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Sunday, October 13, 2024

 

Facing the fascist danger

Published 
Refugees welcome

First published at New Politics.

In autumn 2024, the largest democratic republics in Europe and North America remain in extreme danger, amid ongoing and deepening fascist threats, especially in the United States.

France: Centrists betray July vote, allying with neofascists.

In France, voters mobilized by the left defeated the neofascist National Rally party in the July parliamentary elections. But by September, the authoritative newspaper Le Monde published a somber editorial noting that by now the neofascists had been placed “in the position of arbiter or censor” of the government, with the left sidelined (“Matignon: Un choix qui ne referme pas la crise politique,” September 7, 2024).

How did this happen? July saw a surprising and exhilarating defeat for the fascists, one where the left took the lead in creating a “republican front” against them, forcing most of the centrists into line. In the event, the neofascists came in a humiliating third, after the leftist New Popular Front and after President Emmanuel Macron’s “centrist” Together bloc. However, France’s semi-authoritarian constitution, originating in De Gaulle’s 1958 coup, allows the president huge powers. Using these to the fullest, the increasingly rightwing Macron refused to allow the leftist New Popular Front even to attempt to form a government, likely with his Together bloc the minor partner. Instead, he appointed conservative politician Michel Barnier as prime minister, rather than even trying to negotiate with the left. Even though Barnier’s small party combined with Macron’s lacks anything near a parliamentary majority, he has entered into a corrupt informal agreement with the National Rally, which now has veto power over policies and legislation. This bodes ill for migrants and refugees, people of color, the working class, as well as for Ukraine, and most of all for the future of French democracy.

Evidently, French centrists and conservatives have finally moved far enough to the right to do what has been feared over the last several decades. They have decided to side with the fascists against the left, in order to preserve austerity, avoid even the mildest tax increases on high incomes or wealth, and because they are also becoming increasingly anti-immigrant, more openly racist and Islamophobic, and repressive. They have also slid to the right in the face of mounting unrest from the left, from labor, from youth of color in the banlieus, and from a new generation of students determined to defend Gaza in the face of an Israeli genocide in which the French state is complicit.

In response, the left held large protest demonstrations around the country on September 7. Tens of thousands took to the streets, with their white-hot anger expressed by slogans like “Barnier, go f—yourself, you did not get the votes.” With larger labor demonstrations scheduled for October, it could be a hot autumn. But for now, the left has been defeated and the fascist threat in France is looming larger.

Germany: Fascist surge in the east

September 1 state elections in the east showed dramatic gains for the neofascist Alternative for Germany (AfD). In Thuringia, AfD garnered a third of the votes and in Saxony, over 30%. Moreover, leftwing parties saw their vote sharply diminished, with the Left Party going down below the level for any representation in the state parliament in Saxony, and dropping to 13% in Thuringia, where it had held power in a coalition. The Social Democrats and the Greens did equally poorly. The new red-brown Sahra Wagenknecht Party (BSW), which recently split off from the Left Party, received 12% in Saxony and 16% in Thuringia. Overall, the BSW represents another type of shift to the right, in this case from parts of the left with Stalinist roots. While still in the Left Party, Wagenknecht opposed the COVID vaccine. Today, BSW attacks some aspects of capitalism and claims to support labor, but is hostile to immigrants and refugees, climate justice, and sexual minorities. Like AfD, it opposes Ukraine.

At a national level, the Thuringia and Saxony elections have already driven the governing coalition government — comprising the Social Democrats, the Greens, and the liberal Free Democrats – to the right, as seen in the September 9 announcement that Germany will require border checks from other European Union countries. This rolls back freedoms of circulation within Europe going back three decades. Germany will also begin to deport Syrian and Afghan refugees to their respective countries, despite the extreme levels of danger facing them under these horrific dictatorships. In addition, the Free Democrats have shifted right in a particular way, against environmental restrictions, now declaring that they cannot support “anti-automobile” policies.

Over the past year, Germany has seen an upsurge in labor actions and a series of large street demonstrations against the fascist threat represented by AfD, implicitly if not actively supported by the ruling coalition. Yet under the same coalition government, pro-Palestine voices have been muzzled to a greater extent than even in the U.S., including the rescinding of invitations to renowned international scholars who have criticized Israel and bans on demonstrations by students and youth. This is another type of rightwing politics, put forward in the name of democracy and largely spurious charges of antisemitism. (And while some progressive intellectuals like Hartmut Rosa have defended pro-Palestinian voices, others like Jürgen Habermas have simply and shamefully echoed Israeli war propaganda.) With this, and their anti-immigrant politics, the centrist democrats are making it increasingly difficult for any kind of united front against fascism with the very popular forces that would be able to confront it in the streets, should it come to that.

In contrast to France, Germany now lacks a substantial electoral or labor voice to the left of the Social Democrats. On the other hand, the neofascists are polling at around 20% of the vote at a national level, half their level of support in France and less than half that in the U.S.

Britain’s race riots

The British political system has not so far evidenced a neofascist surge in terms of parliamentary or local elections. One reason lies in the fact that the Conservative Party, especially since Brexit and even more so since Boris Johnson, has absorbed many of these tendencies into its own ranks. Another factor is how the electoral system makes it very difficult for minor parties to win political office. Be that as it may, British far right extremism and racism were on full display in the July anti-immigrant riots, when mobs attacked people and property after false rumors on social media attributed a July stabbing attack at a school that killed 3 children to an immigrant of Muslim origin. (In fact, the perpetrator was born in the UK to a Rwandan immigrant family with a Christian religious orientation.)

As the Marxist-Humanist writer Seamus Connolly reported, “In scenes not seen for decades, people of color are being randomly attacked on the street. The ‘P-word,’ an insult aimed at those of Pakistani heritage has been a common refrain, as have Nazi Flags, Nazi salutes, chants of ‘Allah, Allah, Who the Fuck is Allah?’” (“Race Riots in the UK: Fascist Thugs Take to the Street in a Wave of Violent Clashes,” International Marxist-Humanist, August 5 2024).

For its part, the new and very “centrist” Labor government of Keir Starmer condemned the violence but failed to single out racism, xenophobia, or Islamophobia. Starmer is also doubling down on austerity policies, hardly a way to lessen the appeal of neofascist politics among sectors of the working and middle classes that have seen their living standards decline. He also praised Italian neofascist Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s immigration policies, saying she has made “remarkable progress.” Even before taking office, Starmer purged the Labor left, going to far as to expel the internationally renowned former party leader Jeremy Corbyn, who nonetheless kept his seat in the July elections that brought Starmer to power. Starmer is also keeping his distance from the mass anti-racist demonstrations in August in response to the mayhem in July.

