — inequality, sectarian fear, and a ruling class willing to let the country burn rather than share power.”

What followed over the next 15 years was a brutal civil war in which Palestinian refugee communities came under continuous attack. The 1976 Tel al-Zaatar massacre, in which thousands of Palestinian refugees were killed by rightwing militias after a prolonged siege, underscored the ferocity of anti-Palestinian violence. The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon culminated in the Sabra and Shatila massacre, where Christian Lebanese Phalangists — under the watch of the Israeli army — massacred thousands of civilians in the camps.

The late British journalist Robert Fisk, a longtime Beirut resident, was one of the first Western reporters to enter Sabra and Shatila after the massacre in September 1982. His description of what he saw remains haunting to this day:

“I had never seen anything like it. There were women lying in houses with their skirts torn up to their waists and their legs spread apart, children with their throats cut, rows of young men shot in the back after being lined up at an execution wall. There were babies – blackened babies – because they had been slaughtered more than 24 hours earlier and their small bodies were already in a state of decomposition”

Despite these atrocities, Palestinians have often been reduced to players in broader Lebanese historiography — present mainly when blamed, invisible when grieving. Rosemary Sayigh, a British-born anthropologist and one of the foremost scholars of Palestinian refugee experiences in Lebanon, says Palestinians have largely been characterized as a “problem” in Lebanon, with their narratives “of dispossession, resistance, and repeated victimization” ignored and relegated to the margins. “When violence is enacted against them, they are largely invisible; when accused of provoking violence, they dominate the frame,” Sayigh writes.

Destroyed house in the Shatila refugee camp during the War of the Camps, October 8, 1987. (Photo: Palestinian Museum Digital Archive, Palestinian Red Crescent Society Collection)


Memory and myth


Today, the memory of Palestinian involvement in the Lebanese Civil War is a fragmented one. In some Lebanese political narratives, the PLO is cast as a destabilizing force that brought the country to ruin. In others, particularly among leftist circles, Palestinian fighters are remembered as comrades in a shared revolutionary front against imperialism and sectarianism. Among Palestinians themselves, the memory is more personal — shaped by loss, longing, and a mixture of inherited, lived, unresolved, and compounded trauma

.
A PLO poster titled “Long Live Palestinian-Lebanese Unity.”
 (Photo: Palestinian Museum Digital Archive, The Ali Kazak Collection)

Today there are officially 12 Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon: 3 in Beirut, 5 in South Lebanon, Dbayeh Camp in the Mount Lebanon area north of Beirut, and Weivel Camp in Baalbek in the Beqaa Valley. There are several additional unofficial Palestinian “gatherings,” as they are referred to throughout the country. During the Lebanese Civil War, at least five other camps were either destroyed or forcibly dismantled — Tal al-Zaater and Khaldeh are the most widely known.

Part of the reason that conditions in the other already crowded camps became so dire in the years that followed is that they absorbed the twice-displaced residents of the destroyed camps into their own.

I recall, in the summer of 2009, being taken on a walk by a Palestinian friend through the ruins of Ouzai — the dilapidated coastal neighborhood of South Beirut, which is visible when planes land in Beirut. That area used to boast luxury beach resorts, which were destroyed during the Lebanese Civil War. My friend’s family, while historically from Acre, Palestine, had settled in Tal al-Zaatar camp. After the camp was destroyed in 1976, they and many other families displaced from Tal al-Zaatar, built shelters and eventually homes on the ruins of the luxury hotels. I visited his house — a poorly constructed two-story lodging, in a cluster of the same, less than 100 meters from the sea. He recounts growing up during the Civil War playing soccer on the beach every day.

Lebanon’s Palestinian refugee camps, gatherings, and informal communities are simultaneously incredible repositories of memory, and living memorials of a past that has never ended. Graffiti of martyrs, community centers with fading posters, and children’s artwork generated through some foreign NGO’s art workshops can be found in every camp in Lebanon. So can groups of older men who were once hopeful but now sit together drinking coffee. Surrounded by clouds of cigarette smoke, they can be seen around every corner. These camps carry decades of history absent from textbooks in the schools. After all, Lebanon hasn’t had an updated, unified history curriculum since the 1970s. Every attempt to update the history books has failed due to political disagreements over what should be included. This means sensitive issues like the Palestinian refugee presence in the country, and the Lebanese Civil War are left out or glossed over to avoid stirring controversy.

Yet remembering alone cannot compensate for structural marginalization. Palestinians in Lebanon are still denied basic rights: they cannot own property, face restrictions in over 70 professions, and live in deteriorating camp conditions due to the state’s policy not to integrate them. The goal of such a policy is that the refugees go back to where they came from. Despite contributing to Lebanon’s labor force for decades, they remain politically and economically disenfranchised. As of March 2023, UNRWA reports approximately 489,292 registered Palestine refugees in Lebanon. I often hear people say that actual numbers may be less now due to unreported migration, although significantly less seems unlikely.

From past to present

  
Burj al-Barajneh refugee camp, Lebanon, 2025. (Photo: Sabah Haider)

The echoes of the Lebanese Civil War still reverberate today, not only in Beirut’s urban ruins but also in the lived experience of Palestinians who remain refugees two and three generations later. Many of the grievances that drove Palestinians to take up arms in the 1970s — statelessness, exclusion, Israeli aggression — are still a reality for them today.

October 7, 2023, was an undeniable turning point in the history of the Palestinian liberation struggle.

Every day since then, as Gaza burns under siege and genocide and West Bank cities face settler violence and military raids, the image of the Palestinian fighter has reentered the public imagination.

