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Monday, April 21, 2025

Towards a Counter Anthropology


 April 21, 2025
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Image by Sajimon Sahadevan.

It goes without saying that the study of any subject seeks to deepen understanding through careful analysis, employing all available methodological tools. Such understanding serves as the foundation for making informed decisions. When the subject of study is a foreign country—particularly one with a different language and culture—this raises important questions about the purpose of the study: What are its short- and long-term goals? Who is its intended audience? And can it influence cultural perceptions or challenge prevailing narratives about that country and its people?

These questions are especially pertinent given the significant number of books published by Western university presses on Arab countries. These works often explore religion, sectarian dynamics, political systems, geography, customs, traditions, and both ancient and modern histories. Many of these studies are produced by scholars working within academic traditions shaped by classical Orientalism. Edward Said and others have critically examined this tradition, exposing the underlying assumptions, methodologies, and racial biases, as well as its entanglement with colonial interests. Within this framework, the portrayal of foreign “others” has too often served to justify domination, violence, and exploitation—examples of which are numerous and well-known.

Edward Said’s Orientalism had a profound and lasting impact on how the Middle East is studied in the Western academy. It helped shift the label “Orientalist” to “researcher” and prompted scholars to recognize that objectivity, especially in our commodified age, is not a neutral stance but a complex and often problematic ideal.

This is not to cast doubt on the integrity of researchers and academics, nor to diminish the significance of Western universities and their cultural contributions. Rather, the aim is to draw attention to a deeper issue: the complex relationship between the vast body of academic work produced about the non-Western “other” and the cultural role such scholarship plays in shaping, and potentially transforming, the way we understand the world.

In the Arab world, we have yet to fully develop the capacity to study the world and define our place within it—as other advanced nations have done. More critically, we remain largely unable to study ourselves with the depth and rigor required. We struggle to deconstruct our relationship with the past or to confront the layered problems of our present. At the popular level, inherited beliefs and traditional views continue to shape our understanding of everything around us. As a result, we have become the subjects of external study—observed and analyzed as though we were relics or anthropological specimens.

These studies are not conducted by us, nor are they primarily for our benefit. Instead, they are produced by Western universities to sharpen the intellectual tools of their students, enrich academic curricula, expand research frontiers, and feed vast institutional databases. The Western researcher, supported by prestigious institutions, granted funding, and provided with the resources to live comfortably in our societies while devoting themselves to studying us, undoubtedly achieves notable academic outcomes. Yet these accomplishments often remain disconnected—not only from the local audience but even from the broader readership of the language in which the research is written. They are, in effect, confined within the walls of the academic ivory tower.

We must acknowledge the intellectual and theoretical value of many outstanding Western researchers, as well as the depth, breadth, and precision found in some of the studies written about the Arab world. However, these works often fail to play a dynamic cultural role due to their academic isolation. University researchers are typically removed from public discourse and remain inaccessible to the wider public. Their insights, while rich, rarely permeate mainstream cultural or political conversations.

Yet the issue is more complex than any simplistic “conspiracy theory” explanation would suggest. The vast literature produced about the Arab “other” frequently becomes a reference point for politicians, fellow academics, and policymakers. Some of these works even enjoy commercial success. Still, the typical English-speaking reader interested in Syria, Iraq, or other Arab countries often lacks sufficient background knowledge, and may not be motivated to explore further. As a result, these studies, however well-researched, rarely disrupt the entrenched stereotypes that continue to shape Western perceptions of Arabs—stereotypes that are routinely reinforced in newspapers, books, television, and film. The Arab figure remains all too often cast as backward or threatening, locked in a narrative that perpetuates a culture of dominance and control.

A number of younger Western scholars have begun to challenge the traditional dynamics of ethnographic research. They question the framing of the “other” as a mere object of study and have advocated moving away from terms like “informant” toward more reciprocal terms such as “conversation partner” or “interlocutor.” These researchers emphasize that the subject of study should be seen as an active partner in the co-production of knowledge—an approach that calls for attentiveness, flexibility, and sustained engagement.

When an American writes about Syria or another Arab country, they do so from within a different cultural framework, using a language shaped by its own intellectual traditions and historical experiences. Even when they are sympathetic and well-intentioned, they often lack the depth of immersion necessary to transcend the limits of conventional ethnographic methods. Without that sustained, lived engagement, their perspectives—however insightful—remain constrained by the distance between observer and subject.

Rather than labeling individuals as “Alawite informant,” “Sunni writer,” “Shiite novelist,” or “Druze journalist,” it would be more thoughtful—and more accurate—to refer to them simply as “Syrian,” “researcher,” “writer,” “novelist,” or “university professor.” These sectarian identifiers may serve ethnographic, sociological, or anthropological purposes, but they often reduce complex individuals to narrow categories. This is especially problematic when their views engage with broader cultural, political, or intellectual concerns that transcend such identities.

When a Western researcher says, “This incident was recounted to me by an Alawite or Sunni writer,” one must ask: what exactly is being conveyed? Why not express it differently—more inclusively and without reinforcing sectarian boundaries? For instance, rather than saying “an Alawite writer told me,” one could simply say “a Syrian writer told me.” Framing them this way situates the speaker within a shared cultural space, inviting readers to consider perspectives that go beyond sectarian labels and highlight commonalities.