The Trumpist, neofascist threat in the U.S.

As dangerous as the above developments are, it has to be said that today it is the U.S. that exhibits the greatest fascist threat. Donald Trump and vice-presidential candidate JD Vance seem bent on fomenting the kind of race riots that broke out in the UK with their concocted stories about Haitian migrants in Springfield, Ohio. This is just one example among hundreds. Trump dominates the Republican Party almost completely, and even if he loses the election in November, it is doubtful he would receive a popular vote much below 47-48%. That this is happening to a political leader who staged a violent coup attempt in 2021 after he was defeated at the polls represents a grave danger not just to democracy, but also to our very existence on the planet of our species given his anti-environment stance.

For all its erratic nature, Trumpism has been consistent in terms of its Islamophobia, misogyny, xenophobia, and hostility to climate justice at a domestic level, and in terms of antagonism toward Iran and China and friendliness toward Putin’s Russia at an international level. It is important to note that Trumpist forces already control a number of U.S. states, including large ones like Texas and Florida, the U.S. House of Representatives, and the Supreme Court. Even if Trump loses in November by traditional measures, it is very possible that Texas, Florida, and other states would not recognize such a defeat and threaten secession, that the House would refuse to recognize the vote, and/or that the Supreme Court would find ways to undermine the election as well. In these senses, a constitutional coup is possible, either instead of or alongside one in the streets as in January 2021.

At the same time, as in the other countries governed by centrists, the Democratic Party of Joe Biden and Kamala Harris has armed and abetted politically Israel’s genocidal war against the Palestinian people, while also undermining if not repressing dissent and opposition from student youth, the Arab community, and other progressive constituencies. In doing so, they have also ignored much of organized labor and a large coalition of Black churches, which have also come out strongly for a ceasefire, if not more decisive measures against Israel’s genocide. The Democrats have also turned to the right on immigration, crime, and the environment (fracking everywhere). At the same time, they support to an extent bodily autonomy, LGBTQ rights, voting rights, environmental protection, and labor.

In the U.S., it is particularly notable how the holders of some of the largest capitalist fortunes, most notably the white South African immigrant Elon Musk, have gone Trumpist, while others are openly leaning toward Trump or remaining openly neutral. Large universities like Harvard have also bowed out of confronting the fascist threat by declaring they will no longer make moral statements about social justice or human rights issues.

The Democratic Party’s support of outright genocide in Gaza, all the while making slight verbal criticisms while continuing the flow of arms and money to Israel, plus their crackdown on campus protest, has convinced many youth and progressives that it would make no large difference were Trump to assume power a second time.

This is utterly false, and goes against over a century of leftwing politics and principles whereby the genuine left (leaving off authoritarian and ultra-leftist currents) has always distinguished between democratic republics and militarist, fascist, or monarchical rule. This was true in the late 1870s, when Karl Marx supported the French republicans, some of whom had put down the Paris Commune, vs. the Bonapartist military. (This kind of issue was central to Marx’s attack in the Critique of the Gotha Program what he insisted on calling the socialist “sect” founded by Ferdinand Lassalle.) It was true as Nazism was rising before 1933, when Leon Trotsky called for a united front with the reformists, even though just a few years before, they had been complicit in the murder of the great revolutionary Rosa Luxemburg and in the repression of the 1919 socialist workers’ uprising she helped to lead. And it is true today, when we need to unite to oppose Trumpism with every fiber of our bodies.

But like our revolutionary predecessors, we need to unite with other forces to fight Trumpism – and fascism everywhere – in ways that make clear our own anti-capitalist politics. We need to show that the economy is not “strong” when one considers the vast poverty and homelessness, and on a larger scale, the decline in real wages since the 2008 crisis. We need to point out that centrist liberals or social democrats have not only helped create the conditions for fascism, but in places like France, are actually forming alliances with the neofascists. We need to show how social democrats, liberals, centrists, and conservatives in Germany, the UK, and the U.S. are adopting many neofascist policies themselves.

Overall, we need to consider the fact that the global fascist threat has been rising over the past decade, as a response to a whole series of revolutions and protests, from the Arab revolutions and Occupy in 2011 to the rise of Bernie Sanders and Corbyn, and from the global movement for Black lives of 2020 to the Gaza protests of 2023-24. Equally importantly, the 2008 global economic crisis exposed the fact that the higher profit rates of the 1950s/1960s were never coming back. Not only has this turned working people against the neoliberal consensus, but it has also led a section of the dominant classes to support outright neofascism in order to recover lost ground, or at least gain something before the deluge, or out of fear of revolution or even redistribution.

Thus, fascism in the U.S. will remain a threat even if Trump loses the 2024 election and is unable to stage a coup. For as in Germany, even a 20% support level for such politics is extremely dangerous, and Trump’s is at over twice that level.

One thing we need everywhere is a coalescence of revolutionary, anti-racist, and anti-authoritarian leftists. For the long haul, we may need to create a pole of opposition to both centrist liberalism and social democracy, the lesser threat, and to neofascism, the clear and present one. Such a pole of opposition, which would have to be international, would also need a politics separate from the campists as well. It would not seek hegemony over the anti-fascist movement but would form a revolutionary and democratic pole within it. A politics of combining class/race/nationality/gender issues, or one that says the true defense of democracy means opposing capitalism as well, or more specific watchwords like, “From Ukraine to Palestine, Occupation Is a Crime,” would be of the utmost importance. But so would forming some real organizations, probably via regroupment. Here, the French left, which voted in a disciplined manner for all non-fascist candidates in July, while also keeping its coalition together and its political independence, has done the most to fulfill its responsibilities in the present period.

We need more serious thinking on these issues and more action. The hour is late and the danger is great!

Kevin B. Anderson is Professor of Sociology, Political Science and Feminist Studies at University of California, Santa Barbara. He is the author of Lenin, Hegel, and Western Marxism: A Critical Study (1995) and Marx at the Margins: On Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Non-Western Societies (2010) and the co-editor of the Rosa Luxemburg Reader (2004)

Sunday, October 06, 2024

Frederic Jameson, Sui Generis

 October 4, 2024
Facebook

Frederic Jameson in conversation at Fundacíon Juan March.

