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Friday, November 13, 2026

Israel Bombs Lebanon’s Churches


Months into a U.S.-brokered “ceasefire,” Israeli forces are demolishing Christian and Shia villages alike while pressing Lebanon toward sectarian war.

by | Nov 11, 2026 | 

Months after an ostensible “ceasefire” agreement was signed by Marco Rubio’s State Department, the U.S. Army Infantry School-trained President of Lebanon Joseph Aoun, and the government of Israel, Israeli occupation forces continue to occupy much of southern Lebanon, demolish entire villages with C4 explosives, and perpetrate massacres of civilians.

An Israeli soldier smiles at the destruction of St. Joseph’s Church in Qawzah, Lebanon

Under the terms of the Rubio ceasefire, Israel has permission to continue occupying what is called a “security zone,” while Lebanese forces are deputized to accomplish the objective of “disarming” Hezbollah. Only once Hezbollah is disarmed must Israel redeploy from Lebanon. The agreement was designed to supplant the terms of the Iran-U.S. MOU negotiated in Switzerland by J.D. Vance and signed on June 17, 2026, which tied the end of the Iran War to the “immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon” and on “ensuring the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon.”

As Lebanese journalist Mohamad Kleit explained to Dragnet, Lebanese forces have only replaced Israeli occupation forces in three southern villages while Israel’s wholesale destruction of villages continues unabated. A recent New York Times investigation reported that “48 of the roughly 60 villages and towns within Israeli-occupied southern Lebanon are mostly leveled,” noting that “of the 48 villages that have been mostly destroyed, almost all are majority Shiite.”

While corporate media frames the Israeli destruction of those villages and the thousands of civilian casualties Israel has produced as incidental to Israel’s fight with Hezbollah, public statements by Israeli officials reveal what Lebanese human rights activists call “inherent systematic targeting” which “there can be no doubt is deliberate.” Boasting of the destruction of more than 23,000 homes on Israeli television, Israel’s Defense Minister Israel Katz reiterated his longstanding position that Israel seeks to impose what he calls “the Gaza model” in southern Lebanon.

As Israel continues to advance through southern Lebanon despite a ceasefire, Israeli commentators and Lebanese lawmakers alike have said the agreement is designed not to end the conflict but to fuel it, potentially leading to sectarian conflict and civil war.

When the deal was signed, an Israeli analyst remarked on Israel’s Channel 13 that “it seems we’re leading the state of Lebanon into civil war,” adding “maybe it’s not so bad for us, let the Lebanese government fight Hezbollah,” to which his co-host replied that this was “the goal from the start.”

Most recently, Lebanese Druze leader Walid Jumblatt admitted that “we made a mistake by choosing Marco Rubio’s track,” because “believing that the Americans can pressure Israel to withdraw is a complete illusion.” Jumblatt, a former self-admitted warlord responsible for what Jumblatt himself calls “religious cleansing and mass destruction” is no fan of Hezbollah. Yet he now believes he “cannot accept a hardline approach toward Hezbollah if it leads to civil war.”

Indeed, Lebanon is historically ripe for civil war, a consequence of its French imposed system of confessionalism in which political positions are constitutionally divided by religious sect: the President must be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister must be a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of Parliament must be a Shia Muslim. As the Beirut-based war correspondent Robert Fisk argued (he passed away in 2020), confessionalism is one of the root causes of suffering in Lebanon – with the country being the site of some of the most devastating sectarian massacres of the late 20th century. It “may have beautiful mountains, fine food, an extraordinarily well-educated population, but it is sectarian. It’s a bit like owning a Rolls Royce complete with fresh leather seats, a flat screen television and a cocktail bar – but with square wheels. It doesn’t work.”

Israel’s current occupation has exploited these sectarian fault lines, issuing orders seemingly designed to inflame inter-sect animosities. As The New York Times reported in April, 2026,

“Israeli officials have conveyed a [sic] targeted message… In private calls to local leaders across southern Lebanon, Israeli military officials have assured several Christian and Druse communities that they could remain in the evacuation zone. They have pressed them, however, to force out any Lebanese from neighboring Shiite Muslim communities who have sought refuge among them as Israeli bombardments flatten Shiite towns, according to local Christian, Druse and Shiite leaders.”

When Israel destroys Christian villages, demolishing churches and statues of Jesus Christ, Israel blames Hezbollah – the militant group who Shia historically support – for allegedly using them as shelter areas, and some – but not all – Christians in Lebanon have accepted that excuse. Our own various investigations at Dragnet, the substack from this author and Jeremy Loffredo, reveal that what Israel labels “Hezbollah” are usually just Shia families, who often have little or no connection to the group at all. Just as Israel labels the tens of thousands of Palestinians its military killed in Gaza as “Hamas,” Israel likewise uses “Hezbollah” as a rhetorical device to justify its targeting of Shia families. Unlike Israeli statements targeting American audiences, the distinction between “Hezbollah” and Shia Muslims is almost non-existent in Hebrew media, with Defense Minister Katz telling Israeli Channel 14 News in July that in 24 villages destroyed in Lebanon, “there were Shiites who acted as enemies on behalf of Hezbollah and threatened our borders, our residents, and constantly carried out provocations.”

There are Christian leaders in Lebanon who reject Israel’s attempts to inflame sectarian divisions. One of them is Father Tony Hanna, whose church and village of Qaouzah was demolished by Israeli occupation forces in November 2024. Last week, a photo went viral of an Israeli soldier smiling in front of Hanna’s church.

Father Tony Hanna tells Dragnet that while armed groups have existed around the town, he does not view it as an excuse, nor does he blame Shia Muslims for Israel’s destruction of the town. “The Muslims in general and the Shiite sect, we have all respect and love for them, and there are deep friendships and close relationships with many…. Let the words be more than clear… We have never said that Islam, the Muslims, or our Shiite brothers are the ones who demolished the church or because of them…. we are the sons of one nation.”

