#AUKUS

France recalls its ambassadors to US and Australia in submarine deal backlash

BUT NOT THE UK?! 

Issued on: 17/09/2021 - 

Text by: FRANCE 24
Video by: Fraser JACKSON

France on Friday recalled its ambassadors to the United States and Australia in a ferocious row over the scrapping of a submarine contract, an unprecedented step that revealed the extent of French anger against its allies.

President Emmanuel Macron made the exceptional decision due to the “gravity of the announcements on September 15 by Australia and the United States”, said French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian in a statement.

The rare diplomatic backlash against France’s allies came two days after Australia announced the scrapping of a major purchase of French conventional submarines in favour of US nuclear-powered submarines.

The announcement represented “unacceptable behaviour between allies and partners”, said the statement.

Australia in 2016 had chosen France's Naval Group, partly owned by the state, to build 12 conventionally powered submarines, based on France's Barracuda nuclear-powered subs in development.

The contract was worth around 50 billion Australian dollars (€31 billion, $36.5 billion) when announced in 2016.

But on Wednesday, US President Joe Biden, along with Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, announced a new US security alliance between their countries that would develop an Australian nuclear-powered submarine fleet.

The Australia-UK-US alliance – dubbed AUKUS – has been strongly condemned by France, with Le Drian calling it “a stab in the back”.

US describes France as 'vital ally'

The United States on Friday reiterated that France was a 'vital ally'.

"France is a vital partner and our oldest ally, and we place the highest value on our relationship," State Department spokesperson Ned Price said in a statement, adding that Washington was hoping to continue the discussion on the issue at the senior level in the coming days, including during the United Nations General Assembly meeting in New York next week.

Pentagon spokesperson John Kirby meanwhile acknowledged that telephone talks earlier between US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and French counterpart Florence Parly showed "that there is still much work to do in terms of our defence relationship with France."

France 24's Kethevane Gorjestani reports on the US response to France's decision to withdraw its ambassador 02:15

Australia said it regrets France's decision to recall its ambassador to Canberra but it values its relationship with France and will keep engaging with Paris on many other issues.

"We note with regret France's decision to recall its Ambassador to Australia," a spokesperson for the foreign ministry said in a statement. "Australia values its relationship with France ... We look forward to engaging with France again on our many issues of shared interest, based on shared values."

China calls alliance 'extremely irresponsible'

Beijing described the new alliance as an "extremely irresponsible" threat to regional stability, questioning Australia's commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and warning the Western allies that they risked "shooting themselves in the foot".

China has its own "very substantive programme of nuclear submarine building", Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison argued Friday in an interview with radio station 2GB.

China claims almost all of the resource-rich South China Sea, through which trillions of dollars in shipping trade passes annually, rejecting competing claims from Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam.Beijing has been accused of deploying a range of military hardware including anti-ship missiles and surface-to-air missiles there, and ignored a 2016 international tribunal decision that declared its historical claim over most of the waters to be without basis.

'Directly affecting the vision'

The French ambassador recalls from the United States and Australia -- key allies of France -- are unprecedented. Withdrawing envoys is a last resort diplomatic step taken when relations between feuding countries are plunged into crisis but highly unusual between allies.

"I am being recalled to Paris for consultations," France ambassador to the US Philippe Etienne wrote on Twitter. "This follows announcements directly affecting the vision we have of our alliances, of our partnerships and of the importance of the Indo-Pacific for Europe."

Paris sees itself as a major power in the Indo-Pacific due to overseas territories such as New Caledonia and French Polynesia which give it a strategic and military foothold unmatched by any other European country.

The row has for now at least put on hold hopes of a post-Trump renaissance in Paris-Washington relations under Biden and his Secretary of State Antony Blinken, a fluent French speaker who was educated in Paris.

France's European Affairs Minister Clement Beaune also said Friday that Paris was unable to trust Canberra in ongoing European Union trade deal talks following the decision.

France's Europe Minister Clément Beaune calls the AUKUS submarine deal a 'breach of trust' 00:34



France meanwhile called off a gala at its ambassador's house in Washington scheduled for Friday.

The event was supposed to celebrate the anniversary of a decisive naval battle in the American Revolution, in which France played a key role.

AUKUS overshadows Europe’s Indo-Pacific plan

France had pushed for several years for a European strategy for boosting economic, political and defense ties in the region stretching from India and China to Japan and New Zealand.

The EU on Thursday unveiled its plan for the Indo-Pacific. But the AUKUS headlines overshadowed the EU’s own Indo-Pacific strategy aimed at "exploring ways to ensure enhanced naval deployments by EU Member States to help protect the sea lines of communication and freedom of navigation", according to a statement.

A French diplomat told AFP on Friday that Macron received a letter from Australian PM Morrison on Wednesday morning announcing the decision to cancel the submarine deal.

French officials then decided to reach out to the Biden administration "to ask what was going on", the source said. He added that discussions with Washington took place just two to three hours before Biden's public announcement.

Paris had raised the issue of the Indo-Pacific strategy during the June 25 visit to Paris of US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, expressing the importance of its submarine program with Australia, the diplomat said.

“We said that is was for us a very important and critical component in our Indo-Pacific strategy,” he said. Blinken met with Macron during the visit.

The French diplomat said Australia never gave any indication to France before of its intention to scrap the submarine deal, including during a meeting between Macron and Morrison in Paris on June 15.