It is important to recognize and honor anthropologists and scholars who resist dominant narratives and reject perspectives shaped by bias, as their work contributes to more just and meaningful understandings of the world.

I recently came across a remarkable example of this in a book about Syria by American anthropologist Jonathan Holt Shannon. What struck me was how deeply the book resonated—not as a detached academic study, but as though it had been written from within the culture itself. It felt as if the author belonged to it, or was enriched by it in a meaningful and unusual way. His affection for the culture, his personal connection to the topics he explores, and his attentive, respectful engagement with the people he meets—seen not as subjects, but as educated, knowledgeable, and fully human—imbue the work with a rare authenticity.

But it goes beyond that. Among the Jasmine Trees: Music and Modernity in Contemporary Syria stands out as one of the most compelling examples of writing about the so-called foreign “other” without treating them as foreign at all. Instead, Jonathan Holt Shannon engages with the Syrian people and their experiences as an extension of himself, crafting a kind of counter-anthropology—one that resists the traditional anthropological gaze that so often exoticizes or distances its subjects. In doing so, he challenges the dominant discourse that has long portrayed Arabs and Eastern cultures through the lens of strangeness and spectacle, not unlike the caricatures seen in Hollywood cinema. Shannon’s work offers a powerful alternative, grounded in empathy, a passionate critical spirit, intellectual depth, and a refreshing humanism.

Meanwhile, Western studies on Arab societies continue to flourish in the absence of a robust critical cultural movement within the Arab world capable of engaging with and deconstructing these works. The capacity to read in foreign languages remains limited, and the translation movement lacks integration into a local critical framework—one that could analyze ideas, question assumptions, and creatively apply Western methodologies in ways that resonate with local context.

It is telling, for example, that the translation of philosphers like Nietzsche, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Louis Althusser into English is fundamentally different from their translation into Arabic. In English-speaking contexts, these thinkers are situated within a vibrant intellectual culture that actively engages with their ideas, relating them to epistemological, existential, and societal questions relevant to contemporary life. In contrast, their Arabic translations often remain confined to dense, inaccessible language and an elite academic sphere disconnected from broader cultural or societal discourse. As a result, their ideas remain intellectually alien—unrooted in local reality, and largely unused in the development of indigenous theoretical frameworks or critical methodologies.

In my view, there is a way forward. Within the Syrian and broader Arab context, the key lies in cultivating a critical and analytical intellectual culture—one rooted in independent universities that are free from religious and political censorship, and supported by journals committed to open, rigorous inquiry. This must be complemented by a robust translation movement, one not limited to linguistic conversion but connected to a vibrant local intellectual tradition capable of engaging with, analyzing, and contextualizing the most significant Western studies on our region.

Such a cultural infrastructure would allow us to approach these works from our own perspective, situated within our own historical and societal context. In doing so, we would move from being passive recipients of external knowledge to active participants in its interpretation, critique, and application. This shift would enrich our understanding of our own realities, sharpen our ability to evaluate and deconstruct imported ideas, and adapt them in ways that are meaningful and useful to us.

Adopting this approach would help rescue the many books written about Syria and other Arab countries from being misread, misunderstood, or simply forgotten on dusty shelves. It would release us from the status of anthropological, ethnological, or ethnographic specimens and affirm our place as thinking, speaking subjects. It would allow our voices—grounded in experience and critical reflection—to enter the global conversation on our own terms.

Friday, April 18, 2025

SYRIA

Foza Yusif:  HTS risks turning into a new Baath regime

Foza Yusif stated that the constitution and transitional government of HTS are undemocratic, warning that it will resemble the Baath regime.



ANF
ROME
Thursday, 17 April 2025

Foza Yusif, a member of the Co-Presidency Committee of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), stated that if the process initiated by Abdullah Öcalan leads to a resolution, it would eliminate the excuses Turkey has used until now. She said, “This would create a positive situation both in terms of our relationship with Turkey and in resolving the problems within Syria.”

Yusif responded to questions from ANF and noted that Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is currently under significant pressure from international powers. She recalled that its oppressive practices against Alawites have come to light. She pointed out that both the constitution HTS has drafted and the transitional government it has formed so far are not democratic. Foza Yusif stated: “If they continue in this way, they risk becoming a repetition of the Baath regime. We have expressed this on various platforms many times. In particular, their drafted constitution disregards the will of the Syrian people. If they insist on continuing this political line, they will be defeated just as the Baath regime was. If they intend to remain a part of Syria’s future, they must completely change their political approach and reconsider the decisions they have made so far. Their mentality and practices so far have shown no real difference from the Baath regime.”