I have known Fred Jameson for 38 years, and was his colleague for 31 of those years. Many would say 90 is a ripe old age, but the loss of Fred is devastating nonetheless. The following is a long read, but it details in outline how I came to know Fred and become his colleague.

When I came to Duke in 1987, the Literature Program and English Department were in the ascendency. The then provost, the late Philip Griffiths (incidentally a mathematician who later headed the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton), decided that Duke, with its relatively small endowment compared to the Ivy League, Stanford, Chicago, et al, could rise to prominence more easily and rapidly by boosting the humanities rather than STEM—recruiting STEM faculty incurred relatively large start-up costs, such as providing a fully-equipped lab with expensive equipment, lab staff, and of course bigger salaries to entice scientists and engineers to Duke, etc, whereas a start-up in the humanities typically involved providing a computer and a research and travel budget that was relatively small. The humanities “stars” would also be given their own secretaries.

I was recruited by the religion department, in part because my work was informed in a rudimentary way by theory, and the provost wanted to hire faculty in other departments who could create “synergies” (a buzzword still among university administrators) with Lit and English. My appointment was of course overdetermined by other considerations.

The Religion PhD Program was shared by the department and the divinity school, and the two sub-units coexisted uneasily. I surmise the perception that I could, in principle, work with faculty and students in both religion and the divinity school in a “non-ideological” way was thus given some weight. The freighted term “non-ideological” however meant this or that in whatever way to my colleagues in largely undeclared ways.

Fred was one of the people whom I met during my campus visit in 1986.

The Lit Program was on east campus, and all my meetings were on west, so Fred came over to the Allen Building office of the then undergrad dean, the late Richard White. White left his office to the two of us for our meeting, Fred was wearing his usual plaid shirt and khakis, the trademark pocket-watch fastened by a chain to his belt.

I had just written a book on the theological problem of evil, in which I briefly discussed Paul Ricoeur’s Symbolism of Evil. The only other work by Ricoeur I’d read was his text on the “masters of suspicion” Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud. Fred launched into a discussion of the entirety of Ricoeur’s work on hermeneutics, in which I struggled to keep up because I’d only read those 2 books by Ricoeur. Years later I found that hermeneutics had been an early interest of Fred’s—he translated, and wrote an introduction to, Dilthey’s 1900 essay, “The Rise of Hermeneutics”, which he later described as a “false start”.

I had read Fred’s Marxism and Form and The Political Unconscious and wanted to discuss these with him but he was engrossed in his descant about Ricoeur and hermeneutics, and it was soon time for me to go on to my next meeting.

The position in Religion I was hired for was a “target of opportunity” hiring, so there were no other contenders for the job.

As a theologian I was acceptable to most of the divinity school, while some in the department didn’t think a (Christian) theologian should have a place in a religious studies department. With some exceptions, theory in both sub-units was regarded by some with hostility, and by others with indifference and/or stark incomprehension. I recall one biblical studies colleague asking me, in the nicest way over drinks, to tell him who Derrida was. Fair enough, he was an expert in half-a-dozen ancient Semitic languages of which I knew not a single word, and besides he read dictionaries for pleasure.

I was starting to lose interest in theology, and almost all my classes had a theory syllabus which grew in size with each semester. As a result of my graduate courses being cross-listed with Lit, Lit students could take my classes. In some of my courses they preponderated.

In the early 1990s I had a campus visit for a position in philosophical theology at Harvard Divinity School. I didn’t get the job, somewhat to my relief, since I would have to continue teaching theology if I got the job. Harvard ranked more highly than Duke on the invidious totem pole of university rankings, so I was able to parley my Harvard campus visit for a nice salary increase. But what else?

Here is where Fred came in. He suggested I ask the administration for a transfer to Lit, and that the administration allow the religion department to keep my (former) position. Since religion had nothing to lose by my going to Lit, its then chair, Hans Hillerbrand, had no qualms in signing-off on the transfer. The administration had 2 conditions: (1) that the Lit faculty vote on my transfer; and (2) that I come up for tenure again, this time as a bona fide Lit scholar (by now I had enough publications in theory to jump the requisite tenure hoops). Fred shepherded me through both proceedings, and that is how I became his colleague.

I used to tell my students that Fred was the last member of the Frankfurt School. A certain conventional wisdom has it that Habermas occupies this titular position, but Habermas is a neo-Kantian liberal, Europe’s counterpart to John Rawls. I place Fred on a par with Adorno, while acknowledging that Fred had an even wider range of interests than the magus of Frankfurt. Fredric Jameson was sui generis.

Kenneth Surin teaches at Duke University, North Carolina.  He lives in Blacksburg, Virginia.

Sunday, August 18, 2024

Illusion and Fetishism in Critical Theory: A Study of Nietzsche, Benjamin, Castoriadis, and the Situationists



Vasilis Grollios
Routledge, New York and London, 2024. 206 pp., £130 hb
ISBN 9781032556772

Reviewed by Dimitri Vouros
About the reviewer
Dimitri Vouros is a scholar interested in theories of democracy and sovereignty


The connection between Marxism and critical theory has always been fraught. Hiding this connection may have served a political purpose for the first generation of Frankfurt School thinkers. There is evidence that Walter Benjamin’s writings were edited by Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer to tone down his overtly Marxist language, presumably so the school, while in exile, could maintain its social standing in Western academia. For later generations such self-censorship was no longer necessary. Yet, something of this censorship continues in certain strains of critical theory, especially those that focus on everything except what Marx spent most of his energies pursuing – political economy. Have critical philosophers forgotten that bourgeois economists hold the theory of money and exchange to be a thoroughly natural one, the economy as ‘second nature’ to use a formulation of Georg Lukács?

Vasilis Grollios’ Illusion and Fetishism in Critical Theory presents an alternative view of society and the economy to that pursued by many recent critical theorists. He describes the view of Open Marxism, of capitalism as a mode of production in which illusion and fetishism dominate human life. Grollios’ book investigates the ideological trappings of capitalist society and its inversion of human values into economic ones. It formulates a theory of why ‘traditional’ viewpoints in political philosophy and economics end up promoting unfreedom and alienation in everyday life. To this end, Grollios emphasises the Marxist underpinnings of critical theory properly understood and presents the contours of a non-dogmatic dialectical philosophy.