But this time it’s different; it’s not the fedayi in the keffiyeh, but the black-masked Hamas fighters who are celebrated as heroes for many of the Palestinians in Lebanon’s camps.

A poster of Fatah founder Yasser Arafat above green graffiti in support of Hamas’s Qassam Brigades head, Muhammad al-Deif, Burj al-Barajneh refugee camp, Lebanon, 2025. (Photo: Sabah Haider)

For decades, the camps in Lebanon were covered in photos and posters of Arafat, and Fatah flags and slogans. That iconography and those images represented hope and strength to the Palestinians during the Lebanese Civil War due to the strength of the Palestinian armed struggle, and since the Civil War, due to longing and nostalgia for the golden years of the Palestinian armed struggle.

But things have changed, and Hamas support is visibly more pronounced in the camps. A few weeks ago I briefly visited the Burj al-Barajneh camp in Beirut and couldn’t help but notice the images of Hamas and the late Hamas Politburo head, Ismail Haniyeh, around the camp, alongside and sometimes instead of images from a more distant past. To the young men and women in the camps now, Hamas represents a renewed hope that their homeland can be liberated and that the Palestinian struggle is not dead.
Toward reckoning

As Lebanon marks the 50th anniversary of the war, reckoning with the Palestinian dimension is essential — not just as a historical footnote, but as a window into how stateless people navigate the violent political landscapes.

The story of the Palestinians in Lebanon is not one of pure victimhood or romanticized resistance. It is a story with many contradictions: of being guests in a host country, of being feared. Of being forgotten.

I often think of the work of the gifted photographer Dalia Khamissy, who has been working on her powerful ongoing project on the Missing of Lebanon for the past 15 years. For this project, she has meticulously documented and told the stories of the estimated 17,000 people who went missing during the Lebanese Civil War. She has given a voice to countless mothers whose loved ones went out during the war and never came home. To this day, they wait for them. For many, the Lebanese Civil War never ended.

Sabah Haider
Sabah Haider is a visual anthropologist and journalist based between Beirut and Paris.


Lebanon’s civil war anniversary poll: Half of respondents fear conflict could return


Dozens of Palestinian women leave the Bourj Barajneh refugee camp in Beirut southern suburb 25 March 1987, to look for some food at the nearby market. (File/AFP)

Arab News
April 11, 2025

63.3% favor abolishing sectarian political system for secular state model

42.5% report direct personal or family harm from recent conflict



BEIRUT: As Lebanon marks 50 years since the outbreak of its civil war on April 13, a new poll has revealed half of the Lebanese people questioned are worried the conflict could return amid a fragile ceasefire.

The survey, conducted jointly by Annahar newspaper and International Information, sampled 1,200 Lebanese citizens across all regions between March 25 and April 2.

It showed that 51.7 percent expressed varying degrees of concern about the war’s return, while 63.3 percent believed establishing a secular civil state by abolishing the sectarian political system represented the best path forward for the country.

A total of 42.5 percent of respondents reported direct harm to themselves or family members, including deaths or injuries (23.7 percent), property damage (19.9 percent), and forced displacement (19.5 percent).

In assessing Lebanese attitudes toward Iran’s role in Lebanon, 78.6 percent of respondents evaluated this role as negative, and 75.3 percent identified Israel as Lebanon’s primary adversary.

The survey came as Israel resumed attacks on Lebanon, claiming it is targeting Hezbollah infrastructure.

In a statement, Annahar’s management described the poll as an essential tool to understand present realities by examining present and past questions, noting the significant timing on the half-century mark of a conflict whose full lessons remain unlearned.

Public opinion remains deeply divided on how to characterize the war that erupted on April 13, 1975, with 40.7 percent describing it as a Lebanese civil war while 38.5 percent view it as a war for others “fought on our soil.”

A smaller segment (8.8 percent) consider it primarily a war related to Palestinian settlement issues.

Information about the war continued to be transmitted largely through personal channels, with 81.9 percent citing family and friends as their primary source of knowledge, followed by media (44.8 percent), personal experience (28.3 percent), and academic sources (13.4 percent), according to the poll.

MULTIMEDIA PRESENTATION


In post-Assad Syria, Kurdish-led SDF impose media blackout on Aleppo neighbourhoods

The Kurdish-led SDF are due to evacuate two Aleppo neighbourhoods under a deal with the Syrian government, but are still stopping media from accessing them

Paul McLoughlin
Syria
13 April, 2025



The SDF are due to evacuate Sheikh Maqsoud soon [Amer Al-Sayid Ali / The New Arab]

Aleppo, Syria - Dirt barriers and guards remained stationed outside two Kurdish-dominated enclaves in the city of Aleppo on Friday, as members of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) left the neighbourhoods this week after an agreement with the Syrian government.

Security and administration in Aleppo’s Sheikh Maqsoud and Achrafiah neighbourhoods have been largely managed by the US-backed Kurdish-led SDF since 2015, which controls around 25% of Syria's territory, including most of the northeast.

Following a pact signed by Syrian interim President Ahmed Al-Sharaa and SDF military commander Mazloum Abdi on 10 March, it was agreed that all areas would eventually be brought under government control and SDF units integrated into the national army.

Following the withdrawal of Kurdish fighters last week, armed guards from the SDF-linked Asayish security forces remained stationed at the entrance of Sheikh Maqsoud on Friday, inspecting bags and screening people entering the district.

Guards at Sheikh Maqsoud would not allow The New Arab and Al-Araby Al-Jadeed journalists entry to the North Aleppo neighbourhood without approval from the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), something we have sought for over a month.

At the security point in Sheikh Maqsoud, a small lone Syrian national flag now flies alongside six larger blue banners of the Asayish and Kurdish authorities. The entrance to the neighbourhood still shows signs of 14 years of fighting in the city of Aleppo, with damage from shelling and sniper positions visible in a wall of apartment blocks that surround the enclave.