Two weeks before Israeli forces demolished Qaouzah, an Israeli airstrike hit the Church of Saint George the Wonderworker in Deirdghaya, a Melkite Greek Catholic church in the Tyre District built in 1911. The strike, on the night of October 9, 2024, targeted the square beside the church, according to Georges Elia, a social activist at the church who lives in the village’s historic neighborhood. It damaged the church’s façade and collapsed its multi-story parish hall, which “had also been used to shelter displaced civilians,” adding that the strikes also “affected the priest’s residence and the parish office building.”
 Lebanese media reported an initial death toll of seven, including five Civil Defense members.

Elia tells Dragnet that on Christmas, 2024, he “took the initiative to place a simple Christmas tree amid the ruins of the church. My intention was to preserve the spirit of Christmas and convey a message that damage to a building does not mean the end of the village’s spiritual and social life.
”

It was not the first time the Church had been bombed by Israel. Elia said Israeli forces had struck the church during the 1978 invasion, destroying its western wall, and again in 1992, when bombardment destroyed the attached parish building and cracked the dome. He called the 2024 strike “the most destructive attack in the church’s recent history.”

As Elia explains to Dragnet, “the destruction was not limited to stones and walls. It affected a place that had served as a space for worship, gatherings, solidarity, and welcoming people in need and displaced families.”

Like Father Hanna in Qaouzah, Georges Elia says that “damage to a building does not mean the end of the village’s spiritual and social life.”

Asked about the attempt to blame Shia Muslims or “Hezbollah” for the attacks on Christian’s communities, Elia declined to comment, telling Dragnet, “I do not wish to engage in political or sectarian debates. I respect all components of Lebanese society and believe that coexistence and mutual respect among all citizens are fundamental.”

But complicating the narrative Israel seeks to impose upon Lebanon is the role Hezbollah has often played protecting Lebanon’s and Syria’s Christian communities. As the Pro-Israel Wall Street Journal begrudgingly admitted in 2015, “Christians in the Lebanese village of Al-Qaa depended on army troops to shield them from nearby ISIS militants. Another source of protection: Shiite militants in Hezbollah… The village’s main priest, Father Elian Nasrallah, and others, are promoting the idea that Hezbollah, unlike Sunni extremists, has

always been a friend of Christians.” As Father Elian Nasrallah explains in the video report “Hezbollah was never a danger for Christians.” And as BBC reported in 2014, Hezbollah was instrumental in expelling “al-Qaeda-affiliated al-Nusra Front,” also referred to by BBC as “rebels” – whose leader Al-Jolani is now President of Syria – from the Christian village of Maaloula.

These factors explain why many Lebanese Christians do not view the pretext of “fighting Hezbollah” as an excuse for Israel’s destruction of their communities. And as the U.S. funds and backs that Israeli effort, Iran – historically allied with Hezbollah – has demonstrated itself as the region’s only guarantor of Lebanon’s territorial integrity, continuing to tie an end to the Iran War to an Israeli withdrawal from the south.

Harrison Berger is an independent journalist who has contributed to Drop Site News, The American Conservative, and The Nation. Previously, he was a researcher and producer for System Update with Glenn Greenwald. His work focuses on civil liberties and U.S. foreign policy. He holds a BA in Political Science and Russian Studies from Union College (NY).

Democratic Wave or Imperial Rebrand?: Time Will Tell


by | Nov 12, 2026 | 

As a citizen and scholar, whose research, advocacy and moral framework have been dedicated to seeking justice and peace for the people of Palestine, Iran, Yemen and across West Asia, I find little cause for celebration in the recent Democratic Party midterm victories.

Political reveling makes sense if you trust the winning party offers a significant departure from the horrors of the status quo.

Applauding the Democratic Party means ignoring the ashes of Gaza, the massacre at Minab in southern Iran, and the violent legacy of 80 years of bipartisan U.S. foreign policy in the region.

When analyzing the unified bipartisan consensus that has governed U.S. policy in West Asia for decades, the apparent divide is exposed as mere illusion.  For those committed to international law, human rights and decolonization, a Democratic victory does not guarantee political reformation.  It is more likely to represent adaptation—a cosmetic shift in the stewardship of American empire.

Historical evidence demands a rejection of the conventional false binary political narrative that has framed U.S. elections:  the dichotomy between a unilateralist, militaristic Republican Party in opposition to a diplomacy oriented, human rights focused Democratic Party.  With regard to West Asia, both parties operate within a doctrine of institutional hegemony, military interventionism and colonial dominance.

While Republicans pursue aggression through overt unilateralism and unfiltered bellicose rhetoric, Democrats have executed similar policies behind a veneer of rules-based internationalism and institutional diplomacy.  The end result remains the same for the people in Gaza, Tehran, Beirut or San’a – structural violence, economic strangulation and military destruction.

The catastrophic legacy overshadowing Democratic leadership, past and present, makes it difficult for me to foresee, in the party’s electoral success, any departure from a foreign policy dictated by entrenched institutional systems.

The Biden-Harris administration did not simply miscalculate diplomacy; it actively embraced and underwrote what international legal bodies, human rights organizations and scholars worldwide have characterized as genocide in Gaza.

Most Democrats in Congress fast-tracked the shipment of munitions to Israel to carry out its devastating war on Gaza, rather than opposing it.

It is important to remember that it was Democratic leaders and representatives who stayed silent when:

  • President Joe Biden signed off on billions of dollars in unconditional military aid, transferring heavy weapons, artillery shells and precision-guided bombs to the Israeli regime that killed countless Palestinians and decimated civilian infrastructure across the Gaza Strip.
  • Democratic leaders repeatedly deployed the veto at the UN Security Council, neutralizing international legal mechanisms designed to enforce ceasefires and hold war criminals accountable.
  • The administration and party establishment sought to vilify and suppress student activists, scholars and dissenting citizens who demanded an end to American complicity in the destruction of Palestinian life.

A party that has, without conditions, armed, funded and morally shielded and enabled conduct that violates the baseline of human dignity cannot legitimately claim the mantle of progressivism, peace and democracy.