The danger in the occupied areas remains

Yusif emphasized that one of the most critical issues they are facing is ensuring that the people of Afrin (Efrîn), Girê Spî, and Serêkaniyê can return to their lands and live there safely. She continued: “There are still militias in those regions. In some areas, the Turkish state is also present. Our people can only live safely on their land through the presence of local forces and internal security units, because the danger has not yet passed. Our condition is the withdrawal of the Turkish state and the mercenaries affiliated with it from the territories they have occupied. Only then can our people live in safety. Discussions will be held about the future of these areas. Local councils must be established, the people must govern themselves, and municipalities must be in the hands of the people. Security is the most fundamental issue, and both security and administration must be established. This is the approach we are taking.”

Our stance against the Alawite massacre is clear

Yusif stated that the massacre of Alawites had a profoundly damaging impact across all of Syria, as it sent a threatening message to all communities. She stated, “This is why we have made our position on the massacre absolutely clear. We are working to stop such massacres, to expose them, and to prevent them from happening again. We are actively pursuing this both in diplomatic channels and within the framework of international law. We are also working to provide humanitarian support to Alawite communities. In every region, people must govern themselves through their own will, and everyone’s safety must be ensured. That responsibility lies with Damascus. One of the key topics in our negotiations with Damascus is preventing such massacres from ever happening again. Those who committed the massacre must be held accountable and brought to justice. A monitoring committee has been established for this purpose. We are also following the legal developments closely. We will be observing whether justice is served and whether those responsible for the massacre are prosecuted.”

A resolution in Northern Kurdistan would impact all relations

Yusif recalled that, since 2011, the Turkish state has acted as a source of instability and has supported all forces opposed to the Rojava Revolution. She added: “This is why, if the Kurdish question in Northern (Bakûr) Kurdistan is resolved through democratic means, it will undoubtedly have an impact on relations between Turkey and Rojava. It will also influence the policy that the Turkish state is pursuing in Syria. Turkey has repeatedly claimed, ‘The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) is present here, and that is why we are launching attacks.’ If a resolution is achieved, all the excuses Turkey has used until now will collapse. Therefore, if the process developed by Mr. Öcalan succeeds, it will lead to a positive outcome in terms of security, our relationship with Turkey, and the resolution of the problems in Syria.”

Ilham Ehmed: We are seeking a stronger agreement for Syria


“We are seeking a stronger agreement for Syria's constitutional process, political system and reconstruction,” said Ilham Ehmed at the 9th Sulaymaniyah Forum.



ANF
SULAYMANIYAH
Thursday, 17 April 2025

Ilham Ehmed, Co-Chair of the Foreign Relations Department of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, spoke about the situation in Rojava and Syria at the 9th Sulaymaniyah Forum in southern Kurdistan (northern Iraq).

Pointing out that it will be difficult to return to the pre-2011 situation in Syria, Ehmed emphasized that diversity must be respected.

“The rights of Kurds and all other components must be guaranteed in the constitution,” she said.

Stating that the majority of the Syrian people do not want a centralized system, Ehmed said, “Syria needs new solutions to avoid the current crises.”

Underlining that the participation of all parties in the drafting of the new constitution will be important, Ilham Ehmed said, “The Syrian people have decided to fight for their freedom and dignity and will not give up their goals from now on.”

Referring to the agreement between the Autonomous Administration and the Damascus government, Ilham Ehmed said, “We are seeking a stronger agreement for Syria's constitutional process, political system and reconstruction.”

Regarding the agreement signed between SDF General Commander Mazloum Abdi and Syria's interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa, Ilham Ehmed added: “This agreement is important for the fate of the Kurdish people and other components of Syria. The agreement refutes the allegations that the Autonomous Administration is trying to secede from Syria.”

Ilham Ehmed also pointed to the obstacles facing the Autonomous Administration, saying, “These obstacles do not mean that we will take steps back. On the contrary, they strengthen our will to achieve our goals. We hope to build a better and we will continue our struggle until we reach our goals.”

“The experience of the Kurdistan Region is important in the history of Kurds and the countries they live in,” Ilham Ehmed concluded: “The situation in the Kurdistan Region and the geopolitical situation in Syria are generally different. This difference must be taken into account.”


Rojava to defend current status if Damascus rejects federalism: Official

April 17, 2025
Rudaw


Elham Ahmed, co-chair of Rojava’s foreign relations office, speaking during a panel discussion at the Sulaimani Forum on April 17, 2025. Photo: screengrab/AUIS.


ERBIL, Kurdistan Region - A senior official from the Kurdish-led administration in northeast Syria (Rojava) said on Thursday that they plan to preserve the enclave’s current status while engaging more actively in Syria’s political process, despite the new government’s rejection of federalism.

“Our current plan is to preserve what exists, and we will try to be more involved within Syria and participate in every process,” Elham Ahmad, co-chair of the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria’s (DAANES) foreign relations said during a panel at the Sulaimani Forum when asked about their plan if Syria’s interim government opposes federalism.

The interim government’s officials and commanders have ruled out federalism.

The Kurdish official warned that centralized systems have historically led to structural crises in diverse societies like Syria.

“We see that strictly centralized systems do not solve problems but deepen them,” she said. “Syria must not return to [how it was] before 2011. It must be decentralized and give the rights of all Syrian components.”

Her remarks come weeks after a deal was reached between interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) chief Mazloum Abdi to integrate Rojava’s civil and military institutions into the Syrian state.

