Can The US And Iraq Move Beyond Military Ties? – Analysis

Iraq's Mohammed Al-Sudani. Photo Credit: Mehr News Agency

 April 13, 2024  

By James Durso

Twenty-one years ago, the U.S. and its allies invaded Iraq in the erroneous belief that the country possessed weapons of mass destruction and was allied with al-Qaida, the terror group responsible for the 9/11 attacks. 

The U.S. created an occupation authority, but failed to restore order and helped spawn the insurgency that bedeviled it by dismissing the entire Iraqi military and the most experienced civil servants. Coalition troops fought a losing battle, regained their footing with the 2007 troop surge, and finally departed in 2011. U.S. troops returned in 2014 to fight the Islamic State and they remain there to this day, though ISIS was largely eliminated by 2019.

In January 2020, Iraq’s parliament voted on a nonbinding measure to remove the U.S. troops from Iraq, but the Americans remain at the request of the Iraqi government. However, in response to the parliament’s 2020 vote, Iraq and the International Coalition changed the mission of the troops from a combat mission to one of advisory and training.

Iraq’s prime minister, Mohammed Shia’ Al Sudani, will meet U.S. President Joe Biden on April 15, primarily to discuss the U.S. troop presence. 

Though the U.S.-Iraq Higher Military Commission is reviewing the troop presence issue, will the U.S. side stall fearing it may have to agree to a smaller presence and constrained operations? Possibly, so Sudani may want a public commitment from Biden to force the march to a constructive, timely decision.

Aside from the troops issue, Sudani wants to strengthen Baghdad’s ties with Washington, which he considers Iraq’s top bilateral relationship, and to add an economic dimension to Iraq’s ties with America.

When Americans think of Iraq in economic terms it’s all about the oil, but in November 2023 ExxonMobil, America’s biggest oil company, exited Iraq with nothing to show for a decade-long effort. The departure will lower the expectation of other U.S. companies, but Sudani wants to revitalize economic ties, and he will be accompanied by many of the country’s top businessmen.

U.S.-Iraq trade has room for growth. In 2022, the U.S. exported $897 million in goods, the top product being automobiles. Iraq, in turn, exported $10.3 billion in goods, most of it crude oil.

A key economic objective of Iraq is the $17 billion Development Road, an overland road and rail link from the Persian Gulf to Europe via Turkey, that will host free-trade zones along its length.

Biden and Sudani should consider the shape of the future U.S.-Iraq relationship, which has to now been governed by military considerations, and has become the best example of The Meddler’s Trap, “a situation of self-entanglement, whereby a leader inadvertently creates a problem through military intervention, feels they can solve it, and values solving the new problem more because of the initial intervention. …A military intervention causes a feeling of ownership of the foreign territory, triggering the endowment effect.” 

Iraq is the only real democracy in the Arab world, and many young Iraqis want a separation of religion and state, something that should resonate with Americans and, Iraqis hope, cause the U.S. to deal with Iraq as Iraq, not a platform for operations against Syria and Iran, or to support Washington’s Kurdish clients.

Washington damaged itself in Iraq by killing Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis in January 2020. Baghdad had moved the PMF, once a militia, into the government in 2016 (no doubt with American encouragement), so the killing of Muhandis, then a government official, increased popular support the PMF.

What are some clouds on the horizon for the U.S. and Iraq?

Corruption. Pervasive corruption in Iraq has slowed economic development and subjected Iraqi citizens to ineffective governance. The 2023 Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International ranked Iraq 154 of 180, a slight improvement from 2022 when it ranked 157 of 180.

Iraq was previously described by TI as: “Among the worst countries on corruption and governance indicators, with corruption risks exacerbated by lack of experience in the public administration, weak capacity to absorb the influx of aid money, sectarian issues and lack of political will for anti-corruption efforts.”

Sudani has not ignored corruption, calling it one of the country’s greatest challenges and “no less serious than the threat of terrorism.”