This critique is not limited to Palestine; it encompasses the wider region, particularly concerning U.S. policy toward Iran.  The conventional narrative that the Democrats represent a reasoned diplomatic alternative to Republican hawkish saber-rattling is contradicted by historical record:

  • Sanctions as collective punishment: Democratic administrations have consistently maintained and expanded comprehensive economic sanction regimes against Iran. These policies have devastated the Iranian middle class, restricted access to life-saving medicines and crippled civic infrastructure.
  • Entrenched militarism: Rather than dismantling the structure of confrontation, Democratic leadership has fortified heavily armed military bases surrounding Iran, reinforcing a regional security framework that has prioritized the sale of weapons over real security cooperation.
  • Complicity in regional escalation: The Democrats’ policy of granting unchecked latitude to Israel and its regional Arab allies, ultimately laid the groundwork for Tel Aviv’s unprovoked war on Iran and escalating instability throughout the area.

The civic obligation of scholarship, rooted in peace and justice, is to accurately identify oppressive systems and structures, independent of the ruling political party.

 True political renewal cannot be found in an election that merely offers a reshuffling of the empire’s stewards.  Simply changing the political party in power is meaningless without confronting and dismantling the systemic framework and forces behind U.S. foreign policy, which directly exacerbate domestic inequality. Justice cannot be built on electoral wins that leave the destructive apparatus of the military-industrial-security framework undisturbed.

Blue Wave victors campaigned on a promise to break from the past; to fashion a bold new era of accountability, structural reform and progressive ideals.  Yet, beyond the speeches and good intentions, they must contend with an embedded military, security and economic establishment built specifically to resist change, neutralize political challenges and assimilate reformists into its power structure.

The new “wave” of Democrats have received a mandate from the voters to drown out the party’s old guard managers of empire and to move away from its traditional  foreign policy of global hegemony, endless wars and support for dictatorial regimes.  The electorate has instead authorized them to honor international laws and treaties, while developing a new diplomatic path in West Asia.

When the Democratic Party ends its complicity with Israel in the brutal colonization and subjugation of Palestinians, terminates its 48-year aggressive  stance toward Iran and adopts a policy that respects the sovereignty and humanity of all people across West Asia, I will rejoice. Until then, I continue to worry that the “blue wave” will simply fade into the hidebound bloody “red” one.

As the euphoric dust settles over the midterms, a central question remains.  Are we witnessing a true victory for democratic renewal or simply the seamless rebranding of an empire under new management?  Time will tell.

© 2026, M. Reza Behnam, Ph.D.

Dr. Behnam is a political scientist who specializes in comparative politics with a focus on West Asia. His “Cultural Foundations of Iranian Politics,” published by University of Utah Press, and still in print, was recognized by Choice as Outstanding Academic Book for 1987–1988.



Will Republicans Learn Their Lesson From the ‘Disastrous’ Midterms?


by | Nov 10, 2026 | 

Politicians break campaign promises with hardly any hesitation and usually they get away with it. Americans have come to put up with broken promises for so long, they hardly even seem to notice. Last week, however, voters noticed. They showed the Republican party just how angry they were over President Trump’s decision to attack Iran and how angry they were with Congress for abandoning its Constitutional authority over matters of war and peace.

The results were dramatic. Voters even turned Texas blue, as Democrats took firm control of both the House and Senate.

As President Trump’s promise of a quick war and a quick victory rapidly faded, the costs of the unnecessary and illegal attack thousands of miles away soon began to hit Americans hard. The predictable closure of the Hormuz Strait sent fuel costs through the roof, fanning the fires of inflation which hit everything transported by road, rail, or air.

For months the polls were clear: Americans’ top three concerns were high fuel prices, inflation, and the Iran war. All were related yet Republicans ignored voter concerns. Last Tuesday, voters had the final say.

The peace candidate usually wins, and President Trump promised repeatedly on the campaign trail that not only would he not start wars, but he would end existing conflicts. But we’ve heard it all before. George W. Bush was elected promising a “more humble” foreign policy. After eight years of Bush’s Middle East wars, Obama was elected as the “new” peace candidate. However soon the “Saddam must go” of the Bush era became “Assad must go” and “Gaddafi must go” in the Obama era. Trump was elected after Biden took us to the brink of war with Russia over Ukraine. He promised that this time he would be the real peace candidate. We got war on Iran instead – a war that we did not win and cannot win.

Has the Republican party gotten the message? Have they learned the lesson voters can deliver when they finally have had enough of being lied to?

Neocons are seeing the voter rebuke of Trump as an opportunity to return the Republican party to the Bush era. Yes, prices and inflation are a problem, they argue, but that has nothing to do with the Iran war.

Nobody is buying that.

Vice President Vance laid out clearly why Republicans lost in the midterms: the war, inflation, rejection of America first, and our unhealthy relationship with Israel. Bush-era neocons like Marc Thiessen were furious, accusing Vance of being “disloyal” to the President.

Does Vance really mean what he said, or is it just another example of politicians promising what they think voters want to hear?

It seems a Republican Party that drummed out Thomas Massie over his opposition to the “Big Beautiful Bill,” who warned about the dangers of putting foreign countries before our own, and who demanded an end to all foreign aid is not a Republican Party that Americans are interested in.

The pain will continue until the Party finally rids itself of the neocons and warmongers and returns to its roots as exemplified in the past by the late Sen. Robert Taft and in the present by Massie, Marjorie Taylor Greene, Joe Kent, Tucker Carlson, and many others who genuinely care about peace and liberty.

Tuesday, November 10, 2026

Lebanon: Background And U.S. Relations – Analysis


US President Donald Trump welcomes Lebanon's President Joseph Aoun to the White House. Photo Credit: White House, X



By Clayton Thomas and Jim Zanotti


Key Takeaways:

The June 2026 U.S.-brokered Trilateral Framework for sequenced Hezbollah disarmament and Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon has stalled beyond two pilot zones, with talks ending inconclusively by late October.

Hezbollah remains weakened yet refuses to disarm while retaining residual capabilities and support; Israeli forces continue operations and hold a southern buffer zone covering about 5% of Lebanese territory.

Lebanon’s post-2025 government has advanced some IMF-linked financial reforms, but deep economic contraction, political risks of confronting Hezbollah, and ongoing conflict continue to limit recovery.