The SDF is the de facto army of Rojava.

Ahmed called the agreement a “historic point” which dispels accusations that the Kurdish administration seeks partition or separatism.

“We have always been accused of [wanting to cause] division and separation, so this agreement has put those accusations to rest,” she said. “We are now in the phase of forming dialogue committees to discuss the bond of the agreement, how to implement it, and its mechanism.”

Ahmed confirmed that “many understandings” had also been reached regarding the strategic Tishreen Dam and Kurdish-majority neighborhoods of Sheikh Maqsood and Ashrafiyeh in northern Aleppo which had long been under SDF control.

This follows a 14-point agreement signed in early April that includes a prisoner swap and outlines joint security oversight in Aleppo.

As part of the broader agreement, Damascus-aligned forces and the SDF on Sunday began jointly managing security of the neighborhoods.

The dam became the target of intensified attacks by Turkish-backed militia groups following the ouster of the former regime.

Rojava’s Ahmed reiterated that the Kurdish administration demands participation in drafting Syria’s new constitution.

“What is happening now is that Syria’s future is being specified by one side,” she said. “We see ourselves as important and serious partners in the process of rebuilding Syria.”

Sharaa signed a 53-article interim constitutional declaration in March, criticized by minority communities for reinforcing authoritarianism and religious exclusion. It preserves Syria’s name as the “Syrian Arab Republic,” makes Arabic the sole official language, and stipulates Islamic jurisprudence as a primary source of legislation. It also requires that the president be Muslim.

The declaration has drawn backlash from various groups, including Syria’s Druze community. Their spiritual leader, Sheikh Hikmat al-Hajari, who in March called the government “extremist in every sense of the word.”

At the Sulaimani panel, Ahmed noted that many Syrians - including Druze, Alawites, Christians, and a significant secular segment of the Sunni Arab population - reject centralism. “Most in Syria demand decentralization,” she said.

Druze military and political forces in Suwayda have refused to disband and repeatedly called for decentralization. Bahaa al-Jamal, the Druze commander in Suwayda, told Rudaw in March that the declaration is “not accepted” and that the community “ought to have been included” in the process. He added that the Druze will only recognize Syria’s president “through fair elections.”

In March, Rojava’s ruling Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the opposition Kurdish National Council (ENKS) agreed on a joint list of demands, including federalism.

“The unification of the Kurdish stance is the starting point,” said Hoshyar Zebari, a senior official from the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), who voiced support for the demands.

The KDP, led by Masoud Barzani, has maintained ties with both ENKS and the SDF. In January, Barzani met publicly with Abdi in Erbil, followed by talks between Abdi and ENKS that led to a plan to send a united Kurdish delegation to Damascus.

Peter Galbraith, former Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations and fellow panelist, highlighted Syria’s vast social and ideological divisions and argued that federalism offers the best path forward.

“How do you reconcile a part of Syria, northeast Syria, which has its own political system, strict gender equality... with one in Idlib, which is Islamist?” he asked. “Federalism in Syria is likely to keep Syria together.”

The Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), whose leaders rule Syria, was formed from factions previously affiliated with al-Qaeda and Islamic State (ISIS). HTS leader Sharaa has attempted to rebrand, but international critics point to extremist ties. Some members of the newly formed cabinet in Damascus - such as Interior Minister Anas Khattab - were designated as terrorists by the US and the UN in the early years after the civil war in 2011.

Prior to ousting the former regime, the HTS had long controlled Idlib in northwestern Syria.

Galbraith stressed that around 40 percent of Syria’s population is not Sunni Arab, and even among Sunni Arabs, many are secular, echoing claims made earlier by Ahmed.

“The idea that one particular ideology coming out of Idlib led by somebody who used to be ISIS and used to be al-Qaeda could somehow control Syria, is something that is not in the interest of the people of Syria and frankly not in the interest of the rest of the world,” he said

Galbraith proposed elections based on proportional representation as a way to ensure diverse representation and inclusivity across Syria’s fractured landscape.

“We’re hoping to reach deeper understandings regarding the constitutional process, the political process, and the process of rebuilding Syria anew,” Ahmed said during the discussion.


The struggle for democracy must be waged correctly

The democratic struggle must unite all of Syria and prevent HTS from using religion for sectarian rule.




ZEKI BEDRAN
ANF
NEWS DESK
Thursday, 17 April 2025



Those who came to power in Syria under Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) have failed to inspire any confidence in either domestic or international public opinion. Their track record was already deeply troubling. They tried to present themselves as changed by trimming their beards and putting on suits. But in practice, their actions have never matched their words. They deliberately excluded all organized forces in Syria from the entire political process. In their so-called transitional constitution, they included an excessively empowered presidential status. In its current form, it is clear that they are on the path to establishing a regime even worse than the Baath regime. While the Baathists built an oppressive system fueled by Arab nationalism, HTS is adding religious fanaticism to this formula, constructing a regime that is even more despotic and authoritarian.