The situation was similar in Achrafieh, where the flags of the Asayish security forces were visible from a long line of traffic waiting to enter the neighbourhood.

Bar sporadic checkpoints, most Syrians - including journalists - have been largely free to move around the country following the fall of Bashar Al-Assad on 8 December, whose regime killed 181 journalists since the start of the conflict in 2011, with no independent media allowed to operate in regime-controlled areas.

The two Kurdish enclaves in Aleppo, like northeastern Syria, have remained largely autonomous throughout the war with their own administrative, security, and ‘visa’ procedures.

This includes stringent protocols for foreign journalists operating in SDF-controlled areas, including requiring permission to enter the territories - approval Al-Araby Al-Jadeed and The New Arab have continuously sought over the past six weeks.

Shahira Salloum, managing editor of Al-Araby Al-Jadeed website, was with The New Arab during our attempts to enter Sheikh Maqsoud, and said her experience at the enclave was in stark contrast to reporting from other parts of Syria.

"We have entered all parts of Syria freely, and the one side that didn’t allow us into areas they control was the SDF," Salloum told The New Arab.

"It was a very strange experience for us given our previous experiences in Syria, where people and security forces opened their doors and spoke freely. It puts a question mark over their policies and their supposed commitment to democracy."

The situation was similar the the SDF-controlled ‘border point’ near Raqqa, where guards prevented The New Arab and Al-Araby Al-Jadeed journalists from accessing northeast Syria.

Media rights groups such as Reporters Without Borders have for years called on Kurdish-dominated authorities in the northeast to lift restrictions on journalists, with foreign and Syrian reporters needing approval from the AANES to access areas under their control.

In addition to this stringent accreditation process for foreign media entering the northeast, journalists also require a local fixer to operate in the area.

Local journalists have also been jailed for writing critically about the AANES, while broadcasters such as Rudaw and Kurdistan 24, which cover Kurdish politics in Syria and Iraq, have also faced restrictions in the territories.

The agreement signed between Abdi and Sharaa in March stipulates that all border points, airports, and oil fields will come under the control of the Damascus government by the end of the year.

Since the agreement was signed, there has been prisoner exchanges between the two sides, while Kurdish rights will be guaranteed, including a lifting on restrictions on the teaching of the Kurdish language implemented during the Baathist regime.

SDF fighters will also withdraw from Sheikh Maqsoud and Achrafieh, with two batches leaving the two Aleppo enclaves over the past week and heading for northeast of Syria - an Arab-majority region but under the control of a Kurdish-dominated political and security apparatus.

Kurds who lost their nationality during Bashar and Hafez Al-Assad’s rule will also be given Syrian citizenship, while internally displaced Kurds will be allowed to return to their homes.

The deal ends years of conflict between the SDF and rebel forces now integrated into the Syrian government, including Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham, was once led by Al-Sharaa, which has fought fierce clashes with Kurdish militias in Aleppo.


Syrian forces deploy at key dam under deal with Kurds: media

The Kurdish authorities in northeastern Syria struck a deal with the central government on running a key dam they captured from the Islamic State group.


The New Arab Staff & Agencies
12 April, 2025


Fighters loyal to the new Syrian government in Damascus established after the December overthrow of longtime strongman Bashar al-Assad have begun taking over security and a joint administration will run the Tishrin dam. [Getty]

Security forces from the new government in Damascus deployed Saturday around a strategic dam in northern Syria, under a deal with the autonomous Kurdish administration, state media reported.

Under the agreement, Kurdish-led fighters of the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) will pull back from the dam which they captured from the Islamic State group in late 2015.

The Tishrin dam near Manbij in Aleppo province is one of several on the Euphrates and its tributaries in Syria that play a key role in the nation's economy by providing it with water for irrigation and hydro-electric power.

On Thursday, a Kurdish source said the Kurdish authorities in northeast Syria had reached agreement with the central government on running the dam.

A separate Kurdish source told news agency AFP on Saturday that the deal, supervised by the US-led coalition, stipulates that the dam remain under Kurdish civilian administration.

Syria's state news agency SANA reported "the entry of Syrian Arab Army forces and security forces into the Tishrin Dam ... to impose security in the region, under the agreement reached with the SDF".

The accord also calls for a joint military force to protect the dam, and for the withdrawal of Turkey-backed factions "that seek to disrupt this agreement", SANA said.

It is part of a broader agreement reached in mid-March between Syria's interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa and SDF commander Mazloum Abdi, aiming to integrate the institutions of the Kurdish autonomous administration into the national government.

The dam was a key battleground in Syria's civil war that broke out in 2011, falling first to rebels and then to IS before being captured by the SDF.

Days after Sharaa's coalition overthrew Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad in December, Turkish drone strikes targeted the dam, killing dozens of civilians, Kurdish officials and a Britain-based war monitor.


Israel cancels 'provocative' tourist tours inside occupied Syria

Israel has cancelled all 'tourist tours' inside illegally occupied Syrian territory days after they were originally announced


The New Arab Staff
12 April, 2025


Israel has expanded its illegal occupation of the Golan Heights [Getty]


The Israeli army announced on Friday the cancellation of all planned "tourist tours" to border areas inside illegally occupied Syrian territory, which had been arranged for Israeli tourists accompanied by guides holding official permits.

In a statement, the Israeli army explained that the decision came following an "operational situation assessment," adding that "entry to the fence-crossing routes will not be permitted at this stage," in reference to areas seized by the Israeli army beginning in December 2024, adjacent to the occupied Syrian Golan Heights.