Elizabeth Tsurkov. Tsurkov is a Russian-Israeli academic who was kidnapped in 2023 by Kata’ib Hezbollah, an Iranian-influenced Iraqi militia. Tsurkov, a doctoral student at Princeton University in the U.S., entered Iraq with her Russian passport and did not disclose that she was an Israeli citizen and Israeli Defense Forces veteran. (A 2022 Iraqi law criminalized any relations with Israel.)

Tsurkov’s family wants the Biden administration to designate Iraq a state sponsor of terrorism for failing to secure her release. Sudani’s office announced an investigation into the matter and the issue may arise when Sudani meets Biden, though the best outcome for Iraq and the U.S. is a Russia-brokered deal between Israel and Iran.

If Biden designates Iraq a state sponsor of terrorism that will irreparably damage the relationship and open the door for China.

China. The U.S. is Iraq’s top relationship, but not its only relationship. China will respond to the ostracism of Baghdad by extending invitations to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS, the latter of which can fund infrastructure projects through the New Development Bank. PetroChina replaced ExxonMobil in West Qurna 1, one of Iraq’s biggest oil fields, and is ideally positioned for further expansion. And Iraq was the “leading beneficiary” of China’s Belt and Road Initiative investment in 2021.

Sudani has said Iraq should not be a cockpit of conflict for the U.S, and Iran, but when Iran is concerned it, in Washington, is always 1979. Though Sudani has many challenges to face, Biden has more: he must reorient his government away from its colonial mentality in West Asia, recognize that Baghdad must reach a modus vivendi with Tehran that may not be to Washington’s pleasure, and not smooth the way for Beijing’s greater penetration of West Asia.

This article was published at Responsible Statecraft

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James Durso (@james_durso) is a regular commentator on foreign policy and national security matters. Mr. Durso served in the U.S. Navy for 20 years and has worked in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Central Asia.

 

Is Iraq Ready To Stand Alone Against Extremist Threats If US Withdrawal Goes Ahead? – Analysis

U.S. Army Soldiers conclude a training exercise in support of Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve, in Western Iraq, Oct. 30, 2024. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. Tyler Becker)

 June 2, 2025 

By Arab News

By Jonathan Lessware

When Daesh extremists seized control of swathes of Iraqi territory in 2014, many wondered whether the onslaught could have been prevented had US troops not withdrawn from the country three years earlier.

As the militants surged into Iraq’s second-largest city, Mosul, there were reports of members of the Iraqi Security Forces stripping off their uniforms as they fled.

“We can’t beat them,” an unnamed army officer told Reuters amid the chaos. “They are well-trained in street fighting, and we’re not. We need a whole army to drive them out of Mosul.”

After three years of fierce fighting that took Daesh within 25 kilometers of the capital, Baghdad, the extremists were finally driven back and Mosul was liberated.

The gargantuan military effort was spearheaded by Iraq’s elite Counter Terrorism Service, bolstered by the return of American troops and the US Air Force.

Images of the destruction in Mosul, along with the catastrophic impact of Daesh’s occupation, might be playing on the minds of Washington officials as they once again weigh whether or not to remove American troops still stationed in Iraq.

As it stands, the US and Iraq have agreed to end Operation Inherent Resolve — the US-led coalition’s mission to combat Daesh — by September. Most of the 2,500 US personnel in Iraq are scheduled to leave in the initial phase, with a small number remaining until 2026.

Many believe US President Donald Trump, acting under his isolationist tendencies, will want to hasten the withdrawal of those forces, or is unlikely to extend their stay if the Iraqi government requests it.

With reports of an increase in attacks by Daesh sleeper cells, fears of instability across the border in Syria, and with Iran looking to shore up its proxy militias in Iraq, there are concerns that another complete US withdrawal will once again leave the country vulnerable.

“The risk of premature withdrawal from Iraq is that the Iraqi Security Forces will lose critical operational and tactical support, and Daesh will seize the opportunity to reconstitute and once again terrorize the Iraqi people and state,” Dana Stroul, research director at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and a former Pentagon official, told Arab News.