At a time when it was seeking legitimacy, HTS carried out a brutal massacre of the Alawite population. In its current state, it does not have full control over Syria and lacks strong internal support. Yet one must ask: if a mindset capable of such a massacre gains more power, what else might it do? HTS has a background rooted in primitive methods—beheading people and spreading terror throughout society to grow stronger and expand its influence. If it ever gains full control over Syria, it will deny the right to life to anyone who does not conform to its ideology.

The mindset and structure of HTS are no mystery. This is precisely why they have not been accepted internationally in the way they had hoped. The United States (US), the United Nations (UN), and European countries have not removed HTS from their list of terrorist organizations. In fact, by continuing the sanctions imposed on the Baath regime, they have made it clear that they will keep monitoring the group and observing its actions. Despite being under international scrutiny and operating in a time of severe economic collapse within the country, HTS did not hesitate to carry out a massacre targeting the Alawite population. Moreover, the governing practices they have demonstrated so far have consistently excluded any notion of democracy.

Syria is a country rich in culture, ethnicity, and religious diversity. However, the overly centralized and repressive rule of the Baath regime is what led the country to its current state. What Syria needs is not new despots or authoritarian systems, but a democratic structure that embraces all people. Only a democratic Syria can truly welcome all beliefs, cultures, and differences. Yet HTS has acted in complete opposition to this vision. It appointed the so-called transitional government according to its own interests, dictated the content of the transitional constitution, and unilaterally defined the 'congress' and its composition. In doing so, it consulted neither the self-administrations governing significant parts of Syria, nor the Druze community, nor intellectuals or secular groups. In many cases, they were not even informed.

HTS has even adopted and reimposed the name of the country as defined by the Baath regime, insisting on calling it the 'Syrian Arab Republic' instead of the 'Democratic Syrian Republic.' As can be seen, both their mindset and the methods they employ are completely incompatible with democracy. They openly claim that drafting the constitution and holding elections will take four to five years, but this is a deliberate tactic. In reality, one year is more than enough to draft a constitution, and two years are sufficient to organize elections. Because they lack a genuine mass base, they aim to use state power to organize themselves and consolidate their rule. Their plan is to establish dominance first, weaken the opposition, and only then move toward elections.

There are serious misconceptions in the discussions taking place within democratic circles and in the international public sphere. What is truly needed is to correct these misunderstandings, demand democracy for all of Syria, and actively struggle for it. It is often said, “Alawites, Druze, Christians, and other minorities in Syria must be protected, and their persecution must be opposed.” Raising awareness on these issues is not wrong. If HTS gains more power, it will undoubtedly crush these minorities. Their mentality is perfectly suited to such repression. They operate with a boundless lust for power and an authoritarian mindset. However, focusing solely on this aspect of the problem is a mistake. It ultimately plays into HTS’s hands and reinforces their agenda.

Is it only minorities and followers of different faiths who want democracy in Syria? Does the broader Syrian population truly accept the mindset and governance model of HTS? The answer is no. A large portion of the Syrian people, especially Sunni Arabs, must not be abandoned to HTS. There is a broad segment of the population in this country that, in one form or another, has embraced secular life. For example, what percentage of Damascus’s population truly accepts the worldview and lifestyle imposed by HTS?

Do Alawites, Kurds, Turkmens, Druze, and Christian communities need democracy, but Sunnis do not? If Sunnis are overlooked, the possibility of building a healthy and inclusive democracy is put at serious risk. Just as it is wrong to label the entire Baath regime as 'Alawite,' it is equally wrong to associate all Sunnis with HTS, hand them over to it, or consider them part of it. Such an approach and perspective are fundamentally flawed.

Democratic demands and the struggle for freedom must encompass all of Syria. Self-administrations, democratic groups, and intellectuals must join forces and share their experiences. HTS must not be allowed to promote sectarianism or use religion as a tool for power. Without labeling people by sect or ethnicity, all of Syria must come together under the umbrella of democracy. When all communities and religious groups accept one another and succeed in living together peacefully, everyone in Syria will be safe. If Syria is to be a shared home for all its people, then the public stage must not be handed over to those who behead in the name of rule.

Syria’s first Kurdish education minister works to bridge gaps with Rojava

05-04-2025
Rudaw


Syrian education minister speaks to Rudaw on April 1, 2025. Photo: screengrab/Rudaw



ERBIL, Kurdistan Region - Syria’s new education minister, the only Kurd in the cabinet, wants to bridge gaps between the federal education system and the one in northeast Syria (Rojava) that operated independently for 13 years during the civil war.

“The certificates of those who obtained their credentials between 2011 and 2024 should be accepted,” Mohammad Turko told Rudaw’s Dilbixwin Dara on Tuesday.

Kurdish authorities in Rojava developed their own curriculum in areas they controlled, rejecting the national one in place at the time that they said promoted Baathist ideology. They also promoted Kurdish as a language of instruction for the first time.

While acknowledging the technical difficulties of aligning the Rojava curriculum with national standards, Turko vowed to develop a plan for certificate equivalency. The issue has become increasingly urgent for thousands of students in Rojava. Turko explained that recognizing these certificates would allow students from Rojava to enroll in Damascus University and other Syrian institutions.