Continuing themes from his last work Negativity and Democracy: Marxism and the Critical Theory Tradition, Grollios pursues detailed reinterpretations of Friedrich Nietzsche, Walter Benjamin, Cornelius Castoriadis and the Situationists Raoul Vaneigem and Guy Debord. Grollios places these authors in conversation Marx. He presents a view of Marxian epistemology often overlooked by recent scholarship. He underscores Marx’s methodological endeavours that point to the ‘real abstractions’ of the capitalist mode of production and the reduction of labour-power and labour-time to the totalising valuations of the market.

One aim of Grollios’ book is to place the ideology of pecuniary individualism under suspicion. Since capitalism reduces material and social relations to exchange value, bourgeois notions of subjectivity invariably lead to alienation and various limitations on human flourishing. In essence, what we take to be everyday life is informed and driven by the imperatives of the market. This view is first found in Marx, in his 1844 Paris Manuscripts, the Grundrisse manuscripts of 1857-58 and the first section of the first volume of Capital. The Marxist tradition, which wished to join theory to practice, often sidestepped these insights or found them politically inexpedient. It was largely critical theory that retrieved them from possible oblivion. Yet similar insights into monopoly and late capitalism, not only its external mechanisms, but also the way its reifications informed society more generally, were downplayed by later critical theorists. Arguably it was Jürgen Habermas’ influential theory of communicative action that began this forgetting of the social significance of abstractive economic categories. The turn to ‘recognition’ in third-wave Frankfurt School critical theory has only deepened this nescience.

Like Alfred Sohn-Rethel and Moishe Postone before him, Grollios has retrieved the significance of Marx’s thought on fetishism and the real abstractions of the market for philosophy and political theory. He proves that what Max Horkheimer called ‘traditional theory’ reproduces a topsy-turvy understanding of the relation between capital and capitalism’s subjects. Indeed, Grollios pursues a ‘corporeal materialism’, and asks why workers are still being cajoled into navigating the various fetishes of commodity capitalism and subjected to its deleterious effects in their daily life. Grollios also shows how critical theory has not spent its interpretative energies, that much can still be gleaned from twentieth-century thinkers like those dealt with in his book. The relationship between the illusive totality of capitalism and the alienated worker is still relevant, against trends in different theoretical directions, including Foucauldian discourses of power and biopolitics and Lacanian/Post-Marxist theories of symbolic power. In fact, Grollios argues that theory needs to return to the concrete social consequences of capital accumulation, to an understanding of how workers’ free time is expropriated by capitalism’s unceasing search for surplus value. For Grollios, fetishism is ‘a general phenomenon in which, while people attempt to earn a living in a society where “time is money” rules, they end up creating social forms, such as value as money, or the state, or the bourgeois form of democracy that they cannot control and towards which they feel alienated’ (47).

In the first chapter, Grollios reads Nietzsche, unusually, as an ally of critical theory. It is true Nietzsche had a substantial influence on the Frankfurt School and its understanding of capitalist society. Yet most recent thinkers in the Continental tradition have focussed on the cultural and aesthetic aspects of Nietzsche’s critique of modernity and nihilism. They have certainly not reckoned with all his insights into politics and society. What Grollios offers is not a Marxist critique of Nietzsche – à la Georg Lukács’ Destruction of Reason – but an assessment of what is still valuable in his criticism of life and work under capitalism. Just like the first generation of the Frankfurt School, Nietzsche ‘holds a dialectic between appearance/fetishized form and content/essence/alienation in everyday life’ (24). What is especially relevant for Grollios is Nietzsche’s insight into how the creative and liberating aspects of labour and the everyday are rendered superfluous by the market logic of capitalism.

The next chapter refreshingly passes over much of the scholarly literature that has been written about Walter Benjamin the ‘cultural critic’. Such commentaries largely miss the point of Benjamin’s critique of capitalism. Grollios argues that Benjamin ‘belongs to the first generation of Critical Theory and that his ideas take place in the frame of Marx’s Capital’ (61). Using concepts such as ‘determinate negation’, ‘corporeal materialism’, ‘the spellbound, topsy-turvy character of capitalist society’, ‘negative dialectics’ and ‘non-identity-thinking’, Grollios presents Benjamin’s striking characterisations of social production and reproduction and shows what they mean for the inner life of the worker (61). Grollios homes in on commodity fetishism, especially the reification of consciousness and the eternalisation of technical production, a hellish dream Benjamin calls a ‘capitalist phantasmagoria’ (63-64). The ‘corporeal materialism’ of Benjamin comes out in his description of unsavoury aspects of the industrial lifeworld. Benjamin’s perspectives on art and literature are important, but mainly because they alert the reader to fetishized aspects of industrial and post-industrial society. Key for Benjamin is the ‘eternal return’ of commodity capitalism and the way it alienates subjects both from the products they make and from a flourishing human existence. It is for this reason that the motifs of myth, boredom, death and fashion recur in Benjamin’s works, above all his unfinished Arcades Project. The mediation accomplished by capital between things and people can be described in terms of ‘reification’ which, in one essay, Benjamin says not only ‘clouds relations between human beings, but the real subjects of these relations also remain clouded’. This leads ineluctably to the ‘deformation’ of various bureaucratic vocations (93).

Grollios also emphasises the importance of Benjamin’s revolutionary theory of history. For Benjamin, ‘messianic time’ can override idols like the state and the individual. Indeed, as Grollios states, ‘[t]he leap of past events out of history into the present is likened by Benjamin to “the dialectical leap Marx understood as revolution”’ (99). Grollios reads Benjamin as an anarchist and as standing against orthodox (and Leninist) historical materialism. He uncovers an Adornian ‘negative dialectics’ in Benjamin’s methodology. (Adorno’s ‘negative dialectics’ is something of a leitmotif in this book.) One-dimensional, identity thinking, the kind that naturalises the material and social relations under universal exchange society needs to be subjected to dialectical critique. Given that bourgeois epistemologies and logics sacrifice all to the economy and to its limiting temporalities, dialectical thinking must seek to deconstruct, dereify, and demystify them. For Grollios and other exponents of left-communism, historical instances of ‘actually existing socialism’ merely reproduce these logics in a new guise, a ‘state capitalist’ one (192-193).