(FRANCE 24 with AFP and AP)

  

AUKUS alliance: Blinken seeks to calm French fury amid diplomatic row

Issued on: 17/09/2021 - 

Video by:

Marc Perelman

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken on Thursday called France a vital partner in the Indo-Pacific, comments that appeared aimed at calming French anger after the United States, Australia and the UK clinched a deal to supply Australia with submarines. The three countries said on Wednesday they would establish a security partnership for the Indo-Pacific that would help Australia acquire US nuclear-powered submarines and see it scrap a $40 billion French-designed submarine deal. France reacted angrily to the loss of the deal, calling it a "stab in the back." FRANCE 24's French Politics Editor Marc Perelman explains.

  

What does the new AUKUS alliance mean for Japan, South Korea?

Issued on: 17/09/2021 

President Joe Biden announced Wednesday that the United States is forming a new Indo-Pacific security alliance with Britain and Australia that will allow for greater sharing of defense capabilities — including helping equip Australia with nuclear-powered submarines. Northest Asia Editor for Asia Times, Andrew Salmon, explains what this new alliance means for Japan and South Korea.

 

 

Full text of Xi Jinping's signed article on French media

06-May-2024

CGTN

A signed article by Chinese President Xi Jinping titled "Carrying Forward the Spirit that Guided the Establishment of China-France Diplomatic Relations, Working Together for Global Peace and Development" was published Sunday on French newspaper Le Figaro upon his arrival in Paris for a state visit to France.

Here is the full text of his article.

Carrying Forward the Spirit that Guided the Establishment of China-France Diplomatic Relations, Working Together for Global Peace and Development

Xi Jinping

President of the People's Republic of China

I am delighted to pay my third state visit to France at the invitation of President Emmanuel Macron.

France holds a special fascination for us Chinese. This country has produced a galaxy of philosophers, writers, and artists with global appeal who have inspired all humanity. Over 150 years ago, French nationals helped China found its Fujian Navy Yard and the Fujian Naval Academy. France was also the first country to welcome government-sponsored students from China. A century ago, a number of young Chinese traveled to France for further education. Some of these young patriots went on to make remarkable contribution to the founding and development of New China. France was also the first major western country to enter into formal diplomatic ties with New China.

The year 2024 is of special significance. I will visit France bringing with me three messages from China.

—China will work with France to carry forward the spirit that guided the establishment of their diplomatic ties, build on past achievements and open new vistas for China-France relations.

This year marks the 60th anniversary of China-France relations. Six decades ago, General Charles de Gaulle, with a strategic vision based on the trend of the time, resolved to establish diplomatic relations with New China. It wasn't easy to make this independent decision at the height of the Cold War, but it has proven to be right and foresighted. With the establishment of China-France relations, a bridge of communication between the East and West was built, and the international relations were able to evolve in the direction of dialogue and cooperation.

In these six decades, China-France relations have stayed abreast of the times. Our two countries took the lead in establishing a comprehensive strategic partnership and launching institutional strategic dialogue in China's relations with Western countries. We spearheaded cooperation in aviation and nuclear energy and on third-party markets. We were among the first to mutually open cultural centers and start cultural year activities, providing guidance for mutual learning between civilizations. China-France cooperation contributed to the conclusion of the Paris Agreement on climate change and the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, boosting strongly the implementation of the global climate agenda.

History is our best teacher. We live in a world that is far from being tranquil and is once again facing a multitude of risks. China is ready to work with France in the spirit that guided the establishment of our diplomatic ties to forge a stronger comprehensive strategic partnership between our two countries and make new contributions to stronger cooperation of the global community.

—China will open even wider to the world and deepen cooperation with France and other countries.

This year marks the 75th anniversary of the People's Republic of China. Through 75 years of perseverant hard work, the Chinese people have turned China from an impoverished country into the second largest economy in the world. Several hundred million people in rural areas were lifted out of poverty, a miracle in the history of humanity. The Chinese economy registered 5.2 percent growth in 2023, and is expected to grow by around 5 percent in 2024 with greater progress toward high-quality development. China will remain a source of global growth and create opportunities for all countries.

One thing that has made China's development possible is our firm commitment to opening up. We welcome more quality French farm products and cosmetics to the Chinese market to meet the ever-growing needs of the Chinese people for a better life. We welcome investment by companies from France and other countries to China. To this end, we have fully opened up China's manufacturing sector, and will move faster to expand market access to telecom, medical and other services. We also have a 15-day visa-exemption policy for visitors from many countries including France, and we have taken further measures to facilitate travel and payment by foreigners in China.

While opening up itself, China also encourages Chinese companies to go global. France is advancing re-industrialization based on green innovation, whereas China is accelerating the development of new quality productive forces. Our two countries can deepen cooperation on innovation and jointly promote green development. Some Chinese companies have set up battery plants in France. The Chinese government supports more Chinese companies in investing in France. And we hope that France will ensure that they operate in a fair and equitable business environment.

—China will strengthen communication and coordination with France to uphold world peace and stability.

This year marks the 70th anniversary of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Seven decades ago, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai put forth in full the five principles for the first time —"mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence." Through 70 years, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence have been widely accepted and recognized by countries across the world. They have become an important norm governing contemporary international relations.

China has faithfully practiced the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Over the past 70-plus years since its founding, New China never provoked a war or occupied an inch of foreign land. China is the only country around the world that includes in its Constitution the commitment to the path of peaceful development, and China is the only country among the major nuclear-weapon states that is committed to no-first-use of nuclear weapons.