Lebanon, the second-smallest country in the Middle East by size, has at times attracted U.S. and international attention as an arena for regional competition and conflict involving Israel and Iran. Lebanon’s diverse and complex religious demographics have fueled domestic political contention and foreign military interventions. The Iran-backed Shia Islamist group Hezbollah, a powerful Lebanese militia and political party and U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization, has for decades been one of the most prominent concerns of U.S. policy.

Clashes between Israel and Hezbollah since 2023 have impacted Lebanon’s society and its U.S.-supported government. That government took office in 2025 after Hezbollah suffered losses in armed clashes with Israel. U.S. officials have hailed some of the Lebanese government’s actions while pressing it to move more quickly and decisively to disarm Hezbollah. Hezbollah evidently retains some military capabilities and popular support, and it has refused to disarm as demanded by the Lebanese government.


In June 2026, Lebanon and Israel signed a U.S.-brokered Trilateral Framework in which they agreed to restore Lebanese government sovereignty “pending the verified disarmament of non-state armed groups … enabling the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to progressively redeploy out of the Lebanese territory” beginning in designated pilot zones. As of late October 2026, the process appears to be at something of a standstill: implementation of the Framework has not expanded beyond the initial pilot zones, and an eighth round of Lebanon-Israel talks in October 2026 ended inconclusively.

Hezbollah’s refusal to disarm and its characterization of its weapons as necessary to defend Lebanon’s interests against Israel raise the prospect of further civil conflict and foreign intervention in Lebanon. Lebanon’s history has been marred by conflict, as it has struggled to define its national identity since its separation from Greater Syria and establishment as a French-controlled territory after the First World War. At that time, Lebanon’s population included Christian and Muslim communities of roughly comparable size with competing visions for the country. Seeking to avoid sectarian conflict, Lebanese leaders created a confessional system that allocated power among the country’s religious sects according to their percentages of the population. Since then, Lebanon’s demographics and political dynamics have shifted, exacerbating tensions among groups. Sectarian divisions have sometimes stoked violence, such as during the 1975-1990 civil war, as well as periods of stalemate regarding government formation and action. Lebanon’s divisive political dynamics have intensified with Iranian backing for Hezbollah and multiple Israeli military interventions.


Congress has, at times, helped to shape U.S. policy toward Lebanon, including through the authorization of sanctions and the appropriation of various forms of assistance. For two decades, the United States has sought to bolster the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), providing more than $3 billion in military assistance since 2006 with the aim of creating a national force strong enough to counter nonstate actors such as Hezbollah and to secure the country’s borders. The United States has sanctioned Hezbollah and its supporters, as well as other Lebanese actors (including several former Lebanese officials) engaged in activities deemed inimical to U.S. interests such as corruption and drug trafficking. Beyond sanctions and security assistance, the United States has also provided development and humanitarian assistance. Since 2019, Lebanon has undergone the worst economic crisis in its history, with a severe contraction in gross domestic product (GDP) and subsequent rise in poverty rates. Political paralysis after 2022 and recurrent conflict since 2023 have impaired economic recovery. The country’s post-2025 government has undertaken some financial reforms in efforts to secure international assistance, but progress on other International Monetary Fund–sought measures has been uneven.

Location of Lebanon. Credit: Wikipedia Commons

While U.S. officials have hailed direct Israel-Lebanon engagement, fundamental problems persist related to the sequencing and means of possibly disarming Hezbollah, which is weakened but apparently still formidable. Lebanese actors across the political spectrum, including some vociferously opposed to Hezbollah and supportive of its disarmament, have called for Israeli forces to cease operations and withdraw from the country. Those Lebanese actors charge that Israeli operations undermine the Lebanese government and bolster Hezbollah’s resistance narrative. Lebanese policymakers, however, appear to have less clarity on the specific actions, if any, the Lebanese government would take to disarm Hezbollah if Israeli forces were to withdraw, particularly given apparently widespread determination to avoid the civil strife that could be triggered by militarily confronting Hezbollah.

Overview

Lebanon, the second-smallest country in the Middle East by size, has at times attracted U.S. and international attention as an arena for regional competition and conflict involving Israel and Iran. Lebanon is among the most religiously diverse countries in the Middle East, and its complex religious demographics have fueled domestic political contention and foreign military intervention (including by the United States during the 1975-1990 Lebanese Civil War).
Area 10,230 sq. km (slightly larger than Vermont)
People Population: ~5.3 million (2024 est.)Religions: Muslim 69.3 (32.2% Shia, 31.2% Sunni, with smaller numbers of Alawites and Ismailis); Christian 30.5% (Maronites the largest denomination, with others including Greek Orthodox); Druze 5.5% (2023 est.)
Economy Gross Domestic Product (GDP): $34.5 billion in current prices (2025)GDP per capita: $5,897 in current prices (2025)Top exports / partners: cars, gold/jewelry, scrap iron / UAE, Egypt, United States, Turkey (2024)Unemployment rate: 11.5% (2025)Annual inflation rate: 14.6% (2025)GDP Growth Rate: 4.2% (2025), -6.4% (2026, projected)


In 2026, U.S. policy toward Lebanon has largely developed in response to the resumption of fighting between Israel and the Shia Islamist group Hezbollah (an Iran-backed U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization, or FTO, and major political actor in Lebanon) in the context of the U.S./Israel-Iran conflict. Fighting between Israel and Hezbollah after October 2023 has resulted in the deaths of thousands of Lebanese and the displacement of hundreds of thousands, straining Lebanon’s already fragile social and political institutions.1

Congress has, at times, helped to shape U.S. policy toward Lebanon, including through the authorization of sanctions and the appropriation of various forms of assistance, some with conditions attached. Some Members have followed—and made public statements about—developments in the country in 2026. Issues of active or potential congressional engagement include U.S. assistance for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF); sanctions on Hezbollah or other Lebanese actors; and Lebanese government policies, including relations with Israel, Hezbollah disarmament, and putative or proposed economic reforms.
Background: History and Political System

Lebanon’s diverse population of 5.3 million people includes Christian, Sunni Muslim, and Shia Muslim communities of roughly comparable size.2 Political posts are divided among the country’s various religious groups, or “confessions,” to reflect each group’s share of the population—although no formal census has been conducted in the country since 1932.3 Per the 1943 National Pact, Lebanon’s unwritten governing agreement, the presidency is reserved for a Maronite Christian, the prime minister post for a Sunni Muslim, and the Parliament speakership for a Shia Muslim.