The brunt of Grollios’ critique is aimed at those views that seek to compromise on the promise, the one implicit in Western philosophy, of a disalienated existence and work life. Read with such an emancipatory end in mind, Marx is shown to argue that communist freedom is possible only if workers are no longer treated as wage slaves, if they are freed from all economic constraints. As Grollios points out, this entails a completely new relationship to things, to commodities, to time and to labour. Finding such renewed social relations is impossible through party politicking, and unlikely to follow a general revolutionary upheaval. Class warfare does not guarantee the emancipation of the proletariat. One needs to interrupt capitalism where it really matters, by finding ‘cracks’ in its imposing edifice and changing workers’ very relationship to labour. This is the true form of protest for our time according to Grollios and other Open Marxists like John Holloway: ‘Cracks open, and revolution takes place when we deny the mask displaying ourselves as “personifications of economic categories” and revolt against the rule of money, against capital’ (55).

In chapter three, Grollios finds in Castoriadis’ philosophy a stepping stone to a new kind of political thinking about autonomy. But Castoriadis comes under fire for not having correctly understood Marx’s position on labour and alienation; in fact, he is ‘essentially much closer to traditional theory and bourgeois philosophy than has been believed’ (119). During his lifetime, Castoriadis was struggling against the consequences of Leninism, the failure of the dictatorship of the proletariat to effect real change and indeed other problems with articulating a class struggle under a constantly morphing social structure: ‘In Castoriadis’ theory, classes are not formed from below, from people’s productive activity, they are not a perverted form of our doing […] They are formed from above. However, this is a nonmaterialist, undialectical and therefore uncritical theorizing of class’ (126). While Open Marxism is anticipated by Castoriadis in some places, he nevertheless fails to pose fundamental questions about our daily life that lead to political action in the present. Grollios argues that when we succumb to the view that abstractive bourgeois logics do not exist in any meaningful sense, as Castoriadis does, one is (falsely) liberated to pursue political philosophy for its own sake. Additionally, Castoriadis theorizes the state ‘as a separate and relative autonomous instance’ and further ‘accuses Marx of ignoring this fact’ (139). A similar criticism can be made of Hannah Arendt’s mature political philosophy. Like Castoriadis, she fails to read Marx as formulating a critique, as opposed to offering a predictive description, of political economy, turning instead to superficial readings of Marx’s materialist interpretation of labour. Both Arendt and Castoriadis ultimately return to Aristotle and the ancient polis to settle accounts with capitalism and its illusions. Castoriadis ‘does not identify the concept of the double character of the labour which lies hidden in the commodity, and neither does he recognize the fact that contradiction and struggle are ingrained in the essence of our existence in capitalism’ (129). Nevertheless, Grollios appreciates Castoriadis’ formulation of the social imaginary and the need to reimagine the modern polity, to find a completely new and different footing for current society (146-147).

The last chapter is a distillation of the French Situationists’ critique of capitalism and ‘commodified time’ (154). Raoul Vaneigem and Guy Debord write eloquently about the subjection of citizens to a barrage of images, about the mediatization of consciousness: ‘Capital in Debord and the Situationists is not the amount of money accumulated waiting to be thrown again into production for profit to be produced but a social relation made up of fetishized social forms-images that originate in alienated-objectified labour’ (155). Capitalism hopes to endear people to the illusion of the totality. The modern ‘spectacle’ and its effects leads to the naturalisation of commodity exchange, to various false notions about what constitutes value in life and to a new form of temporality. Debord holds that ‘spectacular time is the illusorily lived time’ (166), that the ‘spectacle is a concrete inversion of life, an autonomous movement of the non-living’ (174). The Situationists, as Grollios presents them, do not pursue a reduction to the economic in the last instance, but rather a way of alerting us to the compromised epistemological foundation ­of the modern subject, relying as it does on the inversion of the value-form. Since fetishism is ingrained in all life under capitalism, where consumers are unwittingly beholden to the illusions of the market. The key idea here is that ‘fetishization [is] a process whereby people are turned into zombies of capital/spectacle’. The main consequence of this is that ‘class struggle is not only on the streets […] but also runs through ourselves, our bodies and souls’ (179). The only possibility for freedom is finding a way beyond such illusions. For Grollios, this means being attentive to the cracks that open in capitalism, by capitalising on the moments of what Adorno called the ‘utopian images’ in the everyday against capital’s myths, and by finding fresh opportunities to disrupt the status quo.

1 March 2024


URL: https://marxandphilosophy.org.uk/reviews/21422_illusion-and-fetishism-in-critical-theory-a-study-of-nietzsche-benjamin-castoriadis-and-the-situationists-by-vasilis-grollios-reviewed-by-dimitri-vouros/

Thursday, June 27, 2024

THE DREADED ORIGIN OF CULTURAL MARXISM
 
In Defense of the Frankfurt School

NEITHER TONY GRAMSCI NOR RAYMOND WILLIAMS WERE MEMBERS
JACOBIN
06.25.2024

The Frankfurt School, a group of theorists who grappled with the defeat of Europe's revolutionary left, are often misunderstood. Critics charge them with obscurantism and elitism. They argued that, on the contrary, it was capitalism that obfuscated reality.


Herbert Marcuse, professor of philosophy at the University of California at San Diego. (Getty Images)

Few thinkers have been as consistently misunderstood as the group of anthropologists, economists, historians, sociologists, and philosophers that came to be known as the Frankfurt School. The grouping refers to the second generation of scholars associated with the Institute for Social Research, a private academy established to counter academic conservatism in 1920s Germany.

The institute sought to ask why Karl Marx’s predicted revolution never took place and distinguished itself from other academic analyses of capitalist society through its conviction that both high and low culture were worthy objects of inquiry. This inquiry was, they argued, supplementary to an economic analysis rather than an alternative to it. Their direct experience of fascism, as German Jews exiled from Nazi Germany in the 1930s, informed their thinking, which provided a materialist explanation of the relationship between capitalist exploitation and racial domination.

An Elitist Critique?


It is, however, hard to overcome the apparent aloofness of Frankfurt School thinkers from our times and from popular culture in general. Its famous first generation (which included Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Erich Fromm, Max Horkheimer, and Herbert Marcuse) hailed from privileged bourgeois industrialist backgrounds and wrote famously convoluted academic treatises. Critics, not without good reason, charged them with obscurantism, cultural elitism, liberalism, anti-activism, and even deep state collusion.