The mooted withdrawal of US troops comes more than 20 years after the US-led invasion of Iraq toppled Saddam Hussain, freeing the country from dictatorship, but ushering in a period of sectarian civil war.

US forces were drawn into cycles of violence and routinely became the target of two mutually antagonistic sectarian forces: Iran-backed militias and an insurgency in which Al-Qaeda played a prominent role.

When President Barack Obama took office in 2009, he vowed to end US involvement in the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, but not without first ordering a massive troop surge in an attempt to salvage the mission.

In Iraq, where more than 100,000 people were estimated to have died in the violence, there was widespread public anger at the American presence. In the US, the war was also deeply unpopular with thousands of American soldiers having been killed.

Some American and Iraqi officials wanted to maintain a US military presence in the country, fearful of an Al-Qaeda resurgence. But attempts to negotiate an agreement for a reduced force failed and in October 2011 Obama announced that all of the remaining 39,000 US troops would be withdrawn by the end of that year, bringing a close to the mission.

The US spent $25 billion on training and equipping Iraq’s security forces up to September 2012, alongside Iraq’s own spending on fighter jets and other advanced materiel. So it was something of a surprise that Iraqi forces were so quickly overrun when Daesh launched its offensive in 2014, having emerged from the remnants of Al-Qaeda in Iraq.

Images of Daesh fighters driving around in US armored vehicles captured from the Iraqi military symbolized how quickly Iraq’s armed forces had deteriorated since the 2011 withdrawal.

As the extent of Daesh’s brutality began to emerge, including the slaughter of the Yazidi minority and the beheading of Western hostages on YouTube, the US ordered its forces back to the region, as part of an international coalition, to fight the extremists in both Iraq and Syria.

After some of the most brutal urban warfare seen since the Second World War, Iraq’s then-prime minister, Haider Al-Abadi, declared the territorial defeat of Daesh in December 2017. US forces continued to help their allies in Syria to defeat the extremists there in March 2019.

By December 2021, US forces in Iraq no longer held combat roles, instead working on training, advisory, and intelligence support for the country’s military. The remaining 2,500 US troops are spread between Baghdad, Irbil in the semi-autonomous Kurdistan region, and Ain Al-Asad air base.

However, soon after Al-Abadi’s declaration of victory over the extremists, a new threat emerged in Iraq in the shape of Iran-backed militias, originally mobilized to help defeat Daesh. Having extended their reach over Sunni and Kurdish areas, these groups began attacking US bases with rockets and drones in a bid to force their immediate withdrawal.

These attacks, sponsored by Iran’s powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, prompted President Trump, during his first term, to order the killing of militia chief Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis and Iranian Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani in a drone strike on their motorcade as they left Baghdad Airport on Jan. 3, 2020.

Soleimani’s death was a major setback for Iran’s proxies throughout the region, but the attacks on US positions did not subside. In fact, with the onset of the war in Gaza in October 2023, Iraq’s Shiite militias mounted a fresh wave of strikes, ostensibly in support of Hamas.

The deadliest of these occurred on Jan. 28, 2024, when three US personnel were killed and 47 wounded in a drone attack on Tower 22 just over the border in Jordan, prompting then-US president, Joe Biden, to order a wave of airstrikes on militia positions in Iraq.

Mindful of the need to protect its proxies in Iraq, at a time where Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Yemen’s Houthis have been weakened and the sympathetic Assad regime in Syria has fallen, Iran appears to have forsworn further militia strikes on US forces.

The latest agreement to end the US presence was reached in September last year with the aim of moving to a fully bilateral security partnership in 2026.

Meanwhile, the US Defense Department announced in April it would be halving the number of troops in northeast Syria “in the coming months.”

An indication of Trump’s aversion to the continued US military presence came during a speech in Saudi Arabia while on his tour of the Gulf in May when he decried “Western interventionists.”

A clear concern surrounding a US withdrawal is whether Iraq’s security forces are now strong enough to withstand threats like the 2014 Daesh assault. The disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 is also no doubt fresh in the minds of defense officials.