Since its independence from France in 1943, Lebanon has been frequently wracked by upheaval, including a devastating and complex civil war from 1975 to 1990, and military interventions by Syria (which occupied parts of Lebanon from 1976 to 2005) and Israel (which invaded in 1978 and again in 1982, ultimately withdrawing from southern Lebanon in 2000). The United States deployed troops at the request of different Lebanese governments in 1958 and 1982-1984 in efforts to bring greater stability to the country.

Since 2019, when Lebanon’s current economic crisis began (see “Economy” below), Lebanese politics have undergone a series of shifts. A protest movement that began in 2019 in response to tax hikes forced the resignation of the prime minister; his successor resigned following an August 2020 explosion at Beirut’s port (reportedly caused by the ignition of a large volume of improperly stored ammonium nitrate) that killed over 200 people and caused massive damage. Parliamentary elections in 2022 did not result in a clear majority for any political faction, contributing to paralysis on government formation. Then-President Michel Aoun’s term ended in October 2022, leaving the government in a caretaker capacity and the presidency vacant until January 2025.
2025 Presidential Election and Government Formation

After over two years of deadlock, and in the wake of the November 2024 ceasefire that halted fighting between Israel and Hezbollah (see below), Lebanon’s Parliament elected LAF chief Joseph Aoun (no relation to Michel) as president in January 2025. During his leadership of the LAF from 2017 until his election as president, Aoun generally garnered commendations from U.S. officials.4 Aoun is the fourth consecutive Lebanese president to have previously served as head of the LAF. Aoun’s election was seen as buttressing the influence of countries that reportedly supported him, including the United States, France, and Saudi Arabia.5

President Aoun appointed Nawaf Salam (formerly Lebanon’s ambassador to the United Nations and president of the International Court of Justice) to serve as prime minister after a majority of members of Parliament endorsed Salam; Hezbollah had backed another candidate. On February 8, 2025, Prime Minister Salam formed a cabinet, the first supported by an electoral mandate since 2022. For the first time in over a decade, Hezbollah does not appear to have the ability to block government decisions, a development that may reportedly be at least partly due to U.S. insistence.6 Nevertheless, some analysts speculate that Hezbollah could retain some “influence on major security and political decisions” through ministers (including the finance minister) that are associated with Hezbollah or Amal, a Shia party that has often allied with Hezbollah.7 In March 2026, as conflict between Israel and Hezbollah resumed (below), Parliament voted to postpone national elections scheduled for May 2026 until 2028.
Hezbollah-Israel Conflict

The escalation of the decades-old conflict between Hezbollah and Israel in 2026 has resulted in the deaths of thousands of Lebanese and displacement of hundreds of thousands, mostly from the predominantly Shia south of the country, straining Lebanon’s already fragile social and political institutions.14 Major combat operations largely ended in summer 2026, when Israel and Lebanon signed an agreement that envisioned the eventual withdrawal of Israeli forces from the country after the verified disarmament of all non-state armed groups, including Hezbollah. As of November 2026, progress toward implementation of the agreement has stalled.

Background

Opposition to Israel is a core tenet of Hezbollah’s founding ideology, and Hezbollah has regularly acted against Israel in solidarity with Palestinian militant groups in Lebanon.15 For nearly two decades, Hezbollah’s stated objective was to drive the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) from areas in southern Lebanon in which they operated after the 1982 Israeli invasion. In May 2000, Israel withdrew its forces from southern Lebanon, but Hezbollah used the remaining Israeli presence in disputed areas in the Lebanon-Syria-Israel tri-border region to justify its ongoing violence against Israel and its existence as a non-state armed militia.16

Hezbollah has repeatedly threatened and engaged in combat with Israel, including a 34-day war in 2006 in which at least 1,200 people in Lebanon and 158 in Israel were reportedly killed.17 Following that war, UN Security Council Resolution 1701 expanded the mandate of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL, created in 1978 to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces after an earlier incursion into southern Lebanon and slated to cease operations at the end of 2026). UNIFIL’s mandate has included assisting the Lebanese government in establishing “an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL” between the Blue Line (the UN-demarcated Israel-Lebanon border, which the two countries have not formalized) and the Litani River.18

Nevertheless, Hezbollah continued to operate in this area of southern Lebanon after 2006 amid debates over UNIFIL’s effectiveness: the first Trump Administration argued that the force was “for years … overresourced given the limits on its freedom of movement and access” by Hezbollah, whereas the Biden Administration argued that UNIFIL’s “most effective functions, including its liaison mechanism and patrols along the Blue Line, will provide value even as Hizballah impedes the mission’s freedom of movement and restricts access, preventing full implementation of UNIFIL’s mandate.”19
Post-2023 Conflict and 2024 Ceasefire

In October 2023, Hezbollah began firing into Israel in stated solidarity with Hamas after Hamas led attacks on Israel.20 Hezbollah and Israeli exchanges of fire killed dozens and displaced tens of thousands in Israel and Lebanon.21 In September and October 2024, Israel’s cabinet added a goal of returning evacuated Israelis living in the north to its official war objectives, which had previously focused solely on Gaza; Israeli military activities in Lebanon then escalated significantly. Israeli air operations reportedly killed most of Hezbollah’s leadership, including longtime leader Hassan Nasrallah.22 Israel also orchestrated the explosion of thousands of electronic devices used by Hezbollah members and initiated ground operations in southern Lebanon, and Israeli forces destroyed many Hezbollah weapons caches and tunnel networks.23 Israeli military maneuvers and airstrikes displaced over a million people in Lebanon and left over 4,000 dead as of December 2024, according to Lebanon’s health minister.24 More than 100 Israelis died during the 2023-2024 conflict.25


In November 2024, President Joe Biden announced a ceasefire agreement, including commitments from the Lebanese government to prevent Hezbollah from carrying out attacks against Israel and to deploy 10,000 LAF soldiers in southern Lebanon; a commitment from the Israeli government to halt attacks on targets in Lebanon and withdraw forces from Lebanon within 60 days; and the establishment of a multilateral mechanism to monitor ceasefire implementation.26 A reported U.S. “side letter” to Israel may have expressed U.S. support for Israeli reconnaissance flights over Lebanon and Israeli military action in response to possible ceasefire breaches.27 While Hezbollah fire largely halted after November 2024, Israeli airstrikes and other military operations in Lebanon continued in parallel with a multisided debate over ceasefire compliance, while Israeli forces continued to hold five areas across the Lebanese border.