According to the Israeli newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth, the cancellations affected three main routes: the Ruqad River, the Hamma Bridge on the banks of the Yarmouk River, and the Hejaz Railway tunnel in the Yarmouk area.

On the other hand, a fourth route, located on Mount Hermon overlooking the Lebanese border, was excluded from the cancellation decision, with the army confirming that this path will remain temporarily open for now.

Days earlier, the Israeli military had notified potential Israeli tourists of its intention to organise special tours inside Syrian lands beyond the border strip, in an unprecedented move aimed at reinforcing what it calls "security tourism," under the direct protection of the army.

According to Haaretz newspaper, the surprise invitation to the tours came from the Northern Command of the Israeli army and Division 210, in coordination with the Golan Regional Council.

The tours include areas that are normally off-limits - locations recently occupied by Israel and classified as being outside the border fence of the buffer zone.

According to Israeli media outlets, one of the planned tours was expected to include a visit to an observation point on Mount Dov, overlooking southern Lebanon and the Beqaa Valley.

Some of the areas included in the tours were previously controlled by the former Assad regime’s forces prior to its fall, while others were taken over by Israel later.

Despite Israeli military assurances that the initiative is “entirely safe,” this has been widely questioned in Israel due to the sensitive nature of the border regions involved—particularly in light of the repeated security incidents that have occurred there in recent years.

Yedioth Ahronoth described the move as unprecedented since the founding of Israel, noting that many of the sites involved in the tours are considered closed military zones. This gives the activity a provocative character and has stirred concerns about covert expansionist aims masked as tourism.

Almost as soon a Syrian rebel coalition overthrew the regime of Bashar al-Assad in December, Israel exploited the situation by seizing Syrian territory adjacent to the occupied Golan Heights in southwestern Syria.

Since then, it has unleashed unprecedented airstrikes on Syrian targets, killing dozens of civilians and destroying key infrastructure in the country. It has also issued numerous threats against the Syrian government, warning its security forces to stay out of southern Syria.


What does the Trump administration want from Damascus?


An aerial view of the area as protesters march through the streets of Yarmouk Refugee Camp in Damascus, Syria, on March 28, 2025, carrying Palestinian flags and chanting anti-Israel slogans. [Bakr Al Kasem – Anadolu Agency]


Opinion
April 11, 2025 
MEMO

Following US President Donald Trump’s administration’s decision to change the status of Syrian diplomats at the UN mission, which involved the US not recognising the new Syrian administration, a question comes to mind: What does the Trump administration want from Damascus? Is it using non-recognition as a bargaining chip to manipulate Damascus, and perhaps its regional and international backers?

The US administration’s decision can be described as largely technical, meaning it is bureaucratic in nature, not political. For example, the decision to change the visa type is based on an internal assessment that classifies the interim transitional government in Syria as an extension of structures unacceptable to the US, specifically in terms of its alleged ties to factions designated as terrorist organisations. Its technical nature is confirmed by the fact that it is issued by institutions of a technical, rather than political, nature, such as the Department of Homeland Security.

However, this does not mean that the decision has no political implications, and it indicates that lifting the sanctions is not on the Trump administration’s agenda. There is a possibility that the Trump administration will reconsider the US Treasury Department’s decision under the Biden administration, which stipulated a six-month relief of the sanctions, which could be extended. This means that the road to Syria’s exit from its economic crisis is still long, given that the US role in this area is crucial, and that these policies may push many countries to change their approach to relations with Damascus out of fear of being affected by US sanctions.

What is interesting about American policy is that, even at the height of its conflict with Iran, Russia and the Assad regime, and while leading an international coalition through the Military Operations Centre (MOC) offices in Turkiye and Jordan, it did not go so far as to withdraw recognition of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime, and neither the status nor privileges of Syrian diplomats at the UN mission in New York were affected. Furthermore, the new government in Damascus enjoys de facto legitimacy, a legitimacy based on which most countries in the South were able to integrate themselves seamlessly into the international system without any problems or complications. Furthermore, the removal of the Assad regime entailed geopolitical changes that served Washington’s interests, as part of its efforts to weaken Iranian influence in the region.

Various assessments and analyses of the American position suggest that Washington is still evaluating the new administration in Damascus to reach an arrangement for dealing with this administration, which is primarily composed of Islamist groups led by Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham, which Washington classifies as a “terrorist organisation.” However, this new Syrian administration is attempting to formulate a moderate governing system an Islamic nature, similar to those in Turkiye and Malaysia, to gain the approval of the outside world. Yet, American political behaviour remains cautious in dealing with this new regime, with responses ranging from placing it under observation to testing it through a list of conditions presented by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Levant and Syria Affairs, Natasha Franceschi, to Syrian Foreign Minister, Asaad Al-Shaibani, on the sidelines of the donors’ conference. Furthermore, the Trump administration is witnessing a difference in views between the State Department and the White House on the nature of dealing with Damascus. It appears that the White House (which is home to many pro-Israel supporters) remains the most effective in determining the form of policies to be adopted toward Damascus.

Despite this, the Trump administration’s policy remains largely unclear and vague. There is no clear negative position toward the policies of the new Syrian administration, which has expressed its willingness to cooperate on issues of concern to Washington, particularly the fight against the Islamic State (Daesh) and the issue of chemical weapons. The US administration does not appear to be particularly concerned with the issue of minorities, especially since President Ahmad Al-Sharaa’s administration is working diligently to accommodate Christians, who are the Trump administration’s primary concern. The rest of the components are a given for Washington. The Trump administration has hinted at its relative satisfaction with the Sharaa administration’s measures regarding the constitutional declaration and government formation or at least has not expressed explicit objection to these measures.