I have proposed in recent years the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the Global Civilization Initiative. As part of China's efforts to help improve global governance and resolve tough question regarding human development, the three initiatives have won the support of more than 100 countries and international organizations.

China understands the repercussions of the Ukraine crisis on the people of Europe. China did not start the Ukraine crisis, nor is it a party to or a participant in it. Nonetheless, China has been playing a constructive role in striving for peaceful settlement of the crisis. I have made many appeals, among others, observing the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, respecting sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries, and addressing the legitimate security concerns of all sides. I have stressed that nuclear weapons must not be used, and a nuclear war must not be fought. China has delivered to Ukraine many shipments of humanitarian aids, and sent its special representative many times to mediate among the countries concerned. The longer the Ukraine crisis drags on, the greater harm it will do to Europe and the world. China hopes that peace and stability will return to Europe at an early date. We stand ready to work with France and the whole international community to find a reasonable way out of the crisis.

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict pulls on our heartstrings as well. The fundamental solution lies in the establishment of an independent State of Palestine. History has repeatedly shown that the recurrent Palestine-Israel problem is rooted essentially in the failure of actual enforcement of relevant UN resolutions, in the continued erosion of the foundation for the two-state solution, and the deviation of the Middle East peace process. China and France have many in common on the Palestine-Israel issue. It is thus critical that we strengthen cooperation and help restore peace in the Middle East.

Confucius observed that "a man of true moral integrity is one who is both friendly but independent, and who does not compromise his principles, and who is independent without any bias or taking sides. How unflinchingly firm he is in his strength!" French writer Romain Rolland said that "it is so much easier to allow oneself to be guided than it is to think for oneself. This abdication is the kernel of the mischief." Both China and France value independence as two major countries. Our interactions in the long course of history have released tremendous energy swaying the trajectory of the world. Now we are standing at another historical starting point. Let us join hands together on this new journey toward greater progress in China-France relations to the benefit of our two countries and the world!

Elevation of France as Major Arms Exporter in the World Causes and Implications

The global arms trade has long been a subject of scrutiny and debate, with its impacts reverberating across geopolitical landscapes.

BY SYED RAIYAN AMIR
APRIL 20, 2024

Rafale French Air Force. Image source: Wikipedia

The global arms trade has long been a subject of scrutiny and debate, with its impacts reverberating across geopolitical landscapes. In recent years, significant shifts have occurred within this sphere, notably with France’s ascension as a major arms exporter on the world stage. This transformation raises pertinent questions regarding the underlying causes driving France’s newfound position and the implications it carries for international security dynamics. Examining the factors behind France’s rise in arms exports and the potential ramifications of this development is crucial for understanding contemporary geopolitical trends.

Between the periods of 2014–18 and 2019–23, arms exports from the United States, the leading arms provider globally, experienced a notable increase of 17 percent. Conversely, during the same timeframe, arms exports from Russia saw a substantial decline, plummeting by over half at 53 percent. Meanwhile, France’s arms exports witnessed a significant surge, growing by 47 percent, consequently propelling it ahead of Russia to claim the position of the world’s second-largest arms supplier.

In the period of 2019–23, as mentioned earlier France surpassed Russia to claim the position of the world’s second-largest exporter of major arms. French arms exports constituted 11 percent of all arms transfers during this timeframe, marking a notable increase of 47 percent compared to the period of 2014–18. In 2019–23, France supplied major arms to 64 countries, with India emerging as the largest recipient, accounting for 29 percent of French arms exports. The majority of France’s arms exports during this period were directed towards countries in Asia and Oceania (42 percent) and the Middle East (34 percent). Despite ongoing efforts to expand arms sales to other European nations, France’s exports to European states accounted for only 9.1 percent of its total arms exports in 2019–23. Notably, over half of its European arms exports (53 percent) were directed to Greece, primarily comprising transfers of 17 Rafale combat aircraft.

The Surge in France’s Arms Exports: Why?

France’s proactive export policies, including government support, technological advancements, and strategic targeting of regions like the Middle East, fueled a rise in arms exports during the period. This positioned them to capitalize on Russia’s decline as a major exporter following the Ukraine war, allowing France to secure the number two spot with advanced weaponry like the Rafale fighter jet.

It’s noteworthy that India stands as the largest arms importer globally, with France and Russia supplying 33 percent and 36 percent of its imports, respectively. In July 2023, New Delhi granted preliminary approval for the acquisition of six Scorpène submarines and 26 Rafale jets for the Indian Navy. Shortly thereafter, on July 25, reports from France’s La Tribune newspaper indicated Qatar’s contemplation of adding an additional 24 Rafales to its arsenal. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) report released in March 2023, France’s share of the global arms trade surged to 11 percent between 2018 and 2022, compared to 7.1 percent in the preceding four-year period. Conversely, Russia’s share of the international arms trade dwindled from 22 to 16 percent during the same period. So, this can be one of the indicators.

Figure 1: The 25 largest exporters of major arms and their main recipients, 2019–23

Source: https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2024-03/fs_2403_at_2023.pdf

The imposition of multiple rounds of international sanctions on Russia may have hindered its ability to access the necessary materials for arms production, thereby hampering its export capabilities. Reports from Ukraine have cast doubt on the efficacy of Russia-built armaments, tarnishing their reputation on the global stage. Some importers have expressed dissatisfaction with Russian products in recent years. India, a longstanding importer of Russian arms suppliers, has raised concerns about the technical performance of Russian weaponry. As noted by Pieter Wezeman, the author of the SIPRI report 2023, India’s discontent has prompted a shift towards sourcing arms from France.