Even as Israeli operations continued, Lebanese and Israeli military officials convened regularly with U.S., French, and UNIFIL counterparts in “pentalateral” meetings throughout 2025 to review LAF “progress on maintaining the cessation of hostilities arrangements, and the advancing of disarmament efforts.”28

Lebanese officials insisted throughout 2025 that the Lebanese government would “hold the monopoly over weapons in the country.”29 In August 2025, the Lebanese cabinet ordered the LAF to present a plan to bring all arms under state control by the end of the year and endorsed various U.S.-proposed objectives, including “the gradual end of the armed presence of all non-governmental entities, including Hezbollah, in all Lebanese territory.”30 On January 8, 2026, the LAF announced that it had completed the first phase of its plan to bring all arms under state control by controlling all territory from the Litani to the Israeli border “with the exception of territory and positions still occupied by Israel.”31 Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reacted by calling LAF disarmament efforts “an encouraging beginning, but … far from sufficient” given what he characterized as Hezbollah attempts to rearm.32 UNIFIL reported in December 2025 that it had not seen evidence of Hezbollah’s rearmament.33
Conflict Resumption and June 2026 Trilateral Framework

Citing the February 2026 onset of U.S and Israeli attacks on Iran as well as continued Israeli operations in Lebanon, Hezbollah restarted firing into Israel in early March 2026. In response, Israel launched a large-scale ground offensive that displaced over a million people—around 20% of the country’s population—mostly from the south and other predominantly Shia areas.34 As of October 2026, Lebanon’s health ministry reports over 4,300 people killed since March 2026.35

Days after Hezbollah restarted the conflict, the Lebanese government took the unprecedented step of banning Hezbollah’s military activities, though the LAF chief’s reported inability and/or unwillingness to enforce the decision sparked political contention both within Lebanon and between Lebanon and the United States.36 In early April, the United States and Iran agreed to a ceasefire but made contradictory public statements about its application to Lebanon. Prime Minister Netanyahu authorized direct negotiations with Lebanon days later; they began in Washington on April 14, led by the two countries’ ambassadors to the United States.


In mid-June 2026, the United States and Iran agreed to a memorandum of understanding which included a mutual commitment to ensure “the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon.”37 Apparently wary of Iran’s assertion of influence in Lebanon, the Lebanese government on June 26 signed a “Trilateral Framework” with Israel and the United States. In that agreement, Lebanon and Israel agreed to a “reciprocal, sequenced process, with clear conditions” to restore Lebanese government sovereignty “pending the verified disarmament of non-state armed groups … enabling the [IDF] to progressively redeploy out of the Lebanese territory” beginning in designated pilot zones; for its part, the United States committed to “rally international partners to actively support the Government of Lebanon in rebuilding the country, repairing infrastructure, restoring the economy, and creating opportunities for prosperity.”38 The first “pilot zone” operations began on July 20 in two areas that encompassed the villages of Froun, Srifa, and Zawtar al-Gharbiya. (The IDF had occupied neither Froun nor Srifa, and the LAF was reportedly already present there39.) Some residents began returning to Zawtar al-Gharbiya on July 24, but with around 85% of the town’s homes destroyed, only 16% of the town’s pre-war population of around 5,000 had resettled as of early September.40

An August 2026 Israel-Lebanon meeting in Rome ended without agreement on the future of pilot zones: Lebanon pressed to expand the pilot zones to new areas, while Israel reportedly insisted on the completion of unspecified verification measures in the initial zones.41 It remains unclear who could verify Hezbollah’s disarmament in the pilot zones (reportedly Britain, Italy, Switzerland, and Indonesia have been identified as potential contributors to a verification mechanism) and how they will do so amid disagreements over access to private homes.42

As of October 2026, the process appears to be at something of a standstill: implementation of the framework has not expanded beyond the two initial pilot zones, and the eighth round of talks in October ended inconclusively. U.S. and Israeli officials reportedly view Lebanese government actions as of September 2026 as “insufficient.”43
Current Assessment

As of November 2026, Israeli forces have continued to conduct operations throughout southern Lebanon and have established three new fortified positions there during 2026 fighting.44 Israeli objectives in the 2026 conflict apparently included the creation of a buffer zone in southern Lebanon to reduce Hezbollah threats to Israel (including cross-border anti-tank fire) and the exertion of pressure on Lebanon’s government and military to marginalize Hezbollah—both politically and militarily—and disrupt the group’s sources of weapons and funding. To date, the Israeli buffer zone comprises around 5% of Lebanon’s territory.45 Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz claimed in October 2026 that the IDF had destroyed roughly 60 villages and 23,000 homes in southern Lebanon;46 the IDF reportedly discovered weapons caches in some homes.47 Following allusions by Katz in August to the razing of southern Lebanese villages and preparations for a “long-term” IDF presence in the area, Lebanese Prime Minister Salam termed Israeli actions “systematic destruction” that violates international law. At the same time, an unnamed State Department official was quoted as saying that a permanent Israeli military presence in southern Lebanon “is not consistent with the commitments made in the framework or the long-term peace and security of both states.”48