The last of these accusations has stuck most tenaciously, despite being the least plausible. Marcuse was, during the interwar and war years, in the employ of America’s Office for Strategic Services, a forerunner organization to the CIA. Critics, Marcuse wrote to Jürgen Habermas in the 1960s, “seem to have forgotten that the war was a war against fascism.” Within the context, aiding the United States was not a crime for which he had “the slightest reason for being ashamed.”Critics, not without good reason, charged them with obscurantism, cultural elitism, liberalism, anti-activism, and even deep state collusion.

Similarly, Adorno wrote for a number of journals that received covert CIA funding in the postwar period, such as the German Der Monat, British Encounter, and Italian Tempo Presente, although none of them contradicted Adorno’s public positions, their principal aim being to counter totalitarian currents.

While the charge of CIA collusion can be easily disregarded, those of obscurantism, elitism, crypto-liberalism, and anti-activism are harder to counter. These slurs are most commonly leveled at Adorno, not least as he has emerged as the most quoted of his group of peers. Even as an Adorno scholar, I at times struggle to defend him. He, after all, favored elite art forms over bourgeois culture, detested jazz, prioritized theory over political praxis, and once called the police on his own students while they occupied his faculty.

Capitalist Abstractions

In a 1977 TV interview with the philosopher Bryan Magee, Marcuse called Adorno “a genius,” who spoke in fully formed “ready to print” sentences, only to state later in the same interview that he himself did not always fully understand Adorno’s prose. Such contradiction enforces a suspicion widely held in both right populist and left activist circles that critical theorists prefer the mystique of academic obscurity to textual clarity. The issue of clarity, however, was somewhat more complicated for Adorno who saw the fragmentary nature of his own writing as a response to the fragmentation of late capitalist society.

While capitalism tends toward homogenization of cultural forms, it fragments working, social, and home life. In the introduction to Adorno’s Minima Moralia — a book entirely comprising short aphoristic texts and subtitled Reflections From Damaged Life — the philosopher states that to properly give expression to societal conditions one must reject formal coherence. His hope, ambitious as it may sound, was that the fragmentation of the text would expose the false harmony of consumer society.

This tendency toward fragmentation can also be seen in Adorno’s preference for abstract art, a perennial target in accusations of cultural elitism from both the Left and the Right. Stalinism maintained a deeply hostile attitude toward Russia’s avant-garde, preferring social realism instead. The Nazis of course dedicated exhibitions to “degenerate art.” What “cannot be understood . . . but needs some pretentious instruction book to justify [its] existence will never again find [its] way to the German people,” Hitler said of expressionist and abstract painting.

The perceived distance of abstract art from reality threatened the reactionary idea of social order. Yet Adorno argued it was capitalism that caused and expedited estrangement of nature, a phenomenon that had its roots in humankind’s tendency toward identity thinking — i.e., the need to control nature by categorizing and identifying it.

The second generation of the Frankfurt School saw such estrangement as a main theoretical concern. They had firsthand experience: the first half of the twentieth century witnessed both the most developed societies that have ever existed and the advent of world wars, mass displacement, genocide, and the dawn of the nuclear age — tragedies that showed the utopian and dystopian sides of modernity.To the extent to that Adorno was an obscurantist or a thinker who preferred abstraction, it was a reaction against the co-optation of culture by industrial capitalism.

The response of the Frankfurt School was to challenge the idea that the progress celebrated by liberal society was as complete as it seemed. The transition from first nature — the sphere of animal instinct and biology — to second nature — language and culture — was far from complete. Despite the best intentions of Enlightenment thinking and early science to mediate between humanity and nature through rational inquiry, industrial capitalism was red in tooth and claw to a demonstrably greater degree than nature itself. It was, Adorno argued, reasonable to develop a healthy skepticism toward the promises of Enlightenment because “no universal history leads from savagery to humanitarianism, but there is one leading from the slingshot to the megaton bomb.”

The cruel irony of modernity is that industrial society emerged to resist the unavoidable pull of human life toward death yet created lethal threats of a new kind. This did not just mean illness and want, but also destructive tendencies toward violence, which humans are capable of inflicting on themselves and others — what Sigmund Freud, the strongest influence on the Frankfurt School other than Marx, referred to as the death drive. But instead of an escape from our destructiveness, modernity armed human beings with more lethal capacities for self- and other-directed harm. From the trenches of World War I to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, human beings have proven capable of dealing out death on an unprecedented scale.

Dialectics of Enlightenment


This dialectic of Enlightenment was observed by the main figures of the Frankfurt School, who linked it to a growing sense of cultural malaise. Not only had industrial society produced new forms of human suffering, but the industrial reproduction of art stripped it of its quasi-spiritual calling. Analyzing the transformation of human subjectivity, Marcuse referred to the “one-dimensionality” of life in the postwar period, arguing that in the context of abandonment of transcendent forms of meaning, consumers settled into accepting weak fulfillments of their actual desires.

Like Adorno, Marcuse felt that one of the greatest tricks of an advanced industrial society was to make citizens and consumers feel that they were happily choosing their subjugation (and an inferior fulfillment of their desire). We can observe this trend today amongst internet users who seek the adoration of followers rather than real life friendship, subordinating themselves to stereotypes conveyed via social media to gain recognition.

To the extent that Adorno was an obscurantist or a thinker who preferred abstraction, it was a reaction against the co-optation of culture by industrial capitalism. The cultural figures he lauded — Charles Baudelaire, Samuel Beckett, Franz Kafka, Gustav Mahler, Edgar Allan Poe, Arnold Schoenberg — all incorporated an element of aesthetic dissonance into their work.

For Adorno, this shock was capable of confronting individuals with the reality that artworks were the product of the labor of individuals, a revelation that he called the artwork’s “truth content.” Far from being an elitist and an obscurantist, Adorno intended to break the false spell of a culture industry, which hid human labor behind glossy packaging and glitzy images. Ultimately, his reasons for favoring high art were that it operated with far more honesty about the conditions in which it was produced than popular culture.The idealistic hedonist, in their effort to turn away from capitalist society, was at risk of rejecting the discipline needed to change society for the better.

But Adorno’s hostility toward the culture of his present also manifested as a deep suspicion of its politics. The latter came to a head infamously when the Frankfurt professor called the police on protesters at his university in 1969. In a correspondence with Marcuse, who held a far more sanguine view of the student movement, Adorno wrote that he was “the last person to underestimate the merits of the student movement; it has disrupted the smooth transition to the totally administered world. But it contains a grain of insanity in which a future totalitarianism is implicit.”