He also pointed to logistical obstacles faced by students in Rojava, who are often forced to travel to distant governorates to sit for baccalaureate exams for grades nine and 12. “All of them cannot be expected to travel to other governorates to take their exams,” he said.

Among his stated priorities are improving teaching quality, rebuilding schools, and integrating more than 2.5 million displaced children back into the education system.

On the issue of mother-tongue education, Turko expressed support for cultural and linguistic rights. “Language is the identity of a nation,” he said, noting that many Kurds would have expectations of him. “I am the minister for all Syrian children,” he added. “Every child has the right to learn.”

He said that Syria’s constitution guarantees language freedoms and framed Kurdish-language education as a cultural right. However, he tempered expectations by noting that practical implementation would require “work and agreements.”

Born in the Kurdish city of Afrin in northwest Syria in 1979, Turko holds a law degree from Damascus University and a doctorate from Leipzig University. He has published extensively on child rights, citizenship, and education, and has taught at several Syrian universities.

Turko was appointed Minister of Education and Learning in late March by interim Syrian President Ahmad Sharaa as part of a new 23-member cabinet.

The appointments have raised eyebrows, with ethnic and religious communities voicing concern over the lack of consultation. The cabinet includes several controversial figures, including individuals blacklisted by the United Nations and the United States for ties to extremist armed groups. Among them are Anas Khattab, a former intelligence chief named interior minister, and Mazhar al-Wais, a senior Sharia judge from Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), appointed justice minister.

“I am a Kurdish technocrat minister in this government,” Turko said. “I am not a representative of a political party or political force.”


Druze, Kurds share ‘harmonic’ relationship, vision for Syria’s future: Senior Druze cleric

26-03-2025
Rudaw
Interview    



Senior Druze cleric, Youssef al-Jarbou, speaking to Rudaw on March 24, 2024. 
Photo: Screengrab/Rudaw

ERBIL, Kurdistan Region – A senior Druze cleric from Syria’s southern Suwayda province highlighted his community’s “harmonic” relationship with the Kurdish “brothers” in northeast Syria (Rojava), emphasizing their shared political vision for Syria’s future and alignment in demands and efforts.

“There is good communication between our people in the Kurdish regions and the people of Suwayda,” Yousef al-Jarbou, one of three Sheikh al-Aql (leaders of wisdom) of the Druze community in Syria, told Rudaw on Monday. “We see our relationship with the Kurds as one of harmony and shared political vision, particularly regarding Syria’s future. There is significant alignment in our demands and efforts,” he added.

In early March, Syria's interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) chief Mazloum Abdi signed a landmark agreement to “integrate all civil and military institutions” in Rojava under the administration of the Syrian state, “including border crossings, the [Qamishli International] Airport, and oil and gas fields.”

Jarbou said that the Druze were “very pleased with this agreement.” He described the accord as “a positive step to prevent bloodshed and avoid military confrontations” and “a good step toward the future” of Syria.

At the same time, the senior Druze cleric reiterated his community’s rejection of Syria’s interim constitution in its current draft.

In mid-March, Sharaa signed a 53-article constitutional declaration that centers on Islamic jurisprudence, mandates that the country’s president must be Muslim, and sets a five-year transitional period. It also maintains Syria’s official name as the Syrian "Arab" Republic.

The interim constitution also grants Sharaa exclusive executive power, the authority to appoint one-third of the legislature, and the ability to appoint judges to the constitutional court, which is the body that can hold him accountable.

Jarbou stated that the declaration “does not rise up to the aspirations of the Syrian people,” including the Druze community, and warned that it could steer Syria toward a “non-participatory state.” He added that under these conditions, the Druze cannot “participate” in the upcoming government.

Following the ouster of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad in early December, both the Rojava administration and the Druze community have urged decentralization, despite the new Damascus leadership’s rejection of federalism.

Jarbou reiterated that decentralization is not equivalent to “secession,” emphasizing that Syria’s Druze would accept whatever system emerges from “a comprehensive consensus” among the Syrian people across all governorates.

Below is the full transcript of the interview.

Rudaw: How do you view the constitutional declaration? Do you believe it meets the aspirations of the Syrian people?

Youssef al-Jarbou: In reality, the Syrian constitutional declaration does not fulfill the aspirations of the Syrian people. There are strengths and weaknesses, but the weaknesses are fundamental. The declaration appears to lean toward a non-inclusive state, and there are concerns about extremist undertones in it. We hope this constitutional declaration can be amended - as it is, after all, a draft constitution - to address its shortcomings. I don’t know how the current government views the possibility of amending the constitution to align with the aspirations of the Syrian people. We want a constitution that embraces all components of Syrian society, ensuring freedom, dignity, and full independence for Syria as a sovereign state, free from any external domination, while safeguarding citizens' religious and social rights and guaranteeing general freedoms. We want a constitution that truly represents the diverse components of the Syrian society.

Did the interim constitution’s drafting committee include any representative from Suwayda?

I don’t think so. We were not consulted to nominate anyone for the constitutional drafting committee from the outset. I also don’t believe anyone from Suwayda province was represented in this committee.

Speaking of the provisions in the constitution, which ones do you disapprove of or believe need changing?