This means that the Trump administration is not interested in the specifics of Syria itself, nor in the nature of policies pursued by the Sharaa administration, reflecting the unimportance of Syria to the Trump administration, especially after Iran’s withdrawal and Russia’s weakening. Consequently, the strategic status (already low in the Trump administration’s opinion) has declined to a minimum, placing Syria outside the Trump administration’s priorities, demoting it to a neglected file. Its affairs may be entrusted to regional and international actors in the coming period given growing indications of a US withdrawal from Syria, which is no longer a possibility but has entered the implementation phase through the successive gradual withdrawals of US forces from eastern Syria.

The Trump administration will likely not have a specific policy on Syria in the coming period, nor will it invest diplomatically in Syria. It is likely to pursue a policy of managing the situation through low-level diplomacy to manage the relationship between Turkiye and Israel. In the best-case scenario, it will turn Syria into a bargaining chip for regional parties seeking to benefit from the Syrian dynamic, especially since they possess the tools capable of paralysing Syria: US sanctions, the continuity of which would hinder any ability to emerge from fragility and danger.

This article first appeared in Arabic in Al-Araby Al-Jadeed on 10 April 2025

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.



Syria extends deadline for probe into killings of Alawites


Red Crescent workers help evacuate wounded members of the Alawite sect on March 10 after they sought refuge near a Russian airbase in coastal Syria after violence and revenge killings. (AP/File)

Updated 11 April 2025
AP

President Ahmed Al-Sharaa grants fact-finding committee three month extension to identify perpetrators

Human rights groups say more than 1,000 civilians — mostly Alawites were killed in violence last month


BEIRUT: Syria’s presidency announced on Friday that it would extend a probe into the killings of Alawite civilians in coastal areas that left hundreds dead after clashes between government forces and armed groups loyal to former President Bashar Assad spiraled into sectarian revenge attacks.

The violence erupted on March 6 after Assad loyalists ambushed patrols of the new government, prompting Islamist-led groups to launch coordinated assaults on Latakia, Baniyas, and other coastal areas.

According to human rights groups, more than 1,000 civilians — mostly Alawites, an Islamic minority to which Assad belongs — were killed in retaliatory attacks, including home raids, executions, and arson, displacing thousands.

The sectarian violence was possibly among the bloodiest 72 hours in Syria’s modern history, including the 14 years of civil war from which the country is now emerging. The violence brought fear of a renewed civil war and threatened to open an endless cycle of vengeance, driving thousands of Alawites to flee their homes, with an estimated 30,000 seeking refuge in northern Lebanon.

On March 9, President Ahmed Al-Sharaa, the former leader of an Islamist insurgent group, formed a fact-finding committee and gave it 30 days to report its findings and identify perpetrators. In a decree published late Thursday, Sharaa said the committee had requested more time and was granted a three-month non-renewable extension.
The committee’s spokesperson, Yasser Farhan, said in a statement on Friday that the committee has recorded 41 sites where killings took place, each forming the basis for a separate case and requiring more time to gather evidence. He said some areas remained inaccessible due to time constraints, but that residents had cooperated, despite threats from pro-Assad remnants.

In a report published on April 3, Amnesty International said its probe into the killings concluded that at least 32 of more than 100 people killed in the town of Baniyas were deliberately targeted on sectarian grounds — a potential war crime.

The rights organization welcomed the committee’s formation but stressed it must be independent, properly resourced, and granted full access to burial sites and witnesses to conduct a credible investigation. It also said the committee should be granted “adequate time to complete the investigation.”

Witnesses to the killings identified the attackers as hard-line Sunni Islamists, including Syria-based jihadi foreign fighters and members of former rebel factions that took part in the offensive that overthrew Assad. However, many were also local Sunnis, seeking revenge for past atrocities blamed on Alawites loyal to Assad.

While some Sunnis hold the Alawite community responsible for Assad’s brutal crackdowns, Alawites themselves say they also suffered under his rule.

Friday, April 11, 2025

 

Iran Probes for New Maritime Routes Into Lebanon

Port of Beirut from the ISS, 2020 (NASA)
Port of Beirut from the ISS, 2020 (NASA)

Published Apr 10, 2025 10:58 PM by The Maritime Executive

 

 

Reports from Israel suggest that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force is making progress in its search for new routes into Lebanon, following the destruction of the traditional smuggling routes into Lebanon by Israel in recent months. A primary smuggling route, through Beirut docks, had been shut down beforehand in the wake of the fire and subsequent explosion of badly stored ammonium nitrate in the dock’s quayside Warehouse 12 on August 4, 2020.

Unit 190, the IRGC Quds Force’s dedicated smuggling unit, has a well-established modus operandi of developing multiple routes to service a particular client, so that there is built-in redundancy to the supply system.  The Iranians also appear to assume that a proportion of shipments will be intercepted - so they divide shipments into smaller consignments using different routes, so as to be able to absorb any losses.

In the days before Hezbollah was decimated by Israeli strikes, Unit 190 - working with Hezbollah’s Unit 4400 - operated three primary routes into Lebanon to keep Hezbollah supplied.  Besides shipping into Beirut docks, Iranian heavy cargo aircraft from Mahan Air regularly flew into Beirut’s International Airport, where aircraft were unloaded by Hezbollah without any interference on the part of the Lebanese state.  Large volumes were also trucked over the border from Syria, having arrived in Syria primarily overland, through the port of Latakia or via Damascus International Airport. 

Some sophistication in the smuggling routes into Lebanon was needed, after Lebanese border security was tightened with the aid of RAG, a British private security company; on October 3, 2024, the Israelis destroyed a two mile long truck tunnel which straddled the border and emerged into northern Lebanon at Mrah al-Makbeh.  One of many routes, this tunnel demonstrated the sophistication of the smuggling system, which is now dismantled.