The letter exchange signaled a wider rift between the two thinkers. While Adorno feared his students, Marcuse had become a regular attendant and speaker at protests in the United States. But there were costs to be paid on either side of the barricade. Marcuse’s embrace of the student movement led critics to accuse him of helping to found a New Left less interested in class struggle in the workplace and more concerned with race and sexuality.

Indeed, Marcuse did emphasize the need for the creation of an alliance of migrants, students, and workers, as part of the “Great Refusal” — an uprising against consumerist and imperialist values that would usher in a new world. But the philosopher’s emphasis on nonworkers was primarily an attempt to find a vantage point from which the bamboozling effects of one-dimensionality could be challenged, rather than to supplant trade unionism altogether.

Marcuse saw in the hippy and student countercultural movements of his time wellsprings of resistance to the stupefying effects of the media. Yet in his An Essay on Liberation (1969), he also warned that the aesthetic and hedonistic movements of the 1960s counterculture allowed for their own co-optation and conversion into media spectacle and consumer fad. The idealistic hedonist, in their effort to turn away from capitalist society, was at risk of rejecting the discipline needed to change society for the better. Before long, Marcuse’s fears were realized and hippy culture would become a fashion, co-opted by the culture industry adorning Coca-Cola adverts on billboards.Adorno and Marcuse may have had differing solutions to the challenges of modernity, yet they each prefigured the cultural malaise of our digital age.

But the Frankfurt School’s interest in the leveling effects of capitalism on culture remain salient today. As governments across the globe have worked to restrict the right to protests, political resistance has largely moved online, taking the form of maximalist sloganeering and the embrace of radical political symbols, often mediated through the internet language of videos and memes. When these ideas filter up into the mainstream, it is in the form of xenophobia and bigotry modeled on, or responding to, fringe political discourse.

What is referred to as “the culture wars” grew up on social media before becoming part of mainstream political debate. The language in which concerns about the oppression of minorities is broached often ignores the material reality underpinning them. This, too, can be seen as a sign of one-dimensionality. In the absence of political possibilities, people, rather than grapple with this difficulty, have chosen to withdraw into a sphere in which action seems possible, yet only at the expense of theoretical rigor. Their need to engage politically is only falsely satisfied, in terms of attacks on other hapless online subjects.

This returns us to Adorno’s consideration of identity thinking as an irresolvable problem at the core of human thinking and action. While technology gives us the means for ever more political expression, we are reduced to controlling identificatory practices: i.e., call-out and cancel culture. Adorno and Marcuse may have had differing solutions to the challenges of modernity, yet they each prefigured the cultural malaise of our digital age.


CONTRIBUTORS
Mike Watson is a theorist, critic, and curator who is principally focused on the relation between culture, new media, and politics.

Saturday, March 16, 2024

 

Political theorist Achille Mbembe named 2024 Holberg Prize Laureate


The Holberg Prize is one of the largest international prizes awarded annually to an outstanding researcher in the humanities, social sciences, law or theology



UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND

Professor Achille Mbembe 

IMAGE: 

PROFESSOR ACHILLE MBEMBE

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CREDIT: WITS UNIVERSITY




The Cameroonian scholar Achille Mbembe is Research Professor of History and Politics at the Wits Institute for Social and Economic Research (WiSER), at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. He will receive the award of NOK 6,000,000 (approx. EUR 525,000) during a 6 June ceremony at the University of Bergen, Norway.

Mbembe is one of the most read and cited scholars from the African continent and receives the prize for his pioneering research in African history, postcolonial studies, humanities, and social science over four decades. Both as an academic and as a public intellectual, he is known for his ability to bridge existing thinking on colonialism and decolonisation with pressing questions on topics such as contemporary migration regimes, global citizenship, restitution and reparation, technology, climate change and planetary futures. 

As a historian and a political philosopher, Mbembe has been most concerned about the entanglement of Europe and its former colonies. Using Africa as a point of departure for a mode of thinking that is continuous with multiple and interlocking lineages, he has revealed the extent to which the continent is a living laboratory of thought forms and ideas, a vast world of invention, imagination and creativity. 

As a critical theorist, his deliberations on the global order have left an enduring mark far beyond debates on postcolonialism. Drawing on African experiences, Mbembe has played a major role in advancing thinking beyond identity and difference, particularly through concepts such as ‘necropolitics’, ‘the universal right to breathe’, or ‘the earthly community’, which speak to the ongoing struggles for recognition and repair as well as care and dignity in a racialized world. 

Originally written in French, Mbembe’s books and numerous articles have been translated into seventeen languages. His key books include On the Postcolony (2000/2001), Out of the Dark Night (2010/2021), Necropolitics (2016/2019), Brutalism (2020/2024) and The Earthly Community: Reflections on the Last Utopia (2022), as well as the groundbreaking Critique of Black Reason (2013/2017)—a philosophical study of the meaning of Blackness as it historically emerged. In Necropolitics, Mbembe examines how power structures wield control over life and mortality, shaping the very fabric of existence for oppressed communities. 

Describing the key purpose of his work, the Laureate asks: “What are the conditions for rethinking the world in a way that opens up alternative ways of inhabiting it, of being-in-common and of nurturing a planetary consciousness?” “How to think an open future that moves beyond the history of race, colonialism and segregation with which the present is so deeply entangled,” Mbembe continues. “These questions have been at the heart of my research over the span of my career. Behind them lurks an even bigger issue, that of life futures—how can life be repaired, reproduced, sustained and cared for, made durable and universally shared?” 

“Mbembe’s oeuvre goes beyond a particularized notion of decolonization to a universalist recentring of the human”, says Holberg Committee Chair Heike Krieger. “For him, this involves a dedication to facing historical truth, while learning and remembering across South-North divides.” 

“Congratulations to Professor Achille Mbembe, an outstanding scholar, historian, political philosopher, critical thinker and one of the world’s foremost intellectuals. This award serves as a testament to the distinguished contribution that Professor Mbembe has made to contemporary scholarship, which will undoubtedly inspire generations of scholars in years to come” said Professor Zeblon Vilakazi,  Vice-Chancellor and Principal of Wits University.