Hezbollah remains entrenched in parts of Lebanon and may be more capable in some respects than the LAF.49 It remains unclear how, if at all, the conflict has impacted the level of support for Hezbollah within the Shia community. During the 2026 conflict, a sign of Hezbollah’s resilience has been its use of drones featuring fiber optic cables resistant to electronic countermeasures, which have presented security challenges for Israeli troops and areas of Israel a few miles over the border.50 In early October 2026, Lebanese authorities seized hundreds of kilograms of explosives that a Hezbollah MP said belonged to the group and detained two of the group’s members while bringing charges against several more. In a November 5 joint statement, the several countries’ embassies in Beirut, including the United States, encouraged “a swift, independent judicial process, free from political interference.”51
Economy and Potential Reforms

Lebanon was once a relative economic success story, boasting a higher per capita gross domestic product (GDP) than any other non-oil-exporting Arab state in the Middle East as recently as 2019. That year, long periods of high government borrowing, slowing remittances from abroad, and a decline in foreign financial support culminated in a financial collapse as banks shuttered, the currency lost most of its value, and Lebanon defaulted on its foreign debt.52 A study by a UN special rapporteur stated, “The collapse of the Lebanese economy was avoidable.… [E]conomists and financial experts had warned about the impending crisis since at least 2015. Such warnings were willfully ignored by the political leadership.”53

Compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic, the crisis shrank nominal GDP from nearly $55 billion in 2018 to less than $20 billion in 2021, with a slight recovery in subsequent years. The government responded by reducing or eliminating subsidies on essential goods, and a lack of foreign exchange to finance imports triggered shortages of medicine, water, and fuel. According to the World Bank, the percentage of Lebanese experiencing multidimensional poverty (an index that includes non-monetary indicators such as access to clean water and electricity) increased from 42% in 2018/2019 to 73% in 2022/2023.54


The pressures associated with conflict and resulting displacement have exacerbated these conditions for many Lebanese since 2023. The World Bank estimates that GDP contracted by 7.1% in 2024, with Lebanon suffering $7.2 billion in economic losses and $6.8 billion in physical damage from conflict since October 2023.55 The economy rebounded by around 4% in 2025 but is again projected to contract by 6.4% in 2026 due to the resumption of conflict.56

Lebanon signed a staff-level agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in April 2022 to obtain $3 billion in support in exchange for certain reforms. Parliament pursued some reforms, but efforts largely stalled after the presidency went vacant in October 2022, leaving the government in a caretaker capacity until 2025. Lebanon’s current government has renewed work to obtain IMF assistance, with a focus on the following three pieces of legislation:1. Bank secrecy law. Passed by Parliament and signed by President Aoun in April 2025, this law reverses Lebanon’s previously expansive bank secrecy law, which had prohibited the release of banking information (including customer account names and transactions) to government authorities.57 This law is arguably the least controversial of the IMF-mandated reforms, with 87 of 128 legislators voting in favor and 13 against.58
2. Bank restructuring (or resolution) law. In August 2026, Parliament approved an amended bank restructuring law after adopting IMF-approved changes; President Aoun signed it into law in September but later filed an appeal challenging some of its provisions. The law reportedly “sets the legal framework for restructuring Lebanon’s banking sector and sets up the body in charge of making it happen,” namely the Higher Banking Authority.59 Disagreements between the central bank governor and the finance minister surfaced during Parliament’s consideration of the amended bill.60 Both the IMF and the U.S. embassy in Beirut welcomed passage of the law.61 An October 2026 judicial ruling upheld the president’s challenge, annulling part of the law and throwing its future into doubt.62
3. Financial gap law. Also known as the Financial Stabilization and Deposits Recovery Law, this measure is the most important and sensitive of the potential reforms, as it determines how to apportion the tens of billions of dollars in losses among depositors, commercial banks, the central bank, and the government given the reported “‘gap’ between what is owed by Lebanese banks to depositors and what the Lebanese financial system can pay out.”63 In December 2025, the cabinet approved a draft gap law and submitted it to Parliament, where it remains under consideration. The draft law would ensure repayment of up to $100,000 (over four years) per person to depositors who lost funds in the 2019 collapse. In a statement after a September 2026 visit to Lebanon, IMF staff wrote that the proposed gap law needs to “align … with international standards” to ensure “that the hierarchy of claims is respected and no depositors absorb losses before shareholder and junior creditors.”64

U.S. Policy and Issues for Congress

Congressional action regarding Lebanon over the past decade has sought to counter Iranian and violent extremist influence in the country through a variety of military and economic assistance programs and related certification requirements. Some Members have also sought to expand or refine U.S. sanctions related to Lebanon with a focus on Hezbollah.
U.S. Assistance to Lebanon

Most U.S. bilateral assistance to Lebanon has been in Foreign Military Financing (FMF). The United States has provided $3 billion in assistance to the LAF since 2006.65 Specific Trump Administration actions related to security assistance include:the reported approval in March 2025 of the reallocation of $95 million in FMF from Egypt to Lebanon (announced by the Biden Administration in January 2025)66 and
a September 2025 Presidential Drawdown Authority package valued at $14 million, including demolition charges and other materiel to remove and dispose of unexploded ordnance.67

For years, U.S. aid for the LAF has generated debate in Congress between those who support it and those who have argued that U.S. assistance to the LAF is either insufficiently effective or risks falling into the hands of U.S. adversaries.68 Successive appropriations bills69 have stated that funding for the Lebanese Internal Security Forces and the LAF may not be appropriated if either body is controlled by a U.S.-designated FTO. FMF assistance to the LAF may not be obligated until the Secretary of State submits to the appropriations committees a spend plan, including actions to be taken to ensure that equipment provided to the LAF is used only for intended purposes. Beyond State Department–funded FMF, Section 8034 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2026 (Division A of P.L. 119-75), makes available $50 million for the Secretary of Defense to assist the LAF. In the 119th Congress, H.R. 1844 would prohibit the appropriation of any funds for the LAF until the Secretary of State certifies that Hezbollah “no longer maintains any presence in Lebanon,” among other conditions. In July 2025, the House voted 76-355 not to agree to an amendment to the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2026 (H.R. 4016) that would have prohibited all assistance to the LAF.70