First and foremost, with regards to the provisions stating that the religion of the state is Islam and that the president must be Muslim, we don't object to these two points per se, but we oppose the reliance on Islamic jurisprudence as base for drafting the constitutional declaration as it opens the door to jurisprudential interpretation. I recently told one of the TV channels that this could lead us to the jurisprudence of Ibn Taymiyyah or Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab which are extremist schools of thought that reject the other. This could plunge us into sectarian or religious conflicts over jurisprudential interpretations. We believe a civil constitution that guarantees the freedom of all Syrian citizens, regardless of their background, is the true safeguard for the rights of the Syrian people.

This constitution will be in effect for the next five years marking the transitional period in Syria. If its provisions remain unchanged, will you participate in the new government?

I don’t think we can participate under these conditions. Another notable issue is the absence of a provision specifying the president’s nationality. Previously, one of the requirements was that the president must be a Syrian Arab for at least five years. Now, this provision is missing from the constitutional declaration. Additionally, we noticed the abolition of the prime minister’s position and the expansion of powers for the president and the presidential or national council, which is structured around six or seven leading figures headed by Mr. al-Sharaa. This centralizes decision-making within a single faction and a single group. Decisions concerning Syria’s future as an inclusive state for all Syrians are now monopolized by one group, which we see as problematic. Decision-making should be participatory.

There’s also the issue of the separation of powers, there’s no clear accountability. For example, if a minister is appointed, can they only be held accountable by the president or by the legislature as well? We don’t see the benefit of granting ministers or government officials broad powers without oversight.

Another controversial point is the composition of the legislature, where one-third of its members are appointed by the president, and the other two-thirds are nominated. This deprives citizens of the right to choose their representatives. In most countries, the People’s Council or parliament represents the citizens, voices their concerns, monitors the government’s work, and ensures the implementation of service programs. Allowing the president to appoint one-third of the council opens the door to blocking any decision that doesn’t align with this faction’s interests, which is also another flaw in the constitution.

Speaking of the demands of Suwayda’s residents and the Druze spiritual leaders, how do they envision the state’s policy - centralized or decentralized?

In fact, our demands align with those of the Syrian people as a whole, serving the next phase and all Syrians. In Suwayda, we have no ambitions or orientations that differ from those of the Syrian people. The upcoming political mechanism, whether decentralized or federal, must have broad approval across all Syrian provinces. If there is consensus on whether the next phase should involve centralized governance, decentralization, federalism, or self-administration, Suwayda cannot unilaterally adopt a separate political model.

When we talk about decentralization, we mean for all of Syria, not just a specific region. There have been many statements from Suwayda calling for decentralization, similar to those coming from northeast Syria (Rojava) aiming to guarantee the rights of all components. This does not mean secession. What is your view?

Decentralization is not secession; it is a form of governance. We do not oppose decentralization at this stage, but we demand that this direction be based on a general consensus among the Syrian people. If there is agreement on decentralization, we support it, and if there is agreement on federalism, we support that as well. This is my personal opinion, and I believe many in Suwayda share it.

Regarding the military council in Suwayda, why hasn't it surrendered its arms yet? What are the reasons?

In the past period, we suffered from terrorist attacks from several factions and endured losses in lives and equipment. We have concerns about the next phase, as full stability has not yet been achieved, where the state can fully impose its control over all Syrian territories, including Suwayda, and ensure security. At that point, there will be no need to bear arms. Currently, our weapons are not directed at the state or any party but are for self-defense, protecting our land, honor, and lives. The next phase requires organizing the status of armed factions and cooperating with the state, paving the way for weapon regulation. We may reach a stage where we no longer need these weapons, and control returns to the state.

What is your response to the recent Israeli positions? How do you interpret them?

Recently, there has been much talk about Israel being a guarantor of security for Suwayda and the Druze, but in my perception this is being exploited politically by the Israeli government to send a message to the surroundings that the Druze seek secession, which is untrue. We have not requested protection from Israel, not in the past and not in the future. Our true protector is God, and we are accustomed to defending ourselves with our own means, without relying on external forces. International and regional interventions in Syria’s internal politics have imposed realities on the ground, but we strive to rely on ourselves with all we have. What comes from abroad as part of international agendas is beyond our control.

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s statements spoke of a participatory Syria that embraces all sects. Were you asked to participate in the government or the drafting of the constitution?

The rhetoric of the Syrian government, led by Mr. al-Sharaa, has been positive and reassuring, especially to the people of Suwayda, conveying that the state is cooperative and will do everything necessary to rebuild Syria into a civilized and advanced nation. Personally, I have not been contacted regarding participation in the government or the constitution. I don’t know if there have been communications with other sheikhs or officials, but to my knowledge - perhaps through indirect channels, especially with some young political figures who were part of the opposition - there may have been some coordination. However, this is just a possibility, and I have no confirmed information. We hope to have a role in the new government.

How would you describe your relationship with the Kurds in Rojava? Is there any communication between you?