About the Laureate

Achille Mbembe is Research Professor of History and Politics at the Wits Institute for Social and Economic Research (WISER), University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa. He is also the Director of the Innovation Foundation for Democracy. He was educated in Cameroon and in France where he obtained his PhD in History at the Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne and a a Diplôme d'études approfondies (DEA) at the Institut d'études politiques de Paris.  

Mbembe has taught at various universities in the United States, including Columbia University, the University of Pennsylvania, the University of California at Berkeley and at Irvine, Yale University, Duke University and Harvard University. A winner of the Ernst Bloch Award and the Gerda Henkel Prize, he is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a Fellow of the British Academy. 

Mbembe holds Honorary Doctorates from the Paris 8 University (France), the Catholic University of Louvain (Belgium) and the University of Bergen (Norway). His work has been translated in 17 languages (English, Spanish, Italian, German, Dutch, Portuguese, Arabic, Danish, Swedish, Norwegian, Turkish, Romanian, Polish, Slovenian, Catalan, Finnish, and Mandarin). His latest book is La communaute terrestre (Editions La Découverte, Paris, 2023). 

About the Holberg Prize

Established by the Norwegian Parliament in 2003, the Holberg Prize is one of the largest annual international research prizes awarded for outstanding contributions to research in the humanities, social science, law or theology. The Prize is funded by the Norwegian Government through a direct allocation from the Ministry of Education and Research to the University of Bergen. Previous Laureates include Julia Kristeva, Jürgen Habermas, Manuel Castells, Onora O’Neill, Cass Sunstein, Paul Gilroy, and Sheila Jasanoff. To learn more about the Holberg Prize, visit: https://holbergprize.org/en. For press photos, biography, Committee citation, expert contact information, and more, see: http://holbergprize.org/en/press-room.


Political theorist Achille Mbembe named 2024 Holberg Prize Laureate



THE UNIVERSITY OF BERGEN
Professor Achille Mbembe 

IMAGE: 

PROFESSOR ACHILLE MBEMBE

view more 

CREDIT: CHANTÉ SCHATZ, WITS UNIVERSITY




Achille Mbembe is research professor of history and politics at the Wits Institute for Social and Economic Research, at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. He will receive the award of NOK 6,000,000 (approx. EUR 525,000) during a 6 June ceremony at the University of Bergen, Norway.

Mbembe is one of the most read and cited scholars from the African continent and receives the prize for his pioneering research in African history, postcolonial studies, humanities, and social science over four decades. Both as an academic and as a public intellectual, he is known for his ability to bridge existing thinking on colonialism and decolonisation with pressing questions on topics such as contemporary migration regimes, global citizenship, restitution and reparation, technology, climate change and planetary futures.

As a historian and a political philosopher, Mbembe has been most concerned about the entanglement of Europe and its former colonies. Using Africa as a point of departure for a mode of thinking that is continuous with multiple and interlocking lineages, he has revealed the extent to which the continent is a living laboratory of thought forms and ideas, a vast world of invention, imagination and creativity.

As a critical theorist, his deliberations on the global order have left an enduring mark far beyond debates on postcolonialism. Drawing on African experiences, Mbembe has played a major role in advancing thinking beyond identity and difference, particularly through concepts such as ‘necropolitics’, ‘the universal right to breathe’, or ‘the earthly community’, which speak to the ongoing struggles for recognition and repair as well as care and dignity in a racialized world.

Originally written in French, Mbembe’s books and numerous articles have been translated into seventeen languages. His key books include On the Postcolony (2000/2001), Out of the Dark Night (2010/2021), Necropolitics (2016/2019), Brutalism (2020/2024) and The Earthly Community: Reflections on the Last Utopia (2022), as well as the groundbreaking Critique of Black Reason (2013/2017)—a philosophical study of the meaning of Blackness as it historically emerged. In Necropolitics, Mbembe examines how power structures wield control over life and mortality, shaping the very fabric of existence for oppressed communities.

Describing the key purpose of his work, the Laureate asks: “What are the conditions for rethinking the world in a way that opens up alternative ways of inhabiting it, of being-in-common and of nurturing a planetary consciousness?” “How to think an open future that moves beyond the history of race, colonialism and segregation with which the present is so deeply entangled,” Mbembe continues.“These questions have been at the heart of my research over the span of my career. Behind them lurks an even bigger issue, that of life futures—how can life be repaired, reproduced, sustained and cared for, made durable and universally shared?” 

“Mbembe’s oeuvre goes beyond a particularized notion of decolonization to a universalist recentring of the human”, says Holberg Committee Chair Heike Krieger. “For him, this involves a dedication to facing historical truth, while learning and remembering across South-North divides.” 

About the Laureate
Achille Mbembe is research professor of history and politics at the Wits Institute for Social and Economic Research (WISER), University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa. He is also the Director of the Innovation Foundation for Democracy. He was educated in Cameroon and in France where he obtained his PhD in History at the Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne and a a Diplôme d'études approfondies (DEA) at the Institut d'études politiques de Paris.
Mbembe has taught at various universities in the United States, including Columbia University, the University of Pennsylvania, the University of California at Berkeley and at Irvine, Yale University, Duke University and Harvard University. A winner of the Ernst Bloch Award and the Gerda Henkel Prize, he is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a Fellow of the British Academy. Mbembe holds Honorary Doctorates from the Paris 8 University (France), the Catholic University of Louvain (Belgium) and the University of Bergen (Norway). His work has been translated in 17 languages (English, Spanish, Italian, German, Dutch, Portuguese, Arabic, Danish, Swedish, Norwegian, Turkish, Romanian, Polish, Slovenian, Catalan, Finnish, and Mandarin). His latest book is La communaute terrestre (Editions La Découverte, Paris, 2023).

About the Holberg Prize
Established by the Norwegian Parliament in 2003, the Holberg Prize is one of the largest annual international research prizes awarded for outstanding contributions to research in the humanities, social science, law or theology. The Prize is funded by the Norwegian Government through a direct allocation from the Ministry of Education and Research to the University of Bergen. Previous Laureates include Julia Kristeva, Jürgen Habermas, Manuel Castells, Onora O’Neill, Cass Sunstein, Paul Gilroy, and Sheila Jasanoff. To learn more about the Holberg Prize, visit: https://holbergprize.org/en. For press photos, biography, Committee citation, expert contact information, and more, see: http://holbergprize.org/en/press-room.


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