Furthermore, the United States wields significant influence over countries procuring weapons from Russia, a trend that predates the Ukraine conflict, according to Wezeman. For instance, Indonesia opted to abandon a planned purchase of Russian aircraft in 2021 in favor of options from the US and France.

A significant surge in the delivery of Rafale combat aircraft played a pivotal role in driving the growth of French arms exports during the period of 2019–23. In the preceding period of 2014–18, France exported 23 Rafales, a number that skyrocketed to 94 in the subsequent period of 2019–23. Remarkably, these exports accounted for nearly one third (31 percent) of French arms exports during this timeframe. Furthermore, the pipeline for Rafale exports remained robust, with an additional 193 Rafales on order for export by the end of 2023. However, it is noteworthy that the majority of the Rafale aircraft already delivered (96 out of 117) and those on order (178 out of 193) are destined for states outside Europe, including Egypt, India, Indonesia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. This underscores the persistent challenge France encounters in selling its major arms to European states, particularly amidst fierce competition from the United States. Notably, out of the 10 European states that preselected or ordered combat aircraft in the period of 2019–23, eight opted for US F-16s or F-35s, with only Croatia and Greece opting for the Rafale.

In addition to bolstering its sales of combat aircraft, France also witnessed a 14 percent increase in exports of military ships, along with the weaponry required to equip them, between the periods of 2014–18 and 2019–23.

Figure 2: Global share of exports of major arms by the 10 largest exporters, 2019–23

Therefore the Rafale fighter jet, manufactured by Dassault Aviation, has emerged as a cornerstone of France’s recent achievements in the realm of defense exports, according to Olivier Gras, the general secretary of EuroDéfense-France, an association based in Paris comprising civil and military officials. Despite entering service as early as 2002, it wasn’t until 2015 that the Rafale made its inaugural foray into the international market. Since then, these twin-engine jets have found homes in Greece, Qatar, India, and Egypt, with impending deployments to Croatia, Indonesia, and the United Arab Emirates, which placed an order for 80 Standard F4 Rafales in 2021. The global tally of Rafale deliveries and orders now stands at nearly 500, representing approximately half the volume of its primary American counterpart, Lockheed Martin’s F-35. Moreover, potential orders from additional countries are on the horizon, with Colombia nearing a deal for 16 aircraft while Serbia, historically aligned with Russia’s arms industry, contemplates acquiring 12 planes.

Global military expenditure experienced a significant increase of 9 percent from the previous year, reaching a historic high of $2.2 trillion in 2023. This surge was attributed to heightened insecurity worldwide, fueled by numerous conflicts, as indicated by a recent report from the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Meanwhile, NATO’s budget hike can influence other actors in two ways. First, it sets a precedent. By collectively investing more, NATO strengthens the message of shared security concerns. This can pressure members who haven’t met spending targets to step up.  Second, a larger NATO budget allows for more joint exercises and capabilities, potentially making individual militaries seem less essential. This might nudge some countries towards increasing their own budgets to maintain their national defense posture. And here France was an option to spend on.

Figure 3: Changes in volume of exports of major arms since 2014–18 by the 10 largest exporters in 2019–23

Who are the Importers?

In the period spanning 2019–23, the primary suppliers of major arms to Africa included Russia, constituting 24 percent of African imports, followed by the USA at 16 percent, China at 13 percent, and France at 10 percent. France emerged as the third-largest supplier to sub-Saharan Africa during this period, capturing an 11 percent share of subregional arms imports. Turning to South America, France assumed a prominent position as the leading supplier, contributing 23 percent of subregional imports. Meanwhile, in the Middle East, the United States dominated arms imports, commanding a significant share of 52 percent. Following the USA, France emerged as the next significant supplier, accounting for 12 percent of Middle Eastern arms imports, alongside Italy at 10 percent and Germany at 7.1 percent.

Qatar’s arms imports during the same period predominantly came from the United States, representing 45 percent of Qatari arms imports, followed by France at 25 percent and Italy at 15 percent. Notably, Qatar’s acquisitions included 36 combat aircraft from France, 36 from the USA, and 25 from the UK, in addition to 4 frigates procured from Italy.

Implications of Rising Arms Exports

The surge in arms exports across the globe is poised to have far-reaching implications, reshaping geopolitical dynamics and fostering a climate of heightened tension and competition. As importing countries bolster their military capabilities, several key implications emerge.

Firstly, heightened arms imports are likely to exacerbate existing tensions in importing countries and their surrounding regions. The influx of sophisticated weaponry may fuel regional rivalries and increase the likelihood of conflict, raising concerns about stability and security.

Secondly, importing countries are expected to allocate a larger portion of their budgets towards defense expenditures, reflecting a shift in their strategic priorities. The growing defense budgets signal a commitment to enhancing military capabilities and preparedness in response to perceived threats and geopolitical uncertainties.

Thirdly, the influx of arms into different regions, driven by increased exports from major suppliers, is poised to contribute to a proliferation of armaments. This proliferation not only amplifies the potential for conflict but also complicates efforts towards disarmament and non-proliferation initiatives.

Fourthly,  Eastern Europe, already a region marked by geopolitical tensions and historical rivalries, is likely to experience further strain as arms imports increase. The influx of weaponry, coupled with ongoing political disputes, could exacerbate existing conflicts and raise the risk of escalation.