The 2-mile long Hezbollah tunnel which straddled the Lebanese-Syrian border (Google Earth base map/CJRC)

In building a smuggling infrastructure afresh, Unit 190 will try a number of options.  Small volumes of cash and vital supplies are still entering Lebanon via Beirut International Airport, but while Hezbollah can still rely on Hezbollah sympathizers within the ranks of the Lebanese security forces, the new Lebanese government is adopting a much stricter control regime over airfreight.  Likewise, Unit 190 has tried to use professional smuggler gangs on land routes into Lebanon, but the new Syrian government also has no desire to stir up trouble with Israel, and has made a number of interceptions. 

Sea routes offer a lower chance of interdiction, though in the current political climate, Iran is not likely to use its own naval sealift or sanctioned vessels from the government-owned Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL).  On the basis of past performance, Iran will attempt to ship using third party owners, utilizing respectable container shipping lines and multi-stop routing.

US authorities may be behind reports carried by both Al Arabiya and the Israeli open source intelligence site Intelli Times that Hezbollah’s operation to rebuild its smuggling route through the Beirut docks is headed by Wafiq Safa.  The leaked reports suggest that he controls a network of compliant customs and port officials, but gives no specific details of when and what is being smuggled.  The leak is likely to be a warning both to the Lebanese authorities and to Hezbollah that their activities are being tracked and will not be tolerated.  US State Department envoy Morgan Ortagus, quoted in the same reports, has said that “only by disarming militant groups could the Lebanese people be ‘free from foreign influence, free from terrorism, free from the fears that have been so pervasive in society.’”

If this can be taken as a statement of US policy intent, it is likely that there will be a heavier presence of allied naval vessels in the Eastern Mediterranean overseeing merchant traffic into Lebanon, and that there could in due course be interceptions and searches of suspicious ships off the Lebanese coast.

The opinions expressed herein are the author's and not necessarily those of The Maritime Executive.

Thursday, April 03, 2025

 

The Struggle for Western Sahara


The struggle for Western Sahara stands as one of Africa’s longest-running battles against colonialism and neocolonial occupation. Since Spain’s withdrawal in 1975, the Sahrawi people have resisted Moroccan annexation, enduring forced displacement, repression, and the theft of their land and resources. Today, as Morocco consolidates its illegal occupation with U.S., French, and Israeli backing, including through AFRICOM-linked military exercises, the Polisario Front has reignited armed resistance, refusing to let Western Sahara remain the last colony in Africa.

This fight is not isolated. It mirrors the broader contradictions of imperialism on the continent, where puppet regimes collaborate with foreign powers to suppress liberation movements while looting Africa’s wealth. The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), recognized by the African Union, embodies Pan-African resistance, drawing solidarity from socialist and anti-imperialist forces worldwide. Yet, Western powers continue to prop up Morocco’s occupation, just as they back Israel’s genocide in Palestine, exposing the shared enemy faced by oppressed peoples globally.

The Sahrawi struggle is a litmus test for anti-imperialists. As they reclaim their land through armed resistance, their fight echoes a universal truth: liberation is never given. It is taken.

U.S. Out of Africa: Voices from the Struggle

AFRICOM Watch Bulletin spoke with India Pitts, who is an artist and organiser with the All-African People’s Revolutionary Party and its women’s wing, All-African Women’s Revolutionary Union, based in occupied North Carolina.

AFRICOM Watch Bulletin: The Sahrawi people have been struggling politically for independence from first Spain and then subsequently Mauritania and Morocco since at least the late 1960s.   For those who are just coming to be aware of your fight, who are the Sahrawi people and what is the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic’s (SADR) national liberation struggle?

India Pitts: The Sahrawi people are made up of strong, beautiful, courageous, and determined Africans and Arabs who are waging a legitimate struggle for our land, in the Western Sahara territory. Being there on the ground, we identify politically as Africans, understanding the overall struggle for a United States of Africa.  Similarly to other African countries, the Sahawari people have defeated colonialism and now are struggling against neocolonialism and the puppets who take on traits of the enemy.  After the struggle for independence from Spain the Europeans, always choosing to be delusional,  gave Western Sahara to Mauritania and Morocco.  Like it was ever their legitimate land to give away!  In 1979 Mauritania withdrew, leaving France/Spain/US/Israel backed Morocco to illegitimately occupy 70% of the Western Sahara territory.  After showing three decades of patience waiting for Morocco to abide by the UN resolution to recognize Western Sahara’s sovereignty, the Sahrawi people were forced back into armed struggle in 2020. That brings us to the present day, where the armed struggle continues, as they gain more and more of our land back from western neocolonialist puppets and patriarchal governments like the Kingdom of Morocco.

In 1976 The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic was established by the Polisario Front as an independent state. The masses of Western Sahara chose the Polisario Front to represent us in the struggle for sovereignty in Western Sahara.

In character, the SADR, the Polisario Front, and overall Western Sahara’s evolution is Pan-African. The Polisario Front was established in 1973, and three years later proclaimed the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic.  Between those years, in 1975, the honorable El-Ouali Mustapha Sayed and other revolutionaries from the Polisario Front gathered the leaders of the Sahawari Tribes to unite them in a national council and move them from a tribal bonding to national bonding.  The tribal leaders responded and declared that they chose national unity under the leadership of the Polisario Front with Kwame Nkrumah’s (the founder of the All African People’s Revolutionary Party) understanding that independence is meaningless without African Unity.