A recent report by the New Lines Institute think tank in New York said that a US withdrawal from Iraq would “heavily impede the intelligence and reconnaissance collection, artillery, and command-and-control capabilities of Iraqi military forces.”

The report studied quarterly independent audits for the US Congress between 2019 and 2024 to assess the capabilities of Iraqi forces. It looked at the three main forces in Iraq: the Iraqi Security Forces, Counter Terrorism Service, and the Kurdish Peshmerga.

The report said: “While segments of Iraq’s military, such as the CTS and Kurdish security forces, have proven efficient in counterterrorism operations, several gaps exist in Iraq’s conventional capabilities, including artillery, command and control, inter- and intra-branch planning, and trust.”

The think tank said there were serious questions about whether Iraq’s security forces would be able to “hedge against internal and external challenges” in the absence of the US security umbrella.

The report’s co-author Caroline Rose, a director at New Lines, says the gaps in Iraqi capabilities “could reverse over a decade of progress that Operation Inherent Resolve has made in Iraq.”

“If the objective is still to advance Iraqi forces’ operational capacity, sustain gains against Daesh, and serve as a ‘hedge’ against Iranian influence, there is work still to be done,” she told Arab News.

While Iraq has enjoyed a period of relative stability, the threats to its national security continue to lurk within and beyond its borders.

The biggest fear is of a Daesh resurgence. Although the group has been severely depleted, it continues to operate cells in rural areas of Iraq and Syria, and has since made headway in Afghanistan, the Sahel, and beyond.

“Since January, the US military is still actively supporting the Iraqis,” said the Washington Institute’s Stroul. “There have been monthly operations against Daesh, including the killing of a senior leader in western Iraq. This tells us that Daesh is still a threat, and the US support mission is still necessary.”

Another concern is that instability in Syria, where the embryonic, post-Assad government is facing significant security challenges, could again provide a breeding ground for Daesh that could spill across the border.

“There are still 9,000 Daesh detainees held in prison camps in northeast Syria,” said Stroul, adding that these present “a real risk of prison breaks that will replenish Daesh ranks and destabilize Syria, Iraq, and the rest of the region. If the security situation deteriorates in Syria, this will have seriously negative impacts in Iraq.”

And then there is the ongoing threat posed by Iran-backed militias. While these militias have been officially recognized as part of Iraq’s security apparatus, some believe the US presence in Iraq helps keep them — and, by extension, Iran — in check.

“The staging of US forces and equipment, combined with a deep Iraqi dependence on American technical and advisory support, creates an obstacle and point of distraction for Tehran and its proxies,” Rose said.

If the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq is inevitable, then how can Washington best prepare Iraq to go it alone?

For Rose, the US should play a “long game” to sustain security ties with Iraq and preserve the progress made under Operation Inherent Resolve.

She recommended the US continue investing in Iraq’s defense and security, conducting regular joint military exercises, and using its current presence in Irbil and Baghdad to build strong relations with security officials.

She also advised other international bodies, like the NATO Mission-Iraq and the EU Advisory Mission Iraq, to coordinate closely with the US as the drawdown gets underway.

Although the US appears set on pivoting away from the region to focus strategic attention on the Asia-Pacific, some still hope there could be a way for America to maintain some form of military presence, given the rapidly evolving situation in the wider Middle East.

Reports earlier this year suggested some senior Iraqi politicians aligned with Iran privately want a US presence to continue, at least until ongoing US-Iran nuclear talks reach a conclusion.

“The US military mission is one of support, advice, and assistance by mutual consent of Baghdad and Washington,” Stroul, of the Washington Institute, said. “If the Iraqi government invites the US military to remain for some period of time, there should be agreement on the supporting role that the US can play.”

If Iraq hopes to maintain lasting stability, it needs to ensure its security forces can act alone to protect the country and population from internal and external threats.

Continuing to work with the world’s foremost military power, even in a limited capacity, would go some way to ensuring the horrors of 2014 are not repeated.