Yes, there is good communication between our people in the Kurdish regions and the people of Suwayda. During the 2018 kidnapping crisis following the Islamic State (ISIS) attack, the Kurds offered significant assistance in securing the release of the abducted women. Our Kurdish brothers proposed exchanging high-ranking ISIS leaders held by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) for the kidnapped women. We see our relationship with the Kurds as one of harmony and shared political vision, particularly regarding Syria’s future. There is significant alignment in our demands and efforts.

What is your opinion on the agreement between SDF Chief Mazloum Abdi and Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa?

We were very pleased with this agreement, even though we were not privy to all its details. In principle, it was a positive step to prevent bloodshed and avoid military confrontations. The agreement paved the way for reuniting the Syrian society and removed the specter of war from the region and our Kurdish brothers. I believe the concerned parties are best positioned to evaluate its outcomes, but from my perspective, it was a good step toward the future.

What are your key demands from the Syrian government?

Today, we suffer from the absence of state authority in Suwayda, leading to chaos and a governance vacuum. Some institutions are barely functional, while others, like the judiciary and civil registry, are completely inactive. Births have gone unregistered for three months, marriages are not being documented, and there are obstacles in issuing passports and ID cards. The main reason is the absence of the state. We have demanded and continue to demand, the return of state authority. There were initial understandings and general agreements at first, but some disputes arose. We hope these will soon be resolved so the state can reassert its control over Suwayda.

These are service-related demands. What about political demands?

We want representation in the legislative body, a say in drafting the constitution, and meaningful participation in the upcoming government, one that reflects our component’s rightful place in Syria’s political landscape.

Saturday, March 22, 2025

International report

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Syria in crossfire as Turkish-Israeli rivalry heats up over Assad’s successors

Issued on: 

The overthrow of Bachar al-Assad's regime in Syria and its replacement by new rulers with close ties to Turkey are ringing alarm bells in Israel. RFI's correspondent reports on how Ankara and Jerusalem’s deepening rivalry could impact Syria's future. 


Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, right, and Syria's interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa, hold a joint press conference following their meeting at the presidential palace in Ankara in February. © AP Photo/Francisco Seco

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's already strong support for the militant group Hamas has strained relations with Israel.

Now, Syria is threatening to become a focal point of tension.

Earlier this month, Erdogan issued a widely interpreted warning to Israel to stop undermining Damascus's new rulers.

"Those who hope to benefit from the instability of Syria by provoking ethnic and religious divisions should know that they will not achieve their goals," Erdogan declared at a meeting of ambassadors.


Erdogan's speech followed Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's offer to support Syria's Druze and Kurdish minorities.

"We will not allow our enemies in Lebanon and Syria to grow," Netanyahu told the Knesset. "At the same time, we extend our hand to our Druze and Kurdish allies."

Gallia Lindenstrauss, an Israeli foreign policy specialist at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv told RFI that Israel view is not very optimistic about the future of Syria, and sees it as a potential threat to Israel.

Success of rebel groups in Syria advances Turkish agenda

"The fact that Turkey will be dominant in Syria is also dangerous for Israel," adds Lindenstrauss.

"Turkey could build bases inside Syria and establish air defences there. This would limit Israel’s room for manoeuvre and could pose a threat. Israel wants to avoid this and should therefore adopt a hard-line approach."

Deepening rivalry

Ankara and Jerusalem’s deepening rivalry is shaping conflicting visions for the future of Syria.

Selin Nasi, a visiting fellow at the London School of Economics' Contemporary Turkish Studies Department, "Turkey wants to see a secure and stabilised unitary state under Ahmad al-Sharaa’s transitional government.

"Israel, on the other hand, wants to see a weak and fragmented Syria. Its main concern has always been securing its northern border," added Nasi.

Israeli forces are occupying Syrian territory along their shared northern border, which is home to much of Syria’s Druze minority.

However, Israeli hopes of drawing Syria's Kurds away from Damascus suffered a setback when the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which controls part of Syria, signed an agreement on 10 March to merge part of its operations with Syria’s transitional government.

Mutual distrust

As Damascus consolidates control, analysts suggest Israel will be increasingly concerned about Turkey expanding its military presence inside Syria.

"If Turkey establishes military posts in the south of the country, close to the Israeli border, presumably with the permission of the government in Damascus," warns Soli Ozel, a lecturer in international relations at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna, "then the two sides would be in close proximity, with military forces on both sides. That, I believe, would create a highly dangerous, volatile, and incendiary situation."

As Erdogan celebrates Turkish role in ousting Assad, uncertainty lies ahead

Analysts warn that if Turkey extends its military presence to include airbases, this could threaten Israel’s currently unchallenged access to Syrian airspace.

However, some observers believe that opportunities for cooperation may still exist.

"Things can change," says Israeli security analyst Lindenstrauss.

"Israel and Turkey could resume cooperation and potentially contribute to Syria’s reconstruction in a way that does not threaten Israel. However, this does not appear to be the path the Erdogan regime is currently taking, nor does it seem to be the direction chosen by Netanyahu and his government."

With Erdogan and Netanyahu making little secret of their mutual distrust, analysts warn that their rivalry is likely to spill over into Syria, further complicating the country’s transition from the Assad regime.