At this time we would like to remind everyone that the Polisario Front is a revolutionary movement, a socialist national liberation movement, anti-colonial, anti-zionist, anti-capitalist, and pan-African in orientation. The Polisario Front is not a political party,

AFRICOM Watch Bulletin: We were surprised on January 7 with the announced suspension of relations between the Republic of Ghana and the SADR.  Could you shed some light on this development please and also speak on the SADR’s relationship with other fresh political developments in the sub-region?

India Pitts: Similarly to Palestine, the Western Sahara struggle is a litmus test where neo-colonist puppets can’t hide their true colors. Ghana’s decision did not surprise us at all given Nana Akufo-Addo’s legacy. This is the same person who saddled Ghana with loans from the IMF up to 1.92 billion dollars, and commended western puppet William Ruto for sending police officers into Haiti, one of Africa’s 1st republics.

We are disappointed that many see this as representing the whole of Ghana. The masses of Ghana see this as a betrayal not only to the Pan-African movement, but to Kwame Nkrumah’s legacy of recognizing SADR since 1979 which reaffirmed Ghana’s commitment to justice and decolonization. We know Ghana has historically held a torch for the causes of anti-colonialism and sovereignty, extending support to movements in Africa and beyond.  In the 2000s we saw this same trend of western puppets backing out on their support of SADR.  This political development in Ghana is no different.

SADR in the present day continues to maintain relations with Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Yemen, North Korea, occupied Azania, Iran, Mali, Tanzania, Vietnam and Zimbabwe. Additionally Algeria has been a vital brother and sister to Western Sahara, providing aid, land and education to the Sahrawi people.  Even with the US blockade and the occupation of Guantanamo Bay, Cuba still manages to provide doctors, medical supplies, and education to the Sahawari people, and many have attended university in Cuba as well.

Also we must mention that during the late 60’s, even before Algeria was backing Western Sahara, Pan-Africanist Gaddafi’s Libya supported our legitimate struggle in Western Sahara, including with tents which still stand today in our refugee camps in Algeria.  Support also came from Pan-African, socialist, and anti-imperialist movements like those of Cuba, Vietnam, Burkina Faso, Tanzania, Venezuela, Columbia, Ghana, and Kenya.

AFRICOM Watch Bulletin: Can you please speak to the analogies between your struggles and those of the Palestinian people and discuss the impacts of Operation Al Aqsa Flood and the subsequent genocide in Palestine for your people?

India Pitts: The relationship between the Sahrawi and Palestinian causes dates back to the last century when the Polisario Front began coordinating with liberation forces in the region and across the Global South.  Upon its establishment, the Polisario Front declared that the strength and continuity of the revolution depended on building relationships and establishing a joint struggle among peoples to confront imperialism and capitalist colonialism.

The Polisario Front implemented this revolutionary methodology immediately after its formation. The leader and martyr El Wali Mustapha Sayed made sure to visit Libya, Vietnam, Algeria, and Cuba, and coordinated with African leaders from various liberation movements. He also visited Beirut where he met with the Palestinian leader George Habash, alongside leaders and members of the Palestinian Liberation Front. This meeting marked the beginning of a long-standing relationship that continues to this day between the Palestinian and Sahrawi causes.  George Habash visited Sahrawi refugee camps a year after the martyrdom of El Wali Mustapha Sayed in 1976.  During his visit, George Habash emphasized that the fate of the two peoples are interconnected not only in fighting imperialism, but also in combating puppet regimes that represent colonial interests and perpetuate colonialism in the region.  Of course foremost among them was the Moroccan regime.  During that visit George Habash praised the struggle of the Sahrawi people and thanked them for fighting the Moroccan regime which poses a threat to the Palestinian cause.  He also recalled the history of conspiracy and normalization initiated by Morocco with the Zionist entity against the Palestinian people. This relationship continues into the current phase where the Al-Aqsa Flood marks a new beginning for all struggling peoples living under the oppression of imperialism and colonialism.  This phase is not merely a legendary armed struggle against a deeply entrenched colonial entity fortified with technology and the generous support of the U.S. empire.  Rather it is a rewriting of revolutionary history and the decriminalization of armed resistance.

Since the 1980s American and European imperialism have pursued a strategy of ideological warfare by controlling the media, spreading the toxins of liberalism, and portraying liberation as an internal issue with dictatorial regimes that can be resolved through concepts of human rights and democracy delivered on the back of U.S. tanks, World Bank and IMF loans, blockades, and sanctions.

This approach contributed to the draining of the revolutionary spirit that accompanied national liberation wars.  By funding movements and social justice organizations in the Global South, as well as criminalizing armed struggle and linking it to terrorism, imperialism ended decades of revolutionary work, political organization, and education that clarified to people their true enemy and equipped them with the necessary tools to confront it.

The Al-Aqsa Flood operation removed this veil and contributed to strengthening and enhancing the resistance of entire peoples, including the Sahrawi people who had resumed armed struggle against the Moroccan monarchy, a puppet of colonialism, on November 13, 2020.  The Al-Aqsa Flood reinforced this path and marked the end of a phase in which our peoples were enslaved under the ideology of colonialism.  The Zionist genocide in Gaza also exposed colonial conspiracies and the hypocrisy of the slogans they raised, revealing that the only lives that matter are those of the colonizers.  The masks have been removed from the international community, the United Nations, and humanitarian organizations.  It has become a firm conviction among the Sahrawi people, the Palestinian people, and oppressed peoples across Africa and the world, that the path to liberation lies in adhering to the option of armed resistance, allying with the peoples of the Global South, and strengthening revolutionary ties among all movements fighting against the U.S. empire of colonialism and European imperialism.