Fifthly, the surge in arms exports is expected to intensify competition among major exporters, particularly China, France, and Russia. As these countries vie for market share and influence, competition in the global arms trade is set to escalate, potentially leading to new marketing strategies and geopolitical maneuvering.

Sixthly, the rise in arms exports is likely to contribute to heightened polarization among nations, as countries align themselves with different suppliers based on strategic interests and geopolitical considerations. This polarization may further exacerbate regional tensions and complicate efforts towards diplomatic resolution of conflicts.

Finally, India’s increased arms imports from France, despite its longstanding relationship with Russia, signal a significant shift in procurement patterns. This shift underscores India’s strategic diversification efforts and reflects evolving geopolitical dynamics in the region.

The surge in arms exports has profound implications for global security and stability, with tensions likely to rise in importing countries and their respective regions. The growing competition among arms exporters, coupled with increased defense budgets and regional rivalries, underscores the need for concerted efforts towards arms control, disarmament, and diplomatic dialogue to mitigate the risk of conflict and promote peace and security on a global scale.

The elevation of France as a major arms exporter in the world marks a significant juncture in the evolving dynamics of the global arms trade. While driven by various factors such as strategic partnerships, technological advancements, and evolving defense policies, France’s newfound position underscores its growing influence in international security affairs. However, amidst the shifting landscape of arms proliferation, it becomes imperative for policymakers and stakeholders to carefully assess the implications of this trend on regional stability, conflict dynamics, and the broader geopolitical landscape. Through informed analysis and proactive engagement, efforts can be directed towards fostering a more secure and stable global environment.

Syed Raiyan Amir
Research Associate The Center for Bangladesh and Global Affairs (CBGA)

LA REVUE GAUCHE - Left Comment: Search results for PERMANENT ARMS ECONOMY 

 

The post-election challenge in France: An interview with John Mullen of La France Insoumise

By John Mullen & Tempest

Published 17 October, 2024

First published at Tempest.

Tempest interviews French socialist, John Mullen, about the challenges facing the Left in France following the the formation of a new right-wing government led by prime minister Michel Barnier. This comes after massive mobilizations to keep the far-right, under Marine Le Pen, from taking power, in what was widely seen as a show of strength for the broad Left. Barnier’s traditional center-right parry party came in fourth place in the recent parliamentary elections and in circumstances in which President Emmanuel Macron did not allow the Nouveau Front Populaire (New Popular Front), the party with the largest number of seats, led by La France Insoumise (France in Revolt), to attempt to form a government.

What do you understand to be the main lessons from the summer’s electoral process? Given Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National (RN) won the greatest number of votes (more than 10 million) in each round of the election, despite failing to win a majority of parliamentary seats, do you consider the outcome of the second round a defeat for the forces of the far right?

You have to look at the dynamic of the situation. What looked like the unstoppable rise to government of the fascists was pushed back by the biggest mobilization against them for decades.

The second round was an important tactical victory for the Left and for the working class. Consistent polls predicted that the RN would win more seats than any other group, and might even secure an overall majority in parliament, but they ended up in third place. However, the far right will only remain on the back foot for a short period.

Four parties of the Left formed a coalition — the Nouveau Front Populaire, the New Popular Front (NPF), comprised of the Communists, Socialists, Greens, and La France Insoumise (France in Revolt)—and agreed on a fairly radical minimum program for government in record time. They were, it is true, under tremendous pressure from below (outside the building where negotiations happened, hundreds had gathered to chant slogans of unity). The result is that we do not have a fascist government.

Those political groups who were (and are) opposed to the coalition, one must imagine, consider that it changes little or nothing who is in government. Given that Marine Le Pen’s party has declared it wants the hijab to be banned in all public places, social housing to be reserved to French nationals, and certain public sector jobs to be forbidden even to people with dual nationality, one can imagine there are few Muslims or people from ethnic minorities in France who are quite so relaxed about this prospect. Even a minority government controls the police and the schools, and fascist ministers in charge of these domains would be a demoralizing nightmare for our class.

The reason I speak of a tactical victory is that the fascists remain very strong. They have 140 or so MPs (several dozen more than before) and they garnered ten million votes. The need for a mass antifascist movement to go onto the offensive against them is clear.

For the moment, the National Rally is very weak indeed on the ground. In many towns they have practically no party structure, and they have not organized a street demonstration of more than 10,000 people for decades. At its annual conference the NR leadership noted that, in addition to continuing the long march through the institutions and their obsession with respectability, they absolutely must build locally. It would be quite possible for antifascists to stop them with broad campaigns of education and harassment.

Because the NR has concentrated on a parliamentary strategy, hoping to win power in the institutions to then permit a mass of street fighters, it is particularly the wrong time to argue that elections have no importance.

Earlier this month, President Emmanuel Macron, himself a figure of authoritarian neoliberalism, ignored historical precedent in overseeing the creation of the new government after the election. Macron facilitated the creation of a new government led by a prime minister (Michel Barnier) from the traditional center-right party, The Republicans, which had come in fourth place. In doing so, Macron refused to allow the NFP, with the largest number of parliamentary seats, to seek to form a government. How do you assess the stability of this government and the role that now has to be played by the NFP, France Insoumise, and the forces of the revolutionary left, respectively? What has been the response of the Left, as well as the working-class, to Macron’s decision?

Although the present crisis is a slow-burning one, it is the deepest in the country since 1968. The constitution forbids repeat parliamentary elections until next June, so we will see weak minority governments, rapidly changing alliances, and significant space for extraparliamentary revolt.