Arab News

Arab News is Saudi Arabia's first English-language newspaper. It was founded in 1975 by Hisham and Mohammed Ali Hafiz. Today, it is one of 29 publications produced by Saudi Research & Publishing Company (SRPC), a subsidiary of Saudi Research & Marketing Group (SRMG).

Why did the US and allies invade Iraq, 20 years ago?

The 2003 invasion of Iraq toppled President Saddam Hussein

On 20 March 2003, US and allied forces invaded Iraq and toppled Saddam Hussein's regime.

The US said Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and was a threat to international peace, but most countries refused to support military action against it.

Why did the US want to invade Iraq?

In the Gulf War of 1990-1991, the US had led a multinational coalition which forced invading Iraqi forces out of Kuwait.

Afterwards, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 687 ordering Iraq to destroy all its weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) - a term used to describe nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and long-range ballistic missiles.

In 1998, Iraq suspended cooperation with UN weapons inspectors, and the US and UK responded with air strikes.

After al-Qaeda's 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, President George W Bush's administration started making plans to invade Iraq.

President Bush claimed Saddam was continuing to stockpile and manufacture WMDs and that Iraq was part of an international "axis of evil", along with Iran and North Korea.

In October 2002, the US Congress authorised the use of military force against Iraq.

"Many people in Washington believed that there was significant evidence that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, and that it posed a genuine threat," says Dr Leslie Vinjamuri, director of the US and Americas Programme at Chatham House, a foreign affairs think tank in London.

In February 2003, then-US Secretary of State Colin Powell asked the UN Security Council to give the go-ahead for military action against Iraq, saying it was violating previous resolutions with its alleged WMD programme.

However, he did not persuade the Council. Most of its members wanted weapons inspectors from the UN and International Energy Authority - who had gone to Iraq in 2002 - to carry out more work there to find evidence of WMDs.

The US said it would not wait for the inspectors to report, and assembled a "coalition of the willing" against Iraq.

Who supported the war?

Of the 30 countries in the coalition, the UK, Australia and Poland participated in the invasion.

The UK sent 45,000 troops, Australia sent 2,000 troops and Poland sent 194 special forces members.

Kuwait allowed the invasion to be launched from its territory.

Spain and Italy gave diplomatic support to the US-led coalition, along with several east European nations in the "Vilnius Group", who said they believed that Iraq had a WMD programme and was violating UN resolutions.

What allegations did the US and UK make against Iraq?

US Secretary of State Colin Powell told the UN in 2003 that Iraq had "mobile labs" for producing biological weapons.

However, he acknowledged in 2004 that the evidence for this "appears not to be... that solid".

US Secretary of State Colin Powell told the UN that Iraq was producing weapons of mass destructions

The UK government made public an intelligence dossier claiming that Iraqi missiles could be readied within 45 minutes to hit UK targets in the eastern Mediterranean.

The UK's then-Prime Minister, Tony Blair, said it was "beyond doubt" that Saddam Hussein was continuing to produce WMD.

The two countries relied heavily on the claims of two Iraqi defectors - a chemical engineer called Rafid Ahmed Alwan al-Janabi and an intelligence officer called Maj Muhammad Harith - who said they had first-hand knowledge of Iraq's WMD programme.

Both men later said they had fabricated their evidence because they wanted the allies to invade and oust Saddam.

Who refused to support the war?

Two neighbours of the US, Canada and Mexico, refused to support it.


Germany and France, two key US allies in Europe, also refused support.




French foreign minister Dominique de Villepin said military intervention would be "the worst possible solution".


Turkey - a fellow Nato member and neighbour of Iraq - refused to let the US and allies use its airbases.


Middle Eastern countries which had supported the US against Iraq in the 1990-91 Gulf War, such as Saudi Arabia, did not support its invasion in 2003.



"The Gulf Arab states thought the plan was crazy," says Professor Gilbert Achcar, an expert in Middle Eastern politics at University of London SOAS.