AFRICOM Watch Bulletin: There have been sporadic bursts of support for SADR positions from unlikely voices such as Condoleeza Rice or Robert F. Kennedy Jr.  What do you make of these oscillations and how do they impact your assessment of what to expect from a new administration that contains both tendencies?

India Pitts: This question is closely related to a point mentioned in the previous question regarding the colonial conspiracy carried out by imperialism since the 1980s.  When imperialism failed to defeat the revolutions against colonialism in the Global South and when oppressed peoples organized themselves under a socialist and revolutionary ideology that raised arms, theory, and practice, to repel capitalist imperialism (gaining popular support and engagement from all segments of society,) and when it failed to break the resolve of these peoples, it resorted to the most cunning forms of circumvention.  It spread the toxins of liberalism and wielded the weapon of terrorism accusations and sanctions.  It attempted to resurrect clownish figures and agents representing the U.S. system to deceive struggling peoples and movements into believing that it had changed its nature and was now concerned with their problems—problems that the U.S. itself had created.  However it became clear to everyone that what the U.S. had changed was merely the snake’s skin, while its venom, fangs, and tail remained intact, waiting for the right moment to strike.

Approaching the Sahrawi cause was a malicious U.S. strategy after the United Nations falsely promised the Sahrawi people a self-determination referendum once they laid down their arms against the Moroccan occupation and signed a ceasefire agreement.

The aim of this agreement was to exhaust the liberation movement, cut off its fighters’ breath, corner it, and prevent it from liberating the remaining parts of its land.  To achieve this strategy the U.S. beast oversaw the negotiations and played the role of a concerned party seeking to end this conflict, which it had created, making Morocco the occupying proxy on behalf of imperialism to retaliate against the Sahrawi revolution.

The revolution had declared war on Spain and France and announced itself as an anti-colonial, socialist revolution with a unifying orientation toward the peoples of the continent, which was a declaration of war on the U.S.

The U.S. intervened in 1975 through Henry Kissinger to engineer the Madrid Accords which divided the Western Sahara between Morocco and Mauritania as retaliation against this revolution.  Subsequently the U.S. armed Morocco, its loyal ally in North Africa, and has continued to support it with weapons and political backing to this day.  Therefore we always say that the truth of the Moroccan occupation is revealed by who supports it.  Morocco is supported by France, the U.S., the Zionist entity, Spain, and European imperialism, while the Sahrawi people are supported by liberation movements in Africa, Asia, South America, the Caribbean, and all oppressed peoples and revolutionary consciences worldwide.

What these malicious U.S. figures did to the Sahrawi cause, they also did to the Palestinian cause.  The U.S. consistently attempted, through the faces of its puppets, to project an image of neutrality while simultaneously arming and supporting Israel.  The same applies to its limited stances on the Sahrawi issue.

As for the Sahrawi people and the Polisario Front, they were never deceived regarding the U.S.’s true nature. There was always a sense of wariness towards these maneuvers even though some individuals associated with the movement engaged in relationships with U.S. organizations as is the case in most African countries.

The decisive response to the reality of the conflict with the U.S. came in 2020 when Donald Trump, before the end of his term, recognized the sovereignty of the Moroccan occupation over Western Sahara through a Twitter post.  Subsequently the Biden administration continued to silently support Morocco as had been the case before.  Therefore the Sahrawi people expect no good from the U.S. colonial system, neither from the face that wears a mask to hide its true nature nor from the current fascist face led by Trump.  The Sahrawi people have always known their friends and allies:  the revolutionaries against colonialism, the free, and all those who fight against the U.S., Europe, and their agents.

AFRICOM Watch Bulletin: From a popular uprising standpoint, the Sahrawi self-determination struggle has been widely regarded as not only legitimate but inspiring.  Also it is worth noting that the Black Alliance for Peace has a Shutdown AFRICOM campaign that is ironically implicated as both the United States and Morocco have used the Moroccan location of the annual African Lion Exercise (the largest AFRICOM exercise) as a bargaining chip to attempt to strongarm concessions in one direction or another.  While we are clear in our U.S. Out of Africa perspective, do you have any thoughts on these relativities and any message or requests to the grassroots?

India Pitts: We encourage everyone to educate themselves on international affairs.  There you will see the interconnectedness of our enemies.  Not only is Morocco allowing the U.S. to host the annual African Lion Exercise but Morocco has Israel drone companies in the Western Sahara occupied territory.

Each company and government cooperating with Morocco, including in the integrated waters off the coast of Western Sahara that Morocco put into its maritime territory, have not tried to obtain permission to do so from the people of the Western Sahara.  Instead they make agreements with these illegitimate settlers.  This violates our right to self-determination in the Western Sahara occupied region.

Our enemies work together, historically and in the present day, similar to the US backing Israel in occupied Palestine.  We saw this with our own eyes when we were commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the National Union of Sahrawi Women in the refugee camps. There we saw the army resources that Spain, the US, and France had provided for Morocco to continue to occupy the Western Sahara territory that the Polisario Front captured during our armed struggle.

We want the grassroots including the organizers everywhere to understand their responsibility to the international struggle against imperialism because our enemies and the enemies of nature, organize together to destroy humanity.   Africans, everywhere, must understand our responsibility to Africa because our destiny is tied to Africa.  We cannot continue to commemorate these flag independence days with Western Sahara occupied and Africa’s islands still being colonized.  It is imperative that we organize against neocolonialism governments, all occupations, and European settlers! 

The Black Alliance for Peace (BAP) seeks to recapture and redevelop the historic anti-war, anti-imperialist, and pro-peace positions of the radical black movement. Read other articles by Black Alliance for Peace, or visit Black Alliance for Peace's website.