Barnier’s government is stuffed with reactionaries who are copying ideas from the RN. But Macron would have preferred a more stable left-right coalition, and is unhappy that (so far) the left coalition, the New Popular Front, has held.

Every political organization and political alliance in the country is fragile, including the Barnier government. It took a long time for him to choose ministers, and apparently he had to threaten to resign to make Macron accept his list. The ministers are already bickering publicly about whether RN is a legitimate democratic party or not.

The NFP has reacted by insisting that Macron is in contempt of democracy and that Lucie Castets, the agreed NFP candidate for prime minister, should have been appointed. Nevertheless, nearly half the Socialist Party National Committee wanted to break the left alliance, and voted to support a compromise PM, Bernard Cazeneuve.

It seems to me essential that the whole of the Left should defend the very limited democracy we have under capitalism. It does matter whether Macron respects elections or not. France Insoumise (but not the rest of the NFP) is campaigning for Macron to be impeached for not respecting democracy. This is a healthy, popular demand. The reactions of the revolutionaries have varied, but sadly almost none of the groups have supported the campaign for impeachment.

On other important questions of strategy, the far left organizations are very far from unanimous. One of the bigger groups, Le Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste — The New Anticapitalist Party (NPA), has joined the NFP as a minor player. Others are busy denouncing it.

At very short notice, the NFP was able to build an electoral coalition, one that mobilized broadly across the Left, and within working-class, immigrant, and Arab and Muslim communities, to win the largest plurality of seats. What, if any, is the ongoing impact of these mobilizations in the face of the right-wing government? Can this coalition be the basis for ongoing struggle against the Right?

To some extent. On September 7, demonstrations led by youth organizations and the France Insoumise, and looked on favorably by the leadership of the main left trade union confederation, the Confédération Générale du Travail — General Confederation of Labour (CGT), took place in some 150 towns across France. The Green party and the Communists called for people to get on the streets, but the Socialist Party did not. On September 21, there was a similar mobilization, but it was considerably smaller. France Insoumise is at the center of this dynamic, with other parts of the NFP sometimes agreeing to join in.

It is impossible to say what will come out of a situation which sees both dynamic mass activism and plenty of discouragement on the Left. No doubt the key result on the ground is the 60,000 new people who have asked to get involved with the of France Insoumise and the many hundreds who have joined the different revolutionary organizations.

The more parliament is paralyzed, the more mass action outside parliament is crucial.

There is a lot of criticism and skepticism of the NFP from sections of the revolutionary left based on the participation of the historically social liberal, and pro-NATO Socialist Party. How do you respond to this line of criticism? And how do you understand the balance of forces within the NFP between its constituent parts? How stable do you expect it to be in the face of the Barnier government?

You form coalitions with people you do not agree with. If the France in Revolt leadership had said, “We will not ally with the social-liberals,” there would be a fascist-led government in France today. Every day gives good reason to mistrust most of the leadership of the Socialist Party (as well as the Communist Party), but it is critical that their leaders were pressured from below to sign on to a radical program to block a fascist government.

Like every political force in France today, the coalition is unstable and the right-wing of the Socialist Party are getting organized in case the alliance falls apart. Among other crises, a small group of four or five France Insoumise members of parliament has split off to its right, accompanied by acres of joyful newsprint from the right-wing media. Some of the less right-wing of Macron’s MPs have left his grouping, and the Greens are also having fierce internal debates.

The good news is that Macron’s plan A and plan B both failed. Plan A was the lightning speed election which was supposed to knock out a divided left and leave Macron as “our only defense against fascism.” Plan B was to split the left alliance and set up a “national unity” government with the Right and with sections of the Left outside the France Insoumise.

The huge movement of strikes and street mobilizations, which is necessary and likely, stands more chance against this weak Barnier government.

Insofar as the forces of the far right, led by Marine Le Pen’s RN — which won the greatest number of votes in each round of the election — are essentially giving support to the Barnier government, how do you assess the impact of the new government on the growth of the far right?

This support could be very temporary indeed. But obviously the fascists are hoping to advance in the crisis. Firstly, they want to gain respectability outside their own electorate, particularly in upper-middle-class circles. Secondly, they want to pretend they are the realistic alternative to discredited Macronism. Lastly, they need to encourage their fascist core with red meat racist rhetoric. It’s a difficult balance. In addition, they want to build local party structures everywhere. So, they have real strengths, but lots of weak points that antifascists can attack. There are some signs of antifascist activity increasing around the country, including in France Insoumise.

Given the role that France Insoumise has been playing, and its undisputed mass support within left-wing and antifacist sections of the working-class and immigrant and Arab and muslim communities, it seems clear that revolutionary socialists should relate to this in some way. At the same time, there is some criticism of its inability or failure to create a “democratic membership organization.” In what ways can the revolutionary left relate to LFI?

I was a member of revolutionary organizations in France for more than 30 years. If I am no longer a member now, it is because I think they are wrong on crucial questions and their attitudes to the French new left is at the center of this.

The emergence of the France Insoumise over the last eight years represents a remarkable success for mass left reformism, which must be clearly understood if revolutionaries are to react appropriately.

This is an organization that secured more than 7.5 million votes in 2022 and that speaks of “a citizen’s revolution.” Its leader, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, calls it “an anticapitalist force, aiming at ecological planning of the economy.” Tens of thousands of people have flocked to the movement over the last couple of months. France Insoumise organized a summer school with 116 meetings and more than 5,000 people in August 2024. It has set up regular educational courses for activists, including “Introduction to Marxism” classes, and is taking the accumulation of cadre seriously.