The United States has also provided assistance to Lebanon under the Economic Support Fund (ESF) account (whose function appears to have been replaced during the 119th Congress by the National Security Investment Programs account).71 The Trump Administration’s suspension in 2025 of most U.S. foreign assistance and the termination of some programs apparently affected the implementation of some U.S.-funded activities in Lebanon, according to 2025 media reports.72 The Trump Administration, in its FY2026 budget request, did not include country-specific funding levels. The explanatory statement accompanying the House-passed National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2026 (Division B of H.R. 7006), provides for $112.5 million for assistance to Lebanon, which is roughly even with past years. Successive appropriations bills73 have made economic assistance for Lebanon available notwithstanding Section 1224 of the FY2003 Foreign Relations Authorization Act (P.L. 107-228), which states that ESF funds for Lebanon may not be obligated until the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the LAF has been deployed to the Israeli-Lebanese border and that the government of Lebanon is effectively asserting its authority in the area in which the LAF is deployed.


The United States has been the largest single donor of humanitarian assistance to Lebanon in recent years: as of 2022, the United States had provided more than $3 billion in humanitarian assistance for Lebanon since 2012.74 Through January 2025, the United States had provided over $70 million in humanitarian funding for Lebanon in FY2025, implemented through nongovernmental organizations and UN bodies.75 Lebanon was not included on the list of 17 countries to which the United States committed $2 billion in humanitarian assistance in a December 2025 agreement with the United Nations.
Sanctions

Though Lebanon is not subject to any state- or government-level sanctions, the United States has designated for sanctions over 300 individuals and entities in Lebanon. The vast majority are designated under Executive Order (EO) 13224 as specially designated global terrorist entities (SDGTs), generally for ties to Hezbollah. Hezbollah itself is designated as an SDGT as well as an FTO. Congress enacted additional measures in 2015 and 2018 (the Hizballah International Financing Prevention Act, P.L. 114-102, and the Hizballah International Financing Prevention Amendments Act, P.L. 115-272) to authorize sanctions on foreign financial institutions that conduct or facilitate significant transactions for Hezbollah. Other persons are designated under different authorities, including EO 13441, which provides for sanctions on persons determined to be undermining Lebanon’s democracy or sovereignty. In January 2026, the Administration designated the Lebanese Muslim Brotherhood as an FTO and SDGT.

The United States has on occasion designated Lebanese politicians and officials, including:Gibran Bassil (leader of the Free Patriotic Movement), pursuant to EO 13818, which implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act;
two former cabinet ministers (Ali Hassan Khalil of Amal and Youssef Fenianos of the Marada Movement), pursuant to EO 13224, for providing material support to Hezbollah and engaging in corruption; and
Former Central Bank Governor Riad Salameh, pursuant to EO 13441, for corruption.

For years, some Members of Congress have called on successive Administrations to expand sanctions to target additional Lebanese officials they view as obstructing reform and/or Lebanon’s electoral process. Specifically, some Members have advocated for the designation of Nabih Berri, the speaker of Parliament since 1992 and the chairman of Amal.76

In the 119th Congress, S. 842 would direct the Administration to review whether any Latin American jurisdictions meet the definition of terrorist sanctuary under Title 22, Section 2656f, of the U.S. Code with respect to Hezbollah.
Outlook

Conflict between Israel and Hezbollah since 2023 has had economic and human costs and consequences in Lebanon. The Lebanese government’s tentative steps toward Hezbollah’s disarmament and its attempts at financial reforms could facilitate greater political stability and economic strength in Lebanon. Reform obstacles remain, along with the risk of internal conflict and potential escalation related to U.S./Israel-Iran confrontations.


Events in Lebanon have been a factor in conflict between the United States/Israel and Iran since 2023. In turn, this U.S./Israel-Iran conflict has contributed to additional fighting in Lebanon. Lebanon’s government has publicly rejected what President Aoun characterized as Iran’s strategy of using Lebanon as a “bargaining chip.”

Within Lebanon, the June 2026 Trilateral Framework appears subject to the same challenges that undermined the November 2024 ceasefire agreement, which was arguably fraying even before the resumption of major combat in March 2026. The most immediate obstacle remains how to sequence the potential withdrawal of Israel from Lebanese territory, the possible dismantlement of Hezbollah infrastructure, and prospective LAF movements into previous Hezbollah strongholds. The experience of the pilot zones since July 2026 suggests that those processes, if they move forward at all, are likely to be lengthy and difficult.

Israel has apparently sought to maintain a buffer zone in southern Lebanon to reduce Hezbollah threats to Israel and to pressure Lebanon’s government and military to marginalize Hezbollah politically and militarily. Continued Israeli military operations in Lebanon might impede Hezbollah’s recovery; they could also fuel domestic political support for the group and its calls to resist or oppose Israel. The history of Israeli involvement in Lebanon over several decades suggests that short-term gains for Israeli security could be followed by popular domestic resistance to prolonged Israeli presence in Lebanon and/or Lebanese political decisions deemed to be driven by Israeli demands.

More fundamentally, while U.S. officials hail direct Israel-Lebanon engagement, the problem of how to bring about the disarmament of Hezbollah persists, as does the sequencing question. The Iran-backed group is weakened but apparently still maintains some capabilities and popular support and refuses to discuss disarmament until Israel’s withdrawal. Lebanese actors from across the political spectrum, including some vociferously opposed to Hezbollah and supportive of its disarmament, have called for Israeli forces to cease operations and withdraw from the country.77 Those Lebanese actors charge that Israeli operations undermine the Lebanese government and bolster Hezbollah’s resistance narrative. However, Lebanese policymakers appear to have less clarity when it comes to the specific actions, if any, the Lebanese government would take to disarm Hezbollah if Israeli forces were to withdraw, particularly given apparently widespread determination to avoid the civil strife that could be triggered by militarily confronting Hezbollah.


For the endnotes see here

About the authors:

Clayton Thomas, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Jim Zanotti, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Source: This article was published by the Congressional Research Service (CRS).


About CRS
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