"They were worried about Iran getting control of Iraq after the fall of Saddam's regime."

What happened in the war?

At dawn on 20 March 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom began with 295,000 US and allied troops invading Iraq across its border with Kuwait.

70,000 members of the Kurdish Peshmerga militia fought Iraqi forces in the north of the country.

By May, Iraq's army had been defeated and its regime overthrown. Saddam Hussein was later captured, tried and executed.

However, no weapons of mass destruction were found in Iraq.

In 2004, the country was engulfed by a sectarian insurgency. In later years, a civil war broke out between Iraq's Sunni and Shi'a Muslim factions.

US troops withdrew from Iraq in 2011.

It is estimated that 461,000 people died in Iraq from war-related causes between 2003 and 2011 and that the war cost the US $3 trillion.

"America lost a lot of credibility from this war," says Dr Karin von Hippel, director-general of the Royal United Services Institute think tank.

"You still hear people saying, twenty years later: why do we want to believe American intelligence?"




Shock And War: Iraq 20 Years On
The BBC's security correspondent Gordon Corera seeks to find new answers to why the Iraq war happened, what it meant, and its legacy today.
Download all 10 episodes on BBC Sounds

 

Iraq Heads to the Polls Amid Political Fatigue and Regional Tensions

By James Durso - Oct 29, 2025

• Political fatigue, Sadr’s withdrawal, and shifting alliances point to a record-low voter turnout, complicating post-election government formation.
• 
  
• Iraq signed major deals with GE, Chevron, and ExxonMobil to expand power and oil output, yet 2025 marked the driest year since 1933.
• 
  
• As U.S. troops draw down and sanctions pressure mounts, Iraq’s next government must balance relations with Washington and Tehran.
• 
  

Iraqis head to the polls on November 11 for parliamentary elections, however, surveys predict record-low turnout, which may complicate creation of a government.

This election differs from those before: Muqtada al-Sadr has withdrawn from politics; Hadi al-Ameri’s Badr Organization is contesting the vote independently; and Hezbollah — Iran’s ally in Lebanon — is weakened. Though regional unrest persists, Iraq itself is comparatively stable.

Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani’s tenure was quieter than his predecessors’, ending without scandal or disappointment, but electricity shortages have harried his administration which has announced ambitious infrastructure projects. (Iraq currently produces between 24,000 and 28,000 megawatts of electricity, and Iraq recently inked a contract with U.S.-based General Electric to add another 24,000 megawatts by 2028.)

Recently, U.S. energy giants Chevron and ExxonMobil signed exploration and development deals. Simon Watkins of OilPrice.com, called ExxonMobil’s comeback in Iraq “a major geopolitical shift, signaling renewed Western engagement.” These developments likely please U.S. President Donald Trump, who has yet to meet Sudani formally in Baghdad or Washington, D.C.

Related: EIA: Oil, Oil Product Inventories Continue to Plummet in the U.S.

Whoever becomes Iraq’s next prime minister faces three major challenges: the water crisis, U.S. relations, and regional entanglement with Iran.

Managing the water crisis

Iraq’s most immediate problem is water scarcity. It depends on Turkey and Iran for nearly 75% of its freshwater through the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, which originate upstream. Torhan al-Mufti, Sudani’s adviser on water affairs, warns that Iraq’s vulnerability stems from these transboundary flows.

There is some good news: according to Mufti, water inflows from Turkey to the Tigris have doubled in two years. In October 2025, Baghdad and Ankara reached a draft water-sharing agreement that includes infrastructure rehabilitation, implemented by Turkish companies, and a permanent consultation group to coordinate future water-sharing decisions.

Nevertheless, 2025 has been Iraq’s driest year since 1933. Rainfall shortages, and Turkish and Iranian dam projects, reduced Tigris, and Euphrates water levels by up to 27%. Reservoirs now hold less than 8 billion cubic meters, their lowest volume in over eight decades.