France Insoumise was the driving force behind the coalition that pushed back the fascists—and it is the force attracting the best young activists now. The organization has succeeded in transforming public debate and breaking the reigning “there is no alternative to neoliberalism” atmosphere. It has brought opposition to islamophobia into the mainstream of left politics, from where it had been absent for several decades (even though both France Insoumise and the revolutionary left in France have some distance still to go on this question).

The organization is organizationally independent of the old reformist left (unlike, say, mass Corbynism in the United Kingdom). It now publishes books, organizes weekend schools and lectures, and seems to be becoming hegemonic on the radical left.

In sharp contrast to left reformist groups in several other countries, France Insoumise’s leadership has held firm on the two issues on which the establishment pressure has been strongest: Palestine and police violence. Two of its leaders, Mathilde Panot and Rima Hassan, were called into the police station, accused of the crime of “supporting terrorism.”

Mélenchon had an official police complaint lodged against him by the Ministry of Higher Education because he criticized the disgusting attitude of the Chancellor of Lille University who banned the group’s lecture on the genocide in Gaza. A far-right police trade union organized a demonstration in front of France Unbowed headquarters some time back. In short, France Insoumise is the center of gravity of radical left politics.

Its emergence is the result of two phenomena. Firstly there is the generalization of political class consciousness in France after the mass political strikes of 1995, 2006, 2010, 2013, 2019, and 2023 (against attacks on pensions or on labor protection legislation) and the popular revolts of 2005, 2018, and 2023 (against police violence or rural poverty). Secondly, there was the weakness and division of the revolutionary left, which we would have liked to have become hegemonic. The result is a mass left reformism, seen as an open-ended determination to rethink the whole of society.

It would be disastrous for revolutionaries to primarily see this new force as unwelcome competition. Seeing tens of thousands of new activists flood in to defend a “citizens’ revolution” and “spectacular change” should delight every Marxist. “Debate, debate, debate” should be the priority — not “denounce, denounce, denounce!” It is essential to take as a starting point what the relation is between France Insoumise and workers’ interests, not to start with what effect the rise of the FI will have on our small organizations.

It is easy to read online what the main newspapers of the French revolutionary left have written about France Insoumise in the last few years. The organization is almost never mentioned, except to denounce selected actions, tactics, or slogans. You find almost no debates with its representatives, nor do you find fraternal in-depth articles explaining agreements and disagreements. I think these two kinds of articles should have been present in every issue of every publication.

Mélenchon has written seven books in the last ten years. I have been unable to find a review of any of them in the main far left publications in France.

This tendency to assess other parties of the Left in a sectarian manner has led to some serious mistakes, cutting the far left off from the most promising new masses of activists. I will mention three examples.

In the presidential elections in 2022, two separate Trotskyist candidates stood against Melenchon, obtaining 0.56 and 0.77 percent of the vote (as against Mélenchon’s 21.95 percent). What is more, the campaign of the least unpopular, Philippe Poutou, mostly spoke of radical reforms, not of revolution.

Then, two months ago, a few France Insoumise MPs split off from the party, after having prepared a new organization (L’Après — L’Association pour la République écologique et sociale). It is becoming clear that this formation will, in fact,be less left-wing. Much of the far left supported the split and continues to support the small organization born from it, citing worries about democracy within France Insoumise.

And, third, the far left has refused, with occasional honorable exceptions, to contradict and fight against the horrific smear campaigns against Mélenchon and other France Insoumise leaders, which are similar to those run against Corbyn in the United Kingdom a few years ago, that he is an antisemite and “friend of Vladimir Putin” and so on.

Concerning the kind of organization France Insoumise is building: unimpressed with the results of traditional radical left parties in France, which are frequently bogged down in endless faction fighting, its leadership wanted to try something different. The party has no formal membership, no one can be expelled, representatives at national delegate meetings are chosen by lottery, and local action groups are very much autonomous. The program is meant to hold the organization together.

Revolutionaries may agree or disagree with these methods (though no one is asking our opinion, to be clear), but they give rise to a situation that has advantages for Marxists. You can be an activist in France Insoumise and a member of another organization. You can openly publish your own paper and have your own meetings.

Personally, I can’t see why revolutionaries won’t work openly inside the France Insoumise. Two or three Trotskyist groups do, keeping their independent voice. But even groups that prefer to stay outside should be ten times more interested than they are in debating with France Insoumise people on the many crucial questions thrown up by the present crisis.

Despite its important work building up movements, the revolutionary left is a small player, and needs to recognize this. Mostly, what we have to offer is ideas, analysis, history.

Many debates are in progress inside France Insoumise. How should we understand women’s oppression? How can a radical program be implemented? What should we think of the animal rights movements, privilege theory, the crisis of imperialism, or left patriotism? Marxists have a huge contribution to make to these discussions.

There are also numerous serious disagreements between Marxists and the leadership of France Insoumise over French imperialism, the role of parliament, the potential for constitutional reform, and so on.

But in the France Insoumise, we have an attractive, dynamic mass organization looking for a “citizens’ revolution.” We Marxists want a workers’ revolution. But in a situation in which 90 percent of the working class do not see a clear difference between the two, it’s better to be inside the hall discussing the way forward than standing in the bus shelter across the road, searching through lists of tactical decisions by the France Insoumise looking for one to denounce.

France's New Push To Expand Geopolitical Influence In Africa

By The Jamestown Foundation - May 30, 2023

• Macron has been eager to re-establish French influence in Africa, despite myriad issues in the last six years.
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• rance’s emphasis on the fight against terrorism in the Sahel has further eroded ties between France and the people of Africa.
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• Currently, Paris is trying to woo African nations to its side by implementing a soft power policy through strengthening ties with civil society and appealing to young people.

On March 4, during his trip to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), French president Emmanuel Macron shared his vision for France, with Paris remaining deeply engaged in Africa. He portrayed France as the European partner which had the greatest amount in common with African countries in terms of values and provides the most support for mutually beneficial security and trade relationships (Euractiv, March 6). Macron’s ongoing attempt to facilitate France’s re-emergence as a fully-fledged regional security actor in Africa is not occurring rapidly enough to compensate for the country’s decreasing status in its traditional spheres of economic and cultural influence in Africa, however. Macron’s words were nevertheless consistent with what he has said since he was first elected in 2017. Macron has been eager to re-establish French influence in Africa, despite myriad issues in the last six years: armed conflicts have made the Francophone Sahel region a center of insurgency, French troops have withdrawn from Mali, with even the Algerian government indicating that English will be taught in the country’s schools instead of French (Al Mayadeen, October 7, 2022; La Croix, April 3).

France’s Waning Security Position

In the 1990s, French policy towards Africa came under heavy criticism, and the subsequent souring of French-African relations resulted in a decrease in French diplomatic representation on the continent (Le Monde, March 6). Paris’s most significant stumbling block was its failure to act during the Rwandan Genocide in 1994, when France was accused of failing to prevent the actions of its ally, the government of then-President Juvenal Habyarimana, when it began preparations for what would occur (Le Figaro, May 27, 2021). France’s emphasis on the fight against terrorism in the Sahel at the expense of its economic strategy in the past decade has likewise further eroded ties between France and the people of Africa (France 24, May 24, 2022).

Despite a massive, sustained military effort with more than 5,000 troops deployed in countries such as Niger and Chad, France has not been able to successfully counter the threat from jihadists, whose attacks on local communities and security forces continue in the Sahel (Le Point, January 27). France’s waning influence allowed African states to reorient their economic and security partnerships as the continent has once again become a geopolitical battleground. Now Chinese, Russian, and Turkish influence are growing on the continent and presenting alternatives to that of France (AfricaNews, March 15).

In Mali, France’s inability to combat the insurgency in the north of the country was a subtext to the May 2021 coup d’état that catapulted Colonel Assimi Goïta to power (North Africa Post, November 18, 2022). Operation Barkhane, the French military counter-terrorism campaign that began in 2013, became mired in an increasingly impotent fight against the al-Qaeda affiliate, Group for Supporters of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) and Islamic State in Greater Sahara (ISGS)—all while political instability engulfed Bamako (France Bleu, November 9, 2022). Since the coup, Goïta has shunned Paris and gravitated toward Moscow, whose Wagner mercenaries were already active in another former French colony, the Central African Republic (CAR) (Le Monde, February 4).

The Return of French Soft Power

Currently, Paris is trying to woo African nations to its side by implementing a soft power policy through strengthening ties with civil society and appealing to young people. In March, during a four-country trip to Central Africa, Macron called for a “mutual and responsible relationship” with African nations, including on climate issues (France 24, March 1). Having prompted a shift towards a lower-profile, more collaborative military approach amid the French withdrawal from Mali, Macron is also trying to foster cultural connections with French-speaking Africa by improving access to visas for Africans to pursue post-graduate study in France (Dzair Daily, February 28).

In July 2022, Macron launched a charm offensive to reboot France’s relationship with Africa, touring Cameroon, Benin, and Guinea-Bissau on his first trip to the continent since winning re-election in April 2022 (Euronews, 26 July, 2022). He also promised to reduce France’s military presence across Africa (L’independant, February 27). Macron further claimed France would circumvent “anachronistic” power struggles in Africa, declaring that African states ought to be treated as equal partners in the area of military and economic cooperation (Le Point, February 27).

Nevertheless, African countries themselves seem to prefer to follow a multi-vector foreign policy. For instance, African states’ attitudes toward China and Russia are shifting as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In a UN General Assembly vote in March 2022, 38 African states condemned Moscow’s war on Ukraine, while 16 states abstained (Africa Renewal, April 21, 2022). Despite this, farmers’ associations from 11 Central African states asserted that disruptions in food supplies caused by the war in Ukraine have led to skyrocketing food prices, reducing purchasing power for many Africans (North Africa Post, September 15, 2022). Many African states, therefore, have adopted a “neutral” position on Moscow’s war and might prefer a “peace deal” that, at present, would secure Russian territorial gains in Ukraine and the flow of food to Africa (Al-Jazeera, February 26).

Conclusion

France currently has neither the tools to replace China, Russia, or Turkey nor the intention to be the dominant power in Africa. However, Turkey’s economic challenges and Russia’s prolonged war against Ukraine could create an opening for France to take a more assertive role in Africa, if they are able to induce African states to distance themselves from other powers (Daily Sabah, April 11). As Paris is realizing in Africa, the fight against jihadists, which has been so crucial to its foreign policy on the continent, can only be won by binding military prowess with local governance initiatives, tackling corruption, and improving the lives of civilians. France will not be able to remain influential in Africa with an over-emphasis in counter-insurgency as it has in the past—instead, a more comprehensive strategy will be needed.

By TheJamestownfoundation.org