In September, the government suspended wheat planting due to insufficient water. Southern Iraq, particularly Basra, home to 3.5 million people, faces a growing humanitarian crisis as residents rely on trucked-in water. The once-vast Mesopotamian marshes, a UNESCO World Heritage site, are retreating, threatening biodiversity, and displacing communities.

Increasing water salinity is hurting farmers and livestock. The International Organization for Migration reports saltwater intrusion is destroying farmland, palm groves, and citrus orchards. This ecological decline risks economic instability and social unrest, especially in rural regions.

One solution may be to lease farmland abroad, following the example of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which cultivate crops in Africa to preserve domestic water. However, this could deepen Iraq’s internal dislocation, displacing struggling agricultural communities.

Balancing US relations

U.S. troops withdrew from Iraq in 2011, but returned in 2014 to fight the Islamic State. Washington pledged to achieve the “enduring defeat” of ISIS — a mission to justify a long-term presence.

Under a recent agreement, U.S. combat forces began withdrawing in September 2025, with a full exit expected by September 2026. However, small contingents will remain in Iraqi Kurdistan and at Ain al-Asad Air Base to assist in counterterrorism operations.

In October, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio urged Sudani to “disarm” the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) — a 240,000-strong force formed to fight ISIS with an annual budget of roughly $3.5 billion. The U.S. pressured Iraqi lawmakers to withdraw legislation that would place the PMF fully under government control, though internal disagreements also helped doom the bill. Sudani recently declared the armed groups have two options: join the official security institutions or transition to [unarmed] political work.

The invasion and occupation of Iraq cost the Americans over 4,400 dead and over $3 trillion. The U.S. now faces “the Meddler’s Trap” — a self-inflicted cycle in which intervention creates new problems that policymakers feel compelled to manage indefinitely. Iraq remains caught in this dynamic: Washington wants to leave but cannot bear the risks of doing so.

Keeping Iraq out of the US–Iran conflict

A third challenge for Iraq’s next government is avoiding entanglement in the long-running U.S.–Iran rivalry. Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Washington has sought to reverse what it sees as a national humiliation: the overthrow of its ally, the Shah of Iran, and the 444-day hostage crisis that followed, that may have swayed the 1980 presidential election.

Over the decades, both sides have waged a shadow war — from sanctions and cyberattacks to assassinations and economic sanctions. Iran’s ballistic missile, drone, and nuclear programs are now American justifications for continued containment.

In June 2025, U.S. airstrikes targeted three Iranian nuclear facilities. President Trump claimed the operation “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear program, though American military intelligence wasn’t so sure. Meanwhile, Israel, America’s closest ally in the region, has reportedly continued assassinations and covert operations against Iranian scientists and facilities.

Iraq risks becoming a battleground by proxy. In May 2025, U.S. Reps. Joe Wilson (R-S.C.) and Greg Steube (R-Fla.) advocated sanctioning Iraq as part of the “maximum pressure” campaign on Iran. They advocated sweeping penalties on the PMF, much of Iraq’s banking and oil sectors, the minister of finance, “Iran’s facilitators in Iraq,” the chief justice of Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court, and former prime ministers — a decapitation attack on Iraq’s economy and sovereignty.

The slogan of Sudani’s political project is "Iraq First," but to Washington, Iraq is a tool for pressuring Iran, all the money and dead soldiers provide the justification for America’s droit du seigneur; but this dynamic threatens Iraq’s national stability. The next prime minister must navigate between the U.S. and neighboring Iran to preserve Iraq’s fragile independence. The PMF’s status will be the most contentious issue between America and Iraq, as the Americans have forgotten what happens when you suddenly demobilize a large group of well-armed men.

Despite relative quiet and significant new foreign investment under Sudani’s tenure, Iraq still faces water shortages, unfinished security reforms, and the constant danger of being drawn into foreign conflicts, mostly the legacy of Saddam Hussein’s repression, and Western sanctions and military attacks.

Balancing domestic needs with foreign pressures — especially from the United States and Iran — will define Iraq’s future far more than the election’s immediate outcome.

By James Durso via Responsible